JOURNAL OF TEACHING IN PHYSICAL EDUCATTON, 1985, 4, 178-189

The Moral Judgment of Physical Education Teachers

Steven A. Henkel University of Wisconsin-Madison

Neal F. Earls The Ohio State University

A theoretical framework was developed to frame research on the moral thought and actions of teachers and students. The moral judgment of K-12 physical education teachers (n = 47) was investigated to determine their characteristic types of moral judgment, the amount of variability in moral judgment, and how this variability was distributed with regard to gender, teaching level, formal education, amount of coaching experience, type of coaching involvement, and coaching aspiration. Moral judgment was assessed according to Rest's (1979b) D e f ~ g Issues Test. The largest differences were revealed for the coaching related subgroups. The total sample mean P (principled reasoning) score of 37.8% was lower than the normative mean for comparison groups in other studies employing the DIT.

Physical education and sport have long been regarded as important mediums for the development of moral character and behavior. Plato (442) and Rousseau (1762) ad- dressed the contribution of physical education to moral education. Later, the "muscular Christian" movement (Kingsley, p. 198, cited in McIntosh, 1979) of 19th-century Britain operated on the basis of two assumptions: that competitive team games had an ethical basis, and that moral learning in physical activities was transferred to other activities.

Throughout the 20th century, moral development has been a stated purpose of physical education (Figley, 1984; Hetherington, 1932; Johnson, 1926; Nash, 1932; Shea, 1978; Vannier & Fait, 1957; Williams, 1927); however, many observed practices in physical education teaching might be considered morally miseducative-particularly some associated with team competition (Meakin, 1981). The American Academy of Physical Education (1981) recently declared that physical educators should explicitly emphasize the develop- ment of ethical judgment and morally responsible action:

1. The development of moral and ethical values should be among the stated aims of the physical education program.

2. The educational preparation of physical education teachers and athletic coaches should place emphasis upon moral and ethical values.

Request reprints from Neal Earls, 309 Pomerene Hall, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210.

MORAL JUDGMENT 179

3. Emphasis on the teaching of moral and ethical values by physical education teachers and athletic coaches should be encouraged.

4. The profession of physical education should establish criteria for the selection of appropriate ethical and moral values, develop formal plans of instruction, and methods for the assessment of results. (1981, n.p.)

Explicit and systematic attention to ethicallmoral development and related issues appears to be lacking in the professional preparation of physical educators. Furthermore, little research has addressed moral judgment, development, or action in physical educa- tion (Figley, 1982).

This article describes research on the moral judgment of physical educators by addressing three questions with a particular sample of teachers.

1. What types of moral judgment are characteristic of the physical education teachers?

2. How' much variability in moral judgment is there among the physical educators? 3. How is the variability in moral judgment distributed in relation to selected

characteristics of the teachers?

Teacher characteristics used to form subgroups for analysis were: gender, teaching level, formal education, amount of coaching experience, type of coaching involvement, and coaching aspiration. Six null hypotheses were derived from the three central ques- tions and the six subgroups.

Theoretical Framework

After an extensive study of relevant literature, a model was developed to place educational research on moral judgment into a broad theoretical framework (Henkel, 1984) (see Figure 1). Functional relationships between teacher and student variables are represented by solid lines and the hypothesized directions of the relationships are indicated by arrows. For example, a teacher's formative experiences (T2) are theorized to affect the teacher's moral judgments (T3), and the teacher's moral judgments presumably affect the teacher's actions (T4). A similar sequence of relationships is believed to exist for stu- dent oriented variables.

Interrelationships between teacher and student variables are depicted by dotted lines in Figure 1. It is hypothesized that a teacher's moral judgments and actions across time will affect a student's moral judgments and actions. These effects are believed to be reciprocal, although an individual student probably has less influence on the teacher than does the teacher on the student.

The variables and relationships in Figure 1 represent one way of viewing the complexities involved. The assumption was made, however, that the concepts and rela- tionships were sufficiently accurate for the formulation of early research on moral judg- ment and action in physical education. Examination of the three research questions posed for this study represents a first step in studying the relationship between the moral judg- ment and actions of physical educators and their students. This particular study utilized an extant instrument to assess physical education teachers' moral judgment in accordance with Rest's (1979a) reconceptualization of moral development and moral reasoning.

HENKEL AND EARLS

T5 T6

Consequences Reflection

Consequences Reflection

S5 S6

Figure 1 - Theoretical model of moral judgment and development.

Cognitive-developmental theorists (Kohlberg, 1958, 1981; Piaget, 1932) provided a basis for conceptualizing moral judgment and development. The cog~tivedevelopmental theory posits that a person's perception of reality is cognitively constructed and that cognitive structures develop progressively, so that earlier thinking is elaborated to accommodate more complex experiences. Rest (1969) supported and clarified the assumptions of cognitive- developmental theory. He believed, however, that Piaget's simple stage model did not adequately describe the complex nature of moral judgment. In the simple stage model, each step has a period of exclusive use. The onset and decline of stages are viewed as invariant and evenly spaced across time. The invariant sequence implies that a blending of stages occurs only between adjacent stages.

Rest (1979a) referred to types, rather than stages, within his complex stage model because "stage" implied that an individual was exclusively of one type at a given time, whereas research indicated that a person's moral judgment was of mixed types at a given time. Rest's graphic representation of the contrast between the simple stage model of moral development and the complex stage model is portrayed in Figure 2. In the complex stage model, no type of moral thinking necessarily has a period of predominance. The onset and decline of stages is viewed as variable and unevenly spaced across time. In addition, the relative use of stages, rather than the predominant use, is depicted to account for the blending of more than two types of moral judgment.

Methods

The referent population for this study was the physical education teachers in the Madison (Wisconsin) Metropolitan School District. This school district was selected because it was the closest school system that had enough teachers to meet minimal requirements

MORAL JUDGMENT

Development - A graphic presentation of th simple stage model of moral development (Rest, 1979a. p. 52).

Development - Complex stage model of moral development (Rest, 1979a. p. 66).

Figure 2 - Simple versus complex stage models.

for sample size. All of the 74 physical education teachers were invited to participate, 53 of them responded, and 47 data forms were utilized after a check for internal consistency of responses. The sample distribution closely approximated that of the referent population according to gender (31 males and 16 females) and teaching level.

Subjects were surveyed to obtain two types of information. A questionnaire was used to determine the gender, teaching level, formal education, coaching experience, types of coaching involvement, and coachirvg aspiration of subjects. The evaluative moral judg- ment of subjects was assessed by scoring their responses on a four-story version of the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979b). For each story, subjects judged the importance of 12 factors considered in formulating a solution to the sociomoral dilemma. Importance of the factors was indicated by (a) an initial rating on a scale of five gradations, and (b) an overall ranking of the first, second, third, and fourth most important factors. The fac- tors represented the different moral stages of Kohlberg's (1958) six-stage typology. Rest's elaboration of the six types of moral judgment, similar to Kohlberg's six stages, is presented in Table 1.

The P scores from the Defining Issues Test (DIT) indicated the relative importance given by subjects to principled judgment (Stage 5, social contract, and Stage 6, universal ethical principles). Correlation coefficients from test-retest reliability of the four-story DIT were established in the mid .70s (Davison & Robbis, 1978). Internal reliability of responses was accounted for by (a) including items with no meaningful content, and (b) an internal consistency check. In this study, percentage scores were also derived for Stage 2 (reciprocal "back scratching"), Stage 3 (interpersonal harmony), and Stage 4 (law and social order orientation). All DIT scoring and calculations were cross-checked by a second scorer.

Table 1 Rest's Elaboration of Kohlberg's Six Stages of Moral Judgment +

00 N

Coordination of expectations Schemes of balancing Central concept for about actions (how rules interests (how determining moral rights

Stage are known and shared) equilibrium is achieved) and responsibilities

Stage 1 The caretaker makes known certain demands on the child's behavior.

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Although each person is understood to have his [or her] own interests, an exchange of favors might be mutually decided.

Through reciprocal role taking, individuals attain a mutual understand- ing about each other and the on-going pattern of their interactions.

All members of society know what is expected of them through public in- stitutionalized law.

The child does not share in making rules, but under- stands that obedience will bring freedom from punishment.

If each party sees something to gain in an exchange, then both want to reciprocate.

Friendship relationships establish a stabilized and enduring scheme of coopera- tion. Each party anticipates feelings, needs, and wants of the other and acts in the other's welfare.

Unless a society-wide system of cooperation is established and stabilized, no individual can really make plans. Each person should follow the law and do his [or her] particular job, anticipating that other people will also fulfill their responsibilities.

The morality of obedience: "Do what you're told."

The morality of instru- mental egoism and simple exchange: "Let's make a deal."

The morality of inter- personal concordance: "Be considerate, nice, and kind, and you'll get along with people."

The morality of law and duty to the social order: "Everyone in society is # obligated and protected by P the law." 5

u

Table 1 (cont.)

Stage 5

Stage 6

Formal procedures are in- stitutionalized for making laws, which one anticipates rational people would accept.

The logical requirements of non-arbitrary coopera- tion among rational, equal, and impartial people are taken as ideal criteria for social organization which one anticipates rational people would accept.

Law-making procedures are devised so that they reflect the general will of the people, at the same time in- suring certain basic rights to all. With each person hav- ing a say in the decision process, each will see that his [or her] interests are maximized while at the same time having a basis for mak- ing claims on other people.

A scheme of cooperation that negates or neutralizes all arbitrary distribution of rights and responsibilities is the most equilibrated, for such system is maximizing the simultaneous benefit to each member so that any deviation from these rules would advantage some members at the expense of others.

The morality of societal consensus: "You are obli- gated by whatever arrange- ments are agreed to by due process procedures."

The morality of non-arbitrary social cooperation: "How rational and impartial people would organize cooperation is moral."

Note: From Development in Judging Moral Issues (pp. 22-23) by J. Rest, 1979, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to examine differences by teaching level, amount of coaching experience, and type of coaching involvement. The Dunn method of planned comparisons was used to test for the significance (p < .05) of differences between subgroups. Three comparisons were made for each variable. A Welch-Aspin t test was used for planned comparisons and for the pairwise tests of null hypotheses con- cerning gender, degree of formal education, and coaching aspiration. A smaller alpha level (.01) was used for formal education to keep the overall alpha level down (.26), and to deemphasize the variable of least consequence.

Results

For this sample, DIT results yielded scores of 4.9%, 10.0%, and 44.1 % for Stages 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The mean P (principled judgment, Stages 5 + 6) score of 37.8% for these physical educators was lower than the normative mean for several comparison groups who took the DIT in other studies (Rest, 1979b): (a) 40.0% for nonstudent adults, (b) 42.3% for college students, and (c) 53.3% for graduate students. However, the physical educators' mean P score was higher than that of senior high students (31.8%) and junior high students (21.9%). These comparisons of disparate samples are presented without statistical tests for significance of difference.

The variance of DIT scores was great (see Table 2 and Figure 3). No differences in mean P scores between any of the six subgroups analyzed were significant. The observed

Table 2

Mean Stage 2, 3, and 4 Scores by Coaching Aspiration

Aspiration M SD Range

Stage 2

Move up or retain current responsibilities

Move down or leave coaching field

No desire to coach

Stage 3

Move up or retain current responsibilities

Move down or leave coaching field

No desire to coach

Stage 4

Move up or retain current responsibilities

Move down or leave coaching field

No desire to coach

MORAL JUDGMENT

Moral iudgment stages

Figure 3 - Profde of coaching aspiration subgroups.

differences were smallest for teaching level and formal education. The largest differences were revealed for amount of coaching experience, type of coaching involvement, and coaching aspirations.

A post hoc analysis was conducted to examine (a) possible interaction effects between selected independent variables, and (b) differences between subgroups for stage scores 2, 3, and 4. A Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric analysis of variance revealed that interaction effects between gender and coaching involvement, and between gender and coaching aspiration, were not significant.

The mean scores for relative importance attached to Stage 2- , Stage 3- , and Stage 4-type reasoning are listed in Table 2. In addition, Figure 3 graphically depicts the mean and the range for Stage 2, 3, and 4 scores.

The largest differences in Stage 4 scores for subjects with varying coaching ex- perience and coaching aspirations are presented in Table 3. All of the t values were larger for Stage 4 means than for P scores. A statistically significant difference was noted be- tween the Stage 4 mean of physical educators whose coaching aspiration was to move up or retain the present level of coaching, and the Stage 4 mean of physical educators who preferred to move down or to leave the coaching field (see Table 3).

Discussion and Recommendations

The fact that no significant differences in P scores were observed between the gender, teaching level, and formal education subgroups suggests that there may be no real difference corresponding to the variables. That possibility should remain paramount while considering alternative explanations for the findings of this examination of physical educators' moral judgment.

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Table 3

Greatest Mean Differences in Stage 4 Scores by Coaching Experience and Aspirations

Hypothesis Greatest mean theme difference

Subgroup score

Coaching experience 10.4010 1-1 0 Seasons

>20 Seasons 8.1 010 0 Seasons

>20 Seasons Coaching aspirations 15.4% Move up or

stay the same Move down or

leave coaching 9.1 010 Move up or

stay the same No desire to

coach

aAll t values were compared to critical value 2.24 (.05/2). bSignificant at the .05 level for two-tailed Welch-Aspin t test.

Teaching level and formal education do not appear to be productive variables to examine in isolation. The gender variable may be worthy of further study in physical educa- tion given the differences found in previous studies (Bredemeier & Shields, 1982; Hall, 1981; Preston, 1979) and the questions about the adequacy of Kohlberg-like assessments of women's moral development (Gilligan, 1982; Sichel, 1983).

Although not statistically significant, the differences in P scores for subgroups based on the amount of coaching experience, type of coaching involvement (none, assis- tant, or head coach of major or minor sports), and coaching career aspiration are large enough to warrant further examination. Due to insufficient statistical power, meaningful differences in P scores may have existed but were not revealed. The estimated power ob- tained for each of the coaching aspiration tests of significance was in the .30s. This is far below the power required for eliciting statistically significant differences. A similar study with a larger sample might facilitate greater confidence in the findings emanating from the comparison of subgroups.

The problem of' statistical power would be of less consequence, however, if in- dependent variables are identified that more adequately account for the observed variability. In addition to studying familiar discrete factors, two alternatives are suggested for con- sideration: (a) identify with greater sophistication the potentially salient variables, perhaps consisting of a complex composite of influences, or (b) utilize a naturalistic and hypothesis- generating research strategy wherein unanticipated significant influences may emerge for further testing.

MORAL JUDGMENT 187

The significant difference (associated with Stage 4 scores) observed for variations in coaching aspiration is of interest. If there is a meaningful relationship between moral judgment and action of teacherlcoaches, and the development of students, then the con- tinued influence on students by the "higher aspiring" teacherlcoaches merits attention. These findings may be noted in comparison to those of Locke and Massengale (1978). Caution should be used in making interpretations of the meaning of significant findings related to coaching aspiration in both the present study and the study reported by Locke and Massengale.

In their investigation of role conflict in teacher/coaches, Locke and Massengale (1978) found several statistically significant relationships for analyses by "Career Aspiration Level" @. 171, 172). "Teacherlcoach conflict was related to differences in role skills and attitudinal dispositions demanded in coaching [and in teaching]" @. 164). "Higher aspiration was associated with higher conflict scores, significantly so in the case of Teacherlcoach Conflict" (p. 172). A specific subanalysis revealed that high-aspiring (n = 28) male physical education teacherlcoaches reported significantly higher perceived and experienced load conflict, teacherlcoach conflict, and total conflict than did their low- aspiring (n = 34) peers. The fact that these two studies each found significance for level of coaching aspiration should direct attention to that variable and its relationship to the quality and nature of pedagogical thought and action. Certitude is unjustified at the pre- sent time although speculation is common.

Of course, written responses on the general sociomoral dilemmas of the DIT may not correspond well with moral judgment in situation-specific dilemmas. Part of the in- congruence might be reduced by the development and refinement of an instrument con- taining moral dilemmas specific to the context of pedagogical decisions and actions in physical education. Hall (1981) developed such a tool for athletic contexts.

Another recommendation for future research is to examine and compare the actions of physical education teachers who score high on moral judgment with the actions of those who score low on moral judgment. Lubomudrov, Johnston, and Parsons (1982) found substantial pedagogical differences between female classroom teachers who scored low (P < 25) and those scoring higher (P > 34) on the Defining Issues Test. For example, low-scoring teachers reflected educational perspectives and teaching practices that em- phasized the importance of rules, teacher authority, control of students, one-way teacher domination of interactions, group norms, standardization, and conformity. High-scoring teachers tended to be more student-oriented, democratic, and attentive to individual dif- ferences, and they emphasized student rights, student understanding of rules, and student acceptance of personal responsibility for their own decisions.

Concluding Remarks

The relationship between moral thought and action should eventually be a key consideration in further research. Cognitive developmentalists, and other structural developmentalists, argue that moral judgment is a central component of moral action, although there is generally a lag between the development of moral thought and its conse- quence in action (Kohlberg, 1981). Advanced moral judgment is a necessary but not suf- ficient condition for advanced moral action.

Individuals do not necessarily act in accordance with their thinking (Hartshorne, May, & Shuttleworth, 1930). Unlike the development of moral judgment, moral action

188 HENKEL AND EARLS

is situational and reversible. Moral judgment tends to predict moral action (Reimer, 1977) only for those persons who have attained the most advanced moral judgment (social con- tract or universal ethical principles). Support has been found, however, for the structural- developmental view (Blasi, 1980; Bredemeier & Shields, 1982).

Additional research is needed to determine the validity of structural-developmental frameworks in studying the interrelationships of moral judgment and action of teachers and students in physical education. Alternative methods of research should be considered for examining the qualitative aspects of implicit moral teaching in physical education. An example for further development along these lines is provided by Fine's (1979) research demonstrating both a different conceptual framework and an alternative methodology for studying the moral dimension in sport contexts.

Much progress has been made in thinking about and studying ethical-moral matters in education (Mosher, 1980). In addition to the works previously cited, other resources can aid in further progress in this area (Fraleigh, 1984; Horrocks, 1979; Sprinthall & Bernier, 1977; McIntosh, 1979; Purpel& Ryan, 1976). As has been indicated elsewhere (Giroux & Purpel, 1983; Purpel & Ryan, 1975, 1976; Wicks, 1982), moral influence by educators is inescapable. To ignore that influence is to invite moral rniseducation. ~berteuf- fer (1963) and Williams (1927) cautioned against such neglect. Their writings remind us to not be so exclusive in our rightful concern about the unique contribution of physical education-the skill versus fitness debate-that we fail to make worthy contributions to the concomitant moral outcomes for which all teachers are unavoidably responsible.

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