the lost two-thirds kuwaits territorial

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The Lost “Two-Thirds”:Kuwait ’s Territorial Decline between 1913 and 1922

FARAH AL-NAKIB

Abstract: This paper analyses the formation of the Kuwait-Saʿudi boundary, particularlyfocusing on the period between the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 and the ʿUqair Conference of 1922. Specifically, it seeks to understand how and why ‘two-thirds’ of theterritory allotted to Kuwait in the former agreement became part of the territory of present-day Saʿudi Arabia in the latter. The various factors that led to the decline of Kuwait ’sterritorial fortunes are explored, with particular focus given to the growing enmity betweenthe Al Sabah and the Najdi ruler Abdulaziz ibn Saʿud from 1913 onwards. Though thissubject may not be entirely new to Gulf historiography, this paper re-examines thedevelopments that led to the drawing of the Kuwait-Najd boundary of 1922 from the

perspective of a loss of territory for the al-Sabah rather than the expansion of territory for the Al Saʿud.

Keywords: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait-Saudi boundary, ʿUqair, Ibn Saʿud, Salem al-Sabah,Sir Percy Cox, H.R.P. Dickson, Battle of Jahra, borders, tribes

1 Introduction

In 1913 the British and Ottomans found the broad territory under both fixed and loose al-Sabah

jurisdiction to be “160 miles broad and 100 miles long.”1 By the time Kuwait ’s borders wereofficially ratified a decade later, this territory was reduced to 6,000 square miles.2 This paper

examines how Kuwait shifted from its 1913 boundaries to the 1922 settlement. Did Britain

simply give away ‘two-thirds’ of Kuwait ’s land at the stroke of a pencil as claimed by the promi-

nent British colonial figure H.R.P. Dickson in his memoirs?3 To address this question, this paper

analyses the impact the changing dynamics of power between the Al Sabah and the Najdi ruler

Abdulaziz ibn Saʿud had on the two rulers’ territories during this period. In a region where bound-

aries were based largely on the extent of tribal loyalty a ruler claimed in the desert, Kuwait ’s loss

of territory to Najd by 1922 may be attributed to the fact that, as Joseph Kostiner argues, “Ibn

Saʿud’s efforts in attracting tribal support and consolidating their loyalty proved to be far superior

to all his rivals in the Peninsula”.4

Nonetheless, the story behind Kuwait ’s declining territorial for-tunes between 1913 and 1922 is more complex than the shifting of tribal loyalties, and must be

ISSN 2153-4764 print/ISSN 2153-4780 online

© 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2012.686234

www.tandfonline.com

Farah Al-Nakib is Assistant Professor of History and Director of the Center for Gulf Studies at the Amer-ican University of Kuwait, PO Box 3323, Safat 13034, Kuwait, [email protected]

1 Hakki Pasha to Foreign Office, London, 15 Apr. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.2 Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (1956), p. 276.3 Ibid., p. 274; Schofield, “Britain and Kuwait ’s Borders, 1902 – 1923”, in Kuwait: The Growth of a His-

toric Identity, ed. Slot (2003), p. 93.4 Kostiner, “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Expansion: The Case of Kuwayt, 1916 – 1921”, Die Welt des

Islams 33 (1993), p. 234.

Journal of Arabian Studies 2.1 (June 2012), pp. 19 – 37


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understood in the context not only of Ibn Saʿud’s own expansionist ambitions (and the methods he

adopted to fulfil them) but also his deteriorating relationship with Kuwait ’s rulers after Mubarak

al-Sabah’s death in 1915.

While the rivalry between Ibn Saʿud and the Al Sabah began, like most desert rivalries, as a

quarrel over tribal affairs, the advent of World War I exacerbated these relations by creating new

clashing political and financial interests for both rulers. After 1915 the historic friendship between

the Al Sabah and Ibn Saʿud, who rose to power in Najd largely under Mubarak ’s patronage, turned

into a bitter enmity. Once the war was over, Ibn Saʿud employed his militant Ikhwā n forces to

challenge Al Sabah authority within their own territory, and subsequently pushed for a permanent

settlement of a boundary between the two rulers at a moment when the state of desert affairs was

in his favour. For centuries Arabian rulers would rise and fall and their boundaries would ebb and

flow as a natural part of the process. However, with the intrusion of the British, shifting frontiers

gave way to permanent borders, and once the Kuwait-Najd boundary was fixed in 1922 by

the British — who arguably appeased the state that shared a substantially larger border with

their new Hashemite mandate in Iraq — the Al Sabah were never able to reclaim their lost

territory.Most critical analyses of the delineation of the Kuwait-Najd boundary in scholarly discourse

address the issue from the perspective of Saʿudi territorial expansion in the early twentieth

century. Important works, such as Kostiner ’s article “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Expansion: The

Case of Kuwayt, 1916 – 1921” and Moudi Abdul-Aziz’s King Abdul-Aziz and the Kuwait

Conference, 1923 – 1924,5 analyse similar issues as this paper but from the Saʿudi vantage

point. Kuwaiti historiography has focused largely on the drawing of Kuwait ’s northern boundary

with Iraq, the work of David Finnie and Richard Schofield being the most prominent.6 The focus

on Iraq is, of course, attributable to the fact that the Kuwait-Iraq boundary has been seriously

challenged in recent decades, most notably in 1961 and 1990. And yet despite these contestations,

the actual boundary line between Kuwait and Iraq has more or less remained the same since the beginning of the twentieth century. The southern and western boundary with Najd, on the other

hand, went through much more dramatic shifts before being officially settled in 1922. A dis-

cussion on the establishment of this boundary from Kuwait ’s vantage point (that is, from the

perspective of a loss of territory for the Al Sabah rather than the expansion of territory for the

Al Saʿud) is, therefore, lacking in Kuwaiti historiography. Such an analysis is important not

only because it deepens our understanding of how Kuwait got her borders and became a

bounded nation-state, but also as it provides a more critical insight into Kuwait ’s historic relation-

ship with Saʿudi Arabia.

2 The reign of Mubarak I

As Richard Schofield argues, until 1902 there was no pressing need to consider what constituted

the territorial limits of Kuwait.7 Historically the desert boundaries between Kuwait, Najd, and Iraq

were extremely fluid. Hala Fattah maintains that the only semblance of boundaries that existed in

the region until the early twentieth century were those that delimited tribal d ī ras — tracts of desert

over which a particular tribe exercised habitual grazing rights — though these she accurately

describes as natural and shifting frontiers rather than fixed borders.8 Bedouin paid protection

5

Ibid.; and Abdul-Aziz, King Abdul-Aziz and the Kuwait Conference, 1923 – 1924 (1993).6 Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait ’ s Elusive Frontier With Iraq (1992); Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (1993).

7 Schofield, “Britain and Kuwait ’s Borders”, p. 68.

20 Farah Al-Nakib


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money, usually in the form of the Islamic zak āt , to whichever local ruler could offer them greatest

protection from inter-tribal raids. The breadth of a given ruler ’s territory in the desert thus

extended beyond the town in which he was based, to include the d ī ras of his protégés.9 As

tribal loyalties could often pass from one ruler to another, territories and boundaries were con-

stantly shifting and, therefore, impermanent.10 As John G. Lorimer noted in 1904, “The bound-

aries of the Kuwait principality are for the most part fluctuating and undefined; they are, at any

given time, the limits of the tribes which then, either voluntarily or under compulsion, owe alle-

giance to the Shaikh of Kuwait ”.11

Mubarak — who came to power in 1896 by assassinating his brothers Mohammed (the ruler)

and Jarrah — was Kuwait ’s first ruler to “claim a wider area of jurisdiction than the immediate

neighbourhood of the [town]”, by securing a greater level of tribal loyalty than any of his prede-

cessors (or successors) was able to achieve.12 This was partly due to his long-standing history

with the Bedouin since his brothers had put him in charge of their tribal forces before he

usurped power.13 More important, however, was Mohammed al-Rashid of Haʿil’s capturing of

Riyā dh from the Al Saʿud in 1887 — the second Saʿudi defeat since they rose to power in

1745 — after which Abdulrahman Al Saʿud sought refuge in Kuwait. With the Al Rashid in power and the Al Saʿud in exile, many of the tribes in the hinterland between Kuwait and

Riyā dh shifted to the Al Sabah.

The first attempt to lay down the limits of Kuwait ’s territory was made during Mubarak ’s

reign by the British and Ottomans. Though Mubarak had retained the nominal title of Ottoman

qa’ imaqām (which the Al Sabah held since 1871) when he came to power in 1896, in 1899 he

signed a secret non-alienation bond with the British. In exchange for British protection,

Mubarak pledged not to receive the agent or representative of any power or government in

Kuwait, nor to cede any part of his territory without the previous consent of the British Govern-

ment.14 The British had not attempted to delimit the ruler ’s boundaries in this agreement. The

Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne admitted in 1902 that when the Foreign Office promisedMubarak its “good offices”, its assumption was that “our engagements with Koweit do not

extend beyond the district adjoining or close by the bay of that name”, and did not specifically

include the islands or outskirts over which Mubarak might have tenuous hold.15 The previous

year Britain had entered into an agreement with the Ottomans after revealing to them the

details of their 1899 agreement with Mubarak. Both empires agreed to uphold the status quo:

the Ottomans would not send troops to Kuwait and Britain would not establish an official protec-

torate there.16 Over the next few years, however, the Ottomans attempted to determine the extent

8 Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf: 1745 – 1900 (1997), pp. 30 – 1.9 Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nine-

teenth Century”, New Arabian Studies 6 (2004), p. 42.10 Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr) to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 6 Sept. 1920, R/15/5/105,

IOR, London.11 Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia 2: Geographical and Statistical , ed.

Birdwood (1908, reprinted 1986), p. 1059.12 Government of India, “Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1918”, reprinted in

Persian Gulf Administration Reports 7: 1912 – 1920 (1989), p. 57.13 Rush, Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwait ’ s Ruling Family, 1752 – 1987 (1987), p. 102.14

“Agreement of 23rd January 1899 with Ruler of Kuwait ”, reprinted in Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 1750 – 1965 (1983), p. 184.

15

“Memorandum by the Marquess of Lansdowne”, 21 Mar. 1902, FCO 78/5251, TNA, London, reprinted in Bidwell (ed.), The Affairs of Kuwait: 1896 – 1905, vol. 2 (1971), p. 54.

16“Memorandum Communicated to the Ottoman Ambassador ”, 29 July 1911, reprinted in Schofield

(ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10 (1992), p. 167.

The Lost “ Two-Thirds” 21


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of territory that Britain was prepared to defend for Mubarak by encroaching into areas along the

Kuwait-Iraq frontier. Britain’s inability to definitively ascertain if these advances were in violation

of the status quo, along with the increasing possibility of a German railway into the Gulf, even-

tually prompted them to determine the extent of their control in the area.

In 1908 Lorimer published his Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, in

which he identified for the first time Britain’s perception of Kuwait ’s territory. In determining

Kuwait ’s borders to the south and west with Najd, Lorimer relied mainly on statements made

by Mubarak in 1904.17 In 1911 the Secretary of State for India decided that Britain’s obligations

to Mubarak “extend to the whole of the Sheikh’s territory as described in Lorimer ’s Gazetteer ”

and communicated this to the Porte.18 This constituted an area “160 miles broad and 100 miles

long”. The Ottomans did not agree and argued that Al Sabah influence did not extend more

than 20 kilometres from town.19 However, two successive British Political Agents in Kuwait,

Major Stuart Knox (1904 – 09) and Captain W.H.I. Shakespear (1909 – 14), had by then carried

out extensive tours over this area “without finding traces of any influence there except that of

the Sheikh”.20 Like Lorimer, Shakespear emphasized the importance of the zak āt in maintaining

tribal loyalty and, in turn, of tribal loyalty in determining boundaries:

All Arab Shaikhs base the territorial extent of their power upon their ability to maintain or enforce someorder over the adjacent tribes, their power to enforce the payment of ‘zikat ’ by Bedouin and their capacityto prevent and avenge outrages and raids within the territorial limits claimed. Judged by these standardsthere can be no question that Mubarakh is the paramount chief within the limits described.21

Though some tribes like the Dhaf ī r shifted their loyalties from Mubarak back to Ibn Sa ʿud when

the latter began to reassert his control over Najd in the early twentieth century, Shakespear ’s report

showed that Mubarak ’s sway amongst the desert tribes remained strong by 1911. He still con-

trolled the ʿAwā zim, all of the Mutair except for two or three distant sections in Najd, most of

the ʿAjmā n, the Bani Khā led, and several smaller tribes.22

Eventually the India Office came up with the following arrangement to satisfy Ottoman con-

cerns without giving up British jurisdiction over Kuwait: while Kuwait Town and its immediate

surroundings were completely autonomous, the remainder of the territory as determined by

Lorimer should be

recognised as being under the administrative influence of the Shaikh of Koweit and that the Porteshould agree neither to place military posts nor take any other action within it without the previous

joint consent both of the sheik and of ourselves.23

This was the first indication of what Schofield refers to as the “

zonal territorial scheme of diminishing Kuwaiti authority”.24 Before proposing this to the Ottomans, the Foreign Office

17 Lorimer, Gazetteer , p. 1061.18 Notes summarising the situation, undated, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes

10, p. 180.19 Hakki Pasha to Foreign Office, 15 Apr. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.20 Joint minute by Sir A. Hirtzel and Mr. Parker on the Ottoman Government ’s memorandum commu-

nicated on 15 Apr. 1912, ibid., p. 170.21 Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr), 12 Aug. 1912, R/15/5/65,

IOR, London.22

Ibid.23 Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr) to Foreign Office (London), 6 July 1912, reprinted in Schofield(ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 184.

24 Schofield, “Britain and Kuwait ’s Borders”, p. 82.

22 Farah Al-Nakib


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requested final “evidence demonstrating the control over the tribes by Sheikh Mubarak within

[Lorimer ’s] limits” from the men on the spot.25 The Political Resident used Shakespear ’s findings

from 1910 to adjust Lorimer ’s southern boundary.26 Though the updated boundary was slightly

less extensive, it was “a good deal more definite” and, therefore, “effectively safeguards the

Shaikh’s rights and influence over his tribes at strategic points and at the same time has the sub-

stantial advantage of affording a well defined frontier ”.27

Both Lorimer and Shakespear determined that the Summā n area formed the southern edge of

Kuwait ’s frontier. Shakespear, however, put the Summā n wells inside Mubarak ’s boundary:

It may be taken for granted that nomad Arabs recognise authority in the desert according to wells, andnever in all my tours have I heard it suggested that the [Summan] wells of Hafar, As-Safa, al-Gara ʿa,and al-Haba (all along the Shaikh’s southern boundary) were not in Kuwait territory and jurisdiction.28

Both Shakespear and the Political Resident were certain that these areas were firmly within

Mubarak ’s territory. The al-Safa wells, for instance, were “used exclusively by the tribes under

Shaikh Mubarak ’s control”29

and were also on one of the main caravan routes to and fromKuwait, “and up to this point caravans using that route consider themselves under Kuwait protec-

tion”.30 Hafar was also of great strategic importance to Kuwait as it was halfway to Buraydah,

Riyā dh, and Haʾil, and “its possession by Shaikh Mubarak and the tribes under his control

never seems to have been seriously questioned”.31 Shakespear also spoke to the inhabitants of

the various villages and found that Antaʿa, the southernmost village within Mubarak ’s realm,

looked to Kuwait for its employment and important necessities of life, and the people regarded

themselves as Al Sabah subjects. “Their Shaikhs frequently visit Kuwait to pay their respects

to Shaikh Mubarak, on whom their authority and position depend in considerable measure ”.32

In 1913 the Anglo-Ottoman Agreement was drafted to define “ beyond all doubt the status and

limits of [Kuwait]”

.

33

The agreement identified Mubarak ’

s undisputed territory as beginning withKuwait Town at its centre and including all areas inside a radius of forty miles in all directions,

marked out by a red semi-circle on the accompanying map (Figure 1). In this undisputed area the

ruler of Kuwait exercised complete autonomy. The agreement also recognised as subordinate to

the ruler of Kuwait the tribes within a radius of 140 miles from the town centre, largely based on

Shakespear ’s findings and marked by a green line. The southern limit of this outer zone was

formed by the “more or less natural line” extending from Antaʿa in the east, across (and including)

the Warba, al-Gar ā ʿa, al-Haba, and al-Safa wells, to Hafar in the west. The boundary then ran

north-east from Hafar along al-Bā tin, a low depression habitually used for grazing by the

camels of Kuwaiti merchants and where depredations were always referred back to Mubarak.34

At the northern end of al-Bā tin the boundary followed a natural line to Jabal Sanam, then east to

25 Secretary of State for India (London) to Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr), 26 July 1912, reprinted inSchofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 190.

26 Shakespear to Cox, 12 Aug. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.27 Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr) to McMahon (Foreign Secretary, London to the Govt of India), 4

Aug. 1912, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, pp. 191, 193.28 Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr), 30 Apr. 1913, R/15/5/

65, IOR, London.29 Cox to McMahon, 4 Aug. 1912, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 192.30 Shakespear to Cox, 12 Aug. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.31

Cox to McMahon, 4 Aug. 1912, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 192.32 Shakespear to Cox, 12 Aug. 1912, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.33

“Koweit Draft Agreement: Between His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Ottoman Empire”,26 Mar. 1913, ibid.



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just outside Safwā n. Within this outer zone Mubarak was authorised to collect zak āt and to “conduct

such administration as may be necessary in his capacity as Turkish kaimakam”. The Ottomans could

not set up any administration in this area apart from that of the ruler of Kuwait, nor could they

station any garrisons or take military action there without British consent.35

Figure 1: Anglo-Ottoman Agreement of 1913, showing the red and green lines [Al-Bassam, Footsteps inthe Sand: Kuwait and Her Neighbours, 1700 to 2003 (2004), p. 107].

34 Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait), “ Note on the Boundaries of Kuwait Principality”, 9 Aug. 1912,reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 196.

24 Farah Al-Nakib


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The 1913 agreement thus recognised ‘diminishing’ al-Sabah authority in the inner and outer

zones. Shakespear, however, urged that Mubarak ’s “complete autonomy” be extended to the

entire area as in reality his authority in both portions was “identical in character ”. He worried that,

the division of [Mubarak ’s] territory into two portions, over which he … will have authority different in degree and kind, will be unintelligible to the Shaikh and will moreover lead to constant friction …the suggested division of his territory will undoubtedly hamper the Ruler of Kuwait in his dealingswith the tribes.36

Despite his concerns, no amendments were made to the draft agreement. Though the British Gov-

ernment did consider the outer zone as much within Mubarak ’s territory as the inner, they framed

it thus to appease the Ottomans into believing they still held some sway over Kuwait. Meanwhile,

though the 1913 boundaries meant the extension of Britain’s “good of ces” to areas well beyond

those explicated by Lansdowne in 1902, the zonal scheme “[absolved] Britain from the respon-

sibilities of actively defending this extent of territory and thereby of risking serious embroilment

with the turbulent Arabian interior ”

.

37

At the time, this therefore seemed the best solution for all;except, as Shakespear feared, for Mubarak, “the party most interested” yet least consulted.38

The 1913 agreement was never ratified due to the outbreak of the First World War. However,

Shakespear ’s fear that the division of Mubarak ’s territory would open up the area outside the zone

of “complete autonomy” to “intrigue and friction” was legitimised during and after the war.39

With the Ottomans engaged in the battlefield, Abdulrahman’s son Abdulaziz ibn Saʿud, who

reclaimed Riyā dh in 1902, emerged as the greatest threat to Kuwait ’s jurisdiction. It is noteworthy

that Ibn Saʿud was never mentioned during the 1913 negotiations. That the “ascendant power in

Najd”40 was not a factor in determining Kuwait ’s boundaries in the same year he expelled the

Ottomans from al-Ahsā ʾ indicates the strength of Mubarak ’s hold over the southern territory in

question. And yet, by the time Kuwait ’s borders were officially drawn under British arbitration

at the ʿUqair conference in 1922, Kuwait lost most of the area between the red and green lines

— which Lorimer, Knox, and Shakespear had all found to be undisputedly Al Sabah territory

— to Ibn Saʿud. Though the 1913 agreement was never ratified, its zonal division of Kuwait ’s

territory, largely developed to appease the Ottomans, made it possible to conceive of these

areas as different and, ultimately, as severable.

3 The ʿAjmā n question

Ibn Saʿud learned much of his political knowledge growing up in Mubarak ’s court, and it was with

Mubarak ’s moral and financial support that he successfully seized back power from the Al Rashidin Riyā dh in 1902. Over the next several years he reasserted Saʿudi authority over Najd for the

third time. Ibn Saʿud harboured strong expansionist aims from the start of his reign. His goal,

like those of previous Saʿudi chiefs, was to rule over all Arabia. Although Kuwait had historically

been coveted by his Wahhabi ancestors — who from the late eighteenth century periodically made

35“Anglo-Turkish Agreement between His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Ottoman Empire”,

29 July 1913, R/15/5/65, IOR, London.36 Shakespear (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Political Resident, Bushehr), 30 Apr. 1913, reprinted in

Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 211.37

Schofield, “Britain and Kuwait ’s Borders”, p. 87.38 Shakespear to Cox, 30 Apr. 1913, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 212.39 Ibid., p. 211.40 Schofield, “Britain and Kuwait ’s Borders”, p. 87.



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unsuccessful attacks against the town — Ibn Saʿud never made any overt claims over Mubarak ’s

territory while his mentor was alive. It was not until relations between the Najdi ruler and the

Al-Sabah soured during the First World War that Ibn Saʿud found his own justifications to

stake his claim over what Lorimer had referred to as Kuwait principality but that the Najdi

ruler viewed as his ancestral lands.

The first point of contention between the two ruling houses was the ʿAjmā n tribe. Prior to

1913 when Ibn Saʿud expelled the Ottomans from al-Ahsā ʾ, the ʿAjmā n’s tribal headquarters,

the Najdi ruler had been on good terms with the tribe. Once in power, however, he imposed a

new poll tax on the ʿAjmā n and prevented them from exacting dues from caravans passing

through their territory41 (a common practice in tribal d ī ras).42 In response to these new economic

measures, the ʿAjmā n started to rebel against Ibn Saʿud.43 In July 1915 he appealed to Mubarak for

assistance in an expedition against the tribe, and Mubarak sent his son Salem with a large tribal

force. However, Ibn Saʿud chose to attack before Salem arrived; his force was repulsed, and his

brother Sa‘ad was killed. Salem was instructed to rescue the besieged Ibn Sa ʿud in Hofuf, and his

arrival “changed the balance in Ibn Saʿud’s favour and the ʿAjmā n were thoroughly beaten”.44

Shortly thereafter two ʿAjmā n sheikhs came to Kuwait to sue for peace with Mubarak, whichthe ruler “accepted on a promise of future good behaviour ”, including submission to Ibn Saʿud’s

authority in al-Ahsā ʾ. Two days later a message arrived from Ibn Saʿud asking Mubarak not to

make peace with the ʿAjmā n nor to grant them asylum, but by then 2,000 had already been

given refuge in Kuwait.45 When Mubarak died the following month, his son and successor

Jaber was faced with a dilemma. He was not strong enough to control Ibn Sa ʿud as his father

had been, but if he ejected the ʿAjmā n they could retaliate and give him trouble in his own terri-

tory. He nonetheless gave in to Ibn Saʿud’s insistence that they be ejected.

In November 1916 a meeting was held in Kuwait between Ibn Sa ʿud, Jaber, and Sheikh

Khaz‘al of Mohammerah, under the aegis of Sir Percy Cox (then the Chief Political Officer in

Basra), during which all three chiefs openly declared their allegiance to the British government.As part of their collective commitment to assist Britain against the Ottomans in the war, Ibn Saʿud

agreed to a truce with the ʿAjmā n.46 In February 1917 Jaber died and his brother Salem came to

power. Ibn Saʿud had held a personal grudge against Salem since 1915; though the latter had com-

manded the force that rescued him in Hofuf, it was Salem who had directed the ʿAjmā n sheikhs to

Mubarak to seek refuge. Soon after Salem came to power Ibn Saʿud, “ by way of retaliation on the

Shaikh of Kuwait for provocation offered”, began to tax the ʿAwā zim, a long-standing Kuwaiti

tribe. Salem responded by allowing the ʿAjmā n to move en masse to Kuwait territory, infuriating

Ibn Saʿud. He believed he had a right to tax the ʿAwā zim but was willing to return to the “old

policy” if Salem turned out the ʿAjmā n.47 Though the two rulers agreed, Salem failed to recipro-

cate and the ʿAjm

ā

n stayed in Kuwait. The British finally decided to settle matters by taking thetribe under their protection in 1918 and settling them north of Zubair.48 However, the damage was

done: “Ibn Saʿud considers, and nothing will convince him of the contrary, that [Salim’s] allowing

41 Arab Bureau, “ Note on Relations with Ibn Saʿud”, 12 Jan. 1917, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 247.

42 Fattah, Politics, p. 31.43

“ Note on Relations Between Ibn Saʿud and the ʿAjmā n”, undated, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 233.

44“Ibn Saʿud and the ʿAjmā n”, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 232.

45

Ibid., p. 233.46“ Note on the ʿAjmā n Question”, undated, ibid., pp. 253 – 4.

47 Philby, “Report on the Najd Mission, 1917 – 18”, ibid., p. 281.48

“ Note on the ʿAjmā n Question”, ibid., p. 254.

26 Farah Al-Nakib


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[the ʿAjmā n] to enter his territories is a distinctly unfriendly act … He greatly dislikes Salim per-

sonally”.49 He was consumed by his hatred for the ʿAjmā n, and the asylum given by Mubarak and

his sons “was one of the important factors leading to the unfortunate estrangement ” between Ibn

Saʿud and Salem from 1918 onwards.50

4 Britain and the First World War

Additional factors leading to this estrangement emerged largely as a result of Britain’s need to

employ the local Arabian rulers — namely the Sharif Husayn of Mecca, Ibn Sa ʿud, and Salem

— in their efforts against the Ottomans during the First World War, which exacerbated existing

rivalries between them. Though the ʿAjmā n and Ibn Rashid were his immediate rivals, Ibn Sa ʿud’s

main adversary in his quest to rule Arabia was Husayn. Ibn Saʿud had made it clear since 1913 that

he wanted to establish treaty relations with Britain in order to be recognised as an independent

ruler. His request was initially declined as Britain was in the throes of prolonged negotiations

with the Porte over regional affairs (including the Kuwait boundary) and did not want totrigger any new issues.51 With the outbreak of war, the British reversed their decision and

sought to bring both Ibn Saʿud and Sharif Husayn on their side to ensure that Arabia did not

fall to the enemy. Ibn Saʿud wanted a formal treaty with Britain before he was willing to join

the war effort and compromise himself with the Ottomans; the process was, however, delayed

due to conflicts between himself and Ibn Rashid in 1915. The Najdi ruler also found himself

embroiled with the ʿAjmā n during this period. As a result of unsuccessful operations against

both enemies, his reputation among the tribes and “his position at home at this epoch was the

reverse of secure”.52 Meanwhile, Husayn was positioning himself to fill the gap left by the Otto-

mans should the Allies win. Signing an agreement with Britain became crucial for Ibn Sa ʿud, not

least because he could use British financial subsidies to pay off tribes as Husayn was alreadydoing.53 A treaty was finally signed on 26 December 1915, in which Britain officially recognised

Ibn Saʿud as ruler of Najd, al-Ahsā ʾ , al-Qat ī f, and Jubayl. In exchange, Ibn Saʿud undertook “to

refrain from all aggression on, or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, and of

the Shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast ”.54

When Husayn rose in open rebellion against the Ottomans in June 1916 and declared the inde-

pendence of the Arabs, Ibn Saʿud grew apprehensive that the Hashemite ruler would claim auth-

ority over parts of Najd.55 Husayn not only had all the tribes of the Hejaz and neighbouring

districts on his side, but had also drawn the ʿAtaybah and Harb tribes that Ibn Saʿud claimed as

belonging to him. Thousands of Najdi townsmen from ʿAnayzah, Buraydah, Sharah, and

Midhnib had also joined the Sharif ’s forces, attracted by the high pay Husayn awarded from

his substantial British subsidies. Ibn Saʿud, on the other hand, “was always in need of financial

and material assistance”,56 and without sufficient resources he was having “great difficulty in

managing the great confederation of tribes which acknowledge his religious and secular

49 Hamilton (Political Agent, Kuwait), “ Notes on Ibn Saʿud”, Nov. 1917, ibid., p. 257.50

“ Note on the ʿAjmā n Question”, ibid., p. 253.51 Arab Bureau, “ Note on Relations with Ibn Saʿud”, 1917, ibid., p. 247.52 Ibid.53 Hamilton, “ Notes on Ibn Saʿud”, Nov. 1917, ibid., p. 257.54 Quoted in Schofield, “Britain and Kuwait ’s Borders”, p. 90.55

Arab Bureau, “ Note on Relations with Ibn Saʿud”, 1917, reprinted in Schofield (ed.), Arabian Bound-ary Disputes 10, p. 247.

56 St. John Philby, “Report on the Operations of the Najd Mission, 29 Oct 1917 – 1 Nov 1918”, 12 Nov.1918, ibid., p. 292.



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leadership”.57 Ibn Saʿud was worried that if the Allies won the war and drove the Ottomans out of

Arabia, he would have to suffer the

mortification of finding his rival the Sharif firmly established as an influential and powerful monarchable to count on the support of Great Britain and the Mahommedan world, while he (Ibn Sa ‘ud)

remains a mere Bedouin chieftain — as he was before the war — but with the Shammar and Northern‘Anizah irretrievably lost and the Sharif claiming overlordship over the border tribes.58

Cox stressed to the Najdi ruler how important Husayn was to the Arab cause and that all the

Arab chiefs, him included, should work together in co-operation with the British to expel the

Turks from Arabia.59 Ibn Saʿud therefore knew that to safeguard his own position he had to

get more actively involved in the war effort so as not to be outshone by the Sharif, of whom

he became “consumed with jealousy”.60 Part of his agreement with Britain in 1915 was to

assist in capturing Haʾil from Ibn Rashid (who sided with the Ottomans), though his preoccupa-

tion with the ʿAjmā n prevented him from immediately carrying this out.61 During his 1917 – 18

mission to Najd, St John Philby determined that while Haʾil was no longer an urgent militarytarget, keeping Ibn Saʿud in active employment against Ibn Rashid could serve to distract him

from Husayn. The Government was, however, reluctant to strengthen Ibn Saʿud and run the

risk of a militant Wahhabi revival and decided not to have him undertake any extensive military

operations on their behalf. Instead, they offered him a much scaled-back present of ammunition

and the promise of handsome rewards if he managed to capture Haʾil on his own — which, he

objected, he did not have the financial resources to do.62

Thus side-lined on the battlefield, Ibn Saʿud’s main role in the war became the enforcement of

the Allies’ economic blockade to cut off supply routes to the Ottomans. The British were aware of

the enormous profits to be made in illicit supplies to the enemy; they could not, however, block-

ade the friendly Gulf ports. As such, they enlisted Ibn Saʿud to prevent any leakage of supplies

across his frontier to the enemy, and instructed Salem to refuse enemy agents access to the

Kuwaiti market. The experiment was a sheer failure, “its only substantial result being to

enhance the bitterness and antipathy already existing between Ibn Sa ʿud and Ibn Subah”.63 The

blockade was difficult to implement in Kuwait, and smuggling became widespread. Though

the Political Agent, Colonel Robert Hamilton, believed Salem was “generally anxious to put a

stop to the illicit trade with Haʾil and Medina”, he recognised that the local merchants were a

great force for Salem to contend with, as “the enormous profits of the traffic have so far

proved too great a temptation for even the best among them”.64 Even Cox admitted in 1918

that the British should have sent troops to Kuwait to enforce the blockade themselves rather

than “ place the onus of enforcing on the Shaikh”.65

The existence of smuggling in Kuwait produced two problems for Ibn Saʿud. As Kostiner argues, the war created new rivalries between Arabian chieftaincies that prompted them “to

57 Hamilton, “ Notes on Ibn Saʿud”, 1917, p. 258.58 Arab Bureau, “ Note on Relations with Ibn Saʿud”, 1917, pp. 248 – 9.59 Ibid.60 Hamilton, “ Notes on Ibn Saʿud”, 1917, p. 259.61 Arab Bureau, “ Note on Relations with Ibn Saʿud”, 1917, p. 249.62 Philby, “Report on the Najd Mission”, 1918, pp. 289 – 90. For more information on Philby’s mission to

determine Ibn Saʿud’s potential role in the war, see Silverfarb, “The Philby Mission to Ibn Sa‘ud, 1917 –

1918”, Journal of Contemporary History 14 (1979), pp. 269 – 86.63 Ibid., p. 282.64

“Kuwait News for week ending 19 February 1917”, R/15/5/19, IOR, London.65 Cox (Civil Commissioner, Baghdad) to Government of India, 7 Aug. 1918, R/15/5/103, IOR, London.

28 Farah Al-Nakib


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consolidate their grip over tribes, and compete with each other over new strategic and economic

attractions”.66 Smuggling was certainly one of these economic attractions for the port town of

Kuwait, making its market extremely attractive to Saʿudi tribes. As a result, by September

1917 Ibn Saʿud was reported to have “lost influence last year and is almost powerless against

the combined trading community of Kuwayt and Qasim (south of the Djabal Shammar) and

their smuggling activities”.67 He also suffered a loss of customs revenue in his own Ahsā ʾ

ports, which — as it was — only brought in about 20% of his annual resources (another 30%

came from land revenues, and 50% from the British subsidy of £5,000 per month, hence the

importance of maintaining his commitment to Britain).68

In addition to loss of revenue, smuggling in Kuwait hindered Ibn Sa ʿud’s role in Britain’s war

efforts, thereby diminishing his prestige and jeopardising his rivalry with the Sharif. Throughout

1917 and 1918 the number of caravans coming to Kuwait and the inordinately large stock of

goods in the market became too numerous for Salem to control.69 In September 1917 a

Shammar caravan of 3,000 camels was allowed to load with supplies in Kuwait ’s market,

though the tribe was known to be working with the Ottomans, because they carried a passport

signed by Ibn Saʿud’s son Turki. The latter claimed the pass had been given to allow safe passage through Najd, not to buy supplies. When remanded by the British, Ibn Saʿud claimed

that while the merchants of Qas ī m in his territory were making small profits as a distributive

centre, Kuwait was the source of enemy supply. To solve the matter, the British decided that

Ibn Saʿud should give passes to his legitimate subjects to allow for export from Kuwait. 70

That April, however, when Najdi caravans arrived in Kuwait for the usual spring journey to

load up on supplies for summer, Hamilton became suspicious by “the enormous quantities of

goods they wanted”.71 He instructed Salem to turn them away empty. The ruler was unwilling

to do so himself and Hamilton, therefore, ordered the headmen to leave until further instructions

were received from Ibn Saʿud.72 According to Philby, “the whole of Najd, suddenly faced with the

prospect of spending the summer without supplies, was in a ferment ”.73

Though the issue wasswiftly resolved, it put Ibn Saʿud in a precarious position with his tribes, who began to criticise

his policy of friendship and alliance with the British government. While it was the British officers

who had turned away the caravans, Ibn Sa ʿud was said to be “fuming with rage and again thirsting

for Salem’s blood”.74

5 The Ikhwā n-Kuwait crisis of 1920

With the inevitable clashing of political and financial interests that the war brought, “the tra-

ditional friendship of the houses of Saud and Subah gave place to enmity ”.75 However, Ibn

Saʿud was still bound by his 1915 agreement with Britain, in which he pledged not to carryout any direct aggression against Kuwait. Furthermore, the ruler “was wise enough to recognise

66 Kostiner, “Saudi Arabia”, p. 221.67 Quoted in Kostiner, “Saudi Arabia”, p. 222.68 Philby, “Report on the Najd Mission”, 1918, p. 288.69 Cox (Civil Commissioner, Baghdad) to Loch (Political Agent, Kuwait), 29 May 1918, R/15/5/101,

IOR, London.70 Philby, “Report on the Najd Mission”, 1918, pp. 282 – 3.71 Loch (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Philby (Riyā dh), 6 May 1918; Loch to Cox (Civil Commissioner,

Baghdad), 14 May 1918, R/15/5/101, IOR, London.72

Government of India, “Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1918”, p. 58.73 Philby, “Report on the Najd Mission”, 1918, p. 283.74 Philby (Riyā dh) to Loch (Political Agent, Kuwait), 24 Apr. 1918, IOR, London.75 Philby, “Report on the Najd Mission”, 1918, p. 277.



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that he was not and could not be strong enough under modern conditions to extend his fron-

tiers”.76 After the defeat of the Ottomans he had even asked Britain to guarantee him protection

from his “enemies”: the Sharif, Ibn Rashid, the Shammar, the ʿAjmā n, and Salem.77 He thus knew

that he could not make it on his own, so he set out to establish his rule through the use of the

militant Wahhabi revivalist movement known as the Ikhwā n. The Ikhwā n contained men from

different tribes who shared the rights and privileges of religious brotherhood with one another

while retaining the rights and privileges they shared with their unconverted tribesmen. The move-

ment thus served as a link between the disparate tribes of Najd, and the ancient practice of inter-

tribal raiding was replaced with the collective fight for (and defence of) the faith. It was “on this

foundation [that] Ibn Saʿud built the edifice of his political power ” after the war, and the Ikhwā n

became part of the ruler ’s military force.78

With the war over and Ibn Saʿud no longer obligated to work with his fellow Arab leaders

against the Turks, the Ikhwā n began targeting Kuwaiti tribes. Kostiner argues that Ibn Saʿud

“sought to avoid political complications with the Kuwayti ruler and the British, but was often

led by the Ikhwā n … into skirmishes”.79 Indeed, Philby was unsure of Ibn Saʿud’s ability to

control a movement based on religious fanaticism, particularly if seriously provoked.80 Nonethe-less, Ibn Saʿud certainly used “the hornet ’s nest of Wahhabism” to his advantage, particularly in

his long-standing feud with Salem.81 In the spring of 1920 he gave permission to the Duw ī sh clan

to build a new Ikhwā n settlement (hijra) in Balbūl, which was inside the green line of the 1913

Anglo-Ottoman Agreement. Less than two years previously this area was still considered part of

Salem’s territory. In response to ʿAjmā n raids of Saʿudi caravans in the Kuwaiti hinterland in the

summer of 1918, it had been decided that British forces would guard the Safwā n wells, Salem

would guard Jahra and other nearby watering holes, and Ibn Saʿud was given permission by

Salem to guard the Hafar wells “on [the] boundary of Kuwait territory”.82 In other words, as

of August 1918 Ibn Saʿud and the British still recognised Shakespear ’s southern boundary for

Kuwait. Allowing Faisal al-Duw ī sh to establish a hijra inside this boundary in 1920 can thus be interpreted as an act of aggression by Ibn Saʿud, who began using the Ikhwā n to challenge

Salem within his own territory. In response, Salem began building a palace in Balbūl, no

doubt to stake his jurisdiction there, but stopped when asked by the British.

In April 1920 Ibn Saʿud allowed a group of Ikhwā n Mutair to build a settlement at Jariyah, a

place well within the green line where Kuwaiti tribes customarily camped in the summer.83 In

May a large Mutairi force carrying both Saʿudi and Ikhwā n flags attacked a group of Salem’s tri-

besmen headed by Duʿaij al-Sabah that was camped at Hamdh just south-east of the Jariyah

wells.84 Ibn Saʿud believed Salem had sent Duʿaij to the area to drive away the Mutair and

had, therefore, provoked the attack. The Ikhwā n also attempted to raid Kuwaiti ʿAwā zim, but

were repulsed.

85

It was soon believed that a large force from Ibn Saʿud was advancing to

76 Ibid., p. 292.77 Ibid., p. 291.78 Ibid., p. 297.79 Kostiner, “Saudi Arabia”, p. 227.80 Philby, “Report on the Najd Mission”, 1918, p. 297.81 Ibid., p. 297.82 Cox (Civil Commissioner, in Kuwait) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London), 20 Aug.

1918, R/15/5/103, IOR, London.83 Government of India, “Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1920”, p. 72.84

More (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Civil Commissioner, Baghdad), 20 May 1920; Dickson (Pol-itical Agent, Bahrain) to Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr), 24 May 1920; Dickson to Trevor, 26 May1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.

85 Dickson to Trevor, 24 May 1920, ibid.

30 Farah Al-Nakib


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attack Kuwait Town itself, and Salem ordered a wall to be built to protect it.86 Ibn Saʿud claimed

that he had not approved the attack at Hamdh, and even in Kuwait people were doubtful of the

Najdi ruler ’s power to restrain the Mutair against their will.87 Nonetheless, Ibn Saʿud knowingly

moved “the hornet ’s nest ” into Salem’s territory, aware of the fact that a provocation could ensue

that he most probably would not be able to control. Thus, Salem was attacked without Ibn Sa ʿud

actually breaching his 1915 agreement with Britain.

The Jariyah affair brought the question of boundaries and subjects to the fore of the conflicts

between the two rulers. Ibn Saʿud believed his sway in the desert extended as far north as had his

grandfather ’s. According to an 1865 report by Lewis Pelly, then Political Resident in the Persian

Gulf, this would bring the Kuwait frontier to within 20 miles of the town.88 The territory Salem

claimed, on the other hand, was the area within the green line of the 1913 agreement.89 The Pol-

itical Agent in Kuwait, Major J.C. More, summed up the situation as follows: “Ibn Saʿud appears

to base his claim on the unwritten law of the desert, while Shaikh Salem bases his on a document

as would a civilised state”.90 Nonetheless, when Salem appealed to Cox to inform Ibn Saʿud that

Jariyah was within his boundary, he received a disappointing response. He was told that the unra-

tified 1913 agreement had been negotiated under different circumstances when the Ottomanswere still in al-Ahsā ʾ, and that it had been superseded by Ibn Sa ʿud’s 1915 agreement with

Britain, which stated that the frontier between Kuwait and Najd was still to be determined.

Salem had never been informed of this, and had been led to believe by successive political

agents that the British still upheld the territory within the green line as “his beyond dispute”.91

Indeed, Kuwait ’s boundary identified in the British Government of India’s annual “Adminis-

tration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency” for 1919 reflected this.92 Once he realised that

the British Government might not uphold what he believed to be his rightful territory, Salem pre-

ferred to “leave the frontier undecided than to have it decided against him”.93 Ibn Saʿud, on the

other hand, pushed for a boundary settlement. Seeing as his family had lost power twice before the

creation of the third Saʿudi state in 1902, he must have been eager to officially demarcate his

borders at a moment that was most favourable to him, when he had the “first-class expansionist

tool” of the Ikhwā n to help him.94 The Ikhwā n were known to take the long-standing rules of

tribal raiding beyond the “ prescribed and accepted limits” of desert warfare, and their forcible

submission of tribes to Ikhwā nism, and thereby to Ibn Saʿud’s authority, did not adhere to

common desert practice.95 In 1919 the Political Agent in Kuwait wrote that “recruitment for

[Ikhwā n] membership seems now to have passed the stage of mere conversion and ‘frightfulness’

appears to be the order of the day”.96 This was exacerbated by the fact that Jaber and Salem had

not controlled Kuwait ’s tribes and hinterland as effectively as their father; as reported when Salem

came to power in 1917, “Jabir was too easy going and the country close to Kuwait was gradually

becoming unsafe”

.

97

86 More to Cox, 20 May 1920, ibid.87 More to Cox, 2 June 1920, ibid.88 More to Cox, 13 June 1920, ibid.89 Salem al-Sabah to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 17 Sept. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.90 More to Cox, 13 June 1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.91 Government of India, “Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1920”, p. 74.92 Governmentt of India, “Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1919”, p. 67.93 Government of India, “Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1920”, p. 74.94 Kostiner, “Saudi Arabia”, p. 231.95

Freeth, A New Look at Kuwait (1972), p. 169.96 Quoted in Kostiner, “Saudi Arabia”, p. 226.97 Hamilton (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (Chief Political Officer, Basra), 6 Feb. 1917, R/15/5/19,

IOR, London.



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As the boundary dispute escalated in the summer of 1920, Ibn Sa ʿud declared that he did not

recognise that Ibn Subah has any boundaries [in the hinterland] … nor do I recognise that he has anytribesmen who depend on him, or on whom he depends, nor do I recognise that he has any shore in thehinterland of Koweit beyond the surrounding walls of Koweit town and this has been the situation

from the days of his forefathers and mine.98

In a letter to Salem, Ibn Saʿud framed the situation as a justiable reclamation of his ancestral lands:

From the very beginning there was never any question about boundaries and subjects between theSubah and Saʿud families, nor was there ever any misunderstanding between them: the Subahstopped in Kuwait and the Saʿud controlled the tribes, and there was no friction.

99

Then, according to Ibn Saʿud, “evil days fell on Najd” and the country was split into two, one

part under the Ottomans and the other under Ibn Rashid. Some tribes who were unhappy with this

new arrangement went to Kuwait and Mubarak began taking zak āt from them, to which Ibn Saʿud

did not object, “as it was all in the way of friendship”. When Mubarak died, Ibn Saʿud began

reclaiming some of the tribes he had lost by once again collecting zak āt from them. Ibn Saʿud

referred to the disputed territory as an “amānah”, a voluntary gift entrusted by one party to the

other for the purposes of care and protection. As such, it was his right as the “giver ” to take

them back.100 This was not entirely a reflection of reality — the tribes had gone over to the Al

Sabah of their own volition, mostly before Ibn Sa ʿud had come to power — but rather of how

Ibn Saʿud perceived the situation. Salem, on the other hand, referred to the tribes and territories

between Kuwait and Najd, “according to old rules and usage”, as a “miyānah”, a common prop-

erty or interest of both — making the frontier between them less defined than Ibn Saʿud’s more

fixed interpretation.101 Given these conflicting views, it is not surprising that the contestation over

tribes persisted. In November Ibn Saʿud complained that Salem was continuously bribing the

“most foolish” of his Najdi tribesmen to switch loyalties, “and if I neglect him, the number of men who will be thus persuaded to go over to him will go on increasing”.

102 The Najdi ruler

thus inadvertently admitted that he did not have a sufficient hold over the tribes in the hinterland

around Kuwait to which he was laying claim. Salem insisted that he had done nothing to seduce

the tribes from their allegiance to Ibn Saʿud and that they had come to him entirely on their own;

he could not in honour send them away.103

Meanwhile, in April 1920 Ibn Saʿud declared that tribes and merchants of the Qas ī m and

northern Najd were no longer allowed to import goods by way of Kuwait but had to use the

Saʿudi ports of ʿUqair and Qat ī f.104 Though the Political Agent in Bahrain interpreted this as a

revenue-generating move, it certainly expedited the settlement of the boundary question. The

trade blockade caused great alarm among the merchants in Kuwait, who had long controlledand financed trade with Najd. As the conflict between Salem and Ibn Saʿud dragged on, many

merchants began to pressure Salem to reach a settlement with the Najdi ruler, otherwise “trade

between Kuwait and Najd will remain at a standstill”. The people of Kuwait were much more

concerned with the re-opening of trade than the fixing of a frontier, but, as More identified,

“friendly relations” between the two rulers could be re-established only with the settlement of

98 Ibn Saʿud to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain), 5 Sept. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.99 Ibn Saʿud to Salem al-Sabah, 21 June 1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.100 Ibid.101

Salem al-Sabah to Ibn Saʿud, undated, R/15/1/522, IOR, London.102 Ibn Saʿud to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain), 23 Nov. 1920, R/15/5/100, IOR, London.103 More (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (High Commissioner, Baghdad), 8 Jan. 1921, ibid.104 Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) to Cox, 6 Apr. 1920, R/15/5/25, IOR, London.

32 Farah Al-Nakib


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the boundary dispute.105 As such, Salem was faced with both internal and external pressure to

settle the boundary question with Ibn Saʿud.

The two rulers agreed in the summer of 1920 to “[invoke] the friendly arbitration of the British

Government ”.106 In the meantime both parties were instructed not to commit any aggression

within the disputed territory.107 Construction at Jariyah continued, however, causing resentment

in Kuwait as the boundary was still under arbitration.108 In September Ibn Saʿud learned that a

large raiding party from Kuwait had collected at Jahra with “the avowed intention of attacking

Jariyah”.109 In Kuwait the movement was described simply as a reconnaissance.110 Nonetheless,

on 8 October a large Ikhwā n force was seen making its way towards Jahra, and Salem immedi-

ately prepared to defend the village.111 The Ikhwā n attacked Jahra on 10 October, and within

hours the village was in their hands. Salem and about six hundred men were besieged in the

village fort overnight until relieved by a Shammar force. The following morning the Ikhwā n with-

drew from Jahra and settled at Subaihiyah thirty-two miles south of Kuwait Town, where they

were believed to be preparing for another attack. Hundreds had been killed and wounded on

both sides.112 When envoys of the Ikhwā n arrived in Kuwait to negotiate with Salem, “they

were emphatic that their action was in accordance with Ibn Saʿud’s order ”.113 Ibn Saʿud,however, denied that he ordered the attack on Jahra.114 He claimed that Duʿaij had led a

raiding party towards Riyā dh, and that al-Duw ī sh and the Mutair chased them back to Jahra

(which the British found unlikely).115 The following month Ibn Saʿud warned that should

Salem or his forces leave the territory of Kuwait or approach any of the wells at Jahra or Subai-

hiya, “then I shall not be responsible for the result but he alone will be to blame, as I am bound, in

that case, to defend my country”.116 Ibn Saʿud was now claiming areas well within the red line of

the 1913 convention as his own. And indeed, later that month the Ikhwā n unexpectedly attacked

Kuwaiti tribes just west of Jahra.117 The need for a settlement of the boundary dispute reached

critical point.

In February 1921 Cox officially informed Ibn Saʿud about the 1913 negotiations regarding

Kuwait ’s boundary. He intimated that the territory within the red line was recognised by the

British as “definitely appertaining to Kuwait and not open to dispute”. The area between the

red and green lines was to be “regarded as neutral ground in which neither party must

occupy wells or build permanent habitations” until the question could be permanently

settled.118 Salem’s nephew Ahmed al-Jaber visited Ibn Saʿud in an attempt to find a friendly

solution to the troubles. But, while in Najd, news arrived that Salem had suddenly died. Ibn

Saʿud immediately told Ahmed that the two houses were once again “united in perfect

105 More (Political Agent, Kuwait) to Cox (High Commissioner, Baghdad), 1 Dec. 1920, R/15/5/100,IOR, London; More to Cox, 15 Oct. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.

106 Cox to More, 9 July 1920, R/15/5/99, IOR, London.107 Cox to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) and More, 19 Aug. 1920, R/15/5/105, IOR, London.108 More to Trevor (Political Residency, Bushehr), 16 Sept. 1920, ibid.109 Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) to Cox, 14 Sept. 1920, ibid.110 More to Trevor, 16 Sept. 1920, ibid.111 More (Political Agent, Kuwait), “The Ikhwan Attack on Jahrah”, 19 Oct. 1920, ibid.112 Ibid.113 More to Cox, 24 October 1920, ibid.114 Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain) to More, 15 October 1920, ibid.115 Government of India, “Administration Report of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1920”, p. 79.116

Ibn Saʿud to Dickson (Political Agent, Bahrain), 12 Nov. 1920; Dickson to Cox (High Commissioner,Baghdad), 5 Dec. 1920, R/15/5/100, IOR, London.

117 Salem al-Sabah to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 29 Dec. 1920, ibid.118 Cox to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 26 Apr. 1921; Cox to Salem al-Sabah, 17 Feb. 1921, ibid.



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friendship” and that there was no longer any need of a fixed frontier between their territories,

to which Ahmed agreed.119 The British decided to end the question of arbitration for the time

being, but Cox wondered “how far Ibn Saʿud may make good in the area enclosed between the

red and the green lines”.120

Indeed, now that Ibn Saʿud knew that in 1913 this area was not specifically marked as part of

the Al Sabah’s “undisputed territory”, it was not long before he re-opened the boundary question

and staked his claim to it, thereby legitimising Shakespear ’s concerns with the 1913 “zonal”

scheme. In October 1921 Ibn Saʿud insisted that the zone between the red and green lines was

the “undisputed property” of Najd, and had been acknowledged as such by Ahmed, the new

ruler of Kuwait, during his visit in March.121 Ahmed, however, claimed that nothing had been

fixed during his visit, and that Ibn Saʿud had simply said, “there is no boundary between you

and me but the boundaries of both are one”.122 Although Ahmed was hesitant to have the bound-

ary question raised while he was on friendly terms with Ibn Saʿud, he was not willing to relinquish

his claims to the larger frontier.123

6 The Kuwait-Najd boundary agreement: ʿUqair 1922

A permanent settlement to the Kuwait-Najd boundary was finally reached at the ʿUqair Confer-

ence of December 1922, the primary purpose of which was the settlement of the Iraq-Najd fron-

tier. When after six days of meetings no agreement could be reached on the Iraq-Najd boundary,

Cox allegedly took a red pencil and drew a map of Arabia that gave a large portion of the area

claimed by Ibn Saʿud to Iraq. Then, according to Dickson (who was in attendance), “obviously

to placate Ibn Saʿud, he ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of her territory and

gave it to Najd”.124 According to the new arrangement, Kuwait maintained the area within the

red line of the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman convention but lost most of the area located between thered and green lines to Najd, with a portion kept as neutral ground shared by both governments

(and local tribes) (Figure 2).125 When Ibn Saʿud later “ burst out into sobs” that he had been

deprived of “half ” his kingdom given to Iraq, Cox responded that it was “for this reason I

have given you two-thirds of Kuwait ’s territory”, admitting that he had no idea how Ahmed

al-Sabah, who did not attend and was represented at the meeting by Political Agent More,

would “take the blow”.126 Cox informed Ahmed a few days later in Kuwait that, “he had been

obliged to give away to Ibn Saʿud nearly two-thirds of [his] kingdom”. When the Kuwaiti ruler

asked why this had been done without his consultation, Cox made no mention of the Iraq-Najd

situation but rather told Ahmed that had he not conceded this territory, “Ibn Saʿud would certainly

have soon picked a quarrel and taken it, if not more, by force of arms … Thus, faced with a fait

accompli Shaikh Ahmad agreed to add his signature to the agreement ”.127

Cox’s admission that he had given Ibn Saʿud “two-thirds of Kuwait ’s territory” underscores

the fact that the British still considered the territory between the red and green lines as belonging

119 More to Cox, 11 Mar. 1921, ibid.120 Cox to More, 19 May 1921, ibid.121 Cox to More, 4 Oct. 1921, ibid.122 Ahmad al-Sabah to More (Political Agent, Kuwait), 21 Oct. 1921, ibid.123 More to Cox, 24 Oct. 1921, ibid.124 Dickson, Kuwait , p. 274.125

“Copy of the Najd-Kuwait Agreement of ʿUqair Conference, December 2nd

1922”, R/15/5/100, IOR,London.

126 Dickson, Kuwait , p. 275.127 Ibid., p. 279.

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to Kuwait before it was given to Najd.128 Perhaps, however, it was in Britain’s interest to placate

the ruler with the substantially larger border with their new mandate in Iraq, particularly as they

had just installed Faisal, the son of Ibn Saʿud’s long-time adversary the Sharif Husayn, as the new

Iraqi king. Dickson summed up the situation as follows:

By this somewhat strange arrangement, which savoured of surrender pure and simple to a strong stateat the expense of a small and weak one, the obvious end in view being expediency and a desire tomollify the powerful and troublesome Ibn Saʿud, the southern boundary of the recognised territory

Figure 2: The territory of Kuwait after the drawing of the Kuwait-Najd boundary at ʿUqair in 1922. Neutralzone is marked as “ N.T.” [Freeth, A New Look at Kuwait (1972), p. 12].

128 Ibid., pp. 275, 279.



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of Kuwait was pushed back a hundred and fifty miles, reducing the kingdom to an area of six thousandsquare miles.129

Cox, however, defended his action by arguing that al-Sabah power in the desert by 1922 was

significantly less than it had been under Mubarak when the Anglo-Ottoman Agreement had been

drawn up in 1913.130 More had similarly argued in the midst of the Ikhwā n crisis in 1920 that Salem’s “influence can in no respect be compared with that of his father ”. This he attributed to the

fact that most of the Mutair had since adopted Ikhwā nism.131 The trade blockade during the war

was another factor; as Hamilton identified in 1918, Britain’s insistence “on his tightening the blockade

and discriminating between tribes, friendly or otherwise to us, in the matter of granting supplies” had

contributed to Salem’s unpopularity amongst some tribes.132There is, however, little hard evidence to

show theextentof Al Sabah tribal authorityat that time, given that triballoyalties were constantly shift-

ing (even in the midst of the 1920 conflict). More also pointed out that, logical though the argument

was that “Shaikh Mubarak was a strong man and Shaikh Salim is a weak, and that a frontier which was

suitable for the former is not so for the latter ”, Ibn Saʿud himself refuted this argument by signing the

1915 agreement with Britain. The agreement recognised the Al Saʿud as the independent rulers of Najd, al-Ahsā ʾ, al-Qat ī f, and Jubayl, “and obviously some of his descendants may be weaker than

himself ”.133 Ahmed’s own alleged reaction to the agreement reflects this historical rise and fall of

powerful rulers and the ebbing and flowing of boundaries that was a traditional part of the process:

‘If some day,’ said Shaikh Ahmad, ‘Ibn Saud dies and I grow strong like my grandfather, Mubarak,will the British Government object if I denounce the unjust frontier line and recover my lost terri-tories?’ ‘ No!’ laughed Sir Percy. ‘And may God bless your efforts’.134

The reality was, however, that the drawing of permanent boundaries in the region under

British arbitration — compounded by the arrival of the oil companies and the awarding of

exploratory concessions in the desert — meant that neither Ahmed nor his successors had the

chance to reclaim their territory as previous rulers (including Ibn Saʿud himself) were once

able to do. By the time Ibn Sa ʿud died in 1953 desert boundaries were no longer contestable or

changeable as they had been for centuries. Kuwait ’s borders as drawn in 1922 have thus remained

more or less unchanged until today.

7 Conclusion

Though it certainly appeared as though Britain gave away two-thirds of Kuwait ’s land to Ibn Saʿud

at the stroke of a pencil, this paper has attempted to re-examine the period between 1913 and 1922 tohave a deeper understanding of the historical context within which this occurred. While Sir Percy

Cox, the architect of the 1922 agreement, argued that Al Sabah power in the desert had significantly

diminished after Mubarak ’s death in 1915, the factors leading to Kuwait ’s declining territorial for-

tunes were more complex than a question of tribal loyalty. It was largely the souring of the relation-

ship between Kuwait ’s rulers and Ibn Saʿud of Najd — beginning with the ʿAjmā n crisis in 1913 and

129 Ibid., p. 276.130 Ibid., p. 274.131 More to Cox, 13 June 1920, R/15/5/100, IOR, London.132

Hamilton (Political Agent, Kuwait), “ Note on Situation at Kuwait ”, undated, reprinted in Schofield(ed.), Arabian Boundary Disputes 10, p. 322.

133 More to Cox, 13 June 1920, R/15/5/100, IOR, London.134 Dickson, Kuwait , p. 279.

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worsening as a result of their involvement in Britain’s war efforts — that accelerated the establish-

ment of a fixed Kuwait-Najd boundary. Ibn Saʿud’s use of the Ikhwā n as a tool of tribal and terri-

torial expansion had made him a powerful force to contend with in the aftermath of the First World

War. As such, though the British recognised until 1919 that Kuwait ’s territorial limits extended to

the green line of the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Agreement, when the moment came to actually draw a

line in the sand in 1922 Cox chose to appease Ibn Saʿud at the expense of Ahmed. The creation of a

permanent boundary between the two territories in 1922 resulted in a substantial loss of territory for

Kuwait while also permanently altering the once fluctuating nature of desert boundaries at a

moment that was infinitely more favourable to Ibn Saʿud.

Bibliography

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Ltd, 1971).Dickson, H.R.P., Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956).Government of India, “Administration Reports of the Kuwait Political Agency for 1918 – 20”, reprinted in

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Finnie, David, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait ’ s Elusive Frontier With Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992).Freeth, Zahra, A New Look at Kuwait (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972).Kostiner, Joseph, “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Expansion: The Case of Kuwayt, 1916 – 1921”, Die Welt des

Islams 33 (1993): 219 – 34.Onley, James, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the

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——— , “Britain and Kuwait ’s Borders, 1902 – 1923”, in Kuwait: The Growth of a Historic Identity, edited byBenjamin Slot (London: Arabian Publishing, 2003), pp. 58 – 94.

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