the national police chiefs council (npcc) - november 2018 foi/npcc miscellaneous... · 2019. 7....

616

November 2018

.Ii. College of \?J Policing

CPS

1

Foreword

Disclosure is a vital part of every investigation and the preparation of every case for prosecution and trial. The National Disclosure Improvement Plan (NDIP) published in January 2018 demonstrated the unprecedented joint commitment and focus of the police, the CPS and the College of Policing to finding solutions to the problem of getting disclosure right. We have recently published our report on the extensive action that we have already taken in accordance with that plan to bring about the necessary changes, not just in how cases are handled, but in the wider culture within investigations and prosecutions. Public confidence in the system of disclosure needs to be rebuilt and this continues to be a priority for all three of our organisations, both individually and working together.

The vision, priorities and drivers of improvement we identified in the NDIP remain as true and as important now as they were when it was published at the beginning of the year. However, while all of the actions under the first published plan have either been completed or are on track, there is considerable work still needed to embed the improvement measures and ensure that the changes are having the intended effect throughout police forces and CPS Areas.

Our primary aim is to continue to drive improvements in the way disclosure is dealt with in every criminal investigation and those cases which go forward to prosecution. To make that happen we will focus on:

forging strong local partnerships so that police forces and CPS Areas deliver the changes

required at every level;

developing the core skill of disclosure as part of the investigative process for all investigators;

utilising the opportunities of innovative technological solutions and making these tools available to frontline staff in their work;

ensuring a clear line of sight between local and national expectations to ensure that national changes are embedded and taking effect at a local level;

improving communication between the police, the CPS and the defence, including at the pre-charge stage;

monitoring the impact of improvement activity and setting success measures to assess their effectiveness in investigations and prosecutions; and

focusing on disclosure performance in the magistrates’ and youth courts.

Each of our organisations remains committed to concentrating relentlessly on the implementation of disclosure improvement measures. Working together, the task now is to ensure that we embed these changes we have already introduced and use them to continue to improve organisational performance. We will maintain this momentum to bring lasting improvements to how disclosure is managed in the criminal justice system.

Nick Ephgrave National Police Chiefs’ Council

Mike Cunningham College of Policing

Max Hill Crown Prosecution Service

https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/National-Disclosure-Improvement-Plan-progress-update-Oct-18.pdf

2

Background

The National Disclosure Improvement Plan is the definitive plan for our collective work on disclosure improvement and this document outlines the next phase of it. Since the publication of the NDIP in January 2018, the Justice Select Committee have published their report ‘Disclosure of evidence in criminal cases’ and the Attorney General has concluded his review. We welcome the insights of both of these reports, which build on previous reports, inspections and reviews which have captured and highlighted similar problems over a number of years. We have reflected their respective recommendations in this next phase of our disclosure improvement activity.

The Criminal Justice Board has created a disclosure sub-group to support its functions and oversee the implementation of the cross-system recommendations in the Attorney General’s review of disclosure. NDIP will support and co-ordinate with that work and will also report separately to the main Criminal Justice Board.

Key Priorities of NDIP Phase Two

This plan builds on the substantial progress under the NDIP and is designed to help us continue to align and deliver our collective improvement activities across the criminal justice system; galvanising our efforts and addressing our key priorities. Our strategic priorities remain as:

Strengthening the capacity to deal with disclosure, ensuring we have the flexibility to meet

the challenges we face, both now and in the future;

Improving the capability of police officers and prosecutors and equipping them with the

right skills, particularly in the context of handling large volumes of digital material;

Leading the transformation of the culture of investigators, so that disclosure is viewed as an

integral part of the investigation and any subsequent prosecution;

Engaging more effectively in our partnerships in the criminal justice system and improving

communication between the prosecution and defence throughout criminal investigations and proceedings; and

Embedding the actions taken at a national level into local police forces and CPS Areas by

robust governance on both national and local improvement plans.

That is a challenging agenda and the long-standing disclosure problems require a long-term commitment. Disclosure cannot be remedied in isolation; it is an element of case preparation, review and progression and requires a system wide, concerted plan for continuous improvement. In this next phase of our improvement plan we focus again on ensuring the skills of our people reflect our current and future needs and on technological innovation as a means to drive service improvements and efficiencies. Our long term strategic objectives will be delivered through the implementation of both the national and the local action plans.

We are confident of our collective abilities to transform our performance in this area and to rebuild public trust in the fairness of the disclosure process. This plan sets out the next stage of how we will do this.

3

Capacity

The explosion in both the capacity and use of digital technology brings new and significant challenges to criminal investigations and prosecutions. This has an impact on the volume and complexity of material that is of potential relevance to the investigation, on making decisions on what is a reasonable line of inquiry and reviewing material to assess whether there is anything that undermines the prosecution or assists the defence. Investigators and prosecutors need to keep pace with continuing developments. Pilots of increasingly advanced search and analytics products are already underway.

Early and meaningful engagement between prosecutors and defence representatives needs to take place from the outset of criminal proceedings, particularly in investigations that feature digital devices and communications evidence. The CPS have piloted the use of Disclosure Management Documents (DMD), adapted from our serious casework regime, in all rape and serious sexual offences and cases dealt with by the CPS Complex Casework Units in the Crown Court. We are working with the judiciary and Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to integrate the DMD into the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing and we will now be extending the use of DMDs to other Crown Court cases.

The vast majority of criminal cases are dealt with in magistrates’ courts and we agree with both the Justice Select Committee and the Attorney General that there is a need to review the effectiveness of disclosure performance there. We will also be examining how disclosure is working in youth court cases, which can often be both serious and complex, to ensure that we are driving improvements in all types of criminal proceedings, not just in our Crown Court work.

New and ongoing improvement activity:

Learning from the on-going pilots led by our cross-agency technology working group will be coupled with evidence from a more detailed wider landscape review undertaken by the NPCC Digital Policing Portfolio. As per the Justice Select Committee recommendation, this work will inform the Home Office, in consultation with the CPS, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing, in their production of a comprehensive strategy to ensure that all 43 police forces are equipped to handle the increasing volume and complexity of digital evidence;

Developing processes to ensure that when the investigator seeks a charging decision, whether from a supervising officer or from a prosecutor, information on the lines of inquiry that have been pursued will be supplied as part of the pre-charge file;

Capacity refers to the resource we have available in individuals and our systems to perform our disclosure duties and functions effectively, efficiently and sustainably.

Our strategic objective is to continue to improve and develop capacities and to consider the opportunities of technology to assist in managing ever increasing quantities of digital evidence.

4

Continue working with HMCTS to develop a section in the Crown Court Digital Case System accommodating the transfer of unused material and a record of disclosure decisions;

Evaluating the third party material protocol in 12 months’ time and assess whether it is

improving the quality of third party disclosure handling;

Rolling out the use of DMDs across Crown Court cases and in magistrates’ and youth court

cases in which there are significant volumes of digital material, communications evidence or third party material; and

Exploring standardisation of terminology in the preparation of disclosure schedules and the

recommendation of the Attorney General’s Review that a standard system be developed to provide more information about the nature of material and its potential relevance to the case.

5

Capability

We have made considerable progress since the publication of the January NDIP in delivering training to investigators and prosecutors on disclosure through a combination of e-learning products and classroom-based teaching. The College of Policing will lead work to monitor the impact of NDIP actions on disclosure performance and monitor the uptake of the centrally designed training products. We will examine performance and quality information to ensure that the measures we have undertaken to improve skills form part of an effective system and are driving improvements in disclosure practice.

Building capability is also about effective support and leadership to deliver high standards and identify further development need. We want all new police officers and staff, and all new prosecutors, to develop as enquiring professionals who are highly confident in applying the disclosure test in their investigation and casework, understanding the questions they need to ask and applying a “thinking approach”.

We acknowledge the recommendation of the Attorney General that although the handling of sensitive material is done well in complex cases, there are some gaps in skills in volume crime cases and we will update training products to ensure consistency in handling and oversight of sensitive unused material.

Strengthening performance management will also be a priority, and in the CPS there will be a continuing focus on disclosure-themed Individual Quality Assessments (IQA) to monitor how prosecutors are performing their disclosure obligations in their cases and clear objectives set for disclosure responsibilities. IQA results will also support improvement in police performance on completion of schedules and this will be fed back at supervisor level.

Digitisation has changed both the nature and the extent of material people record about themselves and others, and the increase in volume of personal data that may be relevant to a criminal investigation has implications for our data protection responsibilities. We recognise that the need to examine personal devices of a person making an allegation of crime may be a barrier to reporting serious offences, particularly in the context of sexual offences. We will develop transparent explanations in order to help them understand how we decide what data to collect, how we collect it as part of a criminal investigation and prosecution and how it might be used. We will develop guidance on how to balance the needs of the investigation with the right to privacy, including where personal information should be redacted before disclosure.


Assessing the training needs of prosecutors – ensuring new starters have the opportunity to undertake disclosure training as part of their induction and that recruits receive training appropriate to their level of experience;

Building our capability is about developing and supporting our people to acquire the skills that help us deliver better as organisations.

Our strategic objective is to identify capability and skills gaps, to meet these through learning and development and to make progress on priority areas.

6

Evaluating the training provided to prosecutors and plan accordingly for future training based on organisational assessment of user needs;

Continuing the development of the disclosure champions’ network across policing and the CPS, making sure that there is sufficient capacity and capability to drive change;

Updating and nationalising police guidelines on data protection and the legal basis for data

extraction from digital devices. We will work with victims groups and relevant Commissioners, including the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, to create clear explanations so that complainants and witnesses understand how and why their information will be accessed and processed;

Refreshing the Disclosure Manual to reflect new guidance and processes under the NDIP;

Developing training and toolkits on digital extraction and analytical tools for investigators

and prosecutors and raising awareness of developments with stakeholders across the criminal justice system;

Reviewing processes for handling sensitive disclosure outside specialist police units and the CPS central casework divisions. This will involve ensuring investigators and prosecutors have the knowledge and skills to deal with cases involving sensitive lines of inquiry and sensitive unused material;

Evaluating the impact of the National Disclosure Standards in the next 12 months to assess

whether they have achieved improvements in the service of properly completed and endorsed disclosure schedules;

Ensuring that investigators document what has been considered a reasonable line of inquiry

in the circumstances of the case in all requests to prosecutors for charging decisions; and

Considering, in accordance with the timescales contained in the NDIP Phase One, whether a

licence to practise could drive up police standards in disclosure.

7

Leadership

Changing culture takes time and starts with our leaders. The Justice Committee welcomed the leadership of the signatories to this National Disclosure Improvement Plan and the personal accountability of the leaders of our organisations to delivering improvements pursuant to it. We need to take conscious action to create the culture we want and we will develop the leadership we need throughout our organisations to sustain and embed the improvement measures we have already introduced.

To support our ambition we need to ensure that leadership on the critical importance of disclosure is replicated at all levels across police forces and CPS Areas. We need to set clear responsibilities, standards and expectations, as part of moving to a culture where we grip our disclosure responsibilities from the outset of the investigation and get things right first time.

To drive a change in investigation and prosecution culture, and earlier consideration of the impact of disclosable material on the decision to charge, the need to consider disclosure has now been included in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. This underlines the importance of disclosure as an integral feature of investigations and in the assessment of whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction in every single case.

We have appointed a network of disclosure champions in each of the 43 Home Office forces of England and Wales and in all units in the 14 CPS Areas and we will utilise them further in driving home the messages on disclosure. We have strategic leads and tactical leads in every force feeding into the network of practitioner champions. The College of Policing will support leadership, irrespective of rank and role, to embed disclosure as a core skill right through policing. Our champions also lead on identifying issues arising in investigations and prosecutions on the ground in practice and raising them with senior leaders and managers.

The recent scrutiny of disclosure and focus on performance have been challenging for investigators and prosecutors, individually and collectively. We still need to do more to support and engage staff across our organisations, particularly in leading and managing change and establishing disclosure as an integral part of a good investigation.

We need to do more to address public perceptions of our performance and to explain what we achieve, as well as acknowledging openly where we need to improve, building confidence in our organisations for the future.


Bringing together police and prosecutor champions at local events and national conferences

to further embed the force champions network and the links with the CPS champions;

The quality and impact of leadership at all levels is key to delivering culture change and lasting improvements.

Leading change requires us to build common purpose within our organisations and across our stakeholders and partners.

8

Utilising the CPS Disclosure Champions to perform a key role in compliance and assurance at a local level including undertaking local observation to assess the impact of change;

Encouraging the inclusion of disclosure as part of Continuing Professional Development for police practitioners and driving learning through all levels within forces;

Raising awareness of disclosure improvement initiatives such as the Disclosure Management

Document throughout the criminal justice system;

Maintaining the leadership momentum in the CPS by repeating the Disclosure Seminar,

chaired by the Director of Public Prosecutions on a bi-annual basis and replicating the National Disclosure Forum at local levels chaired by police and CPS leaders in local forces and Areas;

Focussing on disclosure in the magistrates’ and youth courts and bringing together

disclosure champions in these units to accelerate change at a local level; and

Making disclosure improvement in the Area a specific objective for Chief Crown Prosecutors

against which their performance will be measured.

9

Partnership

One of the successes of the National Disclosure Improvement Plan has been the level of collaborative working between our organisations at a national level. The next challenge is to replicate this at a local level through the close monitoring of the Area Disclosure Improvement Plans, ensuring that Chief Constables and Chief Crown Prosecutors make the priorities of the national plan a reality in their forces and their Areas.

As the Attorney General reflected in his Review, early and meaningful engagement between the prosecution team and the defence is crucial to improve the disclosure process and the increases in the volume and complexity of digital material encountered in investigations make this ever more important. As we extend the use of Disclosure Management Documents to more Crown Court cases this engagement will become more effective, and we will also examine how this might be done more effectively at the pre-charge stage.

The judiciary and magistrates already have a case progression function ensuring that identification of issues in the case is done properly and we will work with them to build disclosure into case progression. As we focus on improving performance in the magistrates’ and youth court, we will work with the magistracy to understand where there are issues in the summary justice process as part of the case progression review to inform our improvement plan.

The National Disclosure Forum has, through monthly meetings with representatives from the leaders of the external bar, defence solicitor organisations, the judiciary and police and prosecution, opened channels of communications to discuss disclosure issues at a national level. We consider there would be real benefit in replicating these into existing local structures as they provide an invaluable mechanism for local issues to be discussed and solutions proposed and worked though.

The Director of Public Prosecutions repeated the disclosure seminar hosted at the beginning of the year in the Autumn, with senior representatives from across the criminal justice system coming together to discuss the systemic issues and have meaningful input into improvement measures. This will be repeated bi-annually.


Bringing compliance with disclosure obligations forward, for example in the provision of

schedules at the pre-charge stage, has brought significant benefits in some case types. Senior police leaders and prosecutors will work together to identify where this could be achieved in each force;

Partnership covers collaboration and accountability at national and local levels. It is about police and prosecutor partnerships in all roles. It is also about facilitating communications with defence representatives and working with magistrates and the judiciary in building disclosure into case management.

Our strategic objective is to strengthen partnerships and to replicate the successes of national relationships at local levels.

10

Exploring the possibility of bringing a formalised structure to pre-charge engagement

between investigators and prosecutors and those representing the suspect, particularly in cases where there is a large volume of digital material that is potentially relevant. The potential to formalise this process is being considered with input from defence stakeholder groups;

Replicating the National Disclosure Forum at a local level to facilitate monthly discussions

between stakeholders on issues that arise locally;

Working with the judiciary to embed the use of the Disclosure Management Document into

the Better Case Management processes, including a section on the Plea and Trial

Preparation Form; and

Building on the experiences of what works well in our most complex casework, a

streamlined version of the Early Case Planning Conference will be adopted in all Threshold

Test charged cases to facilitate communication between the investigative team and the

prosecutor.

11

Governance

We have acknowledged that data collection measures have not previously allowed us to capture, analyse and use management information effectively enough, and to understand the number of cases in which disclosure has not been performed as well as it ought to have been. Work is already underway to address this. New points of data collection have been designed to provide a much stronger end-to-end view, including all prosecutors being required to confirm at the conclusion of a case whether disclosure had an impact on the outcome and to drill down deeper into the reason for that.

Further development of data analytics will deliver a necessary change in how we collect information and measure improvement. We are developing a number of measures within our case management systems to monitor disclosure performance in the CPS at team, unit, and Area level, as well as measuring the adequacy of schedule completion by the investigator and compliance with service of the defence statement. This will allow us to capture data on cases in which disclosure does not ultimately cause the case to end but in which it has not been handled properly, as well as measuring when it has been done well.

Disclosure-themed Individual Quality Assessments have been introduced in the CPS and are now undertaken in the first month of each quarter. These will provide the baseline for success measures, together with the data from the first quarter of the new disclosure focus outcome codes. We intend to create a balanced scorecard which brings together police, CPS and College of Policing data that ensures both qualitative and quantitative performance improvements at local, regional and national level.

The Criminal Justice Board, which brings together ministers and a range of other senior partners across the criminal justice system, including the Director of Public Prosecutions and police leaders, has taken oversight of disclosure improvement. The NDIP will report on progress to the CJB.


Delivery against the commitments in this plan will continue to be overseen by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the College of Policing. An update on progress will be published quarterly;

Improving the granularity of data captured in cases which did not result in a conviction but

where disclosure was the primary or contributory reason for the decision to stop the case; and

Developing automated data collection in relation to key stages of the disclosure process which will show levels of compliance by both the police and CPS such as the identification of reasonable lines of inquiry (pre-charge), creation/management of the Disclosure Management Document/Disclosure Record Sheet and completion of schedules.

Governance is effective, system-wide planning, reporting and analysis as part of the National Disclosure Improvement Plan which will help to secure improvement in disclosure.

The strategic objective is to ensure our performance matches our ambition – essentially, have we made a difference?

NDIP Phase 2 – National to Local

Nick Ephgrave Chair of NPCC Criminal Justice Coordination Committee

July 2017 Jan 2018

March 2018

April 2018

June 2018

3rd Party Material Form

Capacity

DMD March 2018

CoP training

DETS

Capability

National Disclosure

Standards May 2018

MG3

addition March 2018

Seminars

National Working

Group Supt. Tactical Lead

regional/local Leadership ACC

Strategic

Lead

Technology working

Group Disclosure

Champions

Disclosure Lead

National event

Capability Maturity

Model

PTPM

Governance

KPI’s

National Disclosure

Forum

Partnership

Case Management

Panels

Regional

Police

and CPS

Meeting

Practical reinforcement of duty to make reasonable lines

of enquiry and apply disclosure test correctly

Pursuing a fair investigation and considering disclosure obligations from the outset

Proportionate ‘frontloading’ of disclosure preparation and

performance

Early and meaningful engagement with disclosure issues

by the defence and judiciary

Harnessing technology

Data management

Sustained oversight and improvement

A shift in culture towards viewing disclosure as a core

duty and not as an administrative add on

The right skills and technology to review large volumes of

material that are now routinely collected by the police

Clear guidelines on handling sensitive material

DMD

Tech Docs.

Digital

Transfer

3rd Party

Data Extraction

End to End

Measures

Training

Data

Protection PTPM

Quality

Assessments

Promote

Grow

Scrutinise

Engage

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Item 7 – Mark Sweeney DG Ministry of Justice Presentation

Return to Agenda

Chief Constables’ Council

Digital Evidence Transfer Service (DETS)

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: 8

Security Classification Papers cannot be accepted without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI):

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

Freedom of information (FOI)

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure.

Author: CC Giles York & DCC Tony Blaker

Force/Organisation: Sussex Police & Kent Police

Date Created: 19/11/2018

Coordination Committee: Criminal Justice Coordination Committee

Portfolio: Digital First

Attachments @ para N/A

Information Governance & Security

In compliance with the Government’s Security Policy Framework’s (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in

compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact [email protected]

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management

1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

1.1. The purpose of this paper is to seek confirmation from Chief Constables’ Council of support for the continuation of the pilots of the national Digital Evidence Transfer Service (DETS) and the commissioning of a review into the Criminal Justice System (CJS) requirement for a single interface for sharing digital evidence.

1.2. This paper has been submitted in recognition of the change to both the policing and criminal justice

reform landscapes since DETS’ original inception and agreement at Chief Constables’ Council in 2016. In particular, the volatility and complexity of the criminal justice reform landscape has caused difficulty for policing in term of a lack of clarity over what is required and when with regards to digital evidence sharing. DETS development has progressed at a faster rate than the CJS Common Platform resulting in the need to identify transition states towards the end goal of integration with the Common Platform.

1.3. The paper seeks to articulate, at a high level:

The DETS solution, current project status, and indicative revenue costs;

The short, medium and long term criminal justice reform landscape in relation to digital evidence management and sharing;

What is known as to the national policing landscape in relation to digital evidence management and sharing;

A comparison of options for provision of digital evidence sharing capabilities, including the risks / disbenefits of a move away from a national solution; and

Recommendations for next steps.

mailto:[email protected]


2. DETS

2.1. DETS Background

2.1.1. The NPCC’s Policing Vision 2025 outlines a digital policing reform theme with the following vision:

By 2025 digital policing will make it easier and more consistent for the public to make digital contact, improve our use of digital intelligence and evidence and ensure we can transfer all material in a digital format to the criminal justice system.

2.1.2. This has been further refined into the following relevant strategic objective for digital policing:

Work with CJS to ensure connectivity to support the sharing of digital material to improve the experience of victims.

2.1.3. Digital First are delivering DETS as the national multimedia sharing service between the police and the

Criminal Justice System (CJS), as shown below at Figure 1. Digital First, as part of the wider Digital Policing Portfolio (DPP), is funded through the Police Transformation Fund to March 2020. DETS has been primarily designed to integrate with the CJS Common Platform (CP) as set out by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) presented by the CJS Common Platform Programme, and agreed at Chief Constables’ Council in July 2016:

‘Access to body worn video, other multi-media material and large evidential files held in police repositories will be enabled by the implementation of a CJS CP EDAMM API, allowing direct streaming or downloading into the common platform as required. The common platform will enable access to the materials by the CPS, court and defence, including presentation in court.’

Fig. 1: DETS Conceptual Model

National Police Chiefs’ Council

2.2. Current status

2.2.1. The DETS Project is currently in its Alpha (proof of concept) phase, which is on target to conclude as planned on 14

th December. The build of the pilot solution has been completed and is undergoing

testing. A successful connection has been established between DETS and the CP using the EDAMM interface standard.

2.2.2. Regular project meetings are taking place with the five forces participating in the DETS pilots (Cheshire,

Cumbria, Northumbria, Merseyside and Kent), to design and implement the technical and business change required.

2.3. Revenue cost model

2.3.1. As a result of the completion of procurement activities for the DETS pilots, the September 2018 circulation of the ‘Statement of Readiness’ letter to all Chief Constables, and the forthcoming update of the Outline Business Case (OBC), a refresh of the DETS revenue cost model has been completed.

2.3.2. The amended costs outlined below at Table 1 are based on assumptions and principles at this stage, as agreed at the Digital First Programme Board on 13th November 2018. It should be noted that costs are made up of a mix of fixed and variable elements. Final costs will be established post pilot and are expected to reduce further. Individual forces’ costs are currently being briefed out via the DPP Business Engagement Officers.

2.3.3. Forces would only be required to meet the DETS revenue costs once they are using the service, and

no earlier than April 2020.

With Optimism Bias Without Optimism Bias

2017 OBC Revenue per annum £10.7m £7.5m

Updated ‘Worst Case’ Revenue per annum

£7.5m £6.2m

Updated ‘ Best Case’ Revenue per annum

£2.8m £2.4m

Table 1: DETS Overall Revenue Cost Comparison

2.4. Next steps

2.4.1. Following completion of the Alpha phase, the project is planned move into the Beta (pilot) phase in January 2019. As described in Section 3, below, due to the delays in Common Platform roll out and the need to agree the transition solution, this is likely to be delayed for a short period in all pilot force areas other than Merseyside.

2.4.2. On completion of the Beta phase, it is currently planned to prepare a Full Business Case (FBC) for

submission to the Policing Portfolio Board and Portfolio Investment Committee (PIC) in May 2019. However, the requirement for an FBC, and the timing for this, will be confirmed at the PIC in March 2019 when the OBC refresh is presented.

2.4.3. National roll out of DETS is scheduled to commence in June 2019 and be completed by April 2020. The scheduling of national roll out will take place over the coming months and will be informed by the DETS Statement of Readiness (SORs) responses received from forces. To date, 26 forces have submitted SORs.

3. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM LANDSCAPE

3.1. Since the agreement of the MOU, Digital First have continued to build towards Common Platform (CP) integration, however it is acknowledged that it is now unlikely that full national roll out of CP functionality will be completed during the DETS national roll out in FY2019/20.


3.2. It is known for certain that CP will not be in place for the DETS pilots (Merseyside, Northumbria, Cumbria, Kent and Cheshire) in early 2019, except for in a subset of cases in Merseyside Police.

3.3. As a result of the delay in CP rollout, and following discussion at the Digital First Programme Board, we

have been exploring alternative options with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the HMCTS Crime Programme (which is responsible for the delivery of the CP).

3.4. The HMCTS Crime Programme Board, at their November 2018 meeting, reiterated that it remains the

case that the CJS requirement of policing is for a single integration into the CP via the EDAMM interface for the sharing of multimedia evidence.

3.5. The CPS and HMCTS Crime Programme have been working with Digital First to identify the transition /

interim states which will take us from the current position to the end state of DETS integration with the CP nationally. These discussions have been extremely constructive and have made substantial progress towards agreement of a transition solution which can be used for pilot and national roll out. As far as possible this solution will utilise CP functionality already in existence thereby achieving a reduction in the impact of moving to the end state of full CP integration.

3.6. It is agreed by HMCTS and CPS that the proposed transitional solution will not integrate to the CPS’

current tactical solution for multimedia sharing (Egress). To do so would incur significant capital and revenue costs for forces. As this represents a short-term solution, with a maximum lifespan of 3 years, it is unlikely that this option will represent value for money.

3.7. Of note the Justice Select Committee made the following reference to DETS in their ‘Disclosure of evidence in criminal cases’ report:

‘We welcome the new commitment on the Digital Evidence Transfer System made in the National Disclosure Improvement Plan, and commitments made by the Minister in oral evidence to us. We expect the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Crown Prosecution Service to provide an update on progress with the business plan to this Committee by the end of 2018.’

4. POLICING LANDSCAPE

4.1. A Digital First Landscape Review carried out in 2016 found that most England and Wales Police Forces still owned their digital storage in-house. Analysis identified that forces had multiple and often disparate systems with varying business processes and backup systems and little progress had been made in the area of transfer or accessibility of data. Further analysis found third party material, such as CCTV, public video and photos, was stored predominantly on physical media (e.g. DVD / CD). Evidential content generated by police, including Body Worn Video (BWV), Scenes of Crime (SOC) and 999 calls, was stored on force systems. In the majority of cases multimedia evidence (MME) was transferred to physical media for case files.

4.2. DETS was conceived as a national solution to accelerate policing’s capability to share digital evidence in

order to meet the requirement to integrate with the CP. The intention was for DETS to be phased out, and eventually made redundant, as forces matured their capability in this space.

4.3. Since 2016, a number of forces have put in place tactical solutions for the sharing of MME (approximately

12, with more with plans to do so). These have primarily been focused on sharing of BWV, as a result of sharing solutions being offered by the manufacturers of the cameras themselves. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has implemented a solution for sharing of CCTV with the CPS. Expansion of the capability of these solutions to deal with other media types is planned, however most solutions currently have a smaller range of media file transfer capability in comparison to DETS and are likely to require short to medium development to improve their offering to forces.


4.4. In addition, forces have been focusing on the need to implement Digital Asset / Evidence Management Systems (DAMS / DEMS) in order to manage the huge volume of digital information that policing ingests and generates. It should be noted that sharing capabilities are only a small part of the business need for such systems.

4.5. The policing landscape and DETS were discussed at the National Police Technology Council (NPTC) on 11th

December. NPTC are not currently able to articulate the national policing landscape with regard to DAMS / DEMS and evidence sharing, and as a result have commissioned a short piece of work to look at this to inform discussion at Chief Constables’ Council in January.

4.6. The requirement for a single integration into the CP was challenged by NPTC, with a view that multiple, consistent integrations should be pursued instead. It was felt that the requirement for a single integration represented a duplication of cost for forces, who would be required to pay for DEMS / DAMS and revenue costs for DETS. However, there was also a call to determine the overall cost to the public purse of either a single or multiple integration / integrations, with a recognition that a whole system approach to costs should be taken.

5. COMPARISON OF OPTIONS

5.1. As a result of the change to both the policing and criminal justice reform landscapes since DETS’ original inception, a comparison of DETS is required against two alternative options:

A hybrid model of DETS and local / regional solutions integrating directly with the CP; or

Local / regional solutions integrating directly with the CP (and no DETS).

5.2. Some of the risks / disbenefits of these options are detailed below to enable informed decision making.

5.3. The fewer forces that take up DETS, the higher the revenue cost to those forces that do, as shown below in Table 2 using the ‘worst case’ conservative estimate:

Costs per

annum- no OB

(figures with OB

included shown

in brackets)

43 forces 30 forces 20 forces 13 forces

Total direct fixed

cost

£5m

(£6m)

£4m

(£4.9m)

£3.1m

(£3.8m)

£2.7m

(£3.2m)

Direct fixed cost

per force (total /

no. of forces on

board

£116k

(£140k)

£135k

(£162k)

£157k

(£188k)

£204k

(£245k)

Total variable

cost

£1.2m

(£1.5m)

£844k

(£1.1m)

£658k

(£829k)

£533k

(£671k)

Total revenue

cost

£6.2m

(£7.5m)

£4.9m

(£6m)

£3.7m

(£4.6m)

£3.2m

(£3.9m)

Table 2: Force take up scenarios’ impact on DETS ‘worst case’ annual revenue costs


5.4. Whilst tactical solutions enable sharing of some MME with criminal justice partners on a local basis, it is unclear how these could / would be scaled to meet a national criminal justice model which is not bound by geographical area. For example, most tactical solutions require local CPS lawyers to have individual log-ons and passwords. This arrangement is not practical or scalable in a national casework model, where CPS lawyers are dealing with cases from anywhere in the country. Additionally, local solutions mean the data security risk remains within the ownership of the force Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO).

5.5. Direct integration of force DAMS / DEMS to the CP using the EDAMM interface standard would resolve the issue described at 5.4. However, whilst it is possible for the manufacturers of force tactical solutions to write an integration to the CP, this will require additional work and potentially increased costs to each force, particularly where more than one integration is required. At this time, it is not known how significant the work is to integrate DAMS / DEMS to the CP, and this (and the cost) will likely vary between systems / solutions. In addition, many forces that have DAMS / DEMS capability have numerous different systems.

5.6. In addition, the force / collaboration would be required to meet the cost of any changes required to their

system as a result of changes in the CP / EDAMM standard. 5.7. The HMCTS Crime Programme have stated that it would not be feasible to manage the onboarding and

support of multiple force integrations into the CP, hence their requirement for a single interface with policing for the sharing of multimedia. This requires further exploration to determine whether this is accurate. The view of NPTC was that this may not be.

5.8. Perhaps most significantly, there is a need to ensure that we do not create a ‘postcode lottery’ for victims, with some areas of the country able to share MME efficiently and effectively with the criminal justice system, and thereby realising the benefits of doing so, and others still relying on hard copy media. This may be an issue that policing is willing to accept for a period of time. As per 4.5, above, it is not clear how many forces may be in a position to integrate directly to the CP now, and the timescales for those that aren’t currently to be in a position to do so.

5.9. The DETS project and solution will provide / deliver the following services and products on a national basis, as opposed to forces or groups of forces having to deliver these individually:

Accreditation;

Data sharing agreement;

Audit capability;

Training materials;

Testing;

Procurement activity;

Contract management;

Service management;

Technical and business designs including interface specifications;

Management of change to interface specifications (e.g. EDAMM);

Continuous improvement.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1. It is proposed that the DETS project should continue into, and complete, the pilot phases planned for early 2019. This will provide evidence, whether positive or negative, of the benefits of a national solution for multimedia sharing as opposed to direct force integrations into the CP.

6.2. In parallel, it is proposed that a policing review of CP delivery achievability and timescales is undertaken by Digital First with assistance from NPTC. This should include an assessment, working in conjunction with our CJS partners, of the overall cost to the public purse of single versus multiple integrations to the CP.

6.3. Following completion of pilots, an informed decision can then be taken on whether to progress to national roll out of DETS. This is consistent with the current approach and plans which have always included a decision point prior to national roll out, through the production and approval of an FBC.


7. DECISIONS REQUIRED

7.1. Chief Constables are asked to agree:

a) That DETS pilots should continue as planned; b) That a review of CP delivery achievability and timescales should be undertaken by Digital

First and NPTC; c) That an assessment of overall cost to the public purse of single versus multiple integrations is

undertaken in conjunction with CJS partners; d) That there will be a further decision point following completion of pilots to determine

whether DETS should proceed to national roll out.

CC Giles York QPM DCC Tony Blaker SRO, NPCC Digital Policing Portfolio SRO, NPCC Digital First Programme


Return to Agenda

Chief Constables’ Council

Pay Reform

16 January 2019 / Agenda Item: 9

Security Classification Papers cannot be accepted without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI):

OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE

Freedom of information (FOI)

This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer & Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure.

Author: CC Francis Habgood

Force/Organisation: Thames Valley police

Date Created: 09/01/2019

Coordination Committee / Portfolio: Workforce – Pay and Conditions Portfolio

Attachments @ para Appendices – attachment separately

Information Governance & Security

In compliance with the Government’s Security Policy Framework’s (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in

compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact [email protected]


1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. This paper is the latest in a series of papers presented to Chief Constables’ Council (CCC) that updates colleagues on the progress of pay reform. On this occasion Chief Constables are asked to consider specific issues that will inform the NPCC submission to the Police Remuneration Review Body (PRRB), due in by 8

th

February 2019.

1.2. A presentation will support this paper which will help to inform the recommendations and decisions required at this stage. A number of appendices have also been shared that provide additional information on key issues. Decisions are sought on the following.

a) Pay award for police officers for 2019/20

b) Proposals around on call allowances c) Proposals around pay reform d) Pay progression for apprentices

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. On 19th

December 2018 the Home Secretary issued the remit letter to the PRRB for 2019/20. This had been significantly delayed for various reasons and gives a very tight deadline for submission of evidence by

8th

February 2019. Having said that the areas for recommendations are in line with those previously considered at CCC and expected.

2.2. The remit letter highlights the following areas for recommendations.

mailto:[email protected]


1) How to apply the pay award for 2019/20 for police officers of all ranks. Including chief officers, in the context of how it will support overarching NPCC proposals and timetable for a new pay structure.

2) To review the NPCC’s design principles, framework and assumptions for pay reform; and to provide views on the extent to which the views of the staff associations have been considered in the development of the design.

3) To review the NPCC’s detailed project plan and risk register and provide observations on the timescales from implementation, taking into account the requirement for formal consultation with the staff associations and the need to make legislative changes.

4) To review the NPCC’s proposals for progression pay for police apprentices. 5) To review proposals from the NPCC in relation to making payments to the superintendent

ranks for undertaking each 24 hour on-call period.

2.3. As usual the Government has highlighted the balance between fair pay for public sector workers, protecting funding for frontline services and ensuring affordability for taxpayers. Affordability has been highlighted as a key consideration for PRRB together with the need to address any recruitment and retention pressures.

2.4. It is worth remembering that the Home Secretary did not support the recommendation of the PRRB in 2018 around the annual pay award for the second year in a row. On that occasion the 1% temporary on consolidated award was not consolidated into pay and this caused significant dissatisfaction amongst officers and the staff associations. That decision was challenged by the staff association, by way of judicial review, and it is currently progressing through the courts.

2.5. The work on pay reform continues to progress. Since the last CCC, meetings have taken place with the chief officer steering group, with the police consultative forum (with representatives from NPCC, APCC, Staff Associations and the Home Office) and with focus groups and workshops with forces. Whilst engagement is much improved with staff associations, it is fair to say that they would prefer a much greater degree of formal consultation. Unfortunately the pace of progress and meetings scheduled does not always enable this and there have been different views about the purpose of engagement and consultation.

3. OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS

3.1. At the October CCC updates were provided on the key strands of pay reform and also on the workforce reform programme owned by the College of Policing. This paper provides further information about the progress to date and highlights areas for decision. The more detailed and immediate recommendations around the annual pay uplift and on call allowances will then follow and should be taken in the context of broader pay reform.

4. DESIGN PRINCIPLES

4.1. The latest version of the design principles is attached at Appendix A. These will be used to inform the design of the framework. They have been shared with CCC in the past and detailed feedback has been received from the staff associations. A full written response has also been provided to PFEW and PSAEW.

4.2. The full feedback is not included in this paper but the area of concerns are mainly around how the principles will be used (this has been clarified), the fact that increments will no longer be linked to time served (this has been a long standing principle), the concern about forces’ preparedness for pay reform (dealt with in workforce reform programme), the idea of local flexibility for Chief Constables (although this already exists to a certain extent with local allowances and bonus payments) and the issue of affordability (concerns that individual pay will be suppressed to deal with affordability).

4.3. The staff associations have provided useful feedback that has now helped to inform the risk log and programme plan. Whilst there is not complete consensus on the design principles I am satisfied that they are in a position to be able to be shared with PRRB, along with the feedback from staff associations. They will continue to be reviewed in light of additional information or changing circumstances.

National Police Chiefs’ Council 2

4.4 DECISION: To endorse the design principles set out at Appendix A.

5. THE ‘P’ FACTOR

5.1. The P Factor is used to describe and value the unique nature of policing and the restrictions and expectations placed on police officers. Whilst it is not argued that others do not experience similar restrictions, risks and requirements, it is the combination of all of these factors that makes policing unique. The work has built on and updated the original methodology prepared by Sir Tom Winsor in his work on the X factor. The title has been changed as the X factor was intended as something to be taken away from police officers not able to fulfil their operational requirements. The P factor is intended as a way of recognising additionality when benchmarking pay.

5.2. There has been considerable engagement on the P factor. Forces have been consulted (all 43 responded). Focus groups have been held with 5 forces (Cheshire, Hampshire, Northumbria, South Wales and MPS) and staff associations have provided feedback. Comparable work with the armed forces has also been reviewed to determine how they assess the value of their X factor. This work was commissioned by the Office for Manpower Economics (OME) who support the Armed Forces Pay Review Body.

5.3. The descriptors that make up the P factor continue to be grouped under 4 headings – physical, psychological, legal and social/economic. The final 12 descriptors have been heavily influenced by input from frontline officers and the latest version is included at Appendix B.

5.4. The policy intent of the ‘P’ factor is as follows:

To readily identify and highlight the P Factor component within base pay and to separate this out for the purposes of pay benchmarking. Only the balance should be used for pay market comparison; this being seen as the percentage of pay that compensates for the skills and abilities officers require that might be found in other jobs

To re-brand as the ‘P’ Factor and re-define with more detailed and accurate descriptors.

To attribute a monetary value to the entire set of components that constitute the P Factor – not merely those associated with danger and deployability. This sum would remain pensionable and index-linked.

To build in a regular review process that refreshes the descriptors, as appropriate, and attributes a monetary value to the ‘P’ Factor.

5.5. The P factor will help to evidence to officers that the benchmarking exercise does take account of the uniqueness of policing and will be applied to all who hold the office of constable. However, the percentage will vary according to the rank that they hold and the exposure to relevant aspects of the descriptors plus the comparators with other sectors at that level.

5.6. The Winsor report suggested that the X factor was equivalent to 8% of base pay, capped at 8% of the top of the constable pay scale. However, this was only calculated on the basis of the danger and deployability component of the new descriptors. The Military have used a collective value for the X factor rather than attempt to value individual elements and this would seem appropriate for policing as well. The value of the armed forces X factor is currently 15% of base pay with reducing value for more senior ranks.

5.7. The staff associations support the move away from Winsor’s X factor to the P factor and of the overarching principles as set out in paragraph 5.4 above. There was some confusion about how specialist skills (for example firearms) will be dealt with but an acceptance that this will become clearer when the variable pay element of the framework is finalised. In terms of monetary value they suggest that the starting point should be that used by the Military, i.e. 15%, rather than that proposed by Winsor. They were broadly supportive of the descriptors of the P factor and the fact that earlier feedback had been incorporated into the later draft. It should be noted that the armed forces X factor includes components


that are not experienced in policing and might attract higher weighting in terms if pay (e.g. turbulence in family life, detrimental impact on spouse / partner employment, separation from family and friends and danger of location and role).

5.8. In summary, the descriptors for the P factor have now been drafted, debated and shared with staff associations. They are in the format that is broadly agreed by all. The issue of monetary value remains unresolved and will require more detailed analysis, but is likely to be in the range between 8% and 15% for constables. The Korn Ferry report on benchmarking (Appendix D) offers caution about using the P factor at more senior ranks, where the general weight of the role and specific legal accountabilities are more likely to be included already. Whilst the final value of the P factor is always likely to have a degree of subjectivity it is recommended that OME are commissioned to complete independent work on valuing the P factor.

5.9. DECISION: To endorse the descriptors for the P factor set out in Appendix B.

5.10. RECOMMENDATION: To recommend that the Office for Manpower Economics are commissioned by the Home Office to value the P factor, in a similar way to that used for the Armed Forces X factor.

6. VARIABLE PAY

6.1. At the October CCC the four categories for variable payments were set out (reproduced at Appendix C). This suggested that the current arrangement for bonus payment (outstanding, demanding or unpleasant in nature) and the geographic allowances (currently the London weighting, London allowance and South East allowance) should be supplemented with a more permanent version of the interim targeted bonus payment. The paper also included the result of the consultation with forces (to which 39 forces responded). Since that date the proposals have been discussed at the police consultative forum and a further survey has been completed with forces to assess the intended use of the interim bonus payments.

6.2. At this stage there have been 26 responses to the targeted bonus payment survey and the early indications are that there will be little use of the payment for superintending ranks. About half of forces have decided to make use of the payment to federated ranks in hard to fill positions. More details will be provided at CCC when further responses have been received and analysed.

6.3. In terms of geographic allowances, previous papers have suggested that there are really only three groupings across other sectors – Inner London, Outer London (including adjacent areas in the South East) and the rest of the UK. This broadly matches the geographic allowances currently available in policing. However, there has been little analysis of these payments since the Winsor review and that made recommendations to review geographic allowances in the context of regional pay decisions being explored in other sectors (now not pursued).

6.4. The MPS submission to PRRB will offer additional evidence around the London weightings and allowances however, given the relationship between them and the South East forces it is important that they are also considered jointly. The current value of the London allowances are made up of the London weighting (£2,444 p.a., pensionable and uplifted based on the pay award), London allowance 1 (£1,011 p.a., non-pensionable and fixed) and London allowance 2 (£3,327 p.a., non-pensionable and fixed). The total value equates to £6,782 and is paid to all officers working in London (there is a separate allowance paid to pre 1994 officers). The cost of the allowances is £192m p.a.

6.5. The South East allowance was increased by £1,000 in value in 2016 and is now up to £3,000 (Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Surrey and Thames Valley) and up £2,000 (Bedfordshire, Hampshire and Sussex). No additional funds are given to forces to pay for S.E. allowances and only 3 forces increased the payment when given the flexibility to do so (Surrey and Sussex by £500 and Bedfordshire by £1,000). The allowances offer a way of compensating officers who live in areas generally viewed as having the most expensive living costs.

6.6. Korn Ferry analysis (see Appendix D) suggests a clear difference between London salaries and those outside London, the gap between the two is on average around 10% of salary. The national data also suggests that there is little difference between outer London pay and that for the most expensive parts of


the south east. The market picture is at odds with a traditional public sector approach to London/South East weighting. Many organisations have now moved away from a specific weighting payment to have separate pay structures for different locations.

6.7. This approach would however go against one of our design principles to have a basic national pay structure for all officers. An alternative would be to look at the NHS approach which comprises a percentage supplement which is then capped with a minimum and maximum cash sum (see below). This has the advantage of protecting the market competitiveness of middle to senior management whilst trying to ensure that the lowest paid are not disadvantaged.

6.8. Table: NHS London Weighting 2018

AREA AMOUNT

Inner London 20% of salary subject to a minimum of £4,326 and a maximum of £6,663.

Outer London 15% of salary subject to a minimum of £3,659 and a maximum of £4,664.

Fringe 5%of salary subject to a minimum of £1,000 and a maximum of £1,733

6.9. It can be seen that the values shown above do not differ significantly from the current allowances (although the definition of outer London might include areas of the South East currently capped at £3,000). It should also be noted that studies often show that costs experienced by employees are considerably higher than either the typical salary market differentials or the most common London weighting

payments1. Given the NHS recruitment and retention issues further work would be required to assess the

effectiveness or otherwise of this methodology.

6.10. The current arrangements for London allowances have grown organically and are now confusing. Therefore it makes sense to refresh the allowance structure so that it is easier to administer and understand. A scheme similar in structure to that offered by the NHS might make sense (but there is unlikely to be any appetite to differentiate the core allowance within London between inner and outer areas). There is also interest to offer greater flexibility for chief constables/commissioners so that they are able to respond more proactively to particular recruitment and retention challenges. This needs further development during 2019. However, it is clear that the current recruitment and retention issues are location based and there might be a need to enable greater flexibility where none currently exists, in this year (in particular MPS).

6.11. DECISION: To endorse the four categories for variable pay set as out in Appendix C

6.12. RECOMMENDATION: Subject to feedback around use of the interim targeted bonus payment scheme (to be provided at CCC) to recommend the extension of the scheme on a permanent basis as a means of recognising additional skills.

6.13. RECOMMENDATION: To carry out further work to update the London and South East allowances both in terms of structure and value. The basic format to remain unchanged for 2019/20.

7. BENCHMARKING

7.1. At the last CCC meeting an update was given on the initial findings on benchmarking and on the methodology being used. Since then progress has been made to refine the model and PSA have shared a copy of the more detailed pay comparability study completed by Korn Ferry.

7.2. Key building blocks for the constable pay levels that were missing at the last CCC were the definition

1 https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/22221/1/London-Weighting-Report.pdf


https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/22221/1/London-Weighting-Report.pdf

of what has previously termed “higher skills” and the evaluation of Advanced Practitioners. The College of Policing lead both of these strands of works. Focus groups and discussions on the former are now suggesting a move towards a role that is consistently and competently displaying the behaviours and skills shown in the constable role profile. This will reduce the need for additional analysis by the College. The next step will be to establish an assessment process to test the graduation from foundation constable to the next level, now being referred to as ‘established’ or ‘senior’ constable (name not yet confirmed).

7.3. The evaluation of the Advanced Practitioner (AP) pilot was presented at the Workforce

Transformation Group on 29th

November 2018. The future roll out of the scheme, as one of the options for forces, is now owned by the workforce reform programme and more consultation is required before this takes place. What the pilot did establish were the descriptors that can be used to define the ‘advanced’ level of pay for constables. The latest draft descriptors for progression and for pay are now shown in a chart at Appendix E. The likelihood is that AP will offer one option at the advanced level, others might include the concept of “leading constable” currently being piloted in MPS and West Yorkshire Police. Korn Ferry have already looked at the role of AP and suggested that this would be best recognised through an uplift equivalent to 10% of pay (this would be pensionable and applicable whilst the officer performed the advanced level role only).

7.4. Korn ferry have continued to support the benchmarking strand of work as they have experience of these exercises across different sectors and have a significant database of current pay scales. They have also worked extensively with policing and police forces and have previously been commissioned by staff associations to complete pay comparability studies (CPOSA and PSA).

7.5. In October 2018 they provided their latest report for the PSA into pay comparability. It uses broadly the same methodology that has been used for the NPCC work so provides a useful health check of our work (it is a far more detailed comparison of roles in policing at superintending ranks and the wider market). This will be referred to later in this section.

7.6. The latest report for NPCC is attached at Appendix D, but some of the key points are as follows. Benchmarking is not an exact science but is used to try to determine what is fair pay and reward. Korn Ferry are able to provide data for all organisations (useful if considering whether people decide not to become police officers or to leave policing because of remuneration on offer in private sector companies, public and not for profit organisations and other public service professional routes (which might compete with policing for recruits and will also give an indication of how pay and career roles then work in a graduate profession). Data is also available for base salary, total cash and total remuneration – this is important given the value of the pensions in the public sector. However it also highlights the use of other benefits and bonuses (as an alternative to pensions) available to senior managers in the private sector.

7.7. Korn Ferry comparators use job size as a means for benchmarking. For superintending ranks these were reviewed as part of the PSA report in 2018. For chief officers they were updated in 2015 and are still considered as representative. The fieldwork for ranks from constable to chief inspector was conducted several years ago and, while they were informed by the study of work levels in policing in 2016 and more recent analysis for the College, they are probably in need of more detailed review.

7.8 There are various options when comparing pay – police officer median against market median, top of pay scale against median, comparison of pay ranges with other groups (for example nurses, school teachers or social workers) or comparison of each pay point in the pay range for a rank against the external market position. There is no single data source or market position that will provide the answer – interpretation and judgement are needed. It is important that the overall system is effective and any changes will typically be made over time (rather than seeing big rises or falls). Policing is traditionally a long term career and so the progression between ranks is also important. For example if we want a large number of people to stay at the constable rank then the rewards have to be good enough to make that a viable career option. Equally promotion must be attractive enough, including in financial terms, for people to want to take that path.

7.9 The summary of the findings from the PSA report found the following for superintending ranks:


Job holders have experienced a continuation of trends visible in 2011, including delegation from chief officers and an increased workload, they also have a heightened sense of personal liability, scrutiny and exposure.

There has been a substantial drop in the number of superintending ranks in the period since 2011, with a particularly sharp drop in the number of chief superintendents.

The study concluded that there has been some change in the weight of these roles. Smaller chief superintendent roles have fallen away and some of the posts at this rank are bigger than seen everywhere in 2011.

National increases in police pay rates have been low compared to the private sector and even to the rest of the public sector.

The 2015 pension scheme is lower in overall value than its predecessor and so total remuneration comparisons against both the general market and the public sector in 2011 are less competitive.

In general terms remuneration at superintending ranks is low in the general market, but close to or above the median in the public and not for profit sectors. It becomes less competitive the bigger the role.

7.8. The summary findings of the Korn Ferry benchmarking exercise (below chief constable) are as follows:

Salaries are more competitive against the public sector than compared to all organisations.

There is no consistent pattern: the ranks all have different market positions and there is currently no clear logical flow of market competitiveness.

Deputy chief constables are the least competitive, followed by chief superintendents.

Compared to all organisations, total remuneration is more competitive than salary for constables and sergeants (primarily because of the pension), whereas it is less competitive than salary at chief inspector and above (because of the impact of bonuses and non-pension benefits in the private sector).

Compared to the public sector and non-profit organisations, total remuneration is more competitive than salary throughout (because of the difference in pensions, some of which in this market will be relatively low cost defined contribution schemes). However, the gap diminishes at more senior ranks, because of the introduction of other package elements.

7.9. Table 1: Competitiveness at the top of range

Rank All organisations Public & not for profit

Base Total rem Base Total rem

Constable 114% 121% 122% 134%

Sergeant (a) 95% 100% 102% 112%

Inspector 100% 101% 112% 123%

Chief Inspector 92% 90% 105% 114%

Superintendent (a) (b) 85% 76% 105% 110%

Chief Superintendent 81% 66% 100% 102%

ACC 88% 70% 119% 122%

DCC (c) 63-76% 39-51% 91-107% 95-104%+

Notes:

(a) Based on the larger jobs in the rank. A comparison based on the smaller jobs would show a higher %

(b) Based on those promoted to rank before April 2014


(c) There are four sizes of role at DCC. We do not have a reliable total remuneration comparison for the biggest Deputies against the public sector.

7.10. The Korn Ferry report (Appendix D) also compares pay with other professions to see how the early stages of professional competence are reflected in grade and pay. This tends to support the proposed model for policing, in particular the opportunity to access higher bands for individuals who acquire and demonstrate greater expertise and/or responsibility (the ‘advanced’ level). The range positioning for constables also suggests that they are already paid alongside, if not slightly above, other groups and that progression to the top of the range is uninterrupted at the moment (apart from the foundation threshold assessment at pay point 4), whereas others have to meet additional tests to get to that level. However, it should be noted that the benchmarking comparisons in the table at 7.9 do not include any P Factor enhancement (therefore if one was aiming for the market median against all organisations one would expect pay comparison to be 110%, if the P factor is set at 10%).

7.11. Korn Ferry suggest that the starting point is to get the salary for constables at the correct level and then to look at the relationship between pay at each rank which reflects the way job weight and responsibility increase. The current relationship between the ranks and with the external market does identify some inconsistencies (at sergeant, chief inspector and chief superintendent levels).

7.12. Discussion at the recent chief officer steering group suggested the following:

Base pay is more likely to be relevant at lower levels of the organisation (demonstrated by, for example, the number of people who opt out of the pension scheme).

Total remuneration becomes more important at more senior levels in the organisation (as service length is greater and people are generally closer to retirement).

Taxation charges (Life Time and Annual Allowance) have altered the pension packages for many in the private sector (to other benefits) and this flexibility is not generally available in the public sector.

Both the ‘all organisation’ and ‘public and not for profit’ market need to be referred to when making comparisons.

Strong support for getting salary level correct for constables and that this is where the relationship with ‘all organisations’ comparators needs to be strongest.

7.13. Chief constable pay is being overseen by APCC however, given the relationship to DCCs in particular and also to ACC pay, the NPCC are working closely with them. As the NPCC Lead for Pay and Conditions I

have been invited to speak at the APCC meeting on 30th

January where pay reform will be discussed. Korn Ferry are supporting this work. Appendix D suggests that the number of bands of chief constable pay should be reduced from the existing 12 (excluding commissioner and deputy commissioner positions) to 4. However this is not yet decided. Given that the rationale for the existing weightings is no longer available it would seem inevitable that some changes will be required. Any views on this point would be welcome.

7.14. A chief officer pay and morale survey was conducted on behalf of NPCC and CPOSA in November. 81 people responded (30% rate) and at least one response was received from every force, (last year 129 people responded). All ranks were represented with the highest return rate coming from chief constables. The full response has been shared with CPOSA but for the purposes of pay consideration the following are relevant:

• 66% of respondents are satisfied or very satisfied with their base salary (only 17% are

dissatisfied). • Several people commented on comparisons with other sectors and the lack of pay movement

in recent years. • Dissatisfaction with pension arrangements has increased year on year (39% in 2017 to 45% in

2018) with most people making comment about Life Time and Annual Allowances. • A similar percentage of people are satisfied with the overall package compared to last year

(54%) and negative comments focussed on inconsistencies and pension taxation. • There is still a reluctance to move between forces at chief officer level (unless they are able to


commute) however, most of the reasons are around disruption to family life and the financial incentive not being great enough to compensate for this.

• Motivation levels amongst chief officers remain very high.

7.15. In summary, benchmarking can be used to assess pay for different ranks and job sizes. There is sufficient information to propose an outline methodology and to start to model what a future pay framework will look like, but further work is needed in 4 key areas before finalising the process.

a) Conduct a more detailed review of job sizes below superintendent level in the early part of

2019. b) Agree with APCC the sizing and banding of chief constable roles and the relationship that they

have with deputy chief constables. c) In the light of a) above finalise the relativities between the ranks and how they compare to

patterns in other organisations. d) Update the data on Korn Ferry market comparisons with 2019 values.

8. MODELLING OF BENCHMARKING WORK

8.1. The NPCC reward team have been working with the Home Office to adapt their pay model so that it can calculate the budgetary impact of any proposed changes. This was a more complicated process than first assumed as the model accommodates historical changes to pay scales and makes predictions about long term changes. However a basic version that compares the existing pay bill for one year with a new framework based on possible salary scales and assumptions for numbers entering via different routes and for progression has been developed and should be ready for sharing at CCC. This will give an initial indication around affordability whilst the more detailed model that shows long term impacts is finalised.

8.2. For the purpose of the modelling exercise certain assumptions were made. These will then be adjusted and the model re-run to test for sensitivity analysis.

a) Pay points will be set at least as high as the market median for public and not for profit Korn

Ferry level. b) This value will then be uprated by a P factor market supplement to recognise the particular

pressures of policy. This will be set initially at 10% of pay for constables up to a maximum cash value equivalent to 10% of the senior constable rate.

c) The P factor for other federated ranks will be set at a reducing percentage value to reflect the lower exposure to physical risk.

d) Newly promoted supervisors and managers will receive 90% of base pay for their new rank in the first year of appointment to recognise the period of learning. There will be a single pay point for qualified managers.

e) For budget modelling purposes it is assumed that Forces will recruit 50% of entrants via the Police Constable Degree Apprentice route (PCDA), 40% by the Degree Holder Entry Programme (DHEP) and 10% with relevant degrees.

f) Forces will start entrants on the basic salary level (for example £18,000 for PCDA) and progression during their training programme will be at fixed points.

g) The advanced level constable pay will be set at 10% above the senior / established officer pay (based on feedback from Korn Ferry).

8.3. It should be noted that the above assumptions are not decisions but have been used as an illustration of what the modelling of a new framework might look like in budgetary terms. This modelling is not intended to deal with any transition arrangements at this stage (see section 3.7).

8.4. The results of the modelling will be shared at CCC.

8.5. DECISION: To endorse the methodology for benchmarking of police pay.


8.6. RECOMMENDATION: Subject to any comments made at CCC, to recommend the methodology and illustrative modelling to the PRRB as the basis for the new framework.

9. TRANSITION

9.1. The programme plan indicates that transition will take place between 2019 and 2025. The early adoption has in reality already started (with the appointment of apprentices on a new pay scale). Setting a completion data for transition of 2025 will ensure that the key workforce enablers are in place for existing staff and for new officers for when they reach the key assessment point from foundation to senior/established constable.

9.2. At this stage some high level proposals around transition have been shared with the staff associations. These include:

When an individual moves from their current pay point to a new pay point under the new framework then they will have transitioned to the new framework.

At the point of transition their base salary will never reduce in cash value.

Once transitioned an officer’s pay will increase in line with the new framework (and based on their PDR assessment).

There are three categories of people to whom transition applies: New entrants (constables and direct entry inspectors and superintendents), existing constables, all other ranks.

9.3. The actual date of transition will depend on the service assessment of readiness to go live with the new framework (including operational impact), the completion of the writing of Determinations and Regulations, readiness of the enabling change being delivered by the College Of Policing and affordability. The NPCC reward team are working with the College of Policing Programme Team to produce options for transition, subject to endorsement of the framework by PRRB.

9.4. No decisions about transition are required at this stage.

10. PROGRAMME DOCUMENTATION

10.1. Since the last CCC a more robust programme structure has been put in place. This includes a programme charter, programme plan, timeline and risk and issues logs. These have been shared with key stakeholders. This work continues to be supported by funding from the Police Transformation Fund and further funds have been bid for in 2019/20.

10.2. Communication support has also been accessed. It will be important that officers understand what pay reform means and how it will affect them. Focus groups have already shown that there is very poor knowledge currently about police pay and conditions and so easily accessible material will be needed to support any future changes. The NPCC Communication Team are advising on this area.

11. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION FOR 2019/20

11.1. ANNUAL PAY UPLIFT

11.1.1. The budget situation for 2019/20 is still being finalised and so the question of affordability will remain unanswered until mid-February, and even then will only be answered for one year. The police grant settlement announced in December 2018 was better than expected but it should be considered in the context of additional cost pressures and additional demand.

11.1.2. The police grant settlement for 2019/20 provides an additional £970m funding for the police service, provided all PCCs increase the band D council tax by £24 p.a., of this £813m is for local policing (the remainder being for CT and SOC). However, this is offset by an increase in employer contributions to the police officer pension scheme of £302m in 2019/20 and a cost of £28m for the MPS for police staff who are


members of the civil service pension scheme.

11.1.3. Early indications are that most PCCs will utilise the additional precept flexibility but this will not be known until February. Given the differential impact of precept rises, the increase is not uniform across all forces. The increase in direct resource funding ranges from 5.8% in Cleveland and Merseyside to 8.5% in Hertfordshire, with an average increase of 7.2%.

11.1.4. In terms of previous assumptions around pay awards data suggests that forces have included 2% per annum pay awards in their medium term financial forecasts. PACCTs will be conducting a survey in early January 2019 to test whether these assumptions have changed – but it is unlikely that they have at this stage.

11.1.5. The background to this year’s annual uplift recommendation includes the following considerations:

a) CPI has fallen over the last twelve months, the last figure released for November 2018 being 2.3%.

b) The employment market appears to be hardening. ONS data shows the highest median rise in the West Midlands. However most regions appear to be in line with the CPI.

c) Pay rises agreed across the public sector in 2018 showed the police were disadvantaged compared to other services, part of this difference being because the non-consolidated

monies given in 2017/18 fell away wef 1st

September 2018.

d) Police Scotland has agreed a recent rise of 6.5%, albeit over a 31 month time period, until 31st

March 2021. We understand this was partly achieved by funding offered by the Scottish Government.

e) Affordability and individual force funding will continue to be key to any decision. Each 1% increase in the national pay bill will cost about £65m including employers’ contributions to National Insurance and Pensions.

f) Targeting of pay could be considered. However, changing relative base rates may not be appropriate at this time.

g) Officers continue to be dissatisfied with their level of base pay. Currently 71.7% of federated ranks say they are dissatisfied (PFEW Pay & Morale survey 2018).

h) Indicators from Police Mutual highlight the levels of financial stress in forces. A request has been made for this to be gathered over time to see how this changes and also to compare this with the wider population.

i) Changes to pensions, as a result of the cost cap, are likely to provide greater benefits to officers who are members of the 2015 scheme (in the form of higher accrual rates)

11.1.6. The effectiveness of pay can be measured by a number of indicators – recruitment, retention, motivation, satisfaction with pay and attendance. There are of course many other factors that influence each of these. Data on some of these is also difficult to gather.

11.1.7. In terms of recruitment there is a mixed picture across the country. After several years of minimal recruitment, forces have recruited in significant numbers and this is likely to continue given the most recent budget settlement. The attraction picture across the country is mixed. In some forces recruitment teams worry about how they will cope with large numbers of applicants from even a short window of time. In other parts of the country recruitment is open the whole time and entry requirements are being relaxed (for example the London residency requirement). The introduction of apprenticeships could open up policing to a new group of applicants and in most of the country there appears to be no reduction in the quality of people wanting to join the service. In summary, whilst there are areas of concern (primarily in the South East and London) recruitment is not an influencing factor for pay for the majority of the country. For those areas where it is a concern this might best be addressed through variable pay (for example geographical allowances).

11.1.8. In the same way that recruitment sees pockets of difficulty, retention has similar challenges. As forces open up recruitment so movement around the country increases. Some forces, again primarily those in the South East, have seen significant numbers of transfers to other forces. This is more likely to be an indication around cost of living adjustment rather than base pay. Whilst resignations (pre ordinary


retirement) are rising, the overall turnover rate for all forces is below that seen in most other organisations (the highest turnover rate is between 7-8%, up by 1% over the last few years). In summary, retention figures are causing some concerns in some parts of the country – but this is partly due to transfers within the service rather than unexpected exits from the service pre ordinary retirement.

11.1.9. In terms of the other measures, national data is less reliable. There is no national workforce survey though many forces take part in the Durham Climate survey. Unfortunately few forces choose to ask questions about pay satisfaction. The PFEW morale survey shows a worsening picture on pay satisfaction, however this is not surprising given recent pay restraint and the rejection of the PRRB recommendations over the last 2 years. In terms of attendance, anecdotal evidence suggests that sickness levels are increasing. More evidence will be provided in the PRRB submission but it is assumed that CCs will be aware about their local indicators for the purposes of the discussion at CCC.

11.1.10. It is also worth reiterating the point often made by the staff associations about spending power. Whilst officers see incremental pay whilst progressing up the pay scale (and for some increments these are significant), those officers at the top pay point have seen little increase in pay over the period of austerity as they cope with general inflation. This is best illustrated by the following table that shows the effect of a top of the range constable and comparable earnings pre and post austerity.

Constable 2010

(pay point 7)

2018

(pay point 7)

Average yearly

inflation rate

2017 - if adjusted

for inflation

Top of

Scale

£36,519 £39,149 - -

CRTP £1,212 Removed - -

Total

£37,731 £39,149 2.9%2

£47,721

Shortfall - - - £8,572

11.1.11. The above should also be put in the context of the earlier section about pay comparability with both all organisations and public sector and not for profit which indicates that, whilst there are differences at some ranks (particularly when comparing with all organisation data), there is not a uniform picture of pay disparity when benchmarking against the market median.

11.1.12. Whilst the remit letter asks for views about the annual uplift of 2019/20, it is also worth considering whether there is an appetite for a multi-year deal. The advantage of this would be to provide greater financial certainty and stability over an extended period at a time when pay reform will be ongoing. However, some might feel that it is difficult to provide pay certainty until there is greater budgetary certainty post CSR.

11.1.13. In terms of a multi-year deal the obvious comparator is Police Scotland, officers there have been offered 6.5% over a 31 month period all paid upfront. Additional budget was provided by the Scottish Government to enable this. The NHS secured a different form of 3 year deal and the headlines (between 4.5% and 29% over the next three years) are confusing, as this incorporates both annual uplifts and annual increments. The basic increase for the majority of staff will be 6.5% (3% in 2018/19, 1.7% in 2019/20 and 1.7% in 2020/21). They will also get an additional one off lump sum of 1.1% in 2019/20.

11.1.14. The options for the annual (or multi-year) pay award will be presented at CCC. However the following prompts will help chief constables to form a view as to where the NPCC recommendations should be set. Appendix F provides a spreadsheet which shows the annual police pay budget for every force (Derbyshire data is missing). The total includes base pay, overtime, national insurance and superannuation costs. All of these would be impacted by a pay uplift. However, it also includes allowances which would not, therefore the total figure of £6.5bn is slightly inflated (but some of this is offset by the absence of Derbyshire costs).

2 Bank of England Inflation Calculator - https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-

calculator


http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-

http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-

Are the economic and workforce drivers set out above sufficient to indicate a pay uplift greater than the budget assumptions of 2%?

Can forces afford a figure greater than 2%? (Each 1% costs about £65m nationally).

Is there appetite/justification to differentiate the annual uplift across ranks in light of the benchmarking indicators? If so how should this be done? (For example PSA have made specific representations about the gap between their pay and the market median and the additional work and on call they are picking up).

Is there appetite for a multi-year deal (either 2 or 3 years)? If so this could be a total sum equal to the current budget assumptions but with a different cash flow projection (e.g. 4%,0%,2% instead of 2%,2%,2%).

If so, is the NHS option of a phased award (with upfront higher rate) more attractive than the police Scotland model (which is unlikely to be affordable)?

11.1.15. RECOMMENDATION: CCC are asked to determine the annual (or multi-year) uplift for police officer, based on information contained in this paper and that presented at CCC.

11.2 ON CALL ALLOWANCES

11.2.1. The PRRB remit letter contains a requirement to specifically look at on call arrangements for superintending ranks, but it was felt appropriate to look at on call for all ranks. Regulation 34 of Police Regulations 2003 (Annex U) provides for federated officers being paid an allowance of £15 for each day that they are on call. This figure has not changed since introduced in 2013. Constables and sergeants are remunerated additionally when they are required to perform duty whilst on call (and there have been several employment tribunals that have challenged the definition of this). Inspectors and chief inspectors receive no additional remuneration and are expected to manage their hours accordingly. Police staff members are paid £29.17 per day (Police Staff Council rates and adopted by most forces).

11.2.2 A survey was conducted with all forces to understand the on call arrangements and to test the appetite for changing the current payment. The survey was issued to pay roll managers and reward specialists to coordinate views on behalf of their forces. There was only a short window to complete the survey but 40 forces responded within the timeframe. Given the responses it is likely that they were based on a financial and HR view of on call, rather than an operational one, and so some forces will be re-contacted to confirm their position. A degree of caution should be exercised around the findings until this has been completed.

11.2.3. A summary of the findings related to the allowance is as follows:

There was strong support for on call to be recognised by an allowance for federated ranks.

The majority of forces make payments in line with Regulations (£15).

There was an appetite to review the value of on call and for it to be uplifted in line with annual pay awards.

There was limited appetite for recognising on call arrangements for superintending ranks through an allowance (the preference being to recognise in base pay).

Senior police staff managers do not receive an on call allowance (research suggests that this position is typical in other sectors).

11.2.4. In terms of the management of on call, the findings were as follows:

Forces had a considerable range of the number of rotas in operation (from 10 to over 30).

Specialist roles tended not to have a rota that supported the on call arrangement (e.g. authorising officer, special branch DI, CHIS controller).

The majority of forces share some on call arrangements across forces.

Significant numbers of individuals who are on call, are part of more than one rota.

Few forces review the impact on the individual of being on call and the number of times they are called out.

Few forces monitor the amount of disruption to superintending ranks whilst being on call.


11.2.5. Whilst caution must be exercised over the findings, for the reasons stated above, they do also suggest that improvements are needed in the way that on call arrangements are managed and monitored in forces. It is likely that individuals and forces have different understanding of the formal on call arrangements (the survey suggests that 47% of superintendents are on call, which PSA suspect is higher). Not having an on call payment for superintending ranks probably avoids the necessity for forces to actually monitor on call arrangements for this group. It is worth noting that police superintendents in Scotland now receive the same on call allowance as federated officers (to be increased in value for all officers in 2019 to £25.49). Research across other sectors indicates a figure of between £20 to £30 per period of on call.

11.2.6. The reported annual cost of on call across England and Wales is £6.2m3. Therefore if the value were

increased by £5 per duty (for example) then this would represent an increase of £2.06m. Alternatively, it would be possible to uplift the on call payment for just inspecting ranks to £20 to reflect the fact that they do not receive additional remuneration if actually called out.

11.2.7. In summary, the management and monitoring of on call arrangements in forces needs to be improved. It is recommended that, if not already, this becomes an item on local wellbeing boards. There is probably a case for uplifting the on call allowance. Superintending pay should reflect the fact that on call is a core part of their role, rather than as a separate on call allowance.

11.2.8. RECOMMENDATION: Forces to better manage and monitor the use and impact of on call at all levels of the organisations (and across forces).

11.2.9. RECOMMENDATION: To uplift the on call payment for all federated ranks (to £20?) and then to review the value on an annual basis.

11.2.10. RECOMMENDATION: Superintending ranks will not receive an on call allowance but the requirement to be on call will be recognised as part of basic pay (possibly overtly included in the P factor adjustment for those ranks).

11.3. APPRENTICE PAY / DEGREE HOLDER PAY

11.2.1. CCs will be aware that the starting salary range for apprentices was confirmed as between £18,000 and pay point 1 (currently £23,586). We await the final version of the determinations which are currently being finalised, but it is likely that setting the actual salary will be the requirement of the local chief officer who should take account of:

1) The local policing body (PCC/Mayor)

2) Local recruitment needs (defined locally) 3) Whether they have a policing qualification or relevant experience (special constable, fit for

independent patrol, or PCSO, 18+ months in role).

11.2.2. No recommendations were made for pay progression so at this point they will automatically move to pay point 1 or 2 (depending on what their starting salary was). NPCC therefore needs to make a recommendation to PRRB as to how apprentices will progress in line with the new framework set out in section 3.

11.2.3. The intention is that in the future there will be three entry routes for police officers – Police Constable Degree apprentice (PCDA), Degree Holder Entry Programme (DHEP) and relevant police degree entry. The intention is that at the point of graduation (both academic and operational) all officers will reach the same point in terms of pay, albeit the length of time to get there will be different. This will be the foundation constable pay point. Early indications are that this will be around £25,000. (Currently midway between pay point 2 and pay point 3). This figure might change in light of the more detailed benchmarking in early 2019.

3 NPCC On call survey December 2018 – Data from 40 Forces (missing data from Humberside, Durham and Avon and

Somerset.


11.2.4 Clearly pay progression for a PCDA officer will depend on their starting salary and, given that this will be determined by the chief officer, it makes sense for progression to be linked to starting salary and for it to be set by the chief officer, subject to certain parameters. It might also be helpful to offer a standard progression rate, which could be varied locally subject to appropriate justification.

11.2.5. As an example, if an apprentice starts on £18,000 p.a. and should reach £25,000 by the end of year 3, progression after year 1 might be set at £20,000 and after year 2 set at £22,000. Clearly if an apprentice started on £23,000 then progression would be more limited over the three years to ensure that all officers met at the same point upon graduation.

11.2.6. The same type of approach could be used for DHEP candidates on two year courses, but starting from say £20,000 for their first year and then moving to a rate at or above £22,000 for year 2, in both cases up to a limit set linked to the graduation rate. The entry rate for degree holders will need to be set according to benchmarking against the graduate market.

11.2.7. RECOMMENDATION: Progression for Apprentices and DHEP will be determined locally by chief officers with an expectation that they will reach the foundation constable point (circa. £25,000 p.a.) upon graduation.

12. APPROVAL OF COORDINATION COMMITTEE

12.1. Pay reform has been subject of ongoing debate at the Workforce Coordination Committee and in the various steering groups, consultative groups and programme boards that support it. Unfortunately this specific paper has not been discussed at the Workforce Coordination Committee as the date falls after CCC. It has been circulated to members of that group for comment and these will be represented at CCC.

13. STATEMENT OF COST OR RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

13.1. In terms of cost of the programme itself this is funded by grant from the Police Transformation Fund and a bid has been submitted for continued funding in 2019/20.

13.2. In terms of funding for the implementation of pay reform this is being assessed as part of the programme. The actual pay reform implementation costs are likely to include payroll changes – more significant will be the workforce reform costs and any budgeting impact caused by the new framework, the workforce reform programme is assessing the implementation costs. The workforce reform would take place regardless of pay reform as these are key strands of work set out in the Policing Vision 2025.

13.3. The budgetary impact of the pay uplift, on call allowance changes and reform of the pay model will be covered in the presentation at CCC or are included in this paper. Clearly the policy decisions around benchmarking and transition will have a major impact on the service and force budgets and will help to mitigate significant cost variations.

14 SUMMARY OF DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DECISION: To endorse the design principles set out at Appendix A.

DECISION: To endorse the descriptors for the P factor set out in Appendix B.

RECOMMENDATION: To recommend that the Office for Manpower Economics are commissioned by the Home Office to value the P factor, in a similar way to that used for the Armed Forces X factor.

DECISION: To endorse the four categories for variable pay set as out in Appendix C

RECOMMENDATION: Subject to feedback around use of the interim targeted bonus payment scheme (to be provided at CCC) to recommend the extension of the scheme on a permanent basis as a means of recognising additional skills.


RECOMMENDATION: To carry out further work to update the London and South East allowances both in terms of structure and value. The basic format to remain unchanged for 2019/20.

DECISION: To endorse the methodology for benchmarking of police pay.

RECOMMENDATION: Subject to any comments made at CCC, to recommend the methodology and illustrative modelling to the PRRB as the basis for the new framework.

RECOMMENDATION: CCC are asked to determine the annual (or multi-year) uplift for police officer, based on information contained in this paper and that presented at CCC.

RECOMMENDATION: Forces to better manage and monitor the use and impact of on call at all levels of the organisations (and across forces).

RECOMMENDATION: To uplift the on call payment for all federated ranks (to £20?) and then to review the value on an annual basis.

RECOMMENDATION: Superintending ranks will not receive an on call allowance but the requirement to be on call will be recognised as part of basic pay (possibly overtly included in the P factor adjustment for those ranks).

RECOMMENDATION: Progression for Apprentices and DHEP will be determined locally by chief officers with an expectation that they will reach the foundation constable point (circa. £25,000 p.a.) upon graduation.

15. CONCLUSION

15.1. Pay and conditions are complex and emotive subjects. After years of minimal increases during austerity it is inevitable that this subject is gaining more focus – by staff associations, by officers and by

politicians (letter circulated to all CCs dated 29th

November 2018 from Rt Hon Nick Hurd, Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service). This paper sets out progress on pay reform and provides information to enable CCs to endorse the proposals that will be included in the submission to PRRB in February 2019.

15.2. The paper also makes recommendations about the annual pay award for 2019/20. As always the decision needs to be a balance between affordability (for the service and for individuals) and effectiveness of the pay system. Further details around options will be provided at CCC.

Francis Habgood NPCC Lead for Pay and Conditions Workforce Coordination Committee


Appendix A – Design Principles

Police Pay & Reward Framework

Design Principles & Assumptions

The new reward framework will be based on the following design principles and assumptions.

Design Principles

1. It will deliver a basic national pay structure for all officers (at all ranks)

2. There will be a link between pay and contribution

3. There will be a link between pay and competence

4. There will be a link between pay and specialist skills

5. It will support the closure of the gender pay gap

6. Base pay, total cash and total remuneration will be benchmarked

7. It will support the professionalisation of policing

8. It will ensure increments can be reviewed

9. It will ensure allowances are consolidated, where appropriate

10. It will provide flexibility so forces can provide local supplements

11. It will seek to ensure consistency between staff and officers, where appropriate

12. Chief Officers to maintain flexibility to be able to post officers to different roles

13. The framework will be sustainable into the long-term

14. It will seek to limit bureaucracy but be robust enough to support evidence-based decision

making

Design Assumptions

1. The framework will seek to be cost-neutral and affordable within forces’ forecast budgets

and the officer pay bill. It will also inform the forthcoming Comprehensive Spending Review

2. The Home Office model will be used to determine the future impact on the officer pay bill

3. Actual base pay for an individual will not reduce when an officer transitions onto the new

framework

4. Existing officers will transition to the new framework over time – it will be phased in line

with the capacity of the service to accommodate the changes and operational priorities

5. New recruits will be move onto the new framework once launched

6. A detailed programme plan will be produced, identifying interdependencies with other

national programmes of work

7. A communications and engagement strategy will be produced

8. Key risks and issues will be recorded with an appropriate management plan in place

9. An equality impact assessment (EIA) will be completed and the framework will be legally

compliant

10. The core reward team will be funded by the Police Transformation Fund (funding agreed for

2018/19 and provisionally agreed for 2019/20). Any wider implementation costs will be

identified and costed – no assumptions have been made about funding.

11. The new framework will be business as usual by the end of 2025

Appendix B – the ‘P’ Factor Descriptors

Descriptors

The final descriptors have now been agreed and are shown in the table below. We have continued to group them under four headings:

Physical

Psychological

Legal

Social/economic

There are now 12 descriptors (rather that the 15 described in the Winsor Review) and they have been heavily influenced by the input from frontline officers.

We feel that, as a whole, they accurately encapsulate the contemporary elements of a police officer’s role that are unique and reflect what Winsor described

as:

“…… those elements of police officers’ responsibilities and obligations, and terms and conditions, that are peculiar to service as a police officer, and are

shared by very few workers in the public sector and even fewer in the private sector”.

It will be noted that we have moved away from describing the components of the P Factor as either positive or negative. We do not see the value in this, as

the interpretation is often questionable; good examples from the Winsor Review being early responsibility and special status and esteem in the community.

The former was viewed to be in both camps and, arguably, this cancelled it out and the later can, at best, be seen as a neutral, rather than a positive. High

levels of community support are not generally manifest in times of scrutiny. More relevant is the victimisation that some officers and their families face from

certain elements of the community, based solely on their police status. Of this, the Winsor descriptors made no mention. Therefore, we have instead focused

purely on those factors that we consider are, collectively, unique to policing and deserving of additional remuneration.

Physical Uniquely confrontational.

The majority of police officers do not carry firearms but, in fulfilling their duties and safeguarding society, risk constant danger and might also be

required to administer lethal force. There has also been a shift from dealing with crime in the public arena to more private spaces (e.g. mental

health, domestic abuse). Policing in this private space is more invasive of privacy. This can create greater tension and tends to increase exposure to

High risk of physical harm and expectation of assault

Every year thousands of police officers are assaulted.1 In addition to this ongoing risk of physical harm, officers now face a greater threat of a targeted attack on

or off duty by criminals and extremists. Officers are also exposed to injury dealing with; vehicle pursuits; public disorder and searching in hazardous conditions

with exposure to biohazards such as blood and saliva.

Psychological

Trauma of exposure to distressing incidents and materials. Exposure to death and disturbing events is a regular occurrence for officers and this can take an emotional toll and post-traumatic stress and vicarious trauma is not uncommon. The wide spectrum of police work can also see officers deployed from an extremely distressing incident to a more routine matter without time to adjust. The changing nature of crime also requires both regular and specialist officers to continually develop, maintain and apply new skills to face new challenges deal with increasingly complex and distressing cases. e.g. indecency with children; rape; sexual exploitation and, more recently, acid attacks. This often means that some officers face continual exposure to distress and often have to deal with serious cases in rapid succession.

Level of scrutiny The advent of social media, a shift in public attitudes towards the actions of authority figures and the nature of media reporting has all served to intensify the need for immediate answers to any incident or event that attracts publicity and is perceived to have had an adverse outcome. This if often before the facts are known and can involve the instant ‘naming and shaming’ of officers, particularly at senior rank. Anxiety levels when responding to calls are now heighten with the knowledge that every action is likely to be filmed and potentially uploaded to social media and/or attract misconduct proceedings.

Legal

Nonfeasance - the failure to perform an act that is required by law As a matter of criminal law, officers are obliged to act to prevent crime and intervene in situations whether on or off duty. It can be argued that an officer is never really ‘off duty’. This inevitably poses a risk to an officer’s safety and affects their ability to enjoy and behave in their private life as a normal member of the public would. When off duty an officer will likely need to act when not in uniform, without protective equipment or radio communication and in unfamiliar surroundings. Intervention could also expose family or friends to danger.

Exposure to risk Increasingly officers are responders across a range of incidents hitherto not seen as core police business. These include, ‘out of hours’ social services cases, medical emergencies and patient transport. Apart from putting additional pressure on officers and deflecting them from their core role, moving into this space has exposed them to greater risk. They might be unfamiliar with case histories and may also lack the necessary levels of training and expertise to provide the best service. This is particularly relevant when dealing with medical emergencies, helping the mentally ill and other vulnerable adults and children. They carry ultimate responsibility for their decision making in these increasingly testing situations.

1 In 2016/17, there were 8,973 assaults on officers involving injury reported to health and safety teams.

Accountability and scrutiny Disciplinary hearings are now in public and thus, regardless whether or not a case is ultimately proven, an officer can expect a greater intrusion on their private life when disciplinary proceedings are brought. Cases involving death or serious injury require referral to the Independent Office for Police Conduct where there has been any form of police contact. Investigations can become protracted and reports are made public. Personal liability for historic action extends well into retirement and this risk escalates with rank. Under the Police and Crime Act 2017 officers dismissed for gross misconduct will also have this information placed on a publicly-searchable database. This prevents forces and policing bodies from employing officers who have been dismissed for conduct or performance matters.

Membership of trade unions and limited political activity Officers are prohibited from; joining a trade union; taking part in any industrial action and do not have the right to strike. The ability of staff associations to conduct meaningful negotiation on behalf of officers is also limited. These restrictions remove many of the usual options available to regular employees for resolving disputes in relation to terms and conditions such as pay. Officers are also restricted from participation in political activity and are expected to be apolitical. As a result, they must be cautious about airing certain opinions and this limits freedom of expression; particularly a modern on-line era.

Social/Economic

Use of social media The use of social media is restricted by virtue of an officer’s profession and this also extends to use of certain applications. For personal security and safety reasons it is necessary for most officers to guard against sharing personal details, including their profession and/or disguise their true identity. In a time when social media plays such a prevalent part in modern life, this inability to behave and to interact freely online can result in an appreciable level of social separation.

Victimisation based on profession Where no respect for the authority of law exists and normal standards of acceptable social behaviour do not apply, officers and their families can be targeted and harassed, solely because of their police status. Personal property can be damaged, children bullied or threats made by those they arrest to an officer’s personal safety whilst ‘off duty’. This may involve active attempts to trace an officer’s home address and, in some cases, families may need to be re-housed to avoid victimisation or retaliation.

Disruption to family life Being a police officer has an inevitable impact upon working arrangements, such as; flexibility of working patterns; requirements to work extended hours; being on-call during leave; taking of rest day(s). What distinguishes police officers further is they can be recalled to duty and/or have leave day(s) cancelled whenever operational need dictates. This level of disruption may have a negative effect on family life. It can infringe on child care arrangements, have an adverse economic impact by inhibiting a partner’s ability to hold down a job and/or limit the ability to develop aspects of a private life such as friendships and hobbies. Officers are intrusively vetted and must, as a matter of regulation, disclose and manage their associations in such a way that may not apply to an ordinary member of the public. This could also have an effect on an officer’s private, family and social life.

Associates and business activity All business interests, such as secondary employment or renting a property must be disclosed and approved by the Force in order to ensure there is no conflict of interest. Disclosure of business-related associates will involve the release of their personal information and, if such an associate is deemed unacceptable, this may inhibit an officer’s ability to earn money in such a way that would not apply to an ordinary member of the public.

P Factor descriptors January 2019

In drafting the updated P Factor descriptors full consideration was given to those used by the military. There are similarities, primarily around danger and

trauma and certainly some cross-over in the area of disruption. Equally, there are many differences, which was a point brought out throughout the

consultation process. Arguably, the military X Factor is heavily linked to times of deployment, when levels of risk and disruption are escalated. In contrast, the

24/7 obligations and restrictions that go with being a police officer are more constant in nature and the proposed P Factor descriptors reflect this. They are

intended to provide a concise summary of the elements that, as a collective, are considered unique to policing and merit recognition. If necessary, there is a

wealth of information provided by the focus groups to evidence the day-to-day challenges faced in relation to each of the headings.

Appendix C – Categories for Variable Pay

Role based allowance This payment would recognise areas that are relevant to the role, for example core skills, environment, demanding nature. This might be used to address ‘hard to fill’ roles. Current examples of such payments include:

Dog handlers

Surveillance officers

Neighbourhood supervisor

Firearms officers

Detectives

Outstanding, demanding or unpleasant piece of work This payment would mirror the existing bonus payment under Regulation 34 Annex U. It could be paid for an individual or a team (of any size). Examples of this include:

Family Liaison Officers (if paid per deployment rather than as a skill)

Important or outstanding piece of work

Significant contribution

Unpleasant task (e.g. fingerprinting of decomposing body)

Skill additional to role This payment would be used to recognise additional skills over and above core skills or where there is a requirement to recognise mission critical skills. Examples of this include:

Hostage negotiation

Public Order (where additional to role)

Tutor Constable

Geographic allowance This payment would be used to compensate officers where geography has a financial or other non-financial, but significant, impact on the individual. Current examples include:

Allowance to compensate for cost of living (South East / London)

Overseas aid deployment

Organisational posting (in lieu of house move)

Appendix D – Korn Ferry Report

Benchmarking and pay policy for police officers

This paper examines the role of benchmarking in setting and reviewing policy, summarises

the results of market comparisons and explores some of the issues to be considered in

creating pay structures. It is a first draft and will be updated and extended later.

1. Technical context

It is common for remuneration to be set alongside multiple comparators. Sometimes one

market or type of organisation is the lead comparator; in other cases, the approach is

necessarily more blended.

Here we have:

Drawn on a range of sources. Public sector data from the Korn Ferry database is an

obvious starting point and offers a reliable comparison at most levels but turnover in the

survey sample since our last study for CPOSA in 2015 means that the information is not

a reliable indication of market trends since then or of salary levels now. All

organisations data (including the private sector) provides a reliable comparison at all

levels but it will be important to show whether and how it is relevant. For example, do

people decide not to become or remain police officers because of the remuneration on

offer in private sector companies? We have also looked at some other public service

professional routes, which might compete with policing for recruits and also might be

seen as providing an indication of how pay and career routes can work in a graduate

profession.

Compared base salary, total cash and total remuneration (based on the 2015 pension

scheme). This is important in relation to the public sector because of the value of

pensions. It is necessary in broader market comparisons because of the sharp

difference in package composition between public and private sectors. Up to inspector

level, the fact that public sector pensions are more than twice as valuable as their

private sector counterparts makes the total remuneration of public service roles more

competitive than base salary; from Chief Inspector upwards, the prevalence of bonuses,

car and other benefits in the private sector starts to outweigh the pension, so the total

remuneration of senior public service roles is less competitive than the base salary.

Used job size as the basis for comparison with Korn Ferry data and also for our

comments on other parts of the public sector (the army, local government etc). The job

sizes for Superintendents are new and come from a 2018 review commissioned by the

Superintendents’ Association. The job sizes for Chief Officers are recent (2015) and we

believe they are representative. In particular, we still support the model of four sizes of

chief Constable role, although there needs to be a review of which job/force goes into

which level. The job sizes for the ranks from Constable to Chief Inspector date from

fieldwork some years ago. While they have been informed by our study of work levels in

policing in 2016 and by our work for the College, for example on advanced practitioner

Constables, police officers and their representatives might question whether the picture

is up to date. We comment at the end of the paper on possible further work in these

areas.

Drawn at various points on four approaches to comparison:

- Police officer median compared to the market median. This is a standard method of

benchmarking to summarise market position and does not imply that median is the

right place to be. We have used this approach in various studies of Superintendents

and Assistant Chief Constables.

- Comparison of top of range to median. This is reasonable as everyone ends up at

the top and in some cases (e.g. Constable) it is the same as comparing median to

median.

- Comparison of ranges – for example, what is the pay range for a Constable and how

does it compare to a nurse, teacher or social worker.

- Comparison of each point in the pay range for a rank with the external market

median.

We do not expect a single data source or a single market position (such as median) to

provide a basis for a reformed pay structure for police officers, for three reasons. First, all

the comparisons described above are potentially relevant, but they all show different things.

Interpretation and judgement are needed.

Second, although benchmarking is an important feature of policy review, it is only one of

several influences. Others include:

The effectiveness of the system. Pay could be relatively good compared to an external

benchmark but still be ineffective in recruitment and retention.

The historical legacy. Both pay reform and pay system management have to take

account of the level and distribution of pay in the system now. Changes are typically

made over time and are about rebalancing rather than sudden drops or rises.

Third, policing for most is a life-long career. Notwithstanding direct entry, most people will

continue to reach senior ranks by progressing from Constable. In these circumstances the

shape of pay progression from one rank to another is as important as the comparison with

other professions and careers. For example, if forces want large numbers to remain at

Constable, the rewards have to be good enough to make that a viable career-long option.

Equally, the rewards on offer at more senior ranks have to be sufficient to encourage enough

candidates to seek promotion and to offer a fair reward for additional responsibility.

2. Summary of benchmarking

a. Below Chief Constable

There are further comments about Constables in section 3 below, but the picture in relation

to Korn Ferry data is as follows.

Table 1 provides a snapshot of the comparison for ranks other than Chief Constable.

Further detail is in a separate Appendix. The table shows that:

Salaries are more competitive against the public sector than compared to all

organisations.

There is no consistent pattern: the ranks all have different market positions and there is

no clear logical flow of market competitiveness.

Deputy Chief Constables are the least competitive, followed by Chief Superintendents.

Compared to all organisations, total remuneration is more competitive than salary for

Constables and Sergeants (primarily because of the pension), whereas it is less

competitive than salary at Chief Inspector and above (because of the impact of bonuses

and non-pension benefits in the private sector).

Compared to the public sector and non-profit organisations, total remuneration is more

competitive than salary throughout (because of the difference in pensions, some of

which in this market will be relatively low cost defined contribution schemes). However,

the gap diminishes at more senior ranks, because of the introduction of other package

elements.

The Appendix provides a fuller and richer – if potentially more confusing – picture, by looking

at all forms of remuneration and all incremental points.

Table 1: competitiveness at the top of range

Rank All organisations Public & not for profit

Base Total rem Base Total rem

Constable 114% 121% 122% 134%

Sergeant (a) 95% 100% 102% 112%

Inspector 100% 101% 112% 123%

Chief Inspector 92% 90% 105% 114%

Superintendent (a) (b) 85% 76% 105% 110%

Chief Superintendent 81% 66% 100% 102%

ACC 88% 70% 119% 122%

DCC (c) 63-76% 39-51% 91-107% 95-104%+ Notes:

(a) Based on the larger jobs in the rank. A comparison based on the smaller jobs would show a higher %

(b) Based on those promoted to rank before April 2014

(c) There are four sizes of role at DCC. We do not have a reliable total remuneration comparison for the biggest

Deputies against the public sector.

(d)

It is possible to supplement this comparison with Korn Ferry data with other market

information. Section 3 below includes comments on Constables and other roles and our

recent study of Superintendents looks at the military (whose salaries are lower than those of

police officers), local government and the NHS (where in both cases the pay ranges overlap

with police officers but extend to a higher level).

b. Chief Constables

The grouped pay figures we have used in three studies for CPOSA are in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Average pay of Chief Constables by main job size

Role Job size Average £ Chief Constable Major 2448 190,202

Chief Constable Substantial 2128 162,914

Chief Constable Mid 1960 148,817 Chief Constable Smaller 1708 141,664

The separate Appendix shows comparisons with Korn Ferry all organisations data on the

basis of these levels. In that comparison, Chief Constables’ salaries range from 63-76% of

the market median and their total remuneration from 38-51% of the median. They are

therefore about the same in competitiveness as their Deputies. For neither group is there a

clear relationship between the size of the role and the pay.

However, the Appendix does not include reliable salary or total remuneration data for

comparable public sector roles. We therefore comment here on other public sector

comparisons.

Comparison with the military is difficult because the job sizes do not align that well. The

closest comparison is with two star generals, whose jobs would mostly be of similar weight

to mid or substantial Chief Constables. Those officers are paid around £150-160,000,

whereas two star generals are on a scale which runs from £116,665 to £128,530.

Table 2 below shows comparisons with the NHS and local government. To simplify, we

have combined the two middle groups of forces and summarised the picture for the other

sectors. There has been considerable political pressure to keep down senior pay in local

authorities; many salaries are similar to or lower than the levels eight years ago. As a

result, although some council chief executives earn a little more than the equivalent Chief

Constable, the salaries are mostly similar.

NHS hospital chief executives are paid more. Their pay has continued to rise in recent

years, albeit by modest percentages. There is close scrutiny by the Department of Health

and NHS Improvement and permission is needed for any pay above £150,000. However,

the average length of stay of NHS chief executives is fairly short and the cost of paying an

interim is prohibitive (certainly over £300,000). As a result, the NHS pays around 20-30%

more than policing.

Table 3: average pay of Chief Constables by main job size

Role Police pay Councils equivalent

NHS equivalent

Chief Constable Major £190,202 £200,000 £220-280,000

Chief Constable Mid/Substantial £150-160,000 £160-180,000 £180-220,000

Chief Constable Smaller £141,664 £140-160,000 £160-180,000

c. London weighting

All the figures so far are from forces outside London compared to UK-wide data. It is of

course possible to repeat the analysis for the Met using a London market, but it might be

helpful in the meantime to look at London weighting.

There is a clear difference between Inner London salaries and those outside London. In

Korn Ferry data, the gap between the two is on average around 10% of salary. This means

that, for someone earning £30,000, the extra amount is around £3,000, whereas for

someone on £80,000 it is £8,000 (before tax). At the lower end, after tax these pay

differences might not be enough to cover commuting costs.

Our data also shows that there is little difference between outer London pay and that for the

most expensive parts of the South East.

This market picture is at odds with a traditional public sector approach to London weighting,

which tends to offer a standard cash supplement (e.g £4,000) irrespective of the level of the

job. There have traditionally been different amounts for inner and outer London and for the

expensive London fringe. These practices are present in our surveys but sit alongside pay

in organisations which only employ people in London and also companies and public sector

organisations who have moved away from a specific weighting payment to have separate

pay structures for different locations.

An interesting compromise is the approach in the NHS. The starting point is a core inner

London supplement of 20%, i.e. considerably higher than is reflected in market data.

However, there is a minimum and a maximum cash sum. This position – illustrated for 2018-

19 by the table below – protects the market competitiveness of middle to senior management

salaries while trying to ensure that the lower paid are not disadvantaged.

Table 4: NHS London weighting 2018

Area Amount Inner London 20% of salary, subject to a minimum of £4,326 and a

maximum of £6,663

Outer London 15% of salary, subject to a minimum of £3,659 and a maximum of £4,664

Fringe 5% of salary, subject to a minimum of £1,000 and a maximum of £1,733

Of course, all employers need to test the effectiveness of their policies, to ensure that they

enable recruitment and retention of the necessary number and quality of people.

They should also consider the evidence about the extra costs which employees actually

experience, which some studies suggest are considerably higher than either the typical

salary market differentials or the most common London weighting payments.2

3. Issues to consider

a. The p factor

In the words of the Winsor Review, the p factor is a term used to:

“encapsulate those elements of police officers’ responsibilities and obligations, and

terms and conditions, that are peculiar to service as a police officer, and are shared

by very few workers in the public sector and even fewer in the private sector”.

2 https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/22221/1/London-Weighting-Report.pdf

https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/22221/1/London-Weighting-Report.pdf

Essentially, the figure is a corrective to be used in market pay comparisons: for example to

be the equivalent of median, actual police salaries need to be median plus p.

The current draft of the p factor framework looks at physical, psychological, legal and socio-

economic issues. It could lead to an across-the-board percentage adjustment or to an

amount which tapers down the higher the rank, as in the case of the military.

In relation to Korn Ferry market data, an adjustment of this type seems reasonable. Some

jobs in the database will have a salary adjustment because they are done at high personal

risk or in dangerous circumstances, but most will not. Our main reservation is about the

amount of adjustment at Chief Officer level. In these senior ranks, there will be some

emphasis on such legal and socio-economic elements as accountability and disruption, both

of which are significant ingredients in comparably senior roles in many organisations.

In this context, we have been asked whether risk is built in to our assessment of job sizes

and pay. The job evaluation includes assessment of the knowledge required to manage risk

and the accountability for decisions but does not cover, for example, the fact of physical risk

or danger. On the other hand, the pay which appears alongside a company director role in

our database will reflect both the general weight of the role and the fact that the individual

has specific legal responsibilities.

In relation to job-specific benchmarking, greater care is needed. Some of the obvious

comparators are the military, social work and healthcare, all of which could claim adjustment

factors of their own. These are built in to military pay but it is less clear how they are

handled in the other cases.

b. Police Constables

Alongside analysis of general market data, it is important to look at how the pay of

Constables compares with that of other professions, particularly in the public sector. This

comparison can produce rather different results to one based on survey data and job size

and it presupposes that, as policing becomes a graduate profession, front line officers will be

operating at graduate level (for example, that they will have to exercise independent

judgement, they will use their knowledge to invent solutions and responses rather than

choosing from a script or play book, and they will not be overly supervised).

Looking at teaching, nursing and social work, it is possible to see how the early stages of

professional competence are reflected in grade and pay. In all cases, there is an

assumption that there is an entry phase of learning to exercise professional independence,

followed by a period as a self-contained and largely self-sufficient caseworker. Then, while

still operating in a similar core front line role, individual practitioners can acquire greater

expertise and/or responsibility, which the pay system can reward.

The clearest example of this is schoolteachers. The main pay range for 2018-19 runs from

£23,720 to £35,008 and incorporates six incremental points (compared to the current £20-

370 to £39,150 for police Constables). However, there is an upper pay range of a further

three points, from £36,646 to £39,406. Teachers can apply to cross the threshold into the

higher range based on criteria and a process which is set and managed by their school. The

general guidelines say they have to demonstrate that they are highly competent in all

elements of the role and their contribution to the school is ‘significant and sustained’. In

addition, headteachers can also use fixed term or permanent additional (‘Teaching and

Learning Responsibilities’) payments to reward those who take on subject level or whole

school responsibilities alongside their core role.

The other professions handle the same issues differently. Pay for social workers is set

locally, but the pattern is reflected in the practice at Oxfordshire County Council. The entry

rate for a qualified social worker is £29,033 – a level which reflects the difficulties in

recruiting to the profession. The salary moves to £30,480 if they pass their end of first year

assessment and the range runs up to £35,093, which is very similar to the top of the main

scale for teachers. It would be common for the next grade up also to be a frontline

caseworker, but one who is more experienced and independent, can deal with more

complex and challenging situations and can advise and support new professionals. This

means there is some opportunity to progress further without becoming a team leader.

The professionalisation of nursing was set out in a government report in 2006 and it has

been a fully graduate profession for some five years. Qualified nurses sit in band 5 of the

NHS Agenda for Change pay system, on an eight point scale from £23,023 to £29,068. This

level will include people with several years of experience who are capable of relatively

independent problem solving and casework. In that sense, the top rate seems low

compared to teachers and police officers.

Access to higher pay comes from promotion to band 6, a nine point scale which runs from

£28,050 to £36,644. This level will include community nurses, who are seen as having less

immediate supervision and more direct case responsibility, and those in a hospital setting

who have acknowledged expertise in particular aspects of care (e.g. pain management) or

certain medical conditions. This has some parallels with the concept of an advanced

practitioner Constable (but with a lower salary).

We have made these comparisons directly and without invoking a p factor, as the other

professions cited here will all have claims of their own to special and difficult circumstances.

c. Range positioning

One inevitable policy question is which part of the range should be aligned to comparator

roles and markets: the top range point, the middle, or some other value?

Much depends on who the comparator is. In the private sector, pay ranges are a bracket

within which pay is set as a spot rate. There are no increments or rights of progression and

position in range depends on the market and performance. No-one can expect to get to the

top of their pay range (which would commonly be well above median), but they might

reasonably assume they would reach the midpoint after some years of experience in role

and when they have demonstrated full competence. The private sector comparator for the

top of the current Constable range is therefore the market median. Of course, the p factor

would then be applied.

If in future performance thresholds are introduced within the Constable range (to match

some of the arrangements for other public service professions), the point of comparison

might change a little.

We would say the same about comparisons with Korn Ferry data on the public sector –

median would be the starting point. Where the database includes people on an incremental

scale, the top of that scale will commonly be the median anyway.

In a direct comparison with other professional roles, the ranges and the various thresholds

can be set alongside each other. What is evident from the brief comparison in section 3b

above is that: police Constables are already paid at least alongside if not slightly above other

groups; and that progression to the top of the Constable scale is uninterrupted at the

moment, whereas others have to meet additional tests to get to that level.

d. Careers and progression

We have emphasised the importance of the overall shape of the pay system across the

ranks. This is understood by review bodies. We have for example undertaken a review of

the pay of the four levels of general, not to look at external comparisons but simply to assess

whether the progression of pay from one rank to the next matched the increase in

responsibility.

In this perspective based on internal relativities, the obvious starting point is to get the pay of

police Constables about right: ensuring it is sufficiently competitive externally to attract and

to reward those who stay at the front line; and that progression is linked to competence and

expertise. One would then expect a pattern in the relationship between pay at each rank

which reflects the way job weight and responsibility increase.

It is hard to tell whether this is the case at the moment but two perspectives make the

current structure look more like a product of history than a deliberate creation:

If we look at the percentage relationship between the top of scale pay for each rank and

the one below, there are major differences. Sergeant, Chief Inspector and Chief

Superintendent all have a relatively small pay lead over the rank below (112%, 108%

and 111% respectively). Inspector, Superintendent and ACC all have a bigger lead

(124%, 134% and 130%).

The relationship of police salaries to the external market also varies across the ranks.

In relation to the public sector, Constable, Inspector and ACC are the most competitive

(see Table 1 above and the separate Appendix).

As a further check, it is possible to compare the pay difference which is offered for a

particular increase in job size in the general or the public sector market and the salary

structure in policing.

4. Further work

Further analyses of external or internal relativities might be needed to develop the case for

new pay structures but four additional areas of work seem to be required.

First, there is an argument for a more detailed and overt review of job sizes below

Superintendent level. This is potentially a substantial exercise but time constraints for

evidence to the PRRB limit the options for now to a study which could be completed in the

early part of 2019.

Second, it would be helpful to review and agree the approach to the sizing/banding of Chief

Constables, particularly as the legacy pay structure at this level is seen as too complicated

and its methodological underpinning is no longer understood. Again, there is a choice about

how to undertake the work. There could be stakeholder consultation and research, and this

might be needed in time, but for now a reassessment of which forces belong in each of our

force size categories might be enough.

Third, we believe the issue of relativities between the ranks and how they compare to

patterns in other organisations or services needs further investigation and discussion. This

included the relationship between Deputies and Chief Constables, another part of the legacy

at senior level which has not been maintained.

Finally, the Korn Ferry market comparisons are based on January 2018 data and will need to

be updated for a final submission.

Peter Smith

Korn Ferry

December

2018

Apprentice appointed

after 1/9/18 0 £18,000 £23,580 £21,645 83% £20,709 87% £22, 165 81% £20 ,722 87% £25,807 91% £24,756 95%

Constable appointed on

0 £20,370 £26,685 £34,413 59% £32,056 64% £35 ,693 57% £32,223 63% £42,375 63% £38 ,223 70%

1 £23,586 £30,898 £34,413 69% £32,056 74% £35 ,693 66% £32 ,223 73% £42,375 73% £38 ,223 81%

2 £24,654 £32,297 £34,413 72% £32,056 77% £35,693 69% £32 ,223 77% £42,375 76% £38 ,223 84%

3 £25,728 £33,704 £34,413 75% £32,056 80% £35 ,693 72% £32,223 80% £42,375 80% £38 ,223 88%

or after 1/4/13 4 £26,802 £35, 111 £34,413 78% £32,056 84% £35 ,693 75% £32 ,223 83% £42,375 83% £38 ,223 92%

5 £28,947 £37,921 £34,413 84% £32,056 90% £35 ,693 81% £32 ,223 90% £42,375 89% £38 ,223 99%

6 £33,267 £43,580 £34,413 97% £32,056 104% £35,693 93% £32 ,223 103% £42,375 103% £38 ,223 114%

7 £39 ,150 £51,287 £34 ,413 114% £32,056 122% £35,693 110% £32 ,223 121% £42,375 121% £38 ,223 134%

Constable appointed

2

£24,936 £32,666 £34,413 72% £32,056 78% £35, 693 70% £32 ,223 77% £42,375 77% £38 ,223 85%

£27,831 £36,459 £34,413 81% £32,056 87% £35 ,693 78% £32 ,223 86% £42,375 86% £38 ,223 95%

£29,445 £38,573 £34,413 86% £32,056 92% £35 ,693 82% £32 ,223 91% £42,375 91% £38 ,223 101%

3 £31,245 £40,931 £34,413 91% £32,056 97% £35,693 88% £32 ,223 97% £42,375 97% £38 ,223 107%

before 1/4/13 4 £32 ,229 £42,220 £34,413 94% £32, 056 101% £35, 693 90% £32 ,223 1OOOm £42,375 100% £38 ,223 11OOm

5 £33,267 £43,580 £34,413 97% £32,056 104% £35, 693 93% £32 ,223 103% £42,375 103% £38 ,223 114%

6 £36,189 £47,408 £34,413 105% £32,056 113% £35 ,693 101% £32 ,223 112% £42,375 112% £38 ,223 124%

7 £39,150 £51,287 £34,413 114% £32,056 122% £35,693 110% £32,223 121% £42,375 121% £38 ,223 134%

Sergeant

1 £40,488 £53,039 £39,550 102% £36, 842 110% £41, 194 98% £36 ,996 109% £49,029 108% £44,538 119%

2

3

£41,847

£42 ,738

£54,820

£55,987

£39,550

£46, 178

106%

93%

£36, 842

£43,230

114%

99%

£41, 194

£48,755

102%

88%

£36 ,996

£43, 344

113%

99%

£49,029

£57,874

112%

97%

£44,538

£5 1,622

123%

108%

4 £43,998 £57,637 £46, 178 95% £43, 230 102% £48,755 90% £43,344 102% £57,874 100% £51, 622 112%

lnspectcr

0 £50,160 £65, 710 £54,335 92% £48,461 104% £57,637 87% £48,785 103% £70,482 93% £57,827 114%

1

2

£51,573

£52 ,986

£67,561

£69,412

£54,335

£54,335

95%

98%

£48,461

£48,461

106%

109%

£57,637

£57, 637

89%

92%

£48,785

£48,785

106%

109%

£70,482

£70,482

96%

98%

£57,827

£57,827

117%

1200,i,

3 £54,408 £71,274 £54,335 100% £48,461 112% £57,637 94% £48,785 112% £70,482 101% £57,827 123%

Chief Inspector

2

3

£55,521 £72,733 £64,005 87% £56,047 99% £69,127 80% £56,148 99% £85 ,947 85% £67,799 107%

£56,634

£57,804

£74, 191

£75,723

£64,005

£64,005

88%

90%

£56,047

£56,047

101%

103%

£69,127

£69, 127

82%

84%

£56 ,148

£56 ,148

101%

103%

£85 ,947

£85,947

86%

88%

£67,799

£67,799

109%

112%

# £58,749 £76,961 £64 ,005 92% £56, 047 105% £69, 127 85% £56,148 105% £85,947 90% £67,799 114%

superintendent

(promoted to rank on or

after 1 April 2014)

2

3

4

£66,789

£70,275

£73,947

£78,888

£87,494

£92,060

£96,871

£103,343

£76,667

£76,667

£92,051

£92,051

87%

92%

80%

86%

£65, 000

£65, 000

£74, 356

£74, 356

103%

108%

99%

106%

£84, 163

£84, 163

£104,656

£104,656

79%

83%

71%

75%

£66 ,141

£66 ,141

£75, 123

£75,123

101%

106%

98%

105%

£106,527

£106,527

£ 134,172

£ 134,172

82%

86%

72%

77%

£79,211

£79,211

£92,481

£92 ,481

11OOm

116%

105%

112%

Superintendent

1 £66,789 £87,494 £76,667 87% £65, 000 103% £84, 163 79% £66 ,141 101% £106,527 82% £79,211 11OOm

2 £69,543 £91'101 £76,667 91% £65, 000 107% £84, 163 83% £66 ,141 105% £106,527 86% £79,211 115%

(promoted to rank before 3 £72,297 £94,709 £92,051 79% £74, 356 97% £104,656 69% £75 ,123 96% £ 134,172 71% £92 ,481 102%

1April 2014) 4 £75,057 £98,325 £92,051 82% £74, 356 101% £104,656 72% £75,123 1000,i, £ 134,172 73% £92 ,481 106%

5 £77,814 £101,936 £92,051 85% £74, 356 105% £104,656 74% £75, 123 104% £134,172 76% £92,481 11OOm

Chief Superintendent

2

£82 ,779 £108,440 £108, 122 77% £87,453 95% £125,806 66% £88 ,293 94% £172,503 63% £112,323 97%

£85,578 £112,107 £108, 122 79% £87,453 98% £125,806 68% £88 ,293 97% £172,503 65% £112,323 1000,i,

3 £87,327 £114,398 £108, 122 81% £87,453 100% £125 ,806 69% £88 ,293 99% £ 172,503 66% £112,323 102%

ACC Core

1 £100,509 £131,667 £128,376 78% £95,082 106% £150,864 67% £95 ,329 105% £211,326 62% £122,341 108%

2 £106,986 £140,152 £128,376 83% £95, 082 113% £150,864 71% £95,329 112% £211,326 66% £122,341 115%

3 £113,475 £148 ,652 £128,376 88% £95, 082 119% £150,864 75% £95 ,329 119% £211,326 70% £122,341 122%

ACC Higher

2

£100,509 £131,667 £154, 193 65% £109,727 92% £195,367 51% £112,969 89% £303,351 43% £152,240 86%

£106,986 £140,152 £154, 193 69% £109,727 98% £195 ,367 55% £112,969 95% £303 ,351 46% £152,240 92%

3 £113,475 £148,652 £154, 193 74% £109,727 103% £195,367 58% £112,969 1000,i, £303 ,351 49% £152,240 98%

Deputy Chief Constable

Sml £117,386 £153,776 £154, 193 76% £109,727 107% £195,367 60% £112,969 104% £303 ,351 51% £152,240 101% Mid

Sub

£122,770

£134,408

£160,829

£176,074

£186,295

£186,295

66%

72%

£134,911

£134, 911

91%

100%

£231,373

£23 1,373

53%

58%

£138,233

£138,233

89%

97%

£361,528

£36 1,528

44%

49%

£169,201

£169,201

95%

104%

Ma· £147,844 £193,676 £232,911 63% £155,500 95% £322 ,691 46% £157,000 94% £502,076 39%

Chief Constable

Sml £141,664 £185,580 £186,295 76% £134,911 105% £231,373 61% £138,233 102% £361,528 51% £169,201 11OOm

Mid

Sub

£148,817

£162,914

£ 194,950

£213,417

£232,911

£232,911

64%

70%

£155,500

£155,500

96%

105%

£322 ,691

£322 ,691

46%

50%

£157, 000

£157,000

95%

104%

£502,076

£502,076

39%

43%

Maj £190,202 £249,165 £300,000 63% £163,350 116% £400,000 48% £164,676 116% £648,769 38%

"'" on commencing serv;ce

....,.. on completion of initial training

# in post 31/8/94

- denotes insuffic ient comparator

data available at these levels

Appendix E – CoP DRAFT DESCRIPTORS FOR LATERNAL PROGRESSION WITH THE NEW PAY AND REWARD FRAMEWORK

STAGE 1 PROBATION

CONSTABLE

STAGE 1 – 2 ASSESSMENT

STAGE 2 FOUNDATION

CONSTABLE


STAGE 3 SENIOR/ ESTABLISHED

/CONSTABLE


STAGE 4 ADVANCED

CONSTABLE

DES

CR

IPTO

R

A constable undertaking their

initial learning programme

Completion of the

learning

programme and

probation period

A constable who has

completed their initial

learning programme

(PEQF/IPLDP) and respective

qualification

A satisfactory PDR

appraisal plus

review of

evidence against

nationally

consistent stage 3

criteria (in

development)

A constable who has

continued to develop their

knowledge and skills, who can

consistently work

autonomously, and who

supports others

Satisfactory PDR

appraisal plus

application and

assessment

process

A constable who leads and

develops others and/or carries

out their role at an enhanced

level in a specific field of

practice.

Examples include Advanced

Practitioner and Leading

Constable schemes

SCA

LE All officers All officers who complete

probation Most officers A minority of officers

PA

Y D

ESC

RIP

TOR

2018/19 PCDAs follow local

force policy for years 1 and

then re-join the current pay

point scale at pay point 1,

further progression being

linked to length of service

2019/20 onwards PCDAs and

DHEPs will follow local force

pay policy for their period of

training and a new reward

framework, subject to the

agreement of the PRRB and

Government with effect from

2019

Pay linked to benchmarking

and capability, according to a new reward framework,

subject to the agreement of the PRRB and Government with effect from 2019

Pay linked to benchmarking

and capability, according to a

new reward framework,

subject to the agreement of

the PRRB and Government

with effect from 2019

Pay linked to benchmarking and

capability, according to a new

reward framework, subject to the

agreement of the PRRB and

Government with effect from

2019

Appendix F – CIPFA POLICE SERVICE STATISTICS ESTIMANTES 2018-19

Police Authority

Police

Officer

Salaries

(31)

£'000s

Police

Officer

Overtime

(32)

£'000s

Total

%

increase

1%

7 months

7

LONDON

E5010

City

..

..

E6060

Metropolitan Police

1,788,492

86,657

1,875,149

18,751

10,938

0 0 0

JOINT FORCE 0 0 0

0 0 0

E7042

Greater Manchester

329,800

13,983

343,783

3,438

2,005

E7043

Merseyside

183,493

6,329

189,821

1,898

1,107

E7045

Northumbria

163,775

3,099

166,874

1,669

973

E7044

South Yorkshire

128,369

5,295

133,664

1,337

780

E7046

West Midlands

351,917

14,202

366,119

3,661

2,136

E7047

West Yorkshire

250,508

7,559

258,067

2,581

1,505

0 0 0

NON METROPOLITAN

0

0

0

ENGLAND

0

0

0

0 0 0

E7050

Avon & Somerset

142,445

3,287

145,732

1,457

850

E7002

Bedfordshire

67,758

2,694

70,452

705

411

E7005

Cambridgeshire

69,186

2,403

71,589

716

418

E7006

Cheshire

107,942

3,044

110,986

1,110

647

E7007

Cleveland

65,043

1,402

66,445

664

388

E7009

Cumbria

79,945

1,714

81,659

817

476

E7010

Derbyshire

..

..

0

0

0

E7051

Devon & Cornwall

158,045

5,567

163,612

1,636

954

E7012

Dorset

66,192

2,599

68,791

688

401

E7013

Durham

61,043

2,021

63,064

631

368

E7015

Essex

155,747

5,515

161,262

1,613

941

E7016

Gloucestershire

58,826

2,000

60,826

608

355

E7052

Hampshire

155,633

4,990

160,623

1,606

937

E7019

Hertfordshire

105,124

4,465

109,589

1,096

639

E7020

Humberside

90,314

3,279

93,593

936

546

E7022

Kent

181,745

4,989

186,734

1,867

1,089

E7023

Lancashire

148,529

4,010

152,539

1,525

890

E7024

Leicestershire

93,458

2,302

95,760

958

559

E7025

Lincolnshire

60,133

2,212

62,345

623

364

E7026

Norfolk

80,202

3,010

83,212

832

485

E7028

Northamptonshire

66,812

2,123

68,935

689

402

E7027

North Yorkshire

73,504

2,290

75,794

758

442

E7030

Nottinghamshire

102,869

3,418

106,287

1,063

620

E7034

Staffordshire

87,563

1,897

89,460

895

522

E7035

Suffolk

57,279

1,415

58,694

587

342

E7036

Surrey

101,525

3,378

104,903

1,049

612

E7053

Sussex

149,354

4,596

153,950

1,540

898

E7054

Thames Valley

209,365

7,473

216,838

2,168

1,265

E7037

Warwickshire

48,952

1,247

50,199

502

293

E7055

West Mercia

104,150

2,761

106,911

1,069

624

E7039

Wiltshire

49,842

1,121

50,963

510

297

0

0

0

WALES

0

0

0

0 0 0

W6071

Dyfed-Powys

61,735

1,650

63,386

634

370

W6072

Gwent

69,032

2,438

71,470

715

417

W6073

North Wales

76,173

2,381

78,555

786

458

W6074

South Wales

154,090

4,828

158,918

1,589

927

0 0 0

0 0 0

Total EW

6,555,910

241,642

6,797,552

67,976

39,652