the myth of intelligentzia vs bureaucracy in 1978

8/11/2019 The Myth of Intelligentzia vs Bureaucracy in 1978

1/27

University of Glasgow

Intelligentsia versus Bureaucracy? The Revival of a Myth in PolandAuthor(s): Maria HirszowiczSource: Soviet Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), pp. 336-361Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/150702.

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2/27

SOVIE T

STUDIES,

vol.

XXX,

no.

3,

July

1978,

pp.

336-361

INTELLIGENTSIA VERSUS

BUREAUCRACY?

THE REVIVAL

OF

A

MYTH

IN

POLAND

By

MARIA

HIRSZOWICZ

THERE is

a

marked

revival

of

the

concept

of

intelligentsia

in

studies

on

Eastern Europe. Many writers are inclined to believe that it would be

the

intelligentsia

that

might

act

as

a

radical force

against

the

party

bureaucracy.

As

Frank

Parkin

put

it

in

his

penetrating analysis:

In

socialist

society

the

key antagonisms

occurring

at the social level

are

those between

the

party

and

the

state

bureaucracy

on the

one

hand

and

the

intelligentsia

on

the

other. The

power

of

the

former

rests

upon

their control

of the

political

and

administrative

apparatus

of

the

state,

giving

them effective

leadership

to socialised

property.

The

social

power

of the latter

group

inheres

in its conmmand

of the

skills,

knowledge

and

general

attributes

which are held

to be

of

central

importance

for the

development

of

productive

and scientific

forces in

modern industrial

society.

And

introducing

the

concept

of the differentiation

and

polarization

of

elites,

the author

concludes:

Seen

from

this

angle,

equilibrium

could be restored

by

the

accession

to

political

power

of the

intelligentsia

and

the

displacement

of

the

apparatchiki.1

Zbigniew

Byrski

opposed

Soviet

technocrats

to

the humane

intel-

ligentsia,

i.e. social

scientists,

writers,

film

workers,

teachers

and

educators:

Regardless

of their material

situation their

profession requires

a

strong

flow of

fresh

air

into

the

suffocating

climate

of

the

totalitarian

state.

...

The

present

system

makes

it

impossible

for them

to

follow

their

calling.2

F. Parkin, 'System Contradiction and Political Transformation', Archives

Europeennes

de

Sociologie,

tome

XIII,

1972,

p.

51.

For

a discussion

of Parkin's

thesis

see also

D.

Lane,

The Socialist

Industrial

State

(1976),

pp.

92-96.

2

Zbigniew

Byrski,

'The Communist

"Middle

Class"

in USSR

and

Poland',

Survey,

Autumn

1969.

See

also

H.

H.

Ticktin,

'Political

Economy

of the

Soviet

Intellectual',

Critique,

no.

2.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/27

337

A

similar

view

was

expressed

by

an

anonymous

writer

in the Polish

emigre

Kultura,

who

commented:

The

creative

intelligentsia

in the broad

sense

of

the word

face

on

the

one

hand

the

destructive force

of

the

totalitarian

tendency

and on

the other

hand have

the

knowledge

and

intellectual

training

which

allow

them to

interpret

their

difficulties

in

general

social

categories.3

In

contrast

to

these

opinions

the Russian

dissidents

who

speak

about

the Communist

intelligentsia

seem

to

be

full of

criticism and

doubt.

Amalrik

declared that

the Soviet

intelligentsia

is

'on

the

whole

even

more

unpleasant

a

phenomenon

than

the

regime

that

gave

it birth'.4

Solzhenitsyn contends that the old pre-revolutionary Russian intel-

ligentsia

has

been

replaced by

the 'obrazovanshchina'-translated

as 'the

smatterers'--moulded

throughout

the

processes

of

annihilation,

disintegration, corruption,

and

finally

rapid expansion

and reconstruc-

tion of the

educated

strata. Hfe

explains:

The modern

intelligentsia

is

in no

respect

alienated

from the

modern

state:

those

who

feel

that

way,

either in

their

private

thought

or

among

their

immediate

circle

of

friends,

with a

sense

of

constriction,

depres-

sion

and

resignation,

are not

only maintaining

the state

by

their

daily

activities as members of the intelligentsia, but are accepting and

fulfilling

an

even

more

terrible

condition

laid

down

by

the

state:

participation

with their

soul in the

common,

compulsory

lie.5

Another

dissident, Maximov,

formulated

his thesis

about

homo

sovieticus-a man

who

is

docile,

amoral,

anti-social,

anti-democratic,

an

opportunist

mainly

concerned with

organizing

his

own

life without

much

regard

to his

fellow

citizens.6

Kuperman

in

turn

explains:

...

the

Soviet

Intelligent

is

a

semi-intelligent.

He has

no

intrinsic

values; his spiritual culture is popular culture, his spiritual education

is

popular

education....

The truth

is

that

the

Soviet

intelligentsia

long ago

ceased

to exist.

The

remnants

of

the

Russian

intelligentsia

were

processed

by

the Great

Intelligent

of all

times-Joseph

Stalin.

Only

inteligenty

of

the

new mould

were left.7

A similar

verdict

was

passed

a few

years

ago

by

a Polish

sociologist,

Alexander

Gella,

in

respect

of

the

Polish

intelligentsia,

in an

extensive

3

'Polityczna

opozycja

w

Polsce',

Kultura

(Paris),

1974,

no.

11/326,

p.

6.

4

A. Amalrik, 'An open letter to Kuznetsov', Survey, no. 74-75, Winter-Spring

1970,

p.

97-

5

A.

Solzhenitsyn

(ed.),

From Under

the Rubble

(1974),

P.

243.

6

An

interview

with Maximov

(in

Polish), Trybuna

(London),

1977,

no.

21,

p.

12.

7

Yuri

Kuperman,

'No Places

The

Jewish

Outsider

in the

USSR',

Soviet

Jewish

Affairs,

vol.

3,

no.

2

(1973),

p.

I9.



4/27

study8

which

referred

to

the destruction

of

the old

intelligentsia

and the

emergence

of a

mass

society

in which the

intelligentsia

as

a

homogeneous

stratum has practically disappeared.

The

disagreements

are serious

enough

to arouse the

interest of

anyone

who wishes to

understand

the

present

social

and

political

scene

in

Eastern

Europe.

In

our

study

we do

not intend

to

go

beyond

analysing

the Polish

intelligentsia;

but

even that

limited

approach

should make

it

possible

to

test the value

of

the

'intelligentsia

versus

bureaucracy'

hypothesis.

After

all,

educated

Poles have the

reputation

of

being

much

more

independent,

more

individualistic

and

more

rebellious

than

similar

groups

in

other

East

European

countries.

Thus,

if

the 'intel-

ligentsia versus bureaucracy' hypothesis were true, the role of the

Polish

intelligentsia

should be

considerable.

I.

Intelligentsia---the

changing meaning of

a

concept9

Following

the controversies

about the definition of

'intelligentsia'

one

should

bear

in mind

the

ambiguities

which

enter

any concept

related

to

social stratification

in a

process

of

change.

Social

structures

change

and

so do

social evaluations

of

them,

while the

labels and names

retain

a

certain

rigidity

accounting

for

subsequent

conceptual

confusions.

A

survey

of the

history

of Polish

society

in the last

Ioo

years

reveals the

shifts and

transformations

in

the

delineation

of

the

group

referred

to as

'intelligentsia',

on

both the

structural and the

conceptual

level.

a)

Intelligentsia

as

a

specific

social

stratum

Referring

to

the

intelligentsia

in

ninreteenth-century

Poland one

has to

distinguish

two

different

themes

that

go

through

the

history

of

the

concept.

On

the one

hand,

the term

designated

those

who

because

of their education

and

ideology

carried

out

special

social

and

national

functions,

while

on

the other

it

pointed

to

a

relatively homogeneous

status

group.

As

far as the

first

aspect

is

concerned,

A.

Gella

writes:10

The

spiritual

leaders of

the

intelligentsia

never

fought

for their

own

group

interest

and

never

formulated

an

ideology

of

their

stratum.

At

the

same time

they

produced

leaders

for all other

class

movements,

parties

and

ideologies.

However,

it should

be

emphasised

that

those

who

symbolised

the most

characteristics

of

the

intelligentsia

of

8

A.

Gella,

'The

Life and

Death

of

the

Old Polish

Intelligentsia',

Slavic

Review,

March

1971.

9 For a definition compare Zygmunt Lemlpicki, Oblicze duchowe wieku XIX',

Kultura

Wychowanie

,

vol.

I

(1933),

p.

67;

R.

Michels, 'Intellectuals',

Encyclopaedia

of

the

Social

Sciences,

vol.

8;

and K.

Mannheim,

'The Problem of

Intelligentsia',

n

Essays

on the

Sociology of

Culture

(I966).

"o

.A.

Gella

(ed.),

The

Intelligentsia

and

the

Intellectuals

(i

976),

p.

I5.

See

also A.

Gella,

'The

Life

and Death

of the

Old Polish

Intelligentsia'.

338

INTELLIGENTSIA



5/27

Russia

and

Poland were

to be

found

principally

on

the

left

in the

service

of

social

progress,

revolution or

national

independence.

The

public

image

of

the

Polish

intelligentsia

in

the

nineteenth

century

was

certainly

reinforced

by

the

limited

numbers

of

those

who

constituted

it: in the

I87os

there

were

about

5,700

members

of the

intelligentsia

in

Warsaw,

in i882

some

I2,ooo.

And the

nucleus

of

that

intelligentsia

was

even

smaller;

it consisted

of

writers,

journalists,

poets,

historians,

i.e.

those

who

tried

to

make

a

living

in

literature,

journalism

or

teaching.

As S. Kieniewicz

put

it:11

That

community,

ideologically

differentiated,

supplied ideologists

and leaders to all political camps, from the extreme conservative wing

to

the

working-class

parties.

There

was,

however,

something

in

common

that united the

writers,

irrespective

of the

differences

of

opinions:

the

conviction

of

the

superiority

of

their

own

social

group,

of

its

mission

in relation

to the

nation....

Opposing

the

world

of

philistines

on

which he was

dependent

for

his

subsistence,

the

inteligent aspired

in

his

ideas

to the

role

of the

activator and

leader

of

large

masses

of the

nation.

It was

exactly

the

feeling

of

mission

and

of

responsibility

for national

survival that became part of the tradition of the Polish intelligentsia.

The

deeply ingrained

drive

for

national

independence

that

permeated

the

Polish

gentry

and

brought

about the

successive

desperate

uprisings

was

preserved among

the

intelligentsia,

which

became

the

leading

force

in

the

fight

for

national

identity by cultivating

and

developing

the

cultural

heritage

as the

only

national link

in

partitioned

Poland.

These

were functions

which

went

beyond

the

'professionalism'

which

developed

at

that

time

in

the

West,

and

they

became

incorporated

in

the

self-image

of the

nineteenth-century

intelligentsia.

The great and real contribution of the intelligentsia consisted in

creating

the

cultural

forms and institutions which

were

later

directly

incorporated

in

the

system

of the

Polish State. There were

schools,

libraries,

scientific

associations,

universities and

archives,

journals

and

publishing

houses,

theatres and

museums,

operas

and

philharmonic

orchestras;

there

was

a

national

literature,

Polish

science

and

arts,

there

were

political parties,

educational and

social

movements,

there

were

close

contacts

with

intellectual

life

in the West and direct

ties

among

artists,

writers

and

academic

teachers that

cut across the

frontiers of the partitioned areas.12

The character

of the

Polish

intelligentsia

was

determined,

however,

11

S.

Kieniewicz,

Historia Polski

I875-I9I8

(PWN, 1969),

pp.

318-19.

12

B.

Suchodolski,

'Kultura okresu

niewoli',

Literatura,

24

November

1977.

YS.

B

UREA UCRAC

Y?

339



6/27

not

only

by

its

calling

and

by

its national

functions

but

also

by

its

social

origin,

by

its cultural

affiliation with the

past

and

by

its

marginal

position

in

a

post-feudal

society.l3

In nineteenth-century Poland the emergence of the 'intelligentsia'

was

directly

associated

with

the

migration

of the

Polish

gentry

to

towns

and their

entry

into

new

occupations. Subject

to

massive

dispossession

as

a

result

of successive

uprisings,

tsarist

policies

and

pressure

of

economic

circumstances,

they

protected

their

status

by

clinging

to

non-manual

jobs

and

filling

the

ranks

of

professionals.

In

a

study

of

the social

composition

of the Polish

intellectuals

in

the nineteenth

and

early

twentieth

centuries,

J.

Szczepaiiski

offered

the

following

estimate

of their

origin:14

Gentry 57'1%

Intelligentsia

23

o0%

Bourgeoisie

9'2%

Petty

bourgeoisie 6'2%

Peasantry

4'1

%

The

origin

in the

Polish

gentry

and the

prestige

attached to it

made

the

Polish

intelligentsia

status-conscious,

accounted

for

its

jealously

guarded

code

of

conduct and

generated

a

great

deal

of

snobbery.

Peasants,

workers, merchants,

Jews,

were

regarded

as

inferior,

and

status

symbols

manifested themselves in

etiquette,

in the

proliferation

of

titles,

in

dignified

garments

and in

emphasis

on those social

skills

and

arts

which were

part

of

upbringing.

Some

of these

features have been

analysed

in a series of

fascinating

studies

by

Jozef

Chalasiiski.l5

The fear

of

social

degradation, rejection

of and

lack

of

ties

with

the

alternative

culture

of

the

peasantry

and

urban

lower

classes,

desperate

clinging

to

the

feudal

sense

of

respect-

ability,

were-according

to

Chalasiriski-the

ingredients

of

the

sub-

culture

of

the

rank-and-file

intelligentsia

in

Poland.

The

focal

institution

around which the entire life of the intelligentsia clustered was, according

to

Chalasifiski,

the

'social

circle'

(or

'society').

Without a

position

in

'society'

there

was

no

status

of

the

member

of

the

intelligentsia-that

position

was

part

of

the

customary

definition

of

the

inteligent

. . .

Inteligent

as a

social

type

combines

(i)

a

social

13

See A.

Hertz,

'The

Case

of

an Eastern

European

Intelligentsia', Journal

of

Central

European

Affairs,

vol.

1I

(195).

See also

St.

Brzozowski,

Legenda

miodej

Polski

(Lwow,

19

I).

14

J.

Szczepaiski,

'Materialy

do

charakterystyki

ludzi

swiata

naukowego

w XIX

i

poczatkach

XX

w.',

in

Odmiany

czasu

terazniejszego

(KiW, 1971),

pp.

50-5I.

15

Spoleczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej (1946);

PrzeszloSc

i

przysztosc

inteligencji

polskiej (1958);

'Kultura

i

osobowosc w

nowoczesnym

spoleczefistwie',

Kultura

i

spoleczenstwo,

1970,

no.

i;

'Droga

do

wiedzy:

autonomiczna osobowosc i

problem

narodu',

Kultura

i

spoleczenrstwo,

971,

no.

I.

INTELLIGENTSIA

340



7/27

position

of the member

of

a

higher

social and

cultural

stratum

with

(2)

an

intellectual

culture,

but

a

culture

of

laymen

and

not

profession-

als, the style of which was shaped by values useless from the utilitarian

point

of

view,

but

characteristic

for

the

past

culture

of the court and

aristocracy.16

b)

Intelligentsia

in

a

changing

society

In the interwar

period

stratification

became

more

complicated::

there

was a

rapid

increase

in

the

number

of

people

in

non-manual

occupations,

the boundaries

between members

of

the

intelligentsia

and

the

rest

of

society

became

blurred

and

the

influx

of

members

of

national

minorities and of those of 'lower class' origin into the

profession

affected

the

homogeneity

of the

intelligentsia.

According

to

Janusz

Zarnowski,

the

number

of

people engaged

in

white-collar

occupations

in

the

years

1921-39

was as

follows:17

The 'real'

white-collar

employees

intelligentsia

in

subordinate

unctions-

1921

2I0,000

315,000

1931

250,000

460,000

1939 300,000 500,000

It

is

interesting

that

Zarnowski

had to draw

the

line between

the

'real'

intelligentsia

and

others

in non-manual

occupations-a

distinction

that

was

hardly

relevant

in the

nineteenth

century

because

of

the

more

homogeneous

social

background

of

the

group.

The

composition

of the

student

body

in

the

interwar

years,

of

whom

about

one-third

belonged

to the 'lower

classes',

i.e. the

workers and

lower

functionaries,

the

peasants

and

the

petty bourgeoisie,'8

marked the

passing

of

social

homo-

geneity

as

a

feature

of

the

Polish

intelligentsia.

In the

professions

there was a considerable

proportion

of minorities:

Jews

made

up 21.5%

of

Poland's

professional

classes

(as

compared

with

9'8%

of

Jews

in

the

total

population

and

27%

of

Jews

in the urban

population),

with

the

proportions ranging

from

56%

among

doctors and

33'5%

among lawyers

to

i'8%

in

public

service.19

In

consequence,

one

could

speak

in

a

way

about a

partial

overlapping

of

two different

systems

of

stratification-one based

on status

charac-

teristics and

social

distances attached to

different status

groups

and

the other determined primarily by class and occupational differences..

81

J.

Chalasifiski,

Spoleczna

genealogia

inteligencji polskiej,

pp.

22,

41,

47.

17

J.

Zarnowski,

Spoleczenstwo

drugiej Rzeczypospolitej,

I9I8-I939

(PWN,

I973)p

pp.

197-8.

18

Ibid.,

p.

206.

19

C. S.

Heller,

On the

Edge

of

Destruction

(I977),

p.

io6.

VS.

B

UREA

UCRAC

Y?

341



8/27

The

concept

of

intelligentsia

acquired

henceforth

some

degree

of

ambiguity.

On

the

one

hand,

it

designated

the 'classic' Polish

intel-

ligentsia as a distinctive social and cultural stratum, and, on the other

hand,

it

was

used in a

broader

sense to

denote

all

those who held

a

diploma

from

an

institution

of

higher

learning

or

simply

held

non-

manual

jobs.

The

gap

between

those

in

non-manual

and

in manual

occupations

manifested

itself

in

living

standards,

consumption

patterns

and social

aspirations.

The

average

earnings

of

non-manual

workers

with

primary, secondary

and

higher

education were

respectively

319,

395

and

686

zloty (monthly

earnings

for

men

only)

as

compared

with the

average

income

of

the

manual

worker

of about

170 zloty,

while

many

peasants lived below subsistence level.20

c)

Intelligentsia

as

a

category

related

to

occupational

structure

After

the Second

World War the situation

changed

again.

The

prewar

intelligentsia

was decimated

by

war

and its after-effects.

The

remainder

became

a

minority

among

the

hundreds

of

thousands

of

people

in

white-

collar

jobs.21

According

to most

estimates,

there

were

about

Ioo,ooo

people

in

Poland

immediately

after

the war

who

would

be

regarded

as

intelligentsia

in the broad sense of the word. In

1974

there were

671,000

employees

with

diplomas

of

higher

education

and

2,445,000 employees

with

full

secondary

education.22

The

difference

between

the workers

and

peasants

on

the

one hand and

people

in

lower-rank

white-collar

positions

on

the

other

considerably

decreased,

and

in

many

cases the status distinctions

and status

distances became almost

negligible.

At

the

same time

the

differentiations

among

white-collar

employees

became

quite

considerable

in terms

of

the

prestige

of

higher

education. No wonder that in

these

circumstances

there

is

a

marked

tendency

to

apply

the

concept

of

'intelligentsia' to holders of higher education diplomas and to people in

positions

of

power

and

importance

regarded

as

equivalent

to a

high

professional

standing.

Jan

Szczepaniski,

who

initiated

a

series

of studies

in

the

stratification

of Communist

Poland,

tailored

his

definition

of

intelligentsia

to

the

new

structures:23

The

intelligentsia

is

defined

in

a

society... by

those activities

which are carried out

by

professionally

trained

people.

Our

definition

20

J. ;arnowski,

op.

cit.,

p.

I99.

See

also

M.

Kalecki,

'Porownanie

dochodow

robotnik6w i pracownik6w

umyslowych

z okresu przedwojennego', Kultura i spole-

czenstwo,

1964,

no.

I.

21

For an estimate of

the

war losses

of Polish

culture,

see

J. Szczepanski,

'The

Polish

Intelligentsia',

World

Politics, I962,

no.

3.

22

Rocznik

Statystyczny,

1975,

Table

10/89,

p.

57.

23

Szczepanski, Odmiany

czasu

terazniejszego, p. 98.

INTELLIGENTS.IA

342



9/27

runs

as

follows:

the

intelligentsia

is

an

aggregate

of

various

professional

categories

and it consists

of

people

who

are

engaged

in

cultural

activities,

who

organize

work

and

social

cooperation

and

who

carry

out

jobs

which

require

theoretical

knowledge. Taking

such

a

definition

as a

starting

point,

we

can exclude from

the

intelligentsia

all

those

groups

who

carry

out

non-manual

activities but

from

the

point

of view of other criteria

are

not

different

from

manual

workers.

Jerzy

J.

Wiatr

goes

further

by

linking

the

concept

of

intelligentsia

with

positions

of

high

prestige

and/or

power.

He

refers

to

the

intelligentsia

as not

only

the

intellectuals

and

professionals,

but also

higher-level

managers

of

economic,

political

and cultural

life.

He

argues

that the

common features of these groups are

24

i) higher level of income, which

results

in a

similar

style

of

life;

2)

higher prestige

of

their

professional

functions;

3)

the

non-anonymous

character

of their

activities,

which

makes

them

known

in their

occupational

capacities

to

the wider

public.

The

visibility

of the

intelligentsia

is thus

added

to

its

characteristics.

At

the same

time,

to

distinguish

the

cultural

and scientific

elite,

wider

use

is

made

of

the

term

'creative

intelligentsia'

as an

equivalent

of

the

Western

concept

of

'intellectuals',

as

opposed

to the

rank-and-file

intelligentsia;

but

here

again

the term

has

acquired

a

taint

of

formalism

by being applied

to

professional writers, artists,

research workers and

senior

journalists

irrespective

of

the value of

their

actual

performance,

in

short,

to those whose

occupations

are

bureaucratically

classified

as

creative.25

d)

The

'true'

intelligentsia

In

spite

of the

withering away

of the

status

system

on

which the

concept

of the

intelligentsia

was

originally

based,

the

past

has

survived,

it

seems,

in more

than

one

respect;

not

only

has the

designation

of

intelligentsia remained, but many cultural traits and collective images

of

the

old

intelligentsia

have

been

preserved

and,

surprisingly,

have

generated

a

tendency

to draw a

line

between

'the

true

intelligentsia'

as

opposed

to

the

'pseudo-intelligentsia'

generated

by

the

Communist

order.

The

nineteenth-century concept

of the

intelligentsia

was

thus

revived,

securing

the

preservation

of a

myth

deeply

embedded

in

the

national

24

J.

J.

Wiatr,

Spoleczen'stwo (PWN, 1973),

p.

283.

25

J.

Szczepafiski

writes: 'The set of vocational

categories

I

call the

Intelligentsia

can be divided

into three

groups:

the

creators of cultural

values

(scholars,

artists,

philosophers, composers, moralists, ideologists, etc.); leaders and organizers of social,

civil

and

work life

(politicians,

engineers,

lawyers,

managers,

army

and

police

officers,

civil

servants, etc.); experts, professionals,

teachers and all

those who

apply

scientific

knowledge

to

the solution

of

practical

(vocational)

problems'

(Polish

Sociological

Bulletin, 1961,

no.

1-2,

p.

38).

D

VS.

B

UREAUCRACY?

343



10/27

344

INTELLIGENTSIA

tradition

of

many

East

European

countries. The

components

of this old

concept,

though

not

included

in

sociological

definitions,

affect

the

contemporary understanding of the concept of intelligentsia and explain

the

disparity

between

the

purely

structural distinctions

and

the cultural

meanings

attached to

them.

Alexander

Gella,

who

presented

'The

life

and

death

of

the

Polish

intelligentsia'

in

a

brilliant

essay published

in

I971,

attempted

five

years

later to

define

the

intelligentsia

as

follows:26

The

intelligentsia

stratum

develops

in

a

given

nation when

the

educated members

of

the

establishment

are

unable to

face and solve

the nation's

growing

problem.

In

response,

the

intelligentsia

appears

as a new element of the social structure, asa stratum placed between the

'power

establishment' on

the

one hand

and all other

classes on

the

other....

The

spiritual

case for

the

formation

of

this

stratum

is the

accepted

calling:

struggle

for

fundamental

socio-political

change

and

help

to liberate

the

lower

classes

of

your

nation from

their

eco-

nomic

and

cultural

poverty

and/or

socio-political

oppression.

From

what

has

been

said

it

follows that the

evaluation

of

the

'intel-

ligentsia

versus

bureaucracy' hypothesis depends

primarily

on how

we

define

intelligentsia.

Once we

describe the

intelligentsia

as a

group

of a

particular

social

calling

it is obvious that we

expect

it to be

opposed

to

the bureaucratic

establishment;

vice

versa,

the

pseudo-intelligentsia

or

obrazovanshchina

is

characterized

by

a

conformist attitude

to their

political

masters.

On

the

other

hand,

by

focusing

our

attention

on the educated

strata,

i.e.

on

intelligentsia

in

the

broad sense

of the

word,

we

leave

the

question

of further

specifications

and

qualifications

to

scholarly

analysis.

Will

the

educated

strata

turn

into new mandarins

and become the new

ruling

class,

as

Machajski

predicted

in his

attack

on the

intelligentsia?

Do

they already constitute, or will they develop as, a new social base for

intellectual

dissent? Or-which seems

most

likely-can

we

discern

and

expect

differentiations

among

the

educated

strata,

with

many

options

and

possibilities

inherent

in

the social

sub-systems

to

which

they belong

and

in the social values

they

are

prepared

to

follow?

2. The new

intelligentsia

and the totalitarian

order

At

the close of the

Second

World

War the Polish

intelligentsia

was

far

from

accepting

the

programme

voiced

by

the

Russian-sponsored

government.

Yet in the first

years

the

role

of the

prewar intelligentsia

in

the

economic

and social

reconstruction

was

enormous.

This

was

made

possible by

the

fairly

moderate

Communist

programme

of social

and

26

Gella

(ed.),

The

Intelligentsia

and the

Intellectuals, p. 25.



11/27

political

reform in

the

years I944-47

which

was

based on

the

principle

of

alliance

of the

government

with the

so-called

'working

intelligentsia',

as well as by the relatively limited scope of state interference.

On

the

other

hand,

in

spite

of

political

slogans

about

the broad

front

of

national

unity,

the

Communists

were

prepared

to

reduce the

role

of

the

prewar

intelligentsia

to the

absolute

minimum.27 The

Communist

eminence

grise

Jakub

Berman

in

a

speech

delivered at the

conference

of

the

Communist

intelligentsia

in

1947

presented

the

intelligentsia

as a

group

torn between

the

feudal

past

and the

demands of

social

progress,

split

between

their

loyalty

to

the

prewar

ruling

classes

and

to

the

common

people

with whom

they

had so far

been

unable

to

find

a

common

langu-

age. That was a stereotype forged by the Communist Party on the eve of

the

transition

to a

complete

Stalinist

regime,

a

stereotype

that

implied

tougher

measures

in

the

future.28

It

was

indeed

with

the

progress

of

Stalinization

in Poland that

the

gap

between

the old

intelligentsia

and the

party-state

apparatus

widened

dramatically

to an

extent

that would

fully

confirm the

'bureaucracy

versus

intelligentsia' hypothesis.

Poland

was to

become

a

replica

of

the

Stalinist

state. For the

prewar intelligentsia

the new

policy

meant

a

witch-hunt,

accusations

fabricated

against

'saboteurs'

and

'wreckers'

among engineers

and

other

specialists, purges among

the

teaching

staff

at

the universities where the eminent

professors

were

deprived

of

their

jobs,

crusades

in

offices

in

the

name

of

increased

alertness

against

'class

enemies',

the

instigation

of

children

against

their

parents,

persecution

of

believers

and

banning

from

educational

institutions

of

many

young

people

of

'alien'

class

origin.

However,

if

the old

intelligentsia

felt

estranged

a new

intelligentsia

was

rapidly

produced by

the

party-controlled

schools

and universities.

Young

people

were

processed

through

a

system

of

education

which

proved quite

effective

in

inculcating

new

orientations

and attitudes

among

many

of

them.

Whereas on

the eve

of

full

Stalinization the

Communist

cells

(PPR)

at the

universities

comprised

only

a

few

individuals,

in

the

following

few

years

the

number

of

party

members

among

students and

teaching

staff

rapidly

increased

while the

youth

mass

organization

controlled the

rank-and-file

students

among

whom

new

cadres

of

political

activists

emerged.

The

principle

of cultural

discontinuity

was

the

essence

of

educational

processes.

Polish

history

was

virtually

rewritten,

prewar

books

banned,

most

of the

distinguished

historians,

writers

and

scientists of

the

past

were declared ideological enemies.

27

See Czeslaw

Milosz,

Zniewolony umysl (Paris,

1953).

28

J.

Berman,

'Zagadnienia

pracy

partynej

wsr6d

inteligencji',

Nowe

Drogi,

I947,

no. 2

(March), p. 142.

VS.

B

UREA UCRA

C Y?

345



12/27

This

policy

was facilitated

by

the

mass

recruitment

of

young

people

of

working-class

and

peasant

origin,

their

processing

through fully

party-controlled educational institutions, and massive propaganda

combined

with

political

terror.

Moreover,

the

policy

of

cultural discon-

tinuity

could

easily

feed

on

the

mass

of

graduates

with

technical

education

who added to

the

new

intelligentsia

a

growing proportion

of

people specialized

but little

equipped

to

deal with

social

problems.

Judging by

the

numbers

and

increasing

political

zeal

of

the

youth

organization

activists

and

young

party

members,

the

appeal

of

the new

persuasion

seemed

to

increase

from one

year

to

another. The

party

as

a

ruling

institution had

a lot to offer to

every

individual who was

prepared to commit himself to the implementation of Communist

policies.

There

was

in

the

first

place

an enormous demand

for

qualified

personnel

and

leading

cadres at

every

organizational

level

in

all

sectors

of

the

national

economy.

Almost

everybody

from

among

the faithful

qualified,

since

ideological

requirements

were

more

important

than

academic

record. In

addition,

the

continual

purges

that

were

taking

place

at

that

time enhanced

the chances

for

organizational

careers even

more,

since

young

graduates

with their

unblemished

curricula

vitae

compared favourably with the Communists of the older generation,

whose

complicated

life

stories were

open

to

political

conjectures.

In

many

memoirs

of

young

members

of the

intelligentsia

referring

to

the

years 1949-55

the same stories

appear

of

people

who in their

twenties

were

appointed factory

directors,

chief

engineers,

party

secretaries and

editors

of

important

newspapers.

The

youth

organization

and

the

party

were,

for

many

of

them,

secure channels

of

political,

professional

and

social

mobility, provided they

were

prepared

to

adopt

the

new

ethos

that

implied:

a) unreserved loyalty to, and faith in, the party leadership;

b)

rejection

of

any

personal

or

group

loyalties

which

might

conflict

with

the interests of the

party;

c)

readiness

to

adjust

personal plans

to the

whim

of

the

party

bosses;

d)

abdication

of

one's critical

faculty

and

humble

submission

to

official

ideology.

The

renunciations connected

with

these

requirements might

seem

high

in

terms

of

intellectual

independence,9

job

stability

and

personal

life,

but so were

the rewards. There

was the

feeling

of

belonging

to

the

elite, the taste of

power,

the

joy

of

participation

in a chosen

group

that

was

arbitrarily

reshaping society,

the

privilege

of

prying

into

other

29

See

J.

Chalasifiski,

'Drogi

i bezdroza

socjalizmu

w nauce

polskiej',

Kultura

i

spoleczenstwo,

January-March 1957.

346

INTELLIGENTSIA



13/27

people's

lives,

the

exhilarating

experience

of

acting

beyond

the

law

and

beyond

the

social rules that

limited

the

freedom

of

ordinary

citizens.

The formation of the party intelligentsia in the period of 'revolution

from above'

has not been

fully

explored.

Retrospective

studies

in

Poland

are

mostly

distorted

by

the

attempts

of

those

who

participated

in

political

activities

under

Stalin

to

present

themselves

as victims

and

objects

of

manipulation

rather

than

fully

motivated activists

of

the

movement.

One

general

conclusion

seems, however,

fully

justified:

a

growing

proportion

of

young

graduates

was absorbed

by

the

ruling

institutions.

3.

Professionalization of

the bureaucrats and bureaucratization

of theprofessionals

The

collapse

of

the

Stalinist

regime

in

Poland and the

Polish October

of

1956

are associated in

public

opinion

with

rebellion

of the

intellectuals.

This

is

true with

regard

to

the

'thaw'

immediately

after Stalin's

death,

but

the so-called

'October

movement'

was much wider

in

scope:

it

encompassed

the workers' riots

in

Poznan,

the

spontaneous

mushrooming

of

workers' councils

all over

Poland,

the

disbanding

of

collective

farms

by peasants,

the

formation

of

clubs

of

the

young

intelligentsia

in

provincial

towns,

the

campaign by

parents

to

reintroduce

religious

teaching

at schools, acts of

revenge against unpopular

directors and

many

other events that were

hardly registered

in written

sources

available

to

the

public.

When

Gomulka

came

to

power

he did

his

best

to

bring

the situation

under

control,

the

militant

weekly

Poprostu

led

by young

intellectual

rebels

being

the first direct

victim of

the

offensive launched

against

'revisionism'. Further

steps

aimed

at

reinforcement

of

the

party

and

state

grip

on

society

followed,

but the reaction

of both

party

and

non-

party

intelligentsia

was

surprisingly

mild. The contrast

between

totalitarian control of the Stalinist type and the new regime seemed so

enormous

that the educated strata

appeared quite

satisfied

with

what

had

been achieved.

In

a

small

survey

of the

political

attitudes

of

different

groups

of

intel-

ligentsia

after

October

I956,

A.

Borucki

presented

the

following

figures:30

Attitudes

Totals

N

%/

Positive

Io6

58

Undecided 50 28

Negative

26

14

Total

I82

o00

30

See

A.

Borucki,

Kariery

zawodowe

i

postawy

spoleczne

inteligencji

w

PRL,

r945-

I959

(Ossolineum, x967),

p. I62.

VS.

B

UREA UCRA

CY?

347



14/27

An

ideology

of

political

realism

became the

common

denominator

of

many

otherwise

divergent

views. The

Polish

intelligentsia

concentrated

its efforts on the programme of modernization, rationalization, seculari-

zation

and

Westernization,

which

became

to

some extent the aims

of

official

policy

and found

unqualified

support among

the

educated strata

of all

generations

both

within the

party

and

outside

it.

The return

of

many

eminent

scholars

to

the

universities

and

academic

institutions

marked

a

tremendous

change

in

comparison

with

previous

years.

New

possibilities

were

open

to the

graduates;

rigid ideological

requirements

were

abandoned,

an

open pragmatic approach

increased

the

demand

for

all

kinds

of

specialists

and the

whole

political

structure

gradually

developed along new lines which brought about a complete transfor-

mation

of the

intelligentsia's

position

in

the

post-Stalinist society.

a)

The

quiet

revolution

in the

political

structure

One

of

the

most

characteristic

changes

which as

a

rule

accompany

rapid

economic

development

is

a tremendous increase in the

number

of

non-manual

jobs

and

among

them

of

functions

requiring

higher

education.

In

Poland,

among

the

non-manual

employees

the number

of

graduates

was

3Io,401

in

1964,

405,454

in

I968

and

611,129

in

i973.3:

In 1971 there were about 50,000 people who held Ph.D. degrees, the

research

institutes

employed

about

300,000

people

and

expenditure

on

scientific

research

amounted

to 2'

5%

of the

budget.32

These

developments

have had

a

great impact

on

the

composition

of

the

party

and

state

apparatus.

An

end

has

virtually

been

put

to

the

massive

recruitment

of

workers

and

peasants

to

positions

of

power

and

responsibility,

and

the new

postwar intelligentsia

has

manned

the

available

posts.

The

first

big

reshuffle

took

place

after October

1956

when

many

thousands

of

party

and

state

functionaries

and

army

officers

without adequate education were dismissed. A second, more limited,

reshuffle

occurred in

1968-69

when

a

multitude

of

young

graduate

party

activists,

many

of

them from

Moczar's

following,

climbed

up

the

official ladder.33Another

period

of

rapid

advancement

of

young people

holding

university

and

technical

diplomas

occurred

in

conditions

of

the

economic

and

administrative

expansion

under

Gierek.

In

short,

the

intelligentsia

has entered the

apparatus,

participates

in the

exercise

of

power

and

enjoys

the

privileges

reserved

for the

ruling

bureaucracies.

This

process

is

reflected in

the

growing

strength

of the

professionals

in the party. In

1961

there were in the party 68,000 engineers, 45,000

1

Rocznik

Statystyczny,

1975,

p.

5.8.

32

Boguslaw

Rein, 'Kadry

i

baza materialna

nauki',

Nowe

Drogi,

1974,

no.

S.

33

See.

C. S.

Heller,'

"Anti-Zionism"

and

the Political

Struggle

within the

Elite

of

Poland',

Jewzih

Journal

of

Sociology,

vol.

II,

no.

2,

19

December

i969.

348

INTELLIGENTSIA



15/27

VS. BUREA

UCRACY?

349

economists,

43,000

teachers,

and

2,ooo

doctors

and

pharmacists.34

In

1973

there

were

255,ooo

engineers,

35,000

specialists in

agriculture,

144,000 teachers,

13,000

doctors, i5,000 professors and lecturers, and

II5,000

economists and

accountants. While

party

membership

doubled

in

the

years

1960-73

the

number

of

professionals

in the

comparable

groups

grew

three or more

times.35

The massive

advance of the educated strata

through

the

bureaucratic

channel

of

the state

and

party

was

accompanied

by

a

new

social

per-

spective

on stratification.36

For

example,

in

the

early

sixties

a

public

opinion

poll

revealed

that the level

of

education

was

regarded

as

second

among

the

factors

shaping

social

divisions

in

Poland

(difference

in

income being the first), in 1976 the majority of respondents placed

education

as

third

and

the

differences between

supervisory

and

ordinary

jobs

came

second.

Most

respondents

drew

a

clear

line

between manual

and

non-manual

occupations,

and

only

12%

declared

that

they

saw

no

difference between

the two.37

Income

figures

do

not

help

to

explain

these

attitudes

as

the incomes

of the

non-manual

workers

averaged

I

I

I

?%

in

I965

and

112%

in

i967

of

the

average

manual

wage.38

The difference between

the

incomes

of

the different

strata

of

non-

manual

workers

is much more

significant

since the

respective

indices

were I64 for engineering and technical personnel and

Io6

for

office

personnel.39

In

other

words,

the

ordinary

office

employee

is no better

off

than

the

worker

and,

as

some

studies

prove,

does

not

perceive

his

situation

as

any

better

than that

of the

manual

labourer,40

but those

who

carry

out

specialized

functions

and

especially

those

at the

higher

level

of

the

bureaucratic hierarchies

belong

to

the

higher

income

bracket,

or

at

least

share some

of the

fringe

benefits available

in the

world

of

state

institutions.

Andrzej

Mozolowski,

in an

article

published

in

Polityka,

complained

that he

was

virtually

unable

to find

exact

data

about

incomes

of the richest

groups

in

Poland,

but

he

pointed

out

that not

only private

entrepreneurs

and suburban

market

gardeners

but also civil

engineers

working

in

planning

bureaux,

film

producers,

doctors,

scientists,

high

officials,

and directors

of

large

factories

belonged

to these

groups.41

34

Nowe

Lrogi,

1961,

no.

5

(May),

p.

142.

35 Rocznik

Statystyczny,

1975,

table

5,

p.

21.

36

See

S.

Ravin,

'The

Polish

Intelligentsia

and

the Socialist

Order',

Political

Science

Quarterly,

I968,

no.

3.

37

'Polski

Gallup',

Polityka,

I976,

no. 8.

38

Krzysztof

Szatnicki,

'Distribution

of

Wages

and

Income',

The Polish

Sociological

Bulletin, 1971,

no.

2,

p.

44.

39

Ibid

40 K. Lutyiska, 'Office workers' views on their social position', The Polish Socio-

logical

Bulletin,

I964,

no.

I,

p.

80.

Lutyiska

writes: 'The

majority

of

replies

show

that

office workers in

both

management

and

subordinate

positions,

both

men

and

women,

regard

the

social

position

of the office workers

as

being

between

the

foreman

and

the

faotoryo

Workers.'

41

A.

Mozolowski,

'Wspinaczka po

pieniadze',

Polityka,

28

September

I974.



16/27

There

seems

to be

an

equalization

of

sorts

in the

living

standards

of both the

higher

officials

and

the

highly

qualified

professionals,

the

former enjoying some perquisites because of their administrative

influence,

the latter

having

the

opportunity

of

using

the market

economy

to

obtain

access

to

highly

coveted

goods

and

commodities.

The

following

presentation

of

technical

and

sanitary

conditions

in

Lodz

provides

an

illuminating

illustration

of

the

differences

in

living

standards

of different

occupational

groups:42

Category

%

of flats

with

Average of

W.C.

Central

Bathroom rooms

per

flat

heating

Intelligentsia

79'I

54'9

71I4

2-90

Technicians

44'8

I8'9

22'4

2-28

Office workers

48'4

I8'2

32'I

2'17

Private craftsmen

-

-

2'36

Foremen

35'3

I6'4 21'5 2'I5

Skilled

workers

28-7

15'0 18-3

1-85

Semi-skilled

workers

I8'6

8'5

Io'2

I'8I

Unskilled

workers

25-5

o'o0

8-9

I'75

b)

Bureaucratic

integration

It follows

from the above

that the

educated

strata are

a

heterogeneous

aggregate

of

people

located

at

different levels

of

organizational

hier-

archies,

carrying

out

different

tasks,

located in

different

sectors of

state

activities and

participating

in

various

degrees

in official

political

life.

Moreover,

there are

marked differences

of social

background

between

occupations;

in

I97I,

for

instance,

70%

of the

prosecutors

were

of

working-class

and

peasant origin

and

58%

of

the

teachers,

but

only

35%

of

the

engineers (chemical), 34%

of the

journalists, 26%

each

of

architects

and

writers,

and

20%

of artists.43

This

is

paralleled

by

the cultural

differentiation

among

the

educated

strata,

the

traditions

of

the 'old

intelligentsia'

being

stronger

in

some

occupations

than

in

others,

and

the

distribution

of first-

and

second-

generation

intelligentsia

extremely unequal.

Cracow

is

known,

for

instance,

as

the bastion

of the 'classic'

Polish

intelligentsia;

in

Warsaw

in the

institutions

of

high

academic

standing

there

is

a

high

concentration

of

people

from the

old

intelligentsia.

Some

professions

seem

to

attract

more

people

identified

with the

latter than

others.

42

A.

xVojciechowska,

'Differentiation

of

Housing

Conditions

and

the Material

Situation

of

Various

Socio-Professional

Groups

in

Lodz',

The Polish

Sociological

Bulletin,

1971,

no.

2,

pp. 50,

57.

4a

A.

Siciiski,

Literaci

polscy.

Przemiany

zawodu

na tle

przemian

kultury

wspdlczesnej

(Zaklad

im.

Ossolifiskich, i97x),

p.

50.

INTELLIGENTSIA

350



17/27

VS.

BUREA UCRACY?

351

Yet

one cannot

ignore

the

powerful

forces at work that

integrate

the

educated strata into

the framework

of

the

party

state.

Working

in

offices

and state-controlled institutions has become a predominant feature of

the

everyday

life

of

the

Polish

intelligentsia. They

attend

office

meetings,

take

part

in

conferences,

learn

to

cope

with

their

superiors,

do

the

paperwork

and

develop

the

'us

and them' attitudes which

define

their

relationship

with

the

higher

authorities

on

the one hand

and their clients

and

customers on

the

other.

At

the

same

time

they

are all

in a

position

of

overall

dependence

on

the

state,

even

if

the

expansion

of the

market

economy

has

somewhat

reduced

this

dependence

in

the field

of

services

and

commodities.

Individuals have to rely on administrative decisions about jobs, promo-

tions,

trips

abroad,

allocation

of

building

sites,

flats

in

cooperative

and

state-controlled

buildings,

etc.

Non-party

people

in

their status

of

clients

of

the

state

are as

anxious

to

get

on with

the

party

bosses as the

party

members,

connections

are evaluated

in terms

of

'who's

who',

irrespective

of the

person's

political

or

moral

record,

and official

favours.

are

highly

valued

by

many

prominent

members

of the

intellectual

and

professional

circles.

Another

aspect

of

bureaucratic

integration

is

connected

with the

tremendous increase in the number of those to whom L. Labedz referred

as

nachal'stvo.4

According

to

the

census

of

occupations

carried out

in

October

1973,

there

were

103,900

major

executive

positions

in

Poland.

In

about

97%

of

them

higher

or

'more than

secondary'

education

was

formally

required.

According

to

a

rough

estimate

there are

altogether

about

600,000

directors

in

Poland and

higher-rank

officials

are even

more

numerous. This means

that

promotions

have

become

a

major

concern

of

the educated

strata and

career

motives are

widespread.

The

ambitious

young

men

are thus

anticipating

their chances

well

in

advance

and they tailor their orientations and attitudes accordingly.

Thus

a

process

called,

somewhat

pompously,

'anticipatory

socializa-

tion'

is

taking

place

on

a

massive

scale.

No

wonder that the

Polish

sociologist

W.

Narojek

suggested

a new

social

category

of

'men

on

the

move':

The

dynamic

aspect

of

individual

behaviour

oriented

to

self-

preservation

...

manifests

itself

in

the

individual's

endeavour

to

move

up

in the

organizational

structure of

society

towards

positions

which

guarantee

a

higher

level

of

satisfaction

of

egoistic

values.

In

that

respect the social personality of the socialist man is concisely expressed

in the Latin

term 'homo

movens'

which

explains

the

manifestation

of

44

L.

Labedz,

'The Structure of

the

Soviet

Intelligentsia',

in

R.

Pipes,

The Russian

Intelligentsia (New

York, i961),

p.

71.



18/27

the

same

tendency

that in

classic

capitalist society

was

incorporated

in

the behaviour of the 'economic

man'.45

No detailed studies

exist

of the social

mechanisms

through

which 'homo

movens'

moves ahead. But there is

no

doubt

that for

many

young

graduates

those mechanisms

operate

within

the

system

of

the

party

state.

The

difference

between

the

office holders and

'pure

professionals'

is also

narrowed because

of the

administrative

restructuring

of

pro-

fessional activities.46Doctors

who

have

to fill

in

forms

and write

lengthy

reports, university

professors

who

spend

their time

in

conference

halls

and

on

innumerable

boards,

writers

who

make

their

living

by

serialized

mass

production,

engineers

who are often

more

interested

in

covering

up

the

shortcomings

of the

productive processes

than in technical

innovations-all are

victims

of the same

system

that overshadows

their

professional

selves.

Many dynamic

individuals

find

the bureaucratic constraints

unbear-

able,

but

many

accommodate

quite

well

and even

appreciate

compensa-

tions

which are

not

available

in other more

competitive

systems.

In

particular,

mediocrities

who

have achieved a

position

of sonme

mportance

can be

certain

of

retaining

their

jobs

as

long

as

they

do not

defy

authority.

In

consequence,

the

development

of

bureaucratic mechanisms

creates

powerful vested interests among the educated strata, both within the

apparatus

of

the

party-state

and outside

it.

c)

The

formation

of

a

compliantpersonality

The

bureaucratization

of

the

educated

strata

manifests

itself

in

the

emergence

of cultural

patterns

completely

different

from those

prevailing

among

the old

Polish

intelligentsia.

The

dominant

type

of social

personality

is

that of

the

'organization

man'.17 Life

chances

depend

on

the

nature

of

the

occupational

position, promotions

are

impossible

without

the

approval

of

the

bosses,

a

clean

political

record

is

essential

in

posts

of trust

and

importance,

disobedience

is

severely punished

and

conformism

highly profitable.

The

new

cultural features

do

not

correspond

exactly

to the Western

concept

of

the 'bureaucratic

personality'

because

of

the

marked

differ-

ences

between the

Western

and

East

European

bureaucracies;

neverthe-

less

some

traits

are

very

similar.

.4

W.

Narojek,

'Przeobra2enia

spoleczne

z

perspektywy

losu

jednestki',

Studiu

'Socjologiczne,I973,, no. 3.

46

'Very

often the scholars

are

useless because

they

are

entangled

in the

supervisory

activities.

This is

so

common

in

Polish

science

that the

phenomenon

of bureaucratiza-

tion

of scholars

can be

regarded

as

a

social

phenomenon,'

writes

J.

Stankowski

in

Tradycje

dzialalnosci

naukowej',

Kierunki,

26

January.

1975.

47

See

W.

E.

Whyte,

The

Organization

IVtan

I957).

INTELLIGENTSIA

52



19/27

There

is

in

the

first

place

the

growing

cult

of

specialization,

which

endows

:individuals with

marketable

skills

with

increased

bargaining

power within and vis-a-vis the bureaucratic structures. Along with

specialization

there

is also

a

progressing

segmentalization

and

privati-

zation

that

shapes

the

attitudes

of

the

present-day intelligentsia

in

Poland and in

other

Communist

countries.

All this

is

at

least

partly

due

to

the

political

system,

which

imposes

severe

restrictions

on

inter-occupational

contacts

and

cuts the lines

of

communication

between the economic

sectors,

institutions

and

pro-

fessions.

The

impact

of

'segmentalization'

is

best reflected

in the

existence

of occupational ghettos in which people spend their lives. Here again

we

deal

with

a

phenomenon

which

is

not alien

to

the

developed

Western

countries.

However,

in

the

West,

clubs,

political parties,

voluntary

associations

and

many

other institutions

allow

people

to

mix with

other

groups

if

they

wish,

which is

hardly

the case

in the

Communist

East.

There

members

of

a

professional

circle

are doomed to

rubbing

shoulders

with

each

other

in the

same

canteens,

restaurants

and

coffee-houses

attached

to

their association's

headquarters,

at

the same

meetings

and

in

the same

ministerial corridors.

In

some

institutions

they

are sent

to the

same

health

resorts.

They

know

each other and

they

know

everything

about

each

other,

which is

pretty

natural,

but

they

are at the same

time

ignorant

of

what

is

going

on

in

other

sectors

of

society.

Being part

of

an

occupational

circle

gives

them a

feeling

of

security,

consolidates

mutual

ties

and

allows the

cultivation

of

private

loyalties

which

often

cut

across

hierarchical

lines.48

'Segmentalization'

is associated mwith

he

institution

of

client-master

relationships

within the

professional

ghettos,

with the network

of

informal

communication

which

compensates

for

the

lack

of

official

information,

and

with

the unofficial structure

of

prestige

and

auth

the myth of intelligentzia vs bureaucracy in 1978

Documents