the market for force and public security

7/31/2019 The Market for Force and Public Security

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The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private MilitaryCompaniesAuthor(s): Anna LeanderSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 5 (Sep., 2005), pp. 605-622Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042371

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2005 JournalofPeaceResearch,vol.42, no. 5, 2005, pp. 605-622SagePublicationsLondon,ThousandOaks,CAandNew Delhi) http://jpr.agepub.comDOI 10.1177/0022343305056237

The Market for Force and Public Security:The Destabilizing Consequences of PrivateMilitary Companies*ANNA LEANDERDepartment of Political Science and Public Management, University ofSouthern Denmark

This article explains how it is possible to arriveat the paradoxicalconclusion that an increasedrelianceon privateactors (in the guise of privatemilitarycompanies)could consolidate public peaceand securityin the weakestAfrican states. It arguesthat this conclusion can only be reached if the dynamics of themarketfor force are neglected. The basic claim is that the marketas a whole has effects that cannot becaptured by focussing on single cases. The articleanalysesthese effects, departing from the empiricalfunctioning of supply, demand and externalities n the marketfor force in order to spell out the impli-cations for public security.More specifically, he articleshows that supply n the market for force tendsto self-perpetuate,as PMCs turn out a new caste of securityexperts striving to fashion securityunder-standings to defend and conquer marketshares.The processleads to an expansion of the numbers andkinds of threats the firms provide protection against. Moreover,demand does not penalize firms thatservice'illegitimate'clients in general. Consequently, the number of actorswho can wield control overthe use force is limited mainly by their ability to pay. Finally,an externalityof the market is to weakenexisting security institutions by draining resourcesand worsening the security coverage. This givesfurther reasons to contest the legitimacy of existing security orders. In other words, the developmentof a market for force increases the availabilityand perceivedneed for military services, the number ofactorswho have access to them and the reasonsto contest existing security orders.This hardlyaugurswell for public security.

IntroductionOver the past decade, an instructive andinteresting debate about the state in Africahas developed. Terms have been inventedand explanationsfound to communicate theidea that African states are of a differentkind. African states have been described as'fragile' (Clapham, 1996) 'quasi-states'(Jackson, 1990) with 'pathologies' tied totheir design (Herbst & Mills, 2003: 39).They are associated with notions of 'occult* Correspondenceand comments are most welcome [email protected].

power structures' (Bayart, Ellis & Hibou,1997) and warlord politics (Reno, 1998).They have become the prime examples of'pre-modern' or 'failed' states (Cooper,2002). This article is primarily concernedwith these states.In the accounts of the peculiarity ofAfrican states, the breakdown of publicsecurity,that is, the endemic violence result-ing from the blurring of the boundariesbetween crime and law enforcement as wellas between war and peace, figures promi-nently.The consequences are seriousas con-flicts spill across borders with refugees and

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606 journal of PEACE RESEARCHarmed troops/groups, the lack of territorialcontrol opens space for terrorist groups(Menkhaus, 2004), and the human costskeep rising. The 1998-2003 war in theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC) leftan estimated 3 million dead, and the unrav-ellinghumanitarianemergency n Darfurhasdisplaced at least 1.5 million personsso far.It is therefore not surprising that how tocreateor restore order,how to restoresomeform of public security,has become a primepolitical and academic concern.It is also thecentralconcern of this article.The seemingly obvious and simplesolution that African states need to bestrengthened and their public monopolycontrol on the use of force re-established(Ayoob, 1992) is intensely contested. Theworst violence is perpetratedby, or with theapproval of, states. Strengthening them isthereforenot an obvious solution (Clapham,2002). It might 'be better to try to redesignat least some African states rather thansimply trying to prevent disaster and thenattempting to resurrect hem after profoundfailure'(Herbst, 2000: 258). More radically,some question the adequacyof statehood assuch. 'Sovereignty' and the statemonopolyon the legitimate use of force centralto it -arethe root causesof violence and insecurity,not solutions. A better understanding ofpolitics and political organizationin Africa,combined with a profound reconsiderationof the pro-state bias in the policies towardsthem, is called for (e.g. Duffield, 2002;Reno, 2000).This shows that state control overthe useof force does not equate to public security.Public security (or the relative absence ofviolence in the public sphere) can beprovided by private as well as by publicagents.Inversely,public forcesmay be majorsources of insecurity. Most pertinently, inmost weak African states, the boundarybetween the two is blurred. In this article,thereis therefore no assumptionto the effect

volume 42 / number 5 / september2005that the arrangementthat underpins publicsecurity, the security order, is necessarilybasedon a statemonopoly of the use of forceor that a state monopoly on the legitimateuse of force equates to public security.Thisblurring of public and private in Africansecurity orders does not reduce the import-ance of the question of how to move towardsgreaterpublic security.This article deals with one concrete, butparadoxical,answerto this question, namely,that creating/restoringpublic security in theweakest African states might be helped byencouraging private actors - and morespecifically private military companies(PMCs)1 - to play a more active role. Thearticle argues that the paradox is clear.Reliance on PMCs does not enhance publicsecurity. The market for force created byincreased reliance on PMCs weakens thefoundations of public security.A marketforforce increasesthe supplyof military servicesand the number of actors who can buy theservices,and it underminesthe consolidationof public security structures. The conse-quence is that insecurity and violence arelikely to increaseeven further.Beforemakingthis argument, the article presents the casefor increasedrelianceon PMCs.The Case for Private MilitaryCompanies in the African Context'Write a cheque and end a war' is howBrooks (2000b) summarizeshis view on therole PMCs should play in Africa. Elsewhere,he argues that private military companieshave more in common with the Messiah1 PMCs will in this text refer to firms providing con-sultancy, logistics and direct support for security opera-tions. PMC (rather than, say, private security firms) hasbecome the standard term used by those interested in thestudy of the rapidly growing private market for force(Isenberg, 2004b: 15; Singer, 2003b). The heterogeneity offirms and activities covered by the term reflects the closelinkage (and often blurred distinctions) between thedifferent segments of the market for force (Leander, 2004a:ch. 3; Zamparelli, 1999).


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Anna Leander PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIESthan with mercenaries (2000a), and hedevotes considerable energy to lobbying foran increasedrole of PMCs in peacekeepingoperations as he directs the lobby organiz-ation International Peace OperationsAssociation (http://www.ipoaonline.org).However, Brooks does not advocate anunregulatedmarket. The cheque should bewritten to a respectable company followingnational and international regulations (thatneed improving). The company shouldpreferablynot be involved in direct combat,but focus on backing up, consulting andtraining public forces. This position hasbecome rather mainstream. As pointed outalready n 1997 by Enrique BernalesBalles-teros (the former special rapporteuron mer-cenarism who was replaced by ShaistaShameem in July 2004), 'attitudesappeartobe changing towards the mercenary issue'(UN GeneralAssembly, 1997: 97). This ispartlybecause 'influential sectors in the cor-ridorsof power of important Statesinsist ondenying or minimizing the existence of mer-cenaries in contemporary society' (UNGeneralAssembly, 1997: 83). However, itis also because those arguing that PMCscould promote public security make aforceful and persuasive case. This sectionpresents the four pillars on which it rests.Breaking Cyclesof ViolenceThe first pillar supporting the case thatPMCs would be helpful in restoring publicsecurityin African states is that they make itpossible to break vicious circles of violence.They could do this either by working as'force multipliers' for African forces or byproviding troops for outside interventions.The importance of providing troops isoften argued with reference to the 1994genocide in Rwanda.The international com-munity was deeply involved prior to thegenocide. It controlled some 80% of theRwandan budget. It (and particularlyFrance) was equipping and training the

Rwandan military.The international com-munity was monitoring the implementationof the Arusha peace agreement through aUN force (UNAMIR) in the country. Thisinvolvement made the international com-munity morally responsible for develop-ments in Rwanda.However, not only did itfail to limit racialpolicies, laws and propa-ganda, but signals about the cominggenocide were ignored and obfuscated.When the genocide began, UNAMIR wasorderednot to act. Following the killing often Belgiansoldiers, the bulk of UN troopswere withdrawn, leaving between 500,000and 1 million people to be killed (Barnett,2002; Uvin, 1998).The reasons or the failureto intervene inRwanda are varied, controversial andcomplex. Forthe purpose of this article, thefailure is significant because Rwanda hascome to epitomize situations where PMCscould be used to breakcycles of violence: asituation marked by widespread agreementaroundthe necessity of outside intervention,but an equallywidespread unwillingness toprovidetroops (Adams, 1999; Gantz, 2003).In such a situation, those suggesting thatPMCs could be used to enhance securityargue that they could make up for the lackof willing and qualified troops. They ask,'Who or what will respond to tomorrow'sRwanda?' Shearer,2001).They also point out that PMCs could bedeployed as 'force multipliers' by govern-ments who cannot tip the balance to theirfavourin an armedconflict and who cannotobtain the help needed from outsiders.PMCs could 'multiply' local forces quiteliterallyby operatingtogether with them, bytraining locals and/or by taking over non-military tasks,hence freeing up local troopsfor military operations. To illustrate howPMCs might play such roles, the referencepoint is the 'successes'of the South Africanfirm Executive Outcomes (EO) (closed in1998) in ending the cruel and costly (in

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608 journal of PEACE RESEARCHterms of human lives and limbs) conflicts inAngola and in Sierra Leone (e.g. Zarate,1998).In Angola, EO was hired in 1993 toretakecontrol of the oil facilitiesin Soyo andthen train government soldiers. The EOguidance brought UNITA to the negotiatingtable, which eventuallyproduced the 1994Lusakapeace protocol. In SierraLeone, EOwas hired in 1995 to defeatthe RUF, whichit did. It retook the Kono diamond areaandtrained a local ethnically based army unit,the 'Kamajors',to take over security. EObrought the RUF to the negotiating tableand paved the way for the 1996 presidentialelections. In both places,EO playeda pivotalrole in breaking long and protracted con-flicts, stabilizingthe governmentsand settingthe stage for civilian politics.As theirdefenderspoint out, the potential(and proven capacity) of PMCs to breakvicious circles of violence weighs heavily intheir favour. This is widely acknowledged.Kofi Annan, for example, stated that 'in theface of mass murder'the use of privatecon-tracts 'is an option that cannot be relin-quished' (quoted in Shearer, 2001).Similarly,there seems to have been interestin establishing an expert panel looking intothe potential of private firms in peacekeep-ing operations (Financial Times, 2003), evenif David Harland, head of the UN Depart-ment of Peacekeeping Operations, hasdeclaredthat the 'privatizationof peacekeep-ing is not on the agenda' (Deen, 2004). Itcertainly is the case that the scale of thetragedies in places such as Rwanda, SierraLeone and Angola makes worriesabout theprivate-sector tatusof thosethatmight assistending them seem minor - or, worse,immoral.PMC RespectabilityA second pillar supporting the idea thatPMCs could be used to enhance publicsecurity in Africa is that (at least some)

volume 42 / number 5 / september2005PMCs are respectable. If this was not thecase, encouraging their development andrelying on them would be foolish. It is there-fore essential to show that PMCs do notbehave like Machiavelli's 'whores of war',that they are not 'traditionalmercenaries'.The term 'privatemilitarycompanies'waslaunched and energeticallymarketedby TimSpicerpartlyfor that reason.It createda newlabel that could replace the tainted mer-cenary one that put PMCs and the rogue,individual, free-floating and ultimatelyunreliable contemporary mercenaries likeBob Denard or Wild Mike Hoare into onebasket (International Consortium of Inves-tigative Journalists, 2002). As advocatesemphasize, PMCs are different from indi-vidual mercenaries. They are corporations.Moreover, many PMCs have roots in para-public defence industries; many employhighly qualified retired personnel fromarmed forces. The term underlines that thePMCs are corporations similar to othercorporations. Some of them operate asmultinationalbusinesses,aretradedon stockmarkets,haveheadquarters n tax havensandoperate professional advertising and publicrelationsdepartments.However,being a cor-poration is no guarantee of respectablebehaviour, as underlined by the Enron,WorldCom and Parmalat scandals. There-fore, more is needed.There is more. Those arguingthat PMCscould enhance security point out that theiremployees are military professionals.Theyhave no more motivation to maltreatciviliansthan public soldiers (Taulbee, 1998: 159).They may well be less inclined to do so thanpublic soldiers precisely because their moti-vation is pecuniary and not ideological orrooted in loyaltiesto a nation, group,clan ortribe (Lynch & Walsh, 2000). Moreover,industry advocatespoint out that the highlypoliticized marketfor force makesit essentialfor PMCs to behave respectably. The fastestthing that would get us out of business is


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Anna Leander PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIEShuman-rightsviolations'(Nic van Den Berghof EO, quoted in Spearin, 2001: 30). Theyalso argue that PMCs have a pro-state bias.PMCs 'like stable not fragile states. In thatrespect, their interestsand those of the stateareusuallythe same.They have neversoughtto challengestates'(Coker, 1998: 111).According to those arguing for anexpandedrole for PMCs, this presentationofthe firmsis confirmedin practice.Firmshavebehaved respectablywhere they have beeninvolved. They are professional and do agood military job. PMCs are 'strategicallyeffective' (O'Brien, 2000a). They have thepossibility and flexibility to put together ateam with the militarytraining, local knowl-edge and equipment that is needed to acteffectively in any given conflict. PMCs oftenstress that their staffing policies are strictlybasedon professional qualificationsand thatthey have serious vetting procedures toensurethe reliabilityof their employees. 'Wecan muster more generals than thePentagon', boasts Ed Soyster of MPRI(Wayne,2002). It is also underlined that, asprofessionals, PMC employees behave wellin action. They even do humanitarian work,such as EO coordinating the reopening ofschools in SierraLeone (Zarate, 1998: 97).When they havefulfilled their contract, theywithdraw (Spicer, 1998). Those arguing forincreasedPMC involvement in establishingsecuritysee critiqueof the industry as rootedin prejudiceratherthan in the observanceofactualPMC behaviour(Isenberg,2000: 16).TheFallibility ofAfrican ForcesThe third pillar upholding the claim thatPMCs help sustain public security in weakAfrican states is the patent insufficiency ofmany African forces. The argument is that,when discussing the use of PMCs, it isimportant to compare with the most likelyalternative:that is, the deployment of localforces. It is said that PMCs stand out as farmore professionaland efficient, and even as

potentially contributing to improvingAfrican forces.The lack of professionalism of Africanforces is a recurrent preoccupation of

regional scholars and not only PMC advo-cates. It is ranked by some as the mainproblem in African politics (e.g. Howe,2001). Even the continent's stronger andmore cohesive armed forces lack training,equipment and resources (Clapham, 2000;de Waal, 1998; Luckham, 2003). Publicarmed forces have looted, racketed andabusedcivilians to the point of being the keyperpetratorsof violence on the continent.Army responseto threatshas often been dis-proportionate and unjustifiablyfocused oncivilians. The fallibility of African armedforces is reflectedalso in the extensive criti-cism of theircontribution to regionalopera-tions through, for example, the EconomicCommunity of West Africa MonitoringGroup (Adebajo, 2002; Reno, 1998:103-109).Againstthis backdrop,it is not surprisingthat PMCs can be presented as a moreefficientandmore attractivealterative Fisher-Thomson, 2004). The undeniably poorrecord of public African forces sharpens theimageof PMC professionalism.More impor-tantly, t undermines the idea that relianceonPMCs is inherently undesirablebecausethefirmsareprivate.Implicit or explicit contrastswith public African armed forces driven byprivate nterests,behavingasmercenaries, ndwith despicablehuman rightsrecords,under-minesargumentsbuildingon the assumptionsthat publicly controlled uses of force arepreferable.Characteristically,

before MPRI entered the picture ... HumanRights Watch and Amnesty InternationallinkedACRI(AfricanCrisisResponse nitia-tive)trainedbattalionso murders, apesandbeatings ... MPRI is at the top of themilitaryraining ield. 'Committed o ethicalbusinesspractices' s writtenprominently nthe firm'spromotional pamphlet.(Burton-Rose & Madsen, 1999)

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610 journal of PEACE RESEARCHEven more strongly, advocates oftenpresentPMCs as one possibleremedyfor thelack of professionalism in many Africanforces. They can provide the training and

equipment that internationalalliesno longersupply since 1989. This PMC role is nothypothetical. MPRI runsACRI (the AfricanCrisis Response Initiative) and Kellog,Brown and Root trains Rwandantroops, tomention just two examples. Reliance onprivatesecurity firms has become one of thekey strategies used by African leaders torespond to the lack of professionalismoftheir own forces, either by buying servicesthey need from outsiders or by using themto upgrade the local forces(Howe, 2001: 2).This points straight to the final pillarof thecase for using PMCs to stabilizethe securitysituation in weak Africanstates.Pragmatism,Practice and RegulationPMCs are already so extensively involvedthat any reasonable approachmust be prag-matic. Regulation is necessaryand feasible,while banning blocks discussionsabout howto dealwith an importantquestion (Brayton,2002). Therefore, the continued ban andcondemnation of mercenarismis counter-productive and the term had better bedroppedaltogether (Shearer,1998a: 89-90).The point of departurefor this argumentis the increased involvement of PMCs inweak African states. Even if it is hard todocument, specialists working on Africanconflicts and aggregate indicators confirmthe trend. One compilation of availableinformation on 'mercenaryactivity' n Africafrom the 1950s onwards lists 15 conflictsinvolving mercenaries for the 40 yearsspanning 1950-89 and 65 for the period1990-98 (Musah & Fayemi, 2000). Simi-larly, he recent ForeignandCommonwealthOffice Green Paper (Foreignand Common-wealth Office, 2002a: AnnexA) lists 15 con-flicts involving mercenaries for the period1950-89 compared to 80 for the period

volume 42 / number 5 /september 20051990-2000. The impressionis corroboratedby the increase in annual revenue of theprivate military industry (including also therapid expansion of the security industry inWestern Europeand the United States)from$55.6 billion in 1990 to $100 billion in2000, and it was expected to double againand reach $202 billion by 2010 (Inter-national Consortium of InvestigativeJour-nalists, 2002: 4).Moreover,PMC advocatespoint out thatmany of the activitiesundertakenby foreign-ers in Africa depend on PMCs. Westerngovernmentsareoutsourcing asksof training,consulting and logistics- that is, the imple-mentation of military support - to privatefirms.They relyon PMCs to backup militaryoperationsand providethe securitynecessaryfor their physical presence. Similarly,otheroutsidersrelyon PMCs to compensatefor theabsenceof effectivestatecontroloverviolence.Firms have to protect their installationsandtheir personnel.Aid workersneed protectionfrom racketeering,kidnappingand attacks.Incontexts where the public armed forces andpolice are either unavailable,ineffective orinvolved in the activities against which pro-tection is needed, private solutions are theonly ones available(Spearin,2001).The PMCs fill a 'securitygap' (Mandel,2002). This gap cannot be banned out ofexistence. Attempts to ban are counterpro-ductive: 'not using legitimate private firmswill probably lead to a resurgenceof uncon-trollable individual freelance mercenarieswho will flock to satisfy the profitabledemand for militaryexpertise, but who havefar less regard for the legitimacy of theirclients' (Brooks, 2000b: 138). Moreover,there is no political support for a ban. 'Moststates find PMCs useful for implementingtheir own foreign and military policies andoppose efforts to restrict,let alone prohibitthem' (Isenberg,2004b: 12).Instead of sticking to an obsolete ban onmercenarism- penalizinglegitimatesecurity


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Anna Leander PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIESservices - a revision of international andnational regulationsof PMC activitiesis theonly realistic option, the advocates argue.Developments seem to confirmtheirview,asregulationis being adaptedto the expandingsector. At the national level, concernedmilitary hierarchies and policymakers arepushing change according to their ownnationalconcerns.The UK, for example,haspassed the 'Sponsored ReserveAct' to makeit possible to integrateprivatecontractors nmilitary operations while allowing them tokeep their private firm salary and status.Inversely,France has imposed stricterlimitson the activitiesof privatecontractors(Sinat,2002). In the United States,the US NationalDefense Authorization bill is likely to resultin strictervetting proceduresfor PMC per-sonnel, partially under public oversight,following private contractor involvement inAbu Ghraib (Isenberg,2004b).At the internationallevel, the formerUNspecial rapporteuron mercenaries,althoughsticking to the term, has proposed a far-reaching redefinition and specification of'mercenary'(UN General Assembly, 2003:annexe). Proposals for extending regulationalso to cover the logistics and consultancyfirmsare emerging;for example,negotiationsregarding he proposal for a 'Convention onthe Use of Armed Non-Military Contractorsby an Occupying Force' (Isenberg, 2004b:72). Finally, there have been initiatives toextend international human rightslegislationalso to PMCs. Some of these involveprofound changes of international legalpractice, such as the suggestion to placePMCs under the jurisdiction of the Inter-national Court of Justice (Singer, 2003b).Most, however, are based on self-regulationand codes of conduct, such as the genericones adopted by the UN Global Compact(which can be read at http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm) or more specificconducts adopted by NGOs concerneddirectly with security and human rights

(Amnesty's 'specific recommendations forsecurity arrangements' are available athttp://www.amnesty.org.uk/business/pubs/hrgc.shtml#6), the industry organizationssuch as the IPOA (its code is available athttp://www.ipoaonline.org/code.htm)or thefirms themselves (the 'human rights policy'of the now closed firm Sandline can beviewed at http://www.sandline.com/site/index.htm).To sum up, there is a strong and well-argued case for the need to revise existingconventions condemning the use of 'mer-cenaries' to make it possible for PMCs toplay a moreextensiverole in Africaand else-where. This section systematized the mainargumentson which it rests for two reasons.One is to clarifywhy so many scholars andpolicymakersarriveat the conclusion that aprivatemarketforforcewill enhance securityin weak Africanstates. The second is to dojustice to the ideasagainst which the remain-der of this articleis directed.The Dynamics of the Market forForce: Demand, Supply andExternalitiesThe argument that a regulated space forPMCs in the weakest African states couldenhance securityand public control over theuse of force sounds persuasive. However,essential parts of the story are omitted. Ifthese are taken into account, the casebecomes less clearcut and less persuasive.One omission is the difficulties involved in'governingcontracts', hat is, in ensuringthatthe terms of contracts are respected, thatfirms and their employees can be heldaccountable when they are not, and thatcosts remain under control. This has beenpersuasivelyexplored elsewhere (e.g. Singer,2001/02). This articlewill thereforeconcen-trateon another omission, namely that of thedynamicsof the marketfor force. The claimis that the expansionof the market for force

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612 journal of PEACE RESEARCHresulting from the increased reliance onPMCs has effectsthat are arger han the sumof its parts. The expansion of the marketchanges the price and availabilityof militaryservices.It altersthe understandingof threatsand of how they should be met. The creationof a marketfor forcechangesthe rulesof thegame and the starting points of the playersin a way that seems unlikely to enhancepublic security in weakAfricanstates.Expansionary SupplyIn the market for force, supply creates itsown demand. The conventionalexplanationfor this has been racketeering. Suppliersthreaten buyers into payingfortheirservices.However, even for the Sicilian mafiaracketeeringmay not be central. Voluntarymechanismsarefarmore importantand per-vasive than usually allowed for (Gambetta,1993). For PMCs in Africa, racketeering seven less significant.It is not impossiblethatracketeeringoccurs, of course. But even lessrespectable firms are unlikely to get mostcontracts at gun point.Rather, the self-perpetuationof supply isbetter understood in terms of another par-ticularity of the market for force. Thismarket is 'inscrutable':neitherthe seller northe buyer can be certain of the quality andvalue of a serviceoffered (Gambetta, 1994).There is no way of measuringhow import-ant a threatreallyis, nor how important it iscompared to other threats.Threats are, bydefinition, things that mayoccur.It is inher-ently difficult to know which threatswill befollowed by action. Is a sabotage or kid-napping the most imminent threat to theoperations of a firm?Moreover, t is difficultto imagine a common standardfor evaluat-ing which consequences are most serious.How would one comparematerialdamagetoa managing director's ife?Relatedly, t is dif-ficult to assessthe centralityand the qualityof the servicesoffered by any one PMC.The consequence is thatPMCs (likeother

volume 42 / number 5 / september2005actors in the market for force) adjuststrate-gies to market their product. It becomesessentialfor PMCs to shape the understand-ing their clients have of threatsand how theycan best respond to them. First,PMCs haveto convince clients that the threatsthey arespecialized in dealing with are the mostimminent, the most real and the mostimportant threats.This is alsowhat firmsareincreasinglydoing. As privatization ncreasesthe competition for market shares andexpands the market for force,

the key to corporate urvival esides ncreas-ingly in a politicalor evena cultural apacity;the ability o influence uturecustomers ndsuppliers.... The leadingdefence ompany fthe futurewill be primarily manipulatorfopinions, n adiversity f markets,atherhanthe familiarngineeringnterprisef thepast.(Lovering,2000: 167-168, 174)PMCs can no longer content themselveswith being mere technical experts. Theybecome security expertsshaping understand-

ings of and decisions about security. Thecompetition for marketsharespushes PMCsto become lobbyists, security advisers andpublic-opinion-makers (Leander,2005). Inother words, an inbuilt market logic makesPMCs contribute to the 'securitization'2 f avariety of issues. They create a demand forthe services they offer by making clientsawareof the many threats they need protec-tion against.Whether or not PMC represen-tatives do this cunningly, or because theygenuinely believe in the threats they depictand the solutions they suggest, is secondaryto the argument here. The point is thatmarket logic pushes PMCs to establishthemselves not only as providers of securityservices but as security experts definingwhich servicesare needed.Moreover, it is important for PMCs to2 Securitization is the process of turning something intoan existential threat justifying exceptional measures,including the use of force (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde,1998).


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Anna Leander PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIESpersuadepotential clients that their responseto the real and imminent threats is the bestavailable.This makes an image of successandeffectiveness essential. Nothing sells likesuccess. A good reputation and symbols arecrucial (Gambetta, 1991). The extent towhich PMCs in the context of weak Africanstateshave establishedfor themselves such areputation for success is rather impressive.Many acceptPMCs assecurityexperts.Theirpresence s increasingly akenfor grantedandoften favourably compared to the publicalternatives, ometimes by public officials.Ina speech on military operations in Africa,TheresaWhelan (formerUS deputy assistantsecretary of defence for African affairs)praisedPMCs becauseaccording to her theyare efficient, have great local sensibility andcompetence, and are rapid and strategicallyeffective.She found it visibly difficult to addanything positive about public forces(Whelan, 2003).In most other markets, the idea that thesupplier of a service (or product) is also theexpertresponsiblefor evaluatingpresentandfuture needs of the clients would seemslightlyodd. It would seem to be a recipe forsharp increases in these 'needs'. If, inaddition, the supplier was also responsiblefor setting the price of the contract andevaluating the service provided (as is oftenthe case with PMCs; Singer, 2003a:357-360), an exponential growthof demandand costs would seem almost certain. It ishard to see why the market for force shoulddiffer in this respect.The tendencyfor supply in the marketforforce to expand is per se not a sufficientreason to claim that public security isadverselyaffectedby the market for force. Ithas been argued that it would be likely toincrease 'securitization', hat is, the sense ofinsecurity. But this would not necessarilytranslate into more violence (Neumann,1998). However, it would increase milita-rization. Whether or not 'more arms'

increases nsecurityand violence is a peren-nial, unresolvedcontroversy (Krause, 1992:7-8). If it were the case that the expandingsupply of military services was channelledprimarilyto rulerswho used it to centralizeand assertpublic authorityon their own ter-ritories,the market for force might increasepublic security in the long run (thoughpossibly at the cost of very high levels ofviolence in the short run). However, as acloser look at the logic of demand reveals,this is not the case.Demand: Satisfyinga Multiplicity ofClientsEveryone, including those who argue thatPMCs could enhance security,insists on theimportance of controlling the clients ofPMCs. It is agreed that sales to illegitimateclients should be banned. However, themarket or forceis such that drawingthe linebetween legitimate and illegitimateclients isdifficult;and, even if this difficulty could beovercome,it is close to impossible to imaginethatregulationcould settlewhich demand bywhat clients is 'legitimate'. If considered incombination with the expansion of supply,this has far-reaching mplications for publicsecurity in the weakestAfrican states.The basic difficulty is that deciding whois the legitimateauthority (and consequentlya legitimatebuyerof militaryservices) s a (orthe) central stake in most conflicts in weakAfricanstates(Holsti, 1996). Therefore, it isimpossible to fall back on some a prioriblanketstatement (such as that of the OAUConvention) that states arelegitimateclientsand non-stateactorsare not (Kuofor,2000).In the northeast of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, a variety of militias,many of whom claim to represent 'a state',havebeen fighting each other and the popu-lationoverthe last decade (UN, 2001). Whorepresents 'a state' and which states arelegitimately involved in the conflict arecontentious questions. Moreover, the fact

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614 journal of PEACE RESEARCHthat states are so often blatantly illegitimateundermines the possibility for a blanketanswer. The governments in Kigali andKhartoumwere hardlylegitimateclients at atime when they were toleratingand encour-aging the Interahamwe and Janjaweedmilitias, respectively.The difficultyis accentuatedasmanycon-flictsareinitiated and prolongedbythe inter-ests of local and foreign firms. To protecttheir employees from racketeeringand kid-napping and to secure their installations,foreignfirms often end up makingpaymentsthat finance and prolong conflicts.Firmsareeven more likely to make such paymentsin'resource' wars - where the control overnaturalresources(such as coltan, diamonds,timber,gold or coffee) iscentral asthe firmshave an interest in defending and perhapsextending their exploitation rights (Ballen-tine & Sherman, 2003; Le Billon, 2000).Consequently,whetherthe demandsfor pro-tection serviceson behalfof firms (or othersdefending their interests) are legitimate ornot is exceedingly contested. This is articu-lated in the controversies surrounding theUN 'globalcompact' andmoregenerally ur-rounding firms' involvement in conflictzones (Haufler,2004). Forsome, the securitydemands related to firms' interests, NGOprotection and foreign governments'policiesaremerelya new phaseof capitalistexploita-tion, an extension of marketsat the expenseof human rights and local autonomy(Francis, 1999). For others, it is part of thelegitimate process of defending privateproperty rights and the openness of inter-national markets.Even assuming that some process forsettling the legitimacy of various demandsfor PMC services could be agreedupon, itremains hard to imagine an effectivemechanism that would preventprivate firmsfrom also satisfying 'illegitimate' demand.Self-regulation through the market cannotbe counted on. It is simply not the casethat

volume 42 / number 5 / september2005a reputation for working for illegitimateclients is a disadvantage or firms.For many PMCs, it is unimportantwhether or not the marketsanctionsworkingfor illegal contracts. Some firms will makeone operation and then withdraw.This is aviable strategyas the marketsarefluid. Firmsare created,dissolved,branched,merged andmoved from one location to another, andhence can be very difficult to trace. Manyfirms are loose virtual creations, little morethan websites from which networks arecoordinated (O'Brien, 2000b: 61). Thesenetworks are not likely to be affected byregulation. Moreover, regulationmight havean impact on established nternationalfirms.It is unlikely to havemuch effecton the fran-chises, joint ventures and spin-off firmscreated in the wake of their operations. Forexample, employees staying on to establishtheir own operations are unlikely to beaffected by regulatoryefforts (e.g. Neall Ellisand CarlAlberts in SierraLeone; see Musah,2002: 926).But, more profoundly, for firms with along-term market presence, the reputationfor working for illegitimateclients, or at leastbeing willing to do so, may be a competitiveadvantage,a 'trademark',so to speak.Partofthe marketservesthese clients. For example,SakinaSecurity(tied to TransGlobalSecurityInternational), which offered 'Jihad Chal-lenge'packages o radicalgroups n ChechnyaandAfghanistan,andothersimilarfirmswere'discovered'and closed,but only after11 Sep-tember 2001 (Singer,2003a: 270). Presencein the shady/illegal part of the market isfacilitated by the virtual,network-likestruc-tureof many firms. Forexample,many of the80 military contractors arrested in March2004 for theirplansto overthrow he govern-ment in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, wereformerEO employees (BBC, 2004). EO wasofficially closed down in 1998, but itsnetworkseems to be outlivingit well enough.More significantly,though, it is not only


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Anna Leander PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIESin the eyesof shady, private employersclearlyoperatingoutside national and internationallaw that responding to (some) 'illegitimate'demand can count as an advantage. InWesterncountries, a main reasonfor relyingon private contractors is that they make itpossible to evadeproceduresensuringpublicscrutiny (Bigo, 2004). States (includingthose claiming the moral high ground) arenot likely to see the willingness of privatefirms to take on this demand for servicesofdubious legitimacyas a drawback Nor havethey changed their attitude towards firmswho have worked for 'illegal' clients.DynCorp International FZ-LLC, forexample,does not seem to have fallen out offavourwith the US government, despite itsalleged work for and dealings with right-wing paramilitaries n Colombia (Bigwood,2001; Novak, 2003; Singer, 2003a:335-336). The firm continues to win majorpublic contracts, including the contracts toprotectAfghan PresidentKarzaiand to trainthe police in Iraq (Barnett, 2003; Isenberg,2004a).There is little evidence that the marketforforce will (or can be harnessed to) caterexclusively for the demands of a limitednumber of state or state-supported clients.On the contrary,the marketmakes militaryservices available to a larger number ofclients. The main limitation seems to residein the capacity of potential clients to makeinteresting offers. In resource-rich Africanstates, that capacity- including through theselling of futurewar booty (Ross, 2003) - isbound to remain large. Moreover, as thenumberof firms in searchof clients expands,the threshold for clients falls, at least at thelower end of the market. This leads to theworry that 'the return of proxy wars couldbecome a nightmarish reality were well-equipped foreign private forces are allowedto continue propping up opposing partiesintoday's conflicts' (Musah, 2002: 928).

Increasingthe number of actors that can

wield controlover the useof force (by buyingit on the market) weakens the statemonopoly on the use of force. It does so bydefinition. According to the OxfordEnglishReferenceDictionary, a monopoly is 'theexclusivepossession or control of trade in acommodity or service'. The question iswhether it also undermines public security.The answer o thatquestion depends on howforce is used. In weak African states, wherethe legitimacy of existing public orders isweak, there is good reason to think that itwill be used to contest those orders andestablishnew ones (Holsti, 1997). The resultis likely to be moreviolence. Since the exter-nalities of the market contribute to furtherweakeningstate institutions, this conclusionseem even more likely.ExternalitiesWeakeningPublicInstitutionsThose arguing that PMCs could bolsterpublic securityin the weakestAfrican statesdo not probe the effect of PMCs on politicalprocessesandpublic institutions.The reasonthey give is that PMCs can be asked to levelthe groundbut not to be architectsand con-struction workers. 'Military companies canclaim success in achieving immediate strate-gic objectives. But these companies areunable to address he underlyingpolitical orsocial issues that prompted conflict in thefirst place' (Shearer,1998a: 10). Primafaciethis sounds reasonable.At closer inspection,the argument does not stand up well. Themarket for force produces significant 'exter-nalities'for political process.Two of these -the weakening of public armed forces andthe perpetuationof a 'Swiss cheese' securitycoverage- are discussed here because theymake both violence and violent contestationof securityordersmore likely.A first externalityof the market for forceis to weaken public armed forces, making iteasier to contest establishedsecurity orders.The market diverts financial and human

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616 journal of PEACE RESEARCHresources that might otherwise have goneinto constructingpublic securityinstitutionsinto the private market. The constantlygrowing pressure for slimmed budgets andreduced military spending on behalf ofdonors, lenders and investorsmakes relyingon foreign firms rather than home-grownprofessional armies tempting (Luckham,2003). This is not necessarilybecause PMCsare cheaper and less likely to make coupsthan local armed forces. Rather, giving agreaterrole to privatesecurity forces makesit possible to displace the burden of financ-ing security (Duffield, 2001: 170-187;Reno, 1998: 58-72). Companies andpersons who can pay for their own securityhave to do so, directly. They can also beinduced to pay for security provided bypublic forces. Shell and Chevron, forexample, financedthe Nigerian militaryandpolice to secure their facilities in Nigeria(Avant,2004: 154).This said,displacement s easier f securityis privatized. Foreign firms, NGOs andgovernments are often more content withprivate solutions. PMCs from the homecountry are trusted to a better job. Homegovernments will be happy to secure con-tractsfor theirown privatesecurityfirms.Forexample, US government pressure wascentral to the decision that EO would bereplacedby MPRI in Angola after the peaceagreement (Musah, 2002: 914). Similarly,the UK government insists on the import-ance of defending British interests in theindustry (Foreign and CommonwealthOffice, 2002b). Finally, relying on PMCs,foreigners do not risk being accused offinancing the military forces of oppressiveAfrican regimes. In 'the test case of inter-national collaborationto defuse the "curseofresources"' - the Chad-Cameroon Petro-leum Development and Pipeline Project- akey concern was to preventthe governmentof Chad using the projectto finance its ownarmed forces engaged in a civil war (Bray,

volume 42 / number 5 / september20052003: 345; http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj).Controversydid emergeovertheuse of some $4 million by presidentDeby tobuy arms for his troops (http://www.bankwatch.org). It is, therefore, not sur-prising that many firms have preferred tocomplement public security with privateguards, causing considerable confusionabout the status, roles and responsibilitiesofpublic and private security forces in recur-ring human rights violations, as well asthe responsibility of the government andthe main investing firms (Exxon, Petronasand Chevron) (http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/chadcameroonproject.html).The market for force also divertshumanresources from the public armed forces. Itoffersbettersalaries,particularlyorthe morecompetent and professional.The salaries nmanyAfrican armedforces arelow and oftennot paid at all. Hence, it is not surprising odiscover that African soldiers (and not onlywhite SouthAfricans)work as contractors orprivatecompanies where pay is higher.Thisis true both in their home region and in far-off placessuch as Iraq(TheEconomist, 004).Moreover, the market for force drainshuman resources by eroding the status ofpublic forces and accentuating the blurringof boundaries between public and privateforces. African governments play a centralrole in this, as they push their armies tosupport themselves through the market bynot paying salaries. Even more blatant,public officials push the commercializationof armed forces by turning them intomoney-makingventures.Forexample, in theDRC, Zimbabwean army units played acentral part in propping up Kabila'swarefforts, while at the same time defendingMugabe's mineral interests. On the otherside, Ugandan and Rwandan army unitswerewaging a predatorywar for theirleaders(Musah, 2002: 914; based on UN, 2001:32-93 in particular).The militarybecamethoroughly commercialized in the process.


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Anna Leander PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIESAs the UN panel explained, 'Top militarycommanders from various countries, fordifferent reasons, needed and continue toneed this conflict for its lucrativenatureandfor temporarily solving some internalproblemsaswell as allowing access to wealth'(UN, 2001: 217).The outsourcing of training by Westerngovernments (and, most importantly, theUSA) further blurs distinctions. It conveysthe acceptabilityof moving between publicand privateforces. This message is sent outin a context where the fluid boundariesseparatingpublic and private forces, inter-ests, behaviour and status are crucialproblems for the professionalism of thearmed forces. The figure of the SierraLeonian 'sobel' (soldier by day, rebel bynight) epitomizes the concrete problemsposed by the existing lack of distinction(Clapham,2002: 787).Reducing resources for public forces,draining them of their most qualified staffand diminishing their status could hardly beconsidered an ideal route for enhancingpublic security.Even if there is little agree-ment about what the ideal route is, this onewill find few advocates. Weakening publicarmed forceswould rather seem to increasethe likelihood that the public security orderwould be contested, including from withinthe armed forces themselves.A second externality of the market forforce is that it perpetuates a 'Swiss cheese'security coverage - full of holes - undermin-ing the legitimacy of public security ordersand hence increasingthe likelihood that it iscontested byviolent means. It is not becausecertain groups 'opt out' that African statesfail to control the use of force on territory.More frequently, it is because the rulersdecide to 'abandonpeople who could con-tributelittle to a political allianceand wouldmake demands on scarcepolitical resources'(Reno, 1998: 10; Poirier, 1993). There is asharp and widening gap between lAfrique

utile and lAfrique inutile (Bayart, Ellis &Hibou, 1997). The development of a marketfor force cannot be charged with creatingthat gap. However, it does reduce the likeli-hood that the gap will be closed and theholes in the security coveragemended.In a marketfor force,securitywill and canbe coveredfor those who have the means topay for it (or to get others to pay for them).This iswhatis happeningaslocalstrongmen,'warlords',foreign firms, aid organizationsand governments ensure the securitycoverage heyneed. The trouble is that thosewho can pay for security are unevenly dis-tributed in space. Even more troublesomeisthat, when they are present, it is not self-evident at all that their security needs willlead them to cover also the economically andsociallyweakin the area. On the contrary,asillustrated for example by the conflictbetweenKen Saro-Wiwa'sMovement for theSalvation of the Ogoni People and Shell,where the security needs of the firm sharplydivergedfrom those of the people inhabitingthe area(Reno, 1998: 205-208).This skewed distribution of security ishard to correct in weak African states. Onehistorically central route for compellingpublic authorities to take people's securityneeds into account is closed, in part by theexpansionof the marketfor force.Alongsidethe bargain over taxation - 'no taxationwithout representation'- one of the keymechanisms by which European citizensmanaged to persuade their rulers to taketheir interests and security demands intoaccount was via their role in serving themilitary.InTilly'sformulation, the increasedneed to taxand conscript to finance warsledto 'thecentralparadoxof Europeanstate for-mation',namely that 'the pursuit of war andmilitarycapacity... as a sort of by-product,led to a civilianisation of government anddomestic politics' (Tilly, 1990: 206).The development of a marketfor force incontemporaryAfricaallows rulersto buy the

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618 journal of PEACE RESEARCHmilitary manpower they need. The need torecruit/conscript a large part of the popu-lation diminishes correspondingly,and withit the need to make concessions in terms ofsecurity coverage. That need is furtherreduced by the low importanceof taxation.WeakAfricanstatescanrelyon foreignassist-ance and on the sale of naturalresources oan extent unparalleled in early modernEurope. The quest for internal adherenceand legitimacy is therefore replaced by aquest for the external recognition necessaryto get credits and operate in internationalmarkets, including the market for force(Clapham, 1996; Leander, 2004b). TheTillean paradoxhas not appeared n Africa'sweakest states. The point here is that amarket for force makes it seem even moreunlikely that it will.Overall, these externalitiesshow that themarket for force is likely to diminish boththe quality and the extension of the securitycoverage, as well as the legitimacy of thoseproviding it. The lack of professionalismofAfrican armed forces looks bound to befurtheraggravated,and the fluidity betweenpublic and private forces accentuated.The'payfor yourself' approachto securitysanc-tions the patchy approachto securityneedsthat rulers in the weakest African statesalreadyadopt.ConclusionThis articlehas shown that the dynamicsofthe market for force undermines(rather hanhelps) the consolidation of public security nthe weakest African states. Supply in themarket for force is self-perpetuating. Itcreates its own demand. As PMCs becomesecurity experts, lobbyists and consultants,they shape securityunderstandingsof clientswho consequentlyrequire ncreasing evelsofservices. The clients whose demand themarketresponds to include both those con-

volume 42 / number5 /september 2005testing and those defending security orders.The consequence is a strainon alreadyweak(or non-existent) public securityorders.Thestrain is accentuated becausethe market forforce drains resources from public securityestablishments and undermines their legiti-macy, hence making contestationboth fromthe inside and the outside more likely.These effects cannot be captured by thosewho look at the effects of PMCs throughtheir role in single cases. On the contrary,looking at the issue of PMCs through thesingle-caselens leadsobservers o ask techno-managerialquestions. From this perspective,it might be right that PMCs should be seenas if they were 'weapon systems' at thedisposal of policymakers (Shearer, 1998b:90) whose taskis finding the most 'costeffec-tive solution' (Shearer,2001: 30). Moreover,it is probablyalsotruethat, from thisvantagepoint, whether private or public forcesshould be charged with a specific task is a'technicalquestion' (Brauer,1998: 135). Thelogical (and justified) conclusion to draw isalso techno-managerial: if there are diffi-culties with PMCs, it is because our regu-latory framework is not (yet) sufficientlydeveloped.

However, as has just been argued, thisapproachseriouslyunderestimates he stakesinvolved in relying on private firms toenhance public security in weak Africanstates. The dynamics of a market for forcechange the likelihood of crisis, the optionsavailable for dealing with crisis and theunderstanding of their relativeeffectiveness.The effects of the market for force kick inbefore the techno-managerial questionsarise.The central point of this article is thatonly by neglecting these effects is it possibleto reach the paradoxicalconclusion that thedevelopment of private markets for forcewill strengthen public authorityover the useof force in Africa. Hence, even if the case foran expanded, regulated role for PMCs in


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Anna Leander PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIESstabilizing weak African states might seemcompelling at a first glance, this article hasmade clear that the case is far from clearcutand possibly unattractive, if given morecareful consideration.

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ANNA LEANDER, b. 1966, PhD in Socialand Political Sciences (European UniversityInstitute, Florence, 1997); AssistantProfessor,CEU, Budapest (1995-2000); researcher atCOPRI, Copenhagen (2000-04); AssociateProfessor,Department of PoliticalScience andPublic Management, University of SouthernDenmark, Odense (2004-).

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