the middle kingdom's lighter touch: chinese soft power in africa

Constantine J Petallides Govt-‐498: Contemporary Chinese Military Thought

The Middle Kingdom’s Lighter Touch: Chinese Soft-‐Power in Africa

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction…………………………………..……………………..……………………..…………………….3

II. An Offer they Can’t Refuse: The History of Chinese Aid in Africa……..……..…………...5

III. A History of Sino-‐African Military Development…....…………………..……………………...9

IV. Implications of Chinese Influence.……………………..…………………….……………………..15

Attachés, Arms, and Aid….Oh My!……………..…………………….………………………...15

Influence in Action……………..…………………….……………………………………………...19

V. Conclusion – Implications for the US…………….….…………………………………………...…22

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………25

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I. Introduction

Today, China finds itself in a uniquely difficult, yet opportune position. As a

rising economic and military power at a time when the status quo is slowly shifting

in their favor, China can offer a great deal of aid and assistance, both economic and

military, to developing countries; thus buying favor and extending Chinese influence

far beyond the confines of Asia. On the other hand, traditional powers like the

United States and European Union along with regional actors like India view each

Chinese move with suspicion and have been working to combat Chinese influence

and compete with their own aid packages.

Nowhere is this tension more apparent than on the African continent. China

has a long history of involvement with Africa, and Chinese investment on the

continent has been steadily growing over the last decades. Modern political and

economic relations commenced in the era of Mao Zedong. Sino-‐African relations are

embedded in the long history of interchange. The founding of the People's Republic

of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-‐

Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political

ties and frequent exchange of high-‐level visits and contacts.1 Starting in the

beginning of the 21st century, the People's Republic of China built increasingly

stronger economic ties with African nations; and as of August 2007, there are more

than 750,000 Chinese nationals working in different African countries.2 Trade

1 China's African Policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. January 2006 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm> 2 French, Howard W.; Polgreen, Lydia (2007-‐08-‐18). "Entrepreneurs From China Flourish in Africa". The New York Times.

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between China and Africa increased 700% during the 1990s.3 China is currently

Africa's largest trading partner before the EU and the United States.4 This continued

growth of development aid to Africa has been coupled with an increased Chinese

military presence. While China has no bases in Africa, there has been a marked

increase in Chinese arms sales, training exercises, military attachés, and

peacekeeping forces in Africa.

This paper will explore the history that led to these developments and how

aid and military involvement have affected China’s relationship with Africa. These

developments allow China to increase its economic ties to resource-‐rich African

nations, pressure African nations to support the “One China Policy”, and bolster its

own economy through trade deals and arms sales.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/18/world/africa/18malawi.html?_r=1&em&ex=1187582400&en=7b8806ea0f69e210&ei=5087%0A> 3 Servant, Jean-‐Christophe “China’s trade safari in Africa” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2005 <http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica> 4 "China boosts African economies, offering a 'second opportunity’". Christian Science Monitor. <http://www.csmonitor.com/centennial/timeline/2008/07/china-‐boosts-‐african-‐economies-‐offering-‐a-‐second-‐opportunity>

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II. An Offer they Can’t Refuse: The History of Chinese Aid in Africa

China has had a growing hand in African affairs since the Communist Party

threw its support behind the anti-‐colonialist liberation movements that swept

across the continent throughout the 20th Century. While China is not a new player in

Africa, its economic and political presence on the continent and its impact on Africa

have grown exponentially in the last few years.5 Li Xiaoyun at the College of

Humanities and Development in Beijing categorizes Chinese aid policy in Africa can

into three phases.

Phase I (1950-‐1974) was the phase of political aid and ideology exportation.6

During this period, aid as a portion of GNP steadily rose, and large projects were

undertaken. The total amount of foreign aid increased to 337 million RMB in 1959

from the average annual amount of 76 million RMB during the period of 1950 to

1952, which covered 0.23 % the GNP at that time and 0.62% of financial

expenditures. In 1973, the total amount of China’s foreign aid rose up to 5.584

billion RMB, which shared 2.05% of the GNP at that time and 6.9% of the financial

expenditure.7 Examples of such projects include China’s support of the Egyptian

government in 1956 during the Suez Canal crises; China’s 1961 agricultural

initiatives in Mali; and the 1965 plan to build a Tanzania-‐Zimbabwe railroad.8

5 Wild, Leni The New Sinosphere: China in Africa Institute for Public Policy Research 11/1/2006 Pg. 1 <http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2012/03/The%20New%20Sinosphere%20-‐%20China%20in%20Africa_1539.pdf> 6 Li Xiaoyun “China’s Foreign Aid and Aid to Africa: Overview” College of Humanities and Development, China Agricultural University. 2004 7 Ibid 8 Ibid

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Phase II (1974-‐1990) was the adjustment and transformation phase.9 Both

the total amount of the foreign aid and its proportion to GNP and the financial

expenditure were all presenting a descending curve.10 These figures decreased from

the total amount of 4.771 billion RMB, covering 1.71% of the GNP and 6.0% of the

financial expenditure in 1974 down to 1.562 billion RMB of the total amount in

foreign aid, covering 0.08% of GNP and 0.51% of the financial expenditure in

1990.11 This decrease was due to a shift in Chinese domestic priorities. After the

opening reforms in 1978, China made adjustment in its diplomatic policies, and

emphasized that external relations should serve domestic modernization projects.12

Finally they entered Phase III (1991-‐Present Day), which is the phase of

financial aid and technical assistance with integrated-‐objectives.13 China’s foreign

aid entered a new period, which emphasized reciprocity and mutual goals;

economic benefits; the integration of the political interest and the obligations of a

“big country”.14 Since the 1990s, China has been shopping around for recipient

countries that can best support Chinese interests. This can come in the form of trade

deals, new markets for Chinese goods, energy resources and raw materials, and

even political support. With all this in mind, China has chosen Africa as the main

recipient area of its foreign aid. Over the past 50 years, China’s foreign aid to Africa

has amounted to 44.4 billion RMB covering 30% of the total amount of 120.773

9 Ibid 10 Ibid 11 Ibid 12 Ibid 13 Ibid 14 Ibid

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billion RMB.15 This foreign aid to Africa has sponsored about 900 infrastructure and

social development projects.16

The figure below represents China’s aid expenditures in Africa:

Source: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/7/40378067.pdf

The pink dataset represents African aid as a percentage of total expenditures; the

blue dataset represents African aid as a percentage of GNP; and the yellow dataset

represents total aid expenditures. What is most striking about this graph is that

while aid expenditures are going up, aid to Africa is a less significant percentage of

the total than in years past. While this does not mean that the Chinese are spending

15 Ibid 16 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print.

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less on Africa, it does mean that they are spending smarter. Clearly, with China

reaching its goal of $100 billion in trade by 2010, Africa is still a priority for China.

Rather than the large blanket amounts that categorized Phases I and II, China has

focused on delivering aid in a way that furthers its interests. The implications of this

shift will be explored in a later section.

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III. A History of Sino-African Military Development

China’s military relations with Africa stretch back to 1950s when China gave

its support to for revolutionary and independence movements.17 The roots of this

relationship can be found in the 1955 Asian-‐African Conference held in Bandung

Indonesia. With 29 countries participating representing 1.5 billion people, the

Bandung Conference was a major turning point for Sino-‐African relations.18 On the

agenda was the promotion of Afro-‐Asian economic interests, cultural cooperation,

and the opposition of any Cold War colonialism on the parts of the US or USSR.19

What the participating nations had in common was their shared history and

perception of white dominance by the West.20

The conference served to cement China’s interest in the region’s economics

and geopolitics. Shortly after its conclusion, China began gradually increasing its

military involvement on the African continent. On top of any aid being distributed to

the region, China began directly involving itself in African conflicts. From 1957 until

Algerian independence, China supplied the Algeria’s National Liberation Front, FLN,

with military weapons and training in the first fights against French colonial

17 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace” Journal of Political Studies Vol. 18 Issue 1 pg 16 18 Larkin, B. (1971). China in Africa 1946-1970: The Foreign Policy of the Peoples Republic of China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 19 Ibid 20 Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C., & Pushak, N. (2009). Building Bridges: China’s Growing Roles As Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: World Bank.

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power.21 China offered to send 280,000 volunteers to Egypt during the Suez crisis

on top of the generous sums of money it was already sending.22

Because of its tense relationship with the Cold War powers, China saw

disruption and promotion of unrest in Africa as central to China’s policy of

frustrating the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union.23 Such examples

include Chinese military instructors making Ghana a base for training guerrilla

fighters in 1964;24 Rhodesian freedom fighters receiving training in China;25 China

supplying the Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO, with free weapons and

education in the tactics of guerrilla warfare;26 and countless other incidents. By the

early 1970s, China had deployed 112 military instructors to Zaire, to train the

FNLA.27 It was notable that China ignored its rhetoric on noninterference, and got

directly militarily involved in Africa.

China’s recent military involvement in Africa takes essentially the forms of

selling Chinese arms, construction of small arms factories in a number of African

states, participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and defense of Chinese oil

investments and Chinese personnel who often come under heavy attacks in Africa’s

21 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge. 22 Ibid 23 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 17 24 Chuka, E. (2010). China and Africa’s Bilateral Economic Relation. in the 21st Century” Journal of International Politics and Development. 25 Ibid 26 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge. 27 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 17

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conflict zones.28 From direct involvement in African affairs, China has become a

major small arms and light weapons dealer to any and all groups in the market. It

has been noted, “military cooperation and growth of arms sales are major aspects of

relations with African governments, especially those under threat of civil war,

insurgency or even domestic opposition but which are barred from obtaining

weapons from traditional western sources.”29 This policy has led China to engage in

military aid with certain less-‐than-‐democratic regimes including those of Uganda,

Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.30

In 2003, China’s arms sales to Africa stood at $1.3 billion,31 and from 2000 to

2003 China delivered about 13% of all arms to sub-‐Saharan Africa, the second

largest provider after Russia.32 From 2004 to 2007, China’s percentage increased to

almost 18%, featuring the delivery of artillery pieces, armored cars, minor surface

combatants, supersonic combat aircraft, and other air assets.33 The classic

contemporary example of China’s weapon-‐exporting policy in Africa is China’s

involvement in the Sudan War; when Beijing pursued a policy that was entirely

based on economic interest, and supplied the Sudanese government with fighter

aircraft and an assortment of weaponry.34 The Chinese have set up three small arms

28 Ibid 18 29 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print. 30 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 19 31 Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print. 32 Ibid 33 Grimmett, R. (2008). Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-‐2007. CRS Report (October 23, 2008), pp.50-‐61. 34 Taylor, I. (2006). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. London: Routledge.

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factories in Sudan that produce light weapons for use in the region as well as in

Uganda.35

On top of these arms deals, China extends its military presence over the

continent through its defense attachés. Chinese Embassy defense attaché offices

throughout Africa provide the diplomatic foundation for China's military contacts.

Accredited defense attachés link the PLA to host country militaries.36 Attaché duties

vary, but as a minimum, they report on local matters from a military and/or security

perspective and facilitate contacts with local armed forces. China currently

maintains bilateral diplomatic military relations with at least 25 African countries,

spread across the main regions of the continent.37 In Beijing, 18 African countries

maintain permanent defense attaché offices; six of which are directly reciprocal:

Algeria (which has continuously maintained a defense attaché in Beijing since

January 1971), Egypt, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.38 The 11

remaining countries that do not have known Chinese resident equivalents in Africa

include Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,

Guinea-‐Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Niger, South Africa and Tanzania.39 Since 1985, China

has almost doubled the number of defense attaché offices worldwide from 59 to

107. In Africa, however, the number of Chinese defense attaché offices increased

35 Shinn, D. (2009), Chinese Involvement in African Conflict Zones. China Brief. Volume ix, Issue 7, April2, 2009. 36 Puska, Susan “Military backs China's Africa adventure” Asia Times 6/8/2007 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/if08ad02.html> 37 Ibid 38 Ibid 39 Ibid

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quite modestly from only nine to 14, maintaining an average of 15% of all of China's

attaché offices over the past 20 years.

Finally, China has become more involved in UN Peacekeeping missions and

been more strategic with its veto on the UNSC. The 2006 White Paper, China’s

National Defense in 2006, charges the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with

“implementing the military strategy of active defense”—a term that has grown to

provide justification for use of military force outside the PRC’s borders.40 For the

first time, the paper outlines the PLA’s responsibilities to: take the initiative to

prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars; take part in international

security cooperation; strengthen strategic coordination and consultation with major

powers and neighboring countries; and conduct bilateral or multilateral joint

military exercises and play an active part in maintaining global and regional peace

and stability.41 Bolstered by the change in policy, China began to send troops to UN

peacekeeping operations in Africa. Of roughly 2,000 peacekeepers China has

deployed around the world, on average during the first nine months in 2008, 77

percent were in Africa. China is by far the largest contributor to Africa peacekeeping

among the Security Council’s permanent members, with 63 percent of total P-‐5

contributions to the continent.42

40 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 19 41 Parenti, J. (2009). China-‐Africa Relations in the 21st Century. JFQ Issue 52,. www.ndupress.ndu.edu. 42 Qiang, S., and Tian, L. (2009). Peacekeeping: A Rising Role for China’s PLA. China Daily, July 24, 2009.

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This type of influence is much harder to quantify because data comes from

recently declassified reports, hearsay, and first-‐hand accounts rather than

numerical evidence. Despite this lack of graphical data, the implications of this aid

will be discussed and explored in the next section.

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IV. Implications of Chinese Influence

Attachés, Arms, and Aid….Oh My!

Aid in Africa can be best explained in an allegory. If, for example, Kenya

wished to build a new highway and requested help from USAID, the Americans

would impose conditions such as: construction must follow fair labor practices;

waste and runoff from the project must be gathered before they can impact the

environment; the highway must be at least 10km from the nearby elephant

preserve; etc. When the frustrated Kenyan ministers present the same application to

China, the only question asked is “where do you want it?”43

Officially, China’s “no-‐conditionality“ aid makes possible self-‐driven

development for African countries;44 however, it really provides China with

opportunities to extort political favors or pursue economic goals. China has sought

from its aid partners such concessions as support of the “One China Policy”, access

to energy resources, access to raw materials, and trade deals.

To support its growing energy needs, China has pursued exploration and

production deals in smaller, low-‐visibility countries, such as Gabon, while also

targeting Africa's largest oil producers-‐-‐with whom the United States and Europe

have longstanding relationships-‐-‐by offering integrated aid packages.45 In Angola,

Africa's largest exporter of oil to China, oil deals "are characterized by loans and

43 Remarks by Fmr Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to her American National Security Toolbox Class. 2/25/2011 44 Li Xiaoyun “China’s Foreign Aid and Aid to Africa: Overview” College of Humanities and Development, China Agricultural University. 2004 45 Alessi, Christopher “Expanding China-‐Africa Oil Ties” Council on Foreign Relations 2/8/2012 <http://www.cfr.org/china/expanding-‐china-‐africa-‐oil-‐ties/p9557?cid=rss-‐energy_environment-‐expanding_china_africa_oil_tie-‐020812>

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credit lines in connection with infrastructure projects," writes Shelly Zhao for China

Briefing magazine.46 In many cases, China also signs aid agreements with countries

rich in raw materials desperately needed by China to maintain its production to

achieve its growth targets. China currently has military alliances with 6 African

states, 4 of which are major oil suppliers: Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt.

In Africa, as elsewhere, Chinese aid agreements seem to follow diplomatic

ties; however, China does not seem to distribute aid in larger amounts to resource-‐

rich countries, as can be seen in flows to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of

Congo. In fact, grants and zero-‐interest loans are distributed fairly evenly around

the continent.47China gives money to almost every single country in Sub-‐Saharan

Africa, excluding only those that don’t acknowledge the One China policy.48 There is

little evidence that China gives more aid to countries with more natural resources or

specifically targets countries with worse governance.49 A mix of political,

commercial, and social/ideological factors motivate aid packages and economic

deals.

Looking to the military side of things, it is once again obvious that China has

been supporting undemocratic, oppressive regimes in exchange for political favors.

Interestingly enough, some military aid and the presence of defense attachés seems

46 Ibid 47 Brautigam, Deborah “Chinese development finance in Africa” East Asia Forum 12/25/2011 <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/25/chinese-‐development-‐aid-‐in-‐africa/> 48 Freschi, Laura “China in Africa myths and realities” AID Watch 2/9/2010 <http://aidwatchers.com/2010/02/china-‐in-‐africa-‐myths-‐and-‐realities/> 49 Ibid

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to follow countries that are either most useful to China, or countries with the largest

Chinese diaspora . For example, there are roughly 30,000-‐50,000 Chinese currently

residing in Sudan50 which is the third largest diaspora on the continent. Sudan has

also received a great deal of aid and political protection from China regarding the

Darfur crisis.

Through its peacekeeping involvement, China is able to dispel western

accusations of supporting conflict and human rights violations; but this provides

political cover for further unofficial arms deals that maintain the cycle of conflict,

and ensure that there will always be more customers for Chinese arms. According to

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China, the world’s top

weapons importer for much of the past decade, fell to fourth place on an annual list

as it produces more arms at home.51 In the same vein, China’s arms exports nearly

doubled over the period of 2007 to 2011 from five years earlier, making it the

world’s sixth biggest supplier after the United Kingdom.52 China is able to continue

circumventing US and EU arms embargoes in conflict zones with its growing

domestic small arms industry, and further support any regime or guerilla force it so

chooses.

50 Barmé, Geremie “Strangers at Home” The Wall Street Journal 7/19/2010 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704682604575369390660095122.html#articleTabs%3Dinteractive> 51 Kate, Daniel Ten “China's Share of Global Arms Imports Falls, Sipri Says” Bloomberg 3/18/2012 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-‐03-‐18/china-‐buys-‐fewer-‐weapons-‐as-‐local-‐industry-‐expands-‐sipri-‐says.html> 52 Ibid

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Through these processes, China is able to secure the energy resources and

minerals it needs, while providing aid and arms in an economically symbiotic

manner with recipient states. As this trend continues, China’s reach will continue to

extend and its influence in Africa will get stronger. Even countries that have good

relations with the United States, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, Ghana, and South

Africa, find themselves in a position where they can be much more selective in

taking advice from the United States.53 African countries under pressure from the

United States and the West to improve their human rights and governance practices

are less likely to do so when they know they can rely on China for support.54 While

none of the official aid projects are in conflict with US interests, Chinese aid with its

freedom from conditions may become a more attractive alternative to US offerings.

As more countries follow this line of thinking, China will gain influence over the

continent, many multilateral organizations, and can push for its political goals with

more force. China holds a veto power in the UN Security Council and Africa has three

non-‐permanent seats on the Council. Africa is well represented in organizations of

interest to China such as the UN Human Rights Council and the World Trade

Organization.55 China makes every effort to cultivate support among the maximum

number of African countries on all issues of interest to Beijing that arise in

international forums.56 Increased influence in Africa can directly lead to increased

influence over the entire international system.

53 “Africa: China's Growing Role in Africa -‐ Implications for U.S. Policy” All Africa 11/1/2011 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201111021230.html> 54 Ibid 55 Ibid 56 Ibid

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Influence in Action

China’s use of this newfound influence can be seen in several examples. First

let us examine the case of South Africa. With a Chinese population of over 200,000,57

South Africa has the largest Chinese diaspora in Africa. Recently, South Africa sought

to expand its trade ties with the BRIC countries, focusing for the most part on its

relationship with China, which is both an important partner at a political and

economic level for South Africa. Despite the benefits South Africa experiences, this

relationship is equally one which has elicited criticism from some quarters.58 At the

political level, South Africa regards China as a key player in the global debates that

characterize the shift to multipolarity. China’s developing country status, its

identification as a member of the Global South, and the G77 in the UN are elements

that carry significance for South Africa too.59 As the two counties deepened their

economic ties and embarked on projects together, South Africa suddenly declared

its support for the One China policy. The sudden change in foreign policy was

viewed by many as a clear sign of Chinese political pressure. Shortly after the

incident, President Jacob Zuma tried, in vain, to reassure South Africans that “South

African foreign policy is independent and decisions serve no one but South

57 Barmé, Geremie “Strangers at Home” The Wall Street Journal 7/19/2010 58 Alves, Ana Cristina “South Africa-‐China Relations: Getting Beyond the Cross-‐roads?” South African Institute of International Affairs 8/29/2010 <http://www.saiia.org.za/china-‐in-‐africa-‐project-‐opinion/south-‐africa-‐china-‐relations-‐getting-‐beyond-‐the-‐cross-‐roads.html> 59 Ibid

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Africans.”60 Despite these assurances, few domestic or international observers were

convinced.

In Zimbabwe, oppressive rule has been sustained owing to some extent,

China’s substantial military support to president Robert Mugabe.61 Attempts by

human rights activists and the international community to redress and halt this

abuse were frustrated by Chinese continued military support to the dictator.62 With

assured weaponry and military supplies from China, the brutality inflicted by the

supporters of Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-‐PF was to continue.63 To meet its oil

and mineral needs, Beijing has consistently delivered arms to “pariah” states in

Africa especially those like Sudan and Zimbabwe which have come under western

sanctions in the last decade.64 When sanctions were imposed, Mugabe turned to

China for military assistance. Faced with EU and U.S. embargo, Mugabe in 2004

bought fighter aircraft and military vehicles from China.65 According to Peter

Brookes of The Heritage Foundation, China sold Sudan $55 million worth of arms

between 2003 and 2006, flouting UN arms embargoes.66 It was with Chinese

assistance that the Sudanese government recently constructed an arms factory in

60 Rossouw, Mandy “‘Independent SA’ supports One China Policy – Zuma” City Press 10/13/2011 <http://www.citypress.co.za/SouthAfrica/News/Independent-‐SA-‐supports-‐One-‐China-‐Policy-‐Zuma-‐20111013> 61 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 22 62 Ibid 63 Ibid 23 64 Fowale, Tongkeh Joseph “China's Military Presence in Africa” 5/24/2009 <http://tongkeh-‐joseph-‐fowale.suite101.com/chinas-‐military-‐presence-‐in-‐africa-‐a119916> 65 Ibid 66 Ibid

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Khartoum.67 China’s ability to ignore embargoes and continue fueling conflict and

oppressive regimes in order to maintain access to energy belies Chinese priorities

and China’s clout on the international scene. With such an example, other countries

may be willing to offer China resources or access to markets in exchange for support

and protections.

During the Darfur crisis China played a direct role in selling arms to Sudan

and in developing its weapons industry. Chinese arms sales to Sudan rose twenty-‐

five fold during the crisis in spite of Security Council arms embargoes.68 In spite of

China’s denials, evidence points to the contrary, but with China’s veto in the UNSC,

there was little the rest of the international community could do. China is the

leading developer of the Sudanese oil industry and major purchaser of Sudanese

oil.69 Though Beijing regularly justifies China’s economic involvement in Sudan as

being key to that country’s development, it is obvious that in the context of rising

needs for peace and multilateral efforts to halt the blood-‐thirsty Khartoum regime,

the concentration of wealth and weapons among the Sudan’s ruling elite by Chinese

investment and arms deals, unconditionally feeds conflict.70 In this example, China

demonstrated that it is willing to protect countries under its influence from

everyone, including the combined might of the UNSC. In the future, this may be too

good an offer for other countries to pass up.

67 Ibid 68 Save Darfur. (2007). “China in Sudan: Having it Both Ways” Briefing Paper, October 18, 2007. 69 Enuka, Chuka “China’s military presence in Africa: Implications for Africa’s wobbling peace pg 22 70 Ibid

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V. Conclusion – Implications for the US

From the early years of contact with Africa, China has pursued military

involvements in Africa. This has been in the areas of military training and assistance,

arms sales, anti-‐piracy efforts, and peacekeeping operations. In as much as the

peacekeeping efforts may have engaged China in a positive way in Africa’s conflict

zones, but continued arm sales in a manner that exacerbate African conflicts, China

certainly cannot be helping the much needed peace in Africa.71 While China’s

growing ties with Africa can be viewed as unsettling, Ambassador Johnnie Carson

believes we should avoid “alarmist or apprehensive”72 responses to China’s moves,

and I am inclined to agree with him. While Chinese influence is growing, it does not

pose the same threat the USSR did during the Cold War; and what little direct

influence China has over Africa is quite limited. However, this does not mean the

United States should sit idly by.

While ideology was the overriding factor that fueled Chinese aid to Africa in

the 1950s and 1960s; today, with China on the verge of surpassing the US economy,

Chinese motives are purely business. China has found that aid can secure access to

energy, markets for Chinese goods, friends on human rights councils, and political

support for “One China” among other policies. Normally this would not be a

problem, but with the recent economic crisis and global downturn, the United States

is less able to compete with Chinese deals. Furthermore, Chinese arms sales go

71 Ibid 26 72 Abry, George “U.S., China, Africa an ‘Expanding Circle’” Virginia Military Institute 11/4/2011 <http://www5.vmi.edu/Content.aspx?id=10737419972>

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toward fueling conflicts that distract the attention of the international community

and drain the military resources of countries like the US, France, UK and

organizations like NATO, the African Union, and the UNSC. This drain on the political

will to fight may cost the United States dearly in a future conflict between China and

a US ally like South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan.

What can the United States do to successfully compete with China’s

combined military-‐economic aid deals? First and foremost, steps must be taken in

the UNGA or UNSC to expose and stop China’s more flagrant violations of human

rights and arms embargoes on the continent. Western powers must also make their

aid deals more attractive to developing countries and reduce the number and nature

of aid conditions in order to compete. In 2007, recognizing the need to curtail

Chinese influence, the president of the European Investment Bank said “in the face

of competition from China – we need to lower our environmental and social

standards.”73

If Chinese influence is not curtailed, it will become much more difficult for

the US to engage with countries like Taiwan or pursue its own strategic interests in

Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. With more and more countries falling under

Chinese influence and voting with China in relevant assemblies, other countries will

be hard-‐pressed to block measures introduced by China that require merely simple

or 2/3 majorities. Also, Chinese military presence in Africa is limited, but if ties and

73 Davies, Penny “China and the End of Poverty in Africa Towards Mutual Benefit” Diakonia <http://oefse.at/Downloads/veranstaltungen/1011/Vienna_Penny%20Davies.pdf>

Petallides 24

relations develop, it is not beyond the realm of possibility to see bases springing up

in the next 10-‐20 years. To combat piracy, China has floated the idea of naval bases

in West Africa with access to the Indian ocean, and as recently as December 2011,

China was considering a naval base agreement with the Seychelles.74 While this idea

was dismissed quickly, Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean will hinder the US

and other powers’ efforts to contain Chinese ambitions at sea and will offer new

routes into the Pacific Ocean and around the containment fields of the various Island

Chains.

In the end, the US must engage China and the nations of Africa in order to

reassert America’s position as a protector of rights and a supporter of development;

while curtailing China’s growing influence in the region. While the tide is still in

America’s favor, action must be taken now, before it becomes too late.

74 “China Base a Threat to India Navy?” The Diplomat 12/17/2011 <http://the-‐diplomat.com/2011/12/17/china-‐base-‐a-‐threat-‐to-‐india-‐navy/>

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the middle kingdom's lighter touch: chinese soft power in africa

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