the japanese management theory jungle

The Japanese Management Theory JungleAuthor(s): J. Bernard Keys and Thomas R. MillerSource: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 342-353Published by: Academy of ManagementStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/258447 .

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?Academy of Management Review, 1984. Vol. 9, No. 2, 342-353.

The Japanese Management Theory Junglel J. BERNARD KEYS

THOMAS R. MILLER Memphis State University

Many competing hypotheses have been advanced to account for the apparent effectiveness of Japanese management practices. The present review of some of the leading theories attempts to classify and clarify the state of knowledge of Japanese management. Although each theory may be correct as a partial explanation of Japan's success, no single conceptualization has captured the complexity of Japan's managerial achievement. Further development of integrated, internally consistent models is needed.

In response to Japan's impressive business performance over the last decade, the mystique of Jap- anese management has been addressed by a deluge of books and articles. The perceived superiority of management practices in Japan has been the subject of intensive inquiry by both the academic and the executive communities. Researchers' efforts to unlock this mystery have revealed a multitude of factors presumed to account for the excellence of Japanese management, but the most striking results perhaps are the diversity of factors cited and the disagreement over the causes of this success.

Competing hypotheses abound, ranging from the "Seven S" theory of Pascale and Athos (1981) about a unique Japanese management style to the "bottom line" explanation that stresses the Japa- nese focus on long term operating results. Some observers believe that excellence in Japanese management springs primarily from an emphasis on human resource development. Others maintain that the source of Japanese success is not found in social practices, but rather in the profound understanding of the intricacies of the decision making process. Several researchers laud the effective use of employee quality circles as the key element of Japa- nese success. Still others claim that Japanese expertise in technological developments and in manufacturing management is the basis of their ef-

fectiveness. Yet another school of thought attributes Japanese achievement to their mastery of the use of statistical quality control applications.

To those attempting to comprehend the Japanese phenomenon, it appears that a dense jungle of confusion has grown up consisting of conflicting "theories" (using the term broadly), each of which offers hope as an explanation for the apparent superiority of the Japanese system of management. The jungle of Japanese theories is reminiscent of the "mental entanglement" that characterized American management theories in the 1950s, addressed in a clas- sic article by Harold Koontz (1961). The purpose of this paper is to classify and to clarify the state of knowledge of Japanese management.

The Jungle of Theories

Manufacturing Management

Robert H. Hayes (1981) conducted his research by visiting and studying several plants of six Japa- nese companies. He finds the answer to Japanese superiority in their excellent manufacturing management: clean facilities, responsible employees, little or no inventories on the plant floor made possi- ble by the absence of work stoppages, almost no rejected products, and "just-in-time" materials arri- val. He discovered a remarkable absence of crisis management in the plant and excellent mainte- nance of equipment. Hayes captures the essence of Japanese manufacturing management in the old Japanese proverb: "pursuing the last grain of rice in

'Portions of this paper were presented at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, New York, 1982. The authors acknowledge Harold Koontz (1961), author of the clas- sic paper, "'The Management Theory Jungle."

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the corner of the lunchbox." He points out that the Japanese are never satisfied with the quality of their products even when the defect rate is at an unbelievable 1 percent, nor are they satisfied as long as any defect exists in the manufacturing oper- ation. Hayes believes that technological advantages in Japan stem not from superior technology per se, but from the Japanese insistence on building their own process equipment in-house, which they in turn match with skilled employees trained in-house. They will not accept the compromise of a machine developed for several "users, and therefore several uses. "

Further support for the manufacturing management theory is provided by Wheelwright (1981), who states that Japan's impressive accomplishments in manufacturing result chiefly from the effective integration of operations policy and manufacturing strategy. In marked contrast to the Japanese, the author cites the common American tendency to treat product quality and production planning as "swing factors" that can be traded off in order to meet the production output deadline. Thus, an American manager may deliver a product that, although functionally acceptable, does not meet the quality specifications. In reporting their impressions after visiting the plants of three Japanese companies-Tokyo Sanyo Electric, Toshita Tsurumi Works, and Yokogaua Electric Works, General Electric manufacturing executives agreed that the critical differences between Japanese and American manufacturing were not really cultural and environmental, but rather were related to basic manufacturing policy and practice. Observers reported a high degree of cleanliness and organization with orderly and timely flow of materials through the production system. They commented that although Americans have the necessary knowledge of effective manufacturing processes, they have lacked the discipline to implement them fully (Wheelwright, 1981). Wheelwright concludes that Japan's "truly impressive discipline and consistency in manufacturing operations" is the result of "a deliberate, thorough, and painstakingly developed way of thinking about the day-to-day management of production" (1981, p. 68). In other words, he holds that the Japanese have become so efficient chiefly because of excellent manufacturing practices. How- ever, in interpreting these observations in order to isolate causes, an alternative hypothesis should be

recognized: orderly production operations may be the result of the effective practice of management rather than the cause of manufacturing efficiency.

Quality Circle

A common theme in the literature on the effectiveness of Japanese management is their development and utilization of "quality control circles" or just "quality circles," as they are now commonly called (Cole, 1980; Rehder, 1981; Takeuchi, 1981; Yager, 1980). Although there are many variations of quality circles in practice, nearly all are struc- tured as a relatively small group of employees who meet together to discuss and develop solutions for work problems relating to quality, productivity, or cost.

In many respects, quality circles are rooted in the work of the humanistic behavioral scientists such as Chris Argyris, Douglas McGregor, and Rensis Likert, who have long emphasized the significance of employee participation to effective management. Schooled in these behavioral techniques, the Japa- nese borrowed and adapted them to their organizations. However, it appears that the Japanese found their organizations more receptive to this form of participation than have American managers. Cole (1980) argues that Japanese managers have more fully accepted the fundamental premise of participative management-that employees are capable of contributing and desire to contribute to organizational requirements of a supportive supervisory cli- mate and that the commitment of sufficient time for the participative process may be better satisfied in Japanese industry than in the United States.

Thus, the quality circle theory ascribes the effectiveness of Japanese management to an in-depth application of the participation concept, which appar- ently has resulted in improved productivity through higher levels of motivation, greater sharing of decision making, stronger employee commitment, and increased job satisfaction. In an extensive review of quality circles, Munchus (1983) concluded that they have been successful in widely diversified cultures, but that the results of their use in the United States are still open to question. Matsushita Elec- tric, for example, uses them widely in Japan but does not consider the American worker suited to such activity.

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Statistical Quality Control

In the 1950s the Japanese focused on upgrading the quality level of their manufactured products in an effort to reverse the notion that i"made in Japan" signaled inferior merchandise. As with the development of quality circles, the expertise came largely from consultants in America - in particular from W. Edwards Deming and J. M. Juran, who lectured widely on the development and utilization of statis- tics and quality control techniques. The Japanese quickly embraced and effectively implemented the popular techniques developed in the United States, including zero defects and value engineering, and have become dedicated to the gospel of quality (Takeuchi, 1981). The Japanese appreciation for Deming's work is evidenced by his receipt of the Second Order Medal of the Sacred Treasure from Japan's Emperor Hirohito.

Of course, productivity is closely related to quality, and in Japan there is a fervent interest in "doing it right the first time." Deming argues that quality cannot be increased by inspection, and using men and machines to separate good products from bad is not the answer. The quality capability must be built into the production process. In comparing Japanese and American management, Deming (1980) argues that Americans learned the techniques too, but the Japanese took them seriously.

Long Term, Bottom Line

Peter Drucker suggests that the real reason for Japanese superiority springs from their focus on long term objectives. Large U.S. institutional inves- tors, such as the pension funds, he laments, tend to reject firms that do not show strong performance in such short term measures as quarterly earnings per share. Thus, high technology companies are reluc- tant to "plow back money long term" for fear of adverse effects of their price earnings ratios. The market, he believes, has become far too sensitive to short term fluctuations (Flanigan, 1981).

A similar theme is echoed by William Anderson (1981), chairman and chief executive officer of Na- tional Cash Register Corporation. He cautions that American managers must look "beyond this month's sales report and this year's financial performance" and begin to evaluate both employee and organizational achievements from a long term pro- spective. The clear implication is that U.S. management should adopt criteria that look five years

ahead, not just a month ahead. Further evidence of the long planning horizon of

Japanese management is the tradition of lifetime employment, resulting in a worker spending his entire career with one firm. For example, the average job tenure at Fujitsu is 13 years; the average job tenure in the United States is 3.6 years (Naka- yama, 1980). While providing essentially a guaran- teed job to the worker, the longevity of employment encourages extensive investment in employee training and development and promotes employee loyalty and esprit de corps, as evidenced by the company songs and exercise programs in many of the large plants. The nearly complete job security also reduces costs of turnover and subsequent recruitment. But, perhaps most important, the worker's assurance of economic security greatly reduces one's resistance to technological change that en- ables methods changes to be implemented more easily. Drucker maintains that this willingness to accept change and to embrace opportunities for productivity gains might be "the most important se- cret of the Japanese economy" (1971, p. 116). In sharp contrast, the typical American worker in a unionized firm has been conditioned to resist change, fearing both real and imagined threats to his/her economic security.

However, a key point in evaluating the unioniza- tion issue should be noted. In Japan, employees belong to company unions rather than craft unions; thus they could not readily change companies if they wished to do so. The strong company affiliation makes it easy to shift employees from plant to plant within the same company (Tanaka, 1981). These employer advantages are enhanced by the strong feeling of security promoted by the Japanese lifetime employment concept. Drucker recently commented that lifetime employment, which restricts labor mobility and the threat of strikes, has ren- dered the union powerless in the private sector, almost an "organ of management" (1982, p. 26).

It should be recognized that the Japanese management focus on long term profitability is feasible, in part, because of the supportive role of the Japa- nese government. The comments of Reddy and Rao are revealing: "The Japanese government has been pursuing economic growth with a passion that American government has reserved for fighting communism" (1982, p. 5). The close relationship between business and government has been charac-

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terized as "Japan, Inc.," suggesting the behavior of a superconglomerate (Drucker, 1981). Indeed, some argue that Japan's economic success is related chiefly to the unique business-government relationship fostered by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). As noted by Tsurumi (1981), government policies through tax incentives and other assistance programs are directed to rewarding the firms fulfilling the goals that support industrial growth and national stability. A related factor ena- bling business to focus its attention on the civilian product market is the low level of national resources committed to defense expenditures in Ja- pan, a much publicized criticism by American producers.

Decision Making

At first glance, the consensus decision process of the Japanese appears to be simply an application of the American concept of participative management. Ouchi (1981) states that a consensus has been reached when there is agreement on a single alternative and when there is a mutual understanding of views of the participants and when there is support for the decision, whether one preferred it or not, because it was determined in an open and fair manner. However, Ouchi argues that even this degree of participation does not approach the Japanese concept of consensus decision making, in which an important decision such as where to put a new plant or changing a production process would involve all who would likely be affected by it, perhaps 60 to 80 people. Ouchi further notes that two or three persons would have the task of discussing the decision with the affected employees and repeating this process when significant changes arise. Although this process is very time consuming, when the decision is finally determined, the support for it is nearly unanimous.

Howard and Teramoto (1981), professors in Great Britain and Tokyo, respectively, argue strongly that the most important difference in American and Japanese management involves the subtle differences in decision making. The word in the Japanese vocabulary that describes decision making is "nemawashi," which refers to the "political" processes by which an unofficial understanding is reached before any final decision is made on a particular matter. The literal meaning of nemawashi is "the process of planting a tree, i.e.,

implanting its roots into the soil so it can grow." The authors believe that it perfectly describes the appropriate process of practical decision making in any culture.

To the Western observer, the consensus decision making process may appear to be exceedingly ineffi- cient, but this attitude fails to give proper consider- ation to the implementation of the decision. In defense of the Japanese decision making practice, it is advanced that a consensus decision, though medio- cre, can yield better outcomes than an imposed decision, though brilliant, because of the support of employees, their knowledge of the decision parame- ters, and their commitment to successful execution of the decisions. Further, the considerable time that goes into defining the issue reduces the risk that a preconceived solution will prevent proper definition of the problem, a criterion of decision making practices of American managers (Kobayashi, 1970).

Attempts at Integrated Models of Japanese Management

Several students of the Japanese management process have gone beyond the search for the single- factor explanation in their efforts to develop more comprehensive theories. Three of these notable efforts will be reviewed briefly.

Seven S

Richard Pascale and Anthony Athos (1981) utilize in their model the framework of seven management variables developed by McKinsey & Com- pany. The seven variables of S's are superordinate goals, strategy, structure, systems, staff, skills, and style. These are the "levers" of organizational and management functions with which executives can influence large complex organizations. Superordi- nate goals function as the unifying elements that tie together the various activities and interests of organizational members.

According to Pascale and Athos, the variables can be divided into "hard S's" and "soft S's." The hard S's, presumably the more impersonal and institutional factors, are strategy, structure, and systems. In contrast, the soft S's, dealing more with human values and interpersonal issues, are staff (the concern for having the right sort of people to do the work), skills (training and developing people to do what is needed), and style (the manner in which management handles subordinates, peers,

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and superiors). The authors' chief research instru- ment included interviews and observations of the styles of chief executive officers in the United States and Japan-in particular, the Matsushita Corpora- tion and ITT.

Pascale and Athos maintain that U.S. management is very similar to Japan on all the hard S's of strategy, structure, and system, but that Japan has advantages in the soft S's of staff, skills, and style. These advantages stem largely from the Japanese culture, which differs in its approach to ambiguity, uncertainty, imperfection, and interdependence. The authors discuss at length how the Japanese manager in communicating with others has learned to make the most of ambiguity, indirection, subtle cues, trust, interdependence, uncertainty, implicit messages, and management of process, as opposed to the U.S. managerial norm of striving for complete openness, explicitness, and directness in order to minimize ambiguity and uncertainty. Unfortu- nately, the authors support their theory only with broad generalizations drawn from comparisons of the chief executive officer of Matsushita Corpora- tion and ITT's Geneen.

Organizational

William Ouchi (1981) summarizes his work in what has become the best selling book on Japanese management, Theory Z. Instead of emphasizing the differences in the styles of leaders of key organizations in the United States and Japan, Ouchi focused in his writing on the organizations, themselves. He first describes the ideal Japanese organizational model, which he used as a "foil" against which to compare and understand the American model. The Japanese organization is characterized by lifetime employment, slow evaluation and promotion, nonspecialized career paths, implicit control mechanisms, collective decision making, collective responsibility, and holistic concern for employees. In sharp contrast, features of American organizations include short term employment, rapid evaluation and promotion, specialized career paths, explicit control mechanisms, individual decision making, individual responsibility, and segmented concern for workers.

Ouchi also argues that the characteristics of Jap- anese management have derived from their culture - a culture woven interdependently because of collective rice farming and crowded conditions causing Japan to be very ripe for industrialization. In con-

trast, the American culture has developed from the spirit of individualism of an expanding frontier, a culture less conducive to industrialization.

Ouchi and Jaeger (1978), like Pascale and Athos, point out that the Japanese style is not culture bound, however. Many Japanese firms, with little adaptation, have transported their successful operations to the United States. Theory Z, then, becomes the modified model, which includes the best of the Japanese and American models. Theory Z empha- sizes long, but not lifetime, employment; consensual decision making, as in Japan; individual responsibility as opposed to the Japanese emphasis on collective responsibility; slow evaluation and promotion as in Japan; implicit control (Japanese) but with explicit measures (American); moderately specialized career paths (a compromise); and a holistic concern for employees, as in Japan (Ouchi & Jaeger, 1978).

Ouchi's theory has not been immune to criticism. In his review of Theory Z, for example, Gibney sharply challenges Ouchi's assertion that Japanese organizations can be so readily typified and under- stood from the few cases cited by Ouchi: "Ouchi has given us a chrome-plated collection of hasty generalizations, slogan-type writing, and dimestore business sociology, based on what one might call a modified dart-board technique of research" (1981, p. 17).

A thoughtful, incisive critique of Theory Z is provided by Sullivan (1983), who develops an anti- theory Z "descriptive" conceptualization that contrasts sharply with Ouchi's "prescriptive" model. Anti-theory Z acknowledges the existence of lifetime employment, nonspecialized careers, and auto- matic promotions, but suggests that these are cultural, historical factors rather than managerially initiated incentives. Further, Sullivan hypothesizes that these conditions produce some minimally com- petent managers who, when promoted automati- cally, must depend heavily on subordinates. The resultant consensus decisions and sharing of responsibility may stem more from necessity than from intimacy, involvement, and trust. Thus, consensus decisions and collective responsibility protect bureaucratic, hierarchical relationships, which, he proposes, exist in some Japanese firms. In addition, Sullivan argues that Theory Z does not, as Ouchi claims, emanate from humanistic management. In- stead, Sullivan contends that Theory Z derives from the "industrial clan" values of Durkheim (1902/

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1933) that promote and sustain a regulated social order as opposed to the self-interest of individuals.

Human Resource

Hatvany and Pucik (1981) have conceptualized a model of Japanese management that focuses on the maximization of human resource development. Em- phasizing the use of an integrated system of management, the authors' model rests on the implementation of three interrelated strategies: development of an internal labor market, articulation of a company philosophy stressing cooperation and teamwork, and utilization of a well-defined socialization process for hiring and integrating new employees into the company.

The unique element of Japanese management highlighted by Hatvany and Pucik is the internal labor market, which derives from the lifetime employment syndrome discussed earlier. Japanese firms hire males after graduation, with the expecta- tion of retaining them for a lifetime. This security of male employment is assisted by using female and part time workers in order to adjust the size of the workforce to current economic conditions, by un- derpaying workers in the early stages of their careers in favor of compensation in later years, and by slow career path movement. The Japanese utilize an intensive socialization process designed to foster a "4company man" identity.

Many specific techniques are utilized by the Jap- anese to promote and reinforce their management system. Broad knowledge of company operations is fostered by job rotation, slow promotion, and the lifetime employment. Company policies and assign- ments tend to build group cohesiveness and teamwork and emphasize the importance of the collective interests of the group, rather than the individual's own interests. Employee evaluation en- compasses both performance factors and workers' attitudes and behaviors. Open communications are fostered by extensive face-to-face communications (the absence of private offices, even for high rank- ing managers) and by the frequency with which foremen and senior plant managers tend to visit workers on the plant floor. Use of consultative decision making practices is another supporting technique of Hatvany and Pucik's model. The final element in their model is management's expression of concern for employees enhanced by extensive company sponsored cultural, athletic, and recreational

activities. In contrast to the above model, Cole (1971) cau-

tions that Western knowledge of the blue-collar worker in Japan is still shallow and laden with ste- reotypes of limited validity. He claims that the vi- sion of the Japanese worker as always polite and unemotional differs sharply from the gregarious, spontaneous, openly expressive workers in the To- kyo plant he observed. The character of the Japa- nese worker is further explicated by Tsurumi (1981), who maintains that politeness, hard work, orientation toward group activity, and loyalty to management are no more inborn traits of the Japa- nese than of Canadians and Americans. Although a popular view of Japanese work groups touts their strong cohesiveness and the benefits of consensus decision making, Cole warns that this emphasis masks the strong competition within Japanese society. Such competition reveals itself in efforts to cul- tivate favor with superiors through flattery or poli- ticking, which can result in conflicts within the work group. Further, Cole questions the authentic- ity of Japanese employee security through lifetime employment, noting that there are many devices employers can use to get employees to quit that fall short of actually firing them.

Yazaburo Mogi, first executive vice president of the Kikkoman soy sauce plant at Waleworth, Wis- consin, cautions that "the Japanese seniority system, while it offers security and creates a harmoni- ous atmosphere conducive to good results, may also reduce incentives to do good work" ("How the Jap- anese Manage," 1981, p. 103). Rejecting the ".myth" of the Japanese as "supermen" and the conclusion that Japan's industrial success is linked to the uniqueness of Japanese human factors or "the spirit of its workers," Blotnick argues that it would be as correct to link Japan's success to "the coercive, regimented side of its society," which Americans would "hardly want to emulate" (1981, p. 132).

The transfer of strong family ties to industry has fostered several interesting phenomena. Tanaka (1981) reports that employees tend to hire "total persons," and employees tend to become totally im- mersed in the organization for which they work. Because the company becomes a surrogate for the family, work takes on the same ethos as a contribu- tion to the family-loyalty, sincerity, and so on. The company's (family's) prosperity becomes more

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important than individual prosperity, and work for the company-not leisure--becomes the essence of life.

Sources of Entanglement in the Jungle

Many differences in the Japanese style of management and Western styles can be attributed to sharp differences in the respective cultures rather than to management practices (Schein, 1981). The common thread about which Japanese life has developed is "intimacy," which has evolved from the dictates of collective farming, little available land space, and the need to construct homes that offered little privacy. The family cultural forces are trans- ferred to business firms, reinforcing compliance of behavior and promoting high performance (Cao, 1981). In strong opposition to this style, which promotes close social relations, American life has developed around rugged individualism and indepen- dence (Ouchi, 1981), which has grown out of the developing frontier and a land intense economy rather than a labor intense one. Thus, the cultural focus on the groups' interests, as opposed to the individual's, is strongly imbedded in Japanese workers in contrast to their American counterparts.

Several environmental and structural factors seem to offer Japanese management an advantage over the United States. Most Japanese employees who are union members belong to company unions. Of the directors of major corporations, 16 percent are former union officials (Janger & Berenkein, 1981). Unions and management tend to form a strong productive partnership, paving the way for easy introduction of labor-saving devices. The influence of such "macro" factors as MITI, extensive capital investment, modest defense expenditures, lower wage rates, and the relatively undervalued yen have been slighted as causal factors of Japan's economic success when compared to the much publicized managerial prowess of the Japanese. Fur- ther, Vogel has argued that the Japanese educational environment is the foundation of its economic achievement: "If any single factor explains the Jap- anese success, it is the group-directed quest for knowledge" (1982 p. 65). Perhaps this quest arises in the very competitive school systems and is rein- forced by the close relationships among academic performance, schools attended and job placement.

Nearly all of the confrontations faced by

Japanese firms arise from consumer or environmental issues. Rarely does protest involve issues such as feminism, investment policy, wages, or living and working conditions. For protests that do arise, liti- gation is quite uncommon (Japan has half the pop- ulation of the United States, but only 11,000 law- yers). Nor is shareholder pressure a viable alternative for special interest groups; 90 percent of all directors are "inside" directors employed by the company (Janger & Berenkein, 1981).

A further source of confusion is the tendency toward oversimplification in explaining the effectiveness of Japanese management. It is doubtful that a one-factor or two-factor theory of management such as "decision making" or "quality control" can account fully for a country's economic achievements. Surely a group of complex forces taken together delineate the dimensions of Japanese management experience. A related element of confusion is the difficulty of distinguishing causation from correlation. Sullivan (1983) bases his anti-theory Z on such an argument.

Another caveat to the student of Japanese management concerns the tendency toward overgeneral- ization of the "Japanese management" mystique. Research on Japanese management practices has focused primarily on large, highly visible firms in the automotive and electronics industries. What of the experience of the smaller firms and businesses engaged in retailing, agriculture, chemicals, or in the service industries such as banking and finance? Can one characterize the management practices of an entire nation from such a small and nonrepre- sentative sample? Although Ouchi and Pascale and Athos have highlighted dramatic differences between Japanese and American management practices, it is doubtful that the few firms cited truly represent the norms of "Japanese" and "American" management. The excellent productivity and quality of Japanese manufacturing in such mass production industries as automobiles, household appli- ances, and steel are well recognized, but one should not conclude that the Japanese enjoy superiority over international competitors in all industrial efforts. As noted by Tsurumi:

Japanese industries do not outperform American, Canadian and other foreign counterparts . . . in agriculture, aircraft, nonferrous metals, and some advanced telecommunications equipment. In the fields of organic and non-organic chemicals, pharmaceuti- cals, large-scale computers and large earth-moving

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equipment, American firms lead the Japanese by a substantial margin (1981, p. 7).

The need for additional research to resolve incon- sistencies and conflicts is clear. True, insights and understandings are developing, but much of the evidence is andecdotal or is so narrowly based that ac- curate conclusions must necessarily be tentative. Although these results are to be expected, given the youthful state of research on Japanese industrial sciences, some observers have been unable to resist drawing broad conclusions that are appealing in their simplicity but are unwarranted by the research data.

Common Factors in the Theories and Models-A Mental Factor Analysis

Although the positions of the writers above present different views and perspectives on Japanese management success that have contributed to the " entanglement," there appear to be underlying factors at the heart of the Japanese system that foster the development of the various management theories and models. First, Japanese managers seem to be oriented to a longer planning horizon than their American counterparts. Second, Japanese firms are

more inclined to accept a lifetime commitment and holistic concern for their employees. Finally, the Japanese appear more strongly committed to the concept of collective responsibility than individual accountability. These three factors are explored as integrating concepts in interrelating the streams of Japanese management thought presented above.

A suggested pattern of causality among the underlying factors of long run planning horizon, commitment to lifetime employment, and collective responsibility and a summary of outcomes char- acterizing Japanese management are shown in Fig- ure 1. The authors contend that these underlying factors may be chiefly responsible for the development of the elements of the Japanese system of management and that these are rooted in the Japa- nese culture. Although a model of perfect causality is not claimed, the tentative pattern of causality in Figure 1 relates and summarizes much of the existing evidence.

Long Run Planning Horizon

Once management commits itself to planning for the long run rather than focusing on short run max-

Figure 1 Fundamental Factors Underlying Japanese Management Practices:

A Suggested Pattern of Causalitya

Underlying Factors Management Practices Commitment to sufficient time to manage Diligence in implementation of plans Discipline and order in work

Long-Run Planning Horizon Sufficient time to implement concepts and systems Development of an integrated organizational philosophy Growth of implicit control systems Atticulation of company philosophy Executive investment in employee training and development Socialization process in hiring and integration Reduced turnover and high loyalty

Commitment to Lifetime Employmemn Nonspecialized career paths Development of internal labor markets Emphasis on soft S's-staff, skills, style

Collective Responsibility Company unions rather than craft unions Emphasis on teamwork and cooperation Consensus decision making Participative management Trust and interdependence Quality circles

aOverlapping lines represent shadings of dual causality. The authors acknowledge that some of the resultant practices may, in turn, reinforce the underlying factors, suggesting two-way causality.

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imization, certain benefits are likely to follow. Man- agement is allocated more time to develop objectives and implementation plans. The longer planning horizon is conducive to the generation of interpersonal relationships that foster mutual understandings and implicit goals. Furthermore, the time frame of all plans-short run, intermediate, and long term-tends to lengthen, and immediate pressures tend to diminish. Deliberate planning and communication exhibits itself in orderliness and diligence of implementation of production operations and in the integration of manufacturing strategy and operations policy. There is time to produce cus- tomized in-house process equipment, and, perhaps more importantly, the long tenure of employees pro- vides time to select employees whose skills match the equipment or to train those whose skills do not.

The impact of the long planning horizon on Japa- nese industry is further evidenced in the activities of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which pro- vide a supportive, stable environment for the industries that are responsive to expressed national economic goals. The predictability of public policy toward business and industry permits an easier organizational commitment to long term strategies rather than a penchant for short run expediencies.

The success in Japan of quality circles, statistical quality control, and consensus decision making also is facilitated by the long term focus. Often the lack of success with these approaches in the United States has not been because they are faulty in theory or concept, but rather because they have been implemented poorly. Poor implementation usually means too hastily introduced. However, given sufficient time for employers to become comfortable with these new approaches, and with co-workers, many implicit control systems and corrective ad- justments arise to prevent the failure of these complex managerial concepts and systems.

Commitment to Lifetime Employment

The mutual commitment of Japanese management and the employee to lifetime employment appears to underlie a number of the celebrated Japa- nese management practices. The mutual awareness created by the investment of the two parties permits long term efforts in training and development. It also encourages rotational training programs outside one's specialized field and, perhaps most importantly, as cited by Drucker, promotes the ac-

ceptance of changes in work-methods and technology that enhance productivity. (This approach contrasts sharply with an American tendency to reap short term benefits from new employees with entry-level skills by retaining them in a job until they leave the organization.)

The recruitment and selection process is ap- proached differently when one hires for a lifetime rather than the short term. More emphasis must be given to the socialization factors-the "fit" of the employee to the organization, one's satisfaction with the company philosophy, one's relationships with peer groups at work, the acceptance of management style, and so on. Indeed, hiring may be based more on social factors than on entry skills, because the latter will be utilized less.

The intensive socialization of the Japanese firm's efforts to inculcate the culture of the organization in employees-through such extensive ritualistic practices as employee calisthenics, singing the company song, after-hours group activities, and company sponsored vacations-help develop and sustain long term commitment and loyalty to the organization. The holistic concern that is evidenced for employees and their families may be viewed as a sensi- ble effort to safeguard the employer's substantial investment in human resources and further bond the employees to the organization.

The long term commitment and concern for employees and the consequent familial relationship promote trust and support of organizational leader- ship. Unlike the employee who is likely to remain with an employer (and a boss) for a short time, the Japanese system promotes accommodation and unity of interest. Knowing the extended nature of the employment practice, the worker is less inclined to engage in major confrontations or conflicts that would damage the long term superior-subordinate relationship. One would expect communications to be more gentle, subtle, implicit, and "family oriented."

Finally, a commitment to lifetime employment with holistic concern for employees is likely to produce a balanced, reciprocal psychological contract calling for a "company" type of identity. The employer's side of the contract is likely to include more participation of employees in the decision making process. When one has remained with a company long enough "to belong," the person also is more likely to be "consulted" on important mat-

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ters affecting the company.

Emphasis on Collective Responsibility

According to most writers, Japanese management shuns individual accountability and credit in prefer- ence for collective or group responsibility and re- wards. If true, organizations managed by such persons would place heavy emphasis on the values of teamwork and cooperation. Decisions more often would be made collectively or, more likely, nemawashi style. Participative management or consensus management would not be a style that most managers forced on themselves, but rather would be a natural way of engaging in the collective sharing of responsibility.

The present phenomena of quality circles and consensus decision making are rooted in the Japa- nese cultural traditions emphasizing interdependence, collaboration, and cooperation. The apparent subordination of the individual's needs and interests to those of the group has strong precedent in the Japanese culture. The willing acceptance of one's role in the organization reflects the traditional commitment to the priority of collective action. The emphasis on collective responsibility fosters a congruence of goals among employees and management, which is bolstered further by lifetime, two-way con- tracts between them.

The presence of a hard-working, orderly workforce can be related to the orientation to collective responsibility of the Japanese. When coupled with a high degree of goal congruence between employer and employee, the emergence of cohesive, productive, disciplined work groups is not surprising. The impressive performance of the Japanese work force, particularly their high productivity and exceptional quality levels, reasonably derives from those underlying conditions that support vigorous implementation of high output standards and superior quality control systems.

Clearing a Path Through the Jungle

From a review of the research findings on Japa- nese managerial success, one is reminded of Porter's (1962) parable of the spindle, in which the prover- bial specialists, called on to solve a problem, all found the answer deeply imbedded in their own particular expertise. On greater reflection, however, it is proposed that the writers probably are not bi-

ased in their analyses, but rather are unable to fully grasp the intricacies of the data to describe adequately Japan's industrial success. For, as noted, in addition to the host of management-based theories proposed as explanations for Japanese achievements, alternative theories built on government and environmental models, for example, "Japan Inc.," have been hypothesized. Thus, they are reacting not only as did the scientists in the parable of the spindle, but also as did the blind men in the fable in which they describe the elephant. You will recall that one felt the knee of the elephant and described it as a tree-like creature; another felt the tusk and likened it to a spear; and a third felt the tail and insisted that it was small and round like a rope.

Perhaps all of the theorists are correct in attrib- uting some Japanese excellence to the area of Ja- pan's industry that they have examined. Maybe the Japanese, in their obsession to redeem the honor of their country after World War II and in their quest for world respect in industry, have produced excellence in many areas of the process of management. If so, it should not be surprising that existing research efforts have failed to capture adequately the essence of Japanese management effectiveness. Fur- ther, it seems unlikely that additional research seeking single-factor or dual-factor explanations of the Japanese success will be more successful; the panacea will continue to be elusive. Also, the jungle warfare among management theorists cited by Koontz in 1961 is not lacking among students of Japanese management today. For there exists a tendency to discount or discredit rival hypotheses or conceptualizations that are incompatible with one's own.

Of what value are the present theories in the jungle? It is argued that they are of considerable value as long as researchers and organization development implementors recognize that elements of Jap- anese management do not stand alone, but rather they require supporting cultural and environmental frameworks to be effective. As in most new systems of management, practice must precede research, and research must initially address small segments of the implementation. For the organization con- templating adoption of the Japanese system, Chung and Gray (1982) stress that extensive preparation and commitment is necessary, pointing out that an adoption will not work unless the organization is willing to change its whole philosophy of organizing

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people. In a similar vein, England (1982) presents evidence to suggest that the social and institutional framework of American industry is inimicable to the tenets of Ouchi's Theory Z, and this will limit its adoption by firms in the United States.

Perhaps the most fruitful approach for uncover- ing tracks in the Japanese management theory jungle will be to build models that reflect the "system" of Japanese management-the interdependencies of the political, economic, social, and religious variables with management practices. What appears to be most needed is the development of integrated, internally consistent models that encompass the evaluation and the context of Japanese management

practices, rather than focusing on the techniques or concepts in isolation. Present understanding of Jap- anese management is limited by the narrow com- prehension of the environment in which it exists- societal norms and values, educational and socialization processes, and the interfaces of business, government, and labor. Armed with a better understanding of the interrelationships of the elements of the Japanese management system, one will be better equipped to address the issues of emulation, adaptation, and implementation in American enter- prises. When one attempts to traverse a jungle, a complete understanding of the terrain is helpful.

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J. Bernard Keys is Professor of Management and Associate Dean of the Fogelman College of Business and Economics, Memphis State University.

Thomas R. Miller is Professor and Chairman of the Depart- ment of Management and Associate Dean, Fogelman College of Business and Economics, Memphis State University.

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