THE MARCH OF WAR

SOUTHERN ITALY

(August 29 to November 75, 7943)-

AT the end of August the A1lies madeseveral vain attempts to gain a foot­hold on the Italian mainland, all of

them on a rniJl0r scale. But in the earlymorning hours of September 3, an invasionwitb major forces began. MOOr a violent artil­lery prepa,ration and under strong naval andair protection, one British tank division andone Canadian infantry division of GeneralBernard Montgomery's Eighth Army werelanded between ViUa San Giovanni andReggio Calabria. ubsequent landings nearCerarnida, Palmi, and--on September 8-inthe Gulf of Ellferuia, brought the Allied forcesin Calabria, lip to four divisions, which con­tinued to recei ve reinforcements. The fewGerman defenders fought a gallant rearguardaction calculated to slow up the enemy'sadvance. They blew up roads, laid exten­sive minc fields (which caused the Britishsevere losses), and succeeded in evading alleffort at eneil·clement.

SL"RPRISE AT SALERNO

On September 8, the American FifthArmy under General Mark Clark, includingalso the British Tenth Army Corps as wellas some Canactian troops, started large-scalelanding operations in the Gulf of Salerno.The &nnouncement of Badoglio's surrenderau' the following day made it clear that theAllied High Command expected to exploitthe situation to the fullest. Naples was tobe occupied, and further large contingentswere to be landed there, while a quickthrust in an easterly direction toward Poten­za and a junction with the Eighth Armywere to cut off the German formations inCalabria. But, apart from the fact that theadvance of the Eighth Army was muchslower than expected, a big surprise was inBtore for the Allies in the fighting around theGulf of Salerno.

The Allied landing fleet was subjected toheavy a.ttacks by the Luftwaffe. But.,

under cover of the guns of strong Alliednaval forces and in spite of heavy loases,seven infantry and tank divisions of theFifth Army were put ashore during the firstthree days. The British troops formed Ii.bridgehead in the Salerno area and tried toenlarge t.heir foothold in a northerly' andwesterly direction. American and Canadiandi visions took over the eastern shore of thegulf and advanced to the heights south ofEboli, where in two days of heavy fightingthey attempted to break through toPotenza. However, by September 13 theyhad. been weakened to such an extent thatthey were forced to abandon their originalplan and to limit themselves to defense.

It was at this moment that tue G~rman

Command struck back. Just as the invaderswere beginning to entrench themselves,German tank and mechanized forces rusheddown on a broad front from their hillsidepositions. In a brief but bitter engage­ment they split the enemy into small groupswhich were put to rout. Large quantitiesof arms and equipment were left behind ort.hrown away. In outflanking maneuverssome of the enemy groups were iBolatedand thousands of men taken prisoner. Bywresting Battipaglia from the invaders, theGermans also drove a wedge between theAnglo-American groups in the Salerno andEboli areas.

1.11 the Salerno sector, the BritiBh troopsfared no better. Their push toward Vietriand then in the direction of the Nocera plainwas stemmed by a powerful couuterattackfrom two directions which threw them backto the coastal strip of Vietri. Althoughfurther landings were carried out on thewestern end of the Sorrento peninsula, theadvance along the coastal road to Amalfiand a tank thrust from Salerno toward thenorth failed to relieve the British.

While all this was going on, the EighthArmy was feeling its way northward alongthe western coast of Calabria. Further to

TH..E 'MAReR OF WAH 431

the easl., Taranto (September 12) andBrinui8i were pla.yed into t.he hands of tIl('Briii h by Badoglio troops.

In order to speed lip help fur the batteredlIn.its of the Fifth Army at Salerno, the AWedHigh Command decided to di patch part ofGenernl Montgomery's forces by Rca. Duringthe night of September Ii, about one anda half divi:;ionJ:l of tank allu motorized unitswere landed in the ar a of l~aC! tum llndAgropoli. Another tank brigade embarkedto strengthen t.he troop' in the alemo sector.Then the Germans, after two weeks offighting and after having united with theircomrade:; who had be n engaged in Calabriaand Apulia, hI' 'an to detach themselve.The front, wbich bad run from Salerno ina southeasterly direction, was taken back011 the left wing, with alorno as the pivot.

10 tbe two weeks' battle of Ralemo, threeGerman divisions, sOllie of thom of Sicilianfame, stood up ngainst forcos vastly superiorin nllmlx-r and enjoying complete nandsupwl1Iacy. The 36th VI-; Jnfantry Di\'isionwas practically wiped out. Tbe employmentof Allied parachutist formation;;, which wasattempted by the British nenr Castellamll.reand by the American8 in the VCSU\riuB area,

end d in their annihilation. Anglo-Americancasualtie numbered fit. least 10,000 killedand wounded. The GormmJs took 4,429prisoners and destroyed or captured 153tanks, U.':l well as a lot of other equipment.Between . ptemuer H Ilnd 17, units of theGerman Luftwaffe and Navy !:lank 3 cruisers,2 destroyers, one torpcdoboat, 15 landingboats, and 9 transports apart from an evenlarger number of vessels they damaged.

TOlJOH OOINU

At the bf'ginning of October, General~lontgol1lcrY'8 forccs had ad\-aneed to a li.nerunning roughly frum Manfredonia to Bovino,while in the west the fighting centered aroundAvellino and Mount Vf' II\-ius. On 0 tober2, Na.plc8 wus evucuated by the Germansafter thoy had hlown up all installationsthat might. be of usc to the enemy andhad rendered tbe harbor unfit u.s a navaland military basc.

Since t hen it has been tough going forthe Anglo-Americllnli, Ull t.he defenders havemade full use of th extrem Iv mountainoustermin, where small deta.clllilCnts in well­camouflaged po itions lue able to inflictserious los8os upon an enemy ploddi.ng along

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--+AII,..d Advanc ..Oc~.I& - JI.I~' J

~ AII,.d Advanc.Nov I - IS, I~'l

The italian Front, September 8 to November 15, 1943

THE XXth OENTURY

roads exposed to flank attacks from steepheights. Although fa.r inferior in numbers,the Germans did not confine themselvcs towarding off the Allies: they often madecounterattacks or launched surprise thrusts.Every strategic point was transformedinto a hedgehog position and tenaciouslydefended. The Allies ha.ve, therefore, beencompelled to undertake the wearying busi·ness of removing one obstacle after anotherwithout being able to start the expectedJa,rge-scale operations.

The valley of the upper Volturno River-continued in a northwcsterly direction bythe valley of the upper Garigliano andSMCO Rivers, with Cassino &s its gateway­is of particular strategic importance sinceit forms the main road to Rome. (Thewidening coastal strip leading to Romeis impracticable for a large.scale adYance,as the Pontine Marshes form a naturalbarrier across this strip.) Hence, at thetime of going to pres.'!, the fighting for accessto this road is especially violent. Our mapshows the inconsiderable Allied advancebetween October 15 and November 15.

In view of the Allied naval superiority,it is remarkable that, with the exception ofa major landing maneuver at Termoli onOctober 5 and of some minor ones north·west of that city and north of the mouthof the Volturno River at a later date, noamphibian operations were attempted duringthe period under re\riew. A squadron ofwarships which tried to bombard the portof Gaeta on November 1 was driven off byGerman coastal defense guns.

On the Allied right wing this lack ofamphibian maneuvers is probably due totheir lack of sufficient shipping and to thefact that the eastern shore of the Adriaticis under German control. Such operationsare, therefore, threatened by attacks fromair bases on the Dalmatian coo. t. Moreover,judging by his African campaign, GeneralMontgomery is averse to starting any large.scale operations without superior numbersin men and material, which he is at pres­ent engaged in assembling before venturingto smash through the Sangro line.

On the Allied left wing, the US FifthAnny is now facing strong defense positionsin the mountainous terrain running fromFormia to Isernia. To break through thisline would demand great sacrifices. On theother hand, the outflanking of these posi.tions by means of an amphibian enterpriseis more likely to be attempted, as the

Anglo.Americans have bases on Sardiniaand Corsica to protect naval operations inthe Tyrrhenian Sea. Hence large.scalelandings similar to those in thc Salernoarea may be reckoned with.

GERMAN DEFENSE PREPARATIONS

While the battle on the Italian peninsula.was going on, the German positions incentral and northern Italy were being con·solidated. All Italian armies were dis·armed, the lines of communication secured,and all important passes and tunnels in theAlps taken over by German troops. Italianformations in the occupied t~rritorie.s werelikewise replaced by German or other Axistroops. The resistance offered by IlomoItalian formations was quickly broken.The strategically important islands of Corfuat the entrance to the Adriatic and of Rhodesin the Dodecanese group were secured, andthe British who, with the connivance ofthe Italian commanders, had "OCcupiedvarious other islands in the' Aegean,especially Kos and Leros, were eitherwiped out or taken prisoner.

On the other hand, the naval superiorityof the Allies in the Mediterranean neces­sitated the evacuation of the i lands ofSardinia and Corsica, all troops togetherwith their entire equipment being ferriedacross to the mainland.

The treason of King Victor Emmanueland his Government made the period underreview a. most critical one for the Germanforces in Italy. But, without a mom nt'shesitation, the German High Commandmastered the dangers threatening from out·side as well as lurking in the rear of tboGerman divisions. Central Italy is beingdefended by a large army under Field MarshalKesselring, only a small part of which hasbeen sent into battle as yet; while in thenorth another army under Field MarshalR.ommel is guarding Italy's most importantagricultural and industria.l centers. This aswell as the numerous deeds of individuaJbravery-outstanding among which was therescue of Mu solini by a handful of Germansfrom a mountain top 2,100 meters high­have shown German morale to be unbrokenand have caused the Allied High Commandto desist from boldly exploiting an oppor­tunity on which many Anglo-Americanhopes rested. As General Sir Harold Alex­ander phrased it in a communique: "Allroads lead to Rome, but unfortunately allthese roads are mined and their bridgesblown up."