the new science of virtues · 2016-08-23 · notions from homer, homer has been read as if he had...

OriginalPaperUDC179.9:[1:94]Vico,G.ReceivedFebruary17th,2015

Romana BassiUniversityofPadua,DepartmentofPhilosophy,Sociology,Pedagogy,andAppliedPsychology,

PiazzaCapitaniato3,I–[email protected]

The New Science of Virtues

AbstractAlthough Vico’s NewScience (NS) has been interpreted from the standpoint of practical philosophy, his treatment of moral virtues has largely been overlooked. I show the pivotal role they play in the NS, where the history of humankind is the story of how vices and virtues unfold, and the domain of free will is centred on the possibility of making virtues of the pas-sions. This sheds new light on such notions as the “heterogony of ends”, the relationship between “bestioni” and humankind, and the threat of the “barbarism of reflection”. Also, it allows us to focus on fictional, mythological, and historical figures, which are exemplary for their virtues/vices and which provide an insight into the way virtues shape the stages of history. After presenting an overview of some of Vico’s sources, I argue that he engages in a close dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition and interprets moral virtues as a histori-cal framework and a hermeneutical tool suitable for assessing the moral stages of human historical evolution on the route to and from civilisation.

KeywordsGiambattistaVico,New Science,moralvirtues,vices,passions,Aristoteliantradition,his-tory,humankind

1. “Making virtues of passions”

Inthispaper,1IfocusonVico’saccountofthevirtuesinordertoshowthatitispossibletoconsidertheNew Science2fromthepointofviewofatheoryofthevirtues,thatis,agenealogyofvirtuesandanaccountofevolutionaryvirtueethics.WhenVicopresentsthe“Principalaspectsofthisscience”,inthebeginningofthesecondbook,amongthedifferentperspectiveswhich,ac-

1

This research was financed by the ItalianPRINgrant“Ethicsandthemind/bodyprob-lem”(2012)andbytheUniversityofPaduaresearchgrant“Humansandbeyond”(2013).I amgrateful to FrancoBiasutti, JillKraye,andFabrizioLomonacoforreadinganddis-cussingapreliminaryversionofthispaper.

2

Ingeneral,allquotations refer toNS44and,whentheyreferinsteadtoNS25,thisisclear-lystated;inbothcasespassagesareindicatedbythenumberofparagraph.NS44isquotedintheBergin-Fischtranslation:G.Vico,The New Science, unabridged translation of thethirdedition(1744),withtheadditionofthe“PracticoftheNewScience”,transl.byT.G.

Bergin andM.H. Fisch, CornellUniversityPress, Ithaca – London 1984. Occasionally,toprovideanother translationofparticularlythornypassages,theMarshtranslationisused:G.Vico,New Science,thirdedition,transl.byD.Marsh,withanintroductionbyA.Grafton,Penguin,London1999.NS25isquotedinthePompatranslation:G.Vico,The First New Sci-ence,ed.andtransl.byL.Pompa,CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge 2002.NS30 isreferedtobypagenumberfromtheCristofo-liniedition:G.Vico,La Scienza nuova 1730,ed.P.Cristofolini,ass.ed.M.Sanna,AlfredoGuida,Napoli2004.ReferencestotheItalianoriginaltermsusedbyVicoareprovidedfromtheBattistiniedition:G.Vico,Opere,ed.A.Battistini,2vols.,Mondadori,Milano1990.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA60(2/2015)pp.(189–202)

R.Bassi,TheNewScienceofVirtues190

cordingtohim,can(andshould)beappliedtotheinterpretationofhiswork,hecouldwellhaveaddedthattheNS offersahistoricallydevelopedinterpre-tationoftheAristoteliantheoryofvirtues.IdonotnecessarilymeanthatthisisthewayVicowantedhistexttoberead,asthetheoryofvirtuewouldhaveseemedverymuchaplatitudetohim.Instead,Iwishtoshowthatsomeoftheconceptual,aswellaslexical,choicesmadebyVicocanbebetterunderstoodifwebearinmindthewidelydebatedtraditionofmoralvirtues.Dealingwiththe“secondprincipalaspectofthisscience”,whichisa“phi-losophyofauthority”,hemakesitclearthat:“thepropertyofhumannaturewhichnotevenGodcantakefrommanwithoutdestroyinghim(…)isthefreeuseofthewill”(§388–389).ThisisconnectedtoAxiomVIII:that“manhasfreechoice(libero arbitrio),howeverweak,tomakevirtuesofhispas-sions”(§136).Howthishistoricaltransformationandcivilevolutionofthepassionsintovirtuesisachieved,andinwhatwaysitbringsaboutthewholecourse of history, is the object of the readingwhich I propose. From thisstandpoint,makingthevirtuesthefocusofourattentionisrelevanttodevel-opinganewinsightintoVico’sworkandtoseeinghowhedealswiththelongphilosophicaltraditionofmoralvirtuesandAristotelianethics.Itmightalsohelptocounteractawidespreadhistoriographical(mis)judgementtypicaloftheanalyticalhistoryofethics:theviewthatphilosophicalreflectionaboutvirtuesandvirtueethicsmovesfromAristotleandThomasAquinastoHume,placingeverythinginbetweenintoablackholeofirrelevance.3

Apreliminaryobjectionneedstobeconfronted:isa“Vichianaccountofthevirtues”tobefoundintheNS afterall?Vicodoesnotdevoteaspecificsectiontoatreatmentofthevirtues,andonewouldbehardputtotrackdownasystem-aticapproachtothevirtuesinhisworks.Instead,heprovidesmultiplecluestodifferentaccountsofthevirtuesthroughouthisworkanddrawsoncomplex,intertwined,andmulti-facetedphilosophicaltraditionswhich,however,seemtohavegenerallyescapedtheattentionofscholars.Althoughagooddealhasbeenwrittenabouthistreatmentofprudenceorofhisheroesandtheirheroicvirtue,nocomprehensiveanalysisofmoralvirtuesintheNSseemsasyettohavebeenattempted.This isnot theplace to investigateanyspecificvirtueatlength;instead,IaimtofocusonthewaydifferentphilosophicaltraditionsaboutmoralvirtuescropupinVico’swork.Apreliminaryaccountofsomeofthesevariousinfluences,basedonafewpassagesintheNS,willguideusthroughVico’streatmentofthenotionofvirtue.Thisnotionshouldnotonlytakeintoaccountreferencestothevirtuesandtotheirdefinitions,butshouldalsostriveforabroaderoutlook,inwhichtheircorrelatedvicesareconsidered.Therearemanyreasonsforthis:1.Vicooftenjuxtaposesvirtueswithvicesandbasestheirtheoreticalpolarityonhistoricalconsiderations;2.indoingso,heseemstobeinfluenced,atleasttosomeextent,bytheAristoteliantraditionwithregardtothedefinitionsofvirtuesandvices;3.however,theconnectionwhichVicohighlightsbetweenviceandvirtueisnotjustanoppositionorpolarizationinlinewiththeAristoteliantradition.Healsoconnectsvirtuestovices;andinmanyinstancestheirinterconnectionsarespreadalongthecontinuouscurveofidealeternalhistory,asvirtuesandvicesevolveandresolveintooneanother,withtheheterogonyofendsplayingakeyroleinthispassage.

2. At the root of virtues: Homer and Achilles

ItcomesasnosurprisethatinhisresearchVicodoesnotstartdirectlyfromthephilosopherwhowenowadaysconsiderthefatherofvirtueethics,Aris-



totle.AndthisisnotbecauseheexplicitlystatesinhisAutobiographythatheprefersPlatotoAristotle–ajudgementwhichshouldbeputunderclosescru-tinyandcalledintoquestion,oratleasttreatedwithsomecaution.4Rather,inthisinstance,Aristotle’smoralphilosophycannotprovidethepointofdepar-tureforatheoryofvirtuesbecauseinVico’sviewherepresentsamaturestageofphilosophicalreflection,whichhereferstoasastageof“fullydevelopedhuman reason” (§326,924).For thevery same reason,Plato’saccountofvirtuesalsocannothelpVico,whoislookingfortheoriginsofhumanmoralvirtue.Therefore,movingalongaregressivepathinordertofindtherootofthevirtues,Vicoreachesanarchaicpoet,ratherthanaphilosopher–Homer,ratherthanPlato.ApassagefromNS25explainsthereasonsunderlyingthischoiceanditsim-plications,bothphilologicalandphilosophical:“whilstPlatowastakinghisnotionsfromHomer,HomerhasbeenreadasifhehadbeenaphilosopherlikePlato”.5VicoopenlycriticisessuchanunhistoricalinterpretationofHomer’spoems;buthismainreasonforaddressingthisissueistoprovideacompari-sonbetweenthephilosophers’notionofheroicvirtueandthepoets’notionoftheheroandhisvirtue.Thispassage,withitshapax legomenon(omerizzò),lacksacorrelativeinthelaterversionsofNS;6Vico’s“DiscoveryofthetrueHomer”isyettocome,sothiscanonlybeseenasahintatthephilologicalissueswhichwillfindamorecomprehensivesolutionthere;7andyetthispas-sageshowsthedistance,aswellastheconnection,betweentheheroofthepoetsandtheheroofthephilosophers.Thedifferencebetween themis thenotionofvirtuewhich theyembodied.Thepoetsattributedvirtuetothesupposedlydivinenatureofthehero,acon-ceptwhichwaslaterreinforcedbymetaphysics:

“theheroofthepoetswasbelievedtobeofdivineoriginbecausehehadbeenbornunderJupi-ter’sspells,andthisishowthepoets’hero,bymeditationandphilosophicalexplanationbecamethephilosophers’hero:thathewastheonewho,bymeditatingontheeternaltruthstaughtbymetaphysics,heactuallycouldbecomeofadivinenature,andbecauseofthat,henaturallyactedmovedbyvirtues”(NS25,§301).

Itseemsherethat,properlyspeaking,moralvirtuesareonlytobefoundatalaterstageinhistory,aswellasinhistoryofphilosophy;andyettheHo-

3

See, for instance,S.M.Gardinered.,Virtue Ethics, Old and New, Cornell UniversityPress,Ithaca–London2005,p.1.

4

Thereislittledoubt,forinstance,thatVico’sdivisionofmoral,economicandcivilvirtuesis modelled on the RenaissanceAristoteliantradition ofmoral philosophy,which distin-guished between ethics, oeconomics andpolitics, see J. Kraye, “Moral philosophy”,in:gen.ed.C.B.Schmitt,eds.Q.Skinner,E.Kessler,ass.ed.J.Kraye,Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy,CambridgeUni-versityPress,Cambridge1988,pp.303–386,inparticularatpp.303–305.Generallyspeak-ing,andfromaquantitativeperspective,com-paredtoNS25,NS44containsalargernumberofreferencestobothPlatoandAristotle,butwhile the number of references to Plato in-

creasesonlymoderately,therearemorethanfivetimesasmanytoAristotle.

5

NS25,§302(“ondePlatoneomerizzò,Omerofucredutoplatonizzare”).

6

For a synoptic analysis of the different ver-sionsofNSbookIIIaboutHomerinthe1730andinthe1744editionsee,G.Vico,La dis-coverta del vero Omero,seguitadalGiudizio sopra Dante, ed. P. Cristofolini, ETS, Pisa2006.

7

ThecriticismaimedatthenotionofHomerasaphilosopheranticipatestheVichiansolutionof theHomericquestion, seeP.Cristofolini,“Prefazione”, in G.Vico,La discoverta del vero Omero,pp.5–19.



meric legacy8 is the point of departure, sincePlato drewhis notions fromHomer,andVicowaslookingforthenatureofthingsbytracingthembacktotheirorigins.9Thisexplainswhyheinvestigateswhatsortofvirtuecanbeattributedtotheheroofthepoets,asthatmustbethesourceofaprimeval,fundamentalvirtue.ThisUr-Tugend,firstappearingasatraitbelongingtotheheroesinHomer’sIliad,wasthebasic(andevenbase)elementofanasyetunrecognized,andbarelyrecognizable,morallife.ThattheHomericpoemsprovidethefirstaccountofethicsandcanbecon-sideredtheoriginalsourceofthecustomsandvirtueswhichhaveshapedtheWesterntraditionwasobvioustoVico;and,remarkably,“recentdecadeshaveseenagreatdealoffascinatingandsuggestivescholarlyworkontheethicsoftheHomericpoems”.10AlthoughtheeducationalvalueofHomer’spoemswaswidelyrecognizedbyancientauthors,11nowadaysthisviewislesscom-mon;andinThe Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics,whichopenswithanintroductorychapterdevotedto“HomericEthics”,RogerCrispfeelstheneedtojustifythissubject.12CrispdoesnotrefertoVico,who,nevertheless,seemstostrikeabalancebetweenadevelopmental,progressivistview,asputforwardbyBrunoSnell,whichconsiderstheHomericpoemsasportrayinga ‘primitive’ account ofmorality, and a regressivist account, as developedbyBernardWilliams.Thelatterperspectivewillbecomeclearin§7below,whilehereIwillconsidertheformer.WhenconsideringVico’sprogressiveviewinrelationtothemoralvirtues,weareboundtonoticethatinprovidinghisaccountofagenealogyofvirtues,VicofirstofallgoesbacktoHomer’spoems;andwhathefindsthereisin-deedsofarfromthephilosophicalandethicalnotionofvirtuethatitsupportshisbeliefthatitisatrustworthyandtruthfulexpositionofthetypicalchar-acteristicsoftheheroicnature.Thesearedescribedas“crude,course,wild,savage,volatile,unreasonableorunreasonablyobstinate,frivolous,andfool-ish”.13PreviouslyhehadremarkedthattheIliadisfilledwith“bloodybat-tles,somanyandsuchextravagantlycruelkindsofbutchery”,andthatmostcomparisonsaredrawn“frombeastsandothersavage things”andcoupledwitha“truculentandsavagestyle”(§785).The“blindrage(cieca collera)”,the“bestialwrath (collera bestiale)”and the“godsandheroesof such in-stability”(§786)farexceed(orrather:precede)anytraceofhumanityandcivility,sothatthewisdomofphilosopherscouldnothaveimaginedthem.IfweconsidertheAristotelianaccountofvirtuesandvicesinthe Nicomachean Ethics, it appears that inHomerwe are confrontedwith somethingwhichmorecloselyresemblesalistofvicesthanacatalogueofvirtues:irascibility,rashness,meanness,rusticity,conceit,andvulgarity,asopposedtogoodtem-per,self-restraint,truthfulness,urbanity,liberality,andgreatnessofsoul.Aristotlehadwrittenthat“theconceitedsort(…)arefoolish,andignorantofthemselves”,14andVicoexpands thisnotion: theyarefoolishbecause theycameearlyinhistoricaldevelopmentandthereforetheirimmaturityresem-blesthatofsmallchildren(aconceptmadesufficientlyclearbyFrancisBa-con15).Inaway,itlookslikethetransformationofpassionsandvicesintovirtuesmight justbeamatterofopus temporis.AndifwecompareVico’slonglistsofthevicesofthefirstmenwiththetheoryofvirtuesandvicesinAristotelianethics,manycorrespondencesbecomeevident,makingtheIliadlooklikeacompletecatalogueofmoralvices:haughtiness,presumption,hos-tility, pettiness, naivety, insensitivity, hardness of heart are all to be foundthere.AchillesisthearchetypalexampleofthetraitsoftheHomerichero,andVicopresentshimas



“…forgettingthesacredlawsofhospitality,unmindfulofthesimplefaithinwhichPriamhascomeallalonetohim(…)unmovedbythemanygreatmisfortunesofsuchakingorbypityforsuchafatherorbythevenerationduetosooldaman,heedlessofthecommonlot(fortuna comune)whichavailsmorethananythingelsetoarousecompassion”.16

SowhatsortofvirtuedoesAchillespossess?Itseemslegitimatetodoubtthatitcanberegardedasavirtueatall,Vicoargues.And yet, he provides an interpretation ofAchilles’ qualities which reliesheavilyontheepithet“blameless”:“ThisistheherothatHomersingsoftotheGreekpeoplesasanexampleofheroicvirtueandtowhomhegivesthefixedepithet‘blameless’(irreprensibile)!”.17Thisepithet(amumon)deservescloserattention:Nicolini18remarksthatVicohereistransferringtothemoral

8

SeeK.Mueller-Vollmer,“VomwahrenHomerundvomhistorischenAbstand.GedankenzuVicoswilderHermeneutik”,in:K.K.Polheimed., Sinn und Symbol,PeterLang,Bern1987,pp.45–64;A.Grafton,“Introduction”,in:G.Vico,New Science, pp.XI–XXXIII;L.Fer-reri,La questione omerica dal Cinquecento al Settecento,EdizionidiStoriaeLetteratura,Rome2007.

9

See the famousAxiomXIV:“Thenatureofinstitutions is nothing but their coming intobeing (nascimento) at certain times and incertainguises”(NS44,§147);“Thenatureofaninstitutionisidenticalwithitsnascenceatacertaintimeandinacertainmanner”(trans.Marsh).

10

R.Crisp,“HomericEthics”, inR.Crisped.,The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eth-ics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013,pp. 1–20, here p. 17. See also D. Cairns,Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Hon-our and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature,ClarendonPress,Oxford 1993;T.H. Irwin,Classical Thought,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford1989;A.A.Long,“MoralsandVal-uesinHomer”,Journal of Hellenic Studies90(1970),pp.121–139;A.MacIntyre,A Short History of Ethics, Macmillan, New York1966;R.Sharples,“’ButWhyHasMySpiritSpokenwithMeThus?’:HomericDecision-Making”,Greece and Rome 30 (1983), pp.1–7;B.Williams, Shame and Necessity,Uni-versity of California Press, Berkeley 20082(1993); N. Yamagata, Homeric Morality,Brill,Leiden1994.

11

R.Crisp,“HomericEthics”, “thepoemswereaneducationalstaple”(p.1):see,forinstance,Plutarch’sLife of Alexander,8.

12

R. Crisp, “Homeric Ethics”, pp. 1–2: “Theother chapters in this Handbook mostlyconcern philosophers, their views, and theirworks. So why begin with a chapter on acouple of poems?One reason is the central

importance of the poems in the history ofphilosophy, and hence of philosophical eth-ics”. Among the other reasons given here,theproblemsofinterpretationandtranslationplayacentral role.They raise“issuesaboutthenatureofmorality itself, thehuman selfand agency, responsibility, shame and othermoralemotions,andthenatureof thevirtuein general, and of particular virtues such ascourageandcompassion”(p.2).Crispurgesthat“itisvital,then,inseekingtoanswerthequestionsraisedinphilosophicalethicsnottorestrict one’s reading to works traditionallycategorizedas‘philosophical’(…)thereisinHomeraviewofthenatureofhumanbeingsandtheirplaceintheworld,andtheirreasonsforlivingandactinginthatworld”(ibid.).

13

NS44,§787(“rozzi,villani,feroci,fieri,mo-bili, irragionevoli o irragionevolmente osti-nati,leggierieschiocchi”).

14

Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics,1125a27.

15

See,forinstance,F.Bacon,Cogitata et visa,13.

16

§786.SeeCicero,Pro Quinctio,97forapas-sagedealingwithcompassion(misericordia)andbearingacloseaffinitytothispassageofVico,bothincontentandinstructure.

17

§ 667 (“Omero con l’aggiunto perpetuod’irreprensibilecantaa’grecipopoliinesem-plo d’eroica virtù”). Both Bergin-Fisch andMarsh translate “blameless”; Pompa recursto “irreproachable” (NS25, § 52), however“blameless”hasbeenforalongtimethecus-tomarytranslationinthe Iliad.

18

F.Nicolini,Commento storico alla seconda scienza nuova,EdizionidiStoriaeLettertura,Roma1949–1950,IIvol.,p.296:theepithet“hints only at the position held by birth, atphysical beauty and heroic courage, not atmoralqualities,asVicoseemstobelieve”.



fieldfeaturesoriginallyintendedbyHomertoindicatesuchexterioraspectsas“beingproperlyclad”.Vicohimselfcomesupwithhisownexplanationastowhattheepithetmeans.Beforediscussingthis,however,itisworthnotingthathistranslationoftheepithetasirreprensibilehelpsustoidentifythever-sionofHomer’sIliadwhichVicowasreading.19AsurveyofthetranslationsavailableinNaplesduringhislifetime,limitedtotheBibliotecaBrancaccia-na’sholdingsasrecordedinthecatalogueprintedin1750,20showsthattheeditionoftheIliadtowhichVicoreferredwasalmostcertainlytheannotatededition21byHubertvanGiffen,printedinStrasbourgin1572,containingtheGreektext(1566)byHenriEstienneandtheLatintranslation(1559)byJeanCrespin.Thisappears tobe theonlyone touse, twice, irreprehensibilisastheepithetforAchilles.22Thishypothesiswillneedfurtherinvestigation,ofcourse,asViconodoubtconsultedmorethanoneIliad translation;however,thiseditionlooksliketheversionhemighthaveusedforreference.23

TheattempttosolvetheriddleofwhyAchillesisdescribedas“blameless”hasalonghistory,withmanyscholarsofferingtentativeexplanations,24rang-ingfromtheornamentaltotheformulaic(andthereforeunrelatedtothecon-text)totheirrational25useofepithetsbyHomer.Inabookentirelydevotedtoinvestigatingthisspecificepithet,AnneAmoryParryanalysedits116oc-currencesinbothHomericpoems,consideringtheircontextaswellaswhomtheydesignated.Whilesheconcludesthattranslatingitas“blameless”doesnotmakesense inanyof theseoccurrences,sheneverthelessdemonstratesthattheepithet“…denotesprimarilythekindofbeautypossessedbyayoung,strong,andactiveman,itmightbyaneasyextensioncometomean‘likeawarrior’inrespecttoanyqualitywhichwasalliedwithordependentonastrong,handsomebody.Amumonthereforemaypossesstheconnotationsof‘brave’,‘spirited’,‘steadfastinbattle’andsoon(…)ifEnglishhadanadjectivethatmeant‘possessingthestrong,handsomebodyofawarrior’thatadjectivecouldbeusedsatisfactorilyinthemajorityofthepassages”.26

Unsurprisingly,Vico’sexplanationofthisepithetdiffersfromAmory’s;butbothshareasimilarsenseoftheinappropriatenessofthetranslation‘blame-less’,aswellasanawarenessthattheinterpretationofthisepithetisthekeytobridgingthegapbetweenHomer’sarchaiccultureandourowncivilization.ThedifficultyofmakingsenseofthisepithetandofitstranslationhadbeenapparenttoVicosinceNS25(§52),wherehedidnotprovideaconvincingexplanation.Achilles’ exemplary role in the Iliad as a hero endowedwithheroicvirtuepuzzledVico,sincehecouldnothelpnoticingthatAchillescon-nectedhisnotionofwhatwasrighttohisownstrengthandfailedtorecognizeanydivineauthorityorsuperiorityinApollo,justasanyPolyphemuswoulddo,exceptthatnoonewouldconsiderhimamodelofheroicvirtue.InNS30Vico’sironicalattitudeissignalledbyhisuseofanexclamationmark;27andCristofolini’seditionshowsinitscriticalapparatusthewealthofannotationandmarginaliacrowdingaroundthispassage28between1730and1744.OnlyinNS44didVicoproducehisownexplanation inanewlywrittenpassageinterpolatedintheprevioustextofNS30.HereVicoassumesthat“blameless”(irreprensibile) serves the purpose of indicating thatAchilleswas a proudman:“Thisepithet(…)canbeunderstoodonlyasmeaningamansoarrogant(un uomo orgoglioso)that,aswewouldsaynowadays,hewillnotletaflypasstheendofhisnose.Whathe<Homer>preachesisthusthevirtueofpunctiliousness,onwhichtheduelistsofthereturnedbarbariantimesbasedtheirentiremorality,andwhichgaverisetotheproudlaws(leggi superbe),theloftyduties(ufizj altieri)andthevindictivesatisfactionsoftheknighterrantofwhomtheromancerssing”.29



WhileBerginandFischtranslateorgogliosoas“arrogant”,theItalianhasthelessobviouslynegativeconnotationof“proud”;andthetwinnotionsofor-goglioandsuperbiaprovefundamentalinVico’sattempttouncovertherootofheroicvirtue.Thisoriginal,notyetmoralvirtueofpride–almostinsteadavice–isoftenpairedwithanother:fierceness(fierezza).30ForVicothiswordimpliescrueltyandviolence;anditseemslikelythathechosefierezzabecauseitsroothigh-lightsalinktofieraandthereforetotheprimevalbestioniwhocannotcontroltheirrage.ThisisnotavirtueasAristotlewouldhaveimaginedit;and,yet,

19

This problem has also been addressed byAndreaBattistini in his commentary,wherehegoes as far as excluding thatVicomighthave hadA.M. Salvini’s translation (1723)inmind.

20

See Bibliothecae S. Angeli ad Nidum ab inclyta Brancatiorum familia constructae, et ab aliis deinceps auctae catalogus. In quo singuli singularium Artium, et Scientiarum Libri, qui in quavis fere lingua exstant, Auc-torumque cognomina ordine alphabetico re-censentur,Abbatem&Raymundum,Naples1750, pp. 154–155. One of the main toolsformakingamorethoroughsurveywasnotavailabletome:consultationofValletta’sli-brarycatalogueiscurrentlysuspended.Forageneraloverviewoftheproblems,aswellastoolsneededtoassessVico’s‘library’,seeR.Bassi, “Introduzione”, in: eadem,Canoni di mitologia: materiali per lo studio delle fonti vichiane, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,Rome 2005, pp. 11–26. For an annotatedcatalogueof the editions and translationsoftheHomericpoemsuptoVico’stime,seeM.Cesarotti,“CatalogodelleprincipaliedizionieversionidiOmero”,in:idem,Versione let-terale dell’Iliade, Molini e Landi, Florence1809,pp.1–33.

21

Homer,Iliasseu potius omnia eius quae ex-tant opera, studio et cura Ob. Giphanii I. C. quam emendatissime edita, cum ejusdem Scholijs et Indicibus novis, excudebat T. Rihe-lius,Argentorati[1572].Thisoctavoedition,althoughjudgedtobeinaccuratebothintextand in translation by Isaac Casaubon, waswidespreadthroughoutEuropeandwascon-sideredexemplaryforalongtime.ItwasalsopresentinSpinoza’slibrary:theonlyworkbyHomer which he possessed; see Catalogus van de Bóekerij, Vereeniging “HetSpinoza-huis”,DenHaag[1914],n.117[38],p.28.

22

SeeHomer,Ilias,[1572],2,674,770(pp.93,97).Inallotheroccurrences,however,adif-ferentchoiceoftranslationsispresented(ex-imius, egregius, inculpatus). Other editions,for instanceHomer’s Iliad editedby JoshuaBarnesinCambridge(1711),tendtotranslate

theepithetconsistentlyas laudatissimusandeximius. See also H. Stephanus, Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, Paris 1831–1856, vol. 1parsaltera,ad vocem,pp.174–175.

23

FromNS25(§52),throughNS30 (p.253)andtoNS44(§667).

24

Vicoquotes(andmocks)J.C.Scaliger’sen-deavourtorectifythisprobleminhisPoetics,seeA.Grafton, “Introduction”, in:G.Vico,New Science, pp. XI–XXXIII, in particularaboutVico’sinterpretationofHomerandtheroleofJ.C.Scaligerseepp.XX–XXIV.

25

See S. Lowenstam, “Iris ‘Queenly’ Motherand the Problem of the Irrational Use ofHomeric Epithets”,Pacific Coast Philology(1981),pp.39–47.

26

A.AmoryParry,Blameless Aegisthus. A Study ofAmumonand other Homeric epithets,Brill,Leiden1973,p.60,seealsop.157.

27

NS30, p. 253: “Ecco l’Eroe, ch’Omero can-ta a’ Greci popoli in esemplo dell’Eroica Virtù!”.

28

SeealsothefacsimileeditionwithVico’sms.notes:G.Vico, Principi d’una scienza nuova d’intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni,ed.byF.LomonacoeF.Tessitore,withafore-wordbyM.Sanna,Liguori,Napoli2002,p.313.

29

§ 667, the Bergin-Fisch translation shifts,while keeping, Vico’s emphasis on the no-tionofpride,whichprovespivotal,whilethisnotionisobliteratedinMarshtranslation:“amansoarrogant(…)thehaughtylaws,pomp-ousceremonies”.

30

See§1097(“tuttistupore,quantoeranotuttiorgoglio, e fierezza”, andalso: “i primi sel-vaggi orgogliosi, fierissimi”, “posta la loroorgogliosaeviolentanatura”).



howfarcanthisprideandfiercenessgotowardsdevelopingvirtueslikeAr-istotelianmagnanimity,courageandrighteousindignation?Vicosearchesforpassions/viceswhichflowintovirtues,sowhenlookingintoHomer’sIliadforAchilles’ characteristics and heroic virtue, he tries to trace the not yetmoralrootoftheAristotelianvirtueofmagnanimitybyfollowingthefil rougeofthepassionofanger.31

3. The four cardinal virtues in Hercules: the Platonic-Christian tradition

Theaccountofvirtues(or,moreappropriately,vices)basedontheHomericpoemsandthefigureofAchillesisveryfarfromaccountsofthefirstvirtuespresentedinotherpassagesoftheNS,centeredastheseareonthefigureofHercules.Thisdemigodhighlightsadifferentsetofvirtues,belongingtoadifferentstageofhistory,possiblyonepreceedingthestagewehavejustcon-sidered,althoughadmittedlytheirrelationshipisnotalwaysclear:“thefathersofthefirstgenteswerethefirststrongmenofhistory.HencethefoundersofthefirstgentilenationsabovementionedweretheHerculeses(…)thusthefirstfathersofthegen-tilenations–whowere(1)justinvirtueofthesupposedpietyofobservingtheauspiceswhichtheybelieveddivinecommandsofJove(fromwhoseLatinnameIouscame(…)sothatjusticeamongallpeoplesisnaturallythoughtalongwithpiety);(2)prudentinsacrificingtoobtainorclearlytounderstandtheauspices,andthustotakegoodcounselofwhat,bythecommandsofJove,theyshouldundertakeinlife;and(3)temperateintheinstitutionofmatrimony–werealso,asishereindicated,(4)strongmen.Hencenewprinciplesaregiventomoralphilosophy(…)bytheseprinciplesallthevirtueshavetheirrootsinpietyandreligion,bywhichalonethevirtuesaremadeeffectiveinaction,andbyreasonofwhichmenproposetothemselvesasgoodwhateverGodwills.”(§14)

This long, rambling passage needs to be stripped of itsmany subordinateclauses,sothatwecanappreciatethatVicohereisolatesasetofvirtuesandtiesthemstronglytoreligion.ItiseasytoseeinthisinstancetheinfluenceofthefourcardinalvirtuesoftheChristiantradition(fortitude,justice,prudenceandtemperance),which,thoughmediatedbytheStoictradition,originatedinPlato’sRepublic(427e–434a;441c–444a),wherethevirtuesofthepolisarediscussed.Placedat theverybeginningofNS44 in theopeningsectionentitled“Ideaofthework”,thispassageisthefirstaccountofthevirtuesthereadercomesacross,anditsoundslikeanexplicitdeclarationoffaithandChristianortho-doxy32.ThisisoneoftheveryfewpassageswherethePlatonictraditionispresentedinapureform.Moreoften,spuriouselementsareintermixed,asweseeinanotherhighlyrelevantsection,the“conclusionofthework”:“Theydevelopedcommonwealthsonthebasisofordersnaturallysuperiorbyreasonofvirtuescertainlyheroic.First,piety,fortheyadoreddivinity,(…)andinvirtueoftheirpietytheywerealsoendowedwithprudence,takingcounselfromtheauspicesofthegods;withtemperance,eachcouplingchastelywiththeonewomanwhomhehadtakenunderthedivineauspicesasperpetualcompanionforlife;withstrengthforslayingbeastsandtamingtheearth;andwithmagnanimityingivingsuccourtotheweakandaidtothoseindanger.SuchwasthenatureoftheHerculean commonwealths, inwhich the pious,wise, chaste, strong, andmagnanimouscastdowntheproudanddefendedtheweak,whichisthemarkofexcellenceincivilgovern-ments”.33

HeretheAristotelianvirtueofmagnanimityisinsertedintothefourpillarsofthePlatonicsystemofvirtues;andjustice,ifitistobefound,comesunderthecategoryofmagnanimity,whichisdefinedas“castingdowntheproudanddefendingtheweak”.



Justafewlinesabove,describingapreviousstageofcommunitylife,Vicoadoptsanevensimplertripartitedivisionofvirtueintopiety,temperanceandfortitude:“thesefathers,inthestatewemustcallofnature(whichwasidenti-calwiththestateofthefamilies),musthaveformedthefirstnaturalorders,asbeingthosewhowerepious,chasteandstrong.”(§1098).Thesevirtuesareconducivetocivil institutions:marriage(temperance);privatepropertyandcontrolof theboundariesofcultivatedareas(fortitude:“inorder todefendthemselvesand their families theyhad tokill thewildbeasts thatattackedthem”);andtheparticularformofpietywhichsuspendsnomadiclife,sothat“inordertoprovidesustenanceforthemselvesandtheirfamilies(…)theyhadtotametheearthandsowgrain”.Similarly,at§§11–13,Vicohadreferredtomarriages,burials(linkedtocontroloftheboundariesofcultivatedareas)andaltarsasostensiblesignsofvirtuessuchastemperance,pietyandjustice.

4. Aristotle and magnanimity

InAxiomLXVIIIthecourseofidealeternalhistoryisreworkedbymeansofapersonificationofthevirtues:

“Inthehumanracefirstappearthehugeandgrotesque(immani e goffi),likethecyclopes(Polif-emi);thentheproudandmagnanimous,likeAchilles;thenthevalorousandjust,likeAristidesandScipioAfricanus;nearertous,imposingfigureswithgreatsemblancesofvirtuesaccompa-niedbygreatvices (appariscenti con grand’immagini di virtù che s’accompagnano con grandi vizi),whoamongthevulgarwinanamefortrueglory,likeAlexanderandCaesar;stilllater,themelancholyandreflective(tristi riflessivi),likeTiberius;finallythedissoluteandshamelessmadmen(furiosi dissoluti e sfacciati),likeCaligula,NeroandDomitian.”(§243).

Here,Vicoadoptstherhetoricaldevicesofclimax,anticlimax,andantonoma-siainordertoexpresshisownanthropologicalview,rootedintheAristoteliantheoryofvirtue.Hereworksitsoastodeducebothaseriesofhistoricalstepsintheevolutionofmoralityandamorallexiconwhichheobviouslyfindsval-uable.TheadjectivesusedbyVicointhispassage(immani,magnanimi,val-orosi,giusti,furiosi,dissoluti,sfacciati)arerevealingofthecorrelatevirtuesandcomeloadedwithamoralreflexionthathadbeenworkingonthemforcenturies,atthetimeVicowaswriting.Suchlistsofadjectives,34whicharefoundinmanypassagesoftheNS,areonlyapparentlyrepetitive,andshouldbecarefullyconsideredastheyservethepurposeofbuildingupatheoryoftheevolutionofvirtues(andvices)throughoutthecourseofhistory.InVico’swork,theAristotleoftheRhetoricandthePoeticshasthesameau-thorityasAristotleoftheethicalworks(andattimes,apparently,evenmore).An instance of this is evidentwhenwe considerVico’s reference to greatleadersofthepastsuchasAlexandertheGreatandCaesar.Aristotleinthe

31

SeeAristotle,Rhetoric,II.2.

32

ForanaccountofhowpaganvirtueshadbeenharmonizedwithChristian idealsduring theRenaissance period, see J. Kraye, “PaganVirtue in Pursuit of Christian Happiness:Renaissance Humanists and the Revival ofClassicalEthics”,in:G.Althoffed.,Zeichen – Rituale – Werte. Internationales Kolloquium des Sonderforschungsbereichs 496 an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster,Rhema,Münster2004,pp.55–68.

33

NS44,§1099.Seealso§516and553.

34

Seealso§708(wheretheheroiccustomsarequalifiedas“boorish,crude,harsh,wild,proud,difficult,obstinate;bluff,touchy,magnanimousand generous”) and § 1101 (“gl’industriosinongl’infingardi, i parchi nongli pròdigi, iprovidi non gli scioperati, imagnanimi nongligrettidicuore”).



Poetics(13,1453a–1454b)concededthatsuchfiguresareexcellentcharactersfortragedies,whereitisnecessarytoemployheroes“thatareneitherverygoodnorverybad,butmixinggreatvicesandgreatvirtues”(§708).However,asIhavetriedtoshow,VicodoesnotrelyexclusivelyontheAristoteliantradi-tion,becauseall thewhilehekeepsthePlatoniclegacyinthebackground,withreferencetothefourcardinalvirtues,latersystematizedbyStAmbrose.AlthoughtheintertwinedtraditionsofPlatonismandAristotelianismmightseemtoformaninextricablytangledskeininVico’swork,onewayofevalu-atingtheirrespectiveinfluencemorecarefullywouldbetotakeintoconsid-erationthefactthatonlytheAristoteliantheorycanaccountforanotionofvirtuewhich is socially conditionedand susceptible tohistoricalvariation.Aristotelianvirtuesare theoutcomeofanever-changingbalance(mesotes)betweentwoextremes,andthisbalancecanonlybeidentifiedonthebasisofvariablecircumstances.Evenso,VicodoesnotseemtoadherestrictlytotheAristoteliantheoryofthevirtues,butratherdrawsonthereinterpretationsanddebateswhichhadgrownuparoundit,intheformofawealthoftrea-tisesandcompendia,eachwithitsownoutlookonthevirtues.TheparticularAristotelian traditionof thevirtueswhichmightbe atwork in theNS canthereforebeinvestigatedbyfocusingspecificallyontheNeapolitancontextandmoregenerallyontheItalianone,alonglineswhichstillneedtobemorethoroughlyexamined.35Iwilldealherewithjustafewsketchyexamples,inordertoshowthemulti-facetednatureofthistradition,aswellasthewaysitcouldhavebeendirectlyaccessedbyVico.

5. Pontano: immanitasasvice(vs.humanitasasvirtue)

Attheendofthe15thcentury,aswellasatreatiseonthevirtueofmagnanimity(De magnanimitate),GiovanniPontanowroteaworkentitledDe immanitate.36The term immanitas indicated theattitudeofsomeonewhoeitherdenies theexistenceofGodorcelebratesthedivinitybyceremoniesandsacrificeswhichlackanytraceofhumanity.37Pontano’sinterestinthisnotionisnotparticularlyoriginal,sincemostcommentariesontheAristotelianethicsinthatperiod,andevenmuchlater,38includedasectiondevotedtoit.ThisphilosophicalreflexiononimmanitasmusthavebeenknowntoVico,whoemploysthisconceptinanextremelyprecisesenseandinacarefullychosencontext;andhisuseisconsist-entwithPontano’sdefinition.Interestingly,thatdefinitionistwo-fold,adualitywhichwillbegivennewmeaningbyVico’sreinterpretation,asweshallsee.Thenotionof immanitas isat therootoftheimageofthe“beastlyman”.39Therefore,althoughitimplies“inhuman”inthesenseofcruelandcanevenmean“inhumane”,averyspecificconnotationlinksthisnotiontoalackofreli-gionortoinappropriatereligiousritual.InspiredbyahintintheNicomachean Ethics(VII,6,1148b20),whereitisopposedtotheheroicvirtue,commenta-torshaddevelopeditsscopeandimplications,usingimmanitastoshowthat,bycontrast,humanitaswasavirtue,ratherthanastatewhichcouldbetakenforgranted.Keeping inmindPontano’s treatise, therefore, itbecomesveryeasytoseewhyVicoidentifieshumanitywithpiety.HumanityisfirstofallavirtueandhadalreadybeenconsideredassuchbyCiceroandintheclassicaltradition.Asavirtue,itcouldbeinterpretedinanAristotelianframeworkasadispositionrequiringcultivationandconstantexerciseinwhatwouldbecomea“Practic”ofhumanity,basedontherecognitionofthedivinityanddemon-stratedbyappropriatecultsofveneration.Vico,however,candetectacontinu-ityandagradualprogression,which,whiledistinguishinghumanitasasvirtuefromimmanitasasvice,neverthelesslinksthemtogetherinthatoneistheroot



andoccasionfor theemergenceof theother.There isnomutualexclusion;theybothstandinakindoftension,whichconstantlyunderliesthepracticeofhumanity,understoodasavirtue.Butthispotential,on-goingthreataffectshumanity,understoodasaconditionofbeing(opposedtothatofbeasts),andmakesthestateofhumankinddependentonthevirtueofhumanity.Justasthefirstreligioussentimentisbornoutofvenerationforfalsegods,whose cult is a form of superstition, so, too, the first virtues arise from amodificationoforiginalvices.Thisiswherethe“heterogonyofends”comesin;butVicowouldnotsaythatvirtuesstemdirectlyfromvices.Instead,thosehigh-powered,originalvices,destinedtodeterminetheentirecourseofhis-tory, are called from the very beginning “virtues of the senses” (virtù per sensi),thatis,theyarenotandcannotbetheresultofreason,reflectionandphilosophy:“inconclusion,thevirtuesofthatfirsttimewerelikethose(…)admiredby theScythians,whowould fix aknife in thegroundandadoreit as agod, and thus justify their killings; that is, theywerevirtuesof thesenses,withanadmixtureofreligionandcruelty(mescolate di religione ed immanità)”(§516).Thetensionbetweenbestioniandhumankind,whichisatthebasisofNS,isshapedinsideaframeworkwhichowesmuchtotheAr-istoteliantraditionofvirtueethics:whenhumankindisconceivedintermsofanAristotelianexerciseofvirtue,centeredonagoldenmean,itfollowsthatitmustguarditselfontwofronts:immanitasassuperstition,likethatoftheScythians,ontheonehand,andimmanitasasatheism,likethatofPolybiusandBayle,ontheother.ThedoublemeaninginPontano’sdefinitionisabletoaccommodateboththesepolemicaltargetsofVico.

6. Tesauro

Theexpression“genealogyofvirtues”,usedthroughoutthispaper,isnotem-ployedbyVico,althoughitmightwellhavebeen.ItappearsinEmanueleTe-sauro(1592–1675)asthetitleofasectionofhiswork,La filosofia morale deri-vata dall’alto fonte del grande Aristotele Stagirita.Thistreatise,reprintedinVenicein1703,in1712andagainin1729,wasfirstpublishedin1670,anditsreprintstestifytothegreatinterestinitduringthefirsthalfofthe18thcentury.It isaweighty700-pagetome,generallyregardedasanunoriginalcompen-dium,whichhasnotreceivedmuchattentionfromscholarscomparedtootherworksbyTesaurosuchashisCannocchiale aristotelico.Inthefieldofrhetoric,VicohasbeenreadinlightofTesauro’sCannocchiale aristotelico,anditseemsunlikelythathewouldhaveneglectedacommentaryonAristotle’smoralphilo-sophybythesameauthor,especiallygivenitspopularityinhisowndays.InTesauro’swork,thereemergesanawarenessthatvirtuestranslateintocivil,social, and political institutions,which seems to imply a historical readingofmoralvirtues. InAxiomVII,Vicocombines thisnotionwith thatof the

35

Several years ago thiswas advocated byE.Nuzzo,Tra religione e prudenza: la “filoso-fia pratica” di Giambattista Vico,EdizionidiStoriaeLetteratura,Rome2007,p.54,n.24.

36

I. I.Pontani,De Immanitate liber,ed.byL.MontiSabia,Loffredo,Naples1970.

37

Ivi,III,pp.9–10.

38

See,forinstance,M.S.Evenius,Doctrina de moribus universa,Wittemberg 1612,Dispu-tatio XVI,De virtute heroica, TheoremaV“Extremum Heroicae Virtutis est Feritas seu Immanitas quovis vitio deterior”.

39

SeeC.Finzi,“GiovanniPontano,politicaecul-tura inNapoli aragonese”,Anales de la Fun-dación Francisco Elías de Tejada (1998),pp.161–188,wherehereferstouomo imbestiato.



heterogony of ends, drawingapictureofvices andvirtues as interconnect-ed:“Legislationconsidersmanasheisinordertoturnhimtogoodusesinhumansociety.Outofferocity,avarice,andambition,thethreeviceswhichrunthroughoutthehumanrace, itcreatesthemilitary(la milizia),merchant(la mercatanzia),andgoverningclasses (la corte),and thus thestrength (la fortezza), riches (l’opulenza), andwisdomofcommonwealths.Outof thesethreegreatvices,whichcouldcertainlydestroyallmankindonthefaceoftheearth,itmakescivilhappiness”(§132).Tesaurohadaddressedthevirtueattherootoftheinstitutionofmercatanziainhiscommentary.40Vico,however,goesbeyondthatandtreatsitasaninstancewheretheheterogonyofendshelpstoexplainhowvicesandpassionscanbeturnedintovirtues:“Thisaxiomprovesthatthereisdivineprovidenceandfurtherthatitisadivinelegislativemind.Foroutofthepassionsofmeneachbentonhisprivateadvantage,forthesakeofwhichtheywouldlivelikewildbeastsinthewilderness,ithasmadethecivilinstitutionsbywhichtheymayliveinhumansociety”(§133).

ManymoreparallelsbetweenVicoandTesaurocanbe identifiedandmeritcloseranalysis:notonlythestandardreferencetothe heroicvirtue41(anditscorrelatebestialità),butalsothediscussionofthemassivenessofpyramids,consideredasatraittypicalofbarbarismandtheoppositeofmagnificence.42Vicodevelopsthishintasaninstanceofboria dei dotti43andusesittodismissAtanasiusKircher,who had exaltedEgyptian culture as an example of thewisdomoftheancients.

7. Conclusion

Someimportantreferenceswhichmighthelpustogainabetterunderstandingofthisproblemhavebeenleftoutofthispreliminaryinvestigation:PaoloMat-tiaDoria’snotionofcivil-lifevirtues,Mandeville’sconvergenceofvicesintovirtues,Bayle’snotionofvirtuousatheism,theRenaissancelegacyofpairingvirtueandfortuna,thehintsinFrancisBaconandSpinozaata“semblanceofvirtue”,whichhasacloseaffinitytoVico’sownnotion.Forthisreason,thesecanonlybepartialconclusions.TheAristotelianframework,correlatingeveryvirtuewithadefectandanexcess,bothunderstoodasvices,seemstoshapeimportantelementsintheNS.Eventhework’sconclusion,presentingasketchofthebarbarismofreflection,seemstobeartracesofthisstructure:“Forsuchpeoples,likesomanybeasts,(…)livedlikewildbeastsinadeepsolitudeofspiritandwill(…)throughlongcenturiesofbarbarism,rustwillconsumethemisbegottensubteltiesofmaliciouswits(ingegni maliziosi)thathaveturnedthemintobeastsmademoreinhuman(fiere più immani)bythebarbarismofreflectionthatthefirstmenhadbeenmadebythebarbarismofsense.Forthelatterdisplayageneroussavagery(fierezza generosa)(…)buttheformer,withabasesavagery(fierezza vile),undersoftwordsandembraces,plotsagainstthelifeandfortuneoffriendsandintimates”(§1106).

A detailed list of the viceswhich condemnpeoples to the courses and re-coursesofhistoryintroducedthispassage,andonemightwonderhow,andwhether,theseviceswoulddifferfromthosetypicalofthefirstage,ashere,too,peopleare“slavesof theirunrestrainedpassions” (§1105).Suchpas-sions,however,aredescribedasthoseof“luxury,effeminacy,avarice,envy,prideandvanity”;andalthoughitisspecifiedthat“inpursuitofthepleasuresoftheirdissolutelife<they>werefallingbackintoallthevicescharacteristicofthemostabjectslaves”,thesevicesdifferfromthoseofthefirstagebe-causetheyarebasedonduplicityandfalsehood,causinghumansto“becomeliars,tricksters,calumniators,thieves,cowardsandpretenders”(§1105).Du-plicityappearstomarktheexcessesof“vicesofreason”(Vicomighthave



rememberedAristotle’snotionofironyasavice),asopposedtothe“vicesofsenses”,whichare,inVico’seyes,virtù per sensi,thatis,expressingtruths,evenwhenrootedinfalsebeliefs.Whileearlyhumanitytendstobemovedbyvicesrootedinanexcessofpas-sions(fierezza generosa),andthedescentintobarbarismbringsaboutbehav-ioursbasedonviceswhichhavetraitsincommonwiththefirstageofbar-barism(suchasimmanitas/fierezza),inthelaterstageofdeclininghumanity,thegeneralinclinationtendstobetowardsdefectivevices(fierezza vile)andalackofpassions,coupledwithanexcessofcalculatingdissimulation.Thean-thropologicalschemewhichplacestheageofreasonaftertheageofsenseismademorecomplex,andnotalwaysentirelyconsistent,becauseitintersectswiththeAristotelianframeworkwhichmaintainsthatthevirtueofhumanityisthemeanbetweentwodifferentsortsofvice,bothlimitingandcounteract-inghumanity,eitherbyanexcessofpassionsandsense(and,whatamountstothesamething,bydefectivereasoning),orbyanexcessofreflection(anddefectivecommonsense).TheuniversalcharacterofTiberius,describedas“melancholy reflective” (thoughVicomore appropriately refers instead tosadness,tristezza),standsataturningpointwherereflectioninexcessstartstobecomeatainted,viciouspractice,atfirstjustsubtlelyandinadvertently.WewouldsearchtheNS invainfor thehappinesswhichmotivatesAristo-telianethics;insteadwefindthishintatsadnesswhichsignalsaprecociousisolation,aself-seclusionandamindclosedtothedispositionofhumanity,understoodasthevirtueofpartakinginthecommonnatureofnations.UpontheAristotelianstructureofvicesasanexcess,ontheonehand,andadefect,on theother,withvirtuesgrounded inagoldenmean,Vicocanunfold thethreemovements of ideal eternal history.Although he is familiarwith theinvocationtotreadthevia media,44advancedbyoneofhis“fourauthors”,afterhavingwrittenandsubsequentlydiscardedhisPractic of New Science,itlookslikehecannolongerharbourthebeliefthatsuchavirtuousrouteisactuallyabletoprovideasheltereddimensionforhumankindtolivein.

Romana Bassi

Nova znanost vrlinâ

SažetakIako je Vicova Novaznanost(NZ) bila interpretirana sa stajališta praktičke filozofije, njegovo razmatranje moralnih vrlina većinom je bilo zanemareno. U radu ću ukazati na ključnu ulogu koju vrline imaju u NZ, gdje je povijest čovječanstva prikazana kao priča o tome kako se razvijaju mane i vrline, a domena slobodne volje je usmjerena na mogućnost stvaranja vrlina strasti. Ovo baca novo svjetlo na pojmove poput »heterogonije svrha«, veze između »bestionija« i čo-

40

E. Tesauro, La filosofia morale derivata dall’alto fonte del grande Aristotele Stagirita,Pezzana,Venice1729,p.163.

41

Ibid.,pp.579–586.

42

Ibid.,p.184:“Magnificafuveramentelamole di Artemisia…masesiconsiderailfine…quellacertamentenonfuveramagnificenza,mainsanaoltradecenza;chediedel’esempio,e il nome ad altre simili insanie. L’istesso

diraidellebarbare piramididell’Egitto…eprincipalmente di quella delReCleope, piùsmisurataditutte,epiùvergognosa.”

43

SeeG.Cacciatore,“Le‘borie’diVicotraeti-caefilosofiadellastoria”,Rivista di filosofia(2011),pp.363–380.

44

SeeF.Bacon,De sapientia veterum,XXVII:“Scylla,etIcarus,siveViaMedia”.



vječanstva, te prijetnje »barbarizma refleksije«. To nam također omogućuje da se fokusiramo na fiktivne, mitološke i povijesne ličnosti, koje su primjer njihovih vrlina/mana i koje nude uvid u način na koji vrline oblikuju stadije povijesti. Nakon prikaza nekih Vicovih izvora, nastojat ću pokazati da Vico vodi blizak dijalog s aristotelovskom tradicijom te interpretira moralne vrline kao historijski okvir i hermeneutičko oruđe prikladno za procjenu moralnih stadija ljudske po-vijesne evolucije na putu prema i od civilizacije.

KljučneriječiGiambattistaVico,Nova znanost,moralnevrline,mane,strasti,aristotelovskatradicija,povijest,čo-vječanstvo

Romana Bassi

Neue Wissenschaft der Tugenden

ZusammenfassungObgleich Vicos Neue Wissenschaft (NW) vom Blickwinkel der praktischen Philosophie her interpretiert wurde, wurde seine Behandlung moralischer Tugenden weitgehend übersehen. Ich verweise auf die zentrale Rolle, die Tugenden in der NW spielen, wo die Geschichte der Menschheit als Geschichte darüber dargestellt wurde, wie Laster und Tugenden sich entfalten, und die Domäne des freien Willens auf die Möglichkeit der Bildung von Tugenden der Leiden-schaften konzentriert ist. Dies bringt neues Licht in die Begriffe wie „Heterogonie der Zwecke“, Verbindung zwischen den „bestioni“ und der Menschheit sowie Drohung der „Barbarei der Reflexion“. Dies ermöglicht uns ebenso, sich auf fiktive, mythologische und historische Persön-lichkeiten zu fokussieren, die als Beispiel für deren Tugenden/Laster dienen und den Einblick in die Art und Weise bieten, wie Tugenden Geschichtsstadien formen. Nach der Schilderung ei-niger Quellen Vicos trachte ich zu zeigen, Vico führe einen engen Dialog mit der aristotelischen Tradition und interpretiere die moralischen Tugenden als einen historischen Rahmen und ein hermeneutisches Werkzeug, das sich gut eignet für die Einschätzung moralischer Stadien der menschlichen geschichtlichen Evolution auf dem Weg zur und von der Zivilisation.

SchlüsselwörterGiambattistaVico,Neue Wissenschaft,moralischeTugenden,Laster,Leidenschaften,aristotelischeTradition,Geschichte,Menschheit

Romana Bassi

La science nouvelle des vertus

RésuméBien que Lasciencenouvelle (SN) de Vico ait été interprétée du point de vue de la philosophie pratique, l’étude des valeurs morales a été largement négligée. Dans ce travail, je mets en évidence le rôle clé des valeurs dans la SN, oeuvre dans laquelle l’histoire de l’humanité est présentée comme le récit de la formation des vices et des vertus et où le domaine de la volonté libre est centré sur la possibilité de créer des vertus à partir des passions. Cela met en lumière des concepts tels que « hétérogonie des fins », le rapport entre le « bestioni » et l’humanité et les dangers du « barbarisme de la réflexion ». Cela nous permet également de nous concentrer sur les figures fictives, mythologiques, et historiques qui représentent de manière exemplaire leurs vertus/vices et qui nous offrent un aperçu sur la manière dont les vertus forment les stades de l’histoire. Après avoir présenté une vue d’ensemble de certaines des sources de Vico, je soutiens qu’il engage un dialogue étroit avec la tradition aristotélicienne. Je tente également de montrer qu’il interprète les vertus morales comme cadre historique et arme herméneutique propices à évaluer les stades moraux de l’histoire de l’évolution de l’humanité sur le chemin de la civilisa-tion, aussi bien que partant d’elle.

Mots-clésGiambattistaVico,La science nouvelle, vertusmorales, vices, passions, tradition aristotélicienne,histoire,humanité

the new science of virtues · 2016-08-23 · notions from homer, homer has been read as if he had...

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