the myth of the savior: egypt's "just tyrants" on the eve of revolution, january-july...

The Myth of the Savior: Egypt's "Just Tyrants" on the Eve of Revolution, January-July 1952Author(s): Joel GordonSource: Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt, Vol. 26 (1989), pp. 223-237Published by: American Research Center in EgyptStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40000710 .

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The Myth of the Savior: Egypt's "Just Tyrants" on the Eve of Revolution, January- July 1952

Joel Gordon

On the morning of 26 January 1952, following reports of a battle in Ismailia between British troops and Egyptian auxiliary police which left fifty Egyptians dead and another one hundred wounded, angry crowds took to the streets of Cairo. A riot ensued in which the greater part of the city's business district was set aflame. By evening, when authorities finally acted to restore order, some eight hundred build- ings lay in ruins and twenty-five people, Egyp- tians and foreigners, lay dead. That night the Wafdist prime minister, Mustafa al-Nahhas, declared martial law. The following morning the king dismissed Egypt's only majority government in the post-war period. During the next six months three independent politicians formed four governments, each appointed by royal fiat and undone by royal intrigue. Martial law remained in force, parliament was suspended, then dissolved, and elections postponed indefinitely. The office of prime minister, at least according to popular rumor, sold on one occa- sion for the price of LE 1,000,000. The political process in Egypt ground to a virtual halt. Finally, on the morning of July 23 the army, led by the secret Society of Free Officers, seized power. Egypt stood on the brink, the officers proclaimed, of a "new age."

The ease with which the army seized power reinforced a vision of a decadent monarch and scurrilous political elite. While trouble brewed in the capital, the government vacationed in Alexandria. Many of the country's leading politicians had departed for European spas. When the Cinema Metro, one of Cairo's grandest movie houses, a victim of the Black Saturday blazes, reopened after the coup, it screened "Quo Vadis" as its first feature. Few could miss the

parallels between the Emperor Nero and the ill- fated King Faruq, or the Roman patricians and Egypt's pashas, who reaped great profits while the nation crumbled around them.

Egyptian popular history, encouraged and disseminated by the Nasser regime, fostered this image of the old regime. Leading journalists published accounts of the interval between Black Saturday and the Free Officers' coup laden with scandalous anecdotes, but short on analysis.1 Later historians of the period, Egyptian and foreign, have tended to view the period as merely an interregnum between the fall of Egypt's last democratically elected government and the onset of military rule. Consequently, they have paid scant notice to the governments which followed the fire in the first half of 1952.2

What, if anything, did the ruling class do to save itself? If "party politics" (al-hizbiyah) meant merely, as many Egyptians by then believed, a path to personal profit for those in- volved, what steps, if any, did members of the

1 Ahmad Baha3 al-Din, Faruq malikan (Cairo, n.d.); Musa Sabri, Qissat malik iva-arbac wuzarat (Cairo, 1964).

2 P. J. Vatikiotis, in his The History of Egypt, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1980), accords political events of the period less than a single page. Jacques Berque, despite his penchant for nuance, ignores the period entirely in his Egypt: Imperial- ism and Revolution (New York, 1972). Tariq al-Bishri, the Egyptian scholar who has written in greatest detail on the old regime's last years in Al-Haraka al-wataniya min 1945 ila 1952, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1983), outlines political conflicts which tied the hands of those who sought to rule Egypt after the fire, but fails to pose broader questions about what vision guided these ministries. Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York, 1968), p. 37, describes the period simply as one in which "the reactionary forces sought to bring the situation under control by means of curfew and mobile machine-gun teams that regularly plowed through the streets of the burned capital."

223



224 JARCE XXVI (1989)

political establishment take in order to preserve their interests? Under what constraints, structural and attitudinal, did they operate? These questions have gone unasked. A fresh look at available sources, including recently declassi- fied British and American documents, suggests answers.

If the political establishment could not foresee its own demise, it at least sensed that its options grew fewer. In the aftermath of Black Saturday the palace entrusted three political independents with the tasks of restoring calm and holding the political order in check. In the short run this entailed imposing emergency measures; ultimately it meant bringing the economy under control, instituting social reforms, cleaning up government and, not least, securing the evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal zone. Reflecting the sense of urgency prevalent at the time, Egyptians referred to the post-fire governments as "salvation ministries" (wuzarat al- inqadh). Linked to this phrase was the concept of a "just tyrant" (al-mustcabid al-cadil). The notion of appointing a popular strong man who stood above and apart from party squabbles, who could institute sweeping reform legislation and restore order to a political process gone awry had gained a growing number of pro- ponents by the time of the Cairo fire.3

Egyptians viewed each of the three post-fire prime ministers in this mold. Only one truly fit the description of just tyrant. None succeeded in propagating reforms which might have saved the old regime. Nonetheless, their reigns deserve closer scrutiny than they have been accorded.

Their failures reveal much about the ills of liberalism in Egypt. Each of the three isolated symptoms of the disease; but political constraints rooted in the political system dictated their strategies, causing them to shorten their sights. The first two in particular, cAli Mahir and Ahmad Nagib al-Hilali, adopted opposite political strategies and chose their allies from oppos- ing camps. The third, Husayn Sirri, a man with much less to offer the country, had the pres- cience to recognize the danger posed by discon- tentment within the military. By their actions in

power and their ignominious falls, each reinforced a growing disillusion within Egypt for parliamentary rule and its practitioners.

Faruq's Inferno

Popular discontent with "party politics" had reached a fever pitch by early 1952. The years following the Second World War were marked by sustained political activism and violence. Eight minority coalitions ruled between October 1944, when the palace dismissed the majority Wafdist government, and January 1950. In No- vember 1949 the palace bowed to Wafdist pressure and agreed to hold elections. The Wafd swept to victory, foiling palace hopes for a coalition government. Majority rule began with great promise. The 1950 Wafd cabinet featured a significant number of new faces, men highly regarded for their expertise rather than their political clout. But the Wafd's failure to stand up to the palace, its promotion of party patronage, and blind eye (at best) to corruption in high places alienated many of the brightest and most conscientious reform-minded technocrats in the country. The Nahhas government's subsequent attempt to rally public enthusiasm through nationalist hyperbole, which culminated in its abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the outbreak of irregular warfare against British forces in the Canal zone, underlined for many the fundamental weakness of the political system.

While few political leaders dared challenge the government's support for the "popular struggle"- a policy designed to give the appearance that it controlled rather than followed events - scattered voices espoused alternative pri- orities. Behind the slogan "purification before liberation" (al-tathir qabl al-tahrir), they asserted that Egypt should set its domestic affairs straight before engaging the British in battle. By the year's end the Wafd's days in power appeared numbered. The king, determined to unseat the government but fearing a public backlash, awaited a propitious moment.4

3 The independent weekly, Ruz al-Yusuf, the most in- fluential journal in the country, led the call. See, for example, 27 Nov 1951. Also see Bishri, Haraka, 564-67.

4 Caffery no. 904, 18 Dec 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. V (hereafter FRUS, 1951) (Washing- ton, D.C., 1979), p. 441-42. For the 1950 Wafdist govern-



THE MYTH OF THE SAVIOR 225

Diverse forces working at cross purposes share responsibility for the Cairo riots. The charge that the government had been unprepared for the "popular struggle" it inadvertently unleashed, a charge levelled most vehemently by the Free Officers, is a fair one. When escalating violence led to the showdown in Ismailia between the Egyptian police and far superior British forces, FuDad Sirag al-Din, the minister of interior, gave the direct order for the police to fight to their last bullet.5 The next morning, when demon- strators took to the streets of Cairo, cAbd al- Fattah Hasan, minister of social affairs and Sirag al-Din's right-hand man, egged on an angry crowd gathered outside his office. The sight of a police officer lunching at a casino off Opera Square provoked a spontaneous outburst of violence from an unruly mob.6

Agents provacateurs provided incendiary de- vices and directed the mob against specific targets: foreign business establishments and other symbols of western presence and status, banks, auto dealers, luxury hotels, clubs, bars, and cinemas. Egyptian intelligence reports blamed the Socialist Party, formerly the Young Egypt movement, for inciting and organizing the riot. The British accepted this assessment, but were more concerned with placing official blame on the Wafd, for its negligence, and securing compensation for the loss of British lives and property.7

But a more nagging question - why the army had not been called into the streets to restore order until early evening - plagued the political

establishment. Ardent nationalists accused the British of plotting the entire affair as an excuse to unseat the Wafd. The Wafd pointed fingers at the palace for similar motives. The king may certainly be charged with appalling negligence; while the city burned, he proceeded with a lavish birthday party in honor of his new-born son. Once apprised of the situation, perhaps unaware of its gravity, in all likelihood he did resolve to exploit the disorder as an excuse to finally dump the Wafd. By waiting to dismiss Nahhas until after the prime minister declared martial law, Faruq managed to shift the onus of responsibility. Enemies of the Wafd quickly accused the government, not without some justi- fication, of inciting the mob. Like the palace, the Wafd gambled on its ability to exploit public outrage.

In the short run it was the Wafd which emerged as the loser. Nahhas, after proclaiming martial law, meekly accepted dismissal. The majority party, which had lost control of the situation in the Canal zone and the streets of Cairo, went into a state of collective shock. Faruq, who had watched his capital burn amidst the revelry of a birthday party, now took steps to restore order. His political police quickly and efficiently rounded up several hundred people suspected of inciting the mob. Alexandria remained quiet and fears of further outbreaks of disorder proved groundless.8

But the forces unleashed on Black Saturday could not be ignored. The riot compelled Egypt's political leaders to confront the severity of the crisis which the country faced. There was general consensus among the parliamentary establishment to halt the "popular struggle" in the Canal zone and reopen negotiations with the British (this did not mean, however, they were any more inclined to compromise). Despite labor unrest and several violent outbursts on large estates, Egypt's political leaders had con- sistently resisted calls for land reform and programs to raise the standard of living for workers and peasants. Whoever ruled would have to address growing concerns with popular discontent. But now the country faced a problem

mem, see Joel Gordon, "The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah and the Demise of Egypt's Old Order," International Journal of Middle East Studies XXI (2) 1989, 193-214.

5 For Sirag al-Din's account see his Limadha al-hizb al- jadid? (Cairo, 1978), 56-57. For events leading to the Ismailia battle see the account of General Erskine, Erskine Papers, Public Records Office, WO 236/15 (WO and FO office papers are from the PRO, London.)

6 Report of the British Embassy Committee of Enquiry into the Riots in Cairo of 26 January, FO 371/96873/ JE1018/86. Also see Jamal al-Sharqawi, Asrar hanq al- qahira (Cairo, 1976). The conclusion to the above report and other relevant documents are reprinted in the book's ap- pendix. In contrast to the British report, Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: 1958), 108-9, credit cAbd al-Fattah Hasan with trying to buy time and calm the mob.

7 See the British report cited in the previous footnote. 8 Berque, Egypt, 672-73, captures the contradictory senti-

ments for Faruq in the immediate wake of the riots.




which was more immediate, if not more fundamental, a crisis of leadership.

The country desperately needed a strong hand at the helm. In earlier periods of crisis the palace had turned to national unity cabinets in attempts to mold consensus. In July 1949 the Wafd, breaking with tradition, had joined a coalition, but on the condition that it pave the way for new elections. In November, impatient at wrangling over electoral redistricting, the Wafd withdrew, forcing the king to call elections. The Wafd was now in no position to dictate any terms. Yet, however discredited, and however much it suffered from internal disarray, the majority party remained the most powerful political force in the country. With the Wafd in opposition no minority government could rule effectively.

The minority parties posed no realistic alternative. Small factions without any political base, they still had no real raison d'etre other than opposition to the Wafd. In March the British ambassador speculated that if minority leaders would "display only a minimum of energy and intelligence," they might galvanize greater electoral support. "It would require only a minimum of stage management," he felt, to achieve an electoral victory.9 Sir Ralph Steven- son overestimated their potential. His assessment is noteworthy for the frustration he vented at the failure of minority leaders to articulate any plan of action other than opposition to the Wafd.

In the absence of strong parliamentary leadership the palace, constitutionally the most powerful branch of government, assumed an even greater role in the political arena. Faruq had begun his reign as a champion of Egyptian national aspirations, earning the admiration of his people. By the late 1940s his legendary outrageous behavior dashed his popularity and threatened to undermine the institution of the monarchy itself. The king's escapades always masked a rather shrewd ability for statecraft. Faruq had been tutored in politics by men of keen, if often unscrupulous, political sense. Many who worked closely with the king never

abandoned hope that Faruq might awaken one morning resolved to curb his excesses and take the royal sceptre firmly in hand. When the Wafd had drifted toward abrogation of the Anglo -

Egyptian treaty in the summer of 1951, Faruq sailed for Europe with his new queen, where he indulged himself in gluttony and gambling. For a moment in early 1952 it appeared that Faruq, now father of an heir, might assert his kingship.10 But the British ambassador's "sneaking suspicion" of a year earlier still proved sound. Ralph Stevenson had concluded that "where his own amusement and distraction are concerned the king is fighting a losing battle against the man."11

Faruq' s personal struggle was played out between two camps within the palace which competed for royal favor. The king's official advisers, the chief of his cabinet, Hafiz cAfifi, the latter' s deputy, Hasan Yusuf, former prime minister Husayn Sirri, and others struggled to awaken the statesman in him. As strong pro- ponents of the monarchy and antagonists of the Wafd, these men earned the excoriation of Egyptian nationalists. Hafiz cAfifi, a leading industrialist, director of the Misr Group, former foreign minister and ambassador to London, was the most notable. He is a figure with a long career in politics which deserves closer study. Faruq brought him into the palace in January 1950 to counter the Wafd. cAfifi's deserved reputation as the most openly pro-British Egyptian politician probably kept him from attaining the prime ministry in the post-fire period. Instead, he found himself increasingly isolated in royal circles.12

9 Stevenson to Eden, 4 March 1952, FO 371/96874/ JE1018/104.

10 The New York Times, 28 Jan 1952; also see article by Clifton Daniel, "Farouk Asserts his Kingship," 17 Feb 1952.

11 Stevenson no. 65, 23 May 1951, FO 371/90227/JE1914/ 16.

12 Berque, Egypt, vacillates in his portrayal of cAfifi. He describes him as "one of the shrewdest and most militant Egyptian economists" (p. 337), "capable and tortuous" (p. 405), "presumably playing the British game" (p. 433), and one of those millionaires who "carried on their discus- sions around a lamb roasted whole" amidst the "dying splendors of cosmopolitanism" (p. 611). Bishri, Haraka, dismisses him as a known "reactionary and bitter enemy of the democratic nationalist movement" (pp. 554-55). To the British he represented the figure most worth keeping in office, one of "the only sound elements of Egyptian life";




It was Faruq's boon companions, sycophants with few thoughts other than personal advance- ment and little talent other than intrigue, who exerted ultimate influence with the king. Within the rogues gallery two figures competed with the likes of cAfifi, and often with each other, for the king's ear. Karim Thabit, Faruq's press attache, had been in his entourage since early 1946. The target of numerous investigations into financial impropriety, Thabit found himself banished from the court in late 1951. His fall coincided with the rise of Ilyas Andraos, an Alexandrian businessman whom Faruq appointed economic adviser to the Royal Treasury. Andraos, Thabit, and the others kept watchful guard over their positions. When reformers' eyes turned toward the palace, they moved swiftly to protect their source of livelihood. In the absence of either strong parliamentary or royal leadership it was they who wreaked most damage in the months prior to the military coup.13

The Search for a Savior

Clearly, the only solution in the aftermath of Black Saturday was a strong independent prime minister. To many, the need for a just tyrant who, ruling by emergency measures, could hold the system in check long enough to affect major structural reforms seemed all the more pressing. The reform-minded focused their sights upon the governmental process. Some asserted that the constitution needed to be scrapped and rewritten in toto. Most reformers agreed that the election law needed revision so as to allow illiterates and, some went so far as to argue, women the right to vote.14 Proposed ethics legislation to mandate "purification" aimed at two primary targets. Reformers wanted to elimi- nate immunity provisions which protected former ministers from prosecution. They also sought legal means to overhaul a government

bureaucracy overweight with patronage workers, many of whom had received "exceptional promotions," particularly during the Wafd's recent tenure.15 No such ethics legislation, independent reformers argued, could be enacted so long as partisan politics dominated the legislature.

Two candidates emerged in late 1951 as the men most likely to fill the role of "just tyrant." Both cAli Mahir and Nagib al-Hilali were by then political independents, renegades from major political power blocs. Each had gathered around himself a circle of reform-minded men, many of a younger generation, disillusioned with existing political parties.

cAli Mahir had already carved for himself a place in Egyptian history. He had served on the committee which drafted the 1923 constitution and held cabinet posts in three minority governments. His own ministry of "the one hundred days," from January to May 1936, had fired the imagination of a new generation of reformers.16 Thereafter, as chief of the Royal Cabinet, Mahir played a major role in teaching Faruq the art of statecraft, helping the young king assert his authority against parliament. Mahir' s second tenure as prime minister, from August 1939 to June 1940, which ended with his ouster and subsequent imprisonment at British behest, fur- thered his image as a reformer and solidified his nationalist credentials. In the political wilder- ness after the war, Mahir gathered around him a group of technocrats in a self-styled "Egyptian Front" (Jab hat Misr) to study social and economic problems.17 Disgusted with Faruq's excesses, the teacher had by then distanced himself from his pupil. Clearly angling for a return to power, Mahir sought to curry favor with the British, who, distrustful, kept their distance.18 Sixty-eight years old, Mahir remained, as Berque

Bruce to Caffery no. 8, 2 July 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. V, (Washington, D.C.: 1986), 1826-27.

13 For a sense of how Thabit advanced, see his panegyric, Al-Malik faruq (Cairo, 1944). For Andraos, Caffery no. 997, 774.00/10-2051. (U.S. State Department records are from the National Archives, Washington, D.C.)

14 The Wafdist cAbd al-Magid cAbd al-Haqq claimed that one million workers were ineligible; al-Ahram, 7 April 1952.

15 By unwritten tradition a new government promoted its own at the expense of opponents; in 1950 the Wafd, claiming it merely followed precedent, promoted scores of officials with one pen stroke, infuriating the opposition. For charges of nepotism concerning the family of the prime minister, see Caffery no. 1126, 774.00/5-1850.

16 Berque, Egypt, 460-65. 17 For the program of Mahir's Egyptian Bloc, see al-

Ahram, 3 Feb 1952. 18 Chapman-Andrews to Bowker, 8 April 1951, FO 371/

901 15/JE101 10/12.




describes him in the 1930s, "stylish and fas- tidious in appearance," a "crafty musketeer."19 Egyptian cartoonists portrayed him as a pug- nacious brawler, dwarfed in build by his opponents, but with tarbush cocked jauntily to one side, a challenge gleaming in his eyes.

Nagib al-Hilali, also a veteran of Egyptian politics, cut quite a different figure. A former law professor and four- time minister of education, Hilali looked very much the elderly aca- demic. A wide, toothy grin and beady eyes which

peered from behind thick circular spectacles masked, however, a harsh interior. Hilali had joined the Wafd in the late 1930s and rose to membership in the executive committee a decade later. After the ouster of Makram cUbayd, the Wafd's secretary, in 1942, Hilali assumed the latter' s mantle as the party's "conscience." He soon fell afoul of internal party politics. He refused a

portfolio in the 1950 government, nominating instead four younger proteges, all of whom came into conflict with party patronage. Two of his proteges resigned in protest, a third was fired

outright.20 The Wafd ousted Hilali in November 1951 for his refusal to support the "popular struggle." Hilali's ouster enhanced his reputation as a man aloof from "party politics." Many came to see him as destined to lead the country.21

cAli Mahir: Man of Crisis on a Tightrope

Although his prior experience and reputation for toughness made Mahir the more logical choice to restore order after the events of January 26, he returned to power by default. Faruq, who by this time reportedly went out of his way to avoid his mentor at public occasions, offered leadership of the government to Hilali. He did so, undoubtedly, with mixed feelings. At their inauguration into the Wafdist cabinet two years

before, three of Hilali's nominees had pointedly refrained from kissing the monarch's hand. Hilali, however, had his supporters in palace circles. The previous November Ilyas Andraos had tried without success to woo Hilali away from the Wafd by dangling offers of the prime ministry before him.22 Hilali now chose again to sit on the sidelines. He deferred to Mahir, without whose support, he said, he could not hope to govern Egypt. Reluctantly, the king heeded his advice, appointing Mahir prime minister on January 27. 23

Mahir recognized that tenuous support from the palace left him vulnerable. He formed a government which consisted primarily of political allies from his Egyptian Front. However, for his two most important portfolios, interior and finance, he acceded to the advice of Hafiz cAfifi, chief of the royal cabinet. He appointed Ahmad Murtada al-Maraghi minister of interior. The son of a former rector of al-Azhar, a palace man who had heralded Faruq as caliph in the late 1930s, the younger Maraghi, as director of public security and later governor of Alexandria, had earned the reputation as a tough law and order man. Many credited Maraghi for keeping Alex- andria from burning on January 26. As finance minister Mahir appointed a Hilali protege, Zaki cAbd al-Mutcal. Mutcal, who held the post in the 1950 government, had fallen prey to Wafdist intrigue and was sacked outright in November 1950.24

The Mahir ministry began with a flourish of pronouncements promising reform. Mahir ruled with a direct, hands-on approach.25 During his first week in office the new prime minister decreed that all cabinet ministers would be allowed use of only one government vehicle. He promptly assembled all deputy ministers to inform them they would now be directly re-

19 Berque, Egypt, 460. 20 The proteges were Zaki cAbd al-Mutcal, minister of

finance, fired by Nahhas in November 1950, who later held the portfolio in the Mahir and Hilali governments, Ahmad Husayn, minister of social affairs, who resigned in July 1951, Hamid Zaki, minister of state, who quit the government in December 1951, and Taha Husayn, minister of education, who resigned numerous times but never left the cabinet.

21 Bishri, Haraka, 558-59.

22 Stevenson, 15 Oct 1951, FO 141/1433/JE101 1/30/51. 23 Ahmad Murtada al-Maraghi, GharaJib min cahd jaruq-

wa bidayat al-thawra al-misriya (Beirut, 1976), 131; Hasan Yusuf, Al-Qasr wa-dawruhu fi al-siyasa al-misriya, 1922- 1952 (Cairo, 1982), 330-31.

24 The New York Times, 9 March 1952. 25 Mahir' s hands-on approach angered Maraghi, in par-

ticular. The interior minister threatened to resign on several occasions. But Mahir convinced his colleague to remain part of the team. Maraghi, GharaJib, 131-33.




sponsible to their minister. Mahir initiated a series of measures to promote social welfare. Under the auspices of the ministry of rural affairs, a new cabinet post, a committee was formed to study proposals for land reform. The finance ministry ordered a purge of the cotton bourse and took steps to decrease the price of basic necessities, beginning with kerosene and sugar. An austerity program announced on February 8 called for a 29 percent cut in government spending. Maraghi, the interior minister, continued the round-up of suspects for the January 26 riots and extended the dragnet to include over two hundred wanted thieves. At the same time he took successive steps between February 4 and 11 to ease curfew restrictions.26 By early February shops had reopened; by month's end universities and high schools re- sumed classes.27

The prime minister's supporters hailed Mahir as the right man for a crisis. Ihsan cAbd al- Quddus, editor of Ruz al-Yusuf, wrote "Egypt is in temporary need of a dictator," a man "who will act for the people, not against them, for and not against freedom, a dictator who will push Egypt forward, not hold her back." The political cartoons in Ruz al-Yusuf always reveal much about the political mood of the country. The cover issue of this issue in early February depicted Mahir standing over a boiling pot exhorting the party leaders within, still at each other's throats, to stop their personal feuds.28

Yet, for all his personal force, Mahir proved to be "by temperament a negotiator, not a dictator."29 He had little choice. Mahir walked a dangerous tightrope between the volatile forces of Egyptian politics. The Wafd, Faruq's entourage in the palace, and the British embassy, all traditional enemies, viewed him with skepticism and waited to pounce the moment he appeared vulnerable. Mahir chose his allies carefully. He had agreed to appoint two Hafiz cAfifi nominees to his cabinet. Nonetheless, he knew the inner workings of the palace better than most. He

recognized the danger of its internal rifts, and knew where he stood, and perhaps cAfifi as well. As a counter force Mahir sought to forge a national front of all existing political parties, a gargantuan effort considering the degree of enmity between the minority blocs and the Wafd.

Above all, Mahir could not ignore the potential opposition of the majority party. Old battles would necessarily be set aside. The prime minister quickly closeted with Wafdist leaders, from whom he won conditional support. The Wafd would back Mahir, asserted Nahhas, so long as "he pursues a policy supported by the Egyptian people."30 Hoping to cement an alliance, Mahir offered cabinet posts to two leading Wafdists, Muhammad Salah al-Din and Ibrahim Farag. Rising stars in the Wafd, both also carried strong nationalist credentials, having been among the most vociferous in calling for abrogation of the Anglo- Egyptian treaty. The Wafd rejected Mahir' s offer but voiced support for his plans to form a national unity shadow cabinet.31

Traditional party politics killed Mahir' s hopes. Minority leaders, who refused to ally with the Wafd, announced they would counten- ance a national front only on the condition that the government dissolve parliament, purge the bureaucracy, and initiate an investigation into the Nahhas government's negligence in handling the Black Saturday riots.32 Mahir rejected all such demands.

Rather than aggravate existing hostilities by embarking on a program of "purification," he adopted the opposite tack. Mahir staked his future on reaching an agreement with the British, pledging to do so within three months' time. Although he initially offered cabinet posts to two hardline Wafdists, he did not approach the treaty question with the intransigence of the Wafd. He deftly guarded his Wafd support while adopting a policy much more amenable to Brit- ish demands. He insisted that he would not dis- cuss the principle of evacuation or sovereignty

26 Al-Ahram, 1, 3, 4, 9, 19 Feb 1952; The New York Times, 29 Jan and 2, 4, 5, 11, 24 February 1952.

27 The Economist, 9 Feb 1952, pp. 324-25. 28 Ruz al-Yusuf, 11 Feb 1952, cover and p. 3. 29 The Economist, 16 Feb 1952, p. 383.

30 The New York Times, 1 Feb 1952. 31 The New York Times, 1 and 2 Feb 1952; for British

displeasure, see Stevenson no. 298, 3 Feb 1952, FO 371/

96871/JE1018/47. 32 Al-Ahram, 4, 5, 10, 24 Feb 1952.




over the Sudan, the Wafds' preconditions tor negotiations. He expressed a clear desire to reach an accord and emphasized his willingness to enroll Egypt in a regional, pro-Western de- fense pact.33 Still recovering from the shock of their dismissal and facing the relentless reproach of their enemies, Wafd leaders abstained from open criticism of Mahir's position and reiterated their confidence in the government.34

Mahir's tactical arrangement with the Wafd provoked his enemies to engineer his downfall. The prime minister steadfastly resisted pressures from minority parties, the palace, and the British to implicate the Wafd for Black Saturday. But he could not avoid being drawn into the dispute. When FuDad Sirag al-Din openly criticized the army for its inaction, Mahir responded on the army's behalf.35 A week later, when parliament opposed a government proposal to grant LE 5,000,000 for the reconstruction of burned-out businesses, pressure to dissolve the chamber mounted.36 Mahir obtained from the king a decree dismissing parliament for one month, then pocketed it when the Wafd accepted the compensation bill.37 The last week of February, on the eve of scheduled negotiations with the British, minority leaders again rejected Mahir's unity call, refusing to participate in any front with the Wafd. Furthermore, in private meetings with the prime minister, party leaders, including the general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, refused to support his negotiating position. Mahir threatened to take his case for negotiations directly to the Egyptian people.38

Within days the palace orchestrated Mahir's fall. The decision to dump Mahir appears to have been, if not unanimous, then at least relatively non-controversial within the palace. British displeasure counted for much with cAfifi and Hasan Yusuf. Those who wanted Hilali to take over and who, like Andraos, probably felt

they could work more closely with him, worked gladly to secure Mahir's ouster. On March 1, without the prime minister's knowledge, the press announced that the government had decided to adjourn parliament for one month. At a cabinet meeting that day Maraghi and Mutcal, the palace loyalists, opposed a decision to deny the reports. Following the meeting both sent Mahir letters of resignation.39 The British ambassador administered the final blow. Ever wary of Mahir's coddling the Wafd, the British approached negotiations with little hope of success. When Hafiz cAfifi, acting on the king's behalf, requested he cancel an appointment with Mahir scheduled for March 1, Ralph Stevenson demurred. He excused himself from the meeting on the pretext of a bad cold.40 Mahir got the message. Citing "obstacles placed in the way of my duty to battle corruption, set matters straight, spread prosperity, raise the standard of living, and lessen the sufferings of all citizens," cAli Mahir resigned on March I.41

Mahir left bitter, but in the eyes of many a rare hero of Egyptian political life. Eulogizing his administration, the independent daily, al- Ahram, commended his forthrightness before the people. The editors praised his efforts to take the economy in hand and improve the social welfare of the country. They hailed his policies as based on "justice and true national- ism."42 The day after his resignation ex-prime minister Nahhas paid Mahir a visit.43 That visit only reinforced mistrust of Mahir in British eyes and palace circles. "cAli Mahir did much to achieve public confidence and security and did produce an atmosphere conducive to negotiations," the British ambassador cabled London. "But since he wasn't willing to tackle Wafd or corruption king is probably right in turning to others more likely to do so."44

33 The New York Times, 30 and 31 Jan 1952. 34 The New York Times, 13 Feb 1952. 35 Al-Ahram, 12 and 13 Feb 1952; The New York Times,

12 Feb 1952. 36 The New York Times, 19 Feb 1952. 37 The Economist, 15 March 1952, p. 648. 38 The New York Times, 26 Feb 1952; al-Ahram, 2 March

1952.

39 The New York Times, 2 March 1952; al-Ahram, 1 and 2 March 1952; Maraghi, GharaDib, pp. 133-35.

40 Stevenson no. 438, 26 Feb 1952, FO 371/96872/JE1018/ 84; no. 452, 29 Feb 1952, FO 371/96873/JE1018/89.

41 Al-Ahram, 2 March 1952. 42 Al-Ahram, 2 March 1952; The Economist, 15 March

1952, p. 648. 43 Al-Ahram, 3 March 1952. 44 Stevenson to Eden, 10 March 1952, FO 371/96874/

JE1018/108.




Nagib al-Hilali: Vengeful Man of Destiny

Nagib al-Hilali could no longer postpone his destiny. Various factions, some working at cross- purposes, had eagerly anticipated his assump- tion of power since the fall of 1951 when his break with the Wafd seemed all but official. Although he lacked the experience of governing and had never held a prominent cabinet post, he had two qualities which attracted his suitors. To reformers Hilali was a man of unbounded integrity; rivals of the Wafd hoped they could direct his passion for "purification" against a mutual enemy. Hilali formed a government of ministers who, nearly to a man, bore the Wafd a grudge. These included Murtada al-Maraghi and Zaki cAbd al-Mutcal, who had helped bring the Mahir government down from within. He took office with implicit permission to adjourn parliament as his first act.

From the outset Hilali 's regime took on a distinctively anti-Wafdist tone. Hilali won the instant support of the minority parties. The Muslim Brotherhood announced that the new government should be given a chance to rule. Most important, Hilali believed he had the full backing of the king.45 Like Mahir, Hilali began his tenure with a flourish of pronouncements. He adopted a policy of "purification before liberation," a strategy in direct opposition to that of his predecessor. He adjourned parliament his second day in office. He stated his aim to abolish all government privileges; election reform he declared a "decided" matter. Within days the government issued a report on "exceptional promotions" granted government workers during the previous decade. The report, which condemned the practice in general, focused in particular on the Wafd. At the end of Hilali's first week in office the government released the public prosecutor's report blaming the interior ministry under FuDad Sirag al-Din for inciting the mob to riot on January 26.46

Although applauded in some quarters, the government quickly found itself confronting a

vocal opposition. From the outset, Hilali faced criticism for his apparent shelving of the national question. He denied the charge, some- what weakly, but continued to stress the issue he believed more pressing. When small demonstra- tions erupted at Fuad I University, in reaction to parliament's adjournment, the government suspended classes. Hilali warned the presidents of the Chamber and Senate, both Wafdists, not to hold an emergency session they planned in order to debate his decree. They demurred.47 Hilali reiterated his reluctance to adopt emergency measures, but insisted he would if pressed. "I fear God, Lord of the Worlds, and love freedom," he asserted. "But after the destruction which has occurred I must, first and foremost, work to steer the ship [of state] safely towards land. After that, matters will return to normal. It is necessary first to ward off all danger and root out its sources so that security will reign and confidence pervade."48

When Wafdist opposition continued, a showdown ensued. Following publication of the official report on Black Saturday, the Wafd declared its lack of confidence in the government and called for an immediate end to martial law. The student union of Fuad I University passed a similar resolution, which made favorable men- tion of cAli Mahir and Mustafa al-Nahhas. Hilali countered by accusing the Wafd of sedi- tion.49 On March 21 the government charged FuDad Sirag al-Din and cAbd al-Fattah Hasan with conspiring to disturb the peace. Both were placed under house arrest. The charge sheet against Sirag al-Din pointed to a series of meetings between him and suspected rabble- rousers. He appealed to the State Council, claiming the charges were based either on hear- say or illegal wiretaps.50

Undeterred, Hilali pressed on with his agenda. On March 24 he dissolved parliament. He set new elections for May 18, with the new chamber scheduled to sit on May 31. The next day the government decreed the indefinite continuation

45 The New York Times, 4 March 1952; Caffery no. 1470, 774.00/3-352.

46 Al-Ahram, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 March 1952; The New York Times, 3 and 5 March 1952.

47 The New York Times, 3 and 4 March 1952. 48 Al-Ahram, 4 March 1952. 49 Al-Ahram, 12 March 1952; The New York Times, 14,

16, 19 March 1952. 50 Al-Ahram, 21 March and 6 July 1952.




of martial law, which had been set to expire on March 26. On the last day of March with one pen stroke several thousand directors of government offices, all Wafdists, were demoted. In early April the prime minister initialed a new ' 'illegal gains" bill which eased restrictions against pro- secuting cabinet ministers. On April 12 Hilali postponed parliamentary elections indefinitely. Two weeks later he announced the formation of "purge committees" empowered to clean out the government bureaucracy. Focus shifted in May to election reform with an eye towards eliminat- ing restrictions on voter eligibility. Feminist activists pressed for womens' suffrage; in mid- June, however, the government officially opposed such reform.51

While many considered Hilali 's policies admir- able, his myopic fixation on purging the Wafd drew a flurry of criticism from circles hardly sympathetic to Wafdist leadership. Ihsan cAbd al-Quddus challenged the new government's direction within days of its inauguration. "Cor- ruption does not mean corruption of the Wafd government alone," he protested. Recalling cAli Mahir's attempt to form a united front as a preface to negotiations with the British, he tried to redirect Hilali back to the greater issue of liberation. "How," he asked, "can government be clean in an occupied land?" By the month's end cAbd al-Quddus no longer thought in terms of a just tyranny. Calling for an end to martial rule, he wrote instead of the need for a "popular hero" to lead the nation. So long as Hilali ruled by emergency decree, he argued, he would never be popular, and thus was not the man for the job.52 A Free Officer pamphlet which circulated at the time echoed cAbd al-Quddus' message. The officers accused the prime minister of de- flecting attention away from the liberation struggle and dividing the nation. They praised cAli Mahir for having resisted foreign and trea- sonous domestic pressure to "utilize martial law to severely punish the people." By turning the nation in on itself, Hilali had "forgotten that the source of greatest corruption is imperialism

and that the struggle against internal corruption is impossible without rooting out its source."53

In response to his critics, Hilali enlisted minority leaders to speak on his behalf and exploited rifts within the Wafd. The minority parties preferred the postponement of elections as it allowed them needed time to organize.54 The Wafd, which had eagerly set about prepar- ing for elections, blasted their postponement.55 Scattered members of the Wafd's parliamentary organization, however, threw support to the government. On April 29, in the first major street demonstration during his rule, a crowd of three hundred, calling themselves "young Waf- dists" gathered outside the prime minister's office. In a demonstration of support, they chanted: "Long live the Wafdist Youth, Hilali's soldiers; Long live Hilali, man of morals and purification." Cairo buzzed with rumors of a new, Hilali-led party.56

By May Nagib al-Hilali had weathered the assault of his critics and set in motion a compre- hensive program to reform Egypt's political system. But by June Wafdist opposition again rankled, and signs of cracks in minority ranks appeared. Several minority deputies from the 1950 government signed a petition to the king demanding new elections. More embarrassing, cAli Mahir, Husayn Sirri, and the venerable chief of the Nationalist (Watani) party, Hafiz Ramadan, joined Nahhas in criticizing Hilali in the press. Hilali rejoined, but his confidence was shaken.57 In late June the king turned against Hilali and his dream unravelled. However strong his vendetta against the Wafd, his passion for reform ultimately led Hilali to the palace gates. Those who had most to fear conspired to secure the prime minister's ouster. In mid-May Karim Thabit paid the American ambassador several visits. Thabit, who was temporarily on the outs and clearly seeking a way back in, denounced

51 Al-Ahram, 24 and 25 March and 1, 4, 7, 11, 12, 21 April 1952; The New York Times, 12 April and 14 June 1952.

52 Ruz al-Yusuf, 3 March 1952, p. 3; 24 March 1952, p. 3.

53 Kamal Rif cat, Harb al-tahrir al-wataniya (Cairo, 1968), 173-75.

54 Makram cUbayd passed along Hilali's promise that elections would be held and martial law lifted within the year, al-Ahram, 20 April 1952.

55 The New York Times, 16 April 1952. 56 Al-Ahram, 1 May 1952. 57 U.S. Army Military Attache (USARMA) reports,

774.00(W)/5-2952, 6-552, 6-1252, 6-2052.




Hilali as a failure and promoted the candidacy of either Murtada al-Maraghi or Husayn Sirri.58 A month later, Ilyas Andraos, very much on the in with the king, approached Jefferson Caffery seeking a green light for Hilali' s dismissal. Caffery neither agreed nor protested.59 He could not have been surprised when several days later, on June 29, Hilali resigned.

The talk over tea in Cairo was that Ahmad cAbbud, the pro-Wafdist industrial magnate, paid the king LE 1,000,000 to unseat the prime minister. Word that Hilali planned to break his sugar monopoly and collect LE 5,000,000 in back taxes forced cAbbud's hand. cAbbud sup- posedly arranged the transaction through Thabit and Andraos, both obvious targets of any palace purge. Whether any money actually exchanged hands hardly mattered; the credence which Egyp- tians lent the story is commentary enough on the political climate of the country at the time. In reality it seems more likely, as Caffery related, that Hilali, sensing that his position no longer remained tenable, seized the opportunity to resign with a modicum of honor intact. It is quite likely, as others claim, he first confronted the king, demanding he purge his coterie.60

Hilali's legacy was that of a naive, if honest, politician. He initiated an impressive array of reforms in his four month tenure. For his animosity towards the Wafd he sacrificed a degree of popular support which would have strengthened his position. He took no steps to consolidate his position in March and April, when his popularity was at its peak and many expected he would form a party to contest elections. His failure to make any inroads with the British cost him foreign backing, and les- sened his own enthusiasm and that of his allies. Here, too, Hilali, in the judgment of British and American observers, approached his task with passion, but naivete.61

The campaign to dump Hilali highlighted internal rifts within the palace. Faruq had confessed to Jefferson Caffery in early May that if Hilali resigned he would not know to whom to turn. For the first time, the king admitted, he did not have a new cabinet list in his desk drawer.62 Those who looked beyond their own spoils system opposed Hilali's removal and supported his plans to purge the royal coterie. In late May Hasan Yusuf argued before the king - he says he felt successfully - against dismissing Hilali.63 A week before Hilali's fall Hafiz cAfifi, presumably having read the writing on the wall, tendered his resignation. The king rejected the move and, instead, charged cAfifi with finding a new prime minister. cAfifi had not succeeded by June 29. 64

All of Egypt now watched as the king searched for a candidate to fill Hilali's empty seat. The names of several new "saviors" appeared. Karim Thabit backed Husayn Sirri. Hafiz cAfifi nomi- nated BahaD al-Din Barakat, a respected independent lawyer and a cousin of Sacd Zaghlul. Murtada al-Maraghi's turn, most felt, would come in the near future, if an iron fist was required. The post went unfilled for four days. Sirri and Barakat both failed to form a coalition cabinet. Finally, the kind gave Sirri the nod to lead an independent government.65

Husayn Sirri: Delusions of Grandeur, Premonitions of Disaster

Sirri assumed office on July 2, eager to rule as "just tyrant," a role for which he was terribly miscast. Sirri had led two caretaker governments the previous decade. His first followed the dismissal of cAli Mahir at British behest in November 1940 and ended with the British imposition of a Wafdist government, the infamous 4 February 1942 incident. In his second tenure, from July 1949 to January 1950, he had served merely as referee for the election which brought the Wafd to power for the last time. Sirri now found

58 Caffery desp. 2276, 774.00/5-1352. 59 Caffery no. 2292, 774.00/6-2752. For criticism of Caffery,

see The Economist, 12 July 1952, pp. 97-98. 60 Caffery no. 26, 774.00/7-352; Byroade to acting secretary

of state, 3 July 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, V, pp. 1828-29. 61 In early March Caffery noted that without any negoti-

ated settlement Hilali's government stood no chance of

lasting; Caffery no. 125, 8 March 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, V, pp. 1773-77. Also see The Economist, 19 April 1952, pp. 172, 175.

62 Caffery no. 1965, 8 May 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, V, pp. 1799-1800.

63 Yusuf, Qasr, 338-39. 64 Yusuf, Qasr, 340. 65 The New York Times, 2 July 1952; Sabri, Qissat,

p. 165.




himself entangled in much the same web as his two predecessors. As a king's man, one cham- pioned by the worst elements in the palace, an Anglophile, and an associate of cAbbud, the man believed to be directly responsible for Hilali's downfall, the new prime minister began his reign with a cloud overhead. Competent men comprised his cabinet, with one glaring exception, Karim Thabit, appointed minister of state, and one glaring absence, Murtada al- Maraghi, who declined an offer to retain the interior portfolio he held under Mahir and Hilali. Nonetheless, Sirri now boasted to the American ambassador that this time he would be more than a caretaker.66

As in his previous terms, the presence of the Wafd loomed large in the background. Hilali's offensive had wakened the slumbering giant. Sirri sought to recapture national unity without appearing a prisoner of the majority party. Two days after taking office, bowing to the State Council ruling, Sirri lifted the order confining FuDad Sirag al-Din to his house. In a private meeting with Sirag al-Din prior to his release, Sirri warned the latter to behave himself. The prime minister asserted he would neither lift martial law nor call elections in the near future. Sirag al-Din agreed to take an extended vacation in France. Wishing Sirri luck in correcting errors committed by Hilali, he sailed on July 14. Mustafa al-Nahhas sailed for Europe five days later, ostensibly for health reasons, after some- what more firmly demanding elections in the near future.67

Royal intransigence, not the Wafd, undid Sirri. The day after Nahhas' departure the prime minister suddenly resigned. If Sirri' s dream of benevolent despotism was illusory, it is to his credit that he, virtually alone among Egypt's political leaders, gauged the danger of discon- tentment within the officer corps. The palace and the liberal establishment together bear ultimate responsibility for the ease with which the

army thrust itself into the center of the political arena in July 1952. Indifference to increasing evidence of dissent within the army at a time when the political system hung by a thread proved disastrous. A persistent view that trouble could be contained by the High Command, that young hot-heads could be controlled by transfers and hand slaps, blinded Egypt's political leaders to the real trouble spots within the ranks.

In January 1950 the Free Officers, to test their popularity, contested elections to the Officers' Club. Their slate, headed by Brigadier Mu- hammad Nagib, swept to victory over palace favorites. The regime now not only had proof of widespread discontent, but could identify the movement's presumed leaders.68 Yet in February the king assured the British ambassador that the army remained loyal. There were, he informed Sir Ralph Stevenson "about twelve unsatisfactory officers" and these would be "got rid of."69 Murtadah al-Maraghi, who claims to have been close to uncovering the secret society, says he encountered a similar ill-fated apathy on the king's part.70

In mid- July Faruq's attitude changed. The continued dissemination of hostile pamphlets and political statements by members of the club executive, but even more important, rivalries within the high command, prompted the king to exert greater authority over the army. He thus set in motion the process which led to his overthrow. On July 16 Faruq ordered the governing board of the Officers' Club dissolved, replac- ing it with hand-picked loyalists. That day the Free Officer executive committee resolved to stage a coup d'etat, setting early August as the target date. Sirri urged Faruq to appease dis- sident officers by appointing Nagib war minister. Faruq instead determined to name General Husayn Sirri cAmr to the post. The latter, a key figure in the arms profiteering scandal of the

66 Caffery no. 47, 774.00/7-752; The Economist, 12 July 1952, p. 97.

67 Al-Ahram, 5 and 6 July 1952; Caffery no. 47, 774.00/7- 752; USARMA, 774.00(W)/7-1952. cAbd al-Fattah Hasan had been released in late April, after he withdrew his case against the interior minister which the State Council had agreed to hear in early May; see al-Ahram, 21 April 1952.

68 Hasan Ibrahim and Gamal Salim were from the free Officers executive committee (Salim lost). Zakariyah Muhyi al-Din, Gamal Himmad, and Amin Shakir were from the operational command. Hamdi cUbayd was the other Free Officer. Rashad Mahanna, Ibrahim cAtif, and Galal Nida3 were friends of the movement.

69 Stevenson no. 366, 13 Feb 1952, FO 371/96872/JE 1018/66.

70 Maraghi, Gharacib, 153-57.




Palestine War, was anathema to the Free Officers. Nasser and several companions had tried to kill him in early January. Sirri on his own initiative offered the ministry to Nagib. Nagib refused and warned Free Officer leaders that the high command had a list of their names. Apprised of the

king's intent to appoint Sirri cAmr, and expect- ing him to move against them, they accelerated their plan of action, setting the coup for the

night of July 21/22, then postponing the oper- ation twenty-four hours. On July 20 Sirri, despairing at his failure to convince Faruq to soften his position, resigned.71

Sirri 's resignation in the wake of a military crisis infuriated the king.72 Faruq turned again to Hilali. He did so, suggested Jefferson Caffery, to silence allegations that he had deposed him for bounty three weeks earlier.73 Hilali approached the task with a greater resolve to confront the palace. He demanded total freedom to select a cabinet, refused to appoint Sirri cAmr war minister, and elicited a promise from Faruq that he would purge his inner circle, with Andraos and Thabit named specifically.74 He assumed an almost jaunty public attitude. To questions from the press about his program he replied, "What, you think I'll change my stripes?"75 Yet when Hilali confronted a fait accompli, the appointment of the king's brother- in-law, a colonel, war minster, he acquiesced. His cabinet took the oath of office in Alexandria on July 22. The next morning troops loyal to the Free Officers controlled Cairo and marched towards the summer capital to force their demands upon the king.76

The Myth of the Savior

"From Montazah to Ras el Tin the Egyptian caravan of Pashas, procurers, politicians and eavesdroppers wandered about aimlessly. It was obviously the end, a golden death agony on the

beach."77 The Lacoutures' prose conveys well the despair of political life in Egypt in the months prior to the coup. But a nagging question remains. How, in the face of a protracted leadership crisis, with the number of legitimate candidates thinning, and rumblings of discontent in the army, could Egypt's ruling class desert Cairo for Alexandria and Europe in the summer of 1952?

On the surface the answer seems clear enough. Egypt's political leaders proved unwilling to set aside old disputes or personal ambitions in order to act for their own common good, let alone the welfare of their country. More damn- ing, they knew they were trapped. Faruq knew he had exhausted his options as well as his legitimacy, and so turned back to Hilali. Hilali, under heavy pressure from Haifiz cAfifi, a number of his former ministers, and leading independents, accepted.78 He promised potential ministers less willing to give it another go that this time he would tolerate no interference from Faruq.79 Hilali' s subsequent acceptance of the king's son-in-law in his cabinet points to his own woeful recognition that he could never free himself from royal whim. His passionate resolve to form a government and reform the political system led him once again to compromise his moral vision.

But the problem cut much deeper. This di- lemma, the passion for reform and the willingness to compromise, highlights the crisis of Egyptian liberalism in its waning hours. While some of Egypt's political elites wandered aimlessly, others struggled to bolster the system. Men like Hilali and cAli Mahir had visions of reform and programs in hand. The recipe for stability as Egypt emerged from the violence of the late 1940s had been a national unity coalition that included the Wafd, when that failed, majority party rule. Black Saturday fueled a growing call for progressive strong-arm rule by

71 Fowler to Stabler, 21 July 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, V, pp. 1837-38; weekly summary of 15-21 July, 774.00/7-2152.

72 Caffery no. 128, 774.00/7-2152. 73 Caffery no. 129, 774.00/7-2152. 74 Maraghi, GharaJib, 174. 75 Al-Ahram, 22 July 1952. 76 Maraghi, GharaDib, 175-76.

77 Lacouture, Egypt, 126. 78 Caffery no. 129, 774.00/7-2152; no. 136, 774.00/7-2252.

Among those who pressured Hilali to return were two close associates and former ministers in his cabinet, Zaki cAbd al- Mutcal and Farid Zacluq, and Mustafa Amin, owner of the al-Akhbar newspaper group.

79 Maraghi, GharaJib, 174-76.




a man of action who would not be bound by parliament or be beholden to special interests. The political establishment turned to cAli Mahir and Nagib al-Hilali, both independents, with reputations for honesty and integrity, traits which had become exceedingly rare in Egyptian political life. Like many politically-minded Egyptians, they each believed that without fundamental restructuring of the political system parliamentary rule could not work. It could neither free Egypt from foreign occupation, nor build a strong national economy, nor promul- gate social reforms needed to stave off disorder in the streets.

The notion of the "just tyrant" set the frame- work in which Egyptians perceived the ' 'salvation ministries" of Mahir and Hilali, and their combined failures underline the bankruptcy of the idea. Men of vision, willing to compromise heartfelt ideals in order to lead their country, neither could survive politically. Of the two, Mahir was more the political animal, shrewd and unscrupulous. However, he assumed the role of political mediator, trying to forge a coalition of all political forces and retain the integrity of parliamentary life. Hilali, the aca- demic whose reputation rode on his distaste for politics, seemed the less likely strongman. Yet, despite his stated aversion for martial law, he proved the more eager tyrant.

The real crisis of liberalism in Egypt was that the structure of the political system and the dynamics of Egyptian politics effectively under- mined any substantive political reform. The electoral gulf between the Wafd and minority parties fostered an enmity which precluded political compromise. The constitutional preroga- tive of the throne allowed the palace to deny power to the former and co-opt the latter. Egypt's political elites talked reform, but too many refused to sacrifice partisan and personal interests. The most able men in the country remained on the fringes of power. An entrenched Wafdist old guard ousted Hilali and his allies; the rise of an opportunistic coterie within the palace alienated Mahir and marginalized cAfifi. The foreign powers always played a major role, even when they exerted less direct influence on the course of events.

All of these problems plagued the "salvation ministries." The minority parties shattered Mahir' s plans for a national unity coalition; the Wafd, reinvigorated by Hilali 's policies, drove him on the defensive. Faruq's cronies ultimately brought both down. They undercut Mahir for Hilali as a means to humble the Wafd. But when the reformer's eyes turned towards them, they sought a friendlier face. The British and American embassies turned a blind eye toward palace intrigue. The British ambassador allowed himself to be used in the plot to force Mahir' s resignation. His American counterpart, by refusing to censure the schemes of the Thabits and Andraoses, gave them a tacit green light to pursue their ambitions.

Nonetheless, for those who remained loyal to the liberal ethos, a myth of the savior prevailed. That myth explains the summer exodus of 1952 even as the curtain came down. No one gave Sirri much time, the summer at most. But one more candidate always stood in the wings await- ing the call, Barakat, Maraghi, and so on. The list grew shorter, but it always remained longer than the sight of those who refused to come to terms with the system's failure.80

Implicit in the myth was the steadfast belief that the army, however riddled with dissidents, posed no political threat to the political establishment. Sirri deserves some credit for his intuition; but after a feeble attempt to force the issue with Faruq, he chose to walk away. Maraghi claims to have seen the handwriting on the wall, but he, like the others, was caught off guard when the army moved.81

8U Muhammad Husayn Haykal, leader of the Liberal party, apparently continued to await the expected call to form a government. According to his biographer, Haykal and his Liberal colleagues- like so many other minority politicians - saw Black Saturday as "a means of attacking the Wafd rather than as a portent of things to come" (Charles D. Smith, Islam and Search for Social Order [New York, 1983], 172).

81 Despite Maraghi's claims (GharaDib, 153-57, 164-67), British records demonstrate that the interior minister was looking in the wrong direction. On the morning of July 23 Maraghi reported that the leader of the coup was one Mustafa Kamal Sidqi, a renowned playboy who dabbled- rather overtly- in leftist politics. See Creswell no. 1074, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877/JE1018/215. Michael Creswell,




Myths often die hard, but they may be adapted to changing circumstances. When the Free Officers seized power on July 23, they aimed to inject new life into the political system, not topple it. The officers, who had criticized Hilali for disregarding constitutional procedure, turned to Mahir, the mediator and protector of parliament, to form a government. If the officers did not envision themselves as "just tyrants," others certainly did. Disaffected progressives, leftists, Muslim Brothers, and anti-Wafdist minority politicians pressed the officers to exert more authority over the state apparatus than they

initially sought. This diverse lobby constructed its own "savior" myth, one which exerted a far more profound influence on the course of modern Egyptian history: that a military junta with growing self-confidence in its ability to rule would, after imposing constitutional reform, restore parliamentary life and return to the barracks.82

Franklin and Marshall College

charge d'affaires in Cairo, recognized several days later that his source could not be trusted.

82 Smith, Islam, 173-77; Joel S. Gordon, "Towards Nasser's Egypt: The Consolidation of the July Revolution and the End of the Old Regime, 1952-55," Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Michigan (1987), esp. ch. 3.



the myth of the savior: egypt's "just tyrants" on the eve of revolution, january-july...

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