The Military as Mirror:

Should the Military Be Representative of American Society?

Thomas “Nate” Garner1

To deny or destroy the difference between the military and the civilian

cannot produce genuine similarity, but runs the risk of creating new forms

of tension and unanticipated militarism.

- Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 440

The current United States military is not representative of society. In fact, both

demographic and geographic representation in the military is skewed. For example, according to

the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, for fiscal year 2013

(FY13), the number of enlisted personnel from the south vastly outnumbers their counterparts

from the northeast. Except for the Marine Corp, African Americans are overrepresented in the

enlisted ranks as compared to their percent of the civilian population. The opposite is true for

officers, where African Americans are underrepresented in the Navy, Air Force, and Marines,

and overrepresented in the Army. 2

Though the number of Hispanics serving in the military has

not reached a representative percentage of the population, both their population and military

1 The views expressed in this article are personal and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United

States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States government. 2 For a summary of demographic and geographic data broken down by service component see Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. “Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year

2013 Summary Report.” Accessed and Downloaded October 1, 2015. https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2013/index.html.

2

participation percentages are rising.3 These trends in representation are long-standing. All have

been documented since the start of the all-volunteer force in 1973.

While diversity and representation might not be synonymous, they are certainly linked.

Military analysts David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that “the fundamentals of American

democracy require a military that is representative of and connected to the people of the United

States.”4 Following Barno and Bensahel, we should examine the problem of representation in

the military with a view to what we want our military to do. Is the military’s fundamental

mission to win the nation’s wars at the least possible financial cost? Some who take this view

suggest that diversity and representation are secondary concerns, though (as we shall see)

diversity, representation, and effectiveness are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Should the

military attempt to maintain good relations with the civilian society it serves? If so, the

military’s representation deficit is more worrying, for it could potentially contribute to a civil-

military rift in society. Both those who stress the effectiveness and efficiency of the military,

and those who stress the importance of good civil-military relations, can be concerned with how

representative of society the military is. To frame the questions facing U.S. policymakers

regarding the military’s representation of society, this paper will explore three perspectives on

this problem: the civil-military construct as outlined in the Constitution, the civil-military

relationship in the context of the nature of the military as a profession, and the relationship of the

military to society through the lens of a principle-agent framework. We will then conclude by

considering how a draft might improve or damage civil-military relations.

3 On demographic trends for Hispanics, African Americans, and women in the military see Segal, Mady Wechsler,

Merideth Hill Thanner, and David R. Segal. Hispanic and African American Men and Women in the U.S. Military:

Trends in Representation. Race, Gender & Class, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, 2007, pp. 48-64. 4 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “When the Yellow Ribbons Fade: Reconnecting our Soldiers and Citizens,” War

on the Rocks, July 14, 2015. Accessed July 15, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/when-the-yellow-ribbons-

fade-reconnecting-our-soldiers-and-citizens/2/.

3

The Military in the U.S. Constitution

The U.S. Constitution establishes institutions to balance liberty and security; among these

are the nascent structures of the U.S. military. America’s founders were influenced by their

experiences in the revolutionary struggle against a tyrannical king. How to control the military

so that it did not facilitate the reemergence of tyranny was a question of utmost importance. A

standing army was thought by many to do just that. As a result, in the words of Richard Kohn,

“the threat of the standing army was deeply rooted in [Americans’] political heritage.”5

Institutions of American governance were shaped by a need to balance not only security

and liberty, but representation and good governance. The aptly named House of Representatives,

for instance, contrasted with the more elite Presidency, Senate, and Judiciary. The military’s

potential separation from society was warily approached. Montesquieu, a leading influence on

the American founders, had given voice to this fear. “To prevent the executive power from

being able to oppress,” he wrote, “it is requisite that the armies with which it is entrusted should

consist of the people, and have the same spirit as the people… the soldiers should live in

common with the rest of the people; and no separate camp, barracks, or fortress should be

suffered.”6 Following Montesquieu, the founding fathers wrestled with how to join the military

to the people and give the people, acting through their legislative institutions, the power to

control the military. The power to declare war, “to raise and support” Armies, “to provide and

maintain” a Navy, and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the various militias,

was assigned to the Legislative branch in Article I of the Constitution. This was important

5 Kohn, Richard H., ed. The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989. New

York, NY: New York University Press, 1991. 6 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. “The Spirit of the Laws.” In To Support and Defend: An American

Politics Companion, edited by Heidi A. Brockmann, James T. Golby, and Michael L. Harrison, 63-70. West Point,

NY: The United States Military Academy – McGraw Hill Education, 2014.

4

because the legislature was representative of, elected by, closest to, and therefore, beholden to

the people.7 The power to employ the army was assigned to the Executive branch in Article II.

Therefore, as Kohn has written, “the first line of defense against a standing army was to entrust

its existence to the representative people,” and “the

second was that central check that permeated the entire

Constitution: division of powers.”4

The Constitution divided not only the powers of

political institutions, however; it also divided military

power itself. It acknowledged and sustained the

existence of state militias, tacitly as a check on the

national standing army. Nothing speaks better to the

founders’ desire for a representative force than the presence and requirement of militias in the

United States Constitution. “[E]ven if an army could be marshalled [against its citizens], it

would face hostile citizens armed and embodied in militia, ready to defend their liberties.”4

Although U.S. military power was thus intended to be subordinate to political institutions

and representative of the American people, control of the military was expected to arise more

from the military’s relationship to civil authorities than from its representativeness of the

population. America’s first President, George Washington, helped to cement the subservience of

the military to civilian authority through two primary actions: first, Washington quelled a

potential military coup in 1783, when military officers prepared to march from Newburgh on

Congress for due compensation; second, Washington resigned his military commission after the

revolution and prior to assuming the presidency. Neither of these early actions of Washington

7 Up until the 17

th Amendment to the United States Constitution, the people did not choose their Senators directly.

Instead, they were chosen by State Legislatures.

“[A]n excess of ethical and

political uniqueness leads to

militarism, the undue intervention

of those in uniform in the social

and political life of the polity.”

-Bernard Boëne, How

‘unique’ should the

military be?, p.13

5

indicates that the military representing American society is a more important goal than civilian

institutions controlling over the military. These examples show the primacy of a military’s

relationship to its civilian institutions rather than a need for a representative force.

The Military Profession

Since the time of the American founding, countless works have attempted to elaborate on

the unique role of the military in American society. One of the most influential attempts to serve

Constitutional purposes – i.e., civilian control of the military – by means not explicitly

elaborated in the Constitution was Samuel Huntington’s argument (first published in 1957) that

the military is a distinguishable profession. Huntington suggests that the military, like the

civilian professions of medicine and law, possesses expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.8

Suzanne Nielsen, building on Huntington, suggests that the military is an “intrinsically values-

based” profession that creates “the necessary bond of trust between the professional and the

nation served.”9 Where does this bond of trust come from? Huntington suggests that the ‘bond

of trust’ arises not from the military’s representation of society but the nature of the profession

itself. Professions are trusted when they demonstrate expertise and responsibility.

8 From Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957. By “expertise” Huntington means specialized knowledge in a

field of human endeavor, depth and breadth, knowledge of institutions and history. “Responsibility” suggests that

the ultimate client of every profession, including the military, is society; professions are understood to make

meaningful contributions to society. Therefore, military officers have a responsibly to serve society to their fullest,

without money being the sole motivation. By “corporateness” Huntington indicates that members of a profession

share an organic vision, community, and consciousness of themselves apart from society. Officers are custodians of

expert knowledge and contribute to it through scholarship and study. 9 Nielsen, Suzanne. “The Army Officer as Servant and Professional.” In To Support and Defend: An American

Politics Companion, edited by Heidi A. Brockmann, James T. Golby, and Michael L. Harrison,, 253-60. West

Point, NY: The United States Military Academy – McGraw Hill Education, 2014. Originally published in The

Future of the Army Profession, eds. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005).

6

“Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages,”

Huntington states, and “the professional man commands more respect.”10

The Military Agency

Scholars like Peter Feaver have explored the relationship between the military and

civilian institutions as a principal-agent problem; that is, a relationship in which one side (the

civilian) attempts to get another (the military) to carry out its will, while making use of the

military’s own expert knowledge. Feaver’s argument boils down to what he terms the “military

problematique”: “the need to have [a military] institution strong enough to protect civilians yet

not so strong as to ignore civilian direction – in short, the problem of civilian delegation to and

control of the military.”11

Feaver’s approach to civil-military relations does not lead him to be

overly concerned about the military’s representation of society. Morris Janowitz, like Feaver,

views the military as an instrument of national security policy. For Janowitz, the military’s

relationship to the civilian government resembles that of a ‘pressure group’ that is “not a

voluntary association, acting on the organs of the government, on the contrary, it is an organ of

the government, seeking to develop new techniques for intervening in domestic politics.”12

In

the end, Feaver criticizes both Janowitz and Huntington for their reliance on the proposition of

“professionalism” as the tie that binds the military institution to the civilian leadership and

presents his own theory for civilian control over the military which emphasizes their separate

spheres and civilian dominance.

10

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957. 11

Feaver, Peter D. The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of

Civilian Control. Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, Winter 1996, pp. 149-178. 12

Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New York, NY: The Free Press,

1971.

7

The Representative Military

We have seen so far that the American founders

expressed concern for not only the military’s

professional identity nor its relation to civilian

institutions, but its relation to the American citizenry.

Those who renew this Constitutional perspective today

frequently ask: Who comprises the military itself?

Having a military that represents the society from which

it came, they suggest, facilitates civilian control of the

military and increases the military’s legitimacy.

Michael Sandel’s Democracy’s Discontent

reviews relevant literature on self-government and describes representation in the light of a

republican view of liberty. “I am free insofar as I am a member of a political community that

controls its own fate, and a participant in the decisions that govern its affairs.”13

There is no

reason that this same feeling of being “a participant in the decisions that govern its affairs”

cannot lend legitimacy to the military side of policy. Representation in the military may offer a

form of community and participation similar to representation in political institutions.

Debates over representation in the military arose after the abolishment of the draft and

institution of an all-volunteer army in the United States. According to Sandel, the difference

between a conscript, or draft, army and the all-volunteer army has to do with American civic

ideals, like that of representation. Sandel posits that “the civic argument for conscription claims

13

Sandel, Michael J. Democracy’s Discontent: America in search of a public philosophy. Cambridge, MA: First

Harvard University Press, 1998.

“[T]he line that used to separate

the military from society, military

organization from civilian

bureaucracies, and the general or

flag officer from the statesman

has been weakened, and the

armed forces have in effect

become ‘civilianized.’

-Bernard Boëne, How

‘unique’ should the

military be?, p.21

8

that military service, like jury duty, is a civic responsibility” that expresses and deepens

democratic citizenship.14

Further, he goes on to sum up one side of the argument, that “turning

military service into a commodity – a task we hire people to perform – corrupts the civic ideals

that should govern it.” In other words, “it allows us to abdicate a civic duty.”12

Sandel would

argue that the choice in legitimacy for a military rests in the idea of civic responsibility. If the

United States chooses a market force (all-volunteer army, or a “commodity” force) then it is

sacrificing representation for efficiency, for instance, hiring foreign troops rather than American

citizens.15

Conclusion

What is the military’s ultimate purpose in American society? The military’s role is

presumably determined by changing domestic and international requirements. Generally,

domestic changes involve budgetary constraints or spending on defense and force composition.

International requirements are focused on U.S. interests abroad and the employment of the

military towards those interests. However, changes in domestic and international environments

often occur simultaneously, altering every facet of the force; size, composition, equipment, and

personnel. Technological advancements also changes the nature of military employment, though

it does little to affect the nature of the profession.16

However, the representativeness of the

military is affected by changing domestic and international considerations. For instance,

14

Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do? New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. 15

While there is the civic responsibility comparison laid out by Sandel (the idea that there are certain responsibilities

citizens owe their government), the above logic of a market based, all-volunteer army fits eerily into Montesquieu’s

idea that citizens “ought to have no share in the government but for the choosing of representatives.” For

Montesquieu, see: Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. “The Spirit of the Laws.” In To Support and

Defend: An American Politics Companion, edited by Heidi A. Brockmann, James T. Golby, and Michael L.

Harrison, 63-70. West Point, NY: The United States Military Academy – McGraw Hill Education, 2014. 16

In the words of Bernard Boëne , “Technology does not modify the essence of the military calling,” see: Boëne,

Bernard. 1990. How ‘unique’ should the military be? A review of representative literature & outline of a synthetic

formulation. European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 1, New challenges to justice, pp.3-59.

9

according to Boëne, the American Cold War military was “an ‘institutional’ armed force which

was functionally and, in part, structurally and culturally divergent from large scale civil

organizations, but enjoyed effective social and cultural links to society through the mechanism of

selective conscription.” However, the current all-volunteer military “is nevertheless socially

unrepresentative and in danger of lacking legitimacy and support.”17

Additionally, Boëne notes

that if one goes further back, before the 1950’s, one would find “an armed force of civilians in

uniform” during World War II that is “highly representative, [and] highly legitimate.”

Therefore, the legitimacy of a representative force can be considered as a question of priorities

for the military based on societal needs.

Ultimately, the need for a legitimate military is not at question. But is this legitimacy a

result of the representative nature of the force or the relationship of that force, regardless of

representation, to the civilian part of society? Does the desire for representation in the military

stem from a legitimacy deficit or a societal preference? Perhaps the legitimacy of the armed

forces in society stems more from the military’s relationship and subservience to its civilian

institutions, regardless of whether the military looks exactly like American society. American

civil-military scholars like Samuel Huntington and Peter Feaver agree on this point, and they

make a powerful case on its behalf. There is a strong American tradition that supports both a

need for representation in its governmental institutions, and a long tradition of military

subservience to civilian authority.

Nevertheless, as the context and need for a military’s security changes over time, are

societal preferences and the basis for the legitimacy of an armed force in the US shifting to that

of representation? Furthermore, are a subservient military and a representative military

17

Boëne, Bernard. 1990. How ‘unique’ should the military be? A review of representative literature & outline of a

synthetic formulation. European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 1, New challenges to justice, pp.3-59.

10

mutually exclusive? The merits of both, separately and together, are a worthy discussion in

today’s American civil-military context. As more attention is paid to the budget and size of

America’s military, and the employment of America’s military abroad is scrutinized, Americans

can decide the composition and fate of the military, and what civil-military relations becomes in

the next era. There is an opportunity for both civilians and their military to bridge any civil-

military gaps that exist now or may emerge in the near future.

11

Recommended Readings

Barno, David and Nora Bensahel. “When the Yellow Ribbons Fade: Reconnecting our

Soldiers and Citizens.” War on the Rocks, July 14, 2015. Accessed July 15, 2015.

http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/when-the-yellow-ribbons-fade-reconnecting-our-soldiers-and-

citizens/2/

Boëne, Bernard. 1990. How ‘unique’ should the military be? A review of representative

literature & outline of a synthetic formulation. European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 1,

New challenges to justice, pp.3-59.

Feaver, Peter D. The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of

Civilian Control. Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, Winter 1996, pp. 149-178.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military

Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New York, NY:

The Free Press, 1971.

12

Additional Readings

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Kohn, Richard H., ed. The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States,

1789-1989. New York, NY: New York University Press, 1991.

Madison, James. "The federalist no. 10." November 22, 1787-88.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. “The Spirit of the Laws.” In To Support and

Defend: An American Politics Companion, edited by Heidi A. Brockmann, James T. Golby, and

Michael L. Harrison, 63-70. West Point, NY: The United States Military Academy – McGraw

Hill Education, 2014.

Nielsen, Suzanne. “The Army Officer as Servant and Professional.” In To Support and Defend:

An American Politics Companion, edited by Heidi A. Brockmann, James T. Golby, and

Michael L. Harrison,, 253-60. West Point, NY: The United States Military Academy – McGraw

Hill Education, 2014.

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness. “Population Representation

in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2013 Summary Report.” Accessed and Downloaded

October 1, 2015. https://www.cna.org/pop-rep/2013/index.html

13

Sandel, Michael J. Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do? New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and

Giroux, 2009.

Sandel, Michael J. Democracy’s Discontent: America in search of a public philosophy.

Cambridge, MA: First Harvard University Press, 1998.

Segal, Mady Wechsler, Merideth Hill Thanner, and David R. Segal. Hispanic and African

American Men and Women in the U.S. Military: Trends in Representation. Race, Gender &

Class, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, 2007, pp. 48-64.

U.S. Constitution.