the next american voter
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The Next American Voter. The Political Demography of American Partisanship Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, [email protected] Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, Austria [email protected]. American Political Demography. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
The Next American Voter
The Political Demography of American Partisanship
Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, [email protected]
Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, [email protected]
American Political Demography• Kevin Phillips' The Emerging
Republican Majority (1969)• Teixeira and Judis, The
Emerging Democratic Majority (2004)
• ‘Key’ segments change: Blue-collar whites, soccer moms, Latinos, young, old, ‘metro’
• Field dominated by partisans and pundits. Teixeira 2008 an improvement
• Still, need a more rigorous demographic approach that accounts for all trends
American Macropartisanship• Party Identification vs. Voting• How Stable is Party Identification?
Partisanship, GSS and NES Compared, Major Parties Only, 1972-2004
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
Dem-GSS
Dem-NES
Rep-GSS
Rep-NES
Theories of Macropartisanship
• Green et al. 1998, 2002 – party identification becomes part of self-identity. Affective, durable, resists vicissitudes
• Fiorina 1991; Erikson, Mackuen et al. 1998; Achen 2002 – unstable‚ running tally
• Moving equilibrium: Meffert, Norpoth et al. 2001
• Our method compatible with either stable or moving equilibrium theories
Why Demography?
• Demography the most predictable of the social sciences. Electorate of 2026 is alive today
• Plea from APSA presidents and foreign policy community to incorporate demography
• Not futurology: multivariate models posit a universal predictive model y=f(x1, x2...).
• But what happens between now and equilibrium?: Demographic models can predict at a point in time by accounting for current composition, age structure, fertility, migration
Fixed, Base Parameters
• Largely drawn from GSS 2000-6• Two-Party Population at start year, by sex, 5-
yr bands. Independents held to 15 pc, excluded.
• Partisanship transmitted from parents to children. Neither mother, father, Democrat or Republican advantaged in transmission
Parameters Which Could Change
• Unlike base population, these could change, so we need to develop an expected scenario and alternatives
• Net immigration by party id (by age, sex)• Children per woman by party id • Mortality assumed the same
Immigration • 1.2m per year (many regularized illegals)• Immigrant partisanship = ‘Other Race’ party id• Flow reduced to 863k due to 28 pc of ‘other
race’ with no party idPartisanship, All Americans,
2000-2006 Period (GSS)
Democrats 44%
Republicans 37%
Others 19%
Partisanship, 'Other' Race, 2000-2006 Period (GSS)
Democrats 51%
Republicans 21%
Others 28%
Fertility: A Shift to the Republicans• 1972-84, Democratic Advantage: 2.85 to 2.59
among 40-59 women• 2001-6 Even: 2.39 Democrat v 2.38 Republican
for 40-59 women• 2001-6 Republican Edge Among women over 17:
4 %• Why?: Lower-status v. Upper-status whites,
second demographic transition. • Possible Scenario: growing Republican
advantage: (1.8 v. 1.4 in 2043)
Location of states with respect to the total fertility rate (TFR) in 2002 and the index of fertility
postponement in 2002: non-Hispanic white women
Source: Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2005
Which Will Win?: Fertility vs. Immigration
• ‘Liberals have a big baby problem: They're not having enough of them, they haven't for a long time, and their pool of potential new voters is suffering as a result'. (Brooks 2006)
• 'In Seattle,' adds Longman, 'there are nearly 45% more dogs than children. In Salt Lake City, there are nearly 19% more kids than dogs.' (Longman 2006)
How Important is Demography?• Korey and Lascher (2006): doubling of non-white
electorate during 1990-2001 in California, but only 3-point shift to Democrats
• Here we find just 2.4-point shift to Democrats despite growth of minorities from 30 to 50 percent of the total
• Partly because younger minority voters less Democratic than elders (an assimilation/upward mobility effect)
• Age structure has locked in growing diversity, but stable partisanship
Conclusion• Partisanship stable, no dramatic shift to Democrats.
Much less change in partisan composition than racial composition
• Still, we expect 2.4-point shift to Democrats between 2003 and 2043. Most of this is due to immigration
• Reduced immigration will affect this projection• Not enough of a shift to lead to a natural party of
government• Republicans could gain from growing fertility
advantage, but only after 2050
The Next American Voter
The Political Demography of American Partisanship
Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, [email protected]
Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, [email protected]
Partisanship and the Vote
• Consistently a leading, if not the leading predictor• Lag effect: previous immigrants naturalize and
their children are more partisan, so immigration matters more; new immigrants (whom we assume become partisans) vote at lower rates, so immigration matters less
• I.e. Nevada: Hispanics are 20 percent of population but just 10 percent of voters.
• Why?: Citizenship, Registration, Participation
Partisan Age Structure 2003 (GSS 2000-2006)
•Democrats more female, but only slightly younger
Partisan Age Structures in 2043 (Expected)