the meaning of hebel michael j fox.pdf

The Meaning of Hebel for QoheletAuthor(s): Michael V. FoxReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 105, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), pp. 409-427Published by: The Society of Biblical LiteratureStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3260510 .Accessed: 06/08/2012 18:49

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JBL 105/3 (1986) 409-427

THE MEANING OF HEBEL FOR QOHELET MICHAEL V. FOX

University of Madison, Madison, WI 53706

What does Qohelet mean when he calls something hebel? And what does he mean when he calls everything hebel?

No one English word corresponds exactly to the semantic shape of hebel as Qohelet uses it, but it is possible to render the word by an equivalent that comes close to representing its range of meaning and that bears similar connotations. The best translation equivalent for hebel in Qohelet's usage is "absurd, absurdity,"' understood in a sense close to that given the concept in Albert Camus's classic description of the absurd, The Myth of Sisyphus. 2 The essence of the absurd is a disparity between two terms that are supposed to be joined by a link of harmony or causality but are, in fact, disjunct. The absurd is an affront to reason, in the broad sense of the human faculty that looks for order in the world about us. The quality of absurdity does not inhere in a being, act, or event in and of itself (though these may be called "absurd"), but rather in the tension between a certain reality and a framework of expectations. In Camus's words:

The feeling of absurdity does not spring from the mere scrutiny of a fact or an impression, but ... bursts from the comparison between a bare fact and a certain reality, between an action and the world that tran- scends it. The absurd is essentially a divorce. It lies in neither of the elements compared; it is born of their confrontation.3

Although a noun, hebel can be adjectival in function and is sometimes best translated "absurd."

2 The Myth of Sisyphus (trans. by J. O'Brien; New York: Vintage Books, 1955). English "absurd," we may note, is isomorphic with French "absurd," because the contemporary sense of the term in English has been shaped largely by Camus's use.

3 Camus, Myth, 22-23. I am using Camus's discussion of the absurd as a help in formulat-

ing Qohelet's, for the connotations "absurd" has for Camus are highly congruent with the ones that hebel has for Qohelet: alienation, frustration, resentment, a stale taste of repeated and meaningless events, even resentment at the "gods." This is not to say that Camus's ideas can be transferred to the book of Qohelet; above all, the authors differ in the conclusions they draw from the perception of absurdity. Nevertheless, the similarities run deeper than the dis- similarities that must be reckoned with in making heuristic use of contemporary thought to

interpret ancient literature As one scholar of Camus says, "Whatever the special character

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Journal of Biblical Literature

Life is filled with specific absurdities. But, more fundamentally, the absurd is humanity's condition of existence.4

E. Good has argued that hebel means "incongruous," a sense close to "irony" or "ironic,"5 and indeed most of the phenomena that are called hebel do involve incongruities. But incongruities and ironies may be merely puzzling or amusing; the absurd is never that. Some ironies may also satisfy a sense of justice, as when a man is caught in the trap he has set; the absurd never does. Incongruities and ironies may lie within the grasp of human intellect and evoke a variety of reactions. Hebel for Qohelet, like "absurd" for Camus, is not merely incongruous or ironic; it is oppressive, even tragic. The divorce between act and result is the reality upon which human reason founders; it robs human actions of significance and undermines morality. For Qohelet hebel is an injustice, nearly synonymous with rd ', "inequity, injustice." In 6:1-2, for example, Qohelet first refers to a situation as a r 'a, then calls it hebel and holt rd an "evil sickness." Similarly, in 9:1-3, a single situation (all people receiving the same fate) is called both hebel (9:1-2; see n. 31) and a ra' (9:3); see also 2:21 and 4:8.

B. Pennacchini, in an illuminating essay surveying Qohelet's themes, defines hebel by saying that it is used of a series of situations that are ".. absurd, realities incomprehensible because of lack of sense; realities contrary to the contemporaneous logic and not homogeneous with the cultural climate of the moment; realities of situations which constantly show themselves to be a bluff." 6 Pennacchini is right in defining hebel in the context of logic (in a broad sense), but not in softening the severity of

Qohelet's judgments by defining hebel in relation to Qohelet's cultural climate. To be sure, the presuppositions by which reality is judged absurd are largely social in origin, but that is not what Qohelet means by the term. He is not saying that the reality is irrational only in the context of the logic of his contemporaries, as if he were complaining that his society's perspectives were limited while implying that his own perspectives were broader. Nor can I agree with Pennacchini (pp. 506-8) that Qohelet's assertions of absurdity speak merely of limitations on human reason, an interpretation offered also by A. Barucq, who translates hebel by "absurd," "absurdite"- "dans la ligne de certaines philosophies modernes." Barucq says that the Hebrew word "signifie quelque chose d'inconsistante, comme le souffle, le

of Camus's conclusions, the absurd itself remains a contemporary manifestation of a skepti- cism as old at least as the Book of Ecclesiastes" (J. Cruickshank, Albert Camus [London: Oxford University Press, 1959] 44).

4 Camus, Myth, 7. D. Lazere (The Unique Creation of Albert Camus [New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1973] 52-53) distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological absurdity; both are included in Camus's use of "absurd" and Qohelet's use of hebel.

5 Irony in the OT (London: SPCK, 1965; rpt. Sheffield: Almond, 1981) 176-83. 6 "Qohelet ovvero il libro degli assurdi," Euntes Docete 30 (1977) 496.

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Fox: The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet

neant," and he further notes that "il est bien entendu que Dieu en dirige le sens mais l'homme ne perce pas le mystere de cette action. C'est la faillite de la sagesse." 7 As I see it, hebel designates not the mysterious but (and this is a fundamental difference) the manifestly irrational or meaningless. The absurd is incomprehensible, but it is not completely unknowable. To call something hebel is to evaluate its essential nature, just as it is to call it "an evil sickness." Qohelet is not merely calling the world incomprehensible to humanity; see below, p. 413.

Basic to Qohelet's thinking are certain assumptions about the way human action should operate. His primary assumption is that an action and a fitting recompense for that action are thought of as cause and effect; one who creates the cause can justly expect the effect. Qohelet identifies this expectation with the reasonableness he looks for in the working of the universe. At the same time that he cleaves to this expectation, he sees that there is in reality no such reasonableness, that his expectations are constantly frustrated, and he therefore says both that many individual things are hebel and that "all" is hebel.

Qohelet's statement "all is hebel" strongly implies that there is some meaning common to the various occurrences of the term. To define the word, as commentators commonly do, by listing such translation equiva- lents as "vapor," "futile," "empty,' "nothing,' "ridiculous," "incongruous," "transitory," "illusory," "insignificant," "vain," "incomprehensible," and more, is inadequate.8 Most of these renderings seem to fit some contexts; in fact, in some contexts several quite different renderings seem to fit. On the other hand, we cannot say that the meaning of hebel is a bundle of all the qualities denoted by these renderings. Hebel does not include all of these senses in every application. The renderings suggested by the various translations and commentaries are not, it should be stressed, merely different nuances or colorations of one meaning, but distinct qualities: what is fleeting may be precious; what is frustrating may be no illusion; what is futile may endure forever.

Before looking at specific applications of the word hebel, let us consider some of the concepts that have been suggested as the meaning of hebel in Qohelet. Although hebel may still carry some associations of its original sense, "vapor" (see, e.g., Isa 57:13), most of the hebel predications in Qohelet are not live metaphors, because they do not demand a two-level interpretation-a literal interpretation overridden by a new, metaphorical one.9 In

7 Ecclesiaste (Paris: Beauchesne, 1968) 55-56. 8 0. Loretz, for example, concludes that according to hebel's use elsewhere in the Bible,

"ist hebel mit 'Windhauch, Hauch' zu iibersetzen und ein ansprechender Ausdruck zur Be-

zeichnung des Voriibergehenden, Gewichtlos-Leichten, des Wertlosen, Leeren, Macht- und Hilflosen, kurz, ein Wort fir Nichtiges, Hinfalliges" (Qohelet und der alte Orient [Freiburg: Herder, 1964] 223).

9 On metaphor as a move between two levels of interpretation see, inter alia, P. Ricoeur,

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any case, the image of vapor does not provide much guidance in ascertain- ing the meaning of this word in Qohelet, because a vapor can represent many things. Although the ephemerality of vapor is relevant to the way Qohelet applies hebel to things and beings in some verses (e.g., 2:11; 3:19; 11:10), no quality of a vapor can be applied to situations that he calls hebel (e.g., 2:23). It cannot be said that a vapor "is done" or "occurs" (na 'ds, 8:14), nor is "everything" vaporous or ephemeral (1:2; 12:8).

The meanings of hebel elsewhere in the Bible are well recognized.10 It sometimes means "ephemeral," the sense most directly derivable from its literal meaning; for example, Prov 21:6; Job 7:16; Ps 39:6, 12; 144:4. It is commonly used to indicate inefficacy (thus Isa 30:7; 49:4; Job 9:29). Since something that does not fulfill what it implicitly promises to do is deceitful (and, in a limited sense, absurd), hebel can be used as a synonym of kazdb, seqer, 'dwen, and ma'al and mean "deceit," "lie" (e.g., Zech 10:2; Ps 62:10; Job 21:34, etc.). The implication of both inefficacy and deceit makes hebel a fitting epithet for false gods, "who have no efficacy fm6 'il) in them" Jer 16:19); for example: 2 Kgs 17:15; Jer 2:5; 8:19; 14:22; Jonah 2:9. But Qohelet's usage cannot be simply and directly derived from the lexical meanings it has elsewhere.

We may consider a few of the common glosses for hebel in connection with 8:14.

There is a hebel that occurs on the earth: namely, that there are righteous people who receive what the deeds of the wicked deserve and there are wicked people who receive what the deeds of the righteous deserve I say that this too is a hebel.

The situation described is clear, and, more important (as we shall see), the grammar is clear: the hebel-judgments, "there is a hebel" and "this is a hebel," frame a situation (cf. 6:1-2). The description provides no antecedent for "this (zeh)" other than the whole situation. To call this situation "vaporous" gives no information about it; none of the qualities usually associated with vapors seem to apply. It is not "transitory" or "fleeting"-if it were, that would be all to the good. Nor is it a "Nichtiges," a zero, an absence; it is quite substantive, very much a reality. Nor is it "vain," if by that tradi- tional but ambiguous rendering we mean "trivial," for the injustice described is certainly not that. Nor is it "vain" in the sense of futile; it is true that the deeds of the righteous may prove futile, but the passage also describes what happens to the wicked, and that fate cannot be said to show the futility of their actions.i Nor does "incomprehensible" adequately

Interpretation Theory (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976) 46-54. 10 In this essay I am concerned with Qohelet's individual, rather idiosyncratic usage. For

a review of the etymological background and the biblical distribution of the term, see Loretz, Qohelet, 218-25, as well as the commentaries and K. Seybold, "hebhel," TDOT 3. 313-320.

1 "Futile" is properly predicated of an intentional action and refers to its failure to achieve

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denote the quality that troubles Qohelet in observing this situation. Al- though the injustice described in 8:11-14 is indeed incomprehensible, it is not the mysteriousness of the situation that pains Qohelet, but its inequity.12

Incomprehensibility is not the quality for which phenomena are judged hebel. For example, Qohelet's wealth must be passed on to someone who did not work for it (2:21); his wealth and his labor are not therefore "unknowable" or "incomprehensible." Growing wise produces no perma- nent distinction between wise man and fool; this is not incomprehensible- Qohelet knows quite well why it fails to do so. To be sure, a comparison of 8:17 with 1:14 suggests that saying that "man cannot understand (lo' yim- sd')" what happens under the sun is roughly equivalent to saying that all that happens under the sun is hebel. In some ways "incomprehensible" approaches the meaning of "absurd" (the translation I prefer), for the absurd is, by definition, incomprehensible. But there are important differences between the two terms. To call something "absurd" is to claim a certain understanding of its nature: it is contrary to reason. To call it "incomprehensible" is to avoid a judgment of that sort. "Incomprehensible" allows the possibility that a phenomenon is meaningful; "absurd" denies that it has meaning and suggests its bitter implications for human existence. Zophar says that God's acts are incomprehensible; Job says they are absurd.

Since several qualities-ephemerality, ineffectuality, futility, and inequity-evoke the hebel-judgment, why not translate hebel variously as "ephemeral" or "futile" or "ineffectual" or "inequitable," in accordance with context? NJV, alone of the major translations, takes this approach, using eight different words to render hebel. Ordinarily this context-sensitive

approach would be unobjectionable; a word can be used in different ways in one text. Such an approach, however, does not work for this word in this book. The thematic declaration that everything is hebel and the formulaic character of the hebel-judgments imply that for Qohelet there is a single quality that is an attribute of the world and, further, that this quality is an attribute of the particular habdlim that Qohelet identifies by the formula "This too is a hebel." The hebel leitmotiv disintegrates if the word is assigned

its goal. "Absurd" can be applied at a higher level of abstraction. In other words, "toil" may be futile, but the fact that toil is futile is absurd.

12 W. E. Staples, in "The 'Vanity' of Ecclesiastes" (JNES 2 [1943] 95-104), argues that hebel means "unknowable, incomprehensible." He contends that in many of its uses outside Qohelet, hebel has a "distinctly cultic flavor" and originally referred to Canaanite rites. "The word

hebhel, therefore, originally carried some such idea as cult mystery, and so something un-

fathomable, something unknown or unknowable to man. It may even signify something which it would be impossible to discover" (pp. 65-66). Hence, according to Staples, Qohelet, like Zophar and the author of Job, is calling everything under the sun mysterious and unknowable to the finite mind-an attitude common to the rest of the OT. Staples's reasoning is clearly a string of false analogies based on mistaken assumptions. For further discussion, see Seybold, TDOT 3. 315, 317, 318.

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several different meanings. To do Qohelet justice, we must look for a concept appropriate to all, or, failing that, the great majority, of the specific hebel-judgments that are encompassed by the framing declaration of 1:2 and 12:8.

We should distinguish the qualities that evoke the particular hebel- judgments (ephemerality, inequity, inefficacy, futility, nonsensicality) from the meaning of hebel. If we render hebel by terms designating the qualities that evoke the hebel-judgments, not only does the leitmotiv disintegrate but the judgments become banal. Obviously it is inequitable for the wicked to suffer the fate the righteous deserve and for the righteous to suffer the fate the wicked deserve; it is tautological to say that toil that fails to achieve its goal or that benefits no one is futile. It is not, however, a truism to declare that these examples of inequity and futility are absurd, for the predicate then adds new information to the subject. The best evidence that the hebel- judgments are not truisms if hebel means "absurd" is that some of them- particularly those directed against pleasure and labor-are open to dispute.

Hebel is applied to different types of phenomena: beings, life or a part thereof, acts, and events. An act is something done by people, something one might, at least according to the common notion, elect to do (Qohelet is often skeptical about the possibility of free choice). In this category, experiences such as pleasure can be included, since Qohelet speaks of them as types of behavior that people can choose. In contrast, events or situations are circumstances that happen to people. This distinction can be main- tained on a linguistic, if not philosophical, level.'3 The distinction between these two types of application lies in the level of predication. An action itself is called hebel by virtue of the distortion between expectation and outcome; in a situation or event it is the relationship between action and outcome that is called absurd. In other words, "toiling" is an action, while "one man toiling and another enjoying the wealth" is an event. Hebel is most often applied to situations or events in Qohelet.

The best way to consider the proposal to render hebel "absurd" (or "absurdity") is to review the thirty-eight occurrences of the word in

Qohelet. These may be organized in terms of the referent of hebel, whether particular or universal. The most instructive passages, to which we shall

13 More precisely, actions are a subset of events; an event that has an agent is an action. For purposes of simplicity, I will use "event" to refer to occurrences that are not (human) actions, though they may comprehend them. Donald Davidson defines "agency" in accordance with a semantic criterion: "A person is the agent of an event if and only if there is a

description of what he did that makes true a sentence that says he did it intentionally" (Essays in Actions and Events [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980] 46, and see chap. 3, passim). Making agency a semantic category allows us to circumvent the problem of determinism in discussing act and event. Although it may be the case that God makes a man toil (2:26), that toil may be called intentional. To say a man toils implies that he intends to toil-whatever the source of his intention. (A recurring or continuing event is a situation.)

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pay the closest attention, are those which present a hebel-judgment, gam zeh hebel or the like. The attempt to determine the meaning of hebel in Qohelet runs up against a special grammatical problem: it is frequently difficult, sometimes virtually impossible, to identify the antecedents of the pronouns in the hebel-judgments. Thus, in particular cases it is uncertain what exactly is being judged-a thing or action mentioned in the context, or the entire event or situation described. It is, however, generally possible to discuss Qohelet's underlying reasoning even in passages where this ambi- guity cannot be resolved, since an act or thing is judged to be hebel because it is part of an absurd event: the act or thing derives its absurdity from what happens to the actor or to the product of the action.

The following phenomena are judged hebel: 1. Human behavior

(a) toil and its products (b) pleasure (c) wisdom (d) words

2. Living beings and times in their lives 3. Divine behavior-events

(a) divine justice (b) "everything."

Categories (la) and (3b) are the most important, involving together over half the occurrences of hebel. After reviewing the contexts, we will consider some of the implications of the understanding of hebel as "absurd" for the meaning of the book. Many of the verses with this term are difficult, and a different interpretation of these passages might place some occurrences in different categories. This would not, however, fundamentally affect the understanding of the meaning of hebel, nor should it be allowed to do so; for the definition of a word should be derived from passages where the meaning is relatively clear.

(la) Toil and its products

The noun 'dmal means both "toil" and "wealth, property"; the verb 'dmal means both "to toil" and "to earn."14 Although it is often impossible to know which of the senses is intended (particularly ambiguous are 2:10- 11, 20, 22), the distinction is not usually crucial to interpretation, since

Qohelet judges toil to be hebel because of what happens to its product,

14 The use of 'amal to mean "wealth" is clear in 2:18 and 21 (as Rashbam observed), for what the toiler will pass on is not his toil but his wealth. Similarly ma 'sim and 'dsd sometimes mean "acquisitions," "to acquire," or the like. H. L. Ginsberg has correctly pointed out this use of 'ML and 'SH, but he has not established his claim that 'ML "almost

always" means "possession and property" (Koheleth [Hebrew; Tel Aviv: M. Newman, 1961] 13-14).

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wealth. Yet since Qohelet appreciates the value of wealth (he bemoans its loss) while considering "toil" futile and bitter, it would seem that his neg- ative judgments on 'amal are essentially directed against the effort itself.

2:11 But when I turned (to consider) all the labors [ma 'dsay] that my hands had done and the toil ['dmdl] I had laboriously performed, I found that it all was a hebel and a pursuit of wind, and that there is no advantage [yitron] under the sun.

In 2:10, Qohelet says that his labor produced wealth, which enabled him to experience pleasure, and that this pleasure was his portion-one he will later call "good." Further consideration (v 11, pdnitti) did not invalidate this fact, but it did reveal the paradox that the labor itself was hebel. He does not here give the reason for this conclusion. In 2:2 he said that pleasure is "mad," and "does nothing" (see below). Thus he seems to be complaining that the product of his labor was not worth the effort, which makes the effort absurd. This judgment may also be looking ahead to 2:18-26, where he complains that his wealth will pass on to someone else after his death, someone who did not work for it (this complaint may be present in the obscure v 12).15 In any case, in 2:11 toil is judged hebel because of the disparity between the investment of effort and the outcome.

2:18-26 (18) And I came to hate all my wealth ['dmali] that I had gained under the sun, since I shall be leaving it to the man who succeeds me-(19) and who knows whether he will be a wise man or a fool?- and he will control all my wealth, which I gained through wise toil under the sun. This too is a hebel. (20) So I turned to disabuse my heart concerning all the toil I had done under the sun. (21) For there is a man whose wealth is (gained) through wisdom and knowledge and skill, yet to one who did not toil for it he will (end up) giving it as his portion. This too is a hebel and a great evil. (22) For a man gets nothing out of his toil and his heart's pursuit that he performs under the sun, (23) since all his days his activity (produces) pain and agitation, nor does his heart find rest at night. This too is a hebel. (24) There is nothing better for a man than that he eat and drink and give himself pleasure in his wealth. I saw that this16 too is from the hand of God, (25) for who will eat or who will fret17 except as He (deter- mines)? 18 (26) For it is to a man whom He favors that He gives wisdom

'5 Ginsberg vocalizes 'ahdray and hammolek; thus: "For what will the man be like who will succeed me, and who is to rule over what was built up long ago, etc." (Koheleth, 69; thus NJV, footnote ad loc.). The same idea is expressed in similar words in 2:18-19.

16 Namely, taking pleasure in one's wealth. 17 Yahtus means "worry, fret"; see the thorough study of this verb by F Ellermeier ("Das

Verbum ilM in Koh 2,25," ZAW 75 [1963] 197-217). The one who "frets" is the "sinner"; the one who "eats" or "consumes" is the recipient of God's favor (2:26).

18 For mimmenni read mimmenni, following the Peshitta and the LXX. The MT has

Qohelet saying that no one will eat or drink besides him, whereas vv 21 and 26 imply that someone else will indeed do so. V 25 as emended is paralleled by 3:13 and 5:18, which state that whether one will "eat and drink" is dependent on God's will.

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and knowledge and pleasure, while it is to a "sinner" that He gives the task of gathering and amassing in order to give (his wealth) to one whom God favors. This too is a hebel and a pursuit of wind.

One man toils and someone else receives what was earned; Qohelet broods here on this event. He formulates it in various ways and calls it hebel four times, as well as ra 'd rabba, a "severe injustice," and re''ut ruah, a "pursuit of wind." Although this passage elaborates on the hebel-judgment of 2:11, the object of the judgments here is clearly not the wealth itself but the event that renders toil absurd.

In 2:21-22 it is a complex of events that Qohelet is calling hebel, since nothing in this sentence presents itself as the antecedent of "this" besides the situation in its entirety. "This" in v 26 might be thought to refer to God's deed described in that verse, but since elsewhere deeds are absurd by virtue of being futile and God's inexplicable action is not futile (from God's point of view), we may conclude that the judgment in this verse is directed at the entire event described. It is not property that is hebel and a "severe evil"; if it were, Qohelet would not be embittered at seeing his wealth being given to the undeserving. Nor can we single out the action of toiling as the antecedent, ignoring the rest of the complex situation.

What does it matter to Qohelet what happens to his wealth once he is dead? Why does he not take pleasure in the thought that someone will benefit from it? It is not the ephemerality of wealth or its triviality that galls Qohelet here but rather the inequity of its distribution: Qohelet did the work but someone else will gain possession of its product. (The possibility that the recipient may be a fool exacerbates the absurdity but is not the heart of the problem. V 19aa is parenthetical; the possibility of the recipient's being a fool is not mentioned again.) In v 26, Qohelet calls the toiler a hote', a "sinner," and the recipient of the toiler's wealth "the one whom God favors." It might seem that for a "sinner" to toil only for the benefit of "one whom God favors" is an instance of divine justice; but that would not be hebel by any definition. However, as most modern commentators

recognize, "the sinner" and "the one whom God favors" (lit., "the one good before God") are not simply sinner and saint.'9 Still, HT' always implies an offense against someone, not merely a misfortune. The offense usually has moralistic implications (Qoh 7:20; 8:12; 9:2), but not always. In 10:4, the hditd'im that enrage a ruler cannot be presumed to be moral sins; they are

19 E.g., H.-W. Hertzberg (Der Prediger [KAT n.f. 17/4; Gutersloh: Mohn, 1963] 940); K.

Galling (Prediger Salomo [HAT 1/18; Tiibingen: Hinrichs, 1969] 92-93; and Ginsberg (Koheleth, 720). R. Gordis takes h6te' here to mean both "fool," in a nonmoral sense, and "sinner," in the sense of one who violates God's will by failing to "work for the advancement of his own happiness" (Koheleth: The Man and His World [New York: Bloch, 1955] 91, 94, 217-18. But in this very verse we are told that the man involved in a "pursuit" is the "sinner," whereas the man who pleases God gets all good things without working for them.

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simply any actions that offend him.20 In Qoh 2:26 (and 7:26) the h6te' is someone who has, perhaps inexplicably (cf. 9:2), offended God, not necessarily by sin or folly. A sense of failure makes one feel that he has offended, or is offensive to, God.

It is self-evidently absurd to toil in wisdom and industry only to turn over the wealth to a fool. But Qohelet goes further. He says that even if the toiler is offensive to God and the beneficiary is one who enjoys divine favor, the crisscrossing of effort and result is still an absurdity. Qohelet is pained not by the thought of losing his wealth but by the affront to his sense of

justice.

6:1-2 (1) There is an inequity [rd 'a] I have seen under the sun, and it weighs heavily upon man; (2) namely, that God gives a man wealth and property and substance, so that he lacks nothing he may desire for his appetite, yet God does not let him consume any of it, but rather astranger consumes it. This is a hebel and an evil sickness.

In 6:2 hebel is predicated of a situation rather than an action. There is no labor mentioned that might be reckoned futile and ephemeral, and the wealth itself can hardly be isolated as the thing that Qohelet calls ra'a, hebel, and holt rid since for Qohelet wealth is not an "evil sickness" but a possible source of pleasure. Zeh refers to the whole situation described: God

gives wealth, then takes it away (by a misfortune or by death) and gives it to another. This absurdity is divinely ordained.

Hebel-judgments in the context of toil appear in other passages as well. In 4:7-8 Qohelet speaks of the self-depriving toil of a lone man (again Qohelet indicates he has himself in mind, as he slips into the first person), calling it absurd because no one, present or future, receives benefit from the toil (this is the sense of the rhetorical question). It is not the transitoriness of the gain that makes this labor hebel but its failure to provide even fleeting satisfaction. In 4:4, Qohelet says that because skilled work is motivated by self-destructive envy (cf. Prov 14:30), which prevents the toiler from attain-

ing satisfaction, it is inherently absurd. In 5:9, the subject of the hebel-

judgment is the situation of the person who loves wealth being perpetually dissatisfied with what he has. The insatiable yearning for more, implanted by God, is another one of the absurdities that God has built into the universe. Qoh 4:13-16 is unusually obscure and suffers from great unclarity in

20 Note that the ruler too shows inexplicable, erroneous favor toward some people (10:5- 6). Occasionally elsewhere in the Bible, where HT' is applied to offenses against humans, the term lacks moral implications. In 1 Kgs 1:21, Bathsheba says that she and her son will be hatta'im if Adonijah succeeds, meaning that they will be treated as offenders. Similarly, w.hdtd 't 'ammekd in Exod 5:16 means "and the offense is your people's." The people are not

admitting to any moral guilt but are saying that Moses' meddling, offensive to the king, will be reckoned as their own. See also 1 Kgs 8:31 (the man may not have sinned-the case is not

yet adjudicated), and 1 Kgs 18:9.

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the antecedents of pronouns. In the hebel-judgment in 4:16, the antecedent is probably the entire situation described: A poor youth rising by virtue of his wisdom to the heights of power only to pass his rulership on to another- an absurdity much like the one to which wealth is susceptible; cf. 2:21-26 and 6:1-2, discussed above.

(lb) Pleasure

Toil, though absurd, produces wealth, and wealth creates the possibility of pleasure. Pleasure is a "good portion," but it too is an absurdity.

2:1-2 (1) I said in my heart, "Come, I will let you try pleasure [simhi] and experience enjoyment [tob]l" But I found that it too is a hebel. (2) Of amusement I said, "Mad!" and of pleasure, "What does this do?"

Experiencing pleasure (the "it" of v lb), designated by the synonyms t6b and simhd,21 is hebel. Qohelet explains this judgment by saying that amusement (sehoq) is "mad" and that pleasure "does" [or "produces"] nothing (mah zoh 'Osa is a rhetorical question). For Qohelet, an experience may be "good" (as he will several times say simha is). It may, in fact, be the best thing in life; yet if it fails to achieve anything beyond itself, if it fails to produce a gain worth the investment, it is absurd. Others might not share this expectation and so would not see a disparity of the sort that makes pleasure absurd in Qohelet's eyes.

Qoh 6:9 makes a similar statement: the immediate experience of pleasure (even without satisfaction) is better than mere yearning, but is nevertheless absurd. Qohelet does not give a reason for this judgment.

21 Simhd means "pleasure" rather than "happiness" in Qohelet. One may experience simhd but lack happiness, as Qohelet himself does. Simha in Qohelet includes the pleasures described in 2:1-10, as well as eating and drinking and enjoying life with a woman. The simhd called hebel in 2:1-10 does not differ from the simhd praised elsewhere in the book. Qohelet uses the same terms in describing pleasure throughout: simhd, t6b, rd'oh betob, heleq be'amal. The pleasures described in 2:4-9 are neither trifling nor improper. They are all

permissible to a wise king who gained his wealth through wisdom. The activities described in 2:4-10, far from being folly, are an example of wisdom-more precisely, of what wisdom

produces. Wisdom can produce wealth (1:16; 2:9), and wealth can give pleasure, but pleasure too is absurd.

T6b(d) has several senses in Qohelet, one of which is "pleasure"; see most clearly 2:1; 3:13; 6:3, 6.

Sehoq, "amusement, merriment" ("laughter" does not fit in either of the occurrences in

Qohelet) is a near synonym of simhd and does not denote trivial or frivolous amusements

(though it sometimes may refer to such). In 10:19 it refers to feasts, with nothing to distinguish them from the "eating" and "drinking" that Qohelet recommends. The sehoq of the fool may be trivial (7:6), but that is because it is the fool's. SAehq (even in the sense of "laughter") does not necessarily imply triviality; see, for example, Ps 126:2; Job 8:21.

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(lc) Wisdom and growing wise

2:15 And I said in my heart, "What happens to the fool will happen to me, so to what purpose (lamma), then, have I become wiser (than him)?22 And I said in my heart, "This too is a hebel."

The antecedent of this hebel-judgment may be the situation as a whole: the fool and the wise man (namely, Qohelet) share the same fate. It seems simpler, however, to read "this" as referring to "my growing wise," an action implicit in the immediately preceding phrase. Whatever the antecedent, the reason for the hebel-judgment is the same: both wisdom and folly end in nothingness.

Although growing wise is possible and although wisdom has great advantages (2:13-14a; 7:11-12, 19, etc.), the effort to gain wisdom is absurd, for folly has the same final outcome (2:14b-15). This is no condemnation of wisdom. Qohelet's point is that it is unjust for such different causes (ways of life) to have the same outcome (death).23

In 7:6 it is unclear whether hebel refers to the merry noise of fools-in which case the observation is trite-or to the rebuke of the wise, judged absurd because their wisdom is vulnerable to lust for gain (v 7).

(ld) Words

6:11 For a plethora of words just increases hebel; there is no advantage for man.

The context concerns disputes with "one who is stronger than you" (v 10), apparently referring to God (cf. 5:2). In such a dispute, words are ineffi- cacious. These words may be true statements, but they are "weary," as

Qohelet puts it in 1:8, unable to accomplish the expectations made of them, and are thus absurd. Qoh 5:6, where the plural is used, is obscure, but since the verse warns against excessive words (again in the context of speaking to God; cf. v 1), habaltm probably bears a sense close to that of hebel in 6:11.

(2) Living beings and times in their lives

3:19 For what happens to man and what happens to the beast is one and the same event: as the one dies, so dies the other, and both have the same

22 I understand y6ter as elliptical for yoter mimmennu. 23 R. E. Murphy has pointed out that 2:15-16 is not a rejection of wisdom so much as a

complaint about the failure of wisdom to deliver. The complaint implies a positive evaluation of wisdom. See Murphy, "Qohelet's 'quarrel' with the Fathers," in From Faith to Faith: Essays in honor of Donald G. Miller (ed. D. Y. Hadidian; Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1979) 235-45.

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life-breath, and man has no advantage [motar] over the beast, for both [hakkol] are hebel.

Hebel is predicated of hakkol, which seems to mean "both" (as it clearly does three times in v 20), referring to humanity and beasts. In this case, "ephemeral," rather than "absurd," may be the closest equivalent to hebel here. Even if that is so, Qohelet is thinking primarily of humanity, so the overtones of absurdity are carried over to this usage too. For Qohelet, ephemerality generally entails absurdity. Not all absurdities are ephemeral, but emphemerality, in the case of humans and their achievements, involves absurdity, because their ephemerality obliterates distinctions that are essential if human effort is to be rationally rewarded.

If hakkol in 3:19 means "everything," as in 1:2 and 12:8, Qohelet is saying that the human has no advantage over the beast because both live in a world in which everything is absurd, and all distinctions are therefore inevitably obliterated. In 9:1-2 (as emended; see n. 30) the leveling of differences by death is called hebel in the sense of absurdity, and a similar train of thought may be at work here.

11:10 And remove agitation from your heart, and banish unpleasantness from your flesh, for youth and life's prime are hebel.

In 11:10 hebel refers to a part of a human lifetime. Qohelet is urging the reader to seize without delay the opportunity to enjoy life, for that opportunity is fleeting. In 12:1 it is evident that the brevity of the time of youth is at issue here. But the connotations of absurdity elsewhere borne by the term hebel are not absent from this verse. Though youth is precious, it (like wisdom) is rendered absurd by its brevity.

In 6:12, 7:15, and 9:9, hebel refers to human life in general, and it is impossible to determine just what Qohelet has in mind; "ephemeral" or "absurd" (or a number of other adjectives) could apply equally well. The preponderance of the sense "absurd" throughout the book makes it likely that absurdity, rather than, say, brevity, is the quality Qohelet has in mind when speaking of his, or your, "life of hebel."

The problematic character of the occurrences in 3:19 and 11:10 remains. It may be that all five of the occurrences under this rubric resist the understanding of hebel I have proposed. I would, however, maintain that even if hebel does not denote absurdity here, the connotation of absurdity, established in the great majority of occurrences, carries over even to cases where the primary denotation of the term is "ephemeral."

(3a) Divine justice

Some of the passages discussed in other categories (especially 2:15, 26; 6:1-2; and 9:1-2) could go here as well, for they imply inequities in divine

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rule. One passage, however, has divine justice as the focal point, no human action being concomitantly judged absurd. Unlike the uses in the next category, this verse speaks of a particular divine action rather than of the entire scope of God's activity in this world.

8:14 There is a hebel that occurs on the earth; namely, that there are righteous people who receive what the deeds of the wicked deserve and there are wicked people who receive what the deeds of the righteous deserve. I say that this too is a hebel.

In 8:11-13 Qohelet describes a single absurdity in different ways: a sinner may live a long life. In v 14 Qohelet generalizes: some people receive a fate the opposite of what they deserve. Not only do wicked and righteous both die (in itself an absurdity), but the righteous sometimes die younger than the wicked.24 This radical disjunction between moral deserts and fate

epitomizes absurdity. "This too is a hebel" in 8:10b probably introduces 8:11-14 and refers to

the same inequity as that described therein.25 If, however, the phrase concludes the preceding observation (8:10b), the antecedent of "this" is a very similar inequity: the wicked receive a fine burial while the corpses of the

righteous are neglected.

(3b) "Everything"

1:2(=12:8) Hdbel hibaltm, 'dmar qohelet, habel habiiltm, hakkol hdbel. Utterly absurd, said Qohelet, utterly absurd; everything is absurd.

Hebel in these verses must be used in the sense predominant in the

book, for these verses summarize Qohelet's thought and encapsulate his

hebel-judgments.26 Qohelet is calling everything absurd. But hakkol,

24 Context suggests that the fates referred to in v 14 are early death and long life, the types of recompense most often mentioned in Proverbs.

25 Thus Ginsberg, Koheleth, 109. If "this too is hebel" is taken with the preceding, in accordance with the Masoretic division, 'ser in v 11 has no discernible function. V 11 does not motivate v 10, and 'dJer never motivates a following statement. If the phrase is taken with the following unit, the absurdity described in v 11 begins with a nominalizing 'aser, just like the one described in v 14a (which is a reformulation of the case described in v 11). To be sure, the phrase gam zeh hebel does not introduce a description of a hebel elsewhere, but in 8:14 Qohelet does label a phenomenon hebel prior to describing it. Furthermore, the introductory phrase in 5:15, wegam zoh ra 'a hold, which evaluates the inequity about to be described, is structurally the same as gam zeh habel in 8:10b, except for the lack of a waw, which should perhaps be read in 8:10b as well (haplography; thus Ginsberg).

26 Some commentators consider these verses later editorial additions. Thus F. Ellermeier regards 1:2 as "eine abstrahierende und im allerhochsten Grade missverstiindliche Sum- mierung Qoheletscher Aussagen" (Qohelet 1.1 [Herzberg: Erwin Jungfer, 1967] 100). Galling says that these verses are redactorial additions that summarize and generalize, in contrast to Qohelet's consistently concrete observations (Prediger, 84). I consider them the author's

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"everything," itself requires further specification. In 1:2 it does not refer only to living beings or to worldly goods (understandings implicit in tradi- tional interpretations), for Qohelet is disturbed not by the brevity of life so much as by what happens within it. Likewise the triviality of worldly goods is not his complaint (on the contrary, he takes them quite seriously). On the other hand, Qohelet does not speak of the entirety of reality, but only of what happens in the realm of human existence, "under the sun." (Natural phenomena are described in 1:4-8 only because they are perceived as illus- trating in large the futility of human efforts.)

By frequent repetition of the phrase "under the sun" Qohelet delineates the range of the validity of his statements. He leaves aside as irrelevant other realms of existence that may not be characterized by the qualities he sees in human life. He is concerned only with what happens "under the sun," for of this alone one can have knowledge. Hakkol in 1:2 and 12:8 is therefore synonymous with kol 'dser na'dsd tahat hassames (and variants), "all that happens under the sun" in 1:9, 13, 14; 2:17; 8:17; 9:3, 6. In 1:14 and 2:17 the hebel-judgment is pronounced on "all the events that happen under the sun."27 Thus, 1:14 and 2:17 say essentially the same thing as 1:2 and 12:8. In 11:8, kol sebba' means "all that comes to pass, all that occurs."28 Hebel does not there refer to "the days of darkness," because none of hebel's meanings could apply to the nothingness of death (hebel never means literally "nothing"). Likewise in 9:1-2 (as emended, see below, n. 31), hebel is predicated of a phrase (hakk5l lipnehem) similar in its generality to hakkol in 1:2 and 12:8. The statement in Qoh 1:2/12:8 is thus not an erroneous editorial abstraction, nor is it alone in the range of its applicability.

The scope of hakkol can be restricted further. "Everything" is not truly universal, even within the range of the events of human life. It is not absurd that wisdom proves more beneficial than an inheritance (7:11). It is not absurd that one's property may be damaged if he fails to pay his vows (5:5). It is not absurd (or "futile," or "vain," or "nothing") that wisdom saved a city (9:13-15; only the subsequent treatment of the wise man was absurd).

summation of Qohelet's thought; they are therefore to be understood as authoritative (M. V. Fox, "Frame-narrative and composition in the Book of Qohelet," HUCA 48 [1977] 83-106). In any case, the declaration accurately encapsulates, summarizes, and generalizes what Qohelet says. He certainly implies hakkol hebel by "investigating" or "going around" the world, as he puts it (1:13-14), and pronouncing one thing after another hebel. See further my remarks on 1:14 and 9:1-2, below.

27 Ginsberg observes that na 'Sda often means "occur" (Koheleth, 15-16). The word has this meaning most clearly in 8:17 and 9:3. Likewise, "occurrence" or "event" is usually the best rendering of ma'adeh, while ma 'deh ha'elohim means "what God has brought to pass." Ma'dsm means "events" in 1:14, for Qohelet will examine what happens to humans, as well as what is done by them. In 2:17, too, ma 'aseh means "events": Qohelet came to hate life not because of the deeds that are done in it but because of what happens to everybody, a circumstance described in 2:15-16.

28 Thus E. Podechard, L'Ecclesiaste (Paris: Lecoffre, 1912) 451.

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It is not absurd that "God will judge the righteous and the wicked" (3:17; the absurdity lies in the delay in the execution of the sentence). Hakkol refers to the events in their totality, to life's occurrences taken as a whole. A bad day is made so by a few things-sometimes even one-going wrong, though the most of what happens that day may be satisfactory. Similarly, within the totality of events under the sun many things are not absurd- some important values stand; some fundamental rules are valid-but the absurdities spoil everything.

The statement "all (that happens in life) is absurd," unlike the statements formed by the other renderings of hebel, comprehends most of what Qohelet describes, even when he does not use the formulaic hebel-judgment. In other words, Qohelet describes many situations, such as the fool's being appointed to high places (10:5-7-a rd ') or the wise man's being forgotten by the city he saved (9:13-14), which, though not called hebel, are indeed absurd. Understanding hebel in the sense of "absurd" thus brings out the book's unity in a way that a less generally applicable translation, such as "vain," "insignificant," or "fleeting," does not.

Hakkol hebel, understood as speaking of the events of human life, comprehends likewise the hebel-judgments describing actions (toiling, speaking, getting wisdom) and experiences (pleasure), for these prove absurd in the context of absurd events.

Two further passages apply hebel to "everything."

9:1-3 (1) I considered all this carefully, <and my heart saw> 29 all this: as for the righteous and the wise, their deeds are in the hand of God. Man does not know even whether he is loved or hated. Everything they see30 is < hebel>,31 (2) inasmuch as all have the same fate-the righteous and the wicked, the good and <the bad>,32 the pure and the impure, and the one who gives sacrifice and the one who does not give sacrifice; the good person just as the sinner, the one who swears oaths just as the one who fears (to swear) oaths. (3) This is an evil in all that happens under the sun: all have the same fate. Moreover, the heart of human beings is full of evil, and madness is in their hearts while they live. And after- wards- they join the deadl

Qoh 9:1 continues and reformulates the idea of 8:16-17, according to which no one, however wise and diligent, can comprehend what God does (or "brings to pass," ma'aseh ha'elohtm), that is to say, the events that occur under the sun (hamma'dseh 'dser na'dsa tahat hassemes) (8:17). The

29 Reading welibbi ra 'd with the LXX. 30 Hakkol lipnehem (lit., "all [that is] before them") means "all that they see"; cf. the use

of lipne in tob lipne ha 'elohim in 2:26, meaning "the one who is good in God's sight." 31 Divide the verses before ka'dger and read hbl (reflected in the LXX) for MT hkl, joining

this to v 1. MT's "everything is before them. All as to all" is meaningless. 32 Thus LXX (some MSS) and Peshitta; the antonym is necessary in the paired series.

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mas'cseh 'elohim with respect to an individual is God's "love" or "hate" of that individual. ("Love" and "hate" in 9:1 are not human emotions in the abstract; the fact that human psychology is incomprehensible is not relevant to the context.) In other words, no one can fathom the ways of God's favor.

"All that they see is hebel" takes up the notion that "man knows neither love nor hatred" but also goes beyond it. God's will is not merely mysterious and inscrutable; it is manifestly a violation of reason (9:lba, 2). In v 3a Qohelet calls the universal situation-all people having the same fate-a ra'd, an evil or inequity.33

Because God imposes the same fate on all people, regardless of their individual behavior, we cannot know what motivates God's love and hatred. Even when a person does receive an appropriate fate during his lifetime, death sets the seal on life's absurdity.

In 6:4 hebel is a epithet of life-not the individual lifetime (for which see above, category 2), but the whole of life. (In this verse hebel is not predicated of the events of life, but serves as a trope for them.) Hebel does not mean "ephemerality" here, because the brevity of life would not be a reason for the claim that one who experienced life was worse off than the stillbirth, whose existence was, after all, less than brief. Hebel is rather a quality worse than nothingness, worse, in fact, than pointlessness, for the existence of the man who loses his wealth is no more pointless than the stillbirth's. But his existence is more absurd, since only in the case of a living person are there expectations that may be frustrated.

"Everything is Absurd". Assumptions and Implications

Qohelet's application of the word hebel is rooted in the meanings it

commonly has elsewhere (see p. 412). "Absurd" would be an appropriate translation of hebel in many of the word's occurrences outside Qohelet too, because ephemerality, inefficacy, and deceitfulness are indeed absurd if

permanence, efficaciousness, and reliability are expected of the phenomena that have these failings. Nevertheless, the use of hebel in Qohelet is distinc- tive, as is shown, first of all, by the fact that elsewhere hebel is not predicated of an action or event. Furthermore, it is not used elsewhere to imply a violation of the rationality of the world, but only of the rationality of some people in it. Qohelet is extending the meaning of this word because he is probing not so much the reasonableness of human actions as the reasonableness of the system in which they occur.

An action may be called absurd in condemnation either of its per- formance or of its outcome. When the intention is to condemn the perform- ance, the performer is implicitly condemned; he could have avoided

33 Very likely "the worst evil," reading hara' (A. Ehrlich, Randglossen zur Hebrdischen Bibel [Hildesheim: Olms, 1914] 7. 92).

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absurdity simply by desisting from the action. This is the way in which one might call idolatry or drunkenness absurd. When, however, we believe that an action is in principle morally good, or at least neutral, and yet find that it does not yield what we consider proper results, then it is not essentially the action that is absurd but rather thefact that there is a disparity between rational expectations and the actual consequences. This is the way in which Qohelet calls laboring for wealth and growing wise absurd. The fact that labor and wisdom are absurd renders the human condition absurd whether one chooses a life of laziness and folly or of industry and wisdom. Only in 6:11 (and perhaps in 7:6; cf. 10:14) is a hebel-judgment made upon an action that can be avoided, namely, excessive talk.

Qohelet's evaluation of human effort as absurd is thus not (contrary to a common understanding of the purpose of the book) meant as advice to take it easy, to enjoy life's gifts as they come. Taking it easy is not really something one can choose. Qohelet feels that some people-he has himself in mind-are driven by insatiable ambition into an incessant striving for more and more, whether of wisdom or wealth (6:7). Qohelet knows he is laboring for no one's benefit (4:8), yet he finds himself unable to stop. In fact, this constant, fruitless striving is forced on the "sinner" by God himself (2:26), so there is little hope of escape. Likewise, whether you are one who will be allowed to experience pleasure-that best of experiences-is dependent on God's will (2:26; 3:13; 6:2; etc.).

Qohelet speaks of futile activities not to warn against those activities so much as to muster the fact of that futility as evidence for his contention that life is absurd. The book of Qohelet, taken as a whole, is not primarily lamenting the brevity of life or exposing the vanity of worldly wealth and pleasures. Qohelet is not at root saying that everything is insubstantial, or transitory, or nothingness, or trivial. He does indeed observe these qualities in many beings and actions, but he mentions them mainly to reinforce and exemplify his main complaint-the irrationality of life as a whole, which is to say, of divine behavior.

Underlying Qohelet's hebel-judgments is an assumption that the system should be rational, which, for Qohelet, means that actions should invariably produce appropriate consequences. In fact, Qohelet stubbornly expects them to do so.34 Qohelet believes in the rule of divine justice. That is why he does not merely resign himself to the violations of equity he observes. He is shocked by them: they clash with his belief that the world must work equitably. These violations are offensive to reason. They are absurd. And

34 See 3:17; 5:5; 7:17; 8:12b-13. The various passages in which Qohelet affirms his belief in divine judgment should not be excised as glosses or written off as quotations expressing someone elses opinion. These statements are too well integrated with statements that are un-

doubtedly Qohelet's to be so easily dismissed.

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the individual absurdities are not mere anomalies. Their absurdity infects the entire system, making "everything" absurd. As Qohelet sees it, without the certainty of the deed-consequence principle in its most rigorous form, life-even when pleasant-is fundamentally perverse.

"Everything is absurd" itself implies a complaint against God, one put more explicitly in 7:13, re'eh 'et-ma 'seh hd 'elohim ki mi yukal letaqqen 'et 'dser 'iwwto6, "Observe that no one can right what God has brought to pass, namely, what he has distorted" (ma 'dseh hd 'elohim is equivalent to hakkol of 1:2, and hebel is nearly synonymous with 'et 'dser 'iwweto). The fundamental distortion-for which God is responsible-is the severance of deed from consequence, which severance strips human deeds of their significance.

Wisdom literature insisted that God's behavior is rational and that this rationality is perceptible in the bond between deed and consequence. For Qohelet the reliability of the causal nexus fails, leaving only fragmented sequences of events which, though divinely determined, must be judged random from the human perspective. Awareness of the absurdity of life fills the human heart with "evil and madness" (9:3). The vision of the absurd is, quite literally, de-moralizing. The belief in a reliable causal order fails, and with it human reason and self-confidence. But this failure is what God intends, for after it comes fear. And fear is the only emotion that Qohelet explicitly says God wants to arouse (3:14).

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the meaning of hebel michael j fox.pdf

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