The Mamlūks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the CrossroadsAuthor(s): David AyalonReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Nov., 1996), pp. 305-333Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain andIrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25183239 .Accessed: 08/12/2011 19:10

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The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might

at the Crossroads*

DAVID AYALON

General overview

The study of the Mamluks under the Seljuks is of pivotal significance, because those

Mamluks formed the essential connecting link between their predecessors in the 'Abbasid

Caliphate and their successors in the Sultanates of the Zangids, the Ayyubids and the

Mamluks of Egypt and Syria on the one hand, and in the Sultanate of the Ottomans on the

other. They were also part of an

exceptionally important stage in the ethnic transformation

which those Mamluks underwent with the progress of time.

The full dimensions and centrality of the Mamluk factor under the Seljuks can be seen, in

my view, only on the basis of the following premises, guidelines and considerations.

(a) The Mamluk socio-military institution, in its various forms, had been the mainstay

of Islam's military might throughout the greatest part of its existence, with the ethnic

transformation just mentioned having no mean share in that phenomenon. The pagan

Turks and their like formed for many centuries the backbone of the elite Mamluk armies

because of their remarkably superior military qualities, according to the criteria of those

times. By force of circumstances they were very gradually replaced by Mamluks of

Christian (mainly Eastern) origin, and this is what gave that institution its relative

adaptability to the advance of technology and, consequently, a longer lease of life.

(b) During the early centuries of Islam the centre of gravity of its might moved steadily eastwards and north-eastwards, until it eventually drew its major military manpower from

Central Asia and the areas adjacent to it.

(c) The preponderance of the eastern lands of Islam (including Egypt), vis-a-vis its

western ones was decisive. This is true in spite of the fact that without those western lands

Islam could never have become that great religion and civilization which we know today.

The Seljuks and their Turkmens coming from Central Asia merged into that eastern part.

(d) The Mamluk and the eunuch institutions became, at least from the end of the ninth

century onwards, that is about a hundred years before the Seljuks set foot on Islamic soil,

closely connected or even intertwined with each other. One of the reasons for that closeness

* This study is an enlarged version of my lecture which was delivered to the Royal Asiatic Society on 12 October 1995. A considerably larger one is in preparation. [Editorial note: JRAS, 1946, part 1, contained, on

pp. 67?73, an article on "The plague and its effects on the Mamluk army", by David Neustadt, as he then was. This was Professor Ayalon's first published learned article in a European language. The Society is very pleased to be able to mark the fiftieth anniversary of its publication in so uniquely appropriate a way.]

JRAS, Series j, 6, 3 (1996), pp. 305~333

306 David Ayalon

was that the eunuchs were then already assigned the task of supervising and bringing up the

young Mamluks.

In this context it would be worth mentioning that the eunuchs were made part of the

ruler's court, without fuss, by Caliph Mu'awiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, as

early as the third quarter of the seventh century. The Mamluks, on the other hand, were

made the major military element of the 'Abbasid Caliphate only in the second quarter of the

ninth century, by Caliph Mu'tasim (218-27/833-42), an act which was accompanied by

much publicity and severe internal struggle. From that crucial event onwards the surest

way to reach sound scholarly results on both Mamluk and eunuch research is to study them

together.

(e) When the Seljuks entered Islamic territory towards the end of the tenth century or

thereabouts, both the Mamluks and the eunuchs were already everywhere, strongly

entrenched, holding key positions and extremely powerful. In order to avoid any misun

derstanding, I would like to emphasize in advance that the dominant designation of

"eunuch" at that time, and long before and after it, was the euphemism khddim (pi.

khadam), meaning literally "servant".1 If one replaces khddim in the historical sources by khasi (= "the castrated"), quite a different history, and the correct one, will emerge.

Now the Seljuks came from Central Asia into the lands of Islam as vassals of stronger

Muslim rulers, and gathered strength only gradually, until they reached the peak of their

power. During all that process, there is mention of no systematic attempt to suppress the

Mamluks, and none whatsoever to uproot the eunuchs. If such an attempt had been made,

it would have been recorded in considerable detail, and it would certainly have ended in

ultimate failure, as did so many other attacks on the Mamluks that were made in the

Muslim East. Furthermore, the Seljuks had no long-range reasons for eliminating the

Mamluk military element. On the contrary, they had every reason to preserve and

strengthen it. Otherwise, there would have been no Seljuk empire, at least not the great and

enduring one we know, with all the far-reaching consequences which would have resulted

from that.2

Basing oneself on such premises, guidelines and considerations, one is bound to find that

the dimensions of the Mamluk military establishment were immense under the Seljuks, at

least from the reign of Sultan Tughril onwards, although the picture will unfold only

gradually. We are still at the beginning of this process.

Within the framework of those premises and within the limits of the theme of the

present study, I would like to highlight some specific aspects of my general view of the

Mamluk institution. I shall start by singling out two most indicative instances, completely

independent of each other, which belong to a rather late period in Seljuk history. The first

is that of the famous vizier Nizam al-Mulk (died 1092); and the second is that of Caliph

1 I repeatedly dealt with this term in a number of studies of mine, and not only those confined to the subject of

eunuchs. In a book which I finished recently, called Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans - A Study in Power Relationships, now in the Magnes Press of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, I discuss that and other terms relating to eunuchs

in a very detailed Appendix. Earlier studies where eunuch terminology is discussed at considerable length are: "The eunuchs in the Mamluk

Sultanate", Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 267?9; "On the eunuchs in Islam", JSAI, I

(1979), pp. 74-93; "On the term khddim in the sense of'eunuch' in the early Muslim sources", Arabica, XXXII

(1985), pp. 289-308. 2 See also my "Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon", part A, Der Islam, LIII (1976), pp. 209-18.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 307

al-Muqtafi (530-55/1136?60). I chose the first because it shows that that vizier's theory and

practice concerning the Turkish Mamluks were in complete accord. The second was chosen

because of its centrality in the history of both the 'Abbasid Caliphate and the Seljuk Sultanate

(it reflects with unique clarity the attitude of the Caliphs and the Sultans to pagan Turkish

Mamluks vis-a-vis Eastern Christian ones); because of its far-reaching implications beyond

that history; and, last but not least, because it has been given an erroneous interpretation

which has deprived it of both its purport and its focal significance. Afterwards I will present and very briefly analyze

a small selection of source evidence

relating to the period preceding the Seljuks, which proves the great superiority of the

warlike qualities of the Turks inside and outside the Mamluk military society. This will be

followed by an indication of the close relations existing between the Turks and the Islamic

region bordering their homeland, and of the immense impact of that region on the

Mamluks who entered through it into the lands of Islam. Then will come a case in point: a

brief examination of the role of the Saqaliba in the East, as compared with that of the Turk.

Then the gap between the pre-Seljuk evidence and that for the two opening instances will

be closed, showing once again the superiority of the Turkish Mamluks at that time. This

will be followed by two consecutive sections dedicated to the different kinds of ethnic

changes which the two main Mamluk branches of the Seljuk tree underwent: the

Ottoman on the one hand and the Zangid-Ayyubid-Mamluk on the other; and to the

ultimate outcome of those different changes. Then a summary of the role of the eunuchs

under the Seljuks ?

an inseparable part of the Mamluk phenomenon

? will follow. The

article will close with an affirmation of the unquestionably Mamluk origin of the Ottoman

military slave system.

Nizam al-Mulk

He was not only the detached admirer and protagonist of the Mamluk system, dominated

by the Turkish ethnic group, as it had developed under the Samanids, which he lauded so

highly in his Siydsat-ndma. He himself owned thousands of Turkish Mamluks (uluf min

al-Atrak), about whom nothing is said in the accounts of the chronicles until they suddenly

appear in 476/1084 when the career, and even the life, of their patron is threatened. By their

mere appearance they immediately remove that threat.3 Without that private Turkish

Mamluk army the story of that undoubtedly great personality, who dominated the Seljuk scene for so

long, would have been quite different. At that crucial moment in his career the

presence of units other than the Mamluks is not even hinted at.4

What must be considered as quite certain is that the case of Nizam al-Mulk's Mamluks

3 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil (Beirut edition), x, p. 131. According to Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi the number of these Turkish

Mamluks was more than one thousand (Mir at al-Zamdn, Ankara, 1968, pp. 227, 1. 18-225,1. 17). 4 In the obituary notices about Nizam al-Mulk the fact that he drew his power and authority from the

thousands of Turkish Mamluks he possessed (kathrat mamdlikihi; wa-malaka min ghilman al-Atrdk ulufan) is clearly stated. See Ibn al-Athir, al-Tdrikh al-BdhirJt al-Dawla (Cairo, 1963), p. 10; and Abu Shama, who cites Nizam al-Mulk's contemporary or near-contemporary, the historian Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Malik al-Hamdani, who died early in the sixth/twelfth century (Kitab al-Rawdatayn, Cairo, 1288H, i, p. 26). For more detail see "Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon", pp. 213-14. The Siyasat-ndma certainly reflects Nizam al-Mulk's personal attitude to the Turkish Mamluks and the spirit of the time, even if it was edited after his death.

308 David Ayalon

cannot be an isolated one, but part and parcel of a wider and longer-established

phenomenon.

Caliph al-Muqtafi

There are three sources known to me which give an account of a matter in which the

Caliph and the Seljuk Sultan were involved: al-Bundari, Ibn al-Furat and al-Husayni. Sibt

Ibn al-Jawzi provides us with a much earlier account which is a most illuminating

forerunner of the story of al-Muqtafi. We shall present the evidence of all four in that

order.

Al-Bundari: "The Caliph [al-Muqtafi], when he was made Caliph, was made to swear

(or, more precisely, an oath was exacted from him), that he would not buy any Turkish

Mamluk. [Therefore] he used to buy throughout his reign either an Armenian or a Greek

Mamluk. Of the Turks he had only Terkesh, whom he owned before he became Caliph"

(wa-kana al-imam lammd ustukhlifa ustuhlifa 'aid annahu la yashtari mamlukan Turkiyyan

wa-kana yaqtani muddata khildfatihi immd Armaniyyan aw Rumiyyan wa-lam yakun lahu min

al-Atrak ilia Tarshak malakahu qabla al-imdma)5 Ibn al-Furat:6 When Caliph al-Muqtafi ascended the throne in Baghdad, the Seljuk

Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Masud (527-42/1133-52), the ruler of Iraq and Western Iran, made

him swear that he would not buy any Turkish Mamluks, and that is why he bought

throughout his reign Armenian and Greek Mamluks. Of the Turkish Mamluks he had only one, whom he bought before he became Caliph. It was Tershek. He appointed him as

commander-in-chief of the Caliphal army (istahlafahu [Mas'ud] 'aid annahu la yashtari mamlukan Turkiyyan fa-kdna yaqtani muddata khildfatihi al-mamdlik al-Arman wal-Rum

wa-lam yakun lahu min al-Atrak ilia Tarshak malakahu qabla al-khildfa fa-walldhu imrat

[imriyyat] al-umara). He selected a group of those Armenians and Greeks, gave them

priority in his service and raised them in rank. This build-up of the army was part of a wide

strategic plan of the Caliph. He fortified the walls of Baghdad and deepened its ditches. He

appointed governors in the districts and improved the information network which resulted

in much greater safety on the roads. For his Mamluks he bought swift horses [al-khuyul

al-sawabiq). He spent much money on that whole beneficial programme. He was able to

carry it out fully and without hindrance because whoever remained of the Seljuk sultans

were occupied with each other (ishtighdl ma baqiya min al-saldtin al-Saljuqiyya bdduhum

bi-bdd). The idea behind the whole scheme was to free the tiny Caliphal state from the oppressive

hand of the Seljuks. Their expected reaction did come. But owing to the thorough

preparations just prescribed, the defenders of Baghdad succeeded in withstanding the heavy

siege laid on the town. "And this was the end of the Seljuks' interference with Baghdad's affairs" (kdna hddhd dkhar tdarrud al-Saljuqiyya li-Baghddd) 7

5 Zubdat al-Nusra wa nukhbat al-'usra, ed. M. T. Houtsma in Recueil de textes relatifs a l'histoire des Seljoucides, ii

(Leiden, 1889), p. 235. 6 The evidence of Ibn al-Furat is presented by me as a combination of literal citations, paraphrases and

connecting sentences of mine. This does not affect in any way the unequivocal meaning of that evidence. 7 Ibn al-Furat, Ta'rikh, iii, MS Vienna, A.F. 119, fols. 55b, 1. io-56a, 1. 8. See also ibid., fols. 47a; 72b; 98a-i03a;

103b; 131a.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 309

Al-Husayni: "When Caliph al-Muqtafi reached the age of puberty the Seljuk Sultan

Mas'ud demanded from him insistently to commit himself by oaths and agreements not to

buy Turkish Mamluks, and he [al-Muqtafi] made a pledge that he would comply with this

demand. Sultan Mas'ud's representatives in Baghdad perpetrated evil deeds there, most of

them being against al-Muqtafi's will. When he forbade them from doing so, they did not

heed him. The Sultan's deputy in Baghdad was Mas'ud al-Bilali, a stupid and brainless

eunuch; irreligious; far away from being good and very near to being bad. He was doing

things most of which were unlawful and contradictory to the accepted political conduct.

By all that he intended to antagonize and grieve Caliph al-Muqtafi. Letters of complaint

against him were sent continuously from the Caliph's court to the Sultan. Sometimes the

Sultan would upbraid him [the eunuch] and sometimes he would abstain from doing so. As

a result of all that a feeling of alienation and rancour filled al-Muqtafi's heart. And when

Sultan Mas'ud died he set out briskly to repel the foreigners from Baghdad. He had

Mamluks, part of them being Greek and part being Armenian. He made them commanders

and entrusted each of them with [the rulership: defence:] of part of the land of Iraq. [The

eunuch] Mas'ud al-Bilali was defeated and retreated from Baghdad" (kana al-sultdn Mas'ud

lamma balagha al-imam al-Muqtafi li-amri Allah akhadha 'alayhi al-'uhud wal-mawdthiq annahu la

yataqaddam bi-shira al-ghilman al-Atrak ja-'dhadahu 'aid dhalika wa-kana ashab al-sultdn Mas'ud

yatasarrafuna bi-Baghdad tasarrufat fasida aktharuha yaqa 'aid ghayri wafqi al-Muqtafi li-Amr

Allah wa-rubbamd kana yanhdhum 'anha fa-Id yantahuna wa-yazjuruhum wa-la yanzajiriina

wal-naib 'an al-Sultan bi-Baghdad kana Mas'ud al-Bilall khzdim sakhif al-aql wal-ray qalll al-din

bald 'an al-khayr qarib min al-sharr kana yatamid ahwalan aktharuha khdrij 'an al-shar bald min

rusum al-siydsa al-ma'quda yaqsid bi-dhalika Ihdsh al-imam al-Muqtafi li-Amr Allah wa-kanat

al-murasalat min al-dlwan al-'azlz tatawdla Ud al-sultdn Mas'ud bil-shikaya minhu fa-taratan kana

yazjuruhu 'anftlihi wa-taratan yumsik 'anhu fa-hasalafi qalb al-imam al-Muqtafi li-Amr Allah

min dhalika wahsha wa-intawa Ud hiqdfa-lamma tuwuffiya al-sultdn Mas'ud tashammara li-daf

al-a'ajim 'an Baghdad wa-kana lahu mamallk ba'dhum Rum wa-ba'duhum Arman fa-ja'alahum

umara wa-fawwada Ud kulli wdhid minhum jdniban min jawdnib al-'Iraq wa-inhazama Mas'ud

al-Bildll min Baghdad)8

Sibj Ibn al-Jawzi: In Muharram 471/July 1078 Caliph al-Muqtadi (467-87/1075-94) received from Sultan Malikshah (465-85/1072?92) a letter of demands and restrictions, one

of which was that members of his inner circle, his eunuchs and his followers would not

possess Turkish Mamluks within the precincts of the Caliphal palace (la yakunfiha [ft Dar

al-Khildfa]ghilman Atrak lil-khass wa-la lil-khadam wal-atba).9

The three accounts dealing with al-Muqtafi are not equal in importance (by far the most

important of them is that of Ibn al-Furat). But they complement each other very nicely.

What is absolutely certain about the evidence of all three of them is that both the Seljuks and the 'Abbasid Caliphs considered the Turkish Mamluks to be the very best ones, with the

Armenians and the Greeks definitely inferior to them (the Seljuk sultan must also have

believed that these ones would not endanger his hold on Baghdad). The only Turkish

Mamluk that al-Muqtafi possessed was promoted by him to the topmost post in the

military hierarchy. Al-Muqtafi does not seem to have been bothered by the possibility that

8 Al-Husayni, Akhbdr al-Dawla al-Saljuqiya (Lahore, 1933), p. 129.

9 Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi (Ankara ed.), p. 196, 11. 1-2.

310 David Ayalon

a single Turkish Mamluk at the head of a Mamluk body composed of non-Turkish ethnic

groups would arouse dangerous antagonism among the members of those groups. Such

was the awe and respect for the Turks within the army ranks (see also below: the evidence

of Ibn Hassiil). At the same time it is equally clear that the Mamluk socio-military system remained the unquestionably preferred one. The Caliph did not hesitate to rely on what

were then believed to be second-rate Mamluks as the mainstay of his military might.

Reliance on another, namely non-Mamluk, military element was not even considered. It

was with this kind of Mamluks that he succeeded in freeing Baghdad and himself from the

Seljuks. The Caliph, like any other Muslim ruler basing his power on a Mamluk kernel,

had other armies in his service as well. In the final struggle over Baghdad, only the Kurds

are mentioned in passing in Ibn al-Furat's account, and not in the main part of it.10

From the account of al-Husayni we learn two important things: (a) how central was the

role of the eunuch representative of the Seljuk Sultan in the relations between the two

courts; (b) how heavy was the pressure which the Sultan had to exercise in order to dissuade

the Caliph from buying Turkish Mamluks. And this brings us to the much earlier account

of Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi.

What we learn from this is that the presence of Turkish Mamluks in the Caliphal court

was a cause of great concern to the Seljuk rulers, and that that concern was shared by both

the Great Seljuk (Malikshah) and the smaller one (Mas'ud) who had Baghdad under their

sway. The combined evidence of the four accounts also shows us that that problem consti

tuted a long-standing issue of no small consequence between the two courts for at least

fifty-eight years. It stands to reason as well that a controversy about it arose more frequently

than the two widely separated occasions on which it surfaced in the sources. What can also

be deduced from the accounts under discussion is that at first the Seljuks tried to erode the

power of the Turkish Mamluk body in the Caliphal court by attacking its fringes (namely,

by eliminating that part of it which was owned by the Caliph's entourage or retinue), and

only at the end did they succeed in liquidating the part belonging directly to the Caliph himself.11

Finally, it would be most interesting to know how the military success achieved by "second-rate" Mamluks in such an important struggle affected their future recruitment. It

may be that further research will provide an answer to this question.

10 Ibn al-Furat, Tdrikh, iii, fol. 72b. 11 C. E. Bosworth has made very important contributions to the study of the Turks and the Turks'

recruitment as Mamluks during the first half millennium of Islam's history. He was also the first to call attention to

crucial evidence relating to those subjects. Yet I have a fundamentally different view than his about a number of

major issues regarding the Mamluk institution. In the present context I cannot share his opinion about Caliph

al-Muqtafi's Mamluk policy. According to him that Caliph "disliked Turks" (my italics - D. A.) and therefore

"merely recruited Greeks and Armenians instead", in order to preserve the Mamluk character of his army

("Ghaznevid military organisation", Der Islam, XXXVI (1961), p. 43; The Ghaznavids (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 100). All the sources, including the two he cites (al-Bundari and al-Husayni) appear to tell us something different. I have

already stressed the unique importance of the al-Muqtafi story in my article "Egypt as a dominant factor in Syria and Palestine during the Islamic period", Egypt and Palestine ? A Millennium of Association, Jerusalem, 1984, p. 30, n. 25. But at that time I was not aware of Bosworth's earlier mentioning and interpretation of it. For my

disagreement with him about other essential parts of his view of the Mamluks, see "Aspects of the Mamluk

phenomenon", part A, p. 206, n. 18; "On the eunuchs in Islam", pp. 94, 100, 105. Since, however, all these parts

belong to one whole (which can be epitomised in Bosworth's own words: "That any of the nations customarily

supplying slaves were conspicuously superior to the rest is problematical" - see the two references cited in this

note), I shall discuss them, together with other parts, in the fuller version of this study. There any points of

agreement will also be referred to.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 311

The Pre-Seljuk Evidence

What is significant and unique about the Turks is that the unparalleled number of highly

appreciative statements about their warlike ability and the quite consistent policy of the

Muslim rulers in enlisting them militarily are in full agreement. No other ethnic group

could pride itself with anything resembling even remotely that combination of those two

elements.12

The innumerable statements about the fighting qualities of the Turks and the Turkish

Mamluks still need to be collected more systematically than has been done up till now. Of

the numerous ones which I as well as other Islamicists have already collected, I shall cite

only very few, which seem to me to be particularly relevant to our subject. I do not think

that one can gather evidence about any other ethnic group in the Muslim sources which

will even vaguely resemble the few instances presented here. Here are those statements:

I. Speaking of the Turkish Mamluks of the 'Abbasid Caliphs, al-Istakhri says: "And the

Turks constituted their [the Caliphs'] armies because of their superiority over the other

races in prowess, valour, courage and intrepidity" (wa-kanat al-Atrak juyushahum li-fadlihim

'aid sair al-ajnasft al-bas wal-jara wal-shajaa wal-iqddm)P

II. Speaking of the same Turkish Mamluks of the same 'Abbasid Caliphs, a considerably

earlier authority, al-Jahiz, says: "They became to Islam a source of reinforcement and an

enormous army, and to the Caliphs a protection and a shelter and an invulnerable armour

as well as an innermost garment worn under the upper garment" (fa-sdru lil-Islam maddatan

wa-jundan kathlfan wa-lil-khulafa wiqdyatan wa-mawilan wa-junnatan haslnatan wa-shi'aran

duna al-dithar14) ,15

III. The same al-Jahiz furnishes us with a most instructive instance of which he was an

eyewitness. Not less instructive is his comment on it. He says: "I [i.e. al-Jahiz] tell you that I

witnessed from them [i.e. from the Turks] something wonderful and extraordinary. I saw

in one of al-Ma'mun's campaigns (ghazawdt) two lines of horsemen on both sides of the

road near the halting place [at which the Caliph and his army intended to camp]. The line on the right-hand side of the road was

composed of one hundred Turkish horsemen. The

line of the left-hand side of the road was composed of one hundred horsemen of 'others'

(min sair al-nds). All were arrayed in battle-order, awaiting the arrival of al-Ma'mun. [But

the Caliph seems to have been delayed on his way and meanwhile] it was midday and the

heat became intense. When al-Ma'mun reached the place, he found all the Turks sitting on

12 The only parallel which I can find (and this is a partial one) is the repeated praise, expressed grudgingly, which the Muslims and Franks bestow on each other's military prowess during the Crusading period. But that is

beyond the present subject. 13 Al-masalik wal-mamdlik (Leiden, 1927), p. 291, 11. 16-17. This statement was already cited in my The

Military Reforms of Caliph al-Mu'tasim - Their Background and Consequences, which appeared in the form of a

stencilled brochure (Jerusalem, 1963 -

reprinted, with changed pagination, in Islam and the Abode of War, Variorum (London, 1994), article I). The reference here (p. 25) and throughout the present study is to the Variorum pagination. Ibn Hawqal expresses the same idea in different words (Surat al-Ard, Leiden, 1939, p. 448, H.9-10).

14 This is a very high distinction. In a tradition relating to the Medinan supporters of the Prophet Muhammad

(the Ansdr) they are addressed: antum al-shi'dr wal-nds al-dithdr, which Lane translates: "Ye are the special and close friends [and the people in general are less near in friendship]". It is noteworthy that shi'dr means also a coat of mail

[worn under the garment]. See Taj al-Ariis under dir. 15

Mandqib a\-Atrdk, ed. van Vloten (Leiden, 1903), p. 49, 11. 7-8. "Military reforms", p. 26.

312 David Ayalon

the backs of their horses, with the exception of three or four, whereas 'all that medley1 (jdmi'

tilka al-akhldt) have thrown themselves on the ground, with the exception of three or four.

[Remembering that episode] I said to a friend of mine: see what happened to us! I swear

that al-Mu'tasim knew them better than we did when he gathered them and fostered them

(fa-qultu li-sdhib liunzur ayy shay ittafaqa land ashhadu anna al-Mu'tasim kdna a'rafbihim hina

jama'ahum wa-istana' ahum) }6

IV. Al-Ya'qubi, in his account of the building of Samarra, which forms the basis of our

study of that capital of Islam, tells us that al-Mu'tasim, after a long search for a suitable

place, reached the desirable locality, where he found only a Christian convent. He alighted there and asked its monks about the place. They told him that it is said in their old books

that its name is surra man rdd and that in the distant future (ba'da al-duhur) it will be built by a

great and victorious king, whose companions' (ashdb)17 faces will be like those of the birds

of the desert (wujuhuhum wujuh tayr al-faldt), and that he and his children will inhabit it.

Al-Mu'tasim retorted: "By God! It is I who will build it and inhabit it and my children will

inhabit it as well. One day [my father Harun] al-Rashid ordered his sons to go out hunting.

I went with [my brothers] Muhammad [al-Amin] and al-Ma'mun, together with other

adult sons of his. Each one of us caught his quarry. Mine was an owl (buma). Then we went

back and displayed our game in front of him [i.e. Harun al-Rashid]. The eunuchs (khadam) who were with us started telling him: 'This is the game of so and so', until they presented

my game. Actually, they were afraid to display it, because they thought he might consider

it to be an evil omen, or that he would treat me harshly. Harun al-Rashid asked: 'Who

caught this?' they answered: 'Abu Ishaq [al-Mu'tasim]'. He was delighted and laughed and

then he said: 'This one will become Caliph and his army and his companions and those who

will prevail on him will be a people whose faces are like the face of that owl' (innahu yali

al-khildfa wa-yakun junduhu wa-ashdbuhu wal-ghdlibuna 'alayhi qawman wujilhahum mith la

wajhi hddhihi al-buma). Then his descendants will inhabit it.' Nothing of the game captured

on that day made him so happy

as he was with my catching of that owl".18

V. Ibn Hawqal: "The most precious slaves are those arriving [in Khurasan]19 from the

lands of the Turks. There is no equal to the Turkish slaves among all the slaves of the

earth".20

VI. Al-Istakhri, speaking of Transoxania (md ward' al-nahr) says: "As for the slaves, they

arrive to them [the people of Transoxania] from among the Turks who surround them [in

quantities which are] beyond their need (ma yafdul 'an kifdyatihim). From their country [i.e.

Transoxania] they are

transported to the remotest parts of the earth (yunqal ild al-dfdq min

bilddihim). These are the best slaves [from the region] which surrounds the whole East

(wa-huwa khayr raqiq yuhitu bil mashriq kullihi)".21 VII. Al-Istakhri: "Samarqand. Its people

are distinguished by their dazzling beauty and

sedateness. They are excessive in demonstrating their manliness and in defending them

16 Ibid., p. 38, 11. 21-39, 1. 8.

17 Quite often ashab fulan, relating to a ruler or a commander, means his army or his armed followers. See also

below, in the same passage (no. IV). 18

Al-Ya'qubi, Kitab al-Bulddn (Leiden, 1892), p. 257, 11. 4-21. 19 In the Muslim sources Khurasan sometimes includes Transoxania. See e.g. passage no. VII. 20 Ibn Hawqal, p. 452. 21

Istakhri, p. 288, 11. 5-18. See also Ibn Hawqal, p. 465, 11. 6-8.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 313

selves [against the enemy?] more than any other people in Khurasan, which takes a heavy

toll of their wealth (hatta yujhif dhalika bi-amwalihim). Samarqand is the slaves' place of

assembly in Transoxania. The best slaves in Transoxania are those brought up in Samarqand"

(wa-bi-Samarqand majmd raqlq ma wara al-nahr wa-khayr al-raqlq bi-md ward' al-nahr tarbiyat

Samarqand).22

VIII. Al-Istakhri on the Samanid army: "In all the lands of Islam there is no king who is

stronger and who possesses more military equipment and who is more suitable to rule than

they [the Samanids] are. Because in all those lands of Islam the armies are composed of odd

people belonging to all kinds of tribes, countries and remote regions (shudhdhadh al-qabail wal-buldan wal-atrdf). If they disperse

as a result of defeat or break up as a result of some

event, they never gather again. This is not the case with these [Samanid] kings. For their

armies, both Turkish Mamluks and freemen (juyushuhum al-Atrak al-Mamlukun wa-min

al-ahrar) [are different]. The home and place [of each soldier] is known. If any number of

them is killed or dies, their ranks can be filled because of their numerousness. If they

disperse as a result of some event, all of them will gather again in one

place. Thus they

cannot be blamed for what the other rabble armies are blamed for. It is impossible for them

to be scattered among other armies and move from one kingdom to another, as does

usually happen to the vagabond armies and their like. In the 'Abdallah b. al-Mu'tazz ["the

one day Caliph"] incident, Bars, the Mamluk (ghulam) of [the Samanid ruler] Ismail b.

Ahmad fled from his patron [and went to Baghdad]. The Caliphate's [court] was astounded

by the number of his soldiers, their equipment and their accompanying animals. In the

Caliphal capital there was not such an army (wa-lam yakun bi-hadrat al-khilafa jaysh

mithlahu). And after all [this Bars] was only a slave of the Samanids. The people of Khurasan

did not notice his absence".23

IX. Al-Muqaddasi on the Samanids and their army: "This is the greatest and mightiest

fortress of Islam. ... Its army is the best of all armies. ... its people are very courageous. It

is the rampart against the Turk and the shield against the Ghuzz" (huwa hisn al-Islam

al-dzam. . . . junduhu khayr al-junud wa-qawmuhu ulu bds shadld. . . . huwa sadd al-Turk

wa-turs al-Ghuzz).24

X. Speaking about the taxes under the Samanids, al-Muqaddasi states: "As for the taxes

[there], they are light, but they make them heavier on the Oxus bank as far as slaves are

concerned. They do not let a Mamluk pass without an official permit from the ruler. They

levy together with the permit between seventy and one hundred dirhams. The same goes

for the slave-girls: [they do not let them pass] if they are Turks. On every woman they levy

twenty to thirty dirhams" (wa-amma al-daraib fa-hayyina wa-yus'ibuna bi-hdfat Jayhun fl

al-raqlq wa-la yu abbiriina ghulaman ilia bi-jawaz min al-sultdn25 wa-ydkhudhuna ma a

al-jawaz

sab'lna Ud mi afa-kadhalika 'aid al-jawarl[la yu abbirunaha] bi-lajawaz idhd Atrdkan wa-ydkhud

huna 'aid al-mara 'ishrlna Ud thalahlna dirhaman)26 In another manuscript of the same opus it is

22 Istakhri, p. 318, 11. 14-17.

23 Ibid., pp. 292-3.

24 Al-Muqaddasi, Ahsan al-TaqdsimfiMdrifat al-Aqdlim (Leiden, 1906), p. 260,11. 1-11. See also my "Egypt as

a dominant factor . . .", pp. 26-7, and p. 26, n. 19. 25 Sultan in the second half of the fourth/tenth century does not yet mean unequivocally Sultan. Loosely

speaking, it is the equivalent of "the Higher Authority". 26

Al-Muqaddasi, p. 340,11. 12-17.

314 David Ayalon

said: "The taxes are light. The heaviest are on the Oxus. No Turkish Mamluk is allowed to

pass without an [official] permit. Seventy dirhams are levied on him" (wa-ammd al-daraib

bihi khafifa athqaluhd 'aldjayhun wa-ld ya'bur ghuldm Turki ilia bi-jawdz wa-yukhadh 'alayhi sab'una dirhaman).27

XI. Ibn Hassul, after having lavished praises on the Turks in general, goes on praising

the Turkish Mamluks in particular. He says: "One of the indications of the noble character

of the Turks and of the intensity of their ambitions [is the following fact]: Islam enjoined

[the Muslims] to carry out campaigns against the infidels among them [i.e. among the

Turks], as it enjoined them to do the same thing against the infidels of the rest of the races in

the rest of the countries. And behold! Any one of them [of the Turks] who is taken captive is not content with less than a status of equality with his patron in [whatever relates to]

food, drink, dress and mounts (fa-man subiya minhum lam yarda ilia bi-an yusdwiyahu

sayyiduhu fi mat'amihi wa-mashrabihi wa-malbasihi wa-markabihi). He does not have to do

menial work which members of other infidel races have to do when they become slaves or

are taken captive, like sweeping the house or tending animals. And we have never seen an

Indian or Rumi or Armani or any other one of all the kinds of people who were made slaves [in

Islam], the limits of whose ambitions are not known, and the size of which cannot be

measured. Whereas the Turk, when he is freed from the shackles of slavery (idhd kharaja min

wathdqihi)28, is not content with less than the command of an army, or a very high office, or

leadership of a group. And this phenomenon is not confined to Khurasan,29 which borders

their [the Turks'] lands, and adjoins (muldsiqa) them, but you encounter the same thing, if

you like it [ = if you want to have additional examples], in Egypt, the country which is the

remotest from their [the Turks'] homelands, and which is ignorant of their affairs and of

their language; and the same goes, if you like it, for Iraq, where there are various armies,

like the Daylamites, the Kurds and the Arabs. The Caliphs and the Daylamite kings [i.e. the

Buwayhids] tried, generation after generation, to harm and weaken them, but did not

succeed.30 As for their high value, their bravery and their might, suffice it to mention what

the Prophet Muhammad said about them: 'Make truce with the Turks as long as they leave

you alone' (tdriku al-Turk ma tarakukum)". A few lines later he continues: "The most

amazing thing about them [the Turks] is that nobody had ever seen a pure Turk (Turkiyyan

khdlisan) who had been afflicted by effemination (takhnith), and this in spite of the fact that

this disgrace is general, and this affliction is common among all the peoples we saw,

especially those of Gilan. If, however, one does find traces of effemination (ta'nith) in any

Turk in his speech, in his hints, in his dress or in his jewellery, he is proved to be one of the

Turks of a mixed breed, who thoroughly mingled with the race of their neighbours, the

local inhabitants of those lands [= the lands of Islam]" (fa-innahu 'an muwalladi al-Atrak

alladhina sardfxhim 'irq al-mujdwirin lahum min ndbitat hddhihi al-diydr). Here our author turns to another subject with these opening words: "After having

27 Ibid., p. 341, note.

28 This statement about the manumission of the Mamluk before he started his great career is of great weight, because it constitutes unconscious evidence and because it is so general. The central problem of manumitted

Mamluks and those of them who were lifelong slaves even when they rose in rank and office has still to be studied

systematically. 29 Here is yet another instance of Khurasan in the wider sense (including Transoxania). 30 This is a free translation.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 315

referred to some of the merits of the Turks: about which there cannot be any objection or

controversy, we shall return to the subject of their kings, who were either from the

selfsame kings of Khurasan of the house of Saman [and others] and Sabuktikin and his sons

and descendants, like Mahmud, Muhammad and Mas'ud, and how they overcame their

adversaries and attained their aims, relying on their own

ability".31

XII. Mahmud al-Kashghari: "God said: I have an army whom I called Turk. . . . And

this is a great advantage of theirs over the rest of humanity. . . . He [God] settled them in the

highest place with the best climate of the whole earth, and He called them His own army

(sammahum junda nafsihi). This on top of their beauty and their gracefulness, their good manners and respect for the elder, their keeping their pledge, their avoidance of conceit and

their bravery, as well as other innumerable praiseworthy qualities".32

This very partial list, which goes up to about the middle of the eleventh century, could

easily be continued up to the end of the fourteenth and beyond. It culminates in Ibn

Khaldiin's detailed and most appreciative evaluation of the Turkish Mamluk institution

since its inception and up to his own time, an evaluation which is, in my view, of

unequalled importance.33

The twelve passages quoted above speak for themselves. They will be very briefly

analysed in this section as well as in the next to the following one, and not in the order of

their appearance. But before starting on that analysis it should be pointed out that the

Mamluk regiment of al-Mu'tasim was composed of Turks, as testified not only by al-Jahiz

(passages II, III), but also by all the other sources speaking about it and about the building of

Samarra. From al-Ya'qubi, our best source on this subject, we learn that al-Mu'tasim had

collected, already in the reign of his brother al-Ma'mun, 3000 Turkish Mamluks as a

preliminary to his grand scheme.34 Thenceforward, the Turkish Mamluk element

remained the dominant one under the 'Abbasids, in spite of the numerous internal struggles

and ups and downs in their history.35

The evidence of al-Istakhri (passages I, V, VI, VIII) covers a good number of central

aspects, which will be referred to here and in the next to the following section. He points

up, in the most unequivocal language, the military superiority of the Turks over all the other

ethnic groups, as the sole reason for their forming the [main] armed forces of the 'Abbasids

(passage I). The earlier al-Jahiz holds exactly the same view about the Turks in general

(passage II). At the same time he gives most illuminating eyewitness evidence, which he

31 Ibn Hassul, pp. 41, 1. 8?43, 1. 15. On this author and his work cited here see below. 32 Diwdn Lughat al-Turk (Ankara, 1939-46), i, pp. 293, 1. 13-294, 1. 15. 33 See e.g. the list quoted and discussed in my "The Great Ydsa of Chingiz Khan . . .", SI, XXXVI (1972),

pp. 117?30. The translation of the whole passage from Ibn Khaldun's history, Kitab al-Ibar, and its analysis were

published in my "Ibn Khaldun's view of the Mamluk phenomenon", JSAI, II (1980), pp. 340?9. For my

acquaintance with and treatment of that piece of evidence see ibid., p. 341. The moral qualities of the Turks, mentioned by Mahmud Kashghari (passage XII), are often praised by other sources as well. See e.g. notes 4 and 5.

34 Al-Ya'qubl, pp. 255, 1. 19-256, 1. 1; 262, 1. 19; Tabari (series III), ii, p. 1180, 1. 17; al-Mas'udi, Muruj (Paris,

1861-77), vii, pp. 118, 1. 5; 122, 1. 3. 35 Al-Mu'tasim had three great drawbacks in forming his Turkish Mamluk regiment: (a) his reign was short

(218-27/833-42); (b) he started building Samarra several years after he became Caliph; (c) that regiment came into

being on the verge of the great disintegration of the 'Abbasid empire. Thus the Mamluks could never be used as

part of a general strategy conducted from Islam's central seat of government. Furthermore, the Caliphs who

succeeded al-Mu'tasim were not of his calibre, and did not possess the vision for properly following up his great work.

316 David Ayalon

accompanies with a highly convincing explanation of why al-Mu'tasim preferred the Turks

when he formed his Mamluk regiment (passage III; see also al-Kashghari, passage XII). Al-Istakhri, however, puts into bold relief the disadvantage of the 'Abbasids, because of

their lack of direct access to the sources of supply of the Turkish Mamluks (passage VIII).

Already at a relatively early period, when they were still powerful, the 'Abbasids needed the

cooperation of the Tahirids, Saffarids and Samanids for ensuring that supply. With the

weakening of the 'Abbasids, rulers who had better access to the Mamluk homelands, like the

Samanids and the Ghaznavids, became much stronger than the central government.

Both al-Istakhri and the later al-Muqaddasi (passage X) consider the Samanids, with

their Turkish Mamluks, to be the strongest in Islam, militarily. As for al-Muqaddasi, it is

quite indicative that while speaking so highly of the Samanid army, he says nothing

comparable about the army of the Fatimid empire, which was then at the peak of its

greatness, and towards which he showed a growing sympathy.36 From the detailed

account of al-Istakhri some meaningful matters emerge, after trimming his obvious

exaggerations: the other armies were not as worthless as he describes them, and the story

about the Samanid commander Bars might well have been an invention. But the great

difference between the might of the Turkish Mamluk army of the Samanids and the

Caliphal one, as reflected in that story, seems to me to be basically correct over a certain

period. What is also true in al-Istakhri's account is that a strong Mamluk army radiates

authority beyond its limits. Besides such an army a military body of free men will become

more disciplined and soldierly. From al-Istakhri (passage V) and al-Muqaddasi (passage X) we learn that the Transox

anians tended to sell to other countries only the surplus of the numerous Turkish Mamluks

who arrived in their country, and even those could pass westwards only with a special

permit coupled with a tax payment, clearly implying that non-Turkish slaves were not

subject to that procedure. This gave them absolute control of the Turkish slave traffic, and

enabled them to choose for themselves the very best, leaving for the neighbouring Muslim

countries Mamluks of lower quality. I do not know of any other slaves coming from any

part of the Abode of War, and destined for a military career, who underwent such a sifting

process as the Turks. The existence of Muslim buffer states between the source of supply

and the source of demand was one of the greatest drawbacks of the whole Mamluk system.

It was eliminated thoroughly and over a long period only by the Ottomans, who built their

slave army on other ethnic groups much more accessible to them and more adaptable to the

changes which the Art of War underwent.

I brought in al-Mu'tasim's story about his catching an owl while hunting (passage IV)

because it seems to me that it reflects correctly the great, and justified, trust which the

'Abbasid Caliphs put in their Turkish Mamluk army, against quite stubborn opposition.

Passage no. XI needs some introduction, because of its being, in my view, particularly

indicative, and because its author (Abu al-Ala' Muhammad b. 'All b. Hassul, died 450/1058) is much less known than the other authors cited here. He was an Iranian born in Hamadan,

who first served the Buwayhid Majd al-Dawla of Rayy. When Mahmud of Ghazna

captured Rayy he employed him. By the time of the Seljuk invasion he headed the

36 See "Egypt as a dominant factor . . .", p. 27 and n. 22.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 317

chancellery office (diwdn al-rasail) in that town and was then employed by Tughril, the

Great Seljuk.37 Al-Tha'alibi, in his Tatimmat al-Yatima speaks highly of him, and states

that he learnt much of him. He wrote a booklet, dedicated to Sultan Tughril, which he

called The Preference [or Advantage or Superiority] of the Turks over the Rest of the Armies

(Tafdil al-Atrak 'aid Sd'ir al-Ajndd). The purpose of the booklet was to refute an earlier

work, which has not come down to us, by Abu Ishaq b. Ibrahim b. Hilal al-Sabi (died

384/994), dedicated to the famous 'Adud al-Dawla, the Shi'ite-Daylamite-Buwayhid ruler,

and called Fi Akhbdr al-Dawla al-Daylamiyya. A single manuscript of Ibn Hassul's work

was found in a private library in Baghdad, and was published in 1940 with a Turkish

translation.38

This is, of course, a partisan text by its very character.39 However, since it was dedicated

to Tughril, what is said there must have been in keeping with Tughril's own ideas and

policy relating to the Turkish Mamluks, which is verified by what we know from other

evidence, part of which is presented here (see below). Secondly, his service to three regimes,

two of them Turkish and one Buwayhid, put him in a very good position for forming a

view about their armies. Thirdly, some important parts of what he says are in full

conformity with what we know from other sources. Furthermore, some aspects on which

he sheds light, and which do not emerge as clearly and as

forcefully in other sources, seem

to me to be most logical and convincing. It is mainly these aspects which will occupy us in

the following lines.

Ibn Hassul's remark on the behaviour of the Turkish Mamluks in the rulers' courts as

compared with that of other Mamluk ethnic groups is both revealing and makes sense. In

fact, it could not be otherwise. At that time the Turkish Mamluks had already for two

centuries formed the cream of the Mamluk armies. A Turkish Mamluk newcomer to the

ruler's court knew exactly what awaited him there. This must have been a matter of

common knowledge in his homeland, at least through the constant contact created by the

slave dealers going back and forth between there and the lands of Islam. But that was by no

means all. That newcomer, provided with that knowledge, did not have to fend for himself

in establishing his superior status. In the court he would find numerous Mamluks of his

own stock, firmly established in influential positions and having the strongest possible

interest in preserving Turkish dominance. There was no chance whatever that this

formidable structure would have been weakened, to say nothing of being replaced, by any

other military body in the service of the ruler.

The three ethnicities of Mamluks which Ibn Hassul mentions by name as inferior to the

Turkish Mamluks (the Indians, the Greeks and the Armenians) are very relevant to the

thesis presented here. The Indians remained, even at the height of their presence in the

armies of Islam, mainly an Eastern regional factor, destined to disappear,

or at least to

37 Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, p. 59.

38 Belleten (Ankara), IV. The part in Arabic is at the end of the volume, pp. 1-51. It includes an introduction by 'Abbas al-'Azzawi (pp. 3-24), and the text itself is on pp. 24-51.

39 When the 'Abbasid Caliphs were under Buwayhid suzerainty their Mamluk policy was not free from the

pressure of that Daylamite dynasty. The success of the Daylamite soldiers in so many eastern armies is really astounding, but in the slightly longer run they stood no chance against the Turkish Mamluks, and they disappeared. Even a Buwayhid ruler preferred Turks over them (see e.g. Bosworth, "Ghaznevid military organisation", p. 42; Ayalon, "On the eunuchs . . .", p. 109).

318 David Ayalon

decline sharply in importance. They certainly could not serve as a real constant counterba

lance to the Turkish Mamluks.40

Within the framework of our thesis the case of the Armenians and the Greeks is far more

consequential. The immense gap separating them from the Turkish Mamluks made it

extremely difficult -

nay, practically impossible -

for their patrons to put them, of their own

free will, on an equal footing with them, let alone replacing them. Only the pressure of

external factors could bring about such a change:

a firm demand of a stronger authority on

whom the patron is dependent (as in the case of Caliph al-Muqtafi), or much wider and

uncontrollable factors mentioned in other parts of this study. And it should always be

remembered that those Greeks and Armenians formed the essential connecting link in the

Mamluk ethnic transformation which prolonged the life of that institution as an efficient

military tool in the service of Islam.

Ibn Hassul's affirmation about the Turkish Mamluk ascendancy (accompanied by a

conviction of superiority) in the wide area stretching from the borders of their homelands

in the north-east to Egypt in the south-west, could not be more correct. The Khurasan part

of that affirmation will be referred to in the next to following section. Here only the

remotest and most problematic country at that time, Fatimid Egypt, will be briefly discussed. It would appear that even there, where the Mamluk system was so seriously

curbed,41 the military superiority of the Mamluks of that ethnicity was recognised. Caliph al-'Aziz (365?86/975-96), the only ruler of that dynasty who made a concentrated, and

temporarily successful, attempt to recruit them, is stated to have preferred them (especially

their Hamdanid component) over the Maghribis, because of their fortitude and reliability

(wa-kana yamil ild al-Atrak akthar min al-Maghdriba la siyyamd al-Hamddniyya42 li-shiddat

basihim wa-fadl al-najdafihim).43

40 "Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon", part A, pp. 202-3; 206, n. 18.

41 I have already pointed out, in "Egypt as a dominant factor . . .", pp. 30?1, some of the reasons which

prevented the Mamluks from taking real root under the Fatimids. There I mentioned especially the fact that, on

moving from the Maghrib to Egypt, much of their ruling and military systems had already been crystallized, and

they could not replace, or at least replace properly, the already existing and most powerful military bodies. Another factor which I referred to there was the great distance separating Egypt from the Turkish Mamluks'

homeland, which was, in addition to that, cut off from Egypt by mainly Sunnite states hostile to the Fatimids.

(The antagonism of the Seljuks to the acquisition of Turkish Mamluks by the Sunnite al-Muqtafi must have been at least as strong in the case of the Fatimids. This, coupled with the much greater distance of Egypt from the sources of supply, illustrates well the obstacles which the Fatimids faced in forming a proper Mamluk army.) Yet another major factor was the very inadequate military schools of the Fatimids, when they had them (I discuss this

aspect in my book on the eunuchs). The impossibility of the Mamluk system (with the Turkish Mamluks at its

heart) developing under the Fatimids as it should, was clearly demonstrated in the second half of the fourth/tenth

century, as soon as its great protagonist al-'Aziz billah died (386/996), that is to say, quite soon after their

occupation of Egypt. That was one of the reasons why their hold on Syria was even then not strong enough. With the later appearance of the Seljuks and the Crusaders that hold, without a further military force, could not but become more precarious. Note also the military feats of the Turkish Mamluk contingent which Saladin sent in

568/1172-3 to the Maghrib ("Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon", part B, pp. 12-13). 42 The Turkish Mamluks of the Hamdanids, who were incorporated in the Fatimid army, and who seem to

have been considered as seasoned soldiers, because of their combat experience. 43

Al-Maqrizi, al-Muqaffd, ed. Zakkar (Beirut, 1973), p. 307 (cited from Yaacov Lev's important article, "The Fatimid army, A.H. 358-427/968-1036", Asian and African Studies, XIV (1980), pp. 171-2. This citation is from the quite late historian al-Maqrizi, but there is good reason for accepting it. Al-Maqrizi copied, on the whole

correctly, from earlier authors, showing quite often little inclination to mention their names (see e.g. my "The

Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan - a reexamination", part C2, "Al-Maqrizi's passage on the Ydsa under the Mamluks",

SI, XXXVIII (1973), pp. 107?56). His writings about the Fatimids are invaluable. Where would we have been in

the study of that dynasty without his chronicle Ittiaz al-Hunafa and his topographical work al-Khitat?

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 319

Also worthy of particular note is Ibn Hassul's emphasis on the unequalled manliness of

the Turks. As far as this implies that only men born in the steppe or a similar area, and who

spent their childhood and early boyhood there, could serve as worthy Mamluks, whereas

their sons, born and brought up in an urban environment, could not, it is in keeping with

the inevitable and correct policy of barring the sons from joining their fathers in the

Mamluk elite (a policy justified also by Ibn Khaldun). But Ibn Hassul's remark goes further

than that. It suggests the idea that the Mamluks, especially the Turks, should be segregated

from all the rest in order to preserve their ethnic purity. This was, in fact, the policy of

al-Mu'tasim of segregating his Mamluks in Samarra, so that they would not have any

contact with the same muwalladun mentioned by Ibn Hassul.44 Elements of that approach

lasted long in Mamluk society, but certainly not with the same degree of absoluteness.

The ?aqaliba vis-a-vis the Turk

The Saqdliba are relevant to the thesis presented here, because they serve as yet another

decisive proof of the military superiority of the Turks and of the fact that no other ethnic

group could compete with them for a long time, and certainly not replace them. This

subject will be elaborated at considerable length in the full version of this study. Here only a

few salient points will be mentioned.

As I have shown in a previous study,45 Dozy had already in i860 brought to the

knowledge of students of Islam a passage of the highest importance on the Saqdliba from the

geographer Ibn Hawqal, but he severely misrepresented its contents. However, that

misrepresentation was copied by later Islamicists who did not check Ibn Hawqal's evidence.

My main arguments against Dozy, as expressed in the above-cited study, are these:

(a) That he referred only to one part of the passage, and ignored its other part, which is

essential for the understanding of its whole purport.

(b) That thaj: part to which he did relate says precisely the contrary of what he attributed

to it.

(c) He confused later and earlier occurrences, thus creating an impossible chronological

problem.

I shall start with argument (b).

Dozy states that according to Ibn Hawqal the Saqdliba in the service of the Umayyad

Caliphs of Spain included Galicians, Franks [French and German], Lombards and Cala

brians.46 In fact, what that geographer says, in the clearest possible terms, is that all these

44 See "The military reforms of Caliph al-Mu'tasim", pp. 28?9; "Preliminary remarks on the Mamluk military institution in Islam", in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds), War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London,

1975), pp. 54-5 (for the relevant passage in Arabic see al-Ya'qubi, pp. 285, 1. 15-259, 1. 10). A strong feeling of

affinity, of belonging to "the same race" (jinsiyya, minjins wahid) existed between the Turkish Mamluks and the

non-Mamluk Turks (or Turcomans) and the Mongols, all of whom entered Muslim territory through Transox

ania and its vicinity from the same wide region, and adopted Islam immediately or ultimately. Yet the barrier

separating Mamluks and non-Mamluks of the same privileged stock was never surmounted (see e.g. my "The

European-Asiatic steppe: a major reservoir of power for the Islamic world", Proceedings of the 25th Congress of Orientalists (Moscow, 1963), pp. 47-52; "The Wafidiyya in the Mamluk kingdom", Islamic Culture (1951),

pp. 89-104). 45 "On the eunuchs in Islam", part B; "Remarks on the Saqaliba within Dar al-Islam", JSAI, I (1979),

pp. 92?124, and especially pp. 92?101. 46

Ibid., p. 93.

320 David Ayalon

Western Europeans were one thing, and the Saqdliba were quite another. Furthermore, Ibn

Hawqal attaches to his book a map of the world of his own drawing, on which all those

Western Europeans are shown as being clearly distinct from the Saqdliba.47 At the same

time I repeatedly stressed that I have no suggestion of my own concerning the ethnic

composition of the Saqdliba, and that my main demand is that Ibn Hawqal's evidence

should be excluded as a proof (certainly as the backbone of the proofs) of the identity of all

those Western peoples with the Saqdliba, as Dozy and his followers regarded it. What I

proposed was that other evidence in support of that identity should be gathered, and

weighed against that of Ibn Hawqal and that of other Muslim sources who speak in the

same or a similar vein.48

Dozy precedes his misrepresentation of Ibn Hawqal's account with yet another grave

confusion, this time a chronological one (argument c). He says that at the beginning (dans

Yorigine), prisoners taken by the Germanic peoples were [pure] Slavs (citing indirectly Ibrahim b. al-Qasim al-Qayrawam) and only later was the same designation widened to

include all the Western peoples as well (citing Ibn Hawqal directly49). Now, al-Qayrawam, whose evidence is that of an eyewitness, died after 417/1026, and Ibn Hawqal visited Spain

in 336/948, which means, if we accept Dozy's reasoning, that those Saqdliba were Western

Europeans dans Yorigine, and only later became Slavs!50

The part of Ibn Hawqal's account which is particularly relevant to the subject of the

present study is that which Dozy ignored (argument a), and which tells us about the

importation of Saqdliba to the eastern lands of Islam. Our author does not make any

distinction, as far as ethnic composition is concerned, between them and the Saqdliba going

to the West. He only states that they inhabit the eastern part of their homeland, which is

nearer the eastern lands of Islam. On the other hand, he points out that they, in contrast to

those of them who are sent to the West, are not castrated (turiku fuhulatan 'aid ahwalihim maqrurln

'aid sihhat abddnihim) .51

Now the existence of Saqdliba slave-traffic to the East on a considerable scale is attested to

not only by Ibn Hawqal in the passage under discussion but by a good number of other

major Muslim sources.52 In spite of that there is hardly a trace of them in the Mamluk armies

of the Muslim East, and above all in those of the 'Abbasid Caliphs and the Seljuks.53 Their

availability in abundance did not stimulate those rulers to enlist them in their armies. What

could be a better proof of the superiority of the Turks over them? This is in addition to the

fact that statements of praise and appreciation of the military ability and prowess of the

Turks in the Muslim sources is incomparably more frequent and more varied than similar

statements about the Saqdliba. The inescapable conclusion, as I have already stated else

47 Ibid., pp. 97-8. S. Maqbul Ahmad says: "A glance at the maps of Ibn Hawqal shows that they are superior to

those of al-Istakhri" ("Kharita", EI2, iv, p. 1079a). 48 "On the eunuchs in Islam", pp. 98, 106, 121, 124. 49

Ibid., p. 93 50

Ibid., pp. 93, 100-1, 107. 51

Ibid., pp. 95-6. 52

Ibid., pp. 102-4. 53 The story of the emasculated Saqdliba is, of course, a different one. It would be interesting to find out, as far as

the sources permit, what happened to the numerous unemasculated Saqdliba in the East. In the West, a systematic

attempt should be made to distinguish between the Saqdliba eunuchs and non-eunuchs. I am not sure whether such

an attempt has been made.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 321

where,54 is that the Saqdliba were able to become dominant only where it had been

impossible, or

extremely difficult, to obtain Turks, as in Spain and parts of the Maghrib.55

The Fatimids of Cairo did for some time have a Saqdliba component. But this was a

military element which they brought over from the Maghrib alongside their Maghribi armies.

In concluding this section I would like to say that if the results of further study show,

after leaving out the evidence of Ibn Hawqal, that the Saqdliba who went to the West were

wholly, or quite substantially, Western Europeans, this will not affect the thesis presented

here. What I wanted to prove is that in the East, the heart of Islam's military power, the

Saqdliba (and I mean the unemasculated ones among them) were no match for the Turks.56

The Borderlands of the Turkish Home Countries

In order to grasp the full dimensions of the contribution of Turkish Mamluk might to

Islam, their study should not be confined to them alone, but must include the contiguous

Muslim territory on which the Mamluks set foot as soon as they crossed the border

between the Abode of War and the Abode of Islam. The kind of people and the degree of

religious awareness which they encountered there formed a decisive factor in shaping their

future destiny. The Muslim territory in question included, first and foremost, Transoxania

and its neighbour Khwarazmia (for the significance of that fact see also the last part of Ibn

Hassul's evidence in passage XI of the preceding section).

Transoxania and the adjacent areas had a strong influence on the caliphal and other

Mamluks in the following way. These areas are described by the contemporary sources as

extremely wealthy, densely populated, thriving in commerce and agriculture, and rich in

mineral deposits (mainly Transoxania). Besides, once its population had been finally

subjugated, Transoxania accepted Islam and Islamic culture with great and growing zeal.

This population was stated to have been deeply religious, immersed in Muslim culture,

generous towards foreign Muslims and especially towards those volunteers who flocked to

the frontier to fight the infidels; very warlike and imbued with the spirit of jihad against the

unbelievers. The number of ribdts in that region is said to have been immense. While

54 Ibid., p. 118, and "Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon", part A, p. 206, n. 18.

55 This is a very brief summary of my argumentation concerning Turk vs. Saqdliba in "On the eunuchs in Islam". For a more comprehensive picture see ibid., pp. 92-124, with special stress on pp. 114?24 (and within them

pp. 115?21). An erroneous comment on my criticism of Dozy's handling of Ibn Hawqal's evidence was published in the article "Sakaliba" in EI2, viii (1995), pp. 879b-88oa. This comment will be exhaustively discussed in the fuller version of this study.

56 Certain aspects relating to the Saqdliba which are relevant to the subject of our study are the following. Saqdliba serve as soldiers already under the Umayyads in the East, especially in the frontier areas, but they do not seem to have formed a central part of the Umayyad army. At that time, and well into the 'Abbasid period, they

were still pagans. The process of Christianization, in the full sense of the word, of those of them who did adopt that religion must have been slow, as was the case with the Islamization of pagans of a more or less similar level of civilization. Furthermore, there still remained many pagan Saqdliba in the fourth/tenth century, as stated by al-Mas'udi ("On the eunuchs", p. 113). What was said about people of long-established Christianity as a possible source of Mamluk recruitment does not, therefore, apply to them (for a fuller clarification see ibid., pp. 109-14).

The eunuchs from amongst the Saqdliba, who are only briefly referred to here but discussed at length in the above cited article, belong to a different category. What is particularly indicative within the framework of the thesis

presented here is that under the Umayyads of the East there was some room for the employment of the Saqdliba in their armed forces. Under the 'Abbasids there seems to have been no such room, and since the Mamluks became the main army of that dynasty, no chance was left for the Saqdliba to join them.

322 David Ayalon

military preparedness and alertness were, on that front, at their height, on the Byzantine

front they were on the wane. The geographer al-Muqaddasi, who knew both fronts and

both regions, gives us a vivid description to that effect.

Another important factor in the relations of the Transoxanians, the Khwarazmians, etc.,

with the Turks, which should be taken into consideration, is that there was no abrupt division between the lands of the former and those of the latter. The transformation was

gradual, and there must have been a great merging between the populations of the two

areas, especially in the border zone. The Khwarazmians were described as very similar to

the Turks in their physical appearance as well as in their military qualities. Because of that

similarity they were sold, for a certain period, as Mamluks, under the pretence of their

being Turks. Physical beauty was considered to be an outstanding trait both of the peoples of Farghana and Taraz and of the Turks.

Such were the peoples with whom the Turkish nomads had contact during long periods of peace and war, and whom the Turkish Mamluks encountered first, when they crossed

the borders of Islam. Many of the choicest Mamluks did not go further west beyond the

Muslim frontier states, because they were incorporated in their armies or bought by their

well-to-do people. As for the Mamluks who did continue their journey westward, it is only

logical to think that quite a number of them did not merely cross the frontier states, but

stayed there for varying periods before pursuing their journey. Furthermore, the contact of

the Turkish Mamluks with the Transoxanians did not cease on their crossing the Oxus

westwards, for when they arrived in Baghdad (and later in Samarra) they found there

strong and influential Transoxanian units, which must have received steady reinforcements

from their own people. Otherwise these units could not have existed for a considerable

number of decades, as they in fact did. Thus, Transoxanian influence on the Mamluks,

including even those who reached Baghdad and Samarra, must have been very great and

persistent in the early 'Abbasid period.

Speaking of Samarra, the capital which symbolizes the beginning of the great history of

the Mamluk institution in Islam, it should be pointed out that its founder, al-Mu'tasim, as

already mentioned, brought over his Mamluks even before he became Caliph, from

Samarqand. This town was the hub of the Turkish Mamluk slave trade, and it is also stated

to have produced the best of those Mamluks, because of the upbringing (tarbiya) they received there (passage VII in the preceding section).

In this connection I venture to suggest that, if it were possible properly to reconstruct the

history of the Iranian, and particularly the Khurasanian, armies of Islam since the beginning

of the Muslim expansion and up to the creation of al-Mu'tasim's Mamluk corps, the

Iranian-Transoxanian impact on the Mamluk military institution would be shown to have

been far greater than can be proved today.57

57 See e.g. my "The military reforms of Caliph al-Mu'tasim", pp. 26-7; "Preliminary remarks on the Mamluk

military institution . . .", pp. 52-3; "Egypt as a dominant factor . . .", pp. 9-27. Some citations in our context will be of use. Al-Muqaddasi, p. 261,11. 5-11: "Islam is fresh in it [in Transoxania]" (al-Isldm bihdtariyy). Al-Istakhri,

p. 291: "They [the people of Transoxania], in spite of the remoteness of their country, are the first to perform the

Hajj duty. No one enters the [Arabian] desert before them, and no one leaves it after them". Speaking about the

people of Syria (al-Shdm), al-Muqaddasi (p. 152,11. 4?5) says: "They are not as [good as] the Iranians in learning, religiousness and [the observance of] the [religious] prohibitions" (laysu kal-A'djimftal-ilm wal-din wal-nahyi). The same author (p. 32,11. 4-12) says about the people of the East (Iqlim al-Mashriq): "Of all the [Muslim] people their

Arabic is the most accurate, because they stuck to learning it and clung to it" (asahh al-nds 'Arabiyyatan li-annahum

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 323

In summing up the last three sections I would say: the military superiority of the Turks

and their like was unparalleled. Unparalleled as well were the relations and connections

between them and their immediate Muslim neighbours, with their high level of civili

zation, economic strength and deep Islamic awareness. How much more so the combin

ation of the two. That is why such a great harmony existed between the praise of the Turks

and their actual employment, and why that employment lasted so long, for most of the

time with full justification. But later on that justification was steadily eroded. The Turks

and their like were so strongly entrenched that, for that and other reasons,58 they outlived

their purpose for quite some time.

The Early Seljuk Evidence

The dominance of the Turkish Mamluks already in the reigns of the first Great Seljuks is, in

my view, undeniable. Although much further systematic study should be carried out, what

we already know is quite sufficient. Our information about the eunuchs of the early Seljuks

(the subject of a later section) strongly upholds that statement.

In the following lines two major events in the history of Islam will be discussed: the final

defeat and execution of al-Basasiri (450/1060), and the battle of Manzikert (463/1071). In the first battle, which marked, inter alia, the victory of the Sunna over the Shi'a in the

East, and which took place in the reign of the first Great Seljuk, Tughril (429-55/1038-63), the Seljuk force (or at least its main component) that won the day was

composed of 2000

Turkish Mamluks, headed by a eunuch, with other eunuch commanders under him.59 The

eunuch aspect of that force will be discussed in a following section.

The battle of Manzikert (Malazgird) between the Muslims and the Byzantines took

place, as is well known, in August 1071 near Lake Van. The army of Islam was commanded

by Sultan Alp Arslan, and that of Byzantium by the Emperor Romanus Diogenes. It ended

with a resounding Muslim victory with far-reaching consequences for both religions. It

paved the way for the Muslim conquest of Anatolia and the subsequent rise of the Ottoman

Empire.

The accounts of that battle, which started with the disintegration of the Muslim army

takallafuhd takallufan wa-talaqqafuha talaqqufan). This was the kind of people who welcomed the Mamluk novice when he made his first steps in his new world. A combination of fresh and deeply rooted Islam, strengthened by unusual command of the language of the Qur'an, and linked to hardiness and fighting spirit against the Infidel.

Nothing could suit the novice more, for, as Ibn Khaldun puts it so succinctly, "They [the Mamluks] embrace

Islam with the determination of True Believers, while retaining their nomadic virtues" (yadkhuluna ft al-Din bi-azaim imdniyya wa-akhldq badawiyya) ("Ibn Khaldun's view . . .", p. 345).

58 The difficulty of adaptation to changing circumstances, especially technological innovation, was not

confined to the Islamic armies. It lasted even in the Western European armies well into the twentieth century,

although not with the same degree of persistence. 59

They are called ghulam or ghilmdn by Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi (Ankara ed., pp. 64, 11. 11, 16, 17, 18; 67, 1. 12) and said to be Turk (p. 67, 11. 8, 14). According to Ibn al-Athir (ix, cp. p. 648, 1. 7, with p. 649, 1. 3), those 2000

cavalrymen were Atrak, see also M. Canard, "Al-Basasiri", ET. The identity of ghulam and mamluk is well established for that period. Very indicative in this context is the account of Sultan Alp Arslan's capture of an

immense number of Mamluks in a big foray into the land of the Khazars in 456/1064 (Sibt, Ankara, p. 117, 11. 11?13). This event, which took place between the liquidation of al-Basasiri and the victory of Manzikert won

by the same sultan, is very meaningful within the framework of building a major Mamluk force by the very first

Seljuk rulers. It needs, however, some corroborative evidence.

324 David Ayalon

because it had been taken by surprise, are quite confused. The account which seems to me

the most credible is this.

Alp Arslan's army deserted him. Those who stayed were 4000 Mamluks (wa-baqiya

al-sultdnftarba'at dldfghuldm).60 An army of 10,000 Kurds also joined him, but he relied, after his reliance of God, Be He Exalted, on those 4000 who stayed with him (wa-kana qad ijtima'a

ilayhi 'asharat dldfmin al-Akrdd wa-innamd i 'timdduhu ba'da Allah ta'dld 'aid al-arba'at dldfalladhina kdnu ma'ahu).61

I prefer that account for the following reasons. First and foremost, because this was

precisely the place where the ruler's Mamluks should have been. As I have already stated,

the Seljuks did not weaken the old Mamluk pattern, and with the progress of time that

pattern could only be solidified and strengthened. Such a victory could not be won by tribal armies, be they Turcomans, Kurds or Arabs, however great the valour of all of them

might be. This is not intended to deny the military contribution of those armies. The

Mamluks formed a minority, more often than not a small one, in the general military body

of any ruler who employed them, and without the auxiliary forces the Mamluks could not

function. Yet with the absence of the Mamluk nucleus, the contribution of those forces

could have been, at best, very erratic. As for the Turcomans of the Seljuks, it should be

remembered that, on top of their undeniably great military contribution, they served as a

major vehicle in spreading the Turkish language deep into the Muslim East. Secondly, the

account appears in Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi's Mir at al-Zamdn, but had been copied by him from

Ghars al-Ni'ma Abu al-Hasan Muhammad, the son of Hilal al-Sabi, who was a contempo

rary of the battle (he died in 480/1087).62 And that is the only contemporary Muslim

evidence we possess about the battle.

Thirdly, by contrast with the inflated numbers of soldiers mentioned by the sources as

participating in this battle on both sides, the number of Alp Arslan's Mamluks given as

taking part in it is reasonable. It is also in accord with the number of Mamluks in some

of the big expeditions of the Mamluk Sultanate, which can be proved to be quite correct.63

Thus, according to Alp Arslan's conviction, the only one on earth, after God in heaven,

who could and did save Islam, himself and his army from a certain catastrophic defeat,

and turn it into a glorious victory, were a relatively small body of faithful Mamluks who

stuck to their patron in an hour of desperate need. What certainly increased the glory of

that victory was the fact that it was won on a Friday. The opening of the gates of

Anatolia, which was the ultimate result of the battle of Manzikert and its antecedents,

60 Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi (Ankara), p. 147, 1. 15. 61

Ibid., p. 148,11. 15-17, for the identity here of ghulam and mamluk, cp. ibid., pp. 147,1. 15 and 148,11. 15?17 with p. 152, 1. 8. See also Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1358/1939), vii, p. 262, 1. 12; Ibn

al-Athir, vi, p. 319, 11. 3-5; Abu Shama, Rawdatayn (Cairo, 1288H), i, p. 173, 1. 1. For the account of the whole

battle see Sibt (Ankara), pp. 147-52. I have already referred to this evidence in "Egypt as a dominant factor . . .",

p. 29 and n. 24. As far as I know, the decisive role of the Mamluks in the victory of Manzikert is not pointed out in

the rich Islamicist literature dedicated to that battle. 62 This has already been proved by Claude Cahen ("Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi", ET, French ed., iii, p. 775b), and after

him by Suhayl Zakkar (Mukhtdrdt min Kildbdt al-Mu arrikhin al- Arab, n.p., n.d., pp. 105?6). 63 These numbers are discussed in the as yet unpublished part of my work on the Mamluks, called "The

Mamluk army on the march".

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 325

was one of the highest peaks of Islam's success in its struggle against its Christian adversary.64

The Thorough Ethnic Transformation of the Ottoman Branch65

The main reason for preferring the Turks and their like was their superb horsemanship (and

marksmanship) and the fact that they were both pagan and on a quite primitive cultural

level in comparison with that of the civilization which they were destined to embrace and

serve after their arrival from the Abode of War. They could thus easily be moulded as good Muslims and good soldiers.66 With the gradual expansion of Islam into the homelands of the

Turks, however, the inhabitants of those lands adopted that religion, and were thus not

eligible for slavery.67 Although enslavement and importation of those inhabitants does not

seem to have stopped immediately on Islamization, it certainly stopped ultimately.68 And

the peoples living beyond those newly Islamized lands might not have been very suitable for

recruitment as Mamluks either qualitatively or quantitatively, or for both reasons. The

64 Factors and arguments which tend to reduce the importance of the battle of Manzikert cannot deprive it of

the immense effects which it had on future events. A battle on such a large scale, fought out between two great armies headed by their two sovereigns, ending with the rout of one of them and the capture of its king, cannot be

minimized. The battle of'Aynjalut (1260), where the Mongol army was, in fact, a garrison of a province, did have

its huge impact, and with full justification. How much more so the battle of Manzikert. It is highly improbable that without that battle the fate of Anatolia would have been the same.

65 This part of the present study is confined to the most general outlines of the thesis presented here, and will

receive most detailed treatment in the fuller version. 66 The degree of the Mamluks' knowledge of Islam or their strict observance of its precepts was secondary in

importance to their Islamic awareness, namely, that Islam and what it stands for is superior to anything else. 67 These sources of supply might dwindle away even before Islam had taken deep root in those lands as a result

of internal wars (see e.g. my "The Circassians in the Mamluk kingdom", JAOS (1949), p. 136a, especially Ibn

'Arabshah's evidence); migration of the nomads from one homeland to the other; natural factors (including natural

disasters); and the fact that exporting, over a long period, the pick of boys and girls from a certain tribe or group of tribes must have affected negatively that tribe or that group in various ways.

68 Generally speaking, the easiest to convert to Islam (and this is also true, to no small extent, of converts to

Christianity) were pagans at a primitive level of civilization, bordering on the Abode of Islam; the hardest -

people at a high level of civilization, who adopted monotheism long before the advent of Islam, or at least long before their encounter with it. The best proof that a high level of civilization alone was not enough to deter

Islamization of a conquered people, or even to postpone it for a long time, is the relatively quick conversion of the

Iranians, or most of them. The adoption of Islam by the Indians, another non-monotheistic people, or peoples, at a

high level of civilization, is not a case similar to that of the Iranians. Their immense numbers, the slow Muslim

conquest even of parts of that huge sub-continent, and the history of the relations between its Muslim and

non-Muslim entities, form a different story. Their being a temporary and relatively local factor in the Muslim

Mamluk armies, and the reasons for that, have already been pointed out (see again "Aspects of the Mamluk

phenomenon", part A, pp. 202-3). The negative effects of the conversion to monotheism of the peoples of the

steppe on the slave trade have already been stressed by al-Itsakhri (p. 223,11. 11?15) in connection with the Khazar.

(For the evaluation of that evidence see my "The Mamluk novice: on his youthfulness and on his original

religion", REI, LIV (1986), pp. 1-8. For the relative ease with which a pagan tribesman of the steppe parted from

his adolescent child see ibid.). Conversion to monotheism (and even conversion to Islam) did not necessarily mean

an immediate stoppage of or a drastic decline in the readiness of these peoples of the steppe to sell their next of kin

(see e.g. the attitude of the Islamized Mongols of the Golden Horde: al-Maqrizi, Suluk, ii, p. 525). However, in the

long run conversion to Islam meant the end of slave traffic from the Islamized region. The Christians under the

Ottomans faced a different situation from that of the pagans of the Abode of War. They were forced to raise a quota of their children for their Muslim rulers. There is abundant evidence of their antagonistic reaction to that levy. There were, however, cases where the parents did not lose sight of the great future awaiting their offspring. This

brings us to the attitude of relatively new Christians, inhabiting the margins of the Christian world, and whose

level of civilization was not high. A case in point is that of the Circassians who were Christians during the latter

half of the Mamluk Sultanate. However, Christianity does not seem to have been deeply rooted in them, for

ultimately they all became Muslims. The very interesting case of the Saqdliba is discussed in brief in an earlier

section of this study, and at greater length in "On the eunuchs . . .".

326 David Ayalon

alternative that remained under these expedient circumstances was the lands inhabited by

Christians.69

The Christians, be they Greek, Armenians or others, had a completely different

background. On the average, they were much more civilized and cultured; had, of course,

been monotheist for a very long time; and, as far as military qualities are concerned, many of

them did not live in a purely cavalry milieu and tradition as did the peoples of the steppe.

Being part of a long-standing monotheist community was a disadvantage in the Mamluk

context, because their monotheism was not only non-Muslim, but to no small extent

anti-Muslim. Boys in their early teens cannot simply wipe out that part of their history, and

just exchange one brand of monotheism for an antagonistic brand. By and large, their

Islamic awareness and devotedness could not be as full and unhesitating as that of a boy who

was born into and grew up in a pagan environment.70 In the domain of horsemanship many

of them could not reach the high standards of the people of the steppe. The transition from the recruitment of pagans (mainly tribesmen) from primitive

areas

to that of Christians inhabiting regions of much higher civilization was inevitable for the

purpose of the preservation of the Mamluk system. For one thing, there was the gradual

dwindling away of the Turco-nomad source already mentioned. For another, there was the

slow but growing awareness that the concept of the exclusiveness of cavalry as the

foundation of the elite units of the army should be mitigated. For yet another, there was the

realization that those more civilized and cultured Christian recruits could be utilised in

much wider domains than the original Mamluks could.

Under such circumstances it is no wonder that the period of overlapping in the

recruitment of the two kinds of religio-ethnic groups was very long, with the Turkish

element and its like slowly diminishing.71 One of the great advantages of reliance on those Christian sources of supply was that they

were much nearer geographically and, therefore, were very convenient. Caliph al-Muqtafi

and other Muslim rulers certainly benefited greatly from that proximity. That brings us to

the debate about why the Ottomans recruited by means of enslavement Christians from

within the boundaries of their realm (both in Anatolia and in Ottoman Europe), which is

contrary to the Shari'a (the Shari'a permits the enslavement of monotheistic infidels brought

over from the Abode of War but not those inhabiting the Abode of Islam). In my view, the

major reason was expediency. But that practice seems to me not to have been a purely

Ottoman invention. Its origins are to be sought in an earlier period, particularly since the

already mentioned battle of Manzikert (1071), which opened the gates of Anatolia to Islam.

The shifting fronts between Islam and Christianity and the vague and changing boundaries

between the various Muslim principalities in that peninsula made it extremely difficult to

draw a clear line between Muslim and Christian territories.72 This must have created in that

69 On the four fronts which Islam faced see my "Aspects of the Mamluk Phenomenon", part A, pp. 198-204

(on the Christian front, pp. 198-9). 70 See the passage referred to in note 23. 71 For the employment of Arman and Rum, especially in Egypt under the Fatimids and earlier rulers, see e.g.

B.J. Beshir, "Fatimid military organisation", Der Islam, LV (1978), pp. 43?4. 72 Part of these Greeks and Armenians certainly came from the Abode of War, captured during Seljuk raids on

Trebizond and Nicaea to the north and west and on the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia to the south (S. Vryonis,

"Seljuk ghulams and Ottoman devshirme", Der Islam, XLI (1965), p. 227). Still, it is most unlikely that the Seljuks

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 327

peninsula and its vicinity a situation in which it was practically impossible to observe the

Sharl'a in that particular domain. I very much doubt whether any Muslim ruler or slave

merchant tried hard to do so. It would have been quite a surprise if it had been discovered

that all Caliph al-Muqtafi's Armenians and Greeks had been brought over from the Abode

of War. It stands to reason that the Ottomans, whose state was born almost two and a half

centuries after Manzikert, had already found a well-established practice of recruiting

Christians not only from the Abode of War, a practice which must have been greatly accelerated by the Seljuk Sultans' eagerness to keep the Turkish Mamluks for themselves.73

There was a great advantage in that practice, in that it gave the Ottomans full control of

the source of recruitment of its own slaves, as contrasted with the absolute, or almost

absolute, lack of control by the Muslim rulers of the countries of origin of the earlier pagan Mamluks as well as of a substantial part of the road (or roads) leading from those countries

to the Muslim rulers' realms.

The Ottomans could and did make much better use of that human material than they could have made of the original Mamluks. In their struggle against their European

adversaries they had to adapt themselves to more modern developments. For example, they

built a superb infantry based on their slave recruits, and thus could move into the age of

firearms more smoothly and effectively than any other Muslim state. They also used those

recruits in domains far beyond the purely military machine.

In order to make that argument clearer I would like to add that the Ottomans did benefit

to no small extent from Western European influences in various ways: by alliance; by

importing experts and military equipment; by the movement of Western Europeans into

the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire; and certainly in a number of other ways. But the

manpower which constituted the backbone of its military forces, and much beyond military

might, was overwhelmingly composed of people of Eastern Christian origin, and without

that manpower all those influences would have been of very limited use.

The Limited Ethnic Changes in the Other Branch

Whereas the Anatolian-Ottoman Mamluk branch of the Seljuk tree developed in the way

just described, the other branch of the same tree developed very differently. It consisted of

three regimes, each rising from inside the one which preceded it: the Zangids, the Ayyubids and the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria. All three had Turkish Mamluks as the backbone of

their military power up to nearly the end of the fourteenth century. The Turkish-Mamluk

component of the two earlier regimes was the subject of a detailed article of mine.74 Here I

shall add just one very revealing piece of evidence relating to both the Zangids and the

Ayyubids. A contemporary anonymous source, included in Ibn al-Furat's chronicle and

published by Claude Cahen, describes the entrance into Egypt of the Zangid contingent headed by Shir kuh and his nephew Saladin. In that relatively short description the members

and whoever succeeded them would be so discriminating as to abstain from enslaving members of those two

ethnicities outside these three centres in an area of constantly shifting boundaries (see also Vryonis, op. cit., p. 252). 73 I do not know whether the Seljuks had Rum and Arman Mamluks on the margin. 74 See "Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon", part B, "Ayyubids, Kurds and Turks", Der Islam, LIV (1977),

pp. 1-32; and also "From Ayyubids to Mamluks", REI, XLIV (1981), pp. 43?57.

328 David Ayalon

of the contingent are thirteen times called Turk or Atrdk, and the commander himself,

Shirkuh the Kurd, is called Shirkuh al-Turki. The name of the Kurds is not mentioned even

once!75

Of all the Mamluk societies in medieval Islam the ethnic composition of that of the

Mamluk Sultanate can be established with the greatest degree of certainty and accuracy.

This is also true of the relations between the various ethnic groups.

The list which I have reconstructed is this: Turk (or Atrdk), Qifjdq, Tatar, Mughul (or

Mughul), Khitaiyya, Riis, Rum, Arman, As, Abaza, Ldz,Jarkas.76

The Qifjdq are rarely referred to and are obviously eponymous with Turk. The As and the

Ldz are probably the same. The case of the Mughul and the Tatar is more complicated. The

Mughul, who are mentioned only in the Qipchaqi period, seem to have been distinct from

the Turk, although a certain degree of overlapping between the two should not be excluded.

The Tatar, on the other hand, were often, especially under the Circassians, eponymous with

the Turks.77 Thus the real list is a considerably shorter one.

The Mamluk Sultanate was actually dominated by the struggle between hardly more

than two ethnic groups: the Turk and the Jarkds. The Rum were certainly third in

importance. The Arman were much less conspicuous, as also during the Ayyubid regime.

The reason for this was possibly their strong support for their Fatimid patrons against the

Ayyubid adversary. But there may have been other reasons too. As for the Franks (Faranj,

Ifranj), there is a fair number of individual Mamluks who are said to have been of Frankish

origin. However, they are never mentioned as a separate ethnic body. This does not support

the claim of some medieval European writers that there was a high proportion of Franks in

the Mamluk army. One should, however, take into consideration the possibility that there

might have been some overlapping between Faranj and Rum.

What typifies the ethnic composition of Mamluk society in that Sultanate is the relative

weakness of its Christian element, as far as Mamluks coming from civilized countries of

long-established Christianity are concerned.78

The Mamluk Sultanate, after the expulsion of the Crusaders and the overcoming of the

Mongol danger, did not for a very long time have any enemy who could threaten it on land.

Its extreme naval weakness, especially vis-a-vis the growing naval power of the Western

Europeans inside and outside the Mediterranean, put it from time to time in considerable

straits, but a concerted attack on it from the sea never materialized. The inevitable ultimate

clash on land between the Mamluks and the Ottomans was also a clash between two

Mamluk systems, both emanating from their Seljuk and 'Abbasid predecessors. There could

75 "Un recit inedit du Vizirat de Dirgham", Annales Islamologiques, VIII (1969), pp. 27-46; the Arabic text,

pp. 40-6 (see there pp. 42,1. 19 -

twice; 43, 11. 1, 12, 19, 13; 44,11. 2, 12, 14; 45, 11. 4, 16, 23; 46; 1. 1. For Shirkuh

al-Turki see p. 42,1. 19. 76 Of the chapter dedicated to the Mamluk races in my work on the army of the Mamluk Sultanate, only the

part on the Seljuks has been published (JAOS, LXIX, 1949, pp. 135-47). In my article "Mamluk military slavery in Egypt and Syria" in ET, fasc. 103-4 (1987), a summary of the unpublished parts of that chapter is given. That

article was, however, abridged by the editors. The unabridged summary appeared under the same title in the

Variorum Reprint volume Islam and the Abode of War (London, 1994), no. II, pp. 1-21. The Islamization of the

Turks in the Central Asian area did not affect the Mamluk Sultanate, for it recruited its Turkish Mamluks mainly from southern Russia.

77 For the reasons of that synonymy see the unabridged summary, op. cit., pp. 8?9. 78 The relatively new and transient Christianity of the Circassians, living on the margin of the Christian world

of that time, has already been pointed out. See note 68.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 329

be no question about the results: an antiquated military system, which did not adapt itself to

the development of technology, including its reliance on human material which was

incapable, physically and psychologically, of making use of it; and a more flexible one,

which did adapt itself to a considerable degree, relying on human material which was far

more suitable for that task.79

The Eunuchs of the Seljuks

Eunuchs in key positions under the Seljuks are known from the reign of the first Great

Seljuk, Tughril, onwards, and their presence becomes more and more conspicuous later on.

I can give here only the briefest possible review about them. A much fuller account is given in my book on the eunuchs, already mentioned, which is now in the press.80 It should

also be borne in mind that a eunuch at the top usually represents a pyramid of eunuchs

below him.

We shall start with the eunuch Khumartakin al-khddim al-Tughral, a young boy with

whom Sultan Tughril fell in love to such a degree that he castrated him, so that he could

accompany him even on his visits to his chief wife. The pace of the adaptation of that

ruler from the steppe to the refinements of a higher civilization requires, perhaps, a

systematic study. In that particular domain it seems to have been very quick. The same

Khumartakin became so powerful that both the chamberlains and the commanders stood

in audience in deference to him (fa-istafhala amruhu wa-sdra al-hujjdb wal-umara yaqifuna

'aid ra'sihi).

It was this selfsame Khumartakin who not only headed the already mentioned expedi tion against al-Basasiri, but who also organised it. What makes that double appointment

even more impressive is that the whole idea of preparing that expedition and the route it

should take was given to Tughril by the chief of the extremely powerful Khafaja bedouin

confederation, on condition that he (i.e. the Khafaja chief) should command it. but Tughril

preferred his beloved eunuch. At least one other eunuch, Sawtakin al-khddim, about whom

we shall speak soon, was in the high command of that expedition, composed, as already

stated, of 2000 Turkish Mamluks.

In the battle of Manzikert the presence of the Sultan himself in the field overshadowed

the other commanders. Yet the omnipotent eunuch Kuhraln al-khddim (to whom we shall

return) was there, and it was said that a Mamluk of his was the one who captured Romanus

Diogenes.81

To come back to Khumartakin, he played a prominent role in the struggle of Tughril

with his two brothers; Ibrahim Yanal and, at a later date, Qutulmush. The killing of

Ibrahim Yanal was, as is well known, a major event in early Seljuk history. A son of that

Ibrahim claimed that Khumartakin was the actual killer of his father. Khumartakin lost

favour with Tughril quite suddenly, and, following the advice of'Imad al-Din al-Kunduri, a eunuch belonging to a different category, he was handed over by Tughril's order to

79 See also my Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom - A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society (London,

1956, repr. 1978), especially pp. 46-133. 80 On this book see note 1. Only part of the source references collected in the chapter on the eunuchs of the

Seljuks is cited here. 81 Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, viii, p. 262, 1. 12.

330 David Ayalon

Ibrahim's sons, who finished him off. That eunuch was only about twenty years old when

he was put to death in 454/1062.82 He was

replaced by Sawtakin "the special eunuch" (al-khadim al-khass), another

commander of the expedition against al-Basasiri, who held the high office of chamberlain

(hdjib), and who was also called sarhang (general). He had a much longer career than

Khumartakin. As early as Muharram 450/March 1058, that is to say two years before his

participation in the battle against al-Basasiri, he was sent by Sultan Tughril to his brother in

Mosul, the already mentioned Ibrahin Yanal, with sumptuous gifts which were added to a

momentous order, namely that he must come immediately back to him (to Tughril). It was

eunuchs who were entrusted so often with the carrying of secret and other messages of the

highest order, at least from the reign of Harun al-Rashid onwards.

In the struggle for the succession which burst out, after the assassination of Alp Arslan

(465/1072), between his two sons, Malikshah and Qawurt, the latter, as is well known, was

defeated, captured and executed. It was Sawtakin who arrested him, put him in a tent on the

field of battle, and shackled him there. The person who supervised his execution was a much

more famous, high-ranking official, Sa'd al-Dawla Kuhra'in, another eunuch (on him see

below). Sawtakin fulfilled other important functions until his death in Jumada II 477/September

1084, leaving behind an immense fortune.83

The career of the eunuch Erdem the chamberlain (al-hajlb), who is said to have cut off the

head of al-Basasiri (yet another eunuch on that expedition, presumably a commander) is of

great interest. He certainly had an important share in putting Alp Arslan on the throne of

the Great Seljuks as the successor of Tughril, a fact of the highest importance in the history of that dynasty. Here is the account of Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi.

In Muharram 45 5/January 1063 the childless and very ailing Sultan Tughril arrived in

Baghdad to announce the appointment of his successor (he died eight months later). There

he declared, in the presence of a most impressive audience, that his choice fell on Sulayman,

the son of his deceased brother Chaghri Daud, a minor (saghlr), who was then in Isfahan, and

whose widowed mother Tughril married. All present humbly agreed, and the only objector was Erdem, who declared that he would not serve

anybody after Tughril, and that he

would go to Alp Arslan, another son of Daud. He departed immediately, and this was what

turned the scale in favour of Alp Arslan. This is a rather exaggerated version. A more

balanced presentation is the concise and excellent analysis of Professor C. E. Bosworth.84

But even according to that analysis Erdem was a major supporter of the successful candidate.

The possibility that the result of the battle of Manzikert would have been quite different had

the Seljuk army been headed by Sulayman should not be ruled out.85

The eunuch Sa'd al-Dawla Kuhra'in al-khadim was already very prominent under the

Buwayhids of Fars (in the reign of'Irnad al-Din Marzuban: 415-40/1024-48). With the

82 On Khumartakin see e.g. Sibt (Ankara), pp. 64, 11. 9-20; 74, 1. 14-75, 1. 13; 81, 11. 2-3; 84, 11. 19-22; Ibn

al-Athir, ix, pp. 648?9. It should be noted here that while there were numerous eunuch commanders, hardly any eunuch fighting units are mentioned in the sources. I try to explain this phenomenon in my book on the eunuchs.

83 On Sawtakin see e.g. Sibt (Ankara), pp. 27,11. 1-4; 67,1. 3; 161-4; 228-9; Ibn al-Athir, x, p. 92,11. 7-9; C. E.

Bosworth, in J. A. Boyle (ed.), Cambridge History of Iran, v (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 35, 50, 75, 88, 91. 84

Ibid., p. 54. 85 On Erdem see e.g. Sibt (Ankara), pp. 67, 1. 3; 97, 11. 2-17; 102, 11. 6-10, in, 11. 8-10.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 331

extinction of that dynasty he joined the retinue of Alp Arslan, and it was he who tried,

unsuccessfully, to protect him with his own body (waqdhu bi-nafsihi), when the Sultan was

mortally wounded by an assassin. After that Sultan's death, his son and successor Malikshah

sent him to the Caliph's court in Baghdad, from where he brought back to his new master a

Caliphal robe of honour and his certificate of appointment as Sultan (al-khil'a wal-taqlid). This task was often reserved to first-rank eunuchs.

Ibn al-Athir says about Kuhrain: "No eunuch (khddim) before him enjoyed such a great influence; such a full power and such a degree of obedience on the part of the great amirs

who readily served him". This was in addition to his other noble qualities, according to the

statement of the same author.

In the struggle for the succession to the throne of the Great Seljuks between Muhammad

and Barkiyaruk he sided with the loser, Muhammad, and was killed in the decisive battle

(493/1100).86 The very famous 'Imad al-Mulk al-Kunduri was castrated by Sultan Tughril at an adult

age as a punishment, but he continued to serve his master. He occupied the highest office,

that of vizier, in the last eight years of Tughril's reign (422-55/1055-63). Believing that he

would become the real ruler of the empire after that Sultan's death, he supported the

candidacy of Sulayman the minor against that of Alp Arslan. For that he paid with his life

early in the reign of Alp Arslan, and the way was paved for his arch-enemy Nizam al-Mulk

to become the central figure in the Sultanate.87

A person who deserves a much more detailed discussion than the brief reference here (and this remark also applies to my book on the eunuchs) is al-Muqarrab Jawhar, a eunuch (min

khadam) of the Great Seljuk Sultan Sanjar (511-52/1117-57), who was murdered by the

Shi'ite Isma'ilite Bdtiniyya in 534/1140. He is said to have been the ruler of the whole Sultanate

and "the rest of the army of Sanjar [in addition to his own Mamluks] served him and stood

by his door" (wa-kana qad hakamafi dawlatihijami'an. . . . wa-kana sd'ir 'askar al-Sultdn Sanjar

yakhdumunahu wa-yaqifuna bi-bdbihi). His chief Mamluk 'Abbas, the ruler of the province of

Rayy, launched constant heavy attacks on the Bdtiniyya until his death, and inflicted terrible losses on them.88

Another leading eunuch in the Seljuks' service was Sharaf al-Din Kurdbadhu al-khddim. Sultan Sulayman Shah (554?6/1159?61), the Seljuk ruler of Iraq and Western Iran, who was

the grandson of Malikshah, was a frivolous person who neglected his duties as a ruler,

including his duties to the army. He gave the reins of government to Kurdbadhu, one of the

older Seljuk eunuchs, who is said to have been religious and wise and a person who knew

how to manage things well. The commanders complained to that eunuch about the Sultan's

behaviour, but he used to calm them (wa-kana qad radda jami' al-umur ild Sharaf al-Din Kurdbadhu al-khddim wa-huwa min mashdyikh al-khadam al-Saljuqiyya yarji' ild din wa-'aql

wa-husn tabir fa-kdna al-umara yashkuna Hay hi wa-huwa yusakkinuhum). However, the

86 On Kuhra'in see e.g. Ibn al-Athir, x, pp. 66, 70, 73, 79, 90, 100, 116, 144, 162, 164, 165, 176-7, 184, 187, 204, 219-22, 289, 294f., 295,1. 18-296,1. 9, 435, 480.

87 On al-Kunduri see e.g. Sibt (Ankara), pp. 97, 11. 13-14; 124, 11. 12-14; l65> 1- *3; It>n al-Athir, x, pp. 32, 1- 17?33,1- 5; 33, II- 15-17; Ibn Khallikan, Wafayd (Beirut, 1968^72), v, p. 141, 11. 5-22.

88 Ibn al-Athir, xi, pp. 76, 1. 14?77, 1. 5. He was a black eunuch: Jawhar al-khadim al-Habashi al-maruf bil-muqarrab (Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, x, p. 87. Ibn al-Jawzi describes him there as the real ruler in Sanjar's reign ? kana mustawliyan 'aid mamlakatihi mutahakkiman fihd (ibid.).

332 David Ayalon

irresponsible deeds of the sultan exceeded all bounds; and when Kurdbadhu called upon him and reproached him, he ordered one of his jesters to uncover his pudenda (kashf

sawatxhx) [in order to expose the absence of his genital organs]. After consultation Kurd

badhu arrested the Sultan, sent him to jail, and then ordered him killed. The Sultan's vizier

and the vizier's private retinue were killed on the spot. Kurdbadhu also took part in the

setting on the throne of Arslan Shah (556-73/1161-77), the nephew of Sulayman Shah.89

This is, incidentally, an excellent example of how a eunuch, at the peak of his power,

could be exposed, within seconds, to the utmost disgrace because of his mutilation.

Returning to the relations between the Seljuks and the Caliphs, within the framework of

the subject of the eunuchs, two matters should be pointed out.

(a) As already stated, the Seljuks used to have a representative in Baghdad, holding the

office of shihna, whose main duty was to watch the Caliph's acts and to make him toe the

Seljuks' line. Among these shihnas the eunuchs figure quite prominently. In the reign of

al-Mustarshid (512-29/1118-35) it was the eunuch Bihruz, the sponsor of the Ayyubids, who gave the founder of that dynasty the great push forward which culminated in its

supplanting the Fatimids in Egypt and the Zangids in Syria;90 and the already mentioned

Mas'ud Bilal or Mas'ud al-Bilali, in the reign of this successor, al-Muqtafi.91

(b) In the struggle between the Caliphs, the Seljuks and the Seljuks' allies (or vassals), the

presence of eunuch commanders in all camps is very noticeable. Here I shall mention only

one of them. In 532/1137, during the reign of our old acquaintance al-Muqtafi, Nazar

al-khadim was one of the two commanders who headed an army which repulsed yet

another Seljuk attack on Baghdad.92 Under the Syrian branch of the Seljuks and its successors the power of the eunuchs

reaches yet another peak. It is recounted in my book on the eunuchs. Here I shall only say that in the competing courts of Damascus and Aleppo they are often the real rulers, as well as the commanders of their respective citadels. Very interesting is the remark of Sibt Ibn

al-Jawzi: "Aleppo was afflicted with the following trouble: whenever the ruler dies, one of

his Mamluks or eunuchs take charge of his small son [who succeeds him on the throne].

This goes on from the time of [the Hamdanid] Sayf al-Dawla (933-56/945?67) onwards"

(buliyat Halab bi-mithli hddhd an yamut sdhibuha wa-yatawalla umiira waladihi al-saghlr bad

mamallkihi aw khadamihi min zaman Sayf al-Dawla Ud halummajarran).93 This implies that the Seljuks fit themselves into the already existing pattern in this

domain, as they did in other parts of their realm. It also indicates another matter. It is true

that alternating of Mamluks and eunuchs did not necessarily repeat itself exactly in the same

way everywhere. But the intertwining of eunuchs and Mamluks is forcefully reflected here.

89 Ibid., p. 266,1. 3-268,1. 2.

90 The eunuch Bihriiz's connection with the forefather of the Ayyubids is dealt with in the chapter in the

eunuchs under the Ayyubids in my above-mentioned books on the eunuchs. 91 He was also a black eunuch. He is called khasi by Ibn al-Furat, iii, fol. 2b, 11. 6-7; and ahad al-khadam

al-khisydn al-Habashiyyin al-kibdr by Ibn Khallikan, Wafaydt, vi, p. 231, 1. 17. On him see also Ibn al-Athir, xi,

pp. 118, 131, 161, 189, 195. 92

Ibid., p. 61, 11. 13-16. There is an immense amount of evidence on eunuch commanders in the armies of

medieval Islam. Numerous instances are brought forward in that book, which form only a small part of the

evidence (this statement excludes the eunuchs of the Mamluk Sultanate). 93

Sibt, Mir at al-Zamdn (Hyderabad, Deccan, 1951), viii, part 1, p. 47,11. 5-6.

The Mamluks of the Seljuks: Islam's Military Might at the Crossroads 333

The Ottoman Slave System - A Direct Offshoot of that of the Mamluks

My study of the socio-military slave institution under the Seljuks, which certainly needs to

be much more comprehensive than it has been up to now, fully upholds Professor H.

Inalcik's conclusion in his illuminating article "Ghulam" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, where

he says: "The Ottoman Administration was based on the Ghulam system. The principle of

training young slaves for the Palace service and the service of the state had certainly been

inherited by the Ottomans from the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum".941 would add, and its Seljuk

predecessors, who inherited the system from the Muslim rulers who preceded them.

The conclusions of my study are also in full accord with those of Professor Speros

Vryonis, in his brilliant article, "Seljuk ghulams and Ottoman devshirme",95 where he

traces the Ottoman slave system to that of the Seljuks and their predecessors. His

conclusions are mainly based on a most detailed and insightful reading of Ibn Bibi's

Seljuk-ndme, and supplementary material from Muslim insciptions and waqf documents.96 It

is true that under the Ottomans the major source for the recruitment of military and

administrative manpower became the Balkan peninsula,97 but the recruitment of Greeks

and Armenians in Anatolia and its immediate vicinity, which started much earlier, formed a

vital link in that process. As for the eunuchs, I tend to think that the Byzantine influence in their adoption by the

Muslims in the early decades of Islam's existence was considerably greater than the Iranian.

On the other hand, the Byzantine impact in that domain resulting from the Ottoman

conquest of Constantinople in 1453 seems to me to have been quite marginal. Orkhan, the

son of 'Uthman, already early in the fourteenth century had prominent eunuchs in his

service, as we can learn even from the few documents surviving from his reign.98 As I have

already stated, a highly-placed eunuch often indicates a

pyramid of eunuchs below him.

To sum up: the Ottoman slave system, in spite of all its distinctive characteristics, is a

direct descendant of the earlier Muslim one. Without it there would have been no Ottoman

Empire, at least not the glorious and formidable one of which we know.

94 ET, ii, 1085b ("Ghulam").

95 Der Islam, XLI (1965), pp. 224?52. Note also the numerous studies referred to in that article. 96 See especially ibid., pp. 227ff. and the summary, p. 252. There can be little doubt that had we possessed

sources similar to that of Ibn Bibi on the Seljuks of Rum for the other Muslim principalities of Anatolia, the same

picture relating to their slave systems would have emerged. 97

Vryonis, op. cit., p. 252. 98

ET, "Ghulam", p. 1086a.