Generationsand GenderProgramme

The life of Poles: From leaving the parental home to retirement

Insights from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS-PL)

Irena E. Kotowska, Anna Matysiak, Monika Mynarska (Eds.)

AuthorsIrena E. Kotowska, Full ProfessorWiktoria Wróblewska, Associate ProfessorAnita Abramowska-Kmon, PhDBarbara Bobrowicz, PhDAgnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, PhDIzabela Grabowska, PhDKatarzyna Kocot-Górecka, PhDAnna Matysiak, PhDMonika Mynarska, PhDPaweł Strzelecki, PhDKrzysztof Tymicki, PhDZuzanna Brzozowska, PhD studentWojciech Łątkowski, PhD studentBeata Osiewalska, PhD studentAnna Rybińska, PhD studentEwelina Słotwińska-Rosłanowska, MSc

PublisherWarsaw School of EconomicsCollegium of Economic AnalysisInstitute of Statistics and DemographyMadalińskiego 6/802-513 Warszawatel.: +48 (22) 564 92 70fax: 48 (22) 564 86 43http://sgh.waw.pl/isdisd@sgh.waw.pl

EditorsIrena E. KotowskaAnna MatysiakMonika Mynarska

English translationKrystyna Kupiszewska

Language editingAnna Rybińska

Graphic design and typesettingZuzanna Brzozowska

PrintDrukarnia „Remi-B”Krzysztof Boiński, Adam Krokowski Spółka JawnaStrażacka 3543-382 Bielsko-Biała

The Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), a questionnaire-based panel study, is a part of the internatio-nal Generations and Gender Programme (GGP) launched in 2001. Since 2009 the programme has beencoordinated by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) http://www.ggp-i.org/.

The Institute of Statistics and Demography within the Collegium of Economic Analysis of the WarsawSchool of Economics has joined the Generations and Gender Programme. The first wave of the surveywas conducted at the turn of the years 2010/2011; the second, at the turn of the years 2014/2015, incooperation with the Bureau of Research and Statistical Analyses of the Polish Statistical Association.This publication uses the results of analyses presented in articles and studies in which data from bothwaves of the study were used.

This publication was prepared as a part of a project funded by the National Science Centre (Poland),decision no. DEC-2013/08/M/HS4/00421.

Warsaw, December 2016

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Introduction

In Poland, like in other European countries, we are experiencing a fundamental change in the process ofgenerational replacement. Fertility, i.e. the number of children per woman aged 15-49, has fallen to alevel that is far from ensuring replacement of generations (defined as slightly over two children perwoman). More people reach advanced old age and migration is playing an increasingly large role inshaping the country's population size and its demographic structures. The consequences of this changein the form of declining population size, rapid growth of the number of people aged 65 and over, andshrinking size of the workforce (consisting of people aged 18-64) are constantly present in public debate.However, far less attention is paid to getting to the heart of the ongoing demographic transformationand discovering its causes even though increasingly rich empirical material is currently available.

Particularly valuable data, which may significantly contribute to a better understanding of thedemographic changes in Poland, come from the two waves of the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS)conducted in Poland at the turns of the years 2010/2011 and 2014/2015 within the internationalGenerations and Gender Programme (GGP). The aim of this programme is to provide knowledgeconcerning the transformation of family life with respect to family formation, childbearing, familydissolution and to the roles of men and women in the organisation of family life. Relations betweengenerations as well as attitudes towards and opinions about the family are also in its scope of interest.

The uniqueness of the resulting database lies in the abundance of collected data about the life course ofrespondents aged 18-79, including information on leaving the parental home, partnership formation,conception difficulties, decisions concerning children, education, work and retiring. These data do notonly make it possible to analyse behaviours of different generations, they also allow for internationalcomparisons. This is because a standardised questionnaire is used across all countries participating inthe Generations and Gender Programme. Moreover, it is the only empirical database in Poland thatdocuments in great detail demographic behaviours concerning the family and simultaneously containsinformation about various aspects of the respondents’ lives, e.g. professional and educational activity,economic situation, values, norms and health status, as well as about public and private transfers ofservices, goods and financial means to the household.

Both survey waves were financed by the National Science Centre under two research projects "Panelsurvey of changes in relationships between generations, in the family and between men and women:Generations, families and gender" (1st and 2nd wave). We are grateful to the Netherlands InterdisciplinaryDemographic Institute for the institutional support and to Professor Aart C. Liefbroer for sharing hisknowledge and experience with us.

This publication aims to present selected results of analyses that use data from the Generations andGender Survey in Poland (GGS-PL). Due to the large volume of the empirical material, it was impossibleto present all of it. Therefore, we chose those findings that—in our opinion—are central forunderstanding how individual decisions concerning the family, education and work in Poland are shaped,and to shed light on the changes in the life course of the generations entering adulthood after 1989.

Irena E. Kotowska, Anna Matysiak and Monika Mynarska

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About the authors

IrenaE.Kotowska,professor,directorof the InstituteofStatisticsandDemography, Collegium of Economic Analysis, Warsaw School ofEconomics (WSE); presidentof theDemographicSciencesCommit-tee, Polish Academy of Sciences, chair of GGP Council of Partners;research interests: interdependence between demographic andeconomic processes, particularly changes in family and demo-graphicstructures inconnectionwith labourmarket transformation,populationpolicy; iekoto@sgh.waw.pl

WiktoriaWróblewska,associate professor, Institute of Statistics andDemography, WSE; research interests: health and mortalitydeterminants,social inequality in health,reproductive health; socialand cultural determinants of demographic transformations;wwrobl@sgh.waw.pl

Anita Abramowska-Kmon, assistant professor, head of the Demo-graphy Unit, Institute of Statistics and Demography,WSE; researchinterests: the population ageing process and its socio-economicconsequences, demographic forecasting, care for the elderly, lifesatisfactionofpersonsaged50andover;aabram@sgh.waw.pl

Barbara Bobrowicz, senior academic assistant, College of Europe(Natolin); research interests: labour market economics, relationbetween professional, educational and family activity, social andfamilypolicy;barbara.bobrowicz@coleurope.eu

Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, assistant professor, Institute ofStatistics and Demography, WSE; assistant professor, EducationalResearch Institute; research interests: social and economicconsequences of population ageing,economic activity over the lifecourse, lifelong learning, decision-making regarding retirement,impact of changes in population age structures on private andpublicconsumptionandpopulationincome;achlon@sgh.waw.pl

Izabela Grabowska, assistant professor, Institute of Statistics andDemography, WSE; scientific secretary, Demographic SciencesCommittee, Polish Academy of Sciences; research interests:consequences of demographic processes, in particular related tothe population and workforce ageing process,evaluation of publicpolicy:assessingitsqualityandoptimisingitsdesign;igrabow@sgh.waw.pl

Katarzyna Kocot-Górecka, assistant professor, Institute of Statisticsand Demography, WSE; research interests: determinants ofdemographic processes, in particular changes in the family,includingbeliefsaboutgender roles,changeson the labourmarketandqualityof life;kkocot@sgh.waw.pl

Anna Matysiak, research scientist,Vienna Institute of Demography;assistant professor, Institute of Statistics and Demography, WSE;

research interests: transformations in the family and men and wo-men's economic activity, division of tasks in the household andqualityof life,familypolicyandfatherhood;anna.matysiak@oeaw.ac.at

Monika Mynarska, assistant professor, Institute of Psychology,Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw; research interests:desires and intentions regarding parenthood and the process ofreproductive decision-making, marriage and cohabitation, quali-tative and mixed-research approaches in social demography;m.mynarska@uksw.edu.pl

Paweł Strzelecki, assistant professor, Institute of Statistics andDemography, WSE; research interests: impact of demographicchangesonthe labourmarket,determinantsofeconomicactivityofpersons in households, consequences of changes in pensionsystemsandpopulationforecasting;pstrzel1@sgh.waw.pl

Krzysztof Tymicki, assistant professor, Institute of Statistics andDemography, WSE; research interests: analysis of populationreproduction patterns in the context of social and biologicaldeterminants, quantitative data analysis and measurementmethodologyindemography;krzysztof.tymicki@sgh.waw.pl

Zuzanna Brzozowska, MA, PhD student, Institute of Statistics andDemography, WSE; researcher, Vienna Institute of Demography;research interests: fertility,sociology of the family, family and socialpolicy,socialstratification,quantitativedataanalysis;zuzanna.brzozowska@oeaw.ac.at

Wojciech Łątkowski, MSc, PhD student, Institute of Statistics andDemography, WSE; research interests: demographic projections,consequences of population ageing,health and family situation oftheelderly;wlatko@sgh.waw.pl

BeataOsiewalska,MSc,researchassistantandPhDstudent,CracowUniversity of Economics; research interests: shaping of couples'fertility depending on partners'socio-economic status, in particularimpact of socio-economic (in)equality between partners in a rela-tionship,fertilitymodelling and Bayesian approach in demography;beata.osiewalska@uek.krakow.pl

Anna Rybińska, MSc, PhD student, University of North Carolina atChapelHill; research interests: fertility,sociologyof thefamily,familyandsocialpolicy;arybinska@unc.edu

Ewelina Słotwińska-Rosłanowska, MSc, lecturer, Institute ofStatistics and Demography, WSE; research interests: family policy,reconciling work and family obligations, changes in familyformationandchildbearingbehaviours;eslotw@sgh.waw.pl

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Table of contents

1.The Generations and Gender Survey as a tool for explaining demographic change in Poland

THE CHANGING LIFE COURSE2. Life course development of young adults. Entry to adulthood

3. Later entry to parenthood. What about subsequent children?

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN4. Is marriage an outdated institution?

5. Gender role attitudes in Poland

6. Division of housework and childcare between women and men

CHILDREN7. Do highly educated partners have fewer children than low educated partners?

8. Do couples with a better educated female partner have fewer children?

9. Later or never? Childbearing intentions of childless men and women

10. Childbearing intentions and their realisation

11. Birth control methods and the desire to have a child

12. Postponing birth of the first child and the realisation of childbearing intentions

13. Can health problems limit women's reproductive intentions?

INTERGENERATIONAL CARE14. What is the role of grandparents in caring for grandchildren?

15. Who cares for adults in need?

QUALITY OF LIFE AT ITS DIFFERENT STAGES16. How often do Poles experience tensions between paid work and family?

17. Job satisfaction and reconciliation of work and family

18. How does the health of Polish men and women change over the life course?

19. Loneliness among persons aged 50+

20. Who retires earlier?

APPENDIXReferences

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1. The Generations and Gender Survey as atool for explaining demographic changein Poland

The Generations and Gender Programme (here-after: GGP) is a long-term international demo-graphic research programme launched in 2001. Itconsists of two parts: a panel survey with stan-dardised methodology (Generations and GenderSurvey, hereafter: GGS) and a database of con-textual country-level indices (the Contextual DataBase, hereafter: CDB).

The GGS is conducted in 3 to 5 waves carried outevery 3 years on a random sample of 15 to 20thousand respondents aged 18-79 in each of thecountries participating in the GGP. The surveys areconducted using a questionnaire with standard-ized, compulsory modules and optional, additionalmodules. Moreover, individual countries canbroaden the scope of information obtained inboth types of modules depending on their specificresearch needs. However, the partners are obligedto maintain data comparability to the extent setby experts. The Contextual Data Base containstime series of macro-level indicators of economic,demographic and social processes and adescription of legal regulations along with theirchanges over time (for 60 countries over the last40 years). This dualistic, longitudinal and multi-level approach to studying demographic change iswhat makes this research concept an innovativestep in social sciences. The demographic changesare analysed in connection with labour marketchanges and in parallel with social changesrelated to the family model, intergenerationalrelations and the gendered division of socialroles. Moreover, the research programmeintegrates the micro- and the macro-level ap-proaches (data from the GGS and the CDB).

Currently, 19 countries participate in the GGP. Upto now, the first wave of the survey has beenconducted in all of them (Australia, Austria,Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France,

Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania,Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Romania andSweden), while 12 countries have conducted thesecond wave (Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania,Netherlands, Poland, Russia and Italy).

The international GGS database isthe only source of individual panel datain Europe that allows for in-depthanalyses of family formation, develop-ment and dissolution and for exploringrelationships between its members

The international GGS database covers the de-tailed information on life courses of respondentsaged 18-79, collected in subsequent waves of thesurvey. It is the only base of micro panel data inEurope that allows for comparative longitudinalanalyses of family dynamics, intergenerationaltransfers and relationships in connection withprofessional activity and the evolution of men andwomen's social roles. Moreover, in Central andEastern European countries it is the only source ofpanel data about demographic behaviours under-lying the widely-debated population changes inthe region. Thus, it is not surprising that amongthe 19 countries that have conducted the firstwave of the Generations and Gender Survey, thereare 8 countries from this region.

The scope of the questionnaire in Poland wasdetermined by GGP methodological recommenda-tions, but it also took into account the specificnature of local research needs. Importantly, itallows for interdisciplinary panel analyses ofdemographic change in the country, which havenot been possible previously. The questionnairecontains questions about family history, thecourse of professional careers and education. Itthus allows for revealing the important events in

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the respondents' lives with respect to formationand dissolution of unions/the family as well as toparenthood. It allows for picturing the inter-relationships between these events, work andeducation. The economic situation of families,organisation of family life, health, social contacts,and relationships between parents, children andgrandparents were also important foci in thesurvey. Data about values, intentions and expecta-tions were collected together with informationabout difficulties in realisation of such intentions(e.g. related to health, insufficient state support orlabour market expectations).

The scope of the Polish GGSquestionnaire was broadened to obtaininformation necessary for describingand understanding changes in demo-graphic behaviours in Poland in thecontext of transformation happeningon the labour market and ongoingcultural changes. The aim was tocapture changes in lives of differentgenerations

According to the methodological recommenda-tions for the panel survey of at least 3 waves, thesample in the first round should cover 17 to 20thousand persons. This is to guarantee adequatenumbers of respondents in specific subpopula-tions studied in subsequent waves. During thefirst wave in Poland (GGS-PL1), conducted at theturn of 2010 and 2011, nearly 20 thousandpersons were interviewed. Respondents, aged 18-79, came from households living in randomlyselected dwellings. In each household only oneperson was interviewed.

The results of the second wave (GGS-PL2), whichtook place at the turn of 2014 and 2015,confirmed that it had been indeed necessary tocover such a large sample in the first wave. Of the19,987 respondents from the GGS-PL1, 15,272persons expressed willingness to be interviewedagain in 3 years' time, and 2,190 persons wereundecided. Nevertheless, an effort was made to

contact all participants from the first wave.Eventually, interviews were conducted with12,419 respondents, i.e. 62% of the initial sample.In the second wave, 1,477 persons aged 18-21were additionally sampled and interviewed, inorder to supplement the category of the youngestrespondents. In total, the GGS-PL2 covered 13,896individuals.

The most important reasons for attrition in GGS-PL2, identified in 5,198 cases, were refusals (44%),changes in the household's address of residence(15%), respondent's death (10%), respondent'smove abroad (8%) or to another place in Poland(9%).

Participants who could not be interviewed due toan international migration were–in GGS-PL1–members of households formed by couples withchildren (41%), childless couples (23%) and one-person households (15%). Among respondentsmigrating abroad 57% were women and personsaged up to 44 accounted for 42%.

In both waves of the GGS-PL survey respondentswere members of households composed mainly ofcouples with children and childless couples. Theshare of one-person households was alsosignificant.

Despite a considerable sample attrition, detailedpanel data on 12,419 respondents were collectedin GGS-PL2. It is the only panel database in

Fig. 1.1 Respondents by household type GGS-PL1(N=19,987) and GGS-PL2 (N=13,896).

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Poland with such a broad range of informationabout family change, intergenerational relation-ships and gender dynamics. This publicationpresents only selected results of the analysesconducted by the GGS-PL team that document theextent of demographic changes in Poland. Theinclusion of GGS-PL data from both waves intothe international GGS database makes it alsopossible to discuss family changes in Poland incomparison to other countries. According to the

GGP recommendations, the third wave of thepanel survey should be conducted 3 years afterthe preceding one. This data would allow for evenmore in-depth analyses, covering a longer timespan. Therefore, despite concerns over a reductionin the panel sample size, the Polish team iscurrently preparing to conduct the third wave ofthe survey.

Based on a report by Irena E. Kotowskaand Wojciech Łątkowski

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THE CHANGING LIFE COURSE

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The life course of every person may be described asa sequence of key events related to education, workand family life. Relatively many of these events arerelated to the specific stage in the individual's lifecalled the “transition to adulthood”: finishing school,starting one's first job, leaving the parental homeand forming one's own family.

The “Generations and Gender Survey in Poland”allowed us to study the life course developments inearly adulthood of men and women born in theyears 1950-1984. Observing the trajectories of Polesborn after World War II we see that parenthood isinvariably the last event of the transition toadulthood, but is occurring increasingly late in thecourse of young people's lives. Meanwhile eventsthat precede parenthood—leaving parental home,finishing education, the first job—have changedorder. We illustrate these changes with comparisonsof two cohorts: respondents born between 1950 and1954 and those born between 1975 and 1979,which we treat as proxies for a generation ofparents and their children.

Young generations remain in educa-tion longer than their parents—alsoafter starting work. They also formfamilies increasingly late

Women from the 1950-1954 cohort left theirparental homes after finishing education, starting

work and getting married. They then had theirfirst child—on average around their 23rd birthday,which ended their “transition to adulthood”.Women from the 1975-1979 cohort first startedworking, subsequently left their parental homes,and only then finished education (which lastedlonger than for those of the 1950-1954 cohort)and got married. They gave birth to their firstchild on average three years later than theirmothers' generation, at the age of 26.

In the case of men the process of delaying thetransition to adulthood is even clearer. Men fromthe 1975-1979 cohort decided to get married andhave a child far later than the generation of theirfathers and for them, the “transition to adulthood”ended as late as around the age of 30. However,the sequence of events in their life coursechanged to a lesser degree than in the case ofwomen. The only difference in the life course ofmen born between 1975 and 1979 and that oftheir fathers is that the younger cohort startedworking before finishing education while menfrom the older generation first finished educationand only then started working. Men from the1975-1979 cohort left the parental homes afterschool graduation—similarly to their fathers—while their female peers left the parental homebefore graduation, in contrast to their mothers’experiences.

What percentage of men and women born in the years:1950-1954 1975-1979

63% 65%

91% 76%

90% 75%

75% 53%

69% 51%

Left the parental home before age 25

Finished education before age 25

Started their first job before age 25

Contracted a marriage before age 25

Became a parent before age 25

1950-1954 1975-1979

54% 46%

91% 76%

95% 85%

54% 28%

41% 23%

Women Men

Tab. 2.1. Transition to adulthood-related events experienced by men and women before their 25th birthday, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

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2. Life course development of young adults .Entry to adulthood

Finishingeducation First job Leaving the

parental home Marriage First childCompleting the

transition to adult-hood at age 25.8

First job Finishingeducation

Leaving theparental home

Marriage (aftercohabitation) First child

Men born in the years 1950-1954

Men born in the years 1975-1979

Completing thetransition to adult-hood at age 29.9

Finishingeducation First job Marriage Leaving the

parental home First childCompleting the

transition to adult-hood at age 22.9

First job Leaving theparental home

Finishingeducation

Marriage (aftercohabitation) First child

Women born in the years 1950-1954

Women born in the years 1975-1979

Completing thetransition to adult-

hood at age 26

Prolonged spells of education and labour marketentry before the end of the schooling process arethe most characteristic changes in the “transitionto adulthood” of young generations. Among per-sons born in the second half of the 1970s almosta quarter had not finished education before their25th birthday. In their parents' generation thiswas true for only every tenth person.

Men are leaving the parental homeincreasingly late, and they are doing solater than women

An analysis of the age at which young people inPoland experience events that constitute the“transition to adulthood” shows that all of themare occurring later and later. With one exception:leaving the parental home by women. Womenfrom both analysed cohorts left the parentalhome predominantly before reaching the age of25. Notably, women from the 1950-1954 cohortleft home to reside with their husbands butwomen from the 1970-1979 cohort left homebefore marriage was contracted, to live alone or

cohabit. Men decided to leave their parentalhome far later. Over a half of men born in theyears 1950-1954 left the parental home beforetheir 25th birthday but the ratio dropped to 46%for men born in the years 1975-1979.

The life course trajectories described here presentthe typical order of events in the lives of youngPoles. Notably, the life trajectories of youngergenerations are also becoming increasingly di-verse. Marriage is increasingly preceded by aperiod of cohabitation. Young people remain ineducation longer and longer, often returning toschool after a break. They start working beforecompleting education, but at the same time theyfrequently experience unemployment. Their“transition to adulthood” contains a greater num-ber of events and is stretched over a longerperiod of time. Subsequent generations extendthe process even more – for many men bornbetween 1980 and 1984 the transition toadulthood is still not finished even though theyhave entered their fourth decade of life.

Based on a report by Anna Rybińska

Fig. 2.1. Sequence of events in the transition to adulthood of men and women born in the years 1950-54 and 1975-79, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

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3. Later entry to parenthood. What aboutsubsequent children?

Since the 1990s, a marked childbearing postpone-ment has been observed in Poland. Both men andwomen delay the transition to parenthood. Thischange in reproductive behaviours is reflected bythe raising mean age at (first) birth. For women,the mean age at first birth rose from 23.3 in 1989to 26.9 in 2015, while the mean age at birthincreased from 26.3 to 29.1. This is related to thechanging reproductive behaviours of women bornafter 1969. The GGS-PL study gives us an oppor-tunity to show to what extent these behavioursdiffer from the behaviours of women born earlier.Importantly, the study also provides the possibilityof comparing reproductive behaviours of sub-sequent generations of men.

Does parenthood postponement shorten theinterval between the first and second child? Thisquestion is particularly important for women: aswomen age, the risk of infertility increases andthe time of waiting for conception lengthens.

Later parenthood is primarily connected with theextension of the period in education. Differencesin the timing of first birth due to varying edu-cational attainment are thus expected.

Both men and women delayparenthood

For women reaching the peak of their reproduct-ive period in the years of the centrally-plannedeconomy, the mean age at first birth was stable,slightly under 24 years. A distinct postponementof first childbirth was first observed for womenborn in the early 1970s and became more pro-nounced for women born in the years 1975-1979.The average age at first birth could increase evenmore for this youngest cohort, as some womenborn in the late 1970s might still decide tobecome mothers in their late 30s or 40s.

For men, the delay in the transition to fatherhoodwas gradual for subsequent cohorts therefore thetrend for those born after 1969 is in line withchanges observed for previous generations (Fig.3.1).

Second child comes alsoincreasingly late

Although nowadays the decision to become aparent comes increasingly late, it does notshorten the interval between the births of thefirst and the second child. Women born in theyears 1955-1969, who became mothers atyounger ages, also had their second child withinshorter intervals compared to previous cohorts.

Fig. 3.1 Mean age of parents at first birth by cohortand sex, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

Fig. 3.2 Average interval between birth of first andsecond child by cohort and sex (in years), GGS-PL1 andGGS-PL2.

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The interval was shortest for women born in theyears 1960-1964 who bore their first and secondchild on average only 3.5 years apart.

The situation has changed for women born after1969, who entered their most fecund years in late1990 or later, thus after the political upheaval of1989. For these women, two separate shifts areobserved: motherhood postponement and theextension of the interval between first and secondchildbirth.

The changes for men are less pronounced: astabilization of the first-second birth interval ataround 4 years for cohorts born before 1969 wasfollowed by a slow extension of the interval forthose born in 1970 and later.

Tertiary education is an increasinglyimportant determinant of parenthoodpostponement

Finally, we need to reflect upon the role ofeducation in fertility postponement. Clearly, thelonger a person stays in education, the later he orshe becomes a parent. Importantly, the level ofeducational attainment matters more for thetransition to parenthood for women compared tomen. The importance of tertiary education be-comes stronger for respondents born after 1969(i.e., reaching adulthood after 1989), especially forwomen.

These results, in tandem with a shifting educa-tional composition of younger generations, espe-cially with the increasing university enrolment ofwomen indicate that the process of postponingparenthood in Poland will continue.

Based on a report by Barbara Bobrowicz

Fig. 3.3 Mean age of parents at first birth by cohort, sex and education , GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN

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4. Is marriage an outdated inst itut ion?

Over the last decades significant changes infamily life have occurred in Poland. Young peopledelay marriage and increasingly often chose tocohabit before or instead of marriage. Parenthoodpostponement and divorce are common. Do thesechanges indicate a crisis of the institution ofmarriage? What do Poles think about marriageand divorce?

Marriage is valued, but only half ofrespondents believe it is unbreakable

Among GGS-PL respondents, only every one in tenagreed with the statement that “marriage is anoutdated institution”. Clearly, most Poles valuemarriage but do not consider it unbreakable. Slightlyover half of respondents believed that marriage is alifetime relationship and should not be ended, butat the same time over 60% accept that an unhappymarriage could end in a divorce, even if the couplehas children. Importantly, at the same time a vastmajority (88%) of respondents admitted that a childshould live with both parents in order to develophappily. The most traditional opinions aboutmarriage and divorce were held by persons in theeldest age group (60+ years old) but the differencebetween eldest and youngest was not large.

Over half of respondents acceptcohabitation, but the views of theeldest and youngest respondents aremarkedly different

Half of respondents agreed with the statement thata couple has the right to live together even if theyhave no interest in marriage. Attitudes towardcohabitation divide the older and younger re-spondents: over two thirds of persons aged 18-30were accepting a decision to cohabit but only 35%of respondents aged 60 had the same opinion.

All in all, the results indicate that Poles hold fairlytraditional attitudes towards family issues. Therespondents quite unequivocally indicate marriageas the basic form for family formation, even thoughsome respondents—especially those under 30—agree a couple could cohabit and a marriage coulddissolve. Notably, certain subpopulations are par-ticularly liberal in their views. Younger or highereducated respondents and those residing in urbanareas demonstrate positive attitudes towards lesstraditional family forms.

The results presented here are based on datacollected in the second wave of the GGS-PL(2014/2015). Remarkably, these views do not differmuch from those expressed four years earlier, in thefirst wave of the survey. These results, as well as acomparison of the GGS data with earlier studies ofopinions and attitudes of Poles, indicate a slowchange of views on family issues in Poland.

Fig. 4.1 Attitudes towards selected aspects of familylife. Support for each statement in the whole sampleand among the youngest and the eldest respondents,GGS-PL2.

Based on a report by EwelinaSłotwińska-Rosłanowska

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5. Gender role att itudes in Poland

People have different views on the social roles ofmen and women. Some believe that the woman’srole is to look after children and the man’s toprovide income for the family. Such traditionalviews are expressed in opinions that mothers’involvement in the labour market is detrimentalto children’s development, that men are bettersuited for some professions than women (forexample, they make better political leaders ormanagers) and consequently they should havepriority access to jobs in case of unemployment.Other people have more egalitarian attitudes:they are more likely to think that both partnersare responsible for childcare and providingincome, and do not perceive women’s involve-ment in the labour market as a threat to thewelfare and development of children or theirrelationship with a male partner.

Gender role attitudes are an individual matter,but, as it turns out, traditional views dominate insome countries and egalitarian views in othercountries. This is related to the historical past ofthe country and its numerous institutional,cultural, political and economic circumstances. Forexample, in Southern European countries genderrole attitudes are more traditional, and in Scan-dinavian countries, more egalitarian. And what arethe gender role attitudes in Poland?

We studied views on gender roles in three di-mensions, measures of which were created basedon the basis of respondents’ reactions to thefollowing statements:

The role of men and women in public life:In general, men make better political leaders

than women.

In a situation where there are not enough jobs,men should have a greater right to work thanwomen.

The role of men and women in intimaterelationships:

In a relationship it is better for the man to beolder than the woman.

It is not good for a relationship when thewoman earns more than the man.

The woman’s role as a mother versus an economi-cally active person:

A small child suffers when its mother works.

Persons who consistently agreed with statementsin a given dimension were assumed to hold tradi-tional views; persons who disagreed—egalitarianviews; and persons who did not have a definiteopinion were assumed to be undecided. The ana-lyses were conducted for men and women aged20-84 years.

Poles’ views on gender roles inpublic life and intimate relationshipsare divided

Attitudes toward gender roles in public lifeexpressed by women are more egalitarian thanthose expressed by men. Around 40% of men and60% of women disagree with the view that menmake better political leaders than women andthat men should have priority access to jobs incase of widespread unemployment. A large shareof both men and women (around 20-30%) areundecided on this issue, however, and nearly 20%of women and slightly over 30% of men expresstraditional attitudes. Attitudes toward genderroles in intimate relationships are even morepolarised. The percentage of women expressingegalitarian views on gender roles in intimaterelationships is 43% and is slightly over 15percentage points higher that the percentage ofwomen with traditional views. Among men thisdifference is somewhat smaller.

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In Poland, attitudes to mothers’ paidwork are quite traditional

Over half of men and women agreed with thestatement that a small child suffers if his/hermother works. Only one fourth of women (23%)and about one fifth of men (18%) do not sharesuch a view. In sum, Poles are highly concernedabout the well-being of children whose motherswork for pay.

Such strong concerns depicted in the GGS data donot seem to be well justified given the mostrecent empirical findings on the effects ofwomen’s employment and childcare attendanceon children’s development. These findings showthat mothers’ employment may also have positiveconsequences for children, because it providesadditional income. Further, studies increasinglyindicate the positive influence of institutionalcare on the development of children aged 0-3years, although obviously this effect depends onthe amount of time spent in the care institutionand the quality of care (e.g. Brill et al., 2015; DelBoca et al., 2016; Felfe and Lalive, 2014). Finally,it has been increasingly emphasised that childrenbenefit from contact with both parents andgreater father’s involvement in child care wouldhave positive effects for the child.

Based on a report by Katarzyna Kocot-Górecka

Fig. 5.1 Views of men and women on gender roles inpublic life, GGS-PL2.

Fig. 5.2 Views of men and women on gender roles inintimate relationships, GGS-PL2.

Fig. 5.3 Views of men and women on mothers’professional work, GGS-PL2.

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6. Divis ion of housework and childcarebetween women and men

Like in other developed countries, women inPoland are generally economically active. Thepercentage of professionally active women aged25-49 is lower than that of men only by 10-12percentage points. At the same time, women’slevel of education is constantly rising, and cur-rently women graduate from higher educationmore often than men. In 2014, 2/3 of higher edu-cation graduates in Poland were women, which iseven slightly higher than the European Unionaverage (of almost 60%).

Despite universal and constantly growing activityof women in public life, the involvement of menin the household and care tasks is growing quiteslowly. Results of the time use research indicatethat on average men spend only half as muchtime as women on household duties and up tofour times less on care tasks (Fisher and Robinson,

2011). What is the situation in Poland? And howdoes the division of household tasks betweenmen and women change when children are born?

Economically active women in Poland stillperform most household tasks

From 60 to 70% of employed women in coupleswith no children declare that they perform all ormost of the household tasks. Only 10% of men insuch couples do all or most of the housework, withthe exception of such activities as repairs (almost70%) and paying bills (20%). Women declare thatthey are usually responsible for cleaning, cooking,doing the dishes and shopping, which—unlikepaying the bills and repairs—are practically doneon a daily basis.

Fig. 6.1 Division of household tasks between partners by number of children and age of the youngest childaccording to women’s declarations, working women, GGS-PL2.

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Men’s involvement in housework(cleaning, shopping, paying bills andrepairs) rises slightly when children areborn, but the change is temporary

Men’s involvement in housework (cleaning,shopping, paying bills and repairs) rises slightlywhen children are born. However, this does notimply an increase in the proportion of couples inwhich men perform certain domestic duties moreoften than women. Instead, the share of coupleswhich divide the housework equally rises. Accor-ding to women’s declarations, in around 40% ofcouples with two children (in which the youngestis 0-2 years old) it is still only or mostly the womanwho is responsible for shopping and in around60% for cleaning, while in less than 10% of couplesit is the man who is only or mostly involved inthese tasks. Moreover, women’s declarations indi-cate that men’s participation in household tasksrelative to their female partners falls and oftenreturns to the initial level when the youngest childachieves kindergarten age.

This suggests that men get involved in houseworkto a greater degree when their partner is stronglyinvolved in taking care of a small child. However,when this involvement lessens, men’s participationin housework also falls. Moreover, women’s partici-pation in certain household tasks (such as cooking)actually rises after the birth of a child and in others(doing the dishes) it practically does not change. Itshould be emphasized that the presented datarefer to couples in which the mother is working forpay. Even despite her involvement in the labourmarket she declares to be more encumbered byhousehold tasks than her partner.

Women in Poland declare that theyare mainly responsible for childcare

According to women’s declarations, childcare tasksare performed only or mainly by women in around40-80% of couples in which the woman works forpay. It is mostly women who dress the children, putthem to bed, help with homework or care for themin sickness, i.e perform activities which need to bedone regularly (or intensively in the case of caring

Fig. 6.2 Division of childcare between partners by number of children and age of the youngest child according towomen’s declarations, working women, GGS-PL2.

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for a sick child). These activities often require largetime investments or planning. From 30 to 50% ofwomen declare that the contribution of theirpartners to the performance of these tasks is justthe same as theirs, but the remaining 50-70% statethat they perform these tasks only or mostlythemselves. More frequently, couples equally sharetasks such as taking children to school orkindergarten and playing, i.e. activities that eitherrequire small costs in terms of time (taking toschool) or do not need to be performed regularlyand can be postponed to the weekend or evening(playing). If we accept women’s declarations asbinding, couples in which only or mostly the manperforms a given care task are in the extrememinority: only in around 10% of couples is the manusually responsible for taking children to school orkindergarten and putting them to bed.

Women’s participation in caredecreases slightly with the age of thechild, but is still far higher than that ofmen

As children age, women’s participation in care(dressing, putting to sleep, caring for a sick child)decreases and the share of couples in whichpartners share care equally rises. However, even inthe case of kindergarten-aged children, in over halfof the couples, women declare they are solely ormostly responsible for dressing children and caringfor sick children, and in half, for doing homework.

These results indicate that the family model with adouble burden on women still dominates in Polandand its domination is especially visible in familieswith children. Although increasingly more partnersshare responsibility for providing income for thefamily, an increase in men’s involvement in house-work and childcare is occurring at a slow pace.

Based on a report by Katarzyna Kocot-Górecka

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CHILDREN

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7. Do highly educated par tners have fewerchildren than low educated par tners?

The level of education is one of the mostimportant determinants of socio-economic status.Persons with higher education generally have amore stable professional situation, have highersalaries, and find it easier to get a new job orchange professions in the event of employmentloss. The highly educated enjoy better health, livelonger, and deal better with problem solving.

Education also differentiates reproductive beha-viours. As a rule, those with higher levels of edu-cational attainment postpone union formationand decide to have children later in life, as theystay in education longer and enter the labourmarket later. They thus have less time to realisetheir reproductive intentions. Moreover, personswith tertiary education may be more worriedabout the consequences that childbearing andchildrearing could have on their professionalcareers. Finally, the highly educated tend to investmore in children and thus having children may bemore costly for them both in terms of financialexpenditures and time inputs. On the other handcouples with higher education have better econo-mic resources and thus better financial conditionsfor family formation. Overall, are there differencesin the family size of couples with higher andlower levels of educational attainment?

The higher the education of bothpartners, the fewer children they have

Our analysis applies to couples in which thewoman was at least 40 years old at the time ofthe survey (cohorts born 1932-1974), i.e. couplesfor which total achieved family size can be es-tablished. Partners with tertiary education haveon average 1.8 children and partners with sec-ondary education – 2.1. Couples of partners withlowest levels of educational attainment have thelargest families (2.6 children on average). At thesame time, however, they are characterised by thegreatest incidence of childlessness. On average,4% of them do not have children. This is around1.5 times as many as among other couples.

Fig. 7.1 Mean number of children by both partners'education, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

Our results do not inform us about the reasons forwhich couples with higher levels of educationalattainment have fewer children than couples withlower levels of education. Therefore we do notknow whether they prefer smaller families or forsome reason cannot realise their childbearingintentions. We can only suspect that it is unlikelythese decisions were made based on purelyfinancial factors because usually couples withhigher levels of education have higher incomesthan less-educated couples.

Fig. 7.2 Probability of childlessness by both partners'education, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

Based on a report by Beata Osiewalska

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8. Do couples with a better educated femalepar tner have fewer children?

It may seem that couples in which the manobtained a higher level of education than hispartner have favourable conditions for havingchildren. Such a situation existed in the past inWestern European countries and the UnitedStates, and was the result of the division of labourbetween partners within the breadwinner-home-maker family model. The husband's higher level ofeducational attainment was positively associatedwith family income as he was the sole provider ofthe family income. Thus, families in whichhusband’s level of education surpassed the wife’sattainment were potentially better off financiallythan families where the wife’s attainment washigher than that of the husband.

The relationships observed in the past in highlydeveloped Western countries were not ubiquitousin other socio-economic contexts. The division oflabour between partners could also change overtime. At present, women enrol in higher educationincreasingly often, they also remain professionallyactive after getting married and return to workshortly after the child birth. In Poland suchchanges started to take place far earlier than inWestern Europe. Currently twice as many womenas men successfully finish tertiary education andincreasingly women have higher levels of educa-tional attainment than their male partners. Awoman's rising level of education improves herearning opportunities and may create goodfinancial conditions for family formation. On theother hand, highly educated working women withgood professional prospects may postpone oreven eschew having children as they may beconcerned that childbearing and childrearing mayjeopardise their careers. This may be particularlythe case if their male partners rarely participatein housework and would be reluctant to take upchildcare tasks.

The question arises: what is the effect of thechanging educational composition within thecouples on their reproductive behaviour? Whichcouples have more children: those where thewoman is higher educated than the man or thosewhere the man’s educational level is higher?

We answer these questions with respect tocouples in which the woman was born in theyears 1932-1974, i.e. was at least 40 years old atthe time of the GGS-PL2 study. Only for suchcouples, in which the woman was close to theupper limit of reproductive age, it was possible toestimate the total realised family size. We com-pare four types of couples:

Two types of couples in which the man holdshigher degree than the woman, i.e., couples wherethe male partner has tertiary education and thefemale partner finished secondary edu-cation andcouples in which the male partner finishedsecondary school and the female partner finishedprimary education.

Two types of couples in which the woman holdshigher degree than the man, i.e., couples wherethe female partner has a tertiary education andthe male partner finished secondary educa-tionand couples in which the male partner fini-shedsecondary education and the male partnerfinished primary education.

Couples in which the woman holdshigher degree than the man have, onaverage, slightly fewer children thancouples in which the man is highereducated

This is particularly visible among couples withlower levels of educational attainment. Couples inwhich the woman completed primary education

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and her partner completed secondary educationhave 2.4 children on average, while couples inwhich it is the man who finished primaryeducation and the woman finished secondaryeducation have only 2.2 children on average.Among couples in which one partner has tertiaryeducation these differences are small andoscillate near the statistical error (1.93 forcouples with a man with a tertiary educationversus 1.88 for couples with a woman withtertiary education).

The lower the educational attain-ment of the partners, the larger theirfamily size

Couples in which one of the partners has primaryeducation and the other secondary education

Fig. 8.1 Mean number of children by both partners’educational levels, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2, couples withwomen born 1932-1974.

Fig. 8.2 Probability of childlessness by both partners’educational levels, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2, couples withwomen born 1932-1974.

have 0.4 children more, on average, than couplesin which one of the partners attained tertiaryeducation. This indicates that the highest generallevel of educational attainment of the partners ismore important for the realised family size thanthe gender of the more educated partner.

The relationship between partners’educational pairing and childlessness isweak

Couples are rather unlikely to remain childlessand the incidence of childlessness hardly dependson partners’ relative education. Couples in whichthe man attained tertiary education and thewoman secondary education constitute an excep-tion, as they remain childless more often than theremaining couples: around 5% of them do nothave children.

Based on a report by Beata Osiewalska

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9. Later or never? Childbearing intentions ofchildless men and women

were 13% and 12%. In general, in the subpopu-lation of respondents aged 18-39 every tenthchildless person intended to remain childless.

Childless respondents postponeparenthood increasingly often

At the same time, a change can be observed inrelation to how soon childless people plan tohave a child. The share of persons who aredelaying the decision to become parents hasgrown distinctly between 2010 and 2014. In thefirst wave of the study, 48% of childless men and44% of childless women (aged 18-39) planned tobecome parents later than in the next three years.In the second wave, the decision about parent-hood was postponed by 56% of men and 52% ofwomen.

In the last decades we have witnessed asignificant increase in childlessness in Poland.Among women born in 1945-1955 around 8%never became mothers, while this share rose morethan twofold for women born around 1970.Nowadays, Polish men and women are deciding tohave the first child increasingly late or neverbecome parents.

Childlessness may be a result of various reasons.It can originate from various health problems, lackof a partner or financial limitations. It may alsostem from a person’s individual preferences. It ishard to define how many men and women do nothave offspring due to various obstacles, and inhow many cases it is the effect of a conscious andfree choice. Nevertheless, the GGS-PL study makesit possible to establish how many childless indi-viduals intend to become parents and how manydo not have such plans, regardless of the reason.

In Poland, among childless peopleaged 18-39, one person in ten does notintend to become a parent

Childless GGS-PL respondents aged 18-39 weredivided into three distinct categories. The firstcategory was formed by persons who declaredthey planned to become parents within the nextthree years. The second group consisted of thosewho were planning parenthood in the moredistant future. Individuals who did not intend tohave any children at all fell into the thirdcategory.

As for intention to remain permanently childless,no meaningful change occurred between years2010 and 2014. In the first wave of the survey,15% of men and 11% of women in the childlessgroup aged 18-39 did not intend to have any chil-dren at all. Four years later, the respective shares

Fig. 9.1 Childbearing intentions of childless men andwomen aged 18-39 in the first (GGS-PL1) and second(GGS-PL2) survey wave.

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Based on a report by Monika Mynarska and Zuzanna Brzozowska

Fig. 9.2 Intention to have a child within the next threeyears among childless men and women aged 18-39years in the first and second survey wave.

Young Poles are delaying their reproductivedecisions but they are also increasingly uncertainabout their childbearing plans. In the first wave ofthe survey, 37% of childless men aged 18-39intended to start a family within the next threeyears, with 13% answering “definitely yes” and a

further 24%, “probably yes”. In the second wave,the share of men intending to have a child in thenear future fell and only 7% declared certainty oftheir plans. Similar changes can be observed forwomen. Not only did the share of childless Polishwomen planning motherhood within the nextthree years fall, the share of those who definitelyhad such intentions fell from 18% to 12%.

The lack of certainty in men’s and women’schildbearing intentions can be worrying. As wewill show in the next article, an intentiondescribed as definite (“I definitely intend to havea child within the next three years”) has arelatively high chance of being realized. Lesscertain intentions (“I probably intend to have achild within the next three years”) are realisedwith a much lower probability.

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10. Childbearing intentions and theirreal isat ion

In the first wave of the survey at the turn of 2010and 2011, over one third of men and women aged18-39 gave a positive answer to the question onintention to have a child within the next threeyears: 13% said they definitely intended to have achild within this time period, 22% said that theyprobably had such an intention. The second waveof the survey allowed us to check whether theseplans had been realised.

Persons who have two or morechildren rarely consider having a largerfamily

In the first wave of the survey, parenthood wasmainly planned by childless persons (40% of themintended to become parents) and parents of onechild (over half of them planned to enlarge theirfamily). Among parents of two or more childrenonly one person in ten planned to have anotherchild.

The childbearing intentions were realized to asimilar degree by childless respondents andparents (regardless of the number of children theyalready had). First, only 10% of respondents whoat the first wave did not intend to have a childwithin the next three years actually had one bythe second wave. Importantly, it does not necessa-

rily mean that they became parents unintentional-ly since their childbearing intentions might havechanged after the first survey was taken.

Fig. 10.1 Intention to have a child within the nextthree years, men and women aged 18-39, GGS-PL1 andGGS-PL2.

The consistency between intentions and beha-viour was far lower among the respondents whodeclared they were planning to have a childwithin the next three years. Only half of thosewho definitely planned to become parents atwave one actually realised their intention. In thecase of the respondents who declared such a planwith some uncertainty (“I probably intend to havea child within the next three years”) less than onethird had a child before the second wave of thesurvey.

In comparison with other European countries, therate of the realisation of childbearing intentionsin Poland is similar to that of, for instance,Bulgaria. This trend however differs substantiallyfrom e.g. Netherlands, where as many as 75% ofrespondents realized their reproductive intentionsover the span of three years. Further, in-depthanalyses are called for to better understand theobstacles to realisation of childbearing intentionsin Poland.

Fig. 10.2 Intention to have a child within the nextthree years and its realisation, men and women aged18-39, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

Based on a report by Monika Mynarskaand Zuzanna Brzozowska

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11. Bir th control methods and the desire tohave a child

Reproductive intentions and their realisation arevery strongly connected to birth control. As a rule,individuals who do not want to become parentsshould—if they are sexually active—use somemethod of birth control. The GGS-PL study allows usto establish what methods are used by couples inPoland and whether using birth control is consistentwith their childbearing desires.

The respondents aged 18-39 mostoften use modern methods of birthcontrol: condoms and hormonalcontraceptives

Among respondents aged 18-39, over halfdeclared that they or their partner were usingsome kind of birth control (55%). Respondentscould indicate up to five methods used. If weconsider the first choices of our respondents, theymost often declared using (together with theirpartner) condoms (53%) and contraceptive pills orpatches (29%).

Notably, every fifth respondent indicated at leasttwo different methods of birth control. Mostfrequently, respondents declared combining con-doms with hormonal contraception (almost 40%of persons who indicated at least two methods) orcondoms with methods based on the biologicalrhythm of fertility or withdrawal (further 40% ofthis group).

Fig. 11.1 Birth control methods used by respondentsaged 18-39, first method indicated, GGS-PL1.

Fig. 11.2 Desire to have a child and birth control use,respondents aged 18-39 living together with a spouseor a partner, GGS-PL1.

Among persons with a partner butnot wanting to have a child, 70% usedbirth control

Using methods of birth control clearly correlateswith a lack of desire to have a child, even thoughrespondents’ childbearing plans and contraceptivebehaviours are not completely consistent. Weconsidered the answers of the respondents aged18-39, but only those living together with apartner (in a marital or non-marital relationship).Among those who declared they did not want tohave a child at the moment of the survey, 70%used some method of birth control. Meanwhile,this share was 42% among respondents whowanted to become parents. Apparently, wanting tohave a child does not mean that a personimmediately stops using methods of birth controland starts attempting to conceive. All in all, theGGS-PL results suggest that a significant share ofcouples take advantage of various methods ofbirth control to have a child at the time theychoose.

Based on a report by Monika Mynarska

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12. Postponing bir th of the first chi ld and thereal isat ion of childbearing intentions

Postponing reproductive decisions, particularlythe decision about the first child, may seriouslyhinder realisation of fertility intentions. First ofall, fecundity declines with age, especially amongwomen. Moreover, as individuals start theirattempts to have a child at later age, theirfecundity problems might be diagnosed too late,leaving little time for treatment or assistedreproduction techniques. The limitations of fe-male fecundity have a key significance in thisrespect. Therefore researchers mostly focus onwomen's reproductive behaviours. However, in-creasing attention is being paid to men, sincetheir age and lifestyle (smoking, alcohol or coffeeconsumption) also have a meaningful impact onthe probability of conception.

The results of analyses cited earlier in this reportdocument that Polish women born after 1969delayed their decision to have the first child. Doesthis later decision to become a mother result in alonger time necessary to conceive? Is it possibleto establish at what age the decrease in fecunditycan have a significant impact on the realisation ofchildbearing intentions?

A quest for answers to these questions requiresinformation about the waiting time to pregnancy,defined as the time span between the onset ofintentional attempts to conceive (stopping using

birth control and having regular intercourse) andconception. Such data—crucial to understand therelationship between parenthood postponementand fecundity—were collected in Poland for thefirst time using the Generations and Gender Sur-vey. Unfortunately, unsuccessful attempts havenot been documented as questions about thewaiting time to pregnancy were only directed atthose who subsequently became parents. Never-theless, 1,754 respondents provided informationabout the waiting time to their first pregnancy—this makes the GGS sample the largest Polishsample that allows for studying Poles' repro-ductive potential.

Almost one couple in ten waits over12 months for the first pregnancy

Analyses of waiting time to pregnancy show thatfor 70% of couples, conception of the first childoccurs within the first three months of regular,unprotected intercourse. Meanwhile, around 9% ofcouples needed over a year to conceive their firstchild.

Couples postponing their decision tohave the first child until the woman is35 and over should be aware that thetime between starting attempts toconceive and pregnancy may be longer

The influence of the woman's age on the waitingtime to pregnancy is depicted in Fig. 12.2. Thegraph presents several Kaplan-Meier survivalcurves depending on the age of women. We cansee that the risk of a longer waiting time forpregnancy rises with woman’s age. It means thatamong women trying to conceive the share ofthose who need more time to get pregnantincreases in older age groups.Fig. 12.1 Couples by time interval between trying to

conceive and conception, GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

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Of women who gave birth to their first child atages 25-29, only around 5% waited for pregnancyfor a year or longer. Among women aged 30-34the share doubled to 10%.The time needed to getpregnant lengthens significantly after women’s35th birthday. Around 25% of women who gavebirth to their first child at age 35 or later had towait a year or longer for pregnancy. This result isconsistent with those of previous studies, whichindicated that fecundity of women aged 35 is only60% of the maximum value (Wood, 1989). Couplesthat postpone the decision to have the first child

Based on a report by Krzysztof Tymicki

until the woman is 35 years old or older musttherefore be prepared for a significant increase ofthe waiting time to pregnancy. This may alsoimpede realisation of their intentions regardingsubsequent children. Moreover, a late diagnosis ofinfertility limits chances of a successful treatment.

Since low fertility in Poland concurs withpostponement of the decision to have the firstchild, it is deemed necessary to take actions toincrease people’s awareness of bio-medicalconsequences of childbearing postponement. Itseems equally important to assure appropriatemedical support for couples trying to becomeparents.

Fig. 12.2 Proportion of women by waiting time forpregnancy and the age of the mother at first birth,GGS-PL1 and GGS-PL2.

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13. Can health problems limit women'sreproductive intentions?

As discussed in the previous article, women's ageis highly important for their ability to conceive. Itmatters for women’s reproductive health andfecundity but also for their overall physicalcondition. Generally, health deteriorates with ageand that also might play a role in women’schildbearing plans.

Using data from the Polish Generations andGender Survey, we analysed how health influenceschildbearing plans of women aged 20-44. Dowomen who do not assess their health positivelyforgo having a child or at least postpone such adecision?

In the first wave of the survey—at the turn of2010 and 2011—20% of female respondents aged20-44 were not content with their general health(they assessed it as lower than “good”) and 15%had some type of long-term health problems orchronic illnesses. These values should not bedismissed if we consider health status of womenin reproductive age and their ability to realisechildbearing intentions.

Among the respondents who assesstheir health as poor, only one woman inten intends to bear a child within thenext three years

Analyses showed that women characterised byunsatisfactory health intended to have a child(first or subsequent) significantly less often thantheir healthy counterparts—at least in regards toplans for the next three years. Among women whoassessed their health as very good, more than onethird declared they intended to have a child in thenear future. Among women describing theirhealth as poor or very poor such an intention wasexpressed by only one respondent in ten.

The above results were verified taking intoaccount women's age, their marital status, andnumber of children they already had. Irrespectiveof these factors, women who assessed theirhealth as less than good were not inclined tomake childbearing plans.

General health, i.e. overall physical condition, istherefore an important issue considered bywomen as they make their childbearing plans.Even for very young women it may be a factorthat leads to delaying reproductive decisions. Andthe longer such a decision is postponed, theworse the state of health usually becomes.

Fig. 13.1 Intention to have a child (first or subsequent)within the next three years by subjective assessment ofhealth, women aged 20-44 years, GGS-PL1.

Based on a report by WiktoriaWróblewska and Monika Mynarska

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INTERGENERATIONAL CARE

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14. What is the role of grandparents in caringfor grandchildren?

In Poland, comparatively few small children areenrolled in institutionalized childcare, especiallyamong the subpopulation of children aged 0-2.According to OECD data, in 2014 only 11% of Po-lish children aged under 2 were in institu-tionalised childcare (compared to 33% of childrenaged under 2 in other OECD countries). Signifi-cantly more, namely 75% of children aged 3-5years, attended preschool (much closer to theOECD preschool enrolment average of 84%).

The relatively low enrolment in childcare institu-tions in Poland results from, among others, a lackof sufficient number of providers. As most parentswork—80.5% of women and 92% of men aged 25-49 years are economically active—deficient supplyof institutionalized childcare creates conflictsbetween work and care for many families. Such asituation generates demand for additional care,provided by relatives (including grandparents).

Indeed, around 32% of households with childrenaged 14 and under declared to receive regularhelp with childcare from relatives, friends andacquaintances. Among those who receive regularhelp, around 80% receive regular help fromgrandparents (usually the grandmother on thechild’s mother’s side). Grandparents most oftenprovide care for children aged 0-2 years (see Fig.

14.1) and are slightly less involved in caring forchildren aged 2-5 years. Rarely do they care forschool-aged children.

Care provided by grandparents isquite regular and not only does itsupplement institutional care, it alsooften serves as a substitute for it

On average, grandparents care for their grand-children for 190 days a year and this numberincreases to 209 days a year for those who carefor babies under 2. This is slightly above half ofall the days in a year and around 75% of workingdays. Almost 90% of households that usegrandparents’ childcare help use it more thanonce a week.

Care provided by grandparents isvery important for mothers’ economicactivity

In the households who receive help from thegrandparents, 74% of the mothers work for pay.The number is markedly lower for mothers in thehouseholds who do not receive the grandparents'help in childcare – only 60% of them work for pay.Grandparents’ help is most crucial for mothers’

Fig. 14.1 Percentage of households receiving help withchildcare from grandparents by age, GGS-PL2.

Fig. 14.2 Women’s employment rate by age of theyoungest child in the household and the use ofgrandparents’help, GGS-PL2.

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economic activity for households with childrenaged 3-5 years old. This result once again demon-strates that grandparents’ help is an indispensableelement supplementing or even substituting forinstitutional care.

The extent of care for grandchildrenprovided by grandparents fell slightlyin the years 2010-2014

In 2010, 30% of households with children aged 14or less declared receiving grandparents’ help—4percentage points more than in 2014. This slightdecline in grandparental care over time may haveresulted from two main reasons. On the one hand,it is possible that parents are more likely to enroltheir children in institutionalized childcare as thesupply increased markedly between 2011 and

Based on a report by Paweł Strzelecki

2014. On the other hand, the early retirementpossibilities were limited due to a pension systemreform and so grandparents, who otherwise wouldhave decided to retire and participate in care, areconstrained to stay on the labor market. The latterexplanation is quite likely, taking into account twofacts. First, there exists scientific evidence thatwomen of pre- and early retirement age are likelyto retire specifically in order to provide care fortheir grandchildren. Second, GGS data shows thatthe number of grandmothers of pre-retirement orearly retirement age dropped between 2010 and2015. Yet, at the same time, the decreasingavailability of the grandmothers of pre-retirementand early retirement age was mitigated by anuptake of childcare responsibilities observedamong subpopulations of pre-retirement age menand women aged 45-55.

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15. Who cares for adults in need?

Older people (especially those aged 70 and older),those chronically ill and the disabled often requiresupport from their closest family and friends. Thissupport may entail nursing and help in carrying outbasic everyday tasks. Such help is most frequentlyprovided by family members, acquaintances, friendsand neighbours, although sometimes nursing ofthe elderly may also necessitate assistance fromspecialised institutions.

In Poland, around 8% of the population aged 18-84years regularly take care of adults, helping themwith daily tasks such as eating, getting up, dressing,bathing or using the toilet. Women provide care foradults twice as often as men do.

Persons aged 45-69 years are themost involved in caring for adults

Among persons aged 45-69 years, around 11%(13.5% of women and 7.4% of men) provide careregularly, helping persons older than them(parents and parents-in-law), of the same age(spouses, acquaintances and friends) and alsoyounger than them (adult children). Persons aged45-69 years are said to belong to the so-called“sandwich generation”—a generation of personswho are potentially a source of support and careboth for younger and for older people. They

Fig. 15.1 Share of persons caring for adults by sex andage, GGS-PL2.

usually take care of their mothers (35%), otherunrelated persons (14.8%), parents-in-law (12.6%),spouses (11.2%), other relatives (9.9 %), fathers(8.6), and children (8.1%). The situation of thesandwich generation is specific in that they areoften still supporting their own children (over71% have children), are professionally active(around 40%) and at the same time start toexperience their own health problems (around20% declared disability). Among women aged 45-69 years providing care for adults, almost 30%were in addition looking after a child that was nottheir own (e.g. a grandchild).

Younger persons (aged 18-44 years) and olderpersons (70-84 years) provide care for adults twotimes less frequently than persons aged 45-69years do. The young mainly look after theirgrandparents; more rarely, after their mother andfather; and least frequently, after other relatives,friends and acquaintances. The old, often needingsupport themselves, usually care for their spouses.

Our results indicate that currently the scale ofinvolvement in care for adults is not large, alsoamong persons aged 45-69 years. In the closestdecade, however, we may expect that middle-agedpersons will become more burdened by care,particularly the care for older adults. Two factorscontribute to this. On the one hand, the largecohorts of post-war baby boomers will soon reachthe age at which the risk of disability and old agediseases increases substantially. On the otherhand, the population of persons who couldprovide such care is shrinking due to outmigra-tion and increasing economic activity of personsof early and pre-retirement age.

Based on a report by Anita Abramowska-Kmon

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QUALITY OF LIFE AT ITS DIFFERENT STAGES

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16. How often do Poles experience tensionsbetween paid work and family?

Family and economic activity are two of the mostimportant areas of life. However, combining them,especially when there are children, can be hard.Both working for pay and raising children requirelarge amounts of time and energy, particularlywhen both partners have full time jobs, whichoften happens in Poland. Difficulties with com-bining the two activities give rise to a work-familyconflict. A parent may experience a family-to-workconflict when an excess of family responsibilitiesdoes not allow for the appropriate fulfilment ofprofessional duties—or a work-to-family conflict—when an excess of professional obligations makesit difficult to carry out family responsibilities.

In Poland, a family-to-work conflictis experienced far less often than awork-to-family conflict

Poles experience a far stronger work-to-familyconflict than family-to-work conflict. This meansthat they frequently come home from work tootired or spend too much time at work to properlyperform their domestic duties. Men experience awork-to-family conflict as often as women.

In contrast, Poles rarely declare that they expe-rience difficulties with concentrating at work dueto family responsibilities. They also rarely declare

that excessive tiredness caused by family respon-sibilities does not allow them to function cor-rectly at work. Men experience a family-to-workconflict slightly less often than women.

Parents with three children andchildren of kindergarten age are mostexposed to work-family conflict

Work-family conflict is most noticeable amonglarger families and families with young children.Fathers of three children are most likely to admitthat their work interferes with family obligations.Notably, the rare instances of family life inter-fering with professional career (family-to-workconflict) are most frequently reported by mothersof three children and by fathers of children ofkindergarten age.

Workplace characteristics differen-tiate mainly the intensity of the work-to-family conflict

Supervising other employees strongly increasesthe work-to-family conflict. Indeed, supervisingothers often means working in managerial poststhat require high availability and responsibility,and may also be the source of stress which makes

Fig. 16.1 Experience of a family-to-work conflict, GGS-PL2.

Fig. 16.2 Experience of a work-to-family conflict, GGS-PL2.

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involvement in raising children difficult. Interest-ingly, time devoted to professional work does notdifferentiate the intensity of the work-to-familyconflict for men, but does for women. Finally, thesense of employment stability is related to aweaker work-to-family conflict for both sexes.

Workplace characteristics hardly differentiate theintensity of the family-to-work conflict. Only inthe public sector positions do men tend to experi-ence weaker family-to-work conflict than women.

Interestingly, other workplace characteristics,often considered important for balancing familyand work (flexible working time, possibility ofworking from home or necessity of working indifferent places outside the home) were notassociated with the intensity of the work-familyconflict.

Based on a report by Izabela Grabowska

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17. Job satisfact ion and reconcil iat ion of workand family

As a rule, professional work takes up a large partof adult life. Over a year, persons working full-time spend around 250 days at work, carrying outprofessional duties during around 30% of thetime not devoted to sleep. Having a satisfying jobis therefore extremely important from the per-spective of the general quality of life.

Poles are generally rather satisfiedwith their jobs

Asked to assess their satisfaction on a scale from0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satis-fied), respondents most frequently chose valuesaround 8 (about 25% of respondents). A quarter ofrespondents are even more satisfied with theirjobs (indicated answers 9 and 10). Only under10% of respondents are so unsatisfied with theirjobs that they chose categories 0-3.

Men and women are satisfied with work similarlyoften. Moreover, no significant changes in satisfac-tion with work were noted in the survey of2014/2015 as compared with the survey of2010/2011.

Earlier studies show that job satisfaction stronglydepends on the salary received, employmentstability, working conditions, whether the job is

interesting and important, on interpersonal rela-tionships in the workplace, and also on motiva-tional factors such as being appreciated, receivingbonuses, possibility of promotion and personaldevelopment (Herzberg et al., 1956, Springer,2011). However, little is known about how betterpossibilities of combining professional work withcare are related to job satisfaction in Poland.Meanwhile, family life and professional work aretwo of the four most important conditions of asuccessful life for Poles, next to health andfinancial situation (Czapiński, 2015). Difficulty inreconciling paid work and the family may thus bea source of stress, particularly as professionalwork is also an important determinant of financialsituation.

Working in different places outsidethe home lowers men's satisfactionwith work

Difficulties in combining paid work with care areslightly negatively associated with job satisfac-tion. Interestingly, work characteristics which po-tentially affect work-and-family reconciliation aredifferently related to job satisfaction of men andof women. Men who often work in different placesoutside the home are significantly less satisfiedwith their jobs than those who work in one placeoutside the home. Different places of workoutside the home may be related to frequentbusiness trips, not only tiring for the employee,but also limiting his contact with family.

Among women satisfaction withwork is lower if it entails excessiveduties

The place of carrying out work does not differen-tiate women's satisfaction with their job. This mayFig. 17.1 Poles' satisfaction with paid work, GGS-PL2.

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result from the fact that women usually takefewer business trips than men. Women’s satis-faction with work is decreased, however, by theexperience of work-to-family conflict which isreflected in excessive tiredness from the per-formance of professional duties that makes itimpossible to carry out household tasks aftercoming home.

Apart from these two characteristics ofprofessional work (working in many placesoutside of the home and experience of tirednessfrom excessive professional duties) we alsoexamined the relationship between job satisfac-tion and the possibility of working from home,

flexitime or employer-subsidized childcare. Noneof these features turned out to be significant formen and women's job satisfaction. It seems,however, that future studies should more closelyexamine the role of telework and employer-subsidized childcare. These factors may—particu-larly where professional responsibilities arecombined with care—raise parents' satisfactionwith professional activity.

Based on a report by Izabela Grabowska

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Health is one of the most important determinantsof happy life. It impacts all areas of ourfunctioning: professional work, income, family andprivate life. The “Generations and Gender Survey”(GGS-PL) contains a set of questions on respon-dents’ self-assessed health and thus makes itpossible to examine selected aspects of Poles’health status. As the study covers individuals aged18-79, we are able to describe the physicalcondition of people at different ages and toexplore relations between age and self-assessedhealth in more detail.

Half of respondents aged 18-79assessed their health as good or verygood. Age is the most important factorinfluencing these assessments

Around half of the respondents who took part inthe study at the turn of 2014/2015 assessed theirhealth as good or very good. However, while thisshare was as high as 90% among the respondentsaged 20, only around one third of the individualsaged 60-64 assessed their health so positively.Overall, men rated their health better thanwomen, although the nature of this differencechanged with age. At young ages, men’s favoura-ble position is visible in how they assessed theirhealth as good and very good more frequentlythan women. At older ages, it is mainly about thefrequency of poor and very poor ratings.

Similar age patterns in self-assessed health aredepicted for multiple self-rated health indicators.For example, long-term health problems werereported by around 40% of all respondents,whereas in the 55-59 age group around half ofthe respondents declared suffering from suchproblems. Furthermore, 15% of all respondentsdeclared they were disabled but among those

18. How does the health of Polish men andwomen change over the l i fe course?

aged 55 and older one person in five declaredsuch a condition. Importantly, women performslightly worse than men regardless of which typeof information on their health is considered. Andthe difference between men and women in-creases starting in the mid-thirties.

The worst health—irrespective ofage—is observed for persons with lowlevels of educational attainment. Thiseffect is stronger for men

Notably, age and sex are not the only factors thatmatter for self-assessment of health. Results fromthe GGS highlight the importance of educationalattainment in the studies of health.

Fig. 18.1 Subjective assessment of health in individualage groups, men and women, GGS-PL2.

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Irrespective of age, persons with lower levels ofeducation declare being of poorer health thantheir higher-educated counterparts. The lowestlevels of educational attainment are associatedwith the worst reports of self-rated health.Moreover, the effect of education is stronger formen than for women. The lowest reports of self-assessed health were observed for men with nosecondary education. The probability they wouldrate their health as less than good was almostfour times higher than for men with at least post-secondary education. The risk that women withthe lowest level of education would negativelyassess their health was around three times higherthan for women with at least post-secondaryeducation.

Fig. 18.2 Risk of negative assessment of health amongpersons with lower levels of education compared withpersons with post-secondary or higher education(reference category, ref.=1), men and women, 18-79years, GGS-PL2.The results of a logistic regression model of a risk ofassessing one’s health as less than good byeducational level, controlled for age.

Based on a report by Wiktoria Wróblewska

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19. Loneliness among persons aged 50+

People function within societies. Through socialinteractions they receive and provide support,satisfy their needs of safety, usefulness and be-longingness, develop, and gain new knowledge. Itis thus no wonder that the feeling of being a partof society, the belief that there is somebody onecan count on in need, is an important determinantof quality of life.

However, the feeling of being a part of societymay weaken as a consequence of a combinationof various circumstances, such as adult childrenmoving out of the parental home, loss of a spousethrough death or divorce, worsening health, jobloss or retirement. These events usually cumulateafter age 50. Consequently, persons aged 50+ areexposed to loneliness more than the youngerpopulation groups.

In Poland approximately 12% of Poles aged 50+feel very lonely, and every fifth is quite lonely.Only 34% do not feel lonely.

Poles feel lonely due to the lack ofsocial contacts more often than due tothe lack of an intimate relationship

The feeling of loneliness may result from the lackof an intimate relationship (with such persons asa partner or a close friend) or due to the lack ofmore widely understood social contacts, e.g. withfamily, relatives and friends. In Poland, amongpersons aged 50 years and older the second typeof loneliness, i.e. social loneliness, definitelydominates. Around 25% of respondents declaredthey do not have people they could rely on in caseof trouble or to whom they feel close. Poles werefar less likely to declare experiencing symptomsof emotional loneliness resulting from a lack ofan intimate relationship with a close friend or apartner, resulting in a feeling of rejection and

“emotional emptiness”. Almost 9% declared theyfelt rejected, lacked people around themselvesand felt a great emptiness, while almost 2/3definitely denied experiencing such situations.

Having children weakens lonelinesstwofold

Women aged 50+ feel lonely around 25% lessoften than men in this age group. Those who havechildren experience the feeling of lonelinesstwice less often than the childless. Loneliness isalso more prevalent in large towns, amongpersons with primary education and in a worsefinancial situation, the divorced, and also thedisabled or with a chronic illness.

Loneliness significantly lowerssatisfaction with life

Lonely persons are less satisfied with their lives.An increase in loneliness by one unit on theloneliness scale (from 0 to 3) causes a relativedecline in life satisfaction by around 5%. In otherwords, very lonely people are approximately 15%less happy than persons with the same characteri-stics who do not feel lonely at all. Interestingly,our analyses show that the positive relationship

Fig. 19.1 Loneliness in population aged 50+, indicesproposed by de Jong Gierveld and Tilburg (2006), GGS-PL2.

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between satisfaction with life among personsaged 50 years and older and having children maybe explained with loneliness. After accounting forloneliness in our analyses, the positive relation-ship between life satisfaction and number ofchildren became insignificant. This means thatchildlessness is strongly related to loneliness, andit is loneliness and not number of children which

directly impacts satisfaction with life. Still open isthe question whether childless people feel lonelybecause of the very fact of not having children, orwhether other issues are the key here, such asthe—often co-occurring with childlessness—lackof a partner and less extensive family orfriendship networks.

Based on a report by Anita Abramowska-Kmon

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20. Who retires earl ier?

The advancing process of population ageing and theincreases in life expectancy lead to the growth ofthe retired population and the lengthening of theperiod over which retirement pensions are collected.Such a situation may in the future cause pensions tobe significantly reduced or lead to the bankruptcy ofpension systems.The ongoing demographic changesthus generate pressure to limit the options of earlyretirement and to raise the retirement age.

Limiting the possibility of early retirement andraising the retirement age give rise to social protest.The reluctance to stay professionally active longermay result from various causes such as worseninghealth, dissatisfaction with working conditions,being burdened with domestic responsibilitiesperformed in parallel to carrying out professionalwork or the wish or necessity of looking aftergrandchildren or older people. Persons with highereducation often have better working conditions andhigher incomes than persons with lower education,and their work may be more interesting to them.Thus it may be expected that they will be lesswilling to retire. It is also believed that persons whohave flexible working hours or can shorten theirworking hours are more willing to continueprofessional activity than persons whose options inthis scope are limited.

Using both waves of the GGS-PL, we checked whohastens the decision to retire, and who stayseconomically active longer. We studied persons bornin the years 1935-1964 who were economicallyactive during the first wave of the survey (i.e. theturn of the years 2010 and 2011). In this group,retirement age was reached by women born in theyears 1950-1955 and men born in the years 1945-1950. Among persons born earlier, most had retiredbefore 2010 and only few remained in the labourforce. Among those born later, only persons withthe relevant privileges could retire early.

Sex and health strongly differentiate theprobability of retiring. In the period 2011-2014women were approximately 70% more likely toretire than men. Persons in worse health alsoretired earlier. Level of education is another factorwhich turned out to differentiate the probabilityof retiring, but not as strongly as it may beexpected. Persons with the lowest level ofeducation retired earlier than persons with highereducational attainment. However, we observed nodifferences in the intensity of retiring betweenpersons with secondary or post-secondary edu-cation and those with tertiary education. Men whofelt too burdened by domestic responsibilitiesretired earlier than men who felt less burdened.Interestingly, however, having grandchildren didnot differentiate the probability of retiring in theperiod 2010-2015. Finally, fixed working hours arerelated to earlier retirement among men and laterretirement among women.

Based on a report by Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak

Factors speeding retirement amongeconomically active persons born in theyears 1935-1964

poor healthlow educationdomestic responsibilities among menflexible working hours for womenfixed working hours for men

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Brilli, Y., Del Boca, D., Chiara Daniela Pronzato, Ch.D. 2015.Does child care availability play a role in maternalemployment and children’s development? Evidence fromItaly, Families and Societies Working Papers Series: 31(2015).

Czapiński, J. 2015. Diagnoza Społeczna. 2015. Indywidualnajakość i styl życia.Contemporary Economics 9(4): 200-331.

Del Boca, D., Piazzalunga, D., Pronzato, Ch. 2016. EarlyChildcare, Child Cognitive Outcomes and Inequalities inthe UK, IZA Discussion Paper No.10287.

De Jong Gierveld J., Van Tilburg, T.G. 2006. A six-item scalefor overall, emotional and social loneliness: confirmativetests on new survey data.Research on Aging 28: 582–598.

References

Felfe, Ch., Lalive, R. 2014. Does Early Child Care Help orHurt Children’s Development?, IZA Discussion Paper No.8484.

Fisher, K., Robinson, J. 2011. Daily Life in 23 Countries.Social Indicators Research 101(2): 295-304.

Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., Snyderman, B.B. 1959. Themotivation to work.New York: Wiley & Sons.

Springer, A. 2011. Wybrane czynniki kształtującesatysfakcję pracownika, Problemy Zarządzania, vol. 9, nr 4(34): 162–180.

Wood, J.W. 1989. Fecundity and Natural Fertility inHumans, [w] S.R. Milligan, (red.) Oxford Reviews ofReproductive Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press:61-109.

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The Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) is part of the internationalGenerations and Gender Programme (GGP). It is an innovative programme ofdemographic research founded to establish and explain the cause andconsequence mechanisms underlying demographic transformations currentlytaking place in European countries. It was launched in 2001 as the scientificcommunity's response to research needs generated by the demographicchanges observed in these countries, whose determinants and various conse-quences are both widely discussed in the scientific community and increasingly

often featured at the centre of political debates concerning perspectives for Europe's development.Currently, there are 17 European countries participating in the programme (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,Russia, Romania and Sweden), as well as Australia and Japan.

Since 2009 the programme has been coordinated by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary DemographicInstitute (NIDI) http://www.ggp-i.org/.

Generationsand GenderProgramme

In Poland, the first wave of the survey was conducted at the turn ofthe years 2010 and 2011 as part of the project “Panel survey ofchanges in relationships between generations, in the family andbetween men and women: Generations, families and gender (firstwave)” financed by the National Science Centre (Poland), agreement

no. 554/N-UNECE/2009/0. The second wave of the survey was conducted at the turn of the years 2014and 2015 as part of the project “Panel survey of changes in relationships between generations, in thefamily and between men and women: Generations, families and gender (second wave)” financed by theNational Science Centre (Poland) agreement no. 2013/08/M/HS4/00421. Both projects were carried outby the Institute of Statistics and Demography of the Collegium of Economic Analysis, Warsaw School ofEconomics. Fieldwork was conducted by the Bureau of Research and Statistical Analyses of the PolishStatistical Association with the help of interviewers from the Central Statistical Office of Poland.

http://www.sgh.waw.pl/ggs-pl

This publication was prepared within a project funded by the National Science Centre (Poland), decisionno. DEC-2013/08/M/HS4/00421.

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Generationsand GenderProgramme

The two waves of the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS-PL) were conducted in Poland at the turnof the years 2010/2011 and 2014/2015 in cooperation with the Bureau of Research and StatisticalAnalyses of the Polish Statistical Association. Interviews were carried out by interviewers from theCentral Statistical Office of Poland. The GGS-PL team at the Institute of Statistics and Demography ofthe Warsaw School of Economics would like to kindly thank everyone who participated in thisendeavour for their effort and engagement in the preparation of the study and performance of thefieldwork.