the legal and political economy of abs: abs and non-parties to the nagoya protocol

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The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

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The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol. About the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL). - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Page 2: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

About the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law

(CISDL)

• Contacts: – Ms. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Senior Director -

[email protected]– Prof. Jorge Cabrera Medaglia, Lead Counsel,

Biodiversity & Biosafety Law - [email protected]– Mr. Frederic Perron-Welch, Programme Coordinator,

Biodiversity & Biosafety Law - [email protected]

• The CISDL is an independent legal research centre that collaborates with the McGill University Faculty of Law and Cambridge University, and also works with a network of developing countries’ faculties of law

• The Centre’s mission is to promote sustainable societies and the protection of ecosystems by advancing the understanding, development and implementation of international sustainable development law.

Page 3: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

A Brief History of Access and Benefit-Sharing under the CBD

1993

CBDFair and equitable BS established as the third objective, access to GR is based on Art 15.

ABSin Development

Over 20 Years

1998

2006

2000

2004

COP-4Decision IV/8 on ABS establishes an expert panel to develop common understanding of basic concepts and to explore all options for ABS.

COP-5Decision V/26 reconvenes expert panel and establishes a WG on ABS to consider terms for PIC/MAT, etc.

WSSD Para 44(o) calls for the negotiation of an international regime on ABS.

2002

COP-6Decision VI/24 adopts Bonn Guidelines, extends mandate of WG on ABS to work on use of terms, definitions etc.

COP-7Affirmed Bonn Guidelines and focused WG to look at Art.8(j) and Art.15 intersections.

Ad-hoc Working Group on ABS (WG ABS)The WG on ABS had 9 meetings (2002-2010) to develop guidelines on ABS protection, draft terms relating to key terms (PIC, MAT, Definitions etc…) and spearheaded the ongoing elaboration and negotiation of the international regime on ABS.

COP-10Parties adopt the Nagoya Protocol on ABS in Decision X/1 .

2008 2010 2014

COP-8Established meeting schedule for WG to complete its work “as early as possible”.

COP-9Set further WG meetings and called on Parties to implement Arts. 8(j) and 15 by the next meeting.

Ongoing Negotiations in WG ABS

2002

COP-12/COP-MOP 1Nagoya Protocol on ABS enters into force 12 October 2014.

Page 4: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Target Summary

Target 16 aims to implement the third objective of the CBD on equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources by ratifying or acceding to the Protocol in sufficient numbers for it to enter into force by 2015 and be operational.

• The Target requires countries to undertake the necessary domestic legal and political process to adhere to the international treaty, and to assess and modify existing rules or develop new legislation, regulations or administrative measures to ensure effective implementation of Protocol obligations.

• Operationalization of the Nagoya Protocol will require meeting new obligations while taking into account existing national legislation on subjects as varied as contract law, indigenous rights, property law, intellectual property rights, confidentiality, access to justice etc.

Aichi Target 16 - By 2015, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization is in force and operational, consistent with national legislation

CBD Strategic Plan 2011-2020

Page 5: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

ABS in Context• The basic obligations relating to access to

genetic resources and benefit sharing resulting from their use flow from the CBD, which has 194 Parties.

• The Nagoya Protocol will soon provide an additional level of regulation for those CBD Parties that are also Parties to the Protocol (53) when it enters into force 12 October 2014.

• Despite near universal membership, the CBD lacks one of the biggest players in the field of biotechnology: the USA.

• As a result, there are three categories of States: Parties to the NP & CBD, Parties only to the CBD, and non-Parties to both agreements

Page 6: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

ABS in Context• The three categories of Parties creates legal

and economic implications for most Parties to the CBD: i.e. States that are Parties to the CBD but not Parties to the Protocol.

• These countries are bound by the ABS obligations found in Articles 8(j) and 15, but may have close ties to States that are in other categories (Parties to the Nagoya Protocol, or the United States of America).

• As a consequence, issues of political economy occupy the minds of national decision-makers when considering the ratification of the Nagoya Protocol.

Page 7: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: Canada

• Federal parliamentary democracy with ten provinces and three territories.

• Constitutional division of powers between Federal and Provincial Governments.

• Party to the CBD, Non-Party & Non-Signatory to the Nagoya Protocol.

• Diverse aboriginal population with differing treaty rights depending on time of contact.

• Consultations on ABS Policies have been carried out for ten years with no clear result.

General Information

Page 8: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: Canada

• At 9.98 million sq./km, Canada is the world's second-largest country by total area, with 15 terrestrial ecozones, which can be subdivided into 53 ecoprovinces and 194 ecoregions, and 5 marine ecozones.

• The ecozones range from temperate rainforests in the West to Arctic Cordillera in the North and include arctic, plains, boreal forest, taiga, wetlands, mountains and deciduous forests.

Biogeography

Page 9: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: Canada

• 11th largest economy in the world with a GDP of over $1.8 trillion

• 8th on Human Development Index• Per-capita income of ~$52,000/yr• Member of OECD, G8, G20, WTO, APEC

Commonwealth• One of the world’s top 10 trading

nations with a highly globalized economy

• Ranked 4th in the world for scientific research in 2012

• Bio-based economy has grown to over 6% of GDP and 1,000,000 jobs

Economy

Page 10: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: Canada

Free Trade Agreements

Page 11: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: CanadaDraft Policy Guidance • Identifies the objectives, guiding

principles, scope and common elements that Canada’s federal, provincial and territorial governments agree should guide the development and implementation of measures to manage genetic resources within their jurisdictions.

• Non-binding and only approved in draft form. No updates since it was released.

Page 12: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: CanadaObjectives• Promote the conservation and sustainable

use of Canada’s biodiversity• Improve Canada’s competitiveness in the bio-

based economy• Support ethical scientific research and

development• Foster regional and Aboriginal development• Support Canada’s foreign policy objectives• Contribute to the improvement of the health

of Canadians

Page 13: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: CanadaPrinciples• Environment-focused – contributing to

the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity

• Practical and economically supportive –generating and sharing economic benefits of the utilization of genetic resources among both providers and users as a means of contributing to sustainable development

• Simple, efficient and adaptable – taking into account different sectors and allowing for different approaches in different jurisdictions

Page 14: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: CanadaPrinciples• Supportive of current governmental

policies – and building on and respecting Canada’s existing international commitments

• Balanced, equitable and transparent – balancing responsibilities between users and providers of genetic resources in a manner that is clear and whose rationale makes sense

• Inclusive – developed and implemented with the appropriate involvement of Aboriginal groups and communities

Page 15: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Case Study: CanadaImplementing ABS Policy in CanadaCanada’s federal, provincial and territorial governments agreed to:1. Encourage the application of existing

mechanisms, such as contracts and permits, to the fullest extent possible, supplemented by regulatory and non-regulatory measures.

2. Promote consistency through, for example, the use of consistent public information.

3. Collaborate in the development, application and monitoring of implementation tools and in the development of cooperative approaches to ABS policy in Canada.

4. Share their experiences regarding access and benefit sharing with other jurisdictions.

Page 16: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Conclusions• The Nagoya Protocol will enter into force on 12 October 2014 with 54 of 194 CBD Parties as

members, leaving 140 Parties to the CBD that are non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol.• This creates a situation where CBD Parties must attempt to implement Article 15 while taking

into consideration non-Parties to the CBD, and Parties to the Nagoya Protocol.• International political economy will play a large role in determining whether the Nagoya

Protocol becomes universal or effectively creates a cartel for genetic resources among its Parties (i.e. by blacklisting researchers and companies from non-Parties due to concerns over compliance).

• Industrialized countries like Canada will likely remain outside the ambit of the Nagoya Protocol until the international situation strongly influences the Government’s cost/benefit analysis.

• In Canada, the economic harm caused by ratifying the Nagoya Protocol would likely exceed the economic benefits due to economic integration with the United States.

• For the Canadian Government, this material calculation outweighs any moral or ethical considerations linked to benefit-sharing on GR and TK.

Page 17: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Question for the Audience

How do we alter the international political/economic calculations that undermine the functionality of ABS to increase the number of Parties to the Nagoya Protocol?

Page 18: The Legal and Political Economy of ABS: ABS and Non-Parties to the Nagoya Protocol

Thank You

Mr. Frederic Perron-Welch, M.A. LL.B.Legal Research Fellow and Programme Coordinator, Biodiversity & Biosafety Law

Centre for International Sustainable Development Law3644 Peel St, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 1W9

www.cisdl.org / [email protected]