The Lord’s Resistance Army: A Case Study of an Organizational Vision in the

Symbolic Frame

By Oleg Nekrassovski

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is an insurgent group operating across Uganda, South

Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. Its ideology and

operations have strong ‘spiritual’ aspects (Cline, 2013, p. ix). And it has become notorious for its

almost endemic practice of child abductions, mutilation of civilians, and widespread killing. The

LRA is lead by Joseph Kony, who is widely believed to be a powerful spirit medium (Cline, 2013,

p. x, 12).

The present paper will start by postulating some of the key elements of a clear/good

vision, in terms of Bolman and Deal’s (2013) symbolic frame. Next it will take a look at the LRA’s

vision to see whether it can be said to be clear/good according to the outlined postulates. Then

it will outline some of the positive effects that clear/good visions have on organizations. And

finally, it will see if there is any evidence of the LRA’s vision having any of the outlined positive

effects on the LRA.

According to Bolman & Deal (2013, p. 248), “What is most important is not what

happens but what it means.” Therefore, it can be argued that the meaning of an organizational

vision is more important than how it is pursued; since a vision is meant to provide a sense of

purpose and direction for the organization; while its pursuit is the task of organizational

strategy. Also, “Facing uncertainty and ambiguity, people create symbols to resolve confusion,

find direction, and anchor hope and faith” (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 248). Therefore, it is quite

reasonable that a good organizational vision should be such a symbol, or a symbolic framework,

which would allow all members of the same organization to resolve confusion, find direction,

and anchor hope and faith.

Within organizations, myths “explain, express, legitimize, and maintain solidarity and

cohesion” (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 249). And it is quite reasonable to expect the same from a

good organizational vision. Therefore, an organizational vision should tap into the

organization’s myths as much as possible. Moreover, organization’s heroes and heroines model

organizational beliefs and values; while effective stories, of an organization, provide comfort,

reassurance, direction, and hope for all of organization’s members (Bolman & Deal, 2013).

Consequently, a good organizational vision should, whenever possible, cause a recall of

organization’s heroes and heroines, as well as stories, in the memory of its members. Finally,

rituals and ceremonies “bond a group together and imbue the enterprise with traditions and

values” (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 258). While “Enacting a ritual [or a ceremony] connects an

individual or group to something mystical, more than words or rational thinking can capture”

(Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 256). Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that an organizational

vision can be strengthened by giving it an aura of mystical power, through incorporating it into

the organization’s key rituals and ceremonies.

According to Joseph Kony, “he is possessed by the Holy Spirit and has received divine

orders to replace the Ugandan Constitution with the Ten Commandments” (Cline, 2013, p. 17).

In terms of Bolman and Deal’s (2013) symbolic frame, this vision of the LRA has many desired

qualities of an excellent organizational vision. After all, its spiritual aspects, and reference to the

current Ugandan Constitution, likely provide a good sense of purpose and direction for all of the

LRA’s members. Also, its use of widely known Christian symbols makes the LRA’s vision into a

symbolic framework, which allows the LRA’s members to “resolve confusion, find direction, and

anchor hope and faith” (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 248). Moreover, the LRA’s vision taps into the

LRA’s main myths (the Bible, and those passed down in the LRA’s oral tradition), and causes a

recollection of its heroes (e.g. Moses, Joseph Kony) and stories (e.g. the Biblical stories) in the

minds of its members. Finally, aside from the fact that the elements of this vision are

incorporated into a number of the LRA’s key rituals and ceremonies (Cline, 2013); this vision

clearly has an aura of mystical power about it, in its own right.

According to Lipton (1996), a good/clear organizational vision has a number of positive

effects on the organization, including, enhancing a wide range of performance measures;

promoting change, and thus helping organizational efforts at transformation; and motivating

individuals and facilitating the recruitment of talent (Lipton, 1996, p. 84-85).

According to Cline (2013, p. 18), the Christian beliefs of the LRA, which are obviously

well expressed by its vision, likely help the LRA to recruit and motivate fighters of various ethnic

backgrounds; because among them Catholicism is the only common system of beliefs.

Also, the LRA’s vision seems to have done a good job of helping the organization

transform, or rather survive, despite many setbacks, such as mass desertions, strong pressures

from state militaries, loss of sources of funding, etc. (Cline, 2013, p. 28-34). After all, at its peak,

during the 1990s, the LRA had strong, centralized command and control, which controlled a

sizable ‘army’ (Cline, 2013, p. 28-34). Currently, however, the organization has a lot fewer

members, and is more akin to a loose coalition of small groups, scattered across a wide area

(Cline, 2013, p. 28, 33). However, all of these small groups still operate under a common

banner, and the LRA clearly retains some capability to coordinate multiple attacks (Cline, 2013,

p. 28); which is almost certainly due to the fact that Joseph Kony has remained the LRA’s

undisputed leader. This, in turn, is almost certainly due to his direct, personal connection to the

LRA’s vision.

At the same time, the LRA’s vision likely enhances one of its key performance measures

– combat effectiveness. After all, for a number of reasons, the LRA commanders may not trust

many of the newer recruits of the LRA (Cline, 2013, p. 33); while many of the LRA fighters are

children and youth, who are simply too young to be effective combatants (Cline, 2013). Finally,

at their best, the LRA fighters are equipped with small firearms (Cline, 2013, p. 32); while, at

their worst, the LRA fighters may be equipped with no weapons at all (Cline, 2013, p. ix). All of

this likely explains the LRA’s common preference for utilizing, in combat, what clearly looks like

a human wave attack tactic (Cline, 2013, p. ix).

The human wave attack is an infantry combat tactic, which involves densely

concentrated infantry formations attacking an enemy line, without any attempts to mask or

shield their movement. The goal of the human wave attack is to overrun the defenders with a

large mass of attackers engaging in a disorganized close combat. The reliance on disorganized

close combat often makes the training and the organization of the attacking force irrelevant,

but requires great courage from it (O’Dowd, 2007, p. 145-146). Not surprisingly, the human

wave attack is an extremely costly tactic when used against enemies equipped with modern

weaponry with high firepower. However, it is an effective tactic for armed groups who lack

firepower, ability to maneuver, or tactical training, but who are exceptionally good at

motivating and controlling their soldiers (O’Dowd, 2007, p. 144-145).

Consequently, it becomes obvious why LRA commanders like to utilize the human wave

tactic. After all, the LRA’s ranks contain many child soldiers, who are necessarily poorly trained

and hard to organize during combat. While those newer recruits, who are not trusted by the

LRA’s commanders, may be seen as completely disposable, negating the perceived cost of the

human wave tactic to the LRA. Moreover, groups of the LRA soldiers often have little firepower,

and often, no ability to maneuver, at least whenever they accidently come across government

troops. However, the LRA is very good at motivating and controlling its soldiers, especially in

situations requiring a human wave attack; since all front-line LRA fighters are indoctrinated into

believing that the Holy Spirit will protect all those who bravely run into enemy fire; while those

who take cover will enrage the Holy Spirit and will be killed by the enemy’s bullets (Cline, 2013,

p. 19). Since it is obvious that this doctrine is intimately tied to the LRA’s vision; it is not hard to

see the role the LRA’s vision plays in enhancing the LRA’s combat effectiveness.

References

Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T.E. (2013). Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice, and leadership (5th

ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Cline, L. E. (2013). The Lord’s Resistance Army. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

Lipton, M. (1996). Demystifying the development of an organizational vision. Sloan

Management Review, 37(4), 83-92.

O'Dowd, E. C. (2007). Chinese military strategy in the Third Indochina War. New York, NY:

Routledge.