the moral relativism of privacy and the social construct of whatsapp

Online Access: www.absronline.org/journals

*Corresponding author: André. A. Gomes de Souza, PhD Candidate at Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, United Kingdom. E-Mail: [email protected]

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Management and Administrative Sciences Review

Volume 4, Issue 5

Pages: 801-812

September 2015

e-ISSN: 2308-1368

p-ISSN: 2310-872X

The Moral Relativism of Privacy and the Social Construct of WhatsApp.

André. A. Gomes de Souza

PhD Candidate at Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, United Kingdom

Privacy seems to be interpreted differently by professionals and scholars of different disciplines. This essay suggests the adding the concept of moral relativism to Solove’s description that ‘privacy is a concept of disarray’. This provides an additional parameter. Moral relativism stresses that none of the scholars or professionals who have tried to explain the notion of privacy is right or wrong, but rather they are influenced by the social context they find themselves in. This essay uses this theoretical framework to produce a short case study on WhatsApp Messenger, a free application for cross-platform mobile messaging and available across mobile phone makers and allows encrypted communication between end-user. SCOT (social construct of technology) advocates that social groups understand artefacts differently and pursue shaping them based upon their dissimilar systems of meaning. This essay has identified a particular parallel between the concept of SCOT and moral relativism. Both concepts are influenced by the social context the actors find themselves in.

Keywords: Privacy, Whatsapp., Moral relativism,

INTRODUCTION

This paper is an effort to combine the theoretical framework of ‘privacy is a concept of disarray’, provided by Daniel J. Solove, with the notion of moral relativism. Additionally, it takes advantage of the four components of SCOT proposed Wiebe E. Bijker and Trevor Pinch to investigate the artefact WhatsApp. Although, this essay lacks empirical evidence to challenge or to validate the abstract suggestion put forward by the author, it highlights the importance of the role played by the social context and the social background of the actors interacting with technological artefacts. Privacy

seems to be interpreted in different ways by professionals and scholars of different disciplines. By looking at the concept of privacy through the lens of moral relativism, it is implicitly accepted that none of the frameworks are right or wrong, but the concepts are influenced by the social context they are developed within. Even though the concept of SCOT and moral relativism are two very diverse frameworks, they both have one parameter in common – the actors are influenced in both cases by the social environments they find themselves in.

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Manag. Adm. Sci. Rev. e-ISSN: 2308-1368, p-ISSN: 2310-872X Volume: 4, Issue: 5, Pages: 801-812

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The next section of this essay, section 2, discusses the theoretical frameworks of: ‘a concept of disarray’, ‘moral relativism’, ‘digital panopticon’, ‘surveillance and privacy’ and ‘social construct of technology’. The third section introduces the case study WhatsApp. In the fourth, the case study is related to the theoretical framework. Finally, some limitations of this work are highlighted, further studies are suggested and all points are drawn together in the conclusion.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A concept of Disarray

According to Solove (2006/2008), “[p]rivacy is a concept of disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means.” Solove’s argument reflects the considerable number of scholars trying to tackle the challenge of defining privacy. It is not unreasonable to suggest that there are as many meanings for the word/concept of privacy as there are scholars/professionals trying to define it. Various definitions for privacy have been posited over the years, and it’s been defined in terms of “right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis, 1890), control over personal information (Westin, 1967), the construction of one’s identity (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997), informational self-determination (Rouvroy and Poullet, 2009), or contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2008). More generally it seems hard to deny that privacy is a compound, complicated idea, making it very difficult to master with a single theoretical approach. It is risky to conceptualise privacy, as any one classification, as this could dwindle its other contexts and implications (Gutwirth, 2002). One the one hand, this echoes how Robert Post (2001) defined it, as “complex, […] entangled in competition and contradictory dimensions”. On the other hand, the philosopher Judith J. Thomson (1975) has claimed that “[…] nobody seems to have any clear idea what it is”. For Solove (2002/2008), these innumerous frameworks advanced by professionals/scholars of different disciples are “either to narrow (solely focusing on information, or access to the self) or too broad (the right to be left alone).” Furthermore, the rhetoric assesses privacy by detaching one or more common “essential” or “core” aspects of privacy. Solove posits that privacy belongs to the realm of terms which encompass an array of dissimilar connected

things (Solove, 2006). Therefore, the author tries to explain the concept of privacy by exploring the notion of “family resemblances” (1922) articulated by the Austrian Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Solove (2006) advocates that one views privacy as a social issue, and although many of the definitions have been insightful, overall there has been a lack of clarity and direction. Hence the disarray of definitions offered. For the sociologist Barrington Moore (1984) there would be no need for privacy without the social, as privacy is socially constructed. Privacy has to be studied as a problem rather than as “necessary and sufficient conditions” (Solove, 2002/2006/2008). Judges, politicians, businesspeople, government officials and scholars were repeatedly unsuccessful in their attempts to competently frame the issues that privacy challenges us to focus on (Solove, 2002). Privacy concerns are often not well propounded, thus we are generally short of a convincing interpretation of what is actually put on the line for society as whole when privacy is risked. An important point sometimes overlooked is what action should be undertaken to elucidate these issues (Solove, 2008). Privacy harms have only been understood in a very specific setting. If we are to understand privacy in its digital context we need to revise and radically change the way we look at privacy (Solove, 2004).

We have beheld a deterioration in civil privacy and, in particular, online privacy. The advancement in technology has given some private and governmental agencies a variety of tools for social surveillance. As Solove (2008) has pointed out, “the development of new technologies kept concern about privacy smoldering for centuries, but the profound proliferation of new information technologies during the twentieth century-especially the rise of the computer-made privacy erupt into a frontline issue around the world.”

The Digital Panopticon

Surveillance has grown into a significant focus area for theory, and this attention overlaps with the rise in the monitoring of citizens in Western society (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). Judge Richard A. Posner (1999) described surveillance as “a tool of social control […]”. After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration surreptitiously approved that the National Security Administration (NSA) undertake


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warrantless wiretapping of American citizen’s telephone calls (Solove, 2007) questioning constitutional legitimacy (Eggen, 2007). There were also reports on the compiling the largest telephone call database the world has ever seen (Solove, 2007). The number of private agencies collecting personal information is remarkable (Regan, 1986). These digital data are also progressively flowing from the private sector (firms and financial bodies) to law enforcement agencies (Regan, 1986; Solove, 2004/2007). The 9/11 terrorist attacks gave law enforcement agencies the needed justification to expand personal information gathering, known as data mining, as this data is one of the main apparatuses used in the ‘War on Terror’ (Solove, 2004). Benoît Dupont (2008) refers to it as “The Democratization of Surveillance”.

In a society where most of our interaction with the outside world are digital, the growth of state surveillance can also to be inferred as the expansion of the ‘panopticon’ (Bentham, 1787; Foucault, 1977). It is not surprising then that we are seen, but we do not see – we are the objects of information (Foucault, 1977). Dupont (2008) observes that “[s]urveillance studies scholars have embraced Foucault’s panopticon as a central metaphor in their analysis of online monitoring technologies.” Mathiesen Thomas (1997) offers some criticisms of and limitations to the concept of the panopticon in relation to today’s surveillance by referring to “synopticism”.

For Michael Foucault (1977) the panopticon “must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men”. Solove describes the panopticon as a tool to preserve order; it aims to maintain disciple and to prevent conspiracies and uprisings, to inspire total submissiveness. It attains its authority by a particular methodology of surveillance (Solove, 2004). In this context Foucault, (1977) contends “surveillance is permanent in its effect, even if it discontinuous in its actions”. Thus, the Internet embodies the worst fears of a panopticon – cheap total surveillance (Lessig, 2006).

On the one hand, Foucault argues that (1977) “[…] all the authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode, that of binary division and branding (mad/insane, dangerous/harmless, normal/abnormal) […]”. On

the other hand, Dupont (2008) claimed that this is one of the major reasons for the recent rise in the usage of encrypted communication by the average citizen. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) build on this argument:

The rhizome is [...] a map and not a tracing. [...] It fosters connections between fields [...]. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions. […] Perhaps the most important characteristic of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entry ways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back ‘to the same’.

It is interesting to speculate that binary divisions of the contemporary digital communication are a combination or one of the following on its own: panopticon/rhizome, surveillance/privacy and/or what Paul Ohm (2008) has described as possible/probable.

Surveillance and Privacy

Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, some members of the government, particularly in the US and Britain, advocated that it would be necessary to exchange some personal privacy for greater national security through increased government surveillance. Considering that the security vs. privacy trade-off seems to be impartial favouring security, especially when public security is fragile. Therefore there is reason for citizens to feel alarmed that they may be forced to give up some of their essential rights and freedoms, including privacy (Chandler, 2009). When citizens feel fear over potential external threats they are very likely to swap some of their rights to privacy for so-called ‘national security’. This in turns correlates with the citizens’ trust in their government – the higher the trust in a government the more likely it is that citizens are willing to exchange privacy for security (Davis and Silver, 2004). There is some evidence in the research of mass beliefs about democracy and civil liberties showing that the context within which the exchange of privacy for security happens is crucial. While awareness of the approval for the intellectual principles of democracy is imperative, central too is the degree of commendation for democratic standards, particularly when these values are in conflict with other essential values (Gibson, 1987; Peffley et al., 2001; Sniderman et al., 1996).


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For the average population of a country during conventional periods, questions of civil liberties are likely to be isolated from quotidian experience, but in certain settings concerns about civil liberties have direct repercussions for people’s perception of liberty and welfare (Gibson, 1989; Gibson and Bingham, 1985; Gibson and Gouws, 2000). The conflicting subjects in the civil liberties vs. security trade-off are, therefore, central to the notion of democracy as represented in the Bill if Rights. Citizens should be bulwarked from their government in a democracy. If a government initiative conflicts with the rights of a citizen, it is anticipated that the common opinions of governments, such as faith in a government and patriotism, perform a crucial role in reinforcing people’s motivation to exchange civil liberties for security (Davis and Silver, 2004).

If the information mechanism generates control and the aggregated information consciousness radically increases that authority, citizens are right to think twice before exchanging privacy for security. One manifestation of power is the capability to claim access to information about others while protection one’s own personal information. Governments and businesses are notorious when it comes to keeping their information secret. However, they demand or find ways (whether legal or illegal) to gather information on citizens (Moore, 2011). Technologies are currently being embraced for mainstream use in a diversity of settings for surveillance. An important issue sometime overlooked is as the exact position of a person can be determined by new tracking technology, citizens are at risk of being on the radar of governments and corporations as they move along during their day. This shift in paradigm means that today surveillance and privacy have profound implication on a person’s life (Uteck, 2004). As data mining and profiling are increasingly been conducted by governmental agencies and private sector institutions, a large numbers of citizens are distressed by the alleged loss of control of their personal data. These agencies have the access and are able to store a very large volume of information on ordinary citizens, whether this is for governmental intelligence or business use (Moore, 2011). The issue is pertinent where there are no defined walls to ensure privacy for citizens. The difficulties of articulating these privacy concerns are in counterpoint to the digital surveillance

agenda. The dominance of the anytime/anywhere paradigm in a networked society contributes to the view that we are residing under constant surveillance, and that the privacy of citizens is increasingly vulnerable (Uteck, 2004).

According to Kenneth E. Himma, “[t]he most important value protected by security comes into conflict with the most important value protected by information privacy; the result in this case is that the security interest is more important” (Himma, 2007). The Internet’s introduction of global anonymous communication, which is associated with freedom of speech, is of particular relevance to this (Lipschultz, 2000). Anonymity enables whistle-blowers and political activists to communicate opinions and provides a space for citizens, in particular in authoritarian countries, to articulate their ideas without fear of repercussions (Lepage, 2006; Lamy, 2000). For instance, fear of discrimination may stop a citizen from seeking help. Mohamed Chawki (2006) states that “[a]nonymity allows information gathering about a diversity of issues.”

Nevertheless, the so-called “security trumps” view, explains that when privacy and security clash, security wins. Thus, security seems to be more important than privacy when citizens have to weigh one against the other (Himma, 2007). Adam D. Moore (2011) argues that there is a logic to this:

In the typical case, security protects fundamental rights, the most important of which is the right to life. Privacy may protect important interest, but these interests will never rise to the level of security of life and limb.

Again, the assertion that security trumps privacy is believed to disclose a more instinctive, although, superficial, notion that security and privacy are comparable (Himma, 2007). To Bagby (2009), the situation is more complex:

The public policies of privacy and security are widely misunderstood. A better grasp of these public policy pressures could vastly improve the effectiveness of privacy and security regulation while preserving the some of the interest in both camps.

Himma (2007) sums up “Since the slogan that security trumps privacy entails that when security and privacy are in some sort direct conflict, security


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defeats privacy, it follows that privacy is not absolute.”

Moral Relativism

According to Katinga et al. (2012), moral relativism correlates with a multiplicity of very diverse thoughts. The authors continue “[…] holds that descriptive, prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of prescriptive terms such as ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘ought,’ etc., (e.g., their use, legitimacy, or meaning) are relative to a moral view. Moral relativism denies the most fundamental belief of moral argumentation – the hypothesis that two opposing realities/moralities cannot be right at the same time (Rashdall, 1914; Cook, 1999). For Philip Brey (2007), the concept of descriptive moral relativism is under the umbrella of moral relativism. The author reasons, “[d]escriptive moral relativism is the position that a matter of empirical fact, there is extensive diversity between the values and moral principles of societies, groups, cultures, historical periods and individual […]”. The fact that different cultures and groups within a society accept and are loyal to idiosyncratic moral criteria advocates that morality is relative (Sheehy, 2006). Gilbert Harman (1996) argues moral relativism replicates and enlightens something about the form one respond to the behaviours of others. The author (1996) continues, “[t]he moral relativist supposes that there are various moral frameworks from which moral issues can be judged and that none of these frameworks is objectively privileged […]”.Thus, to profess moral relativism is to presume that there is more than one true morality.

Social Construct of Technology

To Jannis Kallinikos (2004) technology is socially constructed and technological artefacts are interpretable and reshapeable. Digital networks are entrenched in the technical qualities and principles of a system, in the societal construct and the power dynamics these networks find themselves in (Latour, 1991; Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1999; Lovink and Riemens, 2002). The complementary and convoluted liaison of technology and society is an object of tenacious matter in the intellectual account of techniques (Kallinikos, 2004). Technology is socially composed, so that its concepts and forms are mainly driven by the interpretative contexts and dialogues of relevant

social groups (Cadili and Whitley, 2005). A major element in the concept of the ‘social construct of technology’ (SCOT) is the notion of ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). This interpretative flexibility that surrounds any technological tool can be conceptualised in many different ways in terms of how it functions. In short, interpretative flexibility is the way in which viewing a technology, it can mean ‘different things to different actors’ (Law and Callon, 1992). The process of interpretative flexibility not only happens during the development of artefacts, but it evolves during the implementation and the application of those technologies by the users (Kline and Pinch, 1999; Williams and Edge, 1996). Thus, technological arrangements encompass chaotic, complicated and analytical elements (Hughes, 1989). Numerous, commonly related theories have been put forward to portray these processes – labeled as ‘social technical system’ (Hughes, 1983), ‘sociotechnical constituencies’ (Molina, 1989), ‘sociotechnical ensembles’ (Bijker, 1993/1995b.), and finally, the actor-network (Law and Callon, 1992).

As time passes, users detect issues with the tools, improvements are put in place and contextual demands get incorporated into the design. Once all issues have been address the state of ‘closure’ is reached (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). In some cases, there is conflict between stakeholders about the meaning of a tool. In such a scenario, the condition of ‘closure’ it is only achieved if the meaning of the most dominant group is embedded, a compromise is reached between the stakeholders, or some kind of forking is installed (Bijker, 1987). According to W. E. Bijker (1995a.), there is flexibility with regards closure:

Exploring the role of relevant social groups gave us a basis for understanding the concept of interpretative flexibility with respect to artifacts […] The process of closure is generally, but not absolutely, irreversible.

CASE STUDY (WhatsApp)

WhatsApp Messenger is a free application for cross-platform mobile messaging and available across mobile phone makers. It enables users to communicate with each other free of charge; the only criterion is the access to an Internet connection


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(4G/3G or Wi-Fi). WhatsApp enables users to send text, photos, audio or video messages. WhatsApp is particularly popular with users who do not have unlimited text message allowances.

What makes WhatsApp so appealing for this essay is that it allows encrypted communication between end-user; therefore, WhatsApp has caused a lot of polemics across the globe, including in Britain. WhatsApp is forbidden in countries such as Russia and China. David Cameron has revealed his effort to consent to law enforcement agencies being able to store traffic data and access the content of communications. The Prime Minister has also pronounced upon his fears concerning encrypted communications and spoken out in favour of outlawing the use of end-to-end encryption, including WhatsApp.

DISCUSSION

The discussion of the literature and the case study is two-fold. It is important to point out that this essay does not attempt to resolve the difficult questions associated with determining whether privacy genuinely conflicts with security interests and how to resolve those conflicts. It aims to illustrate alternative ways to look at privacy. Therefore, this essay extends the notion of ‘privacy is a concept of disarray’ by adding to Solove’s theoretical framework the idea of moral relativism. Additionally, this work uses the concept of SCOT to grasp the WhatsApp artefact in more detail.

Disarray and Relativism

The concept of moral relativism is broadly applied to question expressions such as right and wrong or ought and should. It is widely held that moral relativism is a concept used to explain differences in moral values and perceptions between different cultures or groups within a culture. This paper does not want to disagree as there is empirical evidence to prove its credentials. More importantly, this paper suggests an extension of the notion of moral relativism to the concept of ‘privacy’. It is not to say that the notion of disarray provides an incomplete set of conceptual tools to analyse privacy, but rather that moral relativism offers an alternative way to understand why privacy means different things for different social groups.

The writing of Philip Brey (2007) has shown that the term of “privacy’ in certain non-Western cultures, in particular in Asia, traditionally has negative connotations. This has changed through Western influence. In other cases new meanings or connotations have been recently implemented in the vocabulary of certain languages to adapt to new needs. What is really remarkable is that some Western societies are going through a major paradigm shift. Information and communication technologies (ICT) are forcing societies to reinvent themselves. As a result, the notion of privacy also has to be reinvented. Therefore, the concept of moral relativism offers an alternative way to conceptualise privacy. The concept of moral relativism is not a key proposition for policy makers; it will not help the judiciary make better judgments, but it does enable citizens to understand that when it comes to privacy there is nothing such as right or wrong but rather actors within different culture and groups within cultures, who view the concept in a particular way.

Considering Berit Broggard assertion that (2008) “[r]elativism takes a statement of reality to be genuinely relative: that is, there is no act of the matter as to whether the utterance is simply true or false.” The quote above offers additional grounds to extend the concept of ‘moral relativism’ to the notion of privacy. What are the arguments to strengthen this proposition? As the title already implies, A Concept of Disarray by Solove (2008) highlights a problem of conception – professionals and scholars from different disciplines, who therefore approach privacy from different realities, understands privacy differently. By observing privacy through the lens of moral relativism it can be understood that none of the concepts scrutinised by Solove (2008) are right or wrong, but rather they are built upon the moral background of the different actors.

Last but not least, to say that moral relativism, in particular descriptive morality, is the same as language would be to exaggerate. But they do have some similarities (Harman, 1996). Words can be used in more than one way, and, depending on the usage, they are understood differently (Harman, 1975). Just as some of us use the term privacy in a very particular way, moral theorists may want to perceive privacy in a narrower or broader way. The moral relativist understands that there are many


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different ways to view the world, and many other ways in which morals can be adjudicated. The question then becomes, can one use the word privacy? The most important thing to note is that according to moral relativism, none of these frameworks is absolutely right or wrong (Harman, 1996). The disparity is not an issue to be defeated, but rather it is a way to see and perceive the world around us. The principles by which we judge morality or assess it are not unconditional, general, or absolutely objective, but they rather depend on the background of the individual or his/her community (Sheehy, 2006).

WhatsApp and SCOT

The aim of this section is to relate the software WhatsApp to the four-part conceptual framework of SCOT (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). This paper contributes to literature on the social construct of technology by applying the SCOT model to a software for encrypted communication. Encrypted communication has been the topic of recent debates, in particular, due to its potential usage by criminal organisations or terrorist groups. This essay is not a discussing of the negative or positives applications of encrypted communication by different actors, but rather shows how the SCOT model can assist to grasp an artefact in more detail, and highlight how an artefact is shaped and shapes the different social groups interacting with it.

First, the “Interpretative Flexibility”. This concept is based upon the empirical curriculum of relativism (Collins, 1975; Pinch, 1977/1986; Pickering, 1984) in the social studies of science. It advocates the idea that “technology design is an open process that can produce different outcomes depending on the social circumstances of development” (Klein and Kleinman, 2002). According to Bijker, “[t]he Interpretative Flexibility of an artifact can be demonstrated by showing how, for different social groups, the artifacts presents themselves as essentially different artifacts” (Bijker, 1994: 76). How can this be explained? We can explore this by reflecting on the recent comments by David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, on encrypted communication, and the reaction that followed from the private sector. An important point that was highlighted by the mainstream media and some members of the private is that, due to an innumerous array of uses for encryption by

different parties (both members of private and members public sector), there are difficulties to conducting business in general without this type of technology. It needs to be highlighted that the technology used by WhatsApp is also used by almost all bank transactions, and for some classified communications by institution such as MI5. To sum up, for the Prime Minister this type of technology is used for terrorism; for businesses this technology is essential for daily business procedure. Here, we can observe how the same technology can mean very different thing for two different actors or social groups. The critical question as to whether WhatsApp, or encryption in general, will be mostly used for a so-called ‘noble causes’ or be applied by terrorist groups or criminal organisations will remain unanswered in this paper, but could be addressed by further studies.

The notion of relevant social group is the second element of SCOT. Trevor J. Pinch and Bijker (1987) argue that “all members of a certain share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artifact (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). Here follows a very broad characterisation of this argument. Let us consider two politically opposed groups. One group believes that all communication should be totally private, unable to be intercepted by anyone, not even government agencies trying to catch terrorist. This particular group believes that there should be a platform where they can express themselves in total privacy. This group of people forms a social group who sees WhatsApp as an important tool for freedom of speech, therefore, indispensable in a democratic society. On the other hand, there is a rather conservative group of people who sees such an artefact as a threat for society as whole. They see such a platform as space for criminals or terrorists, who want to plot the next big act.

The third factor of SCOT is closure and stabilisation. Klein and Kleinman (2002) explore this:

“A multigroup design process can experience controversies when different interpretations lead to conflicting images of an artifacts. Design continuous until such conflicts are resolved and the artifact no longer poses a problem to any relevant social group. The multigroup process achieves closures, no further design modification occur, and the artifact stabilizes in its final form […] closure by definition occurs when unresolved problems are


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redefined so that they no longer pose problems to social groups.”

In his recent speech against encryption, David Cameron mentioned that organisations engaging in encrypted communication should let a ‘window’ open for law enforcement agencies. This ‘key’ to the encryption of a communication would enable government agencies to decipher the communications in case of national security issues. The main proposition of David Cameron was not to give criminal organisation and terrorist groups a ‘safe space’ for communication. The only problem for this ‘window’/‘key’ is that other groups, that should not have the access to the communication, would be able to access it. To some extent, one social group is asking for a window to be opened up for future access when necessary. One the other hand, the other actors understand that same technology as system that allows total privacy of communication between users. Therefore, in this case, the design of an artefact for encrypted communication is still under conflicting interpretations from the two social groups, and has not yet reached closure and stabilisation.

The fourth is the wider context. Klein and Kleinman (2002) define the wider context as: “the wider sociocultural context and political milieu in which artifact development takes place […] The background conditions of groups interactions, such as their relations to each other, the rulers ordering the interactions, and the factors contribution to the differences in their power, remain largely invisible.” Although the fourth component has played a minor role in the initial model of Pinch and Bijker (1987) the following example will explain the fourth and final element of the SCOT model. In a democracy such as Britain, an artefact such as WhatsApp is used casually to communicate with friends and family. Certainly, it cannot be ruled out that some criminal organisations use the artefact to communicate within the organisation. However, my argument is that this platform is taken for granted by most users as we supposedly live in a free democracy. Let us consider the same artefact in a totalitarian country where freedom of speech is oppressed. The same ‘banal’ artefact can spread valuable information between users, or even save lives. To sum up, the wider context in which WhatsApp is used in Britain might differentiate its

use from its application in the social context of a totalitarian regime.

SCOT advocates that social groups understand artefacts differently and pursue shaping them based upon their dissimilar systems of meaning. The awareness of structural issues suggests an opening to grasp the relation of efficacy to a system – its meaning and the importance of meaning in shaping a tool (Klein and Kleinmann, 2002).

LIMITATION AND FURTHER STUDIES

This essay suggests moral relativism as an additional concept to add to Solove’s ‘privacy is a concept of disarray’. However, the concept of moral relativism is used for words such as right or wrong, which have a moral value attached. Moral relativism has been empirically tested with regards to the expression of right or wrong, and there is evidence showing its validity. The usage of term privacy is an abstract proposition, and in the scope of this work it was not possible to test this proposition empirically. Therefore, further studies in the form of qualitative interpretive empirical work could test the validity of this proposed extension, the combination of both frameworks.

The same can be said of the SCOT model applied to the WhatsApp application. There is the need to address the concept empirically. Data about the usage of the artefact within free democracies is easy to acquire, what cannot be said as easily is what the usage pattern is like in countries where such applications are forbidden. Therefore, to validate such a proposition there is the need of true data.

CONCLUSION

By shedding more light on A concept of disarray, it is not difficult to escape the conclusion that Solove has given disproportionate attention to the social context and background of the professionals and scholars who suggested too narrow or too broad a concept of privacy. Therefore, this essay adds to the concept of disarray the notion of moral relativism. Moral relativism stresses that no scholar or professional who tries to explain the notion of privacy is right or wrong, but rather they are influenced by the social context they find themselves in.


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The SCOT model is a great tool to make sense of an artefact such as encrypted communications, in particular WhatsApp. The four elements of SCOT have clearly highlighted how the artefact is shaped and shapes the different actors until it potentially reaches its closure. Additionally, this essay has shown that depending on the social environment, each person gives to the artefact a different meaning. This meaning has a big impact on the way the artefact is used and the importance it has for the individual actors.

Although this paper has discussed two associated but rather diverse issues related to privacy, the essay has identified a very particular parallel between the concept of SCOT and moral relativism. Both models show how meanings are shaped and influenced by the social context the actors find themselves in. The main different between the concepts is that in the case of moral relativism with regards to privacy, the way the actors define privacy has a minimal or zero impact on the person putting forward the definition.

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BIOGRAPHY

André A. Gomes de Souza received MA Creative Media Arts (2013) from the London South Bank University (UK) and a MSc. Management, Information System and Innovation from the London School of Economics and Political Science (2015 (UK). He is a PhD Business and Management Candidate at the Manchester Business School. His field of research is innovation streams within the Hadoop ecosystem, outbound open innovation and open source.

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