the nature of interstate groundwater resources and … law review/v11 n1/hesser.pdfa. groundwater...

Comment

The Nature of Interstate Groundwater Resources and the Need for States to Effectively Manage the Resource Through Interstate Compacts

Justin Newell Hesser*

I. IntroduCtIon..........................................................................................25II. BaCkground.............................................................................................27

A. Groundwater Hydrology.......................................................................28B. Groundwater Resources........................................................................30C. Groundwater Legal Doctrines...............................................................31

1. Absolute Ownership Rule...............................................................312. Reasonable Use Rule......................................................................323. Correlative Rights Rule..................................................................324. Prior Appropriation Doctrine.........................................................325. Restatement Approach...................................................................33

D. Resolving Interstate Water Disputes.......................................................331. Interstate Compacts and Agreements...............................................342. Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment.............................................363. Congressional Apportionment.........................................................37

III. analysIs....................................................................................................37A. Policy..................................................................................................38B. Equitable Apportionment.....................................................................40C. The Best Solution is for States to Compact.............................................41D. Forming Interstate Compacts................................................................43E. Administering Interstate Compacts........................................................45

IV. ConClusIon..............................................................................................45

I.IntroduCtIon

MarkTwainoncesaid,“Whiskeyisfordrinking;waterisforfightingover.”1Whileindividualsfightoverwatereverydayatthestatelevel,thebiggerfights

*CandidateforJ.D.,UniversityofWyoming,2011.IwouldliketothankProfessorLawrenceMacDonnellforsuggestingthistopicandforhisguidancethroughouttheproject.Also,thankstotheAmericanAgriculturalLawAssociationforgivingmetheopportunitytopresentonthistopicatits2010annualconference.Finally,thankstomyfamilyfortheirsupportthroughoutthisprocess.

1 marktwaInQuotatIons,http://www.twainquotes.com/WaterWhiskey.html(lastvisitedNov.21,2010).WhilethisquoteisoftenattributedtoMarkTwain,ithasnotbeenverified.Id.

26 wyomInglawrevIew Vol.11

existbetweenthestates.2WyomingandotherstatesintheWestfoughtfortheirfairshareofwater,andmanyofthesefightscontinuetoday.3Inthesefightsthefocusisonthewatereveryonecansee:surfacewater.4Thenextbigfightamongstateswillconcernwhatcannotbeseen:groundwater.5

Foryears,stateslackedpropergroundwatermanagementlaws,partlybecausetheinabilitytoseegroundwaterinhibitedstatesfromunderstandingtheresource.6While states slowly developed a legal framework for groundwater, large-scalegroundwater development surged in the 1950s—depleting many groundwateraquifers.7 Inmany respects, stateshavenot adequately addressed theproblems

2 SeeJohnB.Draper,Water Rights Litigation for the Natural Resources Practitioner,42AroCkymtn.mIn.l.Inst.8-1,8-9to-15(1996)(describingthenatureof interstatewater litigation).Interstatewater litigationbegan in theearly twentiethcenturywhenKansas suedColorado.Seeinfranotes86–87andaccompanyingtext(discussingKansas v. Colorado).

3 SeeDraper,supranote2,at8-9to-15(citinganumberofcasesinvolvinginterstatewaterdisputes).Wyoming’sfirstfightforwaterbeganin1911whenitsuedColoradotostopaproposeddiversionontheLaramieRiver.Wyomingv.Colorado,259U.S.419,455(1922).NebraskasuedWyomingin1934allegingWyomingwasviolatingtheruleofpriorityanddeprivingNebraskaofwatertowhichitwasentitled.Nebraskav.Wyoming,325U.S.589,591–92(1945).Wyoming’smostrecentfightbeganin2007whenMontanafiledaMotionforLeavetoFileBillofComplaintagainst Wyoming alleging it is acting in violation of the Yellowstone River Compact. Bill ofComplaintat4,Montanav.Wyoming,No.137Original(U.S.Jan.31,2007).

4 SeeJohnD.Leshy,Interstate Groundwater Resources: The Federal Role,14HastIngsw.-nw.J.envtl.l.&Pol’y1475,1486–87(2008).Inrecentyears, interstatewaterdisputesbegantofocus in part on the interconnection between surface water and groundwater. Id. at 1486–88& nn.45–46. However, the United States Supreme Court has not apportioned any interstategroundwateraquifers.Id.at1486–87.

5 See ArthurH.Chan,Outline of a Three-Stage Policy of Interstate Groundwater Allocation that Promotes Equity, Efficiency, and Orderly Development,26land&waterl.rev.149,150(1991)(“[J]udicialpolicyregardinginterstategroundwaterallocationisstillinitsinfancy.”);Leshy,supranote4,at1477–78.Thiscommentreferstogroundwaterasoneword,unlessquotingmaterial.

6 Gary L. Widman, Groundwater-Hydrology and the Problem of Competing Well Owners,14 roCky mtn. mIn. l. Inst. 523, 523 (1968) (“Perhaps nothing has contributed more tothedevelopmentof a confusing, and toooften inadequate, groundwater law than the failureofcourts,legislators,orattorneystoappreciatethefactualsourcesofgroundwaterconflicts.”);see alsoJohnLeshy,Notes on a Progressive National Water Policy,3Harv.l.&Pol’yrev.133,137–38(2009)(referringtowaterlawas“primitive”comparedtopropertylaw);RaphaelJ.Moses,Basic Groundwater Problems,14roCkymtn.mIn.l.Inst.501,501(1968)(describinghowgroundwaterismisunderstood).

7 SeeJeffreys.asHley&ZaCHarya.smItH,groundwatermanagementIntHewest7(1999)(statingthetotalamountofgroundwaterwithdrawnforwesternirrigationwentfrom“smallamountsintheearly1930stoabout10.7millionacre-feetby1945andupto56millionacre-feetby1975”).Severaleventsledtolargescalegroundwaterpumping,includingruralelectrification,development of high capacity centrifugal pumps, and development of center-pivot irrigationsystems.Id.at6–7.

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causedbylargescalepumping.8Oneofthoseproblemsistheinterstateaspectofgroundwater—includinghowtomanageanddividetheresource.9

Thiscommentaddresseshowstatesshouldapproachinterstategroundwatermanagementandallocation.10TheprimaryfocusisontheWest,buttheprinciplesareapplicablethroughouttheUnitedStates.11Thiscommentarguesstatesshouldbeproactiveinresolvingpotentialinterstategroundwaterdisputesbyinterstatecompactorsomeformofagreement.12

II.BaCkground

This section begins by explaining general groundwater hydrology.13 Next,itprovidesadescriptionofWyoming’sgroundwaterresourcesandothermajorgroundwatersourcesintheWest.14Adescriptionoflegaldoctrinesandprinciplesapplicable to groundwater allocation and management follows.15 Finally, thisbackground discusses the three primary methods used to resolve interstatewaterdisputes.16

8 John D. Leshy, The Federal Role in Managing the Nation’s Groundwater, 14 HastIngsw.-nw. J. envtl. l. & Pol’y 1323, 1324 (2008) (“State law generally has not been adequateto the taskofmanagingthenation’sgroundwater.”); see alsoPatrICkt.tyrell,strategICPlanfortHewyomIngstateengIneer’soffICe&wyomIngstateBoardofControl17(2009),available athttp://seo.state.wy.us/PDF/Strategic_Plan_2009.pdf(statingtheengineer’sofficeplanstoaccomplish“[d]evelopmentofastatewidewatermanagementstrategyforgroundwater”duringthe 2013–2014 biennium). Wyoming recognizes that effective groundwater management is “alongoverduenecessity.”stateeng’retal.,stateofwyomIng2009annualrePort66(2009),available athttp://seo.state.wy.us/PDF/2009AnnualReport.pdf.

9 Leshy, supranote4, at1481–82 (“[G]roundwater likelyhas amore common interstatecharacter than might first be appreciated.”). Leshy suggests that pumping from a groundwateraquiferconnectedtoasurfacewatersourcemayaffectallthestatesalongtheriver.Id.at1481.TheWyomingFrameworkWaterPlan recognizes the interstatenatureofgroundwater.wyo.waterdev.Comm’n,wyomIngframeworkwaterPlanvol.1§4.4.1(Oct.2007),available athttp://waterplan.state.wy.us/frameworkplan-index.html(“Groundwaterentersandleavesthestateinthesubsurface,butnoestimatesofratesorlocationshavebeencompiled.”).

10 See infranotes109–22andaccompanyingtext.

11 The“West”inthiscommentisdefinedastheseventeencontiguousstateslocatedonandwestofthe100thmeridian.Seew.waterPolICyrevIewadvIsoryComm’n,waterIntHewest:CHallengefortHenextCentury2-1(1998)[hereinafterwaterIntHewest].ThesestatesareArizona,California,Colorado,Idaho,Kansas,Montana,Nebraska,Nevada,NewMexico,NorthDakota,Oklahoma,Oregon,SouthDakota,Texas,Utah,Washington,andWyoming.Id.WhilewaterdisputesareacommonissueintheWest,thesetypesofdisputesarebecomingmorecommonintheSoutheastbecauseofdroughtsandsignificantpopulationincreases.StephenE.O’Dayetal.,Wars Between the States in the 21st Century: Water Law in an Era of Scarcity,10vt.J.envtl.l.229,230(2009).






A. Groundwater Hydrology

Adequatepoliciesandlawscannotbedevelopedwithoutaclearunderstandingofgroundwaterhydrology.17Waterexistsundertheearth’ssurfaceintwodifferentzones: theunsaturatedandsaturatedzones.18 Immediatelybelowthe surface istheunsaturatedzone,whichcontainsbothwaterandair.19Waterinthiszoneisincapableofwithdrawal.20Belowtheunsaturatedzoneisthewatertable,signifyingthetopofthesaturatedzone.21Thesaturatedzoneiscompletelyfilledwithwatercapableofbeingwithdrawnand thereforeproperly classified as groundwater.22Thisisnotthelegaldefinitionofgroundwater;instead,manystateshavedefinedgroundwaterorundergroundwaterbystatute.23

Groundwater ispartof ahydrologic cycle thatkeepsallwater inconstantmotion.24Whilethereisnobeginningorendtothiscycle,onecouldconsiderevaporationthestartingpoint.25Waterevaporatesfromvegetationandexposed

17 a.dantarloCk,lawofwaterrIgHtsandresourCes§4:5(2006)(“Anunderstandingof thebasicprinciplesof groundwaterhydrology isnecessary tounderstanding theproblemsofdeveloping efficient and fair allocation rules.”); Widman, supra note 6, at 523. Groundwaterhydrologyisdefinedasthesciencedealing“withtheoccurrence,movement,andqualityofwaterbeneath the Earth’s surface.” ralPH C. HeatH, u.s. geologIC survey, BasIC ground-waterHydrology1(Water-SupplyPaper2220,10thprtg.2004revised),available athttp://pubs.er.usgs.gov/djvu/WSP/wsp_2220.pdf.

18 wIllIam m. alley et al., u.s. geologIC survey, sustaInaBIlIty of ground-waterresourCes6–7(Circular1186,1999);HeatH,supranote17,at4;wellsa.HutCHIns,seleCtedProBlemsIntHelawofwaterrIgHtsIntHewest24–25(U.S.Dep’tofAgric.,Misc.Publ’nNo.418,1942);Paull.younger,groundwaterIntHeenvIronment5(2007).

19 HeatH,supranote17,at4;see HutCHIns,supranote18,at24–25.

20 alley et al., supra note 18, at 7; see HeatH, supra note 17, at 4 (stating water in theunsaturatedzonehasnegativehydraulicpressure).

21 alleyetal.,supranote18,at7;younger,supranote18,at5.Thereisatransitionzonebetweentheunsaturatedzoneandthewatertablereferredtoasthecapillaryfringe.alleyetal.,supranote18,at7;younger,supranote18,at5.

22 alleyetal.,supranote18,at6–7;HeatH,supranote17,at4;see HutCHIns,supranote18,at24–26(discussingthenatureofwaterinthesaturatedzone).

23 See, e.g., Colo. rev. stat. ann. § 37-90-103(19) (2010) (“‘Underground water’ and‘groundwater’areusedinterchangeablyinthisarticleandmeananywaternotvisibleonthesurfaceofthegroundundernaturalconditions.”);neB.rev.stat.§46-706(2)(2010)(“Groundwatermeansthatwaterwhichoccursinormoves,seeps,filters,orpercolatesthroughgroundunderthesurfaceoftheland.”);wyo.stat.ann.§41-3-901(a)(ii)(2010)(“‘Undergroundwater’meansanywater,includinghotwaterandgeothermalsteam,underthesurfaceofthelandorthebedofanystream,lake,reservoir,orotherbodyofsurfacewater,includingwaterthathasbeenexposedtothesurfacebyanexcavation suchasapit.”).Coloradodividesgroundwater intodesignatedgroundwater,nontributarygroundwater,and“notnontributarygroundwater.”Colo.rev.stat.ann.§37-90-103(6)(a),(10.5),(10.7).

24 tarloCk,supranote17,§2:3;Widman,supranote6,at523.

25 HeatH,supranote17,at5.


surfaces, including the ocean, and through the process of transpiration risesinto the atmosphere to form clouds.26 The moisture in the atmosphere thenreturnsto landintheformofprecipitation.27Precipitationthenreturnstotheatmospherethroughevapotranspiration,providesmoisturetovegetationandsoil,or infiltrates the ground.28The water that infiltrates the ground first providesmoisturetothesoilandthenfiltersdowntothewatertablewhereitformsthegroundwatersupply.29

Groundwaterexistinginusablequantitiesiscontainedinaquifers—geologicalformations that hold and allow groundwater to move through them.30Thesegeologicformationshavetheabilitytostorewaterbecausetherearevoidspacesorfractureswithinthem.31Aquifersareeitherconfinedorunconfined.32Aconfinedaquiferisoneinwhichthewaterexistsunderpressure,commonlyreferredtoasartesianpressure.33Anunconfinedaquifer,orwater-tableaquifer,isonepartiallyfilledwithwaterthatpermitswatertomovetootherformations.34

Pumpsandwellsallowuserstoextractgroundwater.35Whengroundwaterispumpedfromanaquifer,thewatertableisloweredintheshapeofaninvertedcone—referredtoasaconeofdepression.36Theeffectseachconeofdepression

26 Id.;tarloCk, supra note 17, § 2:3.Transpiration is the “release of water vapor to theatmosphere by plants.” younger, supra note 18, at 29. Often, evaporation and transpirationarehard todistinguish fromeachother and therefore they are collectively referred to as evapo-transpiration.Id.

27 HeatH,supranote17,at5;tarloCk,supranote17,§2:3.Precipitationoccursinmanyforms,includingrain,snow,andhail.HeatH,supranote17,at5.

28 HeatH,supranote17,at5;tarloCk,supranote17,§2:3.

29 HeatH,supranote17,at5;tarloCk,supranote17,§2:3;Widman,supranote6,at523.

30 HeatH,supranote17,at6;Widman,supranote6,at525;see alsoyounger,supranote18,at9(“Anaquiferisabodyofsaturatedrockthatbothstoresandtransmitsimportantquantitiesofgroundwater.”).

31 JamesW.Crosby,III,A Layman’s Guide to Groundwater Hydrology,inCasesandmaterIalsonwaterlaw325–28(7thed.2005);see alsoWardH.Fischer,Equitable Apportionment of Interstate Ground Waters,21roCkymtn.mIn.l.Inst.721,721–22(1976)(describingtheformationoftheMadisonaquiferthatexistsinWyomingandSouthDakota).

32 HeatH,supranote17,at6.

33 Id.;Crosby,supranote31,at326–28;younger,supranote18,at11.

34 Crosby,supranote31,at326–28;younger,supranote18,at11.

35 HeatH, supra note 17, at 30. Large-scale pumping of groundwater was not possibleuntil the late1940swhenhighspeedcentrifugalpumpsweredevelopedandruralelectrificationoccurredtoprovidepowertothepumps.asHley&smItH, supranote7,at6–8(discussingthehistoricaldevelopmentofgroundwater);Leshy,supranote8,at1333.Priortothecentrifugalpump,groundwaterwasmainlyextractedbyuseofwindmills.asHley&smItH,supranote7,at6.

36 HeatH, supra note 17, at 30, 44; Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas,32tex.teCHl.rev.249,255(2001).

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hasonthewatertablevarybyaquifer,butwithdrawalsoflargequantitiesofwaterlowerthewatertable.37Groundwaterminingoccurswhentherateofgroundwaterdischargeexceedstheaquifer’srateofrecharge.38TheNationalWaterCommissionidentified groundwatermining as a problemofnational concern in1973.39 Ifgroundwaterminingoccursforalongperiodoftime,thenegativeeffectsincludeincreasedcostofpumping,increasedthreattowaterqualitythroughsaltwaterintrusion, and the possibility that industries dependent on the groundwaterresourcewillloseeconomicviability.40

B. Groundwater Resources

Groundwater is a critical natural resource—accounting for about ninetypercentofthefreshwaterintheUnitedStatesandprovidingaboutfortypercentof the nation’s public water supply.41Wyoming does not rely on groundwaterasmuchasotherstates,butitsuseisincreasing.42IrrigationisthelargestuseofgroundwaterinWyoming—accountingforaboutsixtypercentofwithdrawals.43MorethanonehundredaquifersexistinWyoming,buttherearefourprimaryaquifers.44Theseaquifersareusuallydescribedingeneralcategoriesratherthanbyindividualname,becausethegeologicalmaterialscreatingtheaquiferarenotconsistent throughout large areas of the state.45The four primary aquifers inWyomingarethealluvialaquifer,theOgallalaaquifer,thestructuralbasinaquifer,andthecarbonateandsandstoneaquifer.46

37 Ella Foley-Gannon, Institutional Arrangements for Conjunctive Water Management in California and Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives,14HastIngsw.-nw. J.envtl.l.&Pol’y1105,1120(2008);DouglasL.Grant,Conjunctive Management of Hydrologically Connected Surface Water and Ground Water: The Problem of Sustainable Use,54roCkymtn.mIn.l.Inst.14-1,14-3to-4(2008).

38 tarloCk,supranote17,§6:13.

39 nat’lwaterComm’n,waterPolICIesfortHefuture8–9(1973).

40 Id.at238–39.

41 alleyetal.,supranote18,at1;asHley&smItH,supranote7,at3.

42 SeeasHley&smItH,supranote7,at128.Inthemid-1990saboutfivepercentofthewaterusedinWyomingwasgroundwaterandtherestwassurfacewater.Id.Ruraldomesticwatersuppliesrelyalmostexclusivelyongroundwater.u.s.geologICalsurvey,natIonalwatersummary1984,453(Water-SupplyPaper2275,1984)[hereinafternatIonalwatersummary],available at http://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/wsp2275(notinggroundwatersuppliedaboutninetypercentofruraldomesticwaterin1980).

43 See asHley & smItH, supra note 7, at 128 (stating sixty-two percent of groundwaterwithdrawalswereforirrigation);natIonalwatersummary,supranote42,at456(notingthatin1980sixty-ninepercentofgroundwaterwithdrawalswereforirrigation).Thesecondlargestuseofgroundwaterisindustrialsupply.natIonalwatersummary, supranote42, at456.

44 ralPHJ.anCtIl,tHeaQuIfersandaQuIfersystemsofwyomIng3(EPA,drft.1990).

45 wyo.waterdev.Comm’n, supranote9,§4.4.2.

46 natIonalwatersummary,supranote42,at453–56;see alsoanCtIl,supranote44,at3(categorizingthegeologicunitsofWyoming);wyo.waterdev.Comm’n,wyomIngwateratlas40–41(1990)(diagrammingaquifertypesinWyoming).


Thelargestandmostwell-knownaquiferintheUnitedStatesistheHighPlainsorOgallalaaquifer.47Theaquiferunderlieseight states, including southeasternWyoming.48AboutfiftypercentofWyoming’sgroundwaterwithdrawalsarefromtheOgallala.49ThewaterlevelsoftheOgallalahavedeclinedmoreinotherstatesthantheyhaveinWyoming.50

C. Groundwater Legal Doctrines

Lawsallocatinggroundwaterareuniquetoeachstate.51Inmanystatesthelawsallocatinggroundwaterdifferfromthosegoverningsurfacewater.52Whilestateshavedifferentexpressionsofgoverninglaw,therearefiveprimarydoctrinesstatesusetoallocategroundwater:(1)theabsoluteownershiprule,(2)thereasonableuserule,(3)thecorrelativerightsrule,(4)thepriorappropriationdoctrine,and(5)theRestatementapproach.53

1. Absolute Ownership Rule

Theabsoluteownershiprule,orEnglishrule,isbasedonthecommonlawandwasthefirstdoctrinefollowedbycourtsintheUnitedStates.54Thisisaruleofcaptureallowingalandownertoextractgroundwaterforanypurposeandinany amount regardless of the effects on neighbors.55 Only a few states followthisdoctrine.56

47 Rex A. Mann, Note, A Horizontal Federalism Solution to the Management of Interstate Aquifers: Considering an Interstate Compact for the High Plains Aquifer, 88 tex. l. rev. 391,393(2009).

48 Id.;natIonalwatersummary, supranote42, at454.TheOgallalaaquiferexistsunderColorado,Kansas,Nebraska,NewMexico,Oklahoma,SouthDakota,Texas,andWyoming.Id.;Mann,supra note47,at393.Theaquiferisestimatedtocover8190squaremileswithinWyoming.anCtIl,supranote44,at11.TheentireOgallalaaquiferholdsenoughwatertofillLakeHuron.Leshy,supranote4,at1482.Anestimated200,000wellspumpfromtheaquifer.Id.

49 anCtIl,supranote44,at2.

50 natIonalwatersummary,supranote42,at456.

51 James H. Davenport, Less is More: A Limited Approach to Multi-State Management of Interstate Groundwater Basins,12u.denv.waterl.rev.139,158(2008);DeanBaxtresser,Note,Antiques Roadshow: The Common Law and the Coming Age of Groundwater Marketing,108mICH.l.rev.773,777–78(2010).

52 tarloCk,supranote17,§4:1;Davenport,supranote51,at158.Inmanystateslandownersoriginallyhadanabsoluteorquasi-absoluteprivilegetopumpgroundwater.tarloCk,supranote17,§4:1.Asstateseliminatedthisprivilegethroughlegislationorcourtopinions,thedoctrinesadoptedvariedfromsurfacewaterdoctrines.See id.

53 Davenport, supra note51, at159.

54 tarloCk,supranote17,§4:6.

55 Id.; J. David Aiken, The Western Common Law of Tributary Groundwater: Implications for Nebraska,83neB.l.rev.541,550–58(2004)(discussingearlyEnglishandAmericancasesapplyingtheabsoluteownershipdoctrine).

56 tarloCk,supranote17,§4:6(listingConnecticut,Louisiana,Maine,RhodeIsland,andTexasasthestatesthatfollowtheabsoluteownershipdoctrine).

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2. Reasonable Use Rule

States developed the reasonable use rule, or American rule, in the latenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturyasalimitationontheabsoluteownershiprule.57Thisdoctrineallowsalandownertouse“anamountofwaterasmaybenecessaryforsomeusefulorbeneficialpurposeinconnectionwiththelandfromwhichitistaken.”58Manyeasternstatesapplythereasonableuserule.59

3. Correlative Rights Rule

Californiarejectedtheabsoluteownershipdoctrinein1903andcreatedthecorrelativerightsdoctrine.60Thisdoctrineisbasedontheconceptofbasinsandgiveseachgroundwateruseracorrelativeorcoequalrighttothegroundwaterinthebasin.61StatesinboththeEastandWestfollowthisdoctrine.62

4. Prior Appropriation Doctrine

ManystatesintheWestfollowthedoctrineofpriorappropriation.63Statesdeveloped this doctrine for surface water and later modified the doctrine toaccommodate for groundwater characteristics.64 Prior appropriation resolves

57 Id.§4:7;Aiken,supranote55,at558–64(discussingthemaincasesapplyingthereasonableusedoctrine);Moses,supranote6,at506–10.

58 Statev.MichelsPipelineConstr.,217N.W.2d339,349(Wis.1974);accordSpearTRanch,Inc.v.Knaub,691N.W.2d116,128(Neb.2005);tarloCk,supranote17,§§4:7–8;Moses,supranote6,at506.Auseontheoverlyinglandispersereasonable,whileauseonnon-overlyinglandisperseunreasonable.tarloCk,supranote17,§4:9.

59 tarloCk,supranote17,§4:7(listingAlabama,Florida,Kentucky,Maryland,NewYork,NorthCarolina,andTennesseeasthestatesfollowingtheAmericanrule).

60 Katzv.Walkinshaw,74P.766,772(Cal.1903).

61 Spear T Ranch,691N.W.2dat128;tarloCk,supranote17,§4:14.Thecorrelativerightsrulediffersfromthereasonableuserulebecausealandownerisnotentitledtomorethanhisorherfairshare.Spear T Ranch,691N.W.2dat128;Moses,supranote6,at515–16.Underthereasonableuserule,alandownercantakeasmuchwaterasheorshewantsaslongasitisreasonable,whicheffectivelyrewardsthepersonwiththedeepestwell.Moses,supranote6,at516.

62 tarloCk,supranote17,§4:15(listingArkansas,Delaware,Hawaii,Minnesota,Missouri,Nebraska,andNewJerseyasthestatesfollowingthecorrelativerightsdoctrine).

63 Id.§6:4(listingIdaho,Kansas,Montana,Nevada,NewMexico,NorthDakota,Oregon,SouthDakota,Utah,Washington,andWyomingas the states following thepriorappropriationdoctrine). Colorado also applies the prior appropriation doctrine but only to certain typesof groundwater. Id.The states in theWest that do not follow prior appropriation are Arizona,California,Nebraska,andTexas.Id.

64 Id.§6:3;WillisH.Ellis,Water Rights: What They Are and How They Are Created,13roCkymtn.mIn.l.Inst.451,469–70(1967).Statesapplythepriorappropriationdoctrinedifferentlytogroundwaterbecausetheresourcemovesataslowerspeedcomparedtosurfacewater.Ellis,supra,at469–70.Surfacewatermovesquickly,and thereforewhena juniorappropriator’sdiversion isshut,waterwillbeavailablewithinadaytonearbyseniorappropriators.Id.Ifajuniorgroundwaterpumperisstopped,itcouldtakeyearsbeforeaseniorpumperseesanyeffectinthewatertable.Id.


conflicts between users by giving senior appropriators, as the first user of thewater,priorityoverjuniorappropriators.65

5. Restatement Approach

The most recently developed doctrine is from the Restatement (Second)ofTorts,section858.66Thisdoctrineallowsuserstopumpgroundwaterunlessthewithdrawalswillcauseanyofthreeproblems:(1)unreasonablycauseharmtoneighboringlandownersthroughloweringofthewatertable;(2)exceedthepumper’s reasonable share of annual supply or total store of groundwater; or(3)haveadirectandsubstantialeffectonsurfacewatersandunreasonablycauseharmtoasurfacewateruser.67TheRestatementappliesseveralfactorstodeterminewhatisreasonable.68Thisdoctrineisappliedinafewstates.69

D. Resolving Interstate Water Disputes

There are three major ways in which interstate water resources can beallocated:(1)interstatecompactoragreement,(2)equitableapportionment,or

65 Baxtresser,supranote51,at783.

66 See restatement(seCond)oftorts§858(1979).

67 Id.Thisdoctrineisbasedinprinciplesofnuisancelaw.SpearTRanch,Inc.v.Knaub,691N.W.2d116,129(Neb.2005).

68 restatement(seCond)oftorts§850A.Thissectionprovides:

Thedeterminationofthereasonablenessofauseofwaterdependsuponaconsiderationoftheinterestsoftheriparianproprietormakingtheuse,ofanyriparianproprietorharmedbyitandofsocietyasawhole.Factorsthataffectthedeterminationincludethefollowing:

(a) Thepurposeoftheuse,(b) thesuitabilityoftheusetothewatercourseorlake,(c) theeconomicvalueoftheuse,(d) thesocialvalueoftheuse,(e) theextentandamountoftheharmitcauses,(f ) thepracticalityofavoidingtheharmbyadjustingtheuseormethodofuseof

oneproprietorortheother,(g) thepracticalityofadjustingthequantityofwaterusedbyeachproprietor,(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments and

enterprisesand(i) thejusticeofrequiringtheusercausingharmtobeartheloss.

Id.

69 tarloCk,supranote17,§4:18(listingNebraska,Michigan,Ohio,andWisconsinasthestatesfollowingtheRestatement).Nebraskaappliesthedoctrinewithregardtodisputesbetweensurfacewaterandgroundwaterusers.Spear T Ranch,691N.W.2dat131.Nebraskastillfollowsahybridrulewhichcombinesthereasonableuseandcorrelativerightsdoctrinesfordisputesbetweentwoormoregroundwaterusers.Olsonv.Wahoo,248N.W.304,308(Neb.1933).

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(3) congressional apportionment.70 Of these three, the United States SupremeCourtencouragesinterstatecompactsasthepreferredmethod.71

1. Interstate Compacts and Agreements

The Compact Clause of the United States Constitution provides that“[n]oStateshall,withouttheConsentofCongress...enterintoanyAgreementor Compact with another State.”72 Despite the broad language of the clause,the United States Supreme Court does not require Congressional consent forevery compact or agreement between states.73The Court requires the consentofCongresswhentheagreementincreasesastate’spoliticalpowerattheexpenseof the federal government.74 States can therefore enter into some agreementswithouttheconsentofCongress.75RegardlessofwhetheracompactisapprovedbyCongress,itisstillacontractandisinterpretedassuch.76Interstatecompacts

70 tarloCk,supranote17,§10:1;JoshClemons,Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States,12soutHeasternenvtl.l.J.115,118(2004);see DouglasL.Grant,The Future of Interstate Allocation of Water, 29 roCky mtn. mIn. l. Inst. 977, 979 (1983) (listing extraconstitutionaland constitutional methods for resolving interstate problems). Some commentators suggest theCommerceClause could serve as away to address interstate groundwater allocation. SeeChan,supranote5,at151;AlbertE.Utton,In Search of An Integrating Principle for Interstate Water Law: Regulation Versus the Market Place,25nat.resourCesJ.985,985(1985).

71 Coloradov.Kansas,320U.S.383,392(1943)(statingthatcontroversiescan,andshouldifpossible,bedecidedbycompact,ratherthanbyinvokingtheSupremeCourt’spower);Sporhasev.Nebraskaex rel.Douglas,458U.S.941,960n.20(1982)(“[T]hisCourthasencouragedStatestoresolvetheirwaterdisputesthroughinterstatecompactsratherthanbyequitableapportionmentadjudication.”)(citingColoradov.Kansas,320U.S.at392).

72 u.s.Const.art.1,§10,cl.3.Twotypesofcontroversiescanleadtotheformationofcompacts:(1)controversiesthatcannotbelitigated,and(2)controversiesthatcanbelitigatedbutarenotwellsuitedforlitigationbecauseoftherangeandtechnicalissuesinvolved.FelixFrankfurter&JamesM.Landis,The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate Adjustments,34yalel.J.685,704–05(1925).

73 CarolInen.Brounetal.,tHeevolvInguseandtHeCHangIngroleofInterstateComPaCts:aPraCtItIoner’sguIde47–48(2006)(statingcompactsaredividedintotwogroups—those that require consent and those that do not); Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause,88tex.l.rev.741,743(2010);MichaelS.Smith,Note,Murky Precedent Meets Hazy Air: The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,34B.C.envtl.aff.l.rev.387,390(2007).

74 Brounetal.,supranote73,at48;Clemons,supranote70,at129–30.Compactsregardingstateboundariesareperhapsthemostcommonexampleofcompacts thatrequireCongressionalconsent.Brounetal.,supranote73,at49.Thisdoesnotmeanthatallcontractsoragreementsbetweenstatesamounttocompacts.SeetarloCk,supranote17,§10:24;frederICkl.ZImmerman&mItCHellwendell,tHeInterstateComPaCtsInCe1925,at37(1951).

75 ZImmerman&wendell,supra note74,at37.StatesmayalsoenterintocontractsthatarecalledcompactsbutdonotrequiretheconsentofCongress.Id.

76 Texasv.NewMexico(New Mexico II),482U.S.124,128(1987).OnceCongressconsentstothecompact,nocourtcangrantreliefinconsistentwiththetermsofthecompact.Texasv.NewMexico(New Mexico I),462U.S.554,564(1983).


donoteliminatecourtbattlesovermeaningorenforcement.77However,properdraftingofcompactscaneliminatemanyoftheproblemswhichleadtolitigation.78

Thefirstcompactallocatingwaterwasthe1922ColoradoRiverCompact.79ManystatesdevelopedorconsideredothercompactssoonaftertheColoradoRiverCompact.80Compactsallocatingsurfacewatercantakemanyforms, includingallocation of a percentage of flow or specific quantity.81 Due to the differingnatureofgroundwaterandsurfacewater, thesemethodsmaynotbeadaptableto groundwater resources.82 Some compacts refer specifically to groundwater,but none of them are devoted exclusively to allocation or management of aninterstateaquifer.83

77 New Mexico I,462U.S.at567–68(“[T]hemereexistenceofacompactdoesnotforeclosethe possibility that we will be required to resolve a dispute between the compacting states.”).Montana’ssuitagainstWyomingprovidesanexampleofthis.SeeBillofComplaintat1–4,Montanav.Wyoming,No.137Original(U.S.Jan.31,2007).

78 See Jerome C.Muys et al.,Utton Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact,47nat.resourCesJ.17,21–24(2007)(discussingproblemswithcurrentcompactsandsolutionstothoseproblems).

79 tarloCk,supranote17,§10:25;Frankfurter&Landis, supra note72,at701–02.ThecompactallocatesthewateroftheColoradoRiverbetweentheupperandlowerbasins.tarloCk,supranote17,§10:25.

80 Frankfurter&Landis,supranote72,at702.ThemostrecentlargescaleinterstatecompactenteredintoinvolvestheGreatLakes.NicholasT.Stack,Note,The Great Lakes Compact and an Ohio Constitutional Amendment: Local Protectionism and Regional Cooperation,37B.C.envtl.aff.l.rev.493,493–94(2010).TheGreatLakes-St.LawrenceRiverBasinWaterResourcesCompactwassignedintolawin2008afterfourandahalfyearsofinterstatenegotiationsandthreemoreyears of intrastate debates. Id.This compact establishes regional standards but leaves individualimplementationtothestates,creatinga“balanceofregionalprotectionandstateautonomy.”Id.at517.Thecompactaddressesbothsurfacewaterandgroundwater.Id.at504.

Wyomingisapartytoseveninterstatewatercompacts:(1)ColoradoRiverCompactof1922,(2)BelleFourcheRiverCompactof1943, (3)UpperColoradoRiverBasinCompactof1948,(4)SnakeRiverCompactof1949,(5)YellowstoneRiverCompactof1950,(6)UpperNiobraraRiver Compact of 1962, and (7) Amended Bear River Compact of 1978.wyo. state eng’r’soffICe,wyomIng’sComPaCts,treatIesandCourtdeCrees1–6(2006).

81 Muysetal.,supranote78,at65.TheUttonTransboundaryResourcesCenterfoundsixgeneralallocationmethods:

(1) the prior appropriation doctrine, (2) specific quantities of water measured intermsofbeneficialconsumptiveuse, (3)specificdiversionrightsmeasured infixedpercentagesofavailableflow,(4)theamountofactualstoragepermittedinexistingorfuturereservoirs,(5)outflowasaproportionofactualinflow,and(6)combinationsoftheabove.

Id.

82 Id.at71–73.

83 Mann,supranote47,at391–92&n.5.TheGreatLakesCompactincludesgroundwater.Stack, supra note 80, at 504.The Amended Bear River Compact, to whichWyoming is party,includes“groundwatertributarytotheBearRiver.”AmendedBearRiverCompactart.V,wyo.stat.ann.§41-12-101(2010).

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2. Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment

Ifstatesareunabletoreachagreementsabouthowinterstatewatersshouldbeshared,thentheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtmayresolvetheconflict.84TheSupreme Court has only equitably apportioned interstate surface waters—andrecently declined its first opportunity to equitably apportion an interstategroundwateraquiferinMississippiandTennessee.85In1907,theSupremeCourtdeterminedithadoriginaljurisdictionoverawaterdisputebetweenKansasandColorado and announced the equitable apportionment doctrine.86 The firstpronouncement of the doctrine was simply that there should be an equitabledivisionofbenefitsbetweenthestates.87Since1907,thedoctrinehasevolvedintoananalysisbalancingtheequities.88

TheSupremeCourtgivesstate lawvaryingdegreesofrelevance.89First, ina dispute between Wyoming and Colorado regarding the Laramie River, theSupremeCourtappliedthepriorappropriationdoctrinebecausethatwasthelawinbothstates.90Later, inadisputebetweenWyomingandNebraskaregardingtheNorthPlatteRiver, theSupremeCourtchosenot toapply thedoctrineof

84 Clemons,supranote70,at118.

85 Mississippiv.Memphis,130S.Ct.1317,1317(2010)(denyingMississippi’sMotionforLeavetoFileaBillofComplaint);Hoodex rel. Mississippiv.Memphis,570F.3d625,627–28(5thCir.2009);Leshy,supranote4,at1486–87.ThedisputebetweenMississippiandMemphisinvolvestheMemphisSandsAquiferexistingunderMississippi,Tennessee,andArkansas.Hood,570F.3dat627.ThestateofMississippiclaimstheCityofMemphisandMemphisLight,GasandWaterarepumpinggroundwaterbelongingtoMississippi.Id.MississippifiledaclaiminfederaldistrictcourtbutfailedtoincludethestateofTennesseeasaparty.Id.ThecourtdismissedMississippi’sclaimbecauseTennesseewasanindispensableparty.Id.TheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheFifthCircuitupheldthedismissal,statingMississippi’sclaiminvolvedtheequitableapportionmentdoctrine.Id.at630.Afterdismissal,MississippifiledaMotionforLeavetoFileBillofComplaintagainsttheCityofMemphisandtheStateofTennessee,buttheSupremeCourtdeniedthemotion.Mississippi v. Memphis,130S.Ct.at1317.

86 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907). The dispute in this case was over theArkansasRiver.Id.at85.EachstatepresentedanextremeargumenttotheSupremeCourt.Id.at98.Coloradoarguedithadanabsoluterighttoappropriateallwaterswithinitsboundaries.Id.Kansasargueditwasentitledtothenaturalflowoftheriver.Id.TheSupremeCourtrejectedbotharguments.Id.

87 Id.at117–18.

88 See, e.g., Clemons, supra note 70, at 126 (identifying a “cardinal rule” and otherprinciples);A.DanTarlock,The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated,56u.Colo.l.rev.381,410(1985)(identifyingfivebasicprinciplesderivedfromtheequitableapportionmentcases).

89 Tarlock,supranote88,at394.

90 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470–71 (1922). As a result, the Court upheldWyoming’s priorities, and Colorado received only a small portion of the Laramie River. Id. at495–96.


priorappropriation,eventhoughbothstatesreliedonthedoctrine.91Thesecasessuggest thatwhenboth states follow theprior appropriationdoctrine,prioritymaycontrolinsmallriverbasins,suchastheLaramieRiver,butislesslikelytocontrolinlargeriverbasins,suchastheNorthPlatteRiver.92

In theabsenceofcontrollingstate law, theSupremeCourtdetermines theequitiesofthecasebyrelyingonanumberoffactors.93Inthemostrecentequitableapportionmentcase,theSupremeCourtstatedaproperfactoristo“weightheharmsandbenefitstocompetingStates.”94TheSupremeCourtalsosuggesteditwouldconsiderwhetherreasonableconservationmeasureswouldoffsetinjuries.95

3. Congressional Apportionment

A less common form of interstate water allocation is congressionalapportionment.96 Congress can affect interstate water allocation both directly,bypassinglawsrelatedtoaparticularinterstatesource,orindirectly,bypassinggeneral laws that would supersede any compacts or equitable apportionmentdecrees.97 This power of Congress was established in Arizona v. California.98However,Congresshasbeenreluctanttousethepower.99

III.analysIs

States,especiallythoseintheWest,mustnolongerignorethatgroundwaterisalimitedresource.100Groundwaterminingisoccurringthroughoutthecountry

91 Nebraskav.Wyoming,325U.S.589,618(1945);see alsoColoradov.NewMexico,459U.S.176,186(1982).

92 Tarlock,supranote88,at410.

93 Nebraskav.Wyoming,325U.S.at618.TheCourtestablishedthefollowingstandard:

Apportionmentcallsfortheexistenceofaninformedjudgmentonaconsiderationofmanyfactors.Priorityofappropriationistheguidingprinciple.Butphysicalandclimaticconditions,theconsumptiveuseofwaterintheseveralsectionsoftheriver,thecharacterandrateofreturnflows,theextentofestablisheduses,theavailabilityofstoragewater,thepracticaleffectofwastefulusesondownstreamareas,thedamagetoupstreamareasascomparedtothebenefitstodownstreamareasifalimitationisimposedontheformer—theseareallrelevantfactors.

Id.

94 Coloradov.NewMexico,459U.S.at186.TheCourtwentontorecognizethatusuallytheequitieswillfavorestablishedusesratherthanproposeduses.Id.at187.

95 Id.at185–86.

96 tarloCk,supranote17,§10:28;Grant,supranote70,at993.

97 Leshy,supranote4,at1483.CongresscanalteracompactbecausethecompactisfederallawthatCongresscanchange.Id.Similarly,equitableapportionmentdecreesapplyfederalcommonlaw,andCongressisabletomodifythecommonlaw.Id.

98 373U.S.546,564–66(1963).

99 Grant,supranote70,at993.

100 See Leshy, supra note 4, at 1477 (describing various limitations on the extractionofgroundwater).

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andposesaseriousproblemforfuturegenerations.101Attentiontomanagementofallgroundwaterresourcesisneededandcannotadequatelybedonewithoutconsideringtheinterstateaspectoftheresource.102Intheabsenceofcompactsoragreementswateruserswilldepleteaquifers—negativelyaffectingtheeconomyandenvironment.103

The first part of this analysis examines what policy choices states shouldconsider regarding groundwater management.104 Then it addresses how theSupremeCourtwould likelyapplythedoctrineofequitableapportionmenttointerstategroundwatersources.105Next,thissectionarguesitisinthebestinterestsofstates,andwaterusers,toavoidequitableapportionmentandinsteadenterintointerstatecompactsorsomeotherformofagreement.106Further,itdiscusseshowcompactsallocatinginterstategroundwatershouldbenegotiated.107Finally,thisanalysisconsidershowcompactsshouldbeadministered.108

A. Policy

States must determine a proper policy before any interstate groundwatersource can be managed or allocated.109 States must make these policy choices

101 nat’lwaterComm’n,supranote39,at238–39;RobertJeromeGlennon,The Concept of Capture: The Hydrology and Law of Stream/Aquifer Interactions,43roCkymtn.mIn.l.Inst.22-1,22-5(1997)(“Overthelastseveraldecades,thecountryhasusedanever-increasingamountofgroundwater,andtheimpactofpumpingonsurfaceflowshasgraduallybecomeapparentand,incertainareas,critical.”);Leshy,supranote4,at1475.

102 Baxtresser,supranote51,at776(statingmostgroundwaterdoctrinesweredevelopedmorethan100yearsagoandwereneverintendedtodealwithlarge-scalewatershortages);see JamesL.Huffman,The Federal Role in Water Resource Management,17n.y.u.envtl.l.J.669,670(2008)(describingtheneedforstateactionandcallingstaterolesinwatermanagement“crucial”);AlbertE.Utton,Sporhase,ElPaso, and the Unilateral Allocation of Water Resources: Some Reflections on International and Interstate Groundwater Law,57u.Colo.l.rev.549,549–50(1986).Huffmanidentifiesfivefactorsthatwillensurewaterfightscontinue:

(1) the certainty of growing demand for water; (2) the certainty of recurrentdroughts;(3)therealitythatmanywatersourcesaretransboundary(interstateand/or international); (4) thereality that, in thecaseof riversandstreams, somestateshavenaturalgeographicaladvantages;and(5)therisingconcernforenvironmentalprotectionandecosystempreservation.

Huffman,supra,at670.

103 SeeChan,supranote5,at176(stating“anunrestrainedracetothebottomoftheaquifer”couldresultwhenstatesdonotknowwhattheirrightsare).






109 Leshy,supranote6,at144;see Ellis,supranote64,at471(statingadecisionmustbemadeforeachaquiferregardingwhetheritwillbemaintainedormined,andifminedthenwhatthelifespanoftheaquifershouldbe).


to determine “the best way to (1) assure that the waters are shared fairly,(2) encourage the prudent planning, management, and utilization of theseresourcesforpresentandfuturegenerations,and(3)protectthedelicatebalancebetweenthestatesthemselveswithinthefederalunion.”110

In theearly1900s,waterpolicies revolvedaround large scaledevelopmentofwater,buttodaythepolicyconcernsareaboutsustainabilityoftheresource.111Thegoalofsustainableresourcemanagementistoensurefuturegenerationshaveenoughoftheresource.112Almosteveryoneagreesaboutthegoal;however,fewagree about themeaningof sustainability orhow to achieve it.113Establishinga policy of sustainability is hard enough for individual states to do, and as aconsequence,establishingamulti-statepolicyisnoeasytask.114Stateswillneedtogatherasmuchinformationabouttheresourceaspossibleinordertoestablishan effective policy.115 Armed with this information, states need to establishgroundwater regulations toadministerandmanage theresource.116Statesneedtoinitiallydeterminehowmuchdepletionorpreservationoftheaquifershouldoccur.117Statesmaypermitanaquifertobecompletelydepleted,determinealevelofacceptabledepletion,orallownodepletionatall.118

Another main policy issue is the role of states in relation to the federalgovernment.119 One source of tension between the states and the federal

110 Utton,supranote102,at549,554(concludingthefundamentalquestionshouldnotbewhatlawtoapplybutwhatpolicytoapply).

111 waterIntHewest,supranote11,at5-47;Huffman,supra note102,at680–84.TheReclamationActof1902providedfederalfundingforconstructionofreservoirsanddams,leadingtothecreationofnearly600damsbytheBureauofReclamation.Huffman,supranote102,at680.

112 Gary D. Meyers & Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications and Practical Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as National and International Policy,4Buff.envtl.l.J.1,6(1996).

113 water IntHewest, supranote11,at3-1 to -6;Meyers&Muller, supranote112,at4,10(referringtothedefinitionof“ecologicallysustainabledevelopment”as“elusive”);JohnE.Thorson,Visions of Sustainable Interstate Water Management Agreements,43nat.resourCesJ.347,354(2003).TheWesternWaterPolicyReviewAdvisoryCommissionrecognizedthestatesshouldbeprimarilyresponsibleforachievingsustainability.waterIntHewest,supranote11,at3-6.

114 SeeLeshy, supranote4,at1492(notingstateboundariesfurthercomplicatethealreadycomplexproblemofgroundwatermanagement).

115 Id.at1497(notingthatasstatesbegintodealwithinterstategroundwaterissues,therewillfrequentlybesituationsinwhichlittleisknownabouttheaquifersystems).

116 nat’l water Comm’n, supra note 39, at 232 (“Thus, each State will have to designgroundwater and surfacewatermanagement schemes to suit its ownphysical and institutionalpeculiarities.”);Leshy,supranote6,at147.

117 nat’lwaterComm’n,supranote39,at234.

118 Id.

119 waterIntHewest,supranote11,at3-38(“Theallocationofgovernanceresponsibilitiesinwesternwaterresourcesbetweenthefederalandstategovernmentshasalwaysbeensomewhatproblematic,frustrating,andfractious.”).

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120 Id. at 3-39; Glennon, supra note 101, at 22-4 to -5. Federal environmental laws placeadditionaldutiesonstatewaterrightholders,whichcanaffectthehowwaterisallocated.waterIntHewest,supranote11,at3-38to-39.

121 J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for a New Water Age,19J.landuse&envtl.l.47,49(2003)(“ItisnotatallclearhowthirtyyearsofenvironmentalawarenessandregulationmayhaveaffectedtheCourt’sdemeanorwhenitcomestointerstatewaterallocation.”).

122 SeeBaxtresser,supranote51,776(arguingthatstatelegislatures,notoutdatedlaws,shouldberesponsiblefordeterminingthelegalityofwatermarketing).

123 SeeTarlock,supranote88,at382–83(statinghowtheSupremeCourtwouldapplytheequitableapportionmentdoctrineinfluenceshowstateswouldreachagreements).

124 SeeFischer,supranote31,at735–36.

125 Coloradov.NewMexico,459U.S.176,188nn.12–13(1982).

126 Fischer, supra note 31, at 736. Without explanation, the Supreme Court seemed torecognizethisinMississippi’sclaimagainstTennessee.SeeMississippiv.CityofMemphis,130S.Ct.1317,1317(2010).ThecourtcitedfootnotethirteeninColorado v. New MexicowhendenyingMississippi’sequitableapportionmentclaim.Id.

127 SeeFischer, supranote31,at735–36.ThenegotiationsbetweenUtahandNevadaovertheSnakeValleygroundwaterbasin illustrate thispoint.See JohnR.Zimmerman,Nevada-Utah Interstate Groundwater Negotiations, 24 nat. resourCes & env’t 54, 56 (2010). The SnakeValleygroundwaterbasinexistsinbothNevadaandUtah.Id.at54.TheSouthernNevadaWaterAuthority,whichsupplieswatertoLasVegas,seekstopumpwaterfromthebasininNevadaandpipe it toLasVegas. Id.Utahcountiesoppose the transferbecauseof theeffects itwillhave inUtah.Id.at54–55.Utah’sinterestisincontrollingNevadapumpingbeforeitbegins,andthestateshavethereforedevelopedadraftagreementapportioningthegroundwater.Id.Intheabsenceofanagreement,UtahwouldlikelybeunabletoproveinjuryuntilNevada’spumpingactuallyimpactedtheSnakeValleygroundwaterbasin.See id.at56.

government is federal environmental laws that threaten toovertakehow statesallocategroundwater—suchastheEndangeredSpeciesActandtheCleanWaterAct.120Theselawswilllikelyaddanotherdimensiontoanypolicyestablished.121Statesoverlyingeachaquifershouldberesponsiblefordeterminingthebestpolicytomanagethegroundwater.122

B. Equitable Apportionment

Before states can reach an agreement regarding interstate groundwaterresources, they should understand how the Supreme Court could equitablyapportiontheresource.123ThefirstissueforanystatewouldbewhetheritcouldbringitsclaimbeforetheSupremeCourt.124Beforeastatecanseektoenjoinadiversionofwaterbyanotherstate,itmustprovethediversionwillcausea“realorsubstantialinjuryordamage.”125Provinginjurywithrespecttoagroundwaterdiversionwillbedifficultbecauseofitsphysicalcharacteristics.126Further,statesseekingonlytoavoidfutureconflictsregardinggroundwaterwouldbeunabletobringanequitableapportionmentaction.127

If a state can establish injury, the next issue is how the Supreme Courtwould equitably apportion interstate groundwater resources—something the


128 Ruhl,supranote121,at48–49.

129 New Mexico II,467U.S.310(1984).

130 Ruhl,supranote121,at49.

131 Grant,supranote70,at981(“[T]hemultiplicityofapportionmentcriteria,andthepaucityofcasesapplyingtheminconcretesituations,makeitvirtuallyimpossibletopredicttheoutcomeofequitableapportionmentlitigation.”);Tarlock,supranote88,at392.

132 SeeTarlock,supranote88,at394.

133 See supranotes51–69andaccompanyingtext(discussingthefivemaindoctrinesappliedtogroundwater).

134 SeeUtton, supranote102,at554–55(statingequitableapportionmentofgroundwaterwouldbebasedonarangeoffactors).

135 See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (referring to factors involvingupstreamanddownstreamusers).

136 SeeUtton,supranote102,at553–54.

137 Id.at553–54.

138 Id.at553.

139 Seeid.

Courthasneverdone.128ThelasttimetheSupremeCourtdecidedanequitableapportionment case was 1984.129 Since that time much has changed, and theSupremeCourtcouldmodifythewayitequitablyapportionswater—especiallyinlightofenvironmentallawsandregulations.130Allequitableapportionmentcasesarefactintensive,makingitdifficulttopredicttheoutcomeofanycase.131Themain issuetheSupremeCourt faceswhendeciding interstatewaterdisputes iswhatlawshouldapply.132Thisissuewouldbeevenmoreprevalentingroundwatercasesbecausethestatelawgoverninggroundwaterismoreinconsistentthanthatgoverningsurfacewater.133Basedonthediversenatureofstategroundwaterlaw,itseemslikelytheSupremeCourtwouldgivestatelawlittleweightandinsteadfocusmoreonbalancingequities.134

Thefactorsusedtobalanceequitiesincludesomethatonlyapplytosurfacewater.135TheSupremeCourtwouldthereforeneedtodevelopnewfactorsbasedonthecharacteristicsofgroundwater.136Thesefactorscouldincludetheextenttheaquiferisbeingdepleted,thesizeoftheaquifer,andfutureusesofgroundwater.137Intheend,thedoctrineofequitableapportionmentrequiressharingtheresourceandprohibitsonestatefromunilaterallymakingitsownallocationregardlessofthestate’seconomic,geographic,orgeologicadvantages.138

C. The Best Solution is for States to Compact

Stateshavethreebasicalternativestoestablishingsomeformofagreementwithregardtointerstategroundwaterresources:(1)donothing,(2)seekanequitableapportionmentthroughtheSupremeCourt,or(3)allowthefederalgovernmentto step in and allocate or regulate groundwater resources.139These alternatives

2011 Comment 41

140 SeeMuysetal., supranote78,at23(referring to“uncertaintiesandcosts”ofequitableapportionmentlitigationand“vagaries”ofcongressionalapportionment).

141 Huffman,supranote102,at693–94(“Absentcontrolsonaccess,commonpoolresourcescan be exploited without regard for maintaining a sustainable supply, resulting in a ‘tragedy ofthecommons.’”).

142 Clemons,supranote70,at129(statinganinterstatecompactguaranteesastateatleastsomeofwhat itwants,while a state isnot guaranteed anything in an equitable apportionmentcase);Frankfurter&Landis,supranote72,at701(“Thejudicialinstrumentistoostaticandtoosporadicforadjustingasocial-economicissuecontinuouslyaliveinanareaembracingmorethanahalfadozenStates.”);O’Dayetal.,supranote11,at257(describingequitableapportionmentas“fraughtwithuncertainty”);Thorson,supranote113,at366(“Rarelycanajudgeorcourt,lookingatacomplexwaterissueforthefirsttime,developabettersolutionthanthepartiesaftersomegiveandtakeonallsides.”).

143 Frankfurter&Landis, supranote72,at708(statingcontrolbythe federalgovernmentin regional water problems would be “ill-conceived and intrusive”); see nat’l water Comm’n,supranote39,at227(“TheCommissionconcludesthatauniformnationalgroundwaterlawisnotdesirablebecauseofthegreatvarietyinaquifercharacteristics,inlegalregimesallocatingtheresource,andintheeconomicandsocialmilieuinwhichtheusestakeplace.”).

144 SeeFischer,supranote31,at740–41(statinganinterstatecompactisthemosteffectivewaytoresolveinterstategroundwaterdisputesbecauseitisflexibleandreflectsexpertise);Frankfurter&Landis,supranote72,at700–01(“AgreementamongtheaffectedStatesandtheUnitedStates,withanadministrativeagencyforcontinuousstudyandcontinuingaction,isthelegalinstitutionaloneadequateandadaptedtothetask.”).

145 Brounetal.,supranote73,at26–28;waterIntHewest,supranote11,at5-4(“Statesplay a central role inwatermanagementbecause they are at the fulcrumbetweennational andlocal concerns.”); Marlissa S. Briggett, Comment, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact,18B.C.envtl.aff.l.rev.751,753 (1991) (“The interstate compacthasbeenrecognizedasavaluableintermediatelevelofregulationbetweenintrusivefederalcontrolandineffective statecontrol.”).TheSupremeCourt inanequitableapportionmentcase isunable toconsiderorunderstandthenuancesofthecase.Thorson,supranote113,at366.

146 Frankfurter&Landis,supranote72,at707–08(discussingthenatureofregionalproblemsrequiringregionalsolutions);Briggett,supranote145,at753(“BecauseregionsaremorefamiliarthanWashingtonwiththeparticularcircumstancesofaregionalproblem,theyaremoresensitivetothetypeofregulationsrequired.”).

147 See Huffman, supra note 102, at 671 (noting resource allocation is only resolved afterdisputesarise).ThePlatteRiverCooperativeAgreementforcedNebraskatoregulateinterconnected

arenotinthebestinterestofthestatesorindividualwaterusers.140First,ifstateselecttodonothingthengroundwaterresourceswillbedepletedattheexpenseoffuture generations.141 Second, equitable apportionmentprovidesnoguaranteesandistooundefinedforastatetorelyon.142Third,thefederalgovernmentisnotsuitedtodealwiththeuniqueandcomplexissuesthatexistwithineachaquifer.143Thebestalternativeisforstatestoenterintointerstatecompactsthatallowthemtocontrolgroundwaterdepletionandachievesustainability.144

Oneof themainbenefitsofcompacts is that theyconsiderregional, state,andlocalinterests.145Compactsfocusonparticularregionsthatrequiremorethanstatelegislationbutlessthanabsolutefederalaction.146Anotherbenefittoforminginterstatecompactsisitforcesstatestoproperlymanagetheirwaterresources.147


groundwaterandsurfacewatermoreproactively.SeeJ.DavidAiken,Balancing Endangered Species Protection and Irrigation Water Rights: The Platte River Cooperative Agreement,3greatPlaInsnat.resourCesJ.119,157(1999)(describingstepsNebraskahastakentoregulategroundwater).

148 See Thorson, supra note 113, at 368 (recognizing the process of negotiation keepsinformationflowingandchangesthebehavioroftheparties).

149 Brounetal.,supranote73,at28.

150 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564–66 (1963) (determining that Congressapportioned waters of the Colorado River); Leshy, supra note 4, at 1498 (arguing the federalgovernmentshouldplayakeyroleinestablishingpoliciesrelatingtointerstategroundwater).

151 waterIntHewest,supranote11,at6-1(“[T]herewillbefewertrulywin-winsolutionsinthefuture.”).

152 Brounetal.,supranote73,at72–73(notingthattheprocessofestablishingcompactscontinuestoevolve).

153 Brounetal.,supranote73,at73–74.Fivegeneralstepsareidentified:(1)authorizationfrom Congress to negotiate a compact, (2) appointment of commissioners from each state,(3)actualnegotiation,(4)ratificationofagreementbystatelegislatures,and(5)consentofCongress.JeffBoyce,NoteandComment,Wrestling With the Bear: A Compact Approach to Water Allocation,19ByuJ.PuB.l.301,306(1996)(citingDouglasL.Grant,Water Apportionment Compacts Between States,in 4waterandwaterrIgHts§46.02(RobertBecked.,1990)).

154 Brounetal.,supranote73,at88–94(“[C]ompacts,foralltheirsimplicity,arenotordinarycontractsatallbutrathercreaturesofaninherentlypoliticalexercise.”);JohnJ.Entsminger,The Challenges of Water for the Future of the West: Where Will We Get the Water?,51roCkymtn.mIn.l.Inst.§25.05(2005)(“[C]ompetitionforwaterbringsintosharpfocusthesocial,cultural,andpoliticaldividesthatcomprisetheWesternlandscape.”).

155 See John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water Disputes Involving Indian Rights, 28 nat. resourCes J. 63, 72–74 (1988) (describing the process ofnegotiation);Huffman,supranote102,at687(“[C]onflictratherthanforesightislikelytobethemotivatingfactorfordiscussionofapossibleinterstateagreement.”).

Thisisoftentrueevenifnoagreementiseverreached.148Thebiggestdisadvantageofacompactisthatastateoftengivesupsomeofitspowertotheindependentadministrativebodiesestablishedbythecompact.149Thisdisadvantagemustbebalancedagainstthepossibilitythatwithoutacompact,thefederalgovernmentcouldapportioninterstategroundwaterwithlittleornostateinput.150Intheend,statesandindividualwaterusersmustrealizewaterisalimitedresource—makingitimpossibleforeverystatetoachieveallofitsgoals.151

D. Forming Interstate Compacts

Thereisnoparticularprocessrequiredtoformacompact.152Traditiondictatesthatstatesdelegatecommissionerstonegotiateand,onceanagreementisreached,eachstatepassesthetermsoftheagreementlegislatively.153Formingacompactispoliticallydrivenand therefore requiresan inclusiveprocess, effectivepublicrelations,andabroadnetworkof supporters.154Thehardestpartof formingacompact concerning groundwater is that there is no visible conflict to drivenegotiationsbecausestatesareunabletoseetheresource.155

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156 See Utton, supra note 102, at 549. While the primary focus of this comment is onallocationofgroundwater,aninterstatecompactcouldfocusonnumerousotherissues,includingwaterquality,interconnectionofgroundwaterandsurfacewater,andfloodcontrol.SeeMuysetal.,supranote78,at27–28.

157 Muysetal.,supranote78,at27–28.

158 SeeOlenPaulMatthews&MichaelPease,The Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water Across State Boundaries, 46nat.resourCes J. 601,602–03 (2006) (“Focusingefforts on improving efficiency, rather than creating winners and losers, is a more productiveapproachtoconflicts.”).But seeChan,supra note5,at176,181(arguingastatemustknowhowmuchwateritisentitledtobeforeitcaneffectivelymanagethatwater).

159 SeeEmilyJeffers,Note,Creating Flexibility in Interstate Compacts,36eCologyl.Q.209,235–36(2009)(comparingtheColoradoRiverCompactwiththeDelawareRiverBasinCompactandconcludingacompactthatmanagesariverissuperiortoonethatdividesariver).

160 SeeHuffman,supranote102,at686–87(statingcompactsaimedatwaterplanningrarelyforcestatesto“compromisetheirambitionsandinterests”).

161 See Davenport, supra note 51, at 173 (stating that if management of the resource isaccomplisheditwouldproducemoreresultsthanacompactdividingtheresource).But seeRobertHaskellAbrams,Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for Eastern States,25u.ark.lIttleroCkl.rev.155,155(2002)(statingallocationisimportanttostateswantingtoconservewaterforfutureuses).

162 Ellis,supranote64,at451(statingthelegalprofessionisresponsibleforensuringtheuseofwaterismoreefficient).

163 Brounetal.,supranote73,at94–95.

164 See, e.g.,Montanav.Wyoming,No.137Original(U.S.Jan.31,2007);Kansasv.Nebraska,No.126Original(U.S.May19,2003).

Negotiations could focuson twoprimaryareas: (1)dividing the interstateaquifersamongthestates,and(2)agreeingonhowtheinterstateaquifershouldbemanaged.156Divisionofaquifersislikelytobeadifficultandtimeconsumingprocess.157Negotiationsconcerningwaysinwhichgroundwatercanbemanagedcooperativelyarelikelytobemoreproductivethannegotiationsfocusingsolelyonhowmuchwatereachstategets.158Ifstatessimplytrytodividetheinterstateaquifer, theagreement is likely to fall apartas timegoesbyandcircumstanceschange.159This isnottosaynegotiationsaboutmanagementofanaquiferwillbeeasier,becausethereareveryfew,ifany,compactsthateffectivelyimplementregionalwatermanagement.160Statescouldbeginwithcompactsaddressingonlythemanagementofgroundwater.161Theexistenceofeffectivelawsandregulationsmanaging groundwater will help increase efficiency and sustainability oftheresource.162

Reachinganagreementinprinciple is important,butprecisionindraftingeverywordofthecompactisequallycrucial.163Thenumberofdisputesbetweenstatesregardingthemeaningofexistingcompacts illustrates this.164Acompactshould contain certain types of provisions: (1) a preamble, (2) a purpose andintentsection,(3)definitions,(4)termsregardingcompactadministration,(5)asectionapportioningwater,(6)disputeresolutionandenforcementclauses,and


165 SeeBrounetal.,supranote73,at98–114;Muysetal.,supranote78,passim.

166 Brounetal.,supranote73,at95.

167 Id.at100.See generallyDavenport,supranote51,passim.

168 Muys et al., supra note 78, at 47; ZImmerman & mItCHell, supra note 74, at 53(“Nevertheless,lackofaspecialcommissiontoadministerthecompactisaserioushandicap.”).

169 SeeBrounetal.,supranote73,at140–47;Muysetal.,supranote78,at47.

170 Huffman,supranote102,at687–88.

171 Muysetal.,supranote78,at48,50.Theamountofauthoritygiventothecommissionoradministrativebodyusuallydictatesthesuccessofthecompact.SeeBoyce,supranote153,at318.Inordertohaveaneffectivecommission,theproperfundingisrequired.Id.

172 Boyce,supranote153,at318.

173 ZImmerman&mItCHell,supranote74,at53;Jeffers,supranote159,at211,230.

174 SeeFrankfurter&Landis,supranote72,at708.

175 Boyce,supranote153,at322.

176 See supranotes39–40andaccompanyingtext.



(7)financingprovisions.165Detaileddefinitionsandastrongpurposeandintentsectionwillhelppreventambiguity.166Multipledetailedtermsarehardforstatestoagreeon,soa“lessismore”approachistypicallyused.167

E. Administering Interstate Compacts

Some form of administrative body is required to implement almost everycompact—especiallyacompactinvolvingwater.168Theformoftheadministrativebodycanvarywidely,butinterstatewatercompactsoftencreateacommission.169Implementationofaninterstatecompactthatcooperativelymanagesgroundwaterislikelytobethemostdifficultpartofthecompact.170

A commission should have ultimate authority regarding implementationofthecompact.171Anydisputesthatariseshouldfirstgotothecommissionoradministrative body.172 A commission ensures attention is continually devotedtotheissuesandgivesflexibilitytothelawsadopted.173Aproperadministrativebody should be able to continually study and build knowledge of the issuesrelevanttoaparticularaquifersystem.174Intheend,asuccessfulcompactisonethatminimizescontroversy.175

Iv.ConClusIon

Interstategroundwaterresourcesaredepleting,andfewstatesareproactivelymanaging these resources.176Managementwillnotbeeasy,but itwillonlygetharderastimepasses.177Whilestatescanandshouldincreasemanagementandregulationsof theirgroundwateraquifers, this cannotbedone inavacuum.178Almost everygroundwater resource is a regionalproblem, requiring a regional

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solution.179Thebestsolutionisforstatestoenterintocompactsaddressingthemanagementandallocationofgroundwater.180Thesecompactscanandwilltakemanyforms,butwithoutthemtheexistenceofgroundwaterforfuturegenerationswillbeindanger.181


the nature of interstate groundwater resources and … law review/v11 n1/hesser.pdfa. groundwater...

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