the making of a conundrum: origins of the modern middle east

8/7/2019 The Making of a Conundrum: Origins of the Modern Middle East

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Thomas BaileyThe Making of a Conundrum: Origins of the Modern Middle East

If one were to engage in nation building in the early twentieth century, some of the best

characteristics to add were democracy, constitutional law, commercial innovation, industrial

production, and culture hallmarks of France and Britain. In the wake of the fall of the Ottoman

Empire, the establishment of the mandate system by the League of Nations, from an European

perspective, seemed to be an ideal solution for the creation of stable nations in the former

Ottomans vilayets. The growth of nationalism in the new Turkish state, along with its hampered-

evolution in the former provinces, and coupled with the dominating control of the Great Powers

(United Kingdom and France) however, created modern states lacking internal cohesion. The

British and French drew the Fertile Crescents states of Syria/Lebanon, Iraq/Kuwait, Jordan, and

Palestine/Israel. A detailed study of each is not possible in this paper, so I will highlight instead

only two: Syria (a French mandate) and Iraq (a British mandate).

The final years of the Ottoman Empire brought a variety of nationalistic sentiments, all

aimed at uniting the empire.1 Of these, the Anatolian-Turkish identity proved to be the most

important it was around a Turkish national identity that Mustafa Kemal created the Republic of

Turkey. The emphasis placed upon being a Turk meant there was little room for the Arabic-

dominated provinces of the old empire in the new republican Turkey. The 1923 Treaty of

Lausanne recognized Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia sine Mosul in exchange for dropping

all claims to other former Ottoman territories.2

These eastern vilayets then were open to be

controlled by the victorious Great Powers along similar lines decided in the Sykes-Picot

Agreement of 1916.

1William L. Cleveland and Martin Burton,A Historyofthe Modern Middle East, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview

Press, 2009), 137-140.2 Cleveland, 177-178.


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Prior to the outbreak of World War I, the Committee of Union and Progress, which

controlled the government in Istanbul, pushed an Ottoman identity. To this end they instituted a

policy in 1909 that dismantled the milletsystem and began to remove prominent Arab families

from positions of power in the vilayets, often replaced with Turks loyal to the new regime.

Intended to unite, its effect was to alienate the Arab population they saw themselves as distinct

from their Turkish overlords.3

Even throughout the war period, British agents manipulated the

Arabic identity in order to obtain Hashemite support against the Ottomans.4

When the Ottoman system of rule collapsed, the British and French were keenly aware of

what Rudyard Kipling called the white mans burden on behalf of the newly freed people. The

Arab people living in the Fertile Crescent were developed, but were not seen as being

sufficiently developed to found modern nation-states without being subject to the rendering of

administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory.5

Britain and France approached the issue

of leadership in their mandates differently, however, they both consciously excluded the same

Arab families that the Young Turks removed from power.

France began its mandate over Syria by dividing it into five separate states, three of

which (Lebanon, Alawite, and Druze) were created to foster separate identities in religious

minority groups.6

The process helped to solidify differences, particularly between the Maronite

Christians and their Muslim neighbors. In addition, economic development could not flourish

because the two larger Syrian states (Aleppo and Damascus) were landlocked.7 France

hampered Syrian political involvement in their government by delaying electoral processes,

3 Cleveland, 137-138; 140-143.4 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 238.5

League of Nations, Covenantofthe LeagueofNations,Article XXII as quoted in Nigel Davidson, TheTermination of the Iraq Mandate,InternationalAffairs (RoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs 1931-1939) 12, no.

1 (January 1933): 62.6

George Antonius, Syria and the French Mandate, InternationalAffairs (RoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs1931-1939) 13, no. 4 (July-August 1934): 526; Cleveland, 218-221.7 Antonius, 527.


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reserving final decision-making to French bureaucrats, and attempting to impose a constitution

without adequate consultation with the people it was to govern.8

Unwittingly French policies,

particularly the violent repression of the Druze revolt and the ceding of Alexandretta to Turkey,

fused a Syrian national identity amongst the varied Muslim populations. At the core of this

identity was a hatred for France. After achieving independence, the segregation enforced by the

French was maintained in the establishment of two states: Lebanon and Syria. Within Lebanon

the Christian-Muslim tension remained, culminating in the 1975-1990 civil war.

Unlike the French mandate of Syria, which was a single vilayet that France divided, Iraq

was the British combination of three (Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra) into one. The majority

populations of each were not natural allies, separated by cultural identity and religious

adherence. In addition, the economic vitality of Iraq was hampered by the British decision to

minimize Iraqs access to the Persian Gulf a decision that created tension and led to war in

1990.9

British imperial policy toward Iraq favored indirect rule consisting of a monarch able to

pit one group against another, though dependent upon Great Britain.10 To achieve their aim of a

client state, the British chose Emir Faysal, a non-Iraqi Arab, as the new king in 1921. King

Faysal was in a precarious position; dependent upon the British for financial and military aid and

yet aware that dependence lost him the support of the Iraqi people. And so at various times the

British conceded minimal concessions to him in external affairs.11 The control of the military

8Cleveland, 222-223; Antonius, 530-531.

9 Helmut Mejcher, Iraqs External Relations 1921-26, Middle EasterStudies 13, no. 3 (October 1977): 345;

Cleveland, 204-205.10

Toby Dodge, Iraq: The Contradiction of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective, ThirdWorldQuarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 195.11 Mejcher, 342.


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however, a key element for international diplomacy, was firmly rooted in British training and

logistics.12

In order to exercise authority over his new kingdom, King Faysal employed two tactics

learned from the British. The first was the extension of the client-patron system to internal

relations and the use of military force. Since Ottoman time, effective centralized control was

maintained only in the urban areas with the vast interior territory controlled by Bedouin tribes.13

Faysal traded land water access and grazing rights to Bedouin leaders in exchange for their

support of his policies. Failure to comply involved the confiscation of the land, which was vital

to the tribal leaders patronage system.

14

Despite the coups that occurred in modern Iraqi

history, the patronage system continued to play a vital role for the central government.

In order for the central government to maintain control over its clients and disenchanted

members of the population, military strength was essential. Neither Britain nor the Kingdom of

Iraq possessed sufficient resources for sustained land operations. The introduction ofhakumatal

tayarra (government by aircraft), led by the British Royal Air Force, ensured the stability of the

kingdom. The air raids were aimed at those who did not cooperate with the government in

Baghdad. The result was two-fold: it united through fear the anti-government groups and

hindered the development of infrastructures necessary for a united state.15

Air power continued

to be used by Iraqi regimes to subdue minority peoples. After the 1991 Gulf War however,

British, French, and American air power was used to protect the Kurds and Shia. Iraq, being a

diverse country with a violent modern history, has not been able to form a national identity

amongst all its peoples.

12 Cleveland, 207.13

Cleveland, 205.14

Curtis Richardson, The New State of Iraq (class lecture, History of the Modern Middle East, NorthwestMissouri State University, Maryville, MO, January 21, 2010).15 Dodge, 193-194.


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The French and British made the decisions concerning their obligation to their mandate

territories based upon their own national security interests and to a degree cannot be faulted for

placing their own citizenry first. The result nevertheless is the present fragmentation in the

Fertile Crescent. The United States is now in a similar position to the old Mandatory powers,

attempting nation building. And like France and Britain have national security interests which

affect the decisions being made.

The long-term stability of Iraq or Afghanistan needs to be determined by the people of

those territories and not imposed from the international community. Despite American

objections to certain elements in their societies, other countries in the region have built stable

nations without such interference. It is usually those countries that have experienced extensive

Western involvement that face political turmoil. If history is to be a lesson here, American

efforts should be focused on national cohesion based upon the will of the populace. Favoring

one side over the other, be they Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Nestorian, Jew, Zoroastrian, etc., will only

re-entrench their differences. If popular sovereignty is acultural, then it should be followed,

encouraged, and protected from outside interference.


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Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Antonius, George. Syria and the French Mandate. InternationalAffairs (RoyalInstituteof

InternationalAffairs 1931-1939) 13, no. 4 (July-August 1934): 523-539.

Davidson, Nigel. The Termination of the Iraq Mandate. InternationalAffairs (RoyalInstitute

ofInternationalAffairs 1931-1939) 12, no. 1 (January 1933): 60-78.

Secondary Sources:

Alonso, Ana Mara. The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation, Nationalismand Ethnicity. AnnualReviewofAnthropology 23 (1994): 379-405.

Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. A Historyofthe Modern Middle East. 4th ed.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009.

Dodge, Toby. Iraq: The Contradiction of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective.ThirdWorldQuarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 187-200.

Mejcher, Helmut. Iraqs External Relations 1921-26. Middle EasterStudies 13, no. 3

(October 1977): 340-358.

Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

the making of a conundrum: origins of the modern middle east

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