the lacanian real

8/9/2019 The Lacanian Real

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The Lacanian Real: TelevisionSlavoj ZizekLacan: Television – let’s proceed like idiots; let’s take this title literally and askourselves a question, not the question, “what can we learn about TV fromLacan’s teachin !" which would et us on the wron path of so#called appliedpsychoanalysis, but the inverse question, “what can we learn about Lacan’steachin from the TV phenomenon!" $t %rst si ht, this seems as absurd as thewell#known &e elian proposition de%nin phrenolo y, “the spirit is the bone"'the equali(ation of the most sublime, elusive theory with the vul ar mass#cultural phenomenon) *ut perhaps, as in the &e elian proposition, there is a“speculative truth" beneath the obvious banality – perhaps certain peculiaritiesof the $merican TV pro ram allow us to rasp the fundamental Lacanianproposition that psychoanalysis is not a psycholo y' the most intimate beliefs –even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, cryin , sorrow, lau hter

– can be transferred, dele ated to others without losin their sincerity)

The frst TV-lesson: psychoanalysis is not psychology

+n his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis , Lacan is speakin of the role ofthe horus in antique tra edy' we, the spectators, came to the theatre worried,full of everyday problems, unable to accustom ourselves without reserve to theproblems of the play, i)e) to feel the required fears and compassions) *ut noproblem; there is the horus, which is feelin the sorrow and the compassioninstead of us, or, more precisely, we are feelin the required emotions throu hthe medium of the horus' “-ou are then relieved of all worries, even if you

don’t feel anythin ; it is the horus who will do it in your place)" [1] .ven if we,the spectators, are /ust drowsily watchin the show, ob/ectively – to use this

ood old 0talinist e1pression – we are doin our duty of feelin compassion forthe heroes) +n so#called primitive societies, we %nd the same phenomenon inthe form of “weepers," women hired to cry instead of us) 0o, throu h themedium of the other, we accomplish our duty of mournin , while we can spendour time on more pro%table e1ploits, disputin how to divide the inheritance ofthe deceased, for e1ample)

*ut to avoid the impression that this e1teriori(ation, this transference of ourmost intimate feelin s, is /ust a characteristic of the so called primitive sta esof development, let’s remind ourselves of a phenomenon quite usual in popular

TV shows or serials – canned#lau hter) $fter some supposedly funny or wittyremark, you can hear the lau hter and the applause included in the soundtrackof the show itself) &ere we have die e1act counterpart of the horus in antiquetra edy; it’s here that we have to look for “livin $ntiquity)" That is to say, whythis lau hter! The %rst possible answer – that it serves to remind us when tolau h – is interestin enou h because it implies the parado1 that lau hter is a

http://www.lacan.com/symptom/?p=38#_ftn1




matter of duty and not of some spontaneous feelin ) *ut this answer isn’tsu2cient, because usually we don’t lau h) The only correct answer would thenbe that the other – embodied in the TV#set – is relievin us even of our duty tolau h, i)e), is lau hin instead of us) 0o, even if, tired from the hard day’sstupid work, we did nothin all evenin but a(e drowsily into the TV#screen,

we can say afterwards that ob/ectively, throu h me medium of the other, wehad a really ood time)

$ll this is, of course, /ust to illustrate the alienation of the sub/ect in thesi ni%er as soon as he is cau ht in the radically e1terior si nifyin network, heis morti%ed, dismembered, divided) To et an idea of what is meant by theLacanian division of the sub/ect, one has only to remember the well#knownparado1 of Lewis arroll' “+’m so lad + don’t like aspara us," said the small irlto a sympathetic friend) “*ecause, if + did, + should have to eat it – and + can’tbear it3" &ere you have the whole Lacanian problem of the re4e1ivity of desire'desire is always a desire of a desire, i)e), the question is not immediately, “whatshould + desire!" but, “there are a lot of thin s that + desire; + have a lot ofdesires – which of them is worth bein the ob/ect of my desire! 5hich desireshould + desire!" This parado1 is literally reproduced in the basic situation ofthe classic 0talinist political processes where the accused victim is at the sametime supposed to confess his love for the aspara us 6the bour eoisie, thecounter#revolution7 and e1press an attitude of dis ust towards his own activitywhich oes to the point of demandin the death penalty for himself) That’s whythe 0talinist victim is the perfect e1ample of the di8erence between the sujetd’énoncé 6sub/ect of the statement7 and the sujet d’énonciation 6sub/ect of theenunciatin 7) The demand that the 9arty addresses to him is' “$t this moment,

the 9arty needs the process to consolidate the revolutionary ains, so be aood communist, do a last service to the 9arty and confess)" &ere we have thedivision of the sub/ect in its purest form' the only way for the accused tocon%rm himself as a ood communist at the level of the sujet d’énonciation , isto confess, i)e), to determine himself, at the level of the sujet d’énoncé , as atraitor) .rnesto Laclau was perhaps ri ht when he once remarked that it isn’tonly 0talinism which is a lan ua e#phenomenon; it is already lan ua e itselfwhich is a 0talinist phenomenon)

&ere, however, we must carefully distin uish between this Lacanian notion ofthe divided sub/ect and the “post#structuralist" notion of the sub/ect#positions)

+n “post#structuralism," the sub/ect is usually reduced to sub/ection) &e isconceived as an e8ect of a fundamentally non#sub/ective process' the sub/ectis always cau ht in, traversed by, the pre#sub/ective process 6of “writin ," of“desire," etc)7, and the accent is put on die di8erent modes of how individuals“e1perience," “live," their positions as “sub/ects," “actors," “a ents" of thehistorical process) :or e1ample, it is only at a certain point in .uropean historythat the author of works of art, a painter or a writer, be an to see himself as acreative individual who, in his work, is ivin e1pression to his interior



a kind of dialo ic economy' we articulate a proposition de%nin the sub/ect,and our attempt fails; we e1perience the absolute contradiction, the e1tremene ative relationship between the sub/ect and the predicate – and it’s preciselythis absolute discordance which is the sub/ect as absolute ne ativity) +t is thesame as with a well#known /oke from the 0oviet =nion about >abinovitch, a ?ew

who wants to emi rate) The bureaucrat at the emi ration o2ce asks him why;>abinovitch answers' “There are two reasons why) The %rst is that +’m afraidthat in the 0oviet =nion, the communists will lose power, there will be acounter#revolution, and the new power will put all the blame for the communistcrimes on us ?ews – and there will be a ain the anti#?ewish po roms<" “*ut,"interrupts the bureaucrat, “this is pure nonsense; nothin can chan e in the0oviet =nion – the 0oviet power will last eternally3" “5ell," responds>abinovitch calmly, “that’s my second reason)" The lo ic is here the same aswith the &e elian proposition, “the spirit is a bone"' the failure itself of a %rstreadin ives us the true meanin )

The secon TV-lesson: yo! only ie t"ice

&ereby, we have touched the other, usually ne lected side of the Lacanianteachin ' the side of the ob/ect in its inertia, the remnants, the left#over of thesi nifyin process) This ob/ect – the Lacanian ob/et petit a – is %llin out thevoid of the symbolic structure which is the sub/ect' @ A a, “the spirit is a bone)"+n Lacanian theory, it is not the word which replaces the absent ob/ect; it is onthe contrary the ob/ect itself which is %llin out a lack of the si ni%er, a centralvoid in the reat ther of the symbolic structure) $nd here a ain, the cartoons– another characteristic feature of TV – are useful in more than one way toillustrate some fundamental Lacanian cate ories)

Let’s take the notion of “knowled e in the real"' the idea that nature knows itslaws and behaves accordin ly) 5e all know the classical, archetypal scene fromthe cartoons' a cat is approachin the ed e of the precipice, but she doesn’tstop' she proceeds calmly, and althou h she is already han in in the air,without round under her feet, she doesn’t fall) 5hen does she fall! Themoment she looks down and becomes aware of the fact that she is han in inthe air) The point of this nonsense#accident is that, when the cat is walkinslowly in the air, it is as if the real has for a moment for otten its knowled e'when the cat %nally looks down) 0he remembers that she must follow the laws

of nature and falls down) +t’s basically the same lo ic as in the well#knowndream reported in :reud’s Interpretation of Dreams of a father who doesn’tknow that he is dead' the point is a ain that because he doesn’t know that heis dead, he continues to live) &e must be reminded of his death, or, to ive thissituation a comical twist, he is still livin because he has for otten to die)

That’s how the phrase memento mori should be read' don’t for et to die3



This introduces us to a distinction between the two deaths' because of the lackof knowled e, the father of :reud’s dream is still livin althou h he is alreadydead) :rom this perspective, we can also approach the problem of repetition' ina way, everybody must die twice) That’s the &e elian theory of repetition inhistory) 5hen Bapoleon lost for the %rst time and was consi ned to .lba, he

didn’t know that he was already dead, that his historical role was %nished, andhe had to be reminded of it throu h his second defeat at 5aterloo) $t thispoint, when he died for the second time, he was really dead) [#]

$nd, to put it brie4y, the place of the 0talinist communist is e1actly betweenthe two deaths) The somewhat poetical de%nitions of the % ure of a communistthat we %nd in 0talin’s work are to be taken literally) 5hen, for e1ample, in hisspeech at the funeral of Lenin, 0talin proclaims, “5e, the communists, arepeople of a special mould) 5e are made of a special stu8," it is quite easy toreco ni(e the Lacanian name for this special stu8' o jet petit a , the sublimeob/ect placed in the interspace between the two deaths) +n the 0talinist vision,communists are “men of iron will," somehow e1cluded from the everyday cycleof ordinary human passions and weaknesses) +t is as if they are in a way “thelivin dead," still alive but already e1cluded from the ordinary cycle of naturalforces) +t is as if they possessed another body, the sublime body beyond theirordinary physical body) 6+s the fact that in Lubitch’s !inotch"a , the role of thehi h party apparatchi" is played by *ela Lu osi, identi%ed with the % ure ofCracula, another “livin dead," e1pressin the presentiment of the describedstate of thin s, or is it /ust a happy coincidence!7 The fantasy which serves as asupport for the % ure of the 0talinist communist is then e1actly the same asthe fantasy which is at work in the cartoons of Tom and ?erry' behind the % ure

of the indestructibility and invincibility of the communist who can endure eventhe most terrible ordeal and survive it intact, reinforced with new stren th,there is the same fantasy#lo ic as that of a cat whose head is blown up bydynamite and who, in the ne1t scene, proceeds intact in its pursuit of its classenemy, the mouse)

The problem is that we %nd this notion of a sublime body located between thetwo deaths already with the classical, pre#bour eois Daster' the Ein , fore1ample – it is as if he possessed, beyond his ordinary body, a sublime,ethereal, mystical body personifyin the 0tate) [$] 5here then lies thedi8erence between the classical Daster and the totalitarian Leader! The trans#

substantiated body of the classical Daster is an e8ect of the performativemechanism already described by la *oFtie, 9ascal, and Dar1' we, the sub/ects,think that we treat the Ein as a Ein because he is in himself the Ein , but inreality a Ein is a Ein because we are treatin him like one) $nd this fact thatthe charismatic power of a Ein is an e8ect of the symbolic ritual performed byhis sub/ects, must remain hidden' as sub/ects, we are necessarily victims of theillusion that the Ein is already in himself a Ein ) That’s why the classicalDaster must le itimi(e his rule with a reference to some non#social, e1ternal







authority 6God, Bature, some mythical past event<7) $s soon as theperformative mechanism which ives him his charismatic authority isunmasked, the Daster loses his power)

*ut the problem with the totalitarian leader is that he doesn’t need thise1ternal point of reference anymore to le itimi(e his rule) &e isn’t sayin to hissub/ects, “-ou must follow me because +’m your Leader)" Huite the opposite'“+n myself, +’m nothin ) + am what + am only as an e1pression, an embodiment,an e1ecutor of your will; my stren th is your stren th<" To put it brie4y, it is asif the totalitarian Leader is addressin his sub/ects and le itimi(in his powerprecisely by refer# rin to the above#mentioned 9ascalian#Dar1ianar umentation, i)e), revealin to them the secret of the classical Daster)*asically, he is sayin to them' “+’m your master because you are treatin meas your master; it is you, with your activity, who are makin me your master3"

&ow, then, can we subvert the position of the totalitarian Leader, if the

classical 9ascalian#Dar1ian ar umentation doesn’t work here any more! &ere,the basic deception consists in the fact that the Leader’s point of reference, theinstance to which he is referrin to le itimi(e his rule 6the 9eople, the lass, theBation7 doesn’t e1ist, or, more precisely, e1ists only throu h and in itsfetishistic representative, the 9arty and its Leader) The misreco nition of theperformative dimension runs here in the opposite direction' the classical Dasteris the Daster only insofar as his sub/ects are treatin him as a Daster, but here,the 9eople are the “real 9eople" only insofar as they are embodied in itsrepresentative, the 9arty and its Leader) The formula of the totalitarianmisreco nition of the performative dimension would then be the followin ' the9arty thinks that it is the 9arty because it represents the 9eople’s real interests,because it is rooted in the 9eople, e1pressin their will, but in reality, the9eople are the 9eople because – or, more precisely, insofar as – they areembodied in the 9arty) $nd by sayin that the 9eople as a support of the 9artydon’t e1ist, we don’t mean the obvious fact that the ma/ority of the peoplereally don’t support the 9arty rule; the mechanism is a little bit morecomplicated) The parado1ical functionin of the “9eople" in the totalitarianuniverse can be most easily detected throu h the analysis of phrases like “thewhole people supports the 9arty)" This proposition cannot be falsi%ed because,behind the form of a statement of a fact, we have a circular de%nition of the9eople' in the 0talinist universe, “supportin the rule of the 9arty" is in the last

analysis the only feature which – to use Eripkean terms – in all possible worldsde%nes the 9eople) That’s why the real member of the 9eople is only he whosupports the rule of the 9arty' those who are workin a ainst the rule of the9arty are automatically e1cluded from the 9eople; they became the “enemiesof the 9eople)" 5hat we have here is a somewhat crueller version of a well#known /oke' “my %ancFe never misses an appointment with me because themoment she misses one, she isn’t anymore my %ancFe)" The 9eople always



support the 9arty because any member of the 9eople who opposes the 9arty#rule automatically e1cludes himself from the 9eople)

The Lacanian de%nition of democracy would then be' a socio#political orderwhere the 9eople don’t e1ist – they don’t e1ist as a unity, embodied in theirunique representative) That’s why the basic feature of the democratic order isthat the place of 9ower is, by the necessity of its structure, an emptyplace) [%] +n a democratic order, soverei nty lies in the 9eople – but what arethe 9eople if not, precisely, the collection of the sub/ects of the power! &ere,we have the same parado1 as that of a natural lan ua e which is at the sametime the last, the hi hest metalan ua e) *ecause the 9eople cannotimmediately overn themselves, the place of 9ower must always remain anempty place; each person occupyin it can only do it temporarily, as a kind ofsurro ate, substitute for the real#impossible soverei n, – “nobody can ruleinnocently," as 0aint#?ust puts it) $nd in totalitarianism, the 9arty a ain becameprecisely the sub/ect who, bein the immediate embodiment of the 9eople, canrule innocently) +t is not by accident that the real socialist countries callthemselves “people’s democracies)" &ere, %nally, “the 9eople" e1ist a ain)

The eath rive

+t is at the level of this di8erence between the two deaths, of this empty placein the very heart of the ther, that we must locate the problematic of the deathdrive) The connection between the death drive and the symbolic order is aconstant with Lacan, but we can di8erentiate the various sta es of his teachinprecisely by reference to the di8erent modes of articulation of the death driveand the si ni%er)

+n the %rst period 6the %rst seminar, “The :unction and the :ield of 0peech andLan ua e<"7, it is the &e elian phenomenolo ical idea that the word is adeath, a murder of a thin ' as soon as the reality is symboli(ed, cau ht in asymbolic network, the thin itself is more present in a word, in its concept, thanin its immediate physical reality) Dore precisely, we cannot return to theimmediate reality' even if we turn from the word to the thin , from the word“table" to the table in its physical reality, for e1ample, the appearance of thetable itself is already marked with a certain lack) To know what a table really is,what it means, we must have recourse to the word, which implies an absenceof the thin )

+n the second period 6the Lacanian readin of 9oe’s Purloined Letter 7, theaccent is shifted from the word, from speech, to lan ua e as a synchronicstructure, a senseless autonomous mechanism which produces meanin as itse8ect +f, in the %rst period, the Lacanian concept of lan ua e is still basicallythe phenomenolo ical one 6Lacan is repeatin all the time that the %eld ofpsychoanalysis is the %eld of meanin , la si#ni$cation 7, here we have a





“structuralist" conception of lan ua e as a di8erential system of elements) Thedeath drive is now identi%ed with the symbolic order itself' in Lacan’s ownwords, it is “nothin but a mask of the symbolic order)" The main thin here isthe opposition between the ima inary level of the e1perience of meanin andthe meanin less si ni%erIsi nifyin mechanism which produces it) The

ima inary level is overned by the pleasure principle; it strives for ahomeostatic balance) The symbolic order in its blind automatism is alwaystroublin this homeostasis' it is “beyond the pleasure principle)" 5hen thehuman bein is cau ht in the si ni%er’s network, this network has a mortifyine8ect on him; he becomes part of a stran e automatic order disturbin hisnatural homeostatic balance 6throu h compulsive repetition, for e1ample7)

+n the third period, where the main accent of Lacan’s teachin is put on the realas impossible, the death drive a ain radically chan es its si ni%cation) Thischan e can be most easily detected throu h the relationship between thepleasure principle and the symbolic order) Till the end of the %fties, thepleasure principle was identi%ed with the ima inary level' the symbolic orderwas conceived as the real “beyond the pleasure principle)" *ut startin fromthe late %fties 6the seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 7 it is on thecontrary the symbolic order itself which is identi%ed with the pleasure principle'the unconscious “structured like a lan ua e," its “primary process" ofmetonymic#metaphoric displacements, is overned by the pleasure principle;what lies beyond is not the symbolic order but a real kernel, a traumatic core)

To desi nate it, Lacan uses a :reudian term das Din# , the Thin as anincarnation of the impossible jouissance 6the term Thin is to be taken herewith all the connotations it possesses in the domain of horror science#%ction'

the “alien" from the movie of the same name is a pre#symbolic, maternal Thinpar e1cellence7)

The symbolic order strives for a homeostatic balance, but there is in its kernel,in its very centre, some stran e, traumatic element which cannot besymboli(ed, inte rated into the symbolic order' the Thin ) Lacan coined aneolo ism for it' l’e%timité – e1ternal intimacy, which served as a title for oneof the seminars of ?acques#$lain Diller) $nd what is, at this level, the deathdrive! .1actly the opposite of the symbolic order' the possibility of what wasnamed by de 0ade “the second death," the radical annihilation of the symbolicte1ture throu h which so#called reality is constituted) The very e1istence of the

symbolic order implies a possibility of its radical e8acement, of the “symbolicdeath" – not the death of the so#called “real ob/ect" in its symbol but theobliteration of the si nifyin network itself)

This distinction between the di8erent sta es of Lacan’s teachin is not ofmerely theoretical interest; it has very de%nite consequences for medetermination of me %nal moment of me psychoanalytic cure) +n the %rstperiod, where the accent is laid on the word as a medium of the intersub/ective



reco nition of desire, symptoms are conceived as white spots, non#symboli(edima inary elements of the history of the sub/ect, and the process of analysis isthat of their symboli(ation, i)e), of their inte ration into the symbolic universeof the sub/ect' the analysis ives meanin , retroactively, to what was in thebe innin a meanin less trace) 0o the %nal moment of analysis is here reached

when the sub/ect is able to narrate to the other his own history in its continuity,when his desire is inte rated, reco ni(ed in a “full speech" 6 parole pleine 7)

+n the second period, where the symbolic order is conceived as havin amortifyin e8ect on a sub/ect, i)e), as imposin on him a traumatic loss – andthe name of this loss, of this lack, is of course the symbolic castration – the%nal moment of analysis is reached when the sub/ect is made ready to acceptthis fundamental loss, to consent to symbolic castration as a price to pay foraccess to his desire)

+n the third period, we have the reat ther, the symbolic order, with a

traumatic element in its very heart; and in Lacanian theory, fantasy isconceived as a construction allowin the sub/ect to come to terms with thistraumatic kernel) $t this level, the %nal moment of analysis is de%ned as “ ointhrou h a fantasy" 6 la traversée du fantasme 7' not its symbolic interpretationbut the e1perience of the fact that the fantasy#ob/ect, by its fascinatinpresence, /ust %lls out a lack, a void in the ther) There is nothin “behind" thefantasy; the fantasy is precisely a construction the function of which is to hidethis void, this “nothin ," i)e), the lack in the ther) The crucial element of thisthird period of Lacan’s teachin is then the shift of the accent from thesymbolic to the real) [&]

The prohi'ition o( the i)possi'le

The usual idea of the Lacanian “real" is that of a hard kernel resistinsymboli(ation, dialecti(ation, persistin in its place, always returnin to it)

There is a well#known science#%ction story 6“.1periment" by :redric *rown7perfectly illustratin this point) 9rofessor ?ohnson has developed a small#scalee1perimental model of a time machine) 0mall articles placed on it can be sentinto the past or the future) &e %rst demonstrates to his two collea ues a %ve#minute time travel into the future, by settin the future#dial and placin a smallbrass cube on the machine’s platform) +t instantly vanishes and reappears %veminutes later) The ne1t e1periment, %ve minutes into the past, is a little trickier)

?ohnson e1plains that havin set the past#dial at %ve minutes, he will place thecube on the platform at e1actly J o’clock) *ut since time is now runninbackward, it should vanish from his hand and appear on the platform at %veminutes before J; that is, %ve minutes before he places it there) ne of hiscollea ues asks the obvious question' “&ow can you place it there, then!"

?ohnson e1plains that at J o’clock the cube will vanish from the platform andappear in his hand, to be placed on the machine) This is e1actly what happens)





The second collea ue wants to know what would happen if, after the cube hasappeared on the platform 6%ve minutes before bein placed there7, ?ohnsonwere to chan e his mind and not put it there at J o’clock) 5ould this not createa parado1!

“$n interestin idea," 9rofessor ?ohnson said) “+ had not thou ht of it and it willbe interestin to try) Very well, + shall not<"

There was no parado1 at all) The cube remained)*ut the entire rest of the =niverse, professors and all, vanished)

0o, even if all symbolic reality dissolves itself, disappears into nothin , the real– the small cube – will return to its place) This is what Lacan means when hesays that the ethical imperative is the mode of the presence of the real in thesymbolic' &iat justitia' pereat mundus 3 The cube must return to its place even if all the world, all symbolic reality perishes)

*ut this is /ust one side of the Lacanian real; it’s the side which predominates inthe %fties, when we have the real – the brute, pre# symbolic reality whichalways returns to its place, then the 0ymbolic order, which structures ourperception of reality, and %nally the +ma inary, the level of illusory entitieswhose consistency is the e8ect of a kind of mirror#play, i)e), which have no reale1istence but are /ust a structural e8ect) 5ith the development of the Lacanianteachin in the si1ties and seventies, what he calls “the real" more and moreapproaches what he called, in the %fties, the ima inary) Let’s take the case oftraumatism' in the %fties, in his %rst seminar, the traumatic event is de%ned asan ima inary entity which wasn’t yet fully symboli(ed, iven a place in thesymbolic universe of the sub/ect +n the seventies, the traumatism is real; it is ahard core resistin symboli(ation) *ut the point is that it doesn’t matter if ittook place, if it “really occurred" in so#called reality; the point is /ust that itproduces a series of structural e8ects 6displacements, repetitions, etc)7) Thereal is an entity which should be constructed afterwards so that we can accountfor the distortions of the symbolic structure) The most famous :reudiane1ample of such a real entity is of course the primal parricide' it would besenseless to search for its traces in prehistoric reality, but it must nonethelessbe presupposed if we want to account for the present state of thin s) +t’s thesame as with the primal % ht to death between the 6future7 master and servantin &e el’s Phenomenolo#y of (ind ' it is senseless tryin to determine when this

event could have taken place; the point is /ust that it must be presupposed,that it constitutes a fantasy# scenario implied by the very fact that people areworkin – it is the intersub/ective condition of the so#called “instrumentalrelation to the world of ob/ects)"

The parado1 of the Lacanian real is then that it is an entity which, althou h itdoesn’t e1ist 6in the sense of “really e1istin ," takin place in reality7, has aseries of properties) +t e1ercises a certain structural causality; it can produce a



series of e8ects in the symbolic reality of sub/ects) That’s why it can beillustrated by a multitude of well#known /okes based on the same matri1' “+sthis the place where the Cuke of 5ellin ton spoke his famous words!" “-es,this is the place, but he never spoke those words)" These never#spoken wordsare a Lacanian real) ne can quote the e1amples ad in%nitum – “0mith not only

doesn’t believe in hosts, he isn’t afraid of them3" etc) – up to the God himselfwho, accordin to Lacan, belon s to the real' “God has all perfections e1ceptone – he doesn’t e1ist3" +n this sense, the Lacanian sujet)supposé)savoir 6thesub/ect supposed to know7 is also such a real entity' it doesn’t e1ist, but itproduces a decisive shift in the development of the psychoanalytic cure) $nd,to mention the last e1ample' the famous DacGu2n, me &itchcockian ob/ect,the pure prete1t the sole role of which is to set in motion the story, but which isin itself “nothin at all)" The only si ni%cation of the DacGu2n lies in the factthat it has some si ni%cation for the characters, i)e), that it must seem to be ofvital importance to them) The ori inal anecdote is well known' two men aresittin in a train) ne of them asks, “5hat’s that packa e up there in theba a e rack!" “ h, that’s a DacGu2n)" “5hat’s a DacGu2n!" “5ell, it’s anapparatus for trappin lions in the 0cottish &i hlands)" “*ut there are no lionsin the 0cottish &i hlands)" “5ell, then, that’s not a DacGu2n)" There isanother version which is much more to the point' it runs the same as the otherwith the e1ception of the last answer' “5ell, you see how e2cient it is3" That’sa DacGu2n, a pure nothin which is nonetheless e2cient) +t is needless to addthat the DacGu2n is the purest case of what Lacan calls o jet petit a ' a purevoid which functions as the ob/ect#cause of desire)

That would be, then, the precise de%nition of the real ob/ect' a cause which in

itself doesn’t e1ist, i)e), which is present only in a series of its e8ects, butalways in a distorted, displaced way) +f the real is impossible, it is precisely thisimpossibility to be rasped throu h its e8ects) Laclau and Dou8e [*] were the%rst to develop this lo ic of the real in its relevance for the social#ideolo ical%eld in their concept of anta onism' anta onism is precisely such animpossible kernel, a certain limit which is in itself nothin , and which is only tobe constructed retroactively, from a series of its e8ects, as the traumatic pointwhich escapes them and prevents a closure of the social %eld) 5e mi ht rereadthis way even the classical notion of the “class stru le"' it is not the lastsi ni%er ivin the meanin to all social phenomena 6“all social processes arein the last instance e1pressions of the class stru le"7, but quite the contrary acertain limit, a pure ne ativity, a traumatic limit which prevents the %naltotali(ation of the socio#ideolo ical %eld) The “class stru le" is present only inits e8ects, in the fact that every attempt to totali(e the social %eld, to assi n tosocial phenomena a de%nite place in the social structure, is always doomed tofailure)

+f we de%ne the real as such a parado1ical, chimerical entity which, althou h itdoesn’t e1ist, has a series of properties and can produce a series of e8ects, it





becomes clear that the real par e1cellence is jouissance ' jouissance doesn’te1ist; it is impossible, but it produces a lot of traumatic e8ects) $nd thisparado1ical nature of jouissance o8ers us also a clue to e1plain the fundamentalparado1 which unfailin ly attests the presence of the real' the fact of theprohibition of somethin which is already in itself impossible) The elementary

model of it is, of course, the prohibition of incest; but there are many othere1amples) Let’s /ust mention the usual conservative attitude towards childse1uality' it doesn’t e1ist, children are innocent bein s, that’s why we muststrictly control them and % ht child se1uality) Bot to mention me obvious factthat the most famous phrase of all analytical philosophy – the last propositionof 5itt enstein’s Tractatus – implies the same parado1' “5hereof one cannotspeak, thereof one must be silent)" +mmediately, the stupid question arises' if itis already stated that it’s impossible to say anythin about the unspeakable,why add that we must not speak about it! 5e %nd the same parado1 in Eant'when treatin the question of the ori ins of le itimate state power, he saysdirectly that we cannot penetrate the obscure ori ins of power because weshouldn’t do it 6i)e) because by doin it, we put ourselves outside its domainand so automatically subvert its le itimacy7) $ curious variation on his basicethical imperative Du "annst' denn du sollst 3 – you can because you must)

The solution to this parado1 – why forbid somethin which is already in itselfimpossible! – lies in the fact that the impossibility re ards the level ofe1istence 6it’s impossible, i)e), it doesn’t e1ist7, while the prohibition re ardsthe properties, its predicates 6 jouissance is forbidden because of its properties7)

+ree o) as real

+n this sense, we may say that the status of freedom itself is real) The usual“6post7structuralist" approach would be to denounce “freedom" as anima inary e1perience restin on misreco nition, on blindness to the structuralcausality which determines the activity of sub/ects) *ut, on the basis of Lacan’steachin of the seventies, we can approach freedom from another perspective'freedom, “free choice" as a point of the real#impossible)

$ few months a o, a -u oslav student was called to re ular military service) +n -u oslavia, at the be innin of military service, there is a certain ritual' everynew soldier must solemnly swear that he is willin to serve his country and todefend it even if it means losin his life, etc) – the usual patriotic stu8) $fter thepublic ceremony, everybody must si n the solemn document) The younsoldier simply refused to si n, sayin that an oath depends upon a free choice,that it is a matter of free decision, and he, from his free choice, didn’t want to

ive his si nature to the oath) *ut, he was quick to add, if one of the o2cerspresent was prepared to ive him a formal order to si n the oath, he was ofcourse prepared to do it) The perple1ed o2cers e1plained to him that becausethe oath depended upon his free decision 6an oath obtained by force is



valueless7, they could not ive him such an order, but that, on the other hand,if he still refused to ive his si nature, he would be prosecuted for refusin todo his duty and condemned to prison) Beedless to say, it was e1actly this thathappened; but before oin to prison, the student did succeed in obtaininfrom the military court of law the parado1ical decision, a formal document

orderin him to si n a free oath)+n the relation of the sub/ect to the community to which he belon s, there isalways such a parado1ical point of choi% forcé ) $t this point, the community issayin to the sub/ect' you have a freedom to choose, but on the condition thatyou choose the ri ht thin ; you have, for e1ample, the freedom to choose tosi n the oath or not, on the condition that you choose ri htly, that you chooseto si n it +f you make the wron choice, you lose the freedom of choice itself)$nd it is by no means accidental that this parado1 arises at the level of therelation of the sub/ect to the community to which he belon s' the situation ofthe forced choice consists in the fact that the sub/ect must freely choose thecommunity to which he already belon s independently of his choice' he mustchoose what is already iven to him) The point, then, is that he is neveractually in a position to choose' he is always treated as if he had alreadychosen) $nd, contrary to the %rst impression that such a forced choice is a trapby means of which the totalitarian 9ower catches its sub/ects, we must stressthat there is nothin “totalitarian" about it) The sub/ect who thinks he can avoidthis parado1 and really have a free choice is precisely a psychotic sub/ect, theone who keeps a kind of distance to the symbolic order, i)e), who isn’t reallycau ht in the si nifyin network) The “totalitarian" sub/ect is closer to thispsychotic position' the proof would be the status of the “enemy" in totalitarian

discourse 6the ?ew in fascism, the traitor in 0talinism7 – precisely the sub/ectsupposed to make a free choice and to choose freely the wron side)

This is also the basic parado1 of love, not only of one’s country, but also of awoman or a man) +f +’m directly ordered to love a woman, it is clear that itdoesn’t work' in a way) love must be free) *ut, on the other hand, if +’mproceedin as if + really have a free choice, if + start to look around and say tomyself, “Let’s choose which of these women + will fall in love with," it’s clearthat this also doesn’t work, that it isn’t “real love)" The parado1 of love is that itis a free choice, but a choice which never happens in the present, i)e), which isalways already done – at a certain moment, + can only state retroactively that

+’ve already chosen)

+n the philosophical tradition, we %nd the clearest formulation of thisparado1ical choice in 0chellin ’s Treatise on *uman &reedom 6K MN7)0chellin ’s initial problem is the so#called sentiment of irrational, unfounded

uilt' sometimes we feel uilty even for thin s for which rationally, on the levelof our conscious decisions and aims, we are not responsible) &is answer is aradical distinction between freedom and consciousness' the basic character of



each human bein – ood or evil – is the result of an ori inal, eternal, eternallypast, a priori, transcendental choice, i)e), of a choice which was always alreadymade althou h it never took place in temporary, ordinary, everyday reality)0uch a free unconscious choice must be presupposed to account for the above#mentioned sentiment that we are uilty even for thin s which don’t depend

upon our conscious decision)Coincidentia oppositorum

The real is then at the same time the hard, impenetrable kernel resistinsymboli(ation and a purely chimerical entity which has in itself no ontolo icalconsistency) To use Eripkean terminolo y, the real is the rock upon which everyattempt at symboli(ation stumbles, the hard core which remains the same in allpossible worlds 6i)e), symbolic universes7; but at the same time its status isthorou hly precarious' it’s somethin that persists only as failed, missed, in ashadow, and dissolves itself as soon as we try to rasp it in its positivity) $s we

have already seen, this is precisely what de%nes the notion of a traumaticevent' a point of failure of symboli(ation, but at the same time never iven inits positivity) +t can only be constructed backwards, from its structural e8ects)$ll its e2cacy lies in these e8ects, in the distortions it produces in the symbolicuniverse of the sub/ect The traumatic event is ultimately /ust a fantasy#construct %llin out a certain void in a symbolic structure and as such theretroactive e8ect of this structure)

There is a series of other oppositions which de%ne the Lacanian concept of thereal) :irst, we have the real as the startin point, the basis, the foundation ofthe process of symboli(ation 6that’s why Lacan speaks of the “symboli(ation ofthe real"7, i)e), the real which in a sense precedes the symbolic order and issubsequently structured by it when it ets cau ht in its network) This is the

reat Lacanian motif of symboli(ation as a process which morti%es, drains o8,empties, carves the fulness of the real of the livin body) *ut the real is at thesame time the product, remainder, left#over, scraps of this process ofsymboli(ation, the remnants, the e1cess which escapes symboli(ation andwhich is as such produced by symboli(ation itself) +n &e elian terms, the real isat the same time presupposed and posed by the symbolic) +nsofar as the kernelof the real is jouissance , this duality takes the form of a di8erencebetween jouissance , and plus)de)jouir ' jouissance is the basis upon which

symboli(ation works, the basis emptied, disembodied, structured bysymboli(ation) *ut this process produces at the same time a remainder, a left#over which is the surplus# jouissance )

0econd, me real is the fullness of the inert presence, positivity; nothin islackin in me real, i)e), the lack is introduced only by the symboli(ation; it is asi ni%er which introduces a void, an absence into the real) *ut at me sametime, the real is in itself a hole, a ap, an openin in the middle of me symbolic



order) +t is the lack around which the symbolic order is structured) The real as astartin point, as a basis, is a positive fullness without lack; as a product, a left#over of symboli(ation, it is on the contrary me void, the emptiness created,encircled by the symbolic structure) 5e mi ht approach the same couple ofopposites also from a perspective of ne ativity' me real is somethin that

cannot be ne ated, a positive inert datum which is insensitive to ne ation,which cannot be cau ht in the dialectics of ne ativity) *ut we must add atonce, that it is so because the real itself, in its positivity, is nothin but anembodiment, a positivation of a certain void, lack, radical ne ativity) +t cannotbe ne ated because it is already in itself, in its positivity, nothin but anembodiment of a pure ne ativity, emptiness) That’s why the real ob/ect is asublime ob/ect in a strict Lacanian sense, i)e), an ob/ect which is /ust apositivation of the lack in the ther, in the symbolic order) The sublime ob/ectis an ob/ect which cannot be approached too closely' if we et too near it, itloses its sublime features and becomes an ordinary vul ar ob/ect +t can persistonly in an interspace, in an intermediate state, viewed from a certainperspective, half#seen) +f we want to see it in the li ht of day, it chan es into aneveryday ob/ect, it dissipates itself, precisely because in itself, it is nothin atall) Let’s take a well#known scene from :ellini’s +oma ) The workers di intunnels for a subway %nd the remnants of some old >oman buildin s; they callthe archeolo ists, and when to ether they enter the buildin s, a beautiful viewis awaitin them, walls full of frescoes of immobile, melancholy % ures) *ut thepaintin s are too fra ile; they cannot sustain the open air and immediatelybe in to dissolve, leavin the spectators alone with the blank walls)

Third, as has been pointed out by ?acques#$lain Diller, the status of the real is

at the same time that of pure contin ency and that of lo ical consistency) +n a%rst approach, the real is the shock of a contin ent encounter which derails theautomatic circulation of the symbolic mechanism, a rain of sand preventin itssmooth function' a traumatic encounter which ruins the balance of thesymbolic universe of the sub/ect) *ut, as we have seen with re ard to thetrauma, precisely as an irruption of a total contin ency, the traumatic eventisn’t anywhere iven in its positivity; it can only be lo ically constructedafterwards as a point which escapes symboli(ation)

:ourth, if we try to sei(e the real from the perspective of the distinctionbetween ,uid and ,uod , between the properties of a symbolic# universal nature

attributed to an ob/ect and this ob/ect itself in its ivenness, a surplus of an Oescapin , in its positivity, the network of universal#symbolic determinations –i)e), if we try to approach the real throu h the %eld opened by the Eripkeancriticism of the theory of descriptions – we should say, %rst, that the real is thesurplus of ,uod over ,uid , a pure positivity beyond the series of properties,beyond a set of descriptions; but at the same time, the e1ample of the traumaproves that me real is also the e1act opposite' an entity which doesn’t e1ist butnevertheless has a series of properties)



Last, if we try to de%ne the real in its relation to me function of writin 6 écrit ,not the post#structuralist écriture 7, we must, of course, in a %rst approach statethat the real cannot be inscribed, that it escapes the inscription 6the real of these1ual relation, for e1ample7) *ut at the same time, the real is writin itself asopposed to the si ni%er) $s has been pointed out by ?acques#$lain Diller, the

Lacanian écrit has the status of an ob/ect and not of a si ni%er) This immediate coincidence of opposite or even contradictory determinations iswhat de%nes the Lacanian real) 5e can thus di8erentiate between theima inary, the symbolic, and the real status of couples of opposites) +n theima inary relation, the two poles of the opposition are complementary;to ether, they build a harmonious totality, each of them ives to the otherwhat the other lacks, i)e), each %lls out the lack of the other 6the fantasy of thefully reali(ed se1ual relationship, for e1ample, where Dan and 5oman areformin a harmonious whole7) The symbolic relation is on the contrarydi8erential) The identity of each of the moments consists in its di8erence fromthe opposite moment) $ iven element doesn’t %ll in the lack of the other) +tisn’t complementary to the other, but on the contrary takes the place of thelack of the other, embodies what is lackin to the other) +ts positive presence isnothin but the positivation of a lack of its opposite element) The opposites,the poles of the symbolic relation, thus in a way return each to the other itsown lack) They are united on the basis of their common lack) That would alsobe the de%nition of symbolic communication' what circulates between thesub/ects is above all a certain void; the sub/ects pass to each other a commonlack) :rom this perspective, a woman is not complementary to a man but ratherembodies his lack 6that’s why Lacan can say that a beautiful woman is a

perfect incarnation of the man’s castration7) The real is de%ned as a point ofthe immediate coincidence of the opposite poles' each of the poles passesimmediately into its opposite; each is already in itself its own opposite) Theonly philosophical counterpart here is &e elian dialectics) $lready at the verybe innin of his Lo#ic , *ein and Bothin ness are not complementary to eachother) Bor is &e el’s point that each of them obtains its identity throu h itsdi8erence from the other) The point is that *ein in itself, when we try to raspit “as it is," in its pure abstraction and indeterminateness, without furtherspeci%cation, reveals itself to be Bothin ness) $nother e1ample, perhaps closerto the Lacanian real) would be &e el’s criticism of Eant’s Thin # in#itself 6 dasDin#)an)sich 7) &e el is tryin to show how this famous Thin #in#itself, this puresurplus of ob/ectivity which cannot be reached by thou ht, this transcendinentity, is e8ectively a pure “Thin #of# the#Thou ht" 6 Gedan"endin# 7, a pureform of thou ht' the transcendence of the Thin #in#itself coincides immediatelywith the pure immanence of a Thou ht) That is to say, how do we reach, howdo we build the idea of a Thin #in#itself! *y makin an abstraction, bysubtractin all the particular, concrete determinations of the ob/ectivity whichare supposed to depend upon our sub/ectivity) $nd what remains after this



abstraction of all particular, determinate contents is precisely a pure, emptyform of Thou h3

The clue to this parado1ical coincidence of opposites is iven by Lacanin Encore when he points out that “the real can be inscribed 6 peut s’inscrire 7only throu h a deadlock of formalisation)" [,] The real is of course in a %rstapproach that which cannot be inscribed, which “doesn’t cease not to inscribeitself" 6 ne cesse pas de ne pas s’écrire 7 – the rock upon which everyformali(ation stumbles) *ut it is precisely throu h this failure that we can in away encircle, locate the empty place of the real +n other words, the real cannotbe inscribed, but we can inscribe this impossibility itself) 5e can locate itsplace' a traumatic place which causes a series of failures) $nd the whole pointof Lacan is that the real is nothin but this impossibility of its inscribin the realis not a transcendent positive entity, persistin somewhere beyond thesymbolic order like a hard kernel inaccessible to it, some kind of Eantian“Thin #in#itself)" m itself, it is nothin at all, /ust a void, an emptiness in asymbolic structure, markin some central impossibility) +t is in this sense thatthe eni matic Lacanian phrase de%nin the sub/ect as an “answer of the real"is to be understood' we can inscribe, encircle the void place of the sub/ectthrou h the failure of its symboli(ation, because the sub/ect is nothin but thepoint of failure of the process of its symbolic representation)

a . S/0

:rom a Lacanian perspective, the ob/ect as real is then, in the last resort, /ust acertain limit' we can overtake it, leave it behind us, but we cannot reach it)

That’s the Lacanian readin of the classic parado1 of $chilles and the tortoise'$chilles can of course overtake it, but he cannot reach it, catch up with it) +t’sas with the old *rechtian parado1 of happiness from The -e##ar’s .pera ' youmust not run to desperately after happiness, because it mi ht happen that youwill overtake it, and then happiness will remain behind you) That’s the Lacanianreal' a certain limit which is always missed – we always came too early or toolate) $nd, as was pointed out by the late Dichel 0ilvestre, the same thin oesalso for so#called “free association" in psychoanalysis) [2] n the one hand, itis impossible to reach it) 5e cannot really spontaneously ive ourselves to it)5e always manipulate, have a certain intention, etc) *ut on the other hand, wecannot escape it' whatever we say durin analysis already has the status of

free association) :or e1ample, + cannot, in the middle of the analysis, turn tothe analyst and say' “Bow wait a minute, + want now to speak to you reallyseriously, person to person) <" .ven if we do this, its performative force isalready suspended, i)e), it already has a status of “free association," ofsomethin that is to be interpreted, that is not to be taken at its face value)

*ut there are ob/ects and ob/ects) +n Lacan’s teachin , we have to distin uishat least three types of ob/ects) To articulate these distinctions, let’s return to







the DacGu2n) 5e must not for et that in &itchcock’s %lms, too, the DacGu2nis /ust one of the three types of ob/ects)

:irst, then, the DacGu2n itself, “nothin at all," an empty place, pure prete1tfor settin in motion the action' the formula of the aircraft#en ines in The /01teps , the secret clause of the Baval treaty in &orei#n 2orrespondent , the codedmelody in The Lady 3anishes , the uranium#bottles in !otorious , etc) +t’s a puresemblance) +n itself, it is totally indi8erent and, by structural necessity, absent+ts si ni%cation is purely autore4e1ive; it consists in the fact that it has somesi ni%cation for the others, for the principal characters of the story)

*ut in a series of &itchcock’s %lms, we %nd another type of ob/ect which isdecidedly not indi8erent, not pure absence) 5hat matters here is precisely itspresence, the material presence of a fra ment of reality) +t’s a left#over, aremnant which cannot be reduced to a network of formal relations proper tothe symbolic structure, but which is, parado1ically, at the same time the

positive condition for the e8ectuation of the formal structure) This ob/ect canbe de%ned as an ob/ect of e1chan e circulatin between sub/ects, servin as akind of uarantee, a pawn in their symbolic relationship) +t is the role of the keyin !otorious and in Dial ( for (urder , the role of the weddin rin in 1hado4 of a Dou t and in +ear 5indo4 , the role of the li hter in 1tran#ers on a Train , andeven the role of the child circulatin between the two couples in The (an 5hoKne4 Too (uch ) +t is unique 6 unaire 7, non#speculari(ed) +t hasn’t a double; itescapes the dual mirror#relation) That’s why it plays a crucial role precisely inthe %lms which are built on a whole series of dual relations, each elementhavin its mirror#counter#part 6 1tran#ers on a Train ; 1hado4 of a Dou t , wherealready the name of the central character is doubled – uncle harlie, niece

harlie7) +t is the one which hasn’t ot its counterpart, and that’s why it mustcirculate between the opposite elements) The parado1 of its role is that,althou h it is a left#over of the real, an “e1crement," it functions as a positivecondition of the restorin of a symbolic structure' the structure of symbolice1chan es between the sub/ects can e1ist only insofar as it is embodied in thispure material element which acts as its uarantee) :or e1ample, in 1tran#erson a Train , the murderous pact between *runo and Guy holds only insofar asthe ob/ect 6the ci arette#li hter7 is circulatin between them)

That’s the basic situation of a whole series of &itchcock’s %lms) $t the

be innin , we have a non#structured, pre#symbolic, ima inary homeostaticstate of thin s, an indi8erent balance where the relations between sub/ects arenot yet structured in a strict sense, i)e), throu h the lack circulatin betweenthem) $nd the parado1 is that this symbolic pact, this structural network ofrelations can only establish itself insofar as it is embodied in a totallycontin ent material element, a little#bit#of#real which, by its sudden irruption,disrupts the homeostatic indi8erence of the relations between sub/ects) +nother words, the ima inary balance chan es into a symbolically#structured



network throu h a shock of the real) [3] That’s why &itchcock 6and with himLacan7 is no lon er a “structuralist"' the basic esture of “structuralism" is toreduce the ima inary richness to a formal network of symbolic relations) 5hatescapes the structuralist perspective is that this formal structure itself is tiedwith an umbilical cord to some radically contin ent material element which, in

its pure particularity, “is" a structure, embodies it) 5hy! *ecause the reatther, the symbolic order, is always arré , blocked, failed, crossed, mutilated,

and the contin ent material element embodies this internal blockade, or limit,of the symbolic structure) The symbolic structure must include an elementwhich embodies its “stain," its own point of impossibility around which it isarticulated' it is in a way the structurin of its own impossibility) The onlyphilosophical counter#point to this lo ic is a ain the &e elian dialectics' the

reatest speculative mystery of the dialectical movement is not how a richnessand diversity of reality can be reduced to a dialectical conceptual mediation,but the fact that this dialectical structurin itself, to take place, must beembodied in some totally contin ent element) :or e1ample, that’s the point ofthe &e elian deduction of the role of the Ein ' the 0tate as the rational totalitye1ists e8ectively only insofar as it is embodied in the stupid presence of theEin ’s body) The Ein , in his non#rational, biolo ically determined presence, “is"the 0tate, it is in his body that the 0tate achieves its e8ectiveness) &ere, wecan use the distinction, developed by Laclau and Dou8e, between theaccidental and the contin ent' an ordinary element of a formal structure isaccidental, indi8erent, i)e) it can be interchan ed) *ut there is always anelement which, parado1ically, embodies this formal structure as such) +t isn’tnecessary, but it is, in its contin ency itself, the positive condition of therestorin of the structural necessity; this necessity depends upon it, han s on

it)

:inally, we have a third kind of ob/ect' the birds in The -irds , for e1ample 6wecould also add, in (arnie , the body of the iant ship at the end of the streetwhere Damie’s mother lives7) This ob/ect has a massive, oppressive materialpresence) +t is not an indi8erent void like the DacGu2n, but at the same time itdoesn’t circulate between the sub/ects; it’s not an ob/ect of e1chan e, it’s /usta mute embodiment of an impossible jouissance )

&ow to e1plain the lo ic, the consistency of these three ob/ects!+nEncore Lacan proposes a schema proposes a schema for it' [14]







&ere, we have to follow ?acques#$lain Diller and interpret the vector not asindicatin a relation of determination 6“the ima inary determines thesymbolic," etc)7, but more in the sense of the “symboli(ation of the ima inary,"etc) 0o'

# the DacGu2n is clearly the o jet petit a , a lack, the left#over of the real,settin in motion the symbolic order, a pure semblance of the “mystery" to bee1plained, interpreted)

# The birds are P, the impassive, ima inary makin present of the real, anima e which embodies jouissance )

# $nd, %nally, the circulatin ob/ect of e1chan e is 06$7, the symbolic ob/ect

which cannot be reduced to ima inary mirror#play and which at the same timeembodies the lack in the ther, the impossibility around which the symbolicorder is structured) +t is the radically contin ent element throu h which thesymbolic necessity arises) That’s the reatest mystery of the symbolic order'how its necessity arises from the shock of a totally contin ent encounter withthe real) +t is like the well#known accident in the 6ra ian !i#hts ' the hero, lostin the desert, enters a cave quite by chance; there, he %nds three old wise menawakened by his entry who say to him, “:inally, you have arrived3 5e havebeen waitin for you for the last three hundred years)"

The s!'ject ass!)e to5

This mystery is in the last resort the mystery of the transference itself' toproduce new meanin , it is necessary to presuppose its e1istence in the other)

That’s me lo ic of the “sub/ect assumed to know" which was isolated by Lacanas the central a1is, or stron hold, of the phenomenon of transference) Theanalyst is in advance assumed to know – what! The meanin of theanalysand’s symptoms) This knowled e is of course an illusion, but it is anecessary one' it is only throu h this supposition of knowled e that, at the end,



some real knowled e can be produced) +n the schema above, we have threeversions of the ob/ect around the central nauseous protuberance of 7ouissance ,the Thin in its inaccessibility; one is tempted to construct, on the same matri1,three other concepts around the sub/ect assumed to know)

Let us start with the sub/ect assumed to believe) [11] omin from -u oslavia,i)e), from a real#socialist country, +’ll take an e1ample typical of real socialismwhere, as you all know, there is always somethin lackin in the stores) urhypothetical startin #point is that there is an abundance of toilet#paper on themarket) *ut, suddenly and une1pectedly, a rumor starts oin around thatthere is a shorta e of toilet#paper) *ecause of this rumor, people franticallybe in to buy it and, of course, the result is mat there is a real shorta e of toilet#paper) $t %rst si ht, this seems to be the simple mechanism of what is called aself#ful%llin prophecy, but the e8ective way of how it functions is a little morecomplicated) The reasonin of each of the participants is the followin ' “+’m notnaive and stupid) + know very well mat there is more than enou h toilet#paperin the stores; but there are probably some naive and stupid people who believethese rumors, who are takin them seriously and who will act accordin ly) Theywill frantically start to buy toilet#paper, and so in the end there will be a realshorta e of it) 0o even if + know very well that there is enou h of it, it would bea ood idea to o and buy a lot of it3" The crucial point is that this other who isassumed to believe naively doesn’t have to e1ist in actuality) To produce hise8ects in the reality, it is enou h that he is supposed by the others to e1ist) +na de%nite, closed multitude of sub/ect, everybody can play this role for all theothers) The e8ect will be e1actly the same, i)e), the real shorta e of toilet#paper) The one who will at the end remain without it will be precisely the one

who will persist in the truth' the one who will say to himself, “+ know that this isonly a rumor and that there is enou h toilet#paper," and act upon it)

This concept of the sub/ect supposed to believe has also its clinical use' itserves to mark the di8erence between the real :reudian analysis and therevisionist cure) 5hile in the :reudian analysis the analyst plays the role of thesub/ect assumed to know, in the revisionist tradition, his role is closest to thatof the sub/ect assumed to believe; that is to say, in this case, the reasonin ofthe patient oes as follows' “+ have some psychic problem) +’m neurotic, so +need an analyst to cure me) The problem is that + don’t believe in the maternalphallus, symbolic castration, and all this shit) This is to me plain nonsense) *ut

happily for me, here is the analyst who believes in it and, why not, perhaps hecan cure me with his belief3" Bo wonder that various neo#:reudian schools aretryin to incorporate some elements of shamanism3

The second concept in this series would be the sub/ect supposedto jouir ) [1#] &is role is fundamental in obsessive neurosis) :or the obsessiveneurotic, the traumatic point is the supposed e1istence, in the other, of aninsupportable, limitless, horrifyin /ouissance) 5hat is at stake of all his frantic







activity is to protect, to save the other from his jouissance , even at the price ofdestroyin him or her 6savin the woman from her corruption, for e1ample7)$nd, a ain, this sub/ect doesn’t have to e1ist in actuality to produce his e8ects,it is enou h that he is supposed by the others to e1ist Thissupposed jouissance is one of the key components of racism' the other 6?ew,

$rab, *lack7 is always supposed to have an access to some speci%c jouissance ,and mat is what really bothers us)

The last concept would be, of course, that of the sub/ect assumed to desire) +fthe sub/ect assumed to en/oy plays a central role in obsessive neurosis, thesub/ect assumed to desire plays such a role in hysteria) ne only has to remindoneself of :reud’s analysis of Cora) +t is quite dear that Dadame E) is playinfor Cora the role not of her ob/ect of desire, as was mistakenly supposed by:reud, but of the sub/ect supposed to desire, supposed to know how to or ani(eher desire, how to avoid its deadlock) That’s why, when we are confronted witha hysteric, the question to ask is not, “5hat is her ob/ect of desire!" but,“5here does she desire from! 5ho is the other person throu h whom she isor ani(in his desire!" The problem with hysterical sub/ect is that she alwaysneeds to have recourse to another sub/ect to or ani(e her desire) That’s themeanin of the Lacanian formula that hysterical desire is the desire of theother)

Beedless to say, this conceptual quartet is useful in an analysis of ideolo icalmechanisms) +n oriental despotism, the whole system turns around the centralpoint, the % ure of the despot supposed to /ouir) +n classical 0talinism, theleadership is supposed to know, etc) *ut the thin not to for et is that the foursub/ects supposed to< are not on the same level' the sub/ect assumed to knowis their basis, their matri1, and the function of the remainin three is preciselyto dis uise its troublin parado1)

T"o oors o( the La"

5hy is this supposed knowled e impossibleIreal! The Lacanian answer is thatthere is an ob/ect hidden in it, embodyin obscene /ouissance) To e1emplify it,let’s take as a startin point the famous apolo ue concernin the door of theLaw in The Trial [1$] the little story told to E) by the priest to e1plain to him hissituation vis#a#vis the Law) The patent failure of all the ma/or interpretations ofthis apolo ue seems only to con%rm the priest’s thesis that “the commentsoften enou h merely e1press the commentator’s bewilderment"6p)QRM7) *utthere is another way to penetrate the mystery of this apolo ue' +nstead ofseekin its meanin directly, it mi ht be preferable to treat it the way laudeLFvi#0trauss treats a iven myth' to establish its relations to a series of othermyths and to elaborate the rule of their transformation) 5here can we %nd,then, in The Trial another “myth" which functions as a variation, as aninversion, of the apolo ue concernin the door of the Law!





5e don’t have to look far already at the be innin of the second chapter 6“:irstinterro ation"7, ?osef E) %nds himself in front of another door of the Law 6theentrance to the interro ation chamber7) &ere also, the door#keeper lets himknow that this door is intended only for him) The washer#woman says to him' “+must shut this door after you; nobody else must come in)" This is clearly a

variation of the last words of the door#keeper to the man from the country inthe priest’s apolo ue' “Bo one but you could ain admittance throu h thisdoor, since this door was intended only for you) + am now oin to shut it)" $tthe same time, the apolo ue concernin the door of the Law 6let’s call it, in thestyle of LFvi#0trauss, mK7 and the %rst interro ation mQ7 can be opposedthrou h a whole series of distinctive features' in mK, we are in front of theentrance to a ma ni%cent court of /ustice, in mQ, we are in a block of worker’s4ats, full of %lth and obscene crawlin ; in ml, the door#keeper is an employee of the court, in mQ, it is an ordinary woman washin children’s clothes; in m K it’sa man, in mQ a woman; in mK, the door#keeper prevents the man from thecountry from passin throu h the door and enterin the court, in mQ, thewasher#woman pushes him into the interro ation chamber half a ainst his will)

That is, the frontier separatin everyday life from the sacred place of the Lawcannot be trans ressed in mK, but in mQ, it is easy to trans ress)

The crucial feature ofmQ is indicated already with its locali(ation' the ourt islocated in the middle of the vital promiscuity of workers’ lod in s) >einer 0tachis quite /usti%ed in reco ni(in in this detail a distinctive trait of Eafka’suniverse, “the trespass of the frontier which separates the vital domain fromthe /udicial domain)" [1%] The structure here is of course that of the band ofDoebius' if we pro ress far enou h in our descent to the social under round,

we %nd ourselves suddenly on the other side, i)e), in the middle of the sublimeand noble Law) The place of transition from one domain to the other is a dooruarded by an ordinary washer#woman of provocative sensuality) +n ml, the

door#keeper doesn’t know anythin , whereas here, the woman possesses akind of advance knowled e' she simply i nores the naive cunnin of E), hise1cuse that he is lookin for a /oiner called Lan(, and ives him to understandthat they have been waitin for him for a lon time, althou h E) chose to enterher room quite by chance, as a last desperate attempt after lon and uselessramblin '

The %rst thin he saw in the little room was a reat pendulum clock which

already pointed to ten) “Coes a /oiner called Lan( live here!" he asked) “9leaseo throu h," said a youn woman with sparklin black eyes, who was washin

children’s clothes in a tub, and she pointed her damp hand to the open door ofthe ne1t room< “+ asked for a /oiner, a man called Lan()" “+ know," said thewoman, “/ust o ri ht in)" E) mi ht not have obeyed if she had not come up tohim, rasped the handle of the door, and said “+ must shut this door after you;nobody else must come in)" 6pp)RS# 7





The situation here is e1actly the same as in the above#mentioned accident fromthe 6ra ian !i#hts ' one enters a place quite by chance and one learns thatone’s arrival has been lon e1pected) The para#do1ical advance knowled e ofthe washer#woman has nothin whatsoever to do with a so#called “feminineintuition)" +t is based on a simple fact that she is connected with the Law) &er

position re ardin the Law is far more crucial than that of a small functionary;E) %nds it out by e1perience soon afterwards when his passionatear umentation before the tribunal is interrupted by an obscene intrusion'

&ere E) was interrupted by a shriek from the end of the hall; he peered frombeneath his hand to see what was happenin , for the reek of the room and thedim li ht to ether made a whitish da((le of fo ) +t was the washer#woman,whom E) had reco ni(ed as a potential cause of disturbance from the momentof her entrance) 5hether she was at fault now or not, one could not tell) $ll Ecould see was that a man had drawn her into a comer by the door and wasclaspin her in his arms) -et it was not she who had uttered the shriek but theman; his mouth was wide open and he was a(in up at the ceilin , 6p) SS7

5hat then is the relation between the woman and the ourt of Law! +n Eafka’swork, the woman as a “psycholo ical type" is wholly consistent with theantifeminist ideolo y of an tto 5einin er; the woman is a bein without aproper 0elf, incapable of assumin an ethical attitude 6even when she appearsto act on ethical rounds, there is a hidden calculation of jouissance behind it7,a bein who hasn’t ot access to the dimension of Truth 6even when what sheis sayin is literally true, she is lyin with her sub/ective position7, a beinabout whom it is not su2cient to say that she is fei nin feelin s to seduce aman – the problem is that there is nothin behind this mask of simulation,nothin but a certain lutinous, %lthy jouissance which is her only substance)

onfronted with such an ima e of woman, Eafka doesn’t succumb to the usualcritical#feminist temptation 6of demonstratin how this % ure is the ideolo icalproduct of certain social conditions; of opposin to it the outlines of anothertype of femininity, etc)7) &is esture is much more subversive' he whollyaccepts this 5einin erian portrait of woman as a “psycholo ical type," but hemakes it occupy an unheard of, unprecedented place, the place of the Law) Thisis perhaps, as was already pointed out by 0tach, the elementary operation ofEafka' this short#circuit between the feminine “substance" 6“psycholo icaltype"7 and the place of the Law) 0meared over by an obscene vitality, the Law

itself – in traditional perspective a pure, neutral universality – assumes thefeatures of a hetero eneous, inconsistent ricola#e penetrated with jouissance )

The o'scene La"

+n Eafka’s universe, the ourt is above all lawless in a formal sense' as if thechain of “normal" connections between causes and e8ects is suspended, put inparentheses) .very attempt to establish the mode of functionin of the ourt



by means of lo ical reasonin is in advance doomed to fail' all the oppositionsnoted by E) 6between me an er of the /ud es and the lau hter of the public onthe benches; between the merry ri ht side and the severe left side of thepublic7 prove themselves false as soon as he tries to base his tactics on them;after an ordinary answer by E), the public bursts into lau hter'

“5ell, then," said the .1aminin Da istrate, turnin over the leaves andaddressin E) with an air of authority, “you are a house#painter!" “Bo," said E),“+’m the /unior mana er of a lar e *ank)" This answer evoked such a heartyoutburst of lau hter from the >i ht party that E) had to lau h too) 9eopledoubled up with their hands on their knees and shook as if in spasms ofcou hin )

The other, positive side of this inconsistency is of course /ouissance' it eruptsopenly when the ar ument of E) is disturbed by a public act of se1ualintercourse) This act, di2cult to perceive because of its over#e1posure itself 6E)

has to “peer beneath his hands to see what was happenin "7, marks themoment of the eruption of the traumatic real, and the error of E) consists inoverlookin the solidarity between this obscene disturbance and the ourt) &ethinks that everybody would be an1ious to have order restored and theo8endin couple at least e/ected from the meetin , but when he tries to rushacross the room, the crowd obstructs him, and someone sei(es him frombehind by the collar) $t this point, the ame is over' pu((led and confused, E)loses the thread of his ar ument; %lled with impotent ra e, he soon leaves theroom)

The fatal error of E) was to address the ourt, the ther of the Law, as ahomo eneous entity, attainable by means of consistent ar ument, whereas the

ourt could only return him an obscene smile mi1ed with si ns of perple1ity) +nshort, E) awaits from the ourt acts 6le al deeds, decisions7, but what he etsis an act 6a public copulation7) Eafka’s sensitiveness as to this “trespass of thefrontier which separates the vital domain from the /udicial domain" dependsupon his ?udaism' the ?ewish reli ion marks the moment of their most radicalseparation) +n all previous reli ions, we always run into a place, a domain ofsacred /ouissance 6in the form of ritual or ies, for e1ample7, whereas ?udaismevacuates from the sacred domain all traces of vitality and subordinates thelivin substance to the dead letter of the :ather’s Law) 5ith Eafka, on the

contrary, the /udicial domain is a ain 4ooded with /ouissance) 5e have a short#circuit between the ther of the Law and the Thin , the substanceof jouissance )

That’s why his universe is eminently that of supere o' the ther as the therof the symbolic Law is not only dead, it doesn’t even know that it is dead 6likethe terrible % ure from :reud’s dream7) +t couldn’t know it insofar as it is totallyinsensible to the livin substance of jouissance ) The supere o on the contrary



makes me present parado1 of a Law which “proceeds from the time when thether wasn’t yet dead) The supere o is a survivin remainder" 6?acques#$lain

Diller7) The supere o#imperative “.n/oy3", the turnin round of the dead Lawinto the obscene % ure of supere o, implies a disquietin e1perience'suddenly, we become aware of the fact that what a minute a o appeared to us

a dead letter is really alive, breathin , palpitatin ) Let’s remind ourselves of asmall scene from the movie 6lien II ) The roup of heroes is advancin in a lontunnel whose stone walls are twisted like interlaced plaits of hair, suddenly, theplaits start to move and to secrete a lutinous mucus, and the petri%ed corpsecomes to life a ain)

5e should then reverse the usual metaphors of “alienation" where the dead,formal letter sucks out, like a kind of parasite or vampire, the livin presentforce, i)e), where the livin sub/ects are prisoners of a dead cobweb) This dead,formal character of the Law is a sine ,ua non of our freedom' the realtotalitarian dan er arises when the Law doesn’t want to stay dead anymore)

The t"o lacks

The result of ml is then that there isn’t any Truth about Truth) .very 5arrant ofthe Law has the status of a semblance) The Law doesn’t have any support inthe Truth' it is necessary without bein true) “+t is not necessary to accepteverythin as true; one must only accept it as necessary," to quote the wordsof the priest’s commentary on ml) The meetin of E) with the washer#womanadds to this the reverse side usually passed by in silence' insofar as the Lawisn’t rounded in Truth, it is impre nated with jouissance )

Dl and mQ are thus complementary, representin the two modes of the lack'the lack of incompleteness, and the lack of inconsistency 6+’m referrin here toa distinction elaborated by ?)#$) Diller7) +n mK, the ther of the Law appears asincomplete' in its very heart, there is a certain ap) 5e cannot ever penetrateto the last door of the Law) $nd it is the reference to mK which supports theinterpretation of Eafka as a “writer of absence," i)e), the ne ative#theolo icalreadin of his universe as a cra(y bureaucratic machine turnin blindly arounda central void of the absent God) +n mQ, the ther of the Law appears on mecontrary as inconsistent' nothin is wantin in it, there is no lack) *ut for allthat, it still isn’t “wholeIall"; it remains an inconsistent bricola e, a collectionfollowin a kind of aleatory lo ic of jouissance ) This ives us a % ure of Eafka asa “writer of presence)" The presence of what! f a blind machinery wherenothin is lackin insofar as it is soaked in the manure of its own jouissance )

That’s why Eafka occupies the opposite pole in relation to the “unreadable"character of modem literature as e1empli%ed by ?oyce’s &inne#an’s 5a"e ) +n animmediate approach, &inne#an’s 5a"e is of course an “unreadable" book; wecannot read it the way we read an ordinary “realistic" novel) To follow the



thread of the te1t, we need a kind of “reader’s uide," a commentary enablinus to see our way in the ine1haustible network of the ciphered allusions) *ut,on the other hand, this “unreadability" functions precisely as an invitation to anunendin process of readin ) +t drives us to an incessant work of interpretation6one knows ?oyce’s /oke that with &inne#an’s 5a"e , he hopes to keep the

literary scientists occupied at least for $c ne1t four hundred years7) 5ith Eafka,the situation is rather reversed' on the level of an immediate approach) TheTrial is quite “readable"' the main outlines of the story are clear enou h, andEafka’s style is concise and of a proverbial pureness) *ut it is this “readability"itself which, because of its over#e1posed character, entails a radical opacityand blocks every attempt at interpretation) +t is as if Eafka’s te1t were acoa ulated, sti mati(ed 0K which we are tryin in vain to articulate in a chainwith an 0Q and thus provide retroactively for its si ni%cation) The Eafkian 0Krepels this articulation because it is too much impre nated with jouissance ' it isthe inert presence of a which prevents its articulation with 0Q – instead of theusual 0K U 0Q, we have a 0K#a)

olloquium ?acques Lacan' Television, Bew -ork, $pril KM, KN W

[1] ?acques Lacan, L’éthi,ue de la psychanalyse 69aris' 0euil, KN 7, p)QNS)

[#] :or this distinction between the two deaths, ?) Lacan, L’éthi,ue de la psychanalyse , chapter OO+ 6“$nti one dans l’entre#deu1#morts"7, and also myanalysis of &itchcock’s The Trouble with &arry in .cto er J 6:all KN 7, NN#KMQ)

[$] The classic te1t by .rnst Eantorowic(, The Kin#’s T4o -odies ) +n “Cas

Cin hafte der Geldware" 6 5o es 4ar K, L/ubl/ana) KN 7, >ado >iha has appliedthis notion of the sublime body to the Dar1ian theory of commodity#fetishism)

[%] laude Lefort, L’invention démocrati,ue 69aris' :ayard KN K7)

[&] This whole periodi(ation of Lacan’s teachin is indebted to ?acques#$lainDiller’s seminar)

[*] .rnesto LaclauI hantal Dou8e, *e#emony and 1ocialist 1trate#y 6London'Verso, KN 7)

[,] ?acques Lacan, Encore 69aris' 0euil, KNWS7, p) S)

[2] Dichel 0ilvestre, Demain la psychanalyse 69aris' Bavarin, KN 7)

[3] Dladen Colar) “&itchcocks b/ekt," in 5o es 4ar Q, L/ubl/ana) KN )

[14] ?acques Lacan, Encore , p) J)

[11] Tastko Docnik, “=eber die *edeutun der himXren fYr die condidohumana," in 5o es 4ar K, L/ubl/ana, KN )

http://www.lacan.com/symptom/?p=38#_ftnref1
























[1#] Diaden Colar, “Cie .infYhrun in das 0erail," 5o es 4ar J#R) L/ubl/ana,KN W)

[1$] + am quotin The Trial from the 9en uin Dodern lassics edition,translated by 5ills and .dwin Duir)

[1%] >einer 0tach, Kaf"as erotischer (ythos 6:rankfurt' :ischer, KN W7, p) J )

$rt' Gillian 5earin , 1elf Portrait as my (other 7ean Gre#ory , 1elf Portrait asmy &ather -rian 5earin# , QMMJ)







the lacanian real

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