TITLE : UNDERSTANDING SECURITY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASI A

AUTHOR: RAJAN MENON, Lehigh University

THE NATIONAL COUNCI LFOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE VIII PROGRA M

1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N .W .Washington, D .C. 20036

PROJECT INFORMATION : '

CONTRACTOR :

Lehigh Universty

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR :

Rajan Menon

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER :

808-08

DATE :

July 29, 1994

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded b yCouncil Contract. The Council and the U.S. Government have the right to duplicate written report sand other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within th eCouncil and U.S . Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials fo rtheir own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, o rmake such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U.S. Government without th ewritten consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom o fInformation Act 5 U.S.C. 552, or other applicable law .

The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the National Counci l

for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U. S. Department of State under Title VIII (th eSoviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983) . The analysis and interpretations contained in th e

report are those of the author.

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA *Rajan Menon

Department of International Relations, Lehigh Universit yVisiting Scholar, Harriman Institute, Columbia University

July, 1994

*Please do not cite without the permission of the author . This paper is a condensed versionof a substantially longer study written under a grant from the National Council for Soviet an dEast European Research, Washington, DC .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY '

This analysis of security in post-Soviet Central Asia condenses a substantially longe r

study funded by the National Council . That project covers an array of topics germane to a

broad understanding of Central Asia's security challenges : nationalism and ethnic conflict, th e

post-Soviet transition in Central Asia and Russia, the role of Islam, Russian perceptions of

Central Asia, Russia's diplomatic and military policy, and the role of other states and

organizations outside the region. The longer study is available from the Council on reques t

(202) 387-0168 .

This paper begins with a conceptual framework specifying the main conditions tha t

constitute the context for Central Asia's security challenges . It then moves to Russia, whose

preponderant power and propinquity is an irreducible reality for the states of the region. The

significance of this fact is illustrated through four scenarios involving Russia and Central Asia .

The next section discusses various alliance strategies that Central Asian states could use to cop e

with a neo-imperial Russia, a problem that I consider to be a possibility, but by no means a

certainty . The role of powers other than Russia, and of international organizations, is examine d

here . The concluding segment specifies the implications posed by this study for US polic y

toward Central Asia and Russia .

For now and the foreseeable future, Central Asian security will be shaped by fou r

resilient, synergistic conditions : preponderant Russian power and domestic dynamics within

Russia that contribute to a hegemonic policy ; the relationship between power imbalances within

Central Asia and ethnic conflict ; the tussle between political institutionalization and socia l

mobilization in the region ; and the political implications of economic change in Central Asia .

1) Preponderant Power and the Domestic Roots of Hegemony : Russian preponderance

is stark and needs little elaboration ; it is the product of Russia's size, power, and long imperia l

relationship vis a vis Central Asia . At the same time the result of domestic political dynamics

is that the dominant Russian conception of Central Asia is suffused with imperial myths . The

specter of the turbulent frontiers, Islamic fundamentalists, plots against Russian predominance ,

falling dominoes, and threats to svoi ("ours") by chuzhoi ("others") are invoked for domesti c

power struggles that spill over into the foreign policy arena . A strategic conception has thu s

arisen in Russia that defines stability in the periphery not just as a function of the balance o f

power between states but also as a function of the nature of the political order within them .

Thus the first condition results from a symbiosis between the systemic fact of Russia n

'Compiled and edited by NCSEER staff .

preponderance, the Russian domestic reality of logrolling, and the rise of a hegemoni c

conception of security vis a vis Central Asia .

2) Regional Imbalances and Ethnic Conflict : Within Central Asia, the imbalance i n

power between Uzbekistan and the other states is striking, particularly if Kazakhstan i s

excluded from the equation . Even with Kazakhstan included, Uzbekistan accounts for 4 9

percent of the region's Muslim population. Its population is twice that of Kyrgyzstan ,

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan combined ; its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exceeds that o f

these three countries taken together . But it is the danger of irredentist conflict in Central Asia ,

itself a legacy of Soviet-era state formation, that makes this imbalance consequential fo r

regional security . The present national borders of the region took final shape between 1924 an d

1936, and the demarcations reflected scant regard for the distribution of ethnic groups . The

potential for ethnic conflict created thereby was suppressed by the stability imposed by th e

Soviet system. With the Soviet collapse, however, this latent source of conflict could becom e

manifest, particularly between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan .

Moreover, in Central Asia, nationalism could be mobilized from above by newly-created state s

seeking legitimacy and social cohesion . Alternatively, it could emanate from below a s

opposition groups seek to garner support against existing regimes and the intelligentsia searche s

for post-Soviet identities based on local traditions . Such prosaic and incremental nationalism i s

already making its appearance .

Thus the second condition results from the interaction between Uzbek preponderance, the

existing basis for irredentism in Central Asia, and the possibility that ethno-nationalism coul d

emerge in Central Asia to fill the ideological-political void created by the collapse of Sovie t

ideology, institutions, and restraints .

3) Political Institutionalization Amidst Social Mobilization : Simply put, political

institutionalization involves the protracted process of creating durable, institutions capable o f

providing basic stability, mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power, political participation ,

and administration . An imbalance between political development and social mobilization i n

Central Asia is to be expected in a region where state formation, the creation of politica l

legitimacy, national integration, and social mobilization are simultaneous, as opposed t o

sequential, developments . As the Tajik civil war shows such a milieu generates instabilities ;

these in turn, set the stage for foreign intervention as domestic power vacuums are filled b y

external forces with their own agendas .

4) Economic Efficiency Versus Political Stability : The problem, in essence, is this :

economic efficiency in Central Asia requires a transition from state-owned economies featurin g

administered prices and subsidized enterprises to economies propelled by markets and privat e

property . Yet economic restructuring could generate an array of politically-rooted instabilities :

ii

resistance by a nomenklatura seeking to avoid the proverbial rubbish heap of history;

politically mobilizable mass discontent generated by unemployment, inflation, socia l

dislocation; and sheer anomie. The unrest that inflation and unemployment have created sinc e

the Soviet collapse in Kazakhstan (among miners), Uzbekistan (among students), an d

Turkmenistan are examples . Economic change that increases the role of market forces i s

inevitable in Central Asia . The question from the standpoint of security is how effectively

Central Asian nascent states will be able to cope with the political instability that wrenchin g

economic change begets .

In Russian discourse on Central Asia there is a proprietorial subtext . This should not

occasion surprise : after all, Central Asia was, until recently, Russian property. For imperial

powers in general, the historical legacy of empire is resilient and conditions post-imperia l

perspectives . This is all the more so in Russia today because of the residual nostalgia fo r

empire, the anxiety over the country's diminished status (itself partly a function of empire) ,

and the anxieties of the 25 million ethnic Russians living in the near abroad—anxieties, which ,

in turn, affect the policies of the Russian state and the balance of domestic political forces .

Russian attitudes matter for Central Asia's security because, as an adjoining ex-imperia l

power, it has unsurpassed advantages in military might and ease of access that enable it t o

project force into the region to defend its interests .

Independent Russia's evolving military doctrine shows that the capacity to apply power i n

the periphery is considered a major requisite for national security. Russian military doctrin e

includes several features that justify this conclusion . These features include the emphasis on

mobile, so-called "quick reaction forces" ; the connection made between conflicts on Russia' s

southern rim and national security ; and the move from a divisional structure to a more flexibl e

one based on corps and brigades . These doctrinal and operational points must be considere d

alongside actual Russian conduct, which also suggests that a hegemonic role in the periphery i s

a goal of national security policy . Examples include the Russian military's push for a revisio n

of the Convention Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to raise the permitted ceiling on Russia n

forces in the North Caucasus military district (as well as the St . Petersburg district) . The

intention is clearly to increase the forces that can be maintained for quick deployment in th e

southern theater . Even more significant is Russia's actual intervention in the civil wars i n

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Moldova . Thus doctrinal and operational facets of

military policy can combine with the momentum generated by precedent and domestic political

pressures for intervention and lead Russia to translate its capacity to intervene in regiona l

conflicts in the near abroad into strategic capital .

iii

Buttressed by the 1992 Tashkent agreement on collective security, the CIS is clearl y

becoming a Russian-dominated security regime . In a nutshell, these bilateral and multilatera l

agreements provide Russia access to Central Asian military facilities and commit Central Asi a

not to join unfriendly alliances . (The Russo-Turkmenistan security treaty also provides for th e

joint command of military forces and the combined defense of Turkmenistan's borders with

Iran and Afghanistan.) In return, Russia is to provide protection, training, and weapons .

These arrangements show that the current elites of Central Asia look to Russia as th e

provider of security . But the preponderance of Russian power and the weight of history sugges t

that Russia could also become the source of insecurity if events in the region--whether or no t

they are controlled by local leaders--threaten its interests . The mere superiority of Russia n

power does not mean that interventionism by Moscow is inevitable . The interplay between the

balance of forces in Russia and the balance of forces within the states of Central Asia is more

important.

Central Asian regimes, struggling to retain power in the face of challenges by domesti c

opponents, are apt to welcome intervention . Indeed, to the extent that Central Asian states ar e

preoccupied with defeating or deterring internal threats, each other, or a non-regional powe r

other than Russia, they will rely on Russia's power and accommodate its strategic preferences .

But in the final analysis Russian intervention does not provide security ; it undermines it .

Vis a vis a neo-imperialist Russia, the Central Asian states face a stark choice betwee n

resistance and appeasement . Just to raise the cost of Russian intervention, resistance by th e

Central Asians would have to be bilateral or multilateral, since none has the power to ac t

effectively alone . For a variety of reasons a strategy of resistance against a state that i s

simultaneously the key threat (at least potentially) and the key provider of security cannot

work, especially in a region where the two most powerful states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan ,

are rivals. Reliance on help from other states in the region (Iran, Turkey or China) is mos t

unpromising . Indeed, there is now a convergence between Moscow and Beijing in Centra l

Asia, and it is not tacit, but has been openly acknowledged by leaders on both sides . Both see

turbulence, the rise of Islam, and ethno-nationalism in Central Asia as a common threat :

Russia, because of the turbulent frontier near-abroad syndrome ; China because it fears tha t

Turkic nationalism in Central Asia could spill over into Xinjiang. NATO and the CSCE are

out of the question . Appeasement on the other hand . could have the effect of polarizing Centra l

Asian societies and reducing the legitimacy of regimes, particularly if they are economicall y

ineffective, politically unpopular, and regarded by their citizens as dependent for survival o n

the former imperial power .

iv

Clearly, a combination of turbulence and upheaval in Central Asia and failure of th e

reform experiment in Russia is the most dangerous . Our best hope is for stability or at leas t

orderly change in the one, and continued reform in the other .

Six policy recommendations follow from my analysis . First: The region is fated to

remain a Russian sphere of influence . Second: Yet how Russian hegemony is exercised is a

matter of great importance for the future of US-Soviet relations . A neo-imperial Russian policy

featuring military intervention will reduce the support within the United States to aid Russia' s

economic transformation . Third: There are no vital American interests in Central Asia tha t

justify the extension of US security guarantees to the states of the region . But the US can

influence Russian policy by a strategy of economic and political engagement that supports the

growth of democracy and market forces in Russia . Fourth : The most effective way for the

United States to influence events in Central Asia is by assisting the region's post-Sovie t

transition through aid, investment, and technical support . A preoccupation with manipulatin g

Iranian-Turkish rivalry or with thwarting fundamentalism is to focus on trees to the exclusio n

of the forest . Such an approach could also promote an anti-American backlash . Fifth :

American policy toward Central Asia must not become a derivative of our relationship with

Russia . The states of Central Asia, and other former Soviet republics, should be dealt with on

an individual basis--not according to parameters communicated (however subtly) by Moscow .

Our objective in Central Asia, and in the rest of the former Soviet Union, should be t o

encourage polycentrism . Sixth : Given the limitations on US resources and the absence of vita l

interests in Central Asia, American policy should be developed in concert with our major allie s

so that resources are pooled and commitments made that are proportionate to US stakes .

v

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASI A

Rajan Menon

Department of International Relations, Lehigh Universit yVisiting Scholar, Harriman Institute, Columbia University

This analysis of security in post-Soviet Central Asia condenses a substantially longe r

study funded by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . That project

covers an array of topics germane to a broad understanding of Central Asia's securit y

challenges: nationalism and ethnic conflict, the post-Soviet transition in Central Asia an d

Russia, the role of Islam, Russian perceptions of Central Asia, Russia's diplomatic and military

policy, and the role of other states and organizations outside the region . Of necessity, what

follows is a portrait painted in broad strokes . Those interested in more detail (and complet e

documentation) should refer to the longer study, available from the Council on request .

This analysis begins with a conceptual framework specifying the main conditions tha t

constitute the context for Central Asia's security challenges . I then move to Russia, whose

preponderant power and propinquity is an irreducible reality for the states of the region . The

significance of this fact is illustrated through four scenarios involving Russia and Central Asia .

The next section discusses various alliance strategies that Central Asian states could use to cope

with a neo-imperial Russia, a problem that I consider to be a possibility, but by no means a

certainty . The role of powers other than Russia, and of international organizations, is examine d

here . The concluding segment specifies the implications posed by this study for US polic y

toward Central Asia and Russia .

ACONCEPTUAL FRAMEWOR KAnalyzing developments in the former Soviet Union is like painting a moving train--an d

doing so while the ground shifts beneath one's feet. The sheer flurry of events--civil wars ,

coups, the rise and fall of leaders, demands by once-obscure ethnic groups--confronts us with a

barrage of the specific and the multitudinous . To paraphrase Emerson: "events are in the

saddle and ride mankind." For seekers of enduring patterns and trends, the only hope is a

heuristic framework that lends meaning and order to apparent chaos . The alternative is to b e

reduced to a Sisyphean chronicler of discrete events, bypassing the truly important question o f

why they matter and how they relate to each other .

Having made these epistemological observations, I suggest that for now and th e

foreseeable future, Central Asian security will be shaped by four resilient, synergisti c

conditions : preponderant Russian power and domestic dynamics within Russia that contribut e

1

to a hegemonic policy ; the relationship between power imbalances within Central Asia an d

ethnic conflict ; the tussle between political institutionalization and social mobilization in th e

region; and the political implications of economic change in Central Asia .

1) Preponderant Power and the Domestic Roots of Hegemony : Russian

preponderance is stark and needs little elaboration ; it is the product of Russia's size, power ,

and long imperial relationship vis a vis Central Asia . The following comparisons in some

standard measures of power tell the story . The Russian Federation has a population of 150 . 4

million people compared to 53 .3 million for all five Central Asian countries . Russia's defense

budget is estimated to be $40 billion, while the total for all five Central Asian states is roughl y

$2 billion; Russia's GNP stands at $400 billion, against $88 billion for all of Central Asia ;

Russia's military manpower is 2 .3 million, compared to 127,000 for Central Asia as a whole . '

These crude measures of relative power do not even take into account the asymmetric

economic interdependence between Russia and Central Asia, Russia's higher level o f

technological development, and its hegemonic relationship with Central Asia since at least th e

mid-nineteenth century (earlier in the case of Kazakhstan) .

The vast disparity in power between Russia and Central Asia should be kept in min d

when reading analyses that, correctly, dispute the conventional view that the Russian arme d

forces are eager for political power and primed for expansion.' True, many problems diminis h

Russia's military might . These include rampant draft evasion, the state's inability to direc t

substantial sums of money toward defense because of economic difficulties, the decline in th e

upkeep and modernization of armaments, and the sharp cutbacks in training for ground force s

and pilots . It is also inaccurate to portray the armed forces as Russia's dominant politica l

force. Yet the proper corrective to views that exaggerate the military power and politica l

influence of the Russian army is not a lurch to the opposite extreme to demonstrate its lack o f

either . Russia's armed forces are a significant influence on policy toward the former Sovie t

republics; and Russian military weaknesses are far more apt to constrain operations against

relatively sizable, modern, and well-equipped forces, such as those of Ukraine and Easter n

Europe. Given Central Asia's minuscule and poorly-equipped military forces, its extrem e

dependence on Russia, and the numerous economic problems facing its regimes, it would no t

take much by way of Russian military power to threaten the region's security . Russia's military

role in Tajikistan and the trans-Caucasus makes this readily apparent .

'International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1993-1994 (London : Brassey's, 1993), pp .98-99, 140, 144-145 .

'Stephen M . Meyer, "Yeltsin's Military Bluff: Mr . Doubtfire," The New Republic, March 14, 1994, pp . 11 -12 ; and Brian D . Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations After the October Uprising," Survival, Vol . 36, No .1 (Spring, 1994), pp . 3-29 .

2

Yet this imbalance in power does not in itself foreordain imperial, interventionist Russia n

policies in Central Asia ; while important, superior Russian might is only half the story . In the

politics among nations, inequalities in power per se are not destabilizing : witness, for instance ,

the disparity between the US and Canada . Many studies, most recently Jack Snyder's Myths of

Empire, have shown that expansionist policies result from the combination of preponderan t

national power and the capacity of pro-imperialist coalitions to dominate the apparatus of state

and shape the course of statecraft by lobbying, manipulating nationalism, and propagatin g

imperial myths .' Contrary to cruder models of realism, imperial foreign policies stem from a

confluence of systemic (power ratios among states) and domestic conditions . This very

confluence is now shaping Russian policy in Central Asia . Russian discourse and deeds relatin g

to the "near abroad" (the standard term in Russian geopolitical discourse for the now -

independent former Soviet republics) are being driven by a neo-imperial conception o f

statecraft replete with notions of special rights, responsibilities, and interests . This outlook

predisposes the Russian state to engage in (and to legitimize) intervention in its souther n

periphery, of which Central Asia is part .

Some clarification is needed regarding this dominant conception of Russian statecraft

toward the near abroad . Contrary to common belief, it is not the world-view solely of the righ t

wing or the military . True, Alexander Rutskoi, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Alexander Prokhanov (the

well-known right-wing publicist), General Pavel Grachev (the Defense Minister and avowe d

hard-liner toward the near abroad), and General Alexander Lebed (the commander of Russia' s

14th Army, which is stationed in Moldova and actively abetting secessionists in the trans -

Dniester region) have been unabashed proponents of Russian hegemony in the near abroad . But

simple dichotomies of militaristic officers and civilian doves, hard-line, authoritarian opponent s

of reform and conciliatory reform-democrats, while alluring, are false . The fact is tha t

hegemonic conceptions of policy toward the near abroad also appear in the pronouncement s

and policies of those generally seen in the West as reform-minded democrats : Presiden t

Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, former presidential counsellor Sergei Stankevich ,

Vladimir Lukin, the former Russian ambassador to the United States who now chairs th e

Russian parliament's Committee on International Affairs (to name but a few) .

Consider Andrei Kozyrev as a brief example. Despite his liberal inclinations, Kozyre v

has assiduously waved banners of warning against Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia .

(That he has done so persuasively is clear from western news reports on Central Asia i n

'Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) . See also Rajan Menon and John R .

Oneal, "Explaining Imperialism : The State of the Art as Reflected in Three Theories," Polity, Vol . XIX, No . 2

(Winter 1986), pp . 182-184, 191-193 and the contrast drawn between "systemic" and "dispositional" theories o f

empire in Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), Ch . 1 .

3

general and the Tajik civil war in particular ; they feature a by-now-predictable, simplistic, and

exaggerated portrayal of the salience of Islamic fundamentalism .) Kozyrev has also insisted tha t

Russia, as a great power, is entitled to special rights in the near abroad . In an October, 1993 .

interview he called for Russian troops to be used in this region to protect "geopolitica l

positions that took centuries to conquer ." And in a September, 1993, speech at the 48th U N

General Assembly, he called--repeating a proposal made by Yeltsin--for Russian troops i n

Central Asia to receive the special imprimatur of UN peacekeeping forces . Moreover, he

explicitly sought to exclude other countries or organizations from peacekeeping responsibilitie s

in Russia's periphery, arguing that "no other international organization or group of states ca n

replace our peace-making efforts in this specifically post-Soviet space ." Kozyrev has also bee n

outspoken in asserting that Russian power will be used to defend the rights of the Russia n

diaspora and in campaigning for dual citizenship for Russians living in the former Sovie t

republics . 4It would be wrong to call this emerging neo-imperial outlook in Russia a strategi c

consensus. This would imply that it results from instrumental-technical debates over security .

In fact, it is the child of domestic politics : infighting, coalition building, and allianc e

formation . This process resembles what Jack Snyder has called "logrolling"--the momentu m

created by diverse coalitions that favor hegemonic policies and are able to affect state policy b y

virtue of their combined efforts, often giving rise to policies that no one of them alone would

have had the political resources to bring about . In Russia, logrolling has been promoted by

several developments : i) Right-wing nationalists and senior military officers have succeeded i n

making virile policies that assert Russian interests and protect ethnic Russians in the nea r

abroad the litmus paper test for patriotism . In doing so, they have defined the terms of foreig n

policy discourse and debate . And the Russian state's eagerness to secure the support of th e

military to foil future challenges from the hard right has increased the leverage of the arme d

forces on foreign policy, particularly as it pertains to the near abroad . (Indeed, Kozyrev onc e

observed that the military seemed to have its own foreign policy .) 5 Localism and disarray i n

the military ranks have given local commanders considerable leeway in using their forces to

intrude into conflicts in Russia's periphery . This has occurred in Moldova and in Tajikistan .

where Russia's 301st Motor Rifle Division, ostensibly on a peacekeeping mission, has bee n

sucked into a civil war in which some of Afghanistan's mujahedeen groups are backing the

'For Kozyrev's views and comments on these matters, see RFE/RL News Briefs, October 4-8, 1993, p . 7 ; TheNew York Times, January 25, 1994, p . 6; Suzanne Crow, "Russia Asserts Its Strategic Agenda," RFE/RLResearch Report, Vol . 2, No. 50 (December 17, 1993), pp. 1-4 ; Rossiiskie vesti, December 3, 1992, p . 2

'Steven Erlanger, "In Ex-Soviet Lands Russian Army Can Be a Protector or an Occupier," (the third installmen tof a six-part analysis) The New York Times, November 30, 1993, p . 12 .

4

military operations of a segment of the Tajik opposition . ii) Elites on the reform-democratic

end of the political continuum have, in response to pressure from nationalists . moved to th e

right so as not to be outflanked from the right . This is clearly evident in the evolution of th e

pronouncements and policies of Yeltsin and Kozyrev . iii) Reform democrats have failed--a s

many of them admit--to articulate an alternative, non-imperial conception of policy toward th e

near abroad . By default, therefore, the nationalist right wing has been able to define what th e

ends and means of foreign policy should be . iv) Those who have tried to present competing

visions have been isolated and later sacrificed by the leadership : the examples of (former )

Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev and Galina Starovoitiva (a former adviser t o

Yeltsin on nationality issues) come to mind . The net result of these domestic dynamics is tha t

the dominant Russian conception of Central Asia is suffused with what Snyder calls imperia l

myths . The specter of the turbulent frontiers, Islamic fundamentalists, plots against Russia n

predominance, falling dominoes, and threats to svoi ("ours") by chuzhoi ("others") are invoke d

for domestic power struggles that spill over into the foreign policy arena .

A strategic conception has thus arisen in Russia that defines stability in the periphery not

just as a function of the balance of power between states but also as a function of the nature o f

the political order within them . As Robert W. Tucker pointed out long ago, this is a classi c

paradigm for hegemonic policies--particularly given the inherently dynamic situation within

Central Asian countries whose internal orders will change as the post-Soviet transition unfolds ,

bringing unfamiliar forces to the fore .

To summarize, the first condition results from a symbiosis between the systemic fact o f

Russian preponderance, the domestic reality of logrolling, and the rise of a hegemoni c

conception of security vis a vis Central Asia .

2) Regional Imbalances and Ethnic Conflict : Within Central Asia, the imbalance i n

power between Uzbekistan and the other states is striking, particularly if Kazakhstan is

excluded from the equation . Even with Kazakhstan included, Uzbekistan accounts for 4 9

percent of the region's Muslim population . Its population is twice that of Kyrgyzstan ,

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan combined ; its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exceeds that o f

these three countries taken together .' But it is the danger of irredentist conflict in Centra l

Asia, itself a legacy of Soviet-era state formation, that makes this imbalance consequential fo r

regional security . The present national borders of the region took final shape between 1924 an d

1936 ; the demarcations reflected scant regard for the distribution of ethnic groups--a proces s

6 Central Asia Monitor, No. 3 (1992), p . 39 ; The First Book of Demographics for the Republics of the Forme rSoviet Union, 1951-1990 (Shady Side, Maryland : New World Demographics, 1992), Table B-3, pp . B-7-B-8 ;International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance,1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp . 14-141 ,144-145 .

5

mirrored in the policies of the European imperial powers elsewhere in the world during th e

19th century. The potential for ethnic conflict created thereby was suppressed by the stability

imposed by the Soviet system . With the Soviet collapse, however, this latent source of conflic t

could become manifest, particularly between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan .

In Tajikistan, 27 percent of the population is Uzbek, concentrated in the Khujand ,

Gissar, and Kurghan Teppe regions (adjacent to Uzbekistan), where they constitute 30-4 0

percent of the population . The danger of conflict between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan wil l

become particularly acute if turmoil within Tajikistan gives rise to movements in the Khujan d

region--located in northern Tajikistan--devoted to secession and federation with Uzbekistan . (In

1992, as the Tajik civil war unfolded, Khujand threatened to do just that .) Khujand, which ha s

traditionally dominated Tajikistan's politics, is economically the country's most develope d

region, and its elite has longstanding and strong ties with neighboring Uzbekistan . On the othe r

side of the coin, the existence within Uzbekistan of a substantial (934,000) Tajik population ,

which has organized to assert its cultural rights, means that tensions between Uzbeks and

Tajiks in Uzbekistan could also escalate into conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan . The

presence of so many Tajiks in Uzbekistan makes the Uzbek government particularly wary o f

the ripple effects of chaos in Tajikistan . This was an important motive for Uzbekistan' s

intervention against the anti-communist opposition in the Tajik civil war .

Tajik wariness over Uzbekistan's superior power and the Uzbek diaspora is reinforced b y

the Uzbek tendency to view Tajiks as Persianized Uzbeks—an attitude that has prompted Taji k

intellectuals to assert their separate identity and the greater refinement of their culture . At root ,

this assertion of difference and superiority reflects both a fear of and response to what Tajik s

regard as an aggressive pan-Turkism centered in Uzbekistan . Such apprehension i s

compounded by the proclivity of Uzbeks to question the very authenticity and legitimacy of th e

Tajik state itself.' Another source of future conflict that also represents the fusion of cultura l

and security issues is the status of Bukhara and Samarkand . Tajiks view both cities as histori c

centers of Persian culture lost to Uzbekistan in the Moscow-directed process of Central Asia n

state and boundary creation during the 1920s : Dushanbe, the lackluster capital of Tajikistan, i s

seen as poor compensation . While the issue is currently dormant, experienced observers o f

Central Asia warn that it could become politically flammable in the future .

7Muriel Atkin, "Religious, National, and Other Identities in Central Asia," in Jo-Ann Gross, ed ., Muslims i nCentral Asia Expressions of Identity and Change (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), pp . pp .51-53 ; OlivierRoy, The Civil War in Tajikistan : Causes and Implications (Washington, DC : The United States Institute for Peace ,1993) .

6

For Tajiks there was a much more dramatic illustration of the significance of

Uzbekistan's "ethnic aspirations," larger size and population, "greater social cohesion ." This

was its intervention in the Tajik civil war, an event that represented another disquieting

development with potentially far reaching significance for the region : Russia's reliance o n

Uzbekistan as regional "gendarme" and enforcer .' With Russian encouragement, Uzbekistan

provided arms and logistical support to the Tajikistan People's Front, the fighting arm of th epro-communist forces . It also intervened directly with aircraft, helicopters, and armore d

personnel carriers, using the local Uzbek population as both a rationale and a resource . Once

the anti-communist opposition was dislodged from power and a pro-Uzbek government- -representing the communist-dominated Khujand-Kulab 9 power bloc's triumph over the

opposing coalition of democrats, Islamists, and Pamiris from Tajikistan's Gorno-Baclaksha n

region--was installed, Uzbekistan helped train its intelligence and security services . The end

result has been the creation of a Tajik regime that, by its own admission, is beholden toUzbekistan . 1 0

The combustible mix of preponderant Uzbek power and the in-built danger of irredentis m

in Central Asia could also spark conflict between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where . Uzbeks

account for 13 percent of the population . The most likely scenario for confrontation would be a

renewed flare up of the strife that occurred between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in June 1990 in th e

predominantly Uzbek province of Osh, adjacent to Uzbekistan . That episode featured a wave

of inter-ethnic pogroms and bloodletting that spread to other parts of Kyrgyzstan, leading t o

the closing of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border and curfews in several Kyrgyz cities . The orgy of

violence culminated in 320 fatalities and intervention by Soviet troops . Since then, there hav e

been other developments that portend trouble for the future . In western Kyrgyzstan, where the

Uzbek population is concentrated, irredentist nationalism simmers ; especially in Osh, Uzgen,

and Jalalabad tension between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks has prompted the declaration of states o f

emergency. The assertiveness of Kyrgyzstan's Uzbeks has been manifested in a campaign fo r

greater representation in political institutions and, in 1992, a demand by Uzbek nationalists fo r

a referendum to decide the future affiliation of the areas in which they are concentrated . The

8Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp . 97-98. Likewise, OlivierRoy points to the "rise of Uzbekistan as the main power of formerly Soviet Central Asia, mainly at the expense o fthe Persian-speaking Tajiks" and detects "an increasing Uzbek ethnic assertiveness ." Roy, The Civil WarinTajikistan : Causes and Implications, pp. 10, 11, 15, 25-26 .

'Tajikistan's politics have long been dominated by a partnership between the regions of Khujand and Kulab .10 At a meeting of the five Central Asian states held on January 4, 1993 at the initiative of Uzbekistan, a treat y

of cooperation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was signed--in effect, a codification of Tajikistan's dependen tstatus--and the Tajik leader, Emomali Rakhmonov, remarked that Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, was "like afather to . . .the entire Tajik people ." Megapolis-express, January 13, 1993, p . 6 .

7

anti-Uzbek Kyrgyz nationalist organization Osh Aymagy responded in defense of what i t

considers parts of the Kyrgyz homeland, tapping the resentment of Kyrgyz over the relative

economic advantages traditionally enjoyed by Uzbeks . The potential for irredentist movements

among its Uzbek population has made significantly weaker Kyrgyzstan wary of Uzbek powe r

and expansion. Specific events have heightened this apprehension . An example was th e

unauthorized exercise by Uzbek military units in March, 1993, in Kyrgyzstan's Osh province ,

the original site of the 1990 Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes . The episode was a reminder tha t

Uzbekistan could use force against its weaker neighbors to signal its ethnic and strategi c

interests—and pursue them if need be .

Imbalances in power among the states of Central Asia are consequential for regiona l

security because the imperial center (the USSR), which suppressed overt nationalism, ha s

crumbled . In the Soviet era the watchword for the union republics was "nationalist in form ,

socialist in content ." These union republics have now become independent states : the way i s

open now for nationalism in form and content." Hyper-nationalism--or "groupness," as Barry

Posen has labelled it—could become the main currency of Central Asian politics, rekindling

dormant disputes and promoting militant "us versus them" animosities that culminate i n

violence among and withi n states.12The various factors that contribute to militant nationalism have been described in th e

well-known studies of Eric Hobsbawm, Walker Connor, Ernest Gellner, Anthony Smith ,

Benedict Anderson, and Liah Greenfeld . This literature suggests that, in Central Asia ,

nationalism could be mobilized from above by newly-created states seeking legitimacy an d

social cohesion . Alternatively, it could emanate from below as opposition groups seek t o

garner support against existing regimes and the intelligentsia searches for post-Soviet identities

based on local traditions . Such prosaic and incremental nationalism is already making it s

appearance. It is apparent in the renaming of streets, cities, and oblasts ; in the move away

from the Cyrillic script and toward national currencies (Currency is not merely a medium o f

exchange but also a symbol of separateness .) ; in the sprouting of ethno-nationalist parties an d

organizations (Alash, Zheltoksan, Birlik, Rastakhiz) ; and the revisionist historiography that ha s

begun examining subjects from an unconventional, nationalist perspective . Finally, the trauma s

and turmoil of the post-Soviet transition could create what Czeslaw Milosz has called the "urg e

"The institutional context for nationalism in the states of the former Soviet Union is discussed in RogersBrubaker, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia," Theory andSociety, Vol . 23, No . 1 (February, 1994), pp . 47-78 .12Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol . 35, No . 1 (Spring, 1993), pp . 29 -31 .

8

to lose oneself in feelings of togetherness", with nationalism offering a sense of direction .

belonging, and rootedness .

To sum up the second condition, it results from the interaction between Uzbe k

preponderance, the existing basis for irredentism in Central Asia, and the possibility tha t

ethno-nationalism could emerge in Central Asia to fill the ideological-political void created b y

the collapse of Soviet ideology, institutions, and restraints . The recent history of the Balkan s

and the trans-Caucasus demonstrates that hardening of "groupness" does not bode well fo r

peace and security .

3) Political Institutionalization Amidst Social Mobilization : Simply put, politica l

institutionalization involves the protracted process of creating durable, institutions capable o f

providing basic stability, mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power, political participation ,

and administration . As students of political development in the Third World have lon g

recognized, this is a daunting challenge in itself . (The classic analysis remains Samue l

Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies . )

Political institutionalization in Central Asia unfolds under especially trying conditions .

The structures and legitimating principles of the ancien regime have become so much debris .

Meanwhile, unprecedented levels of social mobilization (the generation of demands from belo w

by citizens exposed to new ideas from within and without) could emerge as new groups- -regional, nationalist, Islamic--make demands upon nascent states led by Soviet-era leaders wit h

no experience in dealing with mobilized masses . The consequent imbalance between political

institutionalization and social mobilization could be aggravated because the process of stat e

formation coincides with the perilous post-Soviet economic transition .

The Tajik civil war not only is an apt example of the imbalance between politica l

institutionalization and social mobilization ; it also demonstrates how the instability generate d

thereby can set the stage for external intervention and the internationalization of civil war . In

Tajikistan, the fragile political structures of the regime (dominated by the former nomenklatur afrom Khujand and Kulab provinces) were overwhelmed by social mobilization generated by a

coalition that incorporated the Islamist themes of the Islamic Republican Party, the nationalis t

platform of Rastakhiz, the demands for regional autonomy by the Pamiri La'l-i Badakshan

movement, and the push for a more open polity by the Democratic Party .

The conflict featured bloody confrontations between regime and opposition, Russian an d

Uzbek intervention on behalf of the government, intervention on the side of the opposition by

mujahedeen from the Tajik-populated regions of Afghanistan, and clashes between Sovie t

troops and Afghan fighters . An estimated 40,000-80,000 have people died, some 60,000 have

fled to Afghanistan as refugees, and 500,000 are homeless within Tajikistan itself . The

international dimension has become evident quickly and is by no means over . Russian troop s

9

and border guards have been sent to seal the Afghan-Tajik border . Military operations

(including artillery attacks and air strikes) by Russia into northern Afghanistan continue as d o

cross-border forays by detachments of the Tajik opposition aided by Afghan mujahedeen .

Of course, the specifics of the Tajik saga will not be reproduced elsewhere in Centra l

Asia. Nor will all states in the region face the problem of social mobilization in equal measure .

Turkmenistan, with its rigid political controls, muzzled opposition, and quiescent citizenry is at

the low end of the continuum . Tajikistan, with its future political order at stake in the civil war

between the communist leadership and a diverse opposition, is at the high end . Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan, with relatively open polities that allow greater latitude for political participation ,

tend toward the low end, although for reasons that are quite different from Turkmenistan .

Uzbekistan, whose authoritarian government has all but snuffed out the opposition, but face s

the prospect of economically-and ethnically-rooted instability, is an intermediate position bu t

closer to the high end of the continuum . The response of Central Asian regimes to th e

challenge of social mobilization will vary as well . Some, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan ,

have opened up opportunities for political participation . Others have reacted with a mix o f

cooptation and repression. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan exemplify the latte r

approach, although the ratio between repression to cooptation shows significant variation acros s

these three cases . What is certain is that the current absence of significant upheaval in mos t

Central Asian countries is not a reliable predictor of future trends . Central Asia's politica l

development is still embryonic with vast changes either underway or in the offing in ever y

sphere of life. The contest between political institutionalization and social mobilization has ,

therefore, only begun . The only certainty is a future of uncertainty .

To sum up the third condition, an imbalance between political development and socia l

mobilization in Central Asia is to be expected in a region where state formation, the creatio n

of political legitimacy, national integration, and social mobilization are simultaneous, a s

opposed to sequential, developments . As the Tajik civil war shows such a milieu generate s

instabilities; these in turn, set the stage for foreign intervention as domestic power vacuums ar e

filled by external forces with their own agendas .

4) Economic Efficiency Versus Political Stability : The problem, in essence, is this :

economic efficiency in Central Asia requires a transition from state-owned economies featuring

administered prices and subsidized enterprises to economies propelled by markets and privat e

property . Yet economic restructuring could generate an array of politically-rooted instabilities :

resistance by a nomenklatura seeking to avoid the proverbial rubbish heap of history;

politically mobilizable mass discontent generated by unemployment, inflation, socia l

dislocation ; and sheer anomie. The unrest that inflation and unemployment have created sinc e

1 0

the Soviet collapse in Kazakhstan (among miners), Uzbekistan (among students), an d

Turkmenistan are examples .

Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation remains the classic statement on the tensio n

between market efficiency and socio-political stability . For our purposes, two of his points ar e

worth bearing in mind . First, social dislocations are most likely when the "self-regulatin g

market" becomes a pervasive and unprecedented force within countries . This occurred in 19t h

century Europe and could become the reality in Central Asia as well . Yet the people of the

region have had no experience with a system in which markets determine prices an d

employment : they have lived under the workings of the Soviet command economy since 1928 .

Second, from the standpoint of security, what is significant is not just the negative economi c

side effects produced by market forces (inflation, unemployment, and inequalities), but also the

disruption of established social networks and ways of life, which could create alienation ,

disorientation, and instability . True, markets may bring efficiency and prosperity in the lon g

run. But governments, typically preoccupied with the political short run, are apt to remembe r

Lord Keynes's oft-quoted aphorism: "In the long run, we are all dead ." Stated differently ,

dislocations created by economic change (whether triggered by deliberate reforms or •forced b y

the end of Soviet-era subsidies from Moscow) may sow the seeds for domestic unrest . If so ,

the long-term positive consequences of economic change will be a moot point for leader s

facing unrest at home .

True, cold-turkey capitalism is hardly rampant in Central Asia . Precisely because of the

fear of social disruption, regimes have not rushed to supplant Soviet-era economies wit h

markets and private property . Nevertheless, market forces will inevitably loom larger i n

Central Asia, even in countries where the leadership has been distinctly unenthusiastic abou t

economic reform . 13 The desire for foreign aid, efforts to lure foreign investors, and the shee r

inefficiency of the existing economic model will ensure this ; so will the realization that the

state socialist model cannot survive in the periphery while the supporting system withers ,

however slowly, in the center (Russia) . The survival of the central command economy was an d

is the sine qua non for the operation of counterpart systems in the periphery .

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, long-established patterns of trade have been tor n

asunder . Supplies that once came from the center can no longer be counted upon--if they are t o

be acquired on a predictable basis, the terms will involve higher prices and hard currency . But

it is not just the flow of supplies that has been interrupted ; the flow of support has ceased a s

"Thus Uzbekistan, a country in which economic reforms were proceeding at a snail's pace, announced inFebruary 1994 that a variety of steps would be undertaken to move toward markets and private property to addres sthe mounting economic crisis and to entice foreign investment . The Economist, March 19, 1994, p .42 .

1 1

well . Subsidies from the center were essential in enabling Central Asian states to finance a n

array of social services . These subsidies have ceased, and the chronic budget deficits being ru n

by Central Asian governments will make it impossible to maintain such programs at previou s

levels . Unfortunately, this constraint appears amidst rising unemployment as enterprise s

previously funded by ministries in Moscow are deprived of money and locally-financed firm s

are-unable to maintain current levels of production and employment . To complicate matters ,

unemployment in Central Asia, already extremely high, will have a structural quality because

of the region's relatively young population and high rates of population growth . The demand

for jobs will gallop ahead of job creation . These difficulties will make economic hardship an d

social disruptions inevitable . There will be no escaping the tension between the pursuit o f

efficiency and the maintenance of stability .

The challenge of pursuing economic transformation under politically stable circumstance s

will be all the more daunting because it must be faced under adverse external conditions .

While the lack of domestic resources makes the resort to Keynesian policies to cushio n

economic shocks problematic, international conditions—sluggish economies in West and th e

strategically-driven priority assigned to Russia by bilateral and multilateral donors--all but rul e

out large infusions of foreign aid into Central Asia to smoothen the bumpy road of economi c

restructuring . And the future flow of foreign investment will depend on Central Asia's abilit y

to compete with other parts of the world by creating an environment marked by politica l

stability ; clear and attractive regulations governing investments, taxes, and profit repatriation ;

and reliable capital markets . 14 For the region's new states each one of these tasks i s

Herculean .

Central Asian states will vary in their ability to deal effectively with the tension betwee n

efficiency and stability . At the effective end of the continuum are Turkmenistan and

Kazakhstan . Both are rich in energy, politically stable, and thus well placed to attract foreign

investment . At its Tengiz and Karachaganak fields, Kazakhstan is estimated to have 100 billion

barrels in oil reserves and 2.4 trillion cubic meters of natural gas . Turkmenistan is reckoned to

have gas deposits amounting to 8 .1 trillion cubic meters15 and could utilize its substantia l

revenues from natural gas exports (currently estimated at $1,500 per capita) to coopt an d

defuse potential sources of domestic tension in the manner of so-called "rentier states" such a s

14See Felix Rohatyn, "World Capital : The Needs and the Risks," The New York Review of Books (July 14 ,1994), p . 50, on the importance of these provisions for attracting investment into the post-Soviet states .

15Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, pp . 128, 201 .

1 2

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the emirates of the Persian Gulf . 16 Turkmenistan has the

wherewithal to make post-Soviet economic disruptions more tolerable to its citizens, its sever e

shortage of water and arable land and abundant rural poverty notwithstanding . By delivering

the goods to citizens economically, it may be able to continue draconian limits on politica l

activities without spawning radical opposition movements . Kazakhstan could develop a

different strategy, meeting popular economic expectations while also permitting a relativel y

high degree of political freedom ." In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Central Asia' s

poorest states, are at the ineffective end of the continuum in their potential to face the politica l

fallout of economic change . Of the two, Kyrgyzstan has a much better chance of success . Its

government presides over a relatively open polity and is committed to restructuring the

economy. In contrast, Tajikistan features continuing civil war, political repression, and a rulin g

elite opposed to economic reform . Uzbekistan occupies an intermediate position ; it disposes of

greater wealth and resources, but its authoritarian leadership sits atop festering social an d

economic problems and has virtually eliminated the possibility that these problems can b e

channelled into and resolved within institutions that provide opportunities for peaceful politica l

participation and dissent .

To summarize the fourth condition, economic change that increases the role of marke t

forces is inevitable in Central Asia; the only question is whether states enact reforms or are

pushed toward them because the status quo of Soviet-style economies is no longer viable . In

the long run, economic transformation may make for greater efficiency ("no pain, no gain") .

Yet the fundamental question from the standpoint of security is how effectively Central Asia n

nascent states will be able to cope with the political instability that wrenching economic chang e

begets .

The upshot of these four conditions that provide a framework for understanding Centra l

Asian security is this : Central Asia's security should be understood in terms of the interplay

between systemic factors (power imbalances between states) and domestic factors (the balanc e

of political forces ; political institutionalization versus social mobilization ; efficiency via the

market versus political stability) in both center and periphery . A conception of security tha t

dwells on the ratios between opposing arsenals and other indicators of national power misses

the crucial importance of the symbiosis between the systemic and domestic dimensions o f

security .

16Its 1993 decision to provide free electricity and water to the population may be the prelude to an arrangemen tunder which the regime deploys its resources to provide economic benefits to the population, which in turn accept ssevere political restrictions as part of the bargain .

"As will be discussed below, the overall success of such an approach depends on Kazakhstan's ability to manag esimmering tensions between Kazakhs and Russians .

1 3

THE RUSSIAN COLOSSUS AND POST-IMPERIAL SCENARIO S

In Russian discourse on Central Asia there is, as I have already suggested, a proprietoria l

subtext . This should not occasion surprise : after all, Central Asia was, until recently, Russian

property . For imperial powers in general, the historical legacy of empire is resilient and

conditions post-imperial perspectives . This is all the more so in Russia today because of the

residual nostalgia for empire, the anxiety over the country's diminished status (itself partly a

function of empire), and the anxieties of the 25 million ethnic Russians living in the nea r

abroad—anxieties, which, in turn, affect the policies of the Russian state and the balance o f

domestic political forces . Russian attitudes matter for Central Asia's security because, as an

adjoining ex-imperial power, it has unsurpassed advantages in military might and ease o f

access that enable it to project force into the region to defend its interests .

Independent Russia's evolving military doctrine shows that the capacity to apply power i n

the periphery is considered a major requisite for national security .18 Russian military doctrine

includes several features that justify this conclusion . These features include the emphasis on

mobile, so-called "quick reaction forces" ; the connection made between conflicts on Russia' s

southern rim and national security ; and the move from a divisional structure to a more flexibl e

one based on corps and brigades . These doctrinal and operational points must be considere d

alongside actual Russian conduct, which also suggests that a hegemonic role in the periphery i s

a goal of national security policy . Examples include the Russian military's push for a revisio n

of the Convention Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to raise the permitted ceiling on Russia n

forces in the North Caucasus military district (as well as the St . Petersburg district) . The

intention is clearly to increase the forces that can be maintained for quick deployment in th e

southern theater. Even more significant is Russia's actual intervention in the civil wars i n

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Moldova . Thus doctrinal and operational facets of

military policy can combine with the momentum generated by precedent and domestic political

pressures for intervention and lead Russia to translate its capacity to intervene in regiona l

conflicts in the near abroad into strategic capital .

In making this argument, I do not contend that there is something inherently imperia l

about Russia . Indeed, Russian policy toward its immediate environment conforms to a commo n

pattern in world politics : the hierarchical relationship hegemonic powers seek with states i n

their sphere of influence--a tendency, which, as the Melian dialogue of Thucydides suggests .

18 Scott McMichael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol . 1, No . 40 (October9, 1992), pp . 45-50; and Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Relations," Ibid ., Vol . 2, No. 46 ,November 19, 1993, pp . 44-50 . In discussing the features of the new doctrine, Foye emphasizes the politica lcontext, namely, the increased political power of the Defense Ministry and the armed forces given their support o fYeltsin during his September-October 1993 showdown with the Russian parliament .

14

dates back at least to the Peloponnesian War . Indeed, there is a striking parallel between

Russian security policy in the near abroad and American conduct in Central and Lati n

America.19 The historical record demonstrates that both the United States and Russia see thei r

peripheries as strategic backyards where they have--and are entitled to have--special interests .

Both have sought to limit the intrusion of extra-regional powers ; both are status quo powers

fearful of revolutionary change--whether Islamic (as in Russia's case) or Marxist (as i n

America's) . Both have utilized regional bilateral and multilateral security mechanisms to

facilitate and legitimize intervention . In Central and Latin America, the US has relied upo nbilateral security agreements and the Organization of American States (OAS) . Russia now has

bilateral security treaties with each Central Asian country ; in addition it has forged the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) .

Buttressed by the 1992 Tashkent agreement on collective security, the CIS is clearl y

becoming a Russian-dominated security regime . In a nutshell, these bilateral and multilatera lagreements provide Russia access to Central Asian military facilities and commit Central Asi anot to join unfriendly alliances . (The Russo-Turkmenistan security treaty also provides for th e

joint command of military forces and the combined defense of Turkmenistan's borders with

Iran and Afghanistan .) In return, Russia is to provide protection, training, and weapons .

These arrangements show that the current elites of Central Asia look to Russia as th e

provider of security . But the preponderance of Russian power and the weight of history suggestthat Russia could also become the source of insecurity if events in the region--whether or not

they are controlled by local leaders--threaten its interests . To reiterate a previous point, themere superiority of Russian power does not mean that interventionism by Moscow i s

inevitable . Superior power is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for imperial policies .

The interplay between the balance of forces in Russia and the balance of forces within th e

states of Central Asia is more important . Stated differently, as I argued at the outset of thi s

analysis, the nature of Russian policy will depend on the interaction between the balances o f

forces within Russia and within Central Asia . This proposition can be illustrated by four

center-periphery scenarios with different implications for Russian-Central Asian security

relations .

19Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World : Antinationalism and Intervention (New York :Praegar, 1974), pp . 82-125 ; and Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions : The United States in Central AmericaExpanded edition (New York : Norton, 1986) . On similarities between US and Soviet behavior toward their sphere sof influence (Latin America and Eastern Europe respectively), see Edy Kaufman, The Superpowers and theirSpheres of Influence (New York: St . Martin's Press, 1976), esp . pp . 17-40. On the parallels between US polic yin Latin America and Central America, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, and present Russian policy in the nearabroad, see Robert Barylski, "The Caucasus, Central Asia and the Near Abroad Syndrome," (Part 1), Central Asi aMonitor, No. 4 (1993), pp . 31-32 .

1 5

1) Democratic reformers securely control the state in Russia . Central Asian states

are ruled by ex-communist, authoritarian leaders or those presiding over relatively ope n

polities . Both categories of leaders stress close ties to Russia and are mindful of its

interests in the region . Imperial Russian policies are least likely under thi s scenario.20

Despite the hegemonic consensus in Russia, relative to hard-line ultra-nationalist groups ,

Russia's democrats--notwithstanding the differences among them--best appreciate the interna l

and external costs of reviving imperial policies . They believe that neo-imperial Russian policie s

in the near abroad will drain economic resources and create a political environment at home

that favors the opponents of democracy and reform. In their view, such policies will also

damage ties with the West and thus diminish the prospects for specific benefits such as aid ,

investment, membership in Western economic institutions, and arms control . While Russia' s

democratic reformers are by no means willing to sacrifice their country's foreign polic y

interests on the altar of East-West friendship, compared to other political groups, they have the

strongest stake in ensuring that cooperative ties with the West are not frayed by th e

accumulated weight of foreign policy disputes . To the extent that they wield power securely, as

is assumed under this scenario, domestic pressures that could push them toward hegemoni c

policies will be either manageable or negligible. The contrast in domestic structure between

center and periphery--given that some (or all) Central Asian states in this scenario are ruled b y

authoritarian leaders--need not per se promote Russian intervention . Russian democrati c

reformers may not share the political outlook of Central Asia's authoritarian leaders, but the y

see them as known quantities, forces for stability, and advocates of close ties with Russia . The

democracy versus authoritarianism distinction is less significant than the degree to whic h

peripheral regimes are able to provide--as is assumed in this scenario--a level of stabilit y

sufficient to allay Russia's fear of turbulent frontiers and to foster inclusive policies tha t

minimize tensions between the Russian diaspora and ethnic Central Asians . The history of U S

policy in Central and Latin America demonstrates that the willingness of a democrati c

hegemonic power to protect its interests by supporting cooperative authoritarian regimes in a

vital periphery is hardly unique .2) Democratic reformers are at the helm in Russia. Central Asian states, whethe r

authoritarian or democratic, are battling nationalist or Islamic forces . This scenario

20By "imperial policies" I refer to the entire range of actions that can be employed to continue the longstandin gpattern of Russian hegemony in Central Asia: economic pressure, the support of armed groups, the threat of force ,the limited use of force (as in cross-border raids), and outright invasion . These mechanisms can be used either t osupport a government sympathetic to Russian interests against opposition forces or to pressure, destabilize, o roverthrow a government that embarks on policies that are perceived as a threat to Russian interests . Of course, thedefinition of what precisely Russian interests are and what means are most appropriate to pursue them is not a fixe dcategory but contingent upon the nature of Russian state .

1 6

contains central and peripheral conditions that increase the likelihood of imperial Russia npolicies. As already noted, in comparison to other Russian groups, and notwithstanding the

hegemonic consensus in Russia, Russia's democratic reformers are the least enthusiastic abou t

intervention. They are also the most eager to safeguard relations with the West and wary o f

resuming imperial policies, which they regard as recipes for economic and strategi c

overextension abroad and the increased influence of ultra-nationalists at home . But domestic

pressures for intervention increase in this scenario because of revolutionary instability and therise of anti-Russian nationalism and radical Islam in the periphery . Neo-imperial coalitions i n

Russia's state and society will use these circumstances to campaign for the defense of ethni c

Russians and Russian state interests in an area of historic hegemony . The power of imperia l

myths will increase both as cognitive influences on policymakers and as resources mobilized b yultra-nationalist interests to goad the government toward action .

Because the protection of Russians and the virile defense of Russian interests in the nea rabroad have become symbols manipulated in Russia's power struggles to create and destro ypolitical legitimacy, savvy democratic reformers with political ambitions will be determined no t

to be portrayed by ultra-nationalist opponents as reluctant defenders of Russia's interests in th e

near abroad . As turmoil in Central Asia presents the specter of an unstable frontier, the rise o f

anti-Russian political forces, and a vulnerable Russian diaspora, the democratic camp wil l

fragment . Some of its members break will away, staking out interventionist positions that mes h

with those of civilian nationalists and hard-line military officers . The "defection" of suc hindividuals and pressure from nationalists, when combined with the institutional leverage of th emilitary, will push anti-interventionist democrats in positions of foreign policy leadership t o

move to the right--a process illustrated by the tactical shifts of Yeltsin and Kozyrev discussedearlier . And persistently dovish foreign policy officials will come under fire from ultra -

nationalists for neglecting Russia's geopolitical interests . They will lose influence or be ease d

out . The net result of logrolling by pro-imperial groups, tactical shifts by democrats, and th e

isolation or departure of those who propound non-hegemonic policies will be that domesti c

coalitions capable of countering interventionist pressures become weak, fragmented, an dineffectual .

3) Russia's democratic reformers are displaced by authoritarian nationalists . CentralAsian regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, face rising challenges fro mnationalist or Islamist opposition forces . Now groups wedded to the reassertion of Russian

imperial interests control the state, and their predisposition toward interventionist policies i s

reinforced and legitimized by instability in the periphery that threatens core Russian interest s

(friendly regimes, stability, and a peripheral environment that ensures the security of th eRussian diaspora) . Peripheral instability will bring forth nationalist clarion calls to defend th e

17

interests of both the Russian state and of ethnic Russians in Central Asia . Russian policy wil l

be shaped by the lobbying and imperial mythmaking of ultra-nationalist groups demandin g

action to maintain stability in a strategically-vital region to foil hostile alliances between radica l

opposition forces and their external patrons (Iran, Afghanistan) . Russian power will be

mobilized to save imperiled Central Asian leaders traditionally dependent upon Russia an d

deferential to its interests and now soliciting its support to retain power . In this scenario

Russian intervention will create tension between Russia and the United States and Russia an d

other states with special interests in Central Asia, particularly Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan .

4) Democrats or ultra-nationalist authoritarians are in power in Russia . Central

Asian regimes, whether secular-authoritarian, Islamist, or democratic, adopt nationalisti c

policies that favor the titular nationality at the expense of local Russians . In this scenario ,

the development of overriding importance is that Central Asian regimes adopt discriminator y

policies governing culture, political recruitment, and access to economic benefits tha t

compound the creeping sense of foreignness already felt by the Russian diaspora of 10

million . 21 The turn to such preferential nationalism is by no means inevitable . The current

crop of Central Asian leaders is highly dependent on Russia, is itself Russified, and :

understands how the fate of Russians in the near abroad has been manipulated as a symboli c

issue by Russian hard-liners . For these reasons, they have steered clear of fanning anti-Russia n

animus, sought to promote inter-ethnic harmony, and emphasized the importance of retainin g

the technical skills of Russians and other European nationalities . But even they may come to

favor policies designed to increase the representation of the titular nationality in positions o f

political and economic power and to advance the local language and culture . 22 In the long

run, the growing salience of an overt peripheral nationalism that seeks to favor and empowe r

the titular nationality cannot be ruled out . It could originate from the policies of Central Asia' s

present rulers ; or the current generation of leaders could be replaced by another that is les s

Russified and unconnected to Soviet-era institutions and political values--and, therefore, more

likely to be drawn to ethno-nationalist policies . Whatever the composition and orientation of a

given Central Asian regime, organizations that support policies favoring the titular nationalit y

could also become increasingly influential in the societies of Central Asia . although the degree

to which they are allowed to operate openly will vary considerably as will their influence o n

state policies . But nationalism need not result from "high politics" (the deliberate policies o f

21On the fears of ethnic Slays in Central Asia over "a rapidly approaching new and alien life," see Igor' Rotar' sarticle in Nezavisimaia gazeta, April 29, 1993, p . 3 .

'Thus policies that favor the titular nationality are being adopted in Kazakhstan--despite the importance tha tNazarbaev's attaches to ethnic harmony in his country--and have evoked the opposition of local Russians . IanBremmer, "Minority Rules," The New Republic, April 11, 1994, p . 26 .

1 8

regimes) ; it could also emerge from "low politics"--the growing sense of a distinct and separate

identity promoted by a local intelligentsia seeking cultural redefinition and opposition politica l

movements eager to define themselves and mobilize support .

From the standpoint of regional security, the cardinal issue is not the origin o f

nationalism but its ethos : do claims to authentic membership in the political community an d

access to political rights and positions and economic resources hinge on criteria that ar e

inclusive (a function of citizenship divorced from ethnic affiliation) or exclusive (defined b y

ethnic affiliation)? If the principle of exclusivity prevails, the possibility for conflict between

the non-titular nationalities and the state and between Central Asian states and Russia wil l

increase. But the reaction of Central Asia's Russian diaspora will not be uniform . Not all of its

members will resort to struggle or seek to harness the support of the Russian state . Russians

(and other Slays) living in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan will resor t

(as they already have) to emigration . The response will be different in Kazakhstan, the earliest

area of Russian settlement in Central Asia and a country where Russians constitute 38 percen t

of the population . Many Russians tend to think of northern Kazakhstan as part of Russia ;

Kazakhstan's ethnic Russian population is concentrated (and constitutes the majority) . in

provinces adjoining its long border with Russia ; and ultra-nationalist and Cossack groups i n

Russia have established links with some of Kazakhstan's Russian organizations . For these

reasons, secession, not emigration, could well become the mode of protest chosen b y

Kazakhstan's Russians in response to exclusivity local nationalism . Secessionist movements wil l

become stronger if the undercurrent of ethnic tension rises to the surface and confrontation s

increase between Kazakhs and Russians .

The prospects for Russian intervention in this scenario depend both on the modality o f

peripheral nationalism and the type of regime in the center . If an authoritarian-nationalist

regime holds power in Moscow at a time when rising Kazakh nationalism begets secessionis t

movements among Kazakhstan's Russians, the danger of intervention by Russia will b e

particularly pronounced . Russia's nationalists not only have a proprietorial attitude towar d

northern Kazakhstan, they have made the forthright defense of Russians a defining feature of

patriotism. They will either be impelled toward intervention by their rhetoric or rendere d

captives by it . But even a democratic Russian government (particularly if its ineffectual recor d

in improving economic conditions and combatting rising crime makes it unpopular) may prov e

unable to resist domestic pressures for intervention . Logrolling dynamics, the hegemoni c

consensus, and the political symbolism that the cause of the Russian diaspora has taken on ma y

push democratic Russian leaders toward interventionist policies . Yet for reasons previousl y

specified the chances for restraint and for a settlement of Kazakh-Russian differences throug h

negotiations (leading to territorial autonomy, political solutions that assure representation t o

19

various ethnic groups based on criteria that are commonly agreed upon, or both) will be mos t

promising if democratic reformers securely hold power in Russia .

BALANCING OR BANDWAGONING ?

In the first of the four scenarios just outlined, stability prevails in the periphery, an d

Russian intervention is not a danger . The second and third scenarios do involve Russia n

intervention ; but, Central Asian regimes, struggling to retain power in the face of challenges

by domestic opponents, are apt to welcome it . Indeed, to the extent that Central Asian state s

are preoccupied with defeating or deterring internal threats, each other, or a non-regiona l

power other than Russia, they will rely on Russia's power and accommodate its strategi c

preferences . But in the final scenario Russian intervention does not provide security ; i t

undermines it . And thus arises the question of how Central Asian states who challenge Russia n

interests can deal with a neo-imperial reaction .

A fundamental problem for weak states in world politics has been how to cope wit h

preponderant power; this dilemma has been considered by theorists since Thucydides an d

Kautilya. Two stark alternatives have been suggested : appeasement and resistance . In a recent

book, Stephen Walt has come up with catchier terminology . He calls appeasemen t

"bandwagoning" and resistance "balancing . " 23 What does this dichotomous strategic choic e

imply for Central Asia? How is the fact of Russian preponderance to be dealt with? Wil l

balancing prevail over bandwagoning? It is to these questions that I now turn .

Any balancing strategies fashioned by the states of Central Asia will have to be bilatera l

or multilateral . The obvious reason is that no single Central Asian state has the power to

balance Russia . Moreover, any combined strategy would have to involve cooperation between

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most powerful states in the region . Given the sharpl y

bipolar nature of the Central Asian region, if one of these giants stands aside, the other could

not mount an effective balancing coalition against Russia because the remaining three Centra l

Asian states are too weak to be effective alliance partners . (Incidentally, the goal of a bilatera l

or multilateral balancing strategy would not be to generate equal counterforce against Russia .

an inherently impossible undertaking, but to raise the costs of Russian intervention . )

But a bilateral Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan combination or a multilateral Central Asian

approach anchored in a Kazakh-Uzbek combination is very unlikely for several reasons . First .

there are the well-known differences in political orientation between Kazakhstan an d

Uzbekistan that stem from divergences in internal order and external orientation an d

competition for preeminence within the region. The second and more important barrier i s

'Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) .

2 0

Kazakhstan's demographic composition . Its population is 38% Russian and almost 50 %

European (Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, German, Polish) . A defense alliance aimed at

Russia would generate internal conflict and, therefore, would be tantamount to pursuin g

external security at the expense of internal security . The third barrier is that some 90% o f

Central Asia's officer corps is Slavic . Russians also hold key positions in the militar y

industries and security sector, while Russia is the key source of weapons and training . These

realities cannot be changed quickly without creating inefficiencies and instability . The

inescapable conclusion is that a balancing strategy against a state that is simultaneously the key

threat (at least potentially) and the key provider of security cannot work, especially in a region

where the two most powerful states are rivals .

A second balancing strategy available to Central Asia is to rely upon other states near the

region: Iran, Turkey, and China . Here again, there are major impediments . Neither Iran nor

Turkey has the military capacity to balance Russia, and both have important economic dealing s

with it . (For instance, Turkey's trade with Central Asia is a mere one-fifth of Turkish trade

with Russia.) Nor do Turkey and Iran have convergent interests in regard to Central Asian

security ; indeed the scholarly literature on Central Asia emphasizes the (now-tiresome an d

overdramatized) theme of Iran-Turkish rivalry . Turkey does not even have a common borde r

with Central Asia . Iran does, but with only one Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, a

country that, while refusing to sign on the CIS collective security agreement, has forged close

military ties with Russia as a means to ensure the defense of its long borders with Iran an d

Afghanistan . These ties make it very unlikely that Turkmenistan would serve as conduit for a

country seeking to contain Russian influence in Central Asia, particularly because the immense

buffer provided to it by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan make it the Central Asian country leas t

likely to be preoccupied with a Russian threat .

China, another alliance candidate, has both proximity (a common border wit h

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and abundant and increasing power . But its military

formations are concentrated not in Chinese Xinjiang (which adjoins Central Asia) but i n

northeast China . China thus suffers from what Kenneth Boulding called "the loss of strength

gradient ." Mileage is the enemy of power or, as Chou En-lai put it more dramatically to th e

Albanians who sought Chinese aid to keep Russia at bay in the 1960s : "Distant water canno t

quench fire ." There is an even more important barrier to Chinese involvement in a strategy t o

balance Russia--one that is not adequately understood . In the Manichaean years of Sino-Soviet

rivalry, each sought to exploit the other's multinational vulnerabilities . But now there is a

convergence between Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia, and it is not tacit, but has been

2 1

openly acknowledged by leaders on both sides.24 Both see turbulence, the rise of Islam . and

ethno-nationalism in Central Asia as a common threat : Russia, because of the turbulen t

frontier-near abroad syndrome ; China because it fears that Turkic nationalism in Central Asi a

could spill over into Xinjiang and exacerbate the smoldering resentment that Xinjiang Turkic -

Muslim Augurs feel toward the Han Chinese settlers and the Han regime in Beijing .

This leaves a final balancing strategy: the engagement in Central Asia of multilatera l

security systems from beyond the region . One candidate is NATO . But there is vociferou s

Russian opposition to NATO admitting Poland, the Czech republic . Slovakia . and Hungary--let

alone Central Asia . And Kozyrev's September, 1993, UN speech makes it quite clear tha t

Moscow opposes the idea of NATO assuming security responsibilities in the near abroad .

(Kozyrev is not alone in taking this position ; nor would he, by any means, be the mos t

vociferous opponent of NATO's extension eastward .) No state within NATO has proposed tha t

the alliance extend security guarantees to the states of Central Asia ; and it would be mistake n

to interpret the admission of Central Asia—along with the other states of the former Sovie t

Union and Eastern Europe--into NATO's Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace a s

a prelude to this . Political outreach and consultations are one thing, an offer of securit y

guarantees quite another .

Another multilateral organization that could be engaged to balance Russia is th e

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) . But, quite apart from its anemic ,

ramshackle character (it has no standing army or enforcement powers), there is anothe r

problem : Russia is a member and could use the CSCE's provisions for consensual decision -

making and veto to immobilize the organization . The CSCE's fruitless efforts to devise a

solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh testifies to its goo d

intentions--but also to its toothlessness .

The upshot of this discussion of the balancing versus bandwagoning choice is this : Russia

is currently seen as the provider of security in Central Asia . But this could change dependin g

on the balance of political forces in the center and the periphery . (Clearly the combination o f

upheaval in Central Asia and the failure of the reform experiment in Russia is the mos t

dangerous .) The absence of viable balancing options leaves bandwagoning the default optio n

for Central Asia ; there is no changing the fact of Russian preponderance . But bandwagonin g

In a 1992 meeting between Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, and Qian Qichen, his Chines ecounterpart, Kozyrev remarked that "Central Asia should remain a CIS sphere of influence and not a sphere o fextremist forces, and, in particular, of Islamic fundamentalism . And in this, I think, we can count on mutua lunderstanding from our great neighbor." Qian's response was that Russia and China "have common interests i npreserving stability in the Central Asian region," and that Chinese policy toward Central Asia would take int oaccount the close ties that had been established over time between Russia and the region . ITAR-TASS Worl dService in Russian, 1300 GMT, November 25, 1992 . p . 3, trans . in FBIS-SOV, November 27, 1992, p . 9 .

2 2

could have the effect of polarizing Central Asian societies and reducing the legitimacy o f

regimes . particularly if they are economically ineffective, politically unpopular . and regarde d

by their citizens as dependent for survival on the former imperial power . Yet Russia' s

advantage in power in itself need not mean a future of imperialism, intervention, and war fo r

Central Asia ; nor, as emphasized in the conceptual framework presented at the beginning o f

this analysis, is Russian power the only source of danger for the region . The critical link is

between Russian preponderance on the one hand and the balance of political forces within cor e

and periphery on the other . Our best hope is for a combination of continued reform in Russi a

and stability (or at the very least orderly change) in Central Asia .

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATE S

Six policy recommendations follow from my analysis . First: Given the preponderance o f

Russian power over Central Asia, the fact that the region has been within the Russian domai n

(as part of the Russian and Soviet empire), and the unequalled ease with which Russia can

project power into it, the region is fated to remain a Russian sphere of influence . Second: Yet

how Russian hegemony is exercised is a matter of great importance ; not only for Central

Asians, but also for the future of US-Soviet relations . A neo-imperial Russian policy featurin g

military intervention will bring with it the prospect of war in Central Asia ; it will also reduce

the support within the United States to aid Russia's economic transformation . Third: There ar e

no vital American interests in Central Asia that justify the extension of US security guarantee s

to the states of the region . At the same time, the US can influence Russian policy by a strateg y

of economic and political engagement that supports the growth of democracy and market forces

in Russia. Ultimately this transformation will depend on events within Russia : it cannot be

engineered from without . At the same time, US assistance can make a contribution . This

contribution will not only shape the nature of political and economic life in Russia, it will als o

influence the nature of Russian policy toward regions such as Central Asia . My analysis

suggests that a non-imperial Russian policy toward Central Asia is most likely in the context o f

democracy and a market economy in Russia. A failure of Russia's post-Soviet transition will ,

most likely, bring forth an ultra-nationalist Russian regime that will seek to dominat e

peripheral regions like Central Asia . Fourth : The most effective way for the United States t o

influence events in Central Asia is by assisting the region's post-Soviet transition--to the exten t

of our abilities--through aid, investment, and technical support . A preoccupation with

manipulating the (overdramatized) Iranian-Turkish rivalry or with thwarting fundamentalis m

(so often confused with the natural reemergence of Islam in social and political life) is to focu s

on trees to the exclusion of the forest. Such an approach could also promote an anti-America n

backlash. Fifth: American policy toward Central Asia must not become a derivative of ou r

2 3

relationship with Russia . The states of Central Asia, and other former Soviet republics, shoul d

be dealt with on an individual basis--not as afterthoughts and not according to parameter s

communicated (however subtly) by Moscow . Our objective in Central Asia . and in the rest of

the former Soviet Union, should be to encourage polycentrism . Sixth : Given the limitations o n

US resources and the absence of vital interests in Central Asia, American policy should b e

developed in concert with our major allies so that resources are pooled and commitments mad e

that are proportionate to US stakes .

2 4