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The New Financial Services LandscapepGlobal Financial Services Industry
Steven M. Butters
Deputy Managing Partner
Global Financial Services Industry PracticeGlobal Financial Services Industry Practice
February 3, 2010
Unprecedented turmoil ………
$1.6 -1.8 trillion in Losses $and Write-downs
M k t C it li tiMarket Capitalization Down Over 50% in 2008
Relationships with financial providers will change
Mega Bank Mergers and Failures Credit and capital become scarcer
Stalled Credit MarketsCredit spreads will be higher
Government withdraws
Massive Government Intervention
Government withdraws
Global Contagion
© 2010 Deloitte Touche TohmatsuSource: Bloomberg, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions2
Current Status of the Global Financial Services Industry
Market Capitalization of Top 100 Financial Institutions$6.6 trillion
$3.2 trillion$4.5 trillion
20092008 2007
Number of Financial Institutions >$50bn Market Capitalization45
14
28
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
20092008 2007
3
Current Status of the Global Financial Services IndustryDomicile Market Capitalization of the Top 20 Banks
29% 21% 19% 38% 18% 11%
2007 2009
Size of Government Financial Services Bailouts
$
EU - $5.5 trillion
China - $0.9 trillion
US - $3.6 trillion
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu4
A ‘tsunami’ wave of new regulation is driving major uncertainty
A large number of regulatory and industrial organizations are proposing regulations and other means to ‘fix the industry’ e.g., BIS, FSB, CEOPS, Senior Supervisors, etc., all driving uncertainty. The i d t k it f l t h b t d t t k th d t il f th h
Treasury Blueprint,Mar 2008
Senior Supervisory Report, Mar 2008 & Oct 2009 G30 Financial
Reform, Jan 2009
Financial Supervision in the EU, de Larosiere
Report Feb 2009
industry knows it faces regulatory change but does not yet know the detail of those changes.
IIF Report,Jul 2008
The Turner Review, Mar 2009
G30 Structure of Financial Supervision,
Oct 2008
Counterparty Credit Risk Management
Aug 2008Jul 2008 Mar 2009Oct 2008 Aug 2008
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu5
Changing industry landscape globally
f F fi i d l
What used to be constant… …and how it’s now playing out
• Institutions were often highly leveraged utilizing short term financing
• Broker/dealers & investment banks as
• Face new financing models• The growing predominance of the
universal banking modelindependent players
• Mono-line institutions• Strategic market consolidation
• Rapid market consolidation• Return to core businesses• Government as guarantor owner andStrategic market consolidation
• Cutting-edge financial instruments• Liberal regulation and oversight
Government as guarantor, owner, and administrator
• Increased regulation and oversightSi lifi ti d t f• Rising asset prices
• Belief in ratings agencies• Emphasis on supply side of capital
• Simplification and transparency of financial products
• Rating agency reputation weakenedp pp y p• Cheap and available capital and
financing • Predominance of Western wealth
• Strong and growing emphasis on demand side of capital
• Realistic pricing of capital• Predominance of Western wealth g• Rapid growth of emerging market
wealth
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu6
The credit markets are improving…
Counterparty anxieties are much lower
5 0
Bank Risks DiminishCDS Rates (Basis Points)*
TED Spreads Normalize
4.0
4.5
5.0
3.0
3.5
Poi
nts
Poi
nts
1.5
2.0
2.5
Bas
is
Bas
is
0.5
1.0
0.0
01/05/05
01/05/06
01/05/07
01/05/08
01/05/09
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Source: Bloomberg, FDIC, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions*CDS rates for the following institutions: Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, American Express, Bank of America, Capital One, GoldmanSachs, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase
7
…But risks remain
A recent surge in failed banks and distinctly different views about future growth rates emphasize remaining risks to recovery
Charge-Offs and Delinquency Rates IncreaseFailed U S Banks Increase to Charge Offs and Delinquency Rates Increase Top 100 Banks
Failed U.S. Banks Increase to December 2009
9.0%
10.0%
Business LoansCredit Card Loans Charge-Offs
ks
7.0%
8.0%
9.0% Credit Card Loans Mortgages"Business Loans"Credit Card Loans"Mortgages
g
Delinquency
Num
ber o
f Ban
k
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
2.0%
3.0%
0.0%
1.0%
Q1 06
Q2 06Q3 06
Q4 06
Q1 07
Q2 07Q3 07
Q4 07
Q1 08Q2 08
Q3 08
Q4 08
Q1 09Q2 09
Q3 09
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Source: FDIC, Federal Reserve, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
8
A new consumer is emerging
The new U.S. consumers are living more within their means
3.5%4.0%
% Change in Personal Disposable Income % Change in Consumer Expenditure
1.5%
1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%3.0%
‐0 5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
2Q2008 3Q2008 4Q2008 1Q2009 2Q2009 3Q2009
‐1.5%‐1.0%‐0.5%0.0%0.5%
2Q2008 3Q2008 4Q2008 1Q2009 2Q2009 3Q2009
2 5%
‐2.0%
‐1.5%
‐1.0%
0.5%
6 0%
2,500
Savings as % of Personal Disposable Income Consumer Debt‐2.5%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
1,000
1,500
2,000
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
2Q2008 3Q2008 4Q2008 1Q2009 2Q2009 3Q20090
500
,
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
2Q2008 3Q2008 4Q2008 1Q2009 2Q2009 3Q2009
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Jul
Revolving Non Revolving
9
A new financial services marketplace will emerge
We’re not going back to ‘business as usual’
Shadow banking pulls back
‘Cash is king’
Government withdraws support, declares ‘recession over’
Alpha gives way to beta
Awaiting the solidification of new regulation
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu10
Shadow banking pulls back - Markets shift in favor of banks
Alternative markets are severely constrained
Total U.S. Capital Markets IssuanceTotal Credit MarketU.S. Financial System
50%
38% 40%
26% 27%35%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
47%80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
53% 50%
50 0%
60.0%
70.0%
93% 81%
66%
50% 47%54%
50 0%
60.0%
70.0%
ship
Spl
it
Spl
it
47% 50%
62% 60%
74% 73%65%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
50% 53%46%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
Ass
et O
wne
rs
Issu
ance
47%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
Q4 06 Q1 07 Q4 07 Q1 08 Q4 08 Q1 09 Q3 09
7% 9%
34%
50% 46%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
Q4 06 Q1 07 Q4 07 Q1 08 Q4 08 Q1 09 Q3 09
Non Securitized Securitized1975 1985 1995 2005 2008 Q3
2009
Alternate Financial Segment Traditional FinancSource: Federal Reserve L1 Flow of Funds Report, SIFMA, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions.Definitions: Traditional Sector: Fed Commercial Banks Savings and Credit Unions Insurance Companies Public and Private Pensions Funds
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Definitions: Traditional Sector: Fed, Commercial Banks, Savings and Credit Unions, Insurance Companies, Public and Private Pensions Funds.Alternative Sector: Mutual Funds, Closed End Funds, ETFs, GSEs, ABS issuers, Broker-Dealers, REITS, Finance Companies, Hedge Funds and PE firms.
Broker-Dealers transition to the traditional sector in Q4 2008 and Finance Companies in 2009.Securitization issuance includes mortgage backed securities, ABS and Global CDO.11
‘Cash is king’ - Banks are cleaning house
The cost of financial intermediation will rise
U.S. Banks Tier One Capital Ratios U.S. Banks Loan/Deposit Ratios
8.0%
9.0% Q1 09
Q2 09
100 0%
120.0%Q1 09
Q2 09
6.0%
7.0%
80.0%
100.0%
4.0%
5.0%
60.0%
1 0%
2.0%
3.0%
20.0%
40.0%
0.0%
1.0%
BAC C JPM FITB Key PNC WFC0.0%
BAC C FITB JPM Key PNC WFC
S SNL Th D l itt C t f B ki S l ti
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Source: SNL, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions
12
‘Cash is king’ – Corporations build fortress balance sheets
While banks seek shorter loan maturities, corporations seek to borrow longer
Total Debt/Market Cap % Short Term Debt as % of Long Term Debt
74%
80.0%
40% 41%
40 0%
45.0%
Total Debt/Market Cap % Selected U.S. corporations
Short Term Debt as % of Long Term Debt Selected U.S. Corporations
66%
60.0%
70.0%
32%
35%
30 0%
35.0%
40.0%
48%
40.0%
50.0%
20 0%
25.0%
30.0%
28%
20.0%
30.0%
15.0%
20.0%
10.0%5.0%
10.0%
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
0.0%
2006 2007 2008 Q1 2009
0.0%2006 2007 2008 Q1 2009
Source: Annual Reports, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions13
Government withdraws support and declares ‘recession over’
Government support to the market falls by ~$5.9 trillion. About $1 trillion
Summary of Government Commitments Major Programs
Government support to the market falls by $5.9 trillion. About $1 trillion remains in place
Major Programs
Program Expiration Commitment Outstanding Balance
Money Market Mutual Fund Guarantee Sept 18, 2009 $3. 5 trillion 0Guarantee
Contingency Fund No longer needed $750 billion 0
TARP Continues in place $700 billion $377 billion
Commercial Paper Funding Facility April 30, 2009 Limits per issuer $45 billion
Term Auction Credit OngoingAs required
$447 billion (peak)$212 billion
Mortgage Backed Securities Dec 30, 2009 $1.25 trillion $625 billion
Central Bank Swaps OngoingAs required
$375 billion (peak)$61 billion
S U S T Th F d l R B d Th D l itt C t f B ki S l ti
Term Asset Backed Securities Lending Oct 30, 2009 $200 billion $37 billion
Total ~7.2 trillion ~$1.4 trillion
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Source: U.S. Treasury, The Federal Reserve Board, The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions
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Alpha gives way to beta
The new marketplace reflects more beta characteristics than alphamarkets
Ret
urn High
Less SystemicMore Systemic
Systemic institutions adopt a more
Contraction of alternative
investments
balanced approach to risk and returnsIllustrative
Risk
HighLow HighLow
Consolidation in large banks and asset managers
Low
Pre-Crisis Model
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
Source: The Deloitte Center for Banking Solutions
15
While regulation is slow to change, the Institute of International Finance report on strengthening practices for a more stable system shows progress being made……
• Risk Management• Risk Management
• Liquidity Risks
Strengthening Practices for a More Stable System – The Report of the IIF Steering
• Valuation Issues
p gCommittee on Implementation. Progress is being made in all the following
• Compensation Policiesthe following
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu16
……While new proposals are coming in waves
Current Financial System Stability Bills passed by the U.S. Congress and Senate aim:
• to close loopholes that allowed big financial firms to trade risky financial d t ith t i htproducts without oversight;
• to identify system-wide risks that could cause a meltdown;• to strengthen capital and liquidity requirements to make the system more• to strengthen capital and liquidity requirements to make the system more
stable;• to ensure no large firm could take down the entire economy if it failed. g y
President Obama has added two additional reforms:• “Volcker Rule:” banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsorVolcker Rule: banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor
hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated to serving their customers. P t th f th lid ti f th U S fi i l t• Prevent the further consolidation of the U.S. financial system.
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu17
Regulatory reform, some thoughts ….
Global coordination and cooperation must remove the ability to perform regulatory arbitrage.
Any reform needs to ensure that: Fi i l i tit ti ll it li d• Financial institutions are well capitalized
• Financial institutions maintain adequate liquidity levels• Financial institutions have adequate risk management• Financial institutions have adequate risk management
procedures• Financial institutions exercise good corporate governanceFinancial institutions exercise good corporate governance• Provide increased transparency• Address procyclicality that is inherent in the financial systems p y y y
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu18
© 2010 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu19