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Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
"The Nexus between Securitization of the EU’s External
Borders and Human Rights of Migrants”
By
Julija VITANOVA
Martikel-Nr. 2732682
A Master Thesis presented to the Centre for European Integration Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master of European Studies
Programme to achieve the degree of a Master of European Studies
Bonn, 10th of September 2015
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Stephen CALLEYA
DEDICATED TO
MY FATHER, PAVLE VITANOV,
FOR HAVING ME TAUGHT, THAT SKY IS NOT THE LIMIT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my Master Thesis’ Supervisor,
Prof. Dr. Stephen Calleya, for supporting my research, allowing me to grow as a research
scientist and encouraging me to follow my own convictions.
Further on, I would like to give my appreciations to the Zentrum für Europäische
Integrationsforschung, in particular to Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, for believing in us and
supporting the process of growing of our academic character this whole year and setting a
bright example to follow. I would also like to express my thanks to the MES team, led by
Mr. Ralf Meyer for their great help and support and always putting the interest of the students
above all. In continuum, I would like to express my deepest appreciations to the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, in particular to Mr. Henri Bohnet, Ms. Ingrid Rohde and Ms. Anja
Czymmeck for believing in me and offering me the distinguished KAS scholarship to study
in Germany. Appreciations go as well to the UNCCD team, for their support and
understanding during the process of writing of the thesis.
A special gratitude I owe to my mom, Stojna, my two sisters, Jasmina and Dafina and my
whole family, for their love and inspiration to reach further heights. I would also like to
thank Orce Bonev and his lovely family, Silvana Boneva and Aleksandar Bonev for their
love and endless support and keeping me believe that the ‘Secret’ functions. I would like to
thank Ms. Vera Nikolova as well, for her open hand of support in difficult times and to
family Milcevski for their love and care.
While summing, I would like to express special thanks to my best friend, Hristijan
Lazarevski, for his wisdom and advices during the preparation of this thesis. And finally, my
gratitude goes to my friends, Madelene Wickers for her great help during my writing and the
support of my soulmates Hristina Vasileva, Viktor Vitanov, Marina Bulatovic, Mina Lee,
Laura Garces Lamban, Dennis Flück, Radmila Ristovska, Nikola Veselinovic and Guillermo
Lionheart, who helped me and supported me during this tremendous and inspiring period.
1
JULIJA VITANOVA
The Nexus between Securitization of the EU’s External Borders and
Human Rights of Migrants
Table of Contents
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Dedication
Acknowledgements
List of Illustrations 3
List of Abbreviations 4
Introduction 6
Purpose and Rationale 8
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 9
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CHAPTER 1.
The Rationale Behind The Migration-Security Nexus 11
1.1 Genesis of Securitizing Migration in Europe 11
1.2 Factors of Securitizing Migration as a Threat 13
1.3 Political Strategies for Curbing the Migration Challenge 17
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CHAPTER 2.
Realm of Legal Frameworks Protecting the Human Rights of Migrants and the Pathways of
Irregular Migration 27
2.1 Compliance of EU’s Externalization Migration Policies with the International Human
Rights Framework 27
2.2 The Pathway of Irregular Migration 32
2.2.1 The Central Mediterranean Route 33
2.2.2 The Western Mediterranean Route 36
2.2.3 The Eastern Mediterranean Route 38
2.2.4 The Western Balkan Route 41
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2
CHAPTER 3.
The Human Costs of Fortress Europe 44
3.1 EU’s Restrictive Migration Policies - A Detriment to Human Rights of Migrants 44
3.1.2 Externalization-Migration Policies to a Detriment of Human Rights of
Migrants 47
3.1.3 Push-backs and Outsourcing of Border-Policing 50
3.1.4 FRONTEX’ Security Practices in Breach of Human Rights of Migrants 51
3.1.5 Dublin II and EURODOC Restricting Migrants’ Right of Free Movement 52
3.2 Costs of Fortress Europe vs. Human Lives’ Costs 54
3.3 Recommendations 57
3.3.1 Changing the Threat Paradigm 57
3.3.2 Investment in Regular Migration Avenues 57
3.3.3 Investment in Search and Rescue Missions 57
3.3.4 Ensuring Oversight and Control Mechanisms for Externalization
Instruments 58
3.3.5 Reforming the Dublin Regulation 58
3.3.6 Halt Push-Backs of Migrants 59
3.3.7 Review of Border Management Polices 59
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Conclusion 61
List of References 63
APPENDIX 1 76
3
List of Illustrations
Figure 1: Main routes of irregular migration in 2014 32
Figure 2: Central Mediterranean route 33
Figure 3: Illegal border crossings on the Central Mediterranean route (including Apulia and
Calabria) 34
Figure 4: Western Mediterranean route 36
Figure5: Illegal border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route 37
Figure 6: Eastern Mediterranean route 39
Figure 7: Illegal border crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route 41
Figure 8: Section of Western Balkan route 42
Figure 9: Illegal border crossings on the Western Balkan route 43
Figure 10: Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Program (2007-2013) 55
Figure 11: Allocation of Refugee and External Borders Funds in some MS (2007-2013) 55
4
List of Abbreviations
CAT United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984
DG Directorate General
ECHR European Court of Human Rights
EDA European Defense Agency
EEAS External Action Service
EMP Euro Mediterranean Partnership
EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EU European Union
EURODAC European Dactyloscopy or fingerprint identification
EUROPOL European Police Office
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System
EUSC European Union Satellite Center
FRONTEX Frontières Extérieures - European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union
GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IOM International Organization for Migration
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
NGO Non-governmental Organization
5
RABIT Rapid Border Intervention Teams
SIS II Schengen Information System II
SIVE Maritime Surveillance System
SOLID Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VIS Visa Information System
6
Key Words: securitization, externalization, border control, restrictive migration policies,
Fortress Europe, human rights of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers
Introduction
In 2015, the European Union (hereafter: EU) was slammed by the reverberations of its own
migration policy instruments from the last two decades. Diem per diem, the figures of
irregular entries at EU’s external borders reached new ceilings, accompanied by the number
of lives lost in an attempt to reach haven on European soil. The International Organization
for Migration (hereafter: IOM) targeted 40,000 victimized failed attempts to make irregular
border crossings since the year 2000, out of which 22,000 lost their lives in strive to get to
Europe.
Meanwhile, the unfolding narrative of managing migration within a common EU strategy,
was incorporated in the area of ‘freedom, security and justice’ in the EU, falling the trace in
the Treaty of Amsterdam from 1997. Becoming an essential element in EU’s policy
documents, this notion was used for justifying measures directed towards deterring,
prevention and combating irregular migration.1 Paradoxically, there is difficulty in
understanding how freedom, security and justice can be fenced in measures for deterrence,
while the logic of the global world and markets is mobility.2 The same line of thinking is
followed with the Schengen Agreement where the same enshrined principle of freedom of
movement for ‘insiders” can be identified, while laying ground for a differential line towards
‘outsiders’.
In this regard, when tackling the intensified irregular migration pressure at its external
borders, the EU has responded with enhanced border management replicated through its
instruments of securitization and externalization of migration policies. The rationale behind
a restrictive dimension of EU’s migration policies was found in associating the mixed
migratory flows comprising asylum seekers, refugees or labour migrants with security threat,
terrorism, criminality and social conflict.3 The changing geopolitical context and emerging
1 B. Jordan and F. Düvell, “Irregular Migration, The Dilemmas of Transnational Mobility”, UK,
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2002, p. 49. 2 J. Schumpeter, “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, London, Allen and Unwin, 1947. 3 R. Lohrmann, “Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity. Current Threats to Peace?”, International
Migration vol. 38, no. 4, 2000, pp. 3-22. Available from: Wiley Online Library.
7
conflicts in EU’s neighbourhood led to massive migration influxes directed toward Europe,
which legitimized the already triggered tendency of securitizing migration as a threat.4
The 9/11 events accompanied by sloping terrorist attacks around the world, the Arab Spring
uprisings and ISIS, triggered vociferous nationalistic rhetoric and vocal public discourse
against arriving migrants, and assured the restrictive migration policy on EU and individual
Member States’ level.
Surprisingly for the EU corridors and policy makers, the securitization approach when
dealing with irregular migration did not prove to be the panacea for the problem. The
weakness of EU-level response in addressing irregular border crossings resulted with
egregious human rights abuses and moreover with increased number of migrant crossing and
deaths especially in the migratory hallway of the Mediterranean Sea.5 The systemic flow of
the EU’s border management and its incompatibility with human rights of migrants has
become particularly evident in 2015, when the issue was publicly scrutinized and ferociously
criticised by human rights activists after the world media has presented the real effects of
such policies. The lack of human rights-based approach to migration and the ineffectiveness
of EU’s border management policies resulted with thousands of dead bodies, plunging in the
Mediterranean Sea and increased irregular border crossings of desperate migrants fleeing
war and persecution.
4 D. Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, February 2002, pp. 63-92. 5 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, François Crépeau: Regional study: management of the external borders of the European
Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants”, 2013.
8
Purpose and Rationale
Considering, the humanitarian disaster happening at the external borders of EU it is from
crucial importance to identify the weaknesses of the established integrated border
management on behalf of EU and its Member States. Therefore, it is essential to explore the
reasons behind the clasping of the current European Union border management system under
the migratory pressure of refugees and asylum seekers, coming through the Central
Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes
from war-torn countries. This is a condition sine qua non, in order to remedy the whole
securitization system of managing irregular migration, considering that the costs associated
with attaining the status quo are too dark to contemplate. Hence in order to contribute
towards finding the appropriate panacea of the migration crisis and to devise a human rights
based approach emboldened in the migration management policies it is necessary to evaluate
the situation on ground and identify the systemic failures of EU’s migration management
system and in order to do so, this Master Thesis tackles six research questions:
1. What is the genesis and which are the factors of securitizing migration as a threat?
2. What are the current political strategies on EU-level for curbing the irregular
migration challenge?
3. To what extent are the securitization and externalization dimensions of EU’s border
management in compliance with the international human rights legal framework and
the international refugee protection system?
4. Which are the latest migration developments and the most precarious irregular
migratory routes?
5. In what way is the European border management and protection system hampering
the human rights of migrants, with a focus on refugees and asylum seekers?
6. Can Fortress Europe be justified upon the human costs of protecting borders?
Whereas the main leading HYPOTHESIS of the Master Thesis is: “The externalization of
migration border’s control and the securitization of EU’s external borders is having
detrimental effects on human rights of migrants, especially on refugees and asylum
seekers”.
9
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Considering the precarious impact of forced irregular migration, scholarly literature is
abundant when dealing with the problematic. Migration flows consisted of asylum seekers,
refugees, irregular migrants, economic migrants, which despite different in concepts in
reality intertwine, have been seen through the paradigm of terrorism and criminal activities.6
This tendency is depicted as the process of securitization of migration, translated into
policies that deal with it as a security threat. In this context, asylum and migration have been
securitised in the EU and that this evolution has had a negative impact on the status of
asylum-seekers and migrants, including the protection of their human rights.7
In this Master Thesis it is conveyed the securitisation theory analysed through two different
schools of thoughts, the Copenhagen School and the Paris School.
The Copenhagen School was developed by Ole Waever and other researchers and is
premised on the idea that the world, including security threats, is socially constructed, which
means that it is impossible to ever fully assess whether threats are ‘real’ or not.8 This means
that there is no security issue, eo ipso, but instead through securitizing speech acts, issues
are subjected to securitization.
Further on the Copenhagen School, advocates that the securitisation of an issue allows the
successful securitising actor to claim that the issue requires emergency measures and
justifies actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure9. More precisely, in a
successful securitisation process, a ‘speech act’ by a securitising actor presents an issue as
an existential threat to the survival of a ‘referent object’ (e.g. a state, national identity, etc.)
and is accepted as such by the ‘audience’ of the speech act (e.g. the government, public
opinion, etc.).10
6 R. Lohrmann, “Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity. Current Threats to Peace?”, International
Migration vol. 38, no. 4, 2000, pp. 3-22. 7 A. Baldaccini, and E. Guild (eds.), “Terrorism and the Foreigner: A Decade of Tension Around
the Rule of Law in Europe”, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 2007. 8 O. Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in: Lipschutz, R. D. (ed.), “On security”. New
York, Columbia University Press, 1995. 9 B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J de Wilde (eds.), “Security: a New Framework for Analysis”, Boulder,
CO and London, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 25. 10 Ibid.
10
On the other hand, there are other scholars such as Vuori, Atland and Ven Bruusgaard, with
Didier Bigo taking the lead, which were working on another approach when analysing the
securitization process, which accentuates practices instead of discourses and ‘speech acts’.11
After careful consideration, this Master Thesis will put the focus on the Paris school of
thought, accentuating practices, rather than discourses of securitisation. It is argued that a
focus on practices, rather than discourses, is also more adequate when analysing
securitisation processes in the EU asylum and migration policy.12 When applied to the case
of the EU asylum and migration policy, it means that securitising practices can be defined
as activities that, in themselves, conveying the idea that asylum-seekers and migrants are a
security threat to the EU.13
Considering that Bigo sheds the light on the role of security actors and their practices it
therefore necessary to consider the practices of the EU institutions and agencies such as
FRONTEX and practices of implementing the externalization of border control in order to
assess the extent to and the ways in which they securitise asylum and migration.14 Following
the same line of thought, Huysmans explains that the political security discourses are
interlinked with the practices, such as technological devices used for border management,
which separately will be analysed in the course of the thesis.15
Whereas the methodology is comprised from in-desk research, data analysis of already
conducted quantitative and qualitative researches, books, research papers, official
documents and articles, while deploying the analytical, critical and comparative method of
assessment.
11 J. A. Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of
Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders”. European Journal of
International Relations, vol. 14, no. 1, 2008, pp. 65-99. 12 S. Léonard, “EU Border Security and Migration Into the European Union: FRONTEX and
Securitisation Through Practices”, European Security, vol. 19, no. 2, 2010, pp. 231-254. Available
from: Taylor and Francis Online. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 J. Huysmans, “A Foucoultian View on Spill-Over: Freedom and Security in the EU. Journal of
International Relations and Development, vol. 7, no. 3, 2004, p. 307. Available from: WorldCat.
11
Chapter 1.
THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE MIGRATION-SECURITY NEXUS
1.1 Genesis of Securitizing Migration in Europe
The interlinkage between securitization and migration in Europe reflects a dynamic concept
that is influenced by several political, economic and social occurrences over the last few
decades. Tracking the genesis behind this process, it is clear that several factors led to the
post-Cold War era when a resift of the security paradigm took place. At the time, the
language of the classical security debates entailing the concepts of nuclear warheads, nuclear
deterrence and mutual assured destruction, experienced revolutionary change in its security
thinking. The new security agenda inspired new “soft security” issues which brought to the
green table the issue of migration among ethnic-religious violence, terrorism, democracy,
economic security, human development amongst several others.16
This process of labelling migration as a security risk is evident even from the late ‘70s and
during the ‘80s within the operating sphere of the Interior and Justice national officers within
the “Trevi group”, who were committed to working on trans-border issues encompassing
criminality and terrorism.17 Putting migration in the same bracket as criminality and
terrorism pulled the securitization strings among several Heads of States in Europe and gave
rise to the political obsession with controlling borders against newly juxtaposing threats
which were identified as incoming migration flows. The same line of thought was evident in
the United Nations Security Council’ Summit Declaration in 1992, by acknowledging that
threats to international peace and security could come from non-military sources of
instability that could affect the economic, social and environmental areas.18
The corollary of this process was reflected in the efforts of establishing a European security
governance and developing new instruments for controlling migration flows directed
16 More on new security agenda see: H. G. Brauch, “Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerability and
Risks”, International Security, Peace, Development and Environment, Vol. 1. 17 Bunyan, T. “Trevi, Europol and the European state”, in: in Bunyan, T. (ed.), State watching the
New Europe. A Handbook on the European State, London, Statewatch, 1993, pp. 15-36. 18 R. Rogers & E. Copeland, Forced Migration: Policy-Issues in the Post-Cold War World, Medford,
Tufts University 1993, p. 151.
12
towards Europe and at utmost preventing them to reach European soil. The dichotomy of
“insiders” and “outsiders” was further reinforced with the signing of the Schengen
agreement which erased the internal borders between the signatory countries but at the same
time clearly delineated the external borders of the Schengen Area. The notion of securitizing
the borders in order to corner migration influxes became a norm with incorporating legal
obligations to Member States from the Schengen Convention of the 1990 and afterwards the
EU Acquis within the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999. The securitization process appeared to be
developing alongside the ongoing Europeanization process, especially if we consider the
externalization of the Justice and Home Affairs which was triggered at the Tampere Summit
in 1999. From that moment, the EU deployed its capacities in bringing up a Common
European Asylum System and at the same time created the nexus of migration issues and
laid a groundwork for developing a comprehensive approach to migration while addressing
political, human rights and development matter in countries of origin and transit.19
The Presidency Conclusions of the Summit conveyed the recognition of the external aspect
of Justice and Home Affairs (hereafter: JHA), and in this direction the external widening of
migration system was connected to its internal deepening through the third pillar of the
JHA.20 Succinctly, in point 59 of the Conclusions, the European Council required that “all
competences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, in external
relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice’, while assuring that EU’s external relations should be explored towards
attainment of EU’s internal security objectives.21
19 S. Lavenex and E. M. UçArer, “The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of
Immigration Policies”, Cooperation and Conflict, vo. 39, no.4, 2004, p. 427. 20 S. Lavenex, “Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control”, West
European Politics, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, p. 335. 21 S. Wolff, N. Wichmann and G. Mounier, “The External Dimension of the Justice and Home
Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the EU?”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 31, no.
1, 2008, p. 12.
13
1.2 Factors of Securitizing Migration as a Threat
As a complex phenomenon with multifaceted implications, migration has taken the shape of
a security matter as a result of two main reasons. The first is the international security context
of irregular migration flows and trafficking which are distressing border-crossings and
border control practices. The second being its internal security inferences on perceptions of
migrants as a threat to job security, social services, public order and in whole for the welfare
state of the host country.
Starting from the late 1980s and during the 1990s, the Southern European countries such as
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy experienced a tripling of the number of migrants and from
traditional emigration countries were converted to receiving countries. This was due to the
fact that after the accession to the EU they experienced progressive economic development
which opened up employment opportunities in both the formal and informal labour market
and was seen as a green light for migrants coming from North Africa and Latin America.22
This resulted with an urgent need to tighten the countries’ low regulated labour market and
poorly controlled borders.
Additionally with the Balkan Wars, the alleviated figure of asylum seekers in EU countries,
notably in Germany contributed to the publicly scrutinizing migration even further and
placing it high on the European political agenda.23 This forced European leaders to think of
meticulous approaches when dealing with migratory influxes, considering the political
sensitivity of the matter. The first step was a process of harmonization of immigration and
asylum policies through a five-year agenda taken in the Tampere European Council which
along with the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999 are the point of reference when it comes to
common EU asylum and migration policy and sharing the sovereignty between the EU and
its Member States for matters relating to border control, asylum and irregular migration
policies. The intriguing element of the Tampere Agenda is defining the relations and
imposing obligations to third countries when it comes to controlling migration as well as a
22 R. King, G. Lazaridis & T. Charalambos (eds.), Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern
Europe, London, Macmillan 2000. 23 In a Eurobarometer survey conducted in spring 2005, 14% of the respondents consider immigration
one of the two most important issues facing their country, whereas 10% is concerned with
terrorism. In autumn, immigration was considered one of the most important issues by 15% of
respondents, and terrorism by 14%. Eurobarometer 64: ‘Public Opinion in the European Union’,
Eurostat, December 2005. From: J. P. Jiménez, The Migration-Security Nexus in Short:
Instruments and Actions in The European Union, The Amsterdam Law Forum, vol. 4:1, Winter
Issue, 2012, p. 40.
14
commitment to fighting irregular migration, with additionally accentuating on the perception
of immigration as a security threat.24 These elements raise concerns vis-à-vis the
incompatibility of the EU-wide promoted liberal paradigms of open borders, free markets
and humanitarian values on one side and the ambition of nation-states to control the entry
and movement of people.25
The trend of further enhancing the securitization process of migration found its momentum
in 2001, with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by means of even stricter border control and
stigmatizing Islamophobia not only in the United States but especially in Europe. After 9/11,
the West got the opportunity to fill the vacuum left in the post-Cold War period with the
dissolved Eastern bloc and no traditional adversary against whom it can reassert its sense of
security.26 The new adversary was found in the extremist Islamists, subjecting Muslim
migrants to suspicion of posing internal as well as external threat.
Therefore, the securitization belt around migration was tightening as border controls were
heightened, especially in the Euro-Mediterranean region, well after mobilizing the public
opinion that legitimized stricter border control mechanisms and introducing of readmission
agreements. With national and regional security under stake, some of the up-coming
proposals for new instruments for fighting irregular migration were lacking a humanitarian
facet and were rather directed towards effective neutralization of the ‘threat’. This is evident
from the proposal coming from EU Member States as Germany, France, Italy and Spain in
October 2001, for creating a European Border Police which at the time did not see the light
of day at the Laeken Council. However, the idea for a mechanism that incorporates a
common management of the external borders of the EU was brought back to life during the
2003 Thessaloniki Council, were it was carefully reiterated that border control is and will
remain a responsibility of the Member States. In the same time, a room was created for
introducing FRONTEX as a Community Agency and a crucial step forwards for a coherent
approach of external border management.27
The terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, and the expected big-bang enlargement gave a
sense of urgency for further securitization of the EU’s external borders and consequently
24 Presidency Conclusions. Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999. 25 T. G. Hansen, “Filtering Out the Risky Migrant, Migration Control, Risk Theory and the EU,”
AMID Working Paper Series, No: 52, 2006, p.1. 26 J. P. Jiménez, The Migration-Security Nexus in Short: Instruments and Actions in The European
Union, The Amsterdam Law Forum, vol. 4:1, Winter Issue, 2012. 27 A. W. Neal, ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX’. JCMS,
2009-2, pp. 333-356.
15
brought new technological developments, evident through the Visa Information System
(VIS), Schengen Information System II (SIS II) adding to to the already established
EUROPOL and Custom Information System. This technology was seen by the EU official
level, as a panacea for any potential security threat and an instrument for tackling the state
of fear, but without consideration on its further implications for the (in) security of the
individual.28 Therefore, this advancement in security thinking was the appropriate response
towards the risen security concerns of the changing EU neighborhood after the big
enlargement in 2004 and 2007. From the European Security Strategy elaborated at the June
2013 Thessaloniki European Council, we can understand how sturdy the EU’s concerns were
from a potential influx of illegal migrants stemming from the Eastern neighbors, by being at
the same time countries of origin and transit. In this regard, in order to crack down the
upcoming threats from East, the EU decided to use the ‘extended hand’ approach, and shared
the spirit of its Schengen culture of security to the joining Member States. They were obliged
to adopt the Schengen commitments in its fullness and assume the new delegated role of
‘gate-keepers’ and protectors of what was about to be called “Fortress Europe” from
unwanted immigrants.29 It was a symbolic remuneration to be made for the privilege of being
taken inside of the fortress and take part in the implementation of the externalization strategy
of the former domestic EU migration control, which was now being transcended to third
countries.
The perception of immigrants as a security threat was fortified with the detrimental
implications of the Arab Spring rippling in 2011. The political instability and violence had
looming effect on hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and human lives lost from
focal countries as Tunisia and Libya and their close surroundings. The South Mediterranean
was challenged as never before with the displacement of 800,000 people due to the conflict
in Libya and the 35,000 migrants coming from both Tunisia and Libya in Malta and the
Italian island of Lampedusa.30 The Commission was put at Rubicon and the strengths were
on the side of the advocates of stronger common migration policy and a linkage of EU
28 D. Bigo and S. Carrera, From New York to Madrid: Technology as the Ultra-Solution to the
Permanent State of Fear and Emergency in the EU, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, April,
2004. 29 Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework
for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Communication from the Commission
to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003)104 final, Brussels, 11.3.2003, p. 4. 30 European Commission, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern
Mediterranean countries, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
COM(2011) 292 final, Brussels, 24.5.2011.
16
migration and mobility policies to EU foreign policies. Two communications were presented
by the European Commission in 2011 for migration, security and mobility with the southern
Mediterranean countries, which outburst the concerns of the impact of the migration flow
directed at Europe, and even more securitized migration through the lances of threat and risk
and heated the debate for control of EU common borders.
17
1.3 Political Strategies for Curbing the Migration Challenge
The process of securitization of migration, and devising restrictive migration policies have
contributed towards a relentless illegitimating of immigrants in Europe, whereas the security
narrative of them posing a threat led to labeling as illegal instead of irregular migrants. All
EU immigration policies were implemented in this fashion from 2005 onwards when
Fortress Europe started to be a reality and not an imaginary concept. In this regards, the first
phase of the securitization of migration management was translated into a policy of
securitization of the national borders and enhancing the border control structure.
This proved to be the case through the exercise of state control by particular EU Member
States in their effort to control the migration influx directed towards their borders. Evident
examples are Spain’s reaction to the arriving sub-Saharan migrants in 2006 on the Canary
Islands, Italy’s reaction with the Lampedusa Island and Greece with the blocking of the
Evros River which separates them from Turkey.31 In order to make the securitization strategy
a success story two instruments and trends were deployed. On one hand, as analysts precisely
depict it, a so called ‘Berlinization’ process took place concerning the control of the south-
western EU border.32 Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish cities in North Africa which are
fortified with huge fences portraying the border between Spanish and European Union’ soil
on one side and the rest of Africa on the other side. This fence, often compared to the U.S.-
Mexican border, equipped with electronic barriers and high-tech surveillance system is
meant to prevent the arrival of tens of thousands of African and Arab migrants fleeing from
sub-Saharan area and conflict zones as Syria and Somalia and the neighboring Moroccan
territories.33 Those who manage to illegally penetrate the European Union soil face the
destiny to either apply for political asylum or be directly deported due to the bilateral
agreements signed by Spain and third countries.
The similar tendency of ‘Berlinization’ is evident with the Greek-Turkish terrestrial border
at the Evros region, where on behalf of the Greek government a fence was constructed in
order to protect against arriving migrants.34 This anti-immigrant fence on European Union
31 C. Kasimis, “Greece: Illegal Immigration in the Midst of Crisis”, Migration Policy Institute, 8
March 2012 32 C. Nagengast, “Militarizing the Border Patrol”, NACLA, Report on the Americas 32, November-
December, 1998. 33 L. Gabrielli, “Securitization of Migration and Human Rights: Frictions at the Southern EU
Borders and Beyond”, Urban People, 16, 2014, 2. 34 E. Dilek, ”Security versus the Human Rights Dilemma in European Union Migration Policy: the
Greek Evros Antiimmigrant Fence”, Proceedings of the 5th ECRP Graduate Student Conference.
18
soil along with recorded cases of ill-treatment of asylum seekers and refugees by several
human rights agencies, echoes concerns for violation of fundamental rights of migrants
enshrined in international treaties as the Fundamental Rights Charter proclaimed by the
European Parliament from December, 7th 2000.
The established practice of containment of migration influxes from Spain and Greece, is
being followed by Hungary and Bulgaria respectively in 2015, showing a continuum in the
trend of immunizing the EU’ border control. After the UN’s estimates of sharp rises in
numbers of asylum seekers and migrants in Hungary they initiated plans for erecting a wall
separating themselves from Serbia along the 170 km border line where migrants pave their
way towards the EU as the Promised Land. Whereas the Bulgarian government is way ahead
in building a 100 mile fence on its border with Turkey, which is known to be a focal point
for smuggling for the Islamic State group, operating in Iraq and Syria, which happen to share
a border with Turkey as well.35
The second instrument of securitization of EU’s external borders is ‘militarization’ of the
borders in terms of surveillance control tools used and the operational status of the officers
patrolling the border. A clear example is the EU-funded Integrated system of electronic
surveillance, SIVE, which serves as an electronic barrier initially in the cities of Huelva and
Almeria, located in the Mediterranean Spanish coast, and then along the whole coast
including the aforementioned enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and the Canary Islands.36
An even more ferocious example was crystallized with the formation of a unique European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX or Agency) 37, promoting inter-EU
cooperation in protecting external common borders. In order to perform its risk analysis task
of illegal migration crossings, FRONTEX is assisted by several agencies which contribute
towards a laborious border surveillance system on land, air and sea, encompassing heavy
equipment of satellite and radar systems, vessel patrol systems, as well as hardware systems
with helicopters and airplanes. In the list of agencies aiding FRONTEX’s mission are
EUROPOL, the European Union Satellite Center (EUSC), the European Defense Agency
35 E. Banco, “Some EU Countries Are Building Fences, Walls To Keep Migrants Out”, International
Business Times, 23 June 2015. 36 D. Lutterbeck, “Policing Migration in the Mediterranean”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, No.
1, 59–82, March 2006. 37 Council of the European Union, Council Regulation No 2007/2004, “Establishing a European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union”, Official Journal of the EC L 349, 26 October 2004.
19
(EDA) and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).38 This ‘militarization’ trend was
refined with the establishment of the EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System) in
October 2013, achieving a total surveillance from the air with electronic sensors and drones
adding to the satellite and additional funding for research and development of even more
innovative border security methods of over 40 million Euros, approved by EU in 2014.39
This operating field of EU’s external border control indicates a war-preparedness state, but
targeted towards non-military adversaries. The surveillance system identifies clandestine
trials by irregular migrants, whereas the risk analysis reads them as targets and turns them
into statistics. The final aim of the task is to intercept illegal migrants who strive to reach
European land or sea area, and then either expel them or put them into detention centers until
the status of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers is decided upon. During this
border siege, numerous human rights abuses of migrants were documented, whereas
estimates of the International Organization for Migration’ report in 2014, puts the number
of 22,000 lost lives since the year of 2000, trying to reach Europe.40
The second phase of the securitization of EU’s external borders in regards to migration
proceeded with a genuine form of ‘externalization’ of the migration control mechanisms
towards third countries which led to vague differentiation between what was used to known
as internal/external security threat.41 In its essence the externalization of migration control
encompasses two aspects, the delegation of control and responsibility to countries of origin
and/or transit in the African continent, and institutionalizing a platform for facilitation of the
process of returning of asylum seekers and irregular migrants to third countries as countries
of origin/transit.42 The rationale of this mechanism for delegating control is the creation of
genuine buffer zones which will prevent migration influxes to reach EU’s borders, by
propelling the Euro-African border as further southern as possible.
38 A Student Research Project, “Militarization of Borders”, Mediterranean Migration. 39 The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013
of the European Parliament and of the Council, “Establishing the European Border Surveillance
System (Eurosur)”, Official Journal of the European Union L 295/11, 6 November 2013. 40 T. Brian, F. Laczko, Fatal Journeys. Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, Geneva, International
Organization for Migration, 2014. 41 B. Didier, “When Two Become One. Internal and External Securitisations in Europe.” Pp. 171–
203. In: M. Kelstrup and Michael Charles Williams (eds). International Relations Theory and the
Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community, London-New York, Routledge,
2000. 42 C. Boswell, “The external dimension of EU immigration and asylum policy”, International Affairs
79(3) pp. 619–638.
20
In order to enforce the externalization policy of migration control, the principle of
conditionality is being used on the EU level, similar to the one that was initially imposed on
the Eastern European countries, when their membership to the EU was intertwined with their
national competences in containing migration flows. As a proven successful instrument, the
same conditionality principle was translated to the African countries and packed well behind
financial and technical support for reinforcing third countries’ capacities in border control.
Such example is the Aeneas program enacted from 2004 till 2006 based on EU cooperation
and development policy and coordinated by the two DG of the Commission: Home Affairs
and External Relations.43 Further examples encompass training of police assistance and the
notorious readmission agreements on both bilateral (EU Member State and third country)
and multilateral (between the EU and third country) level, as well as extended agreements
on migration control matters on both formal and informal level.44 On a bilateral level Spain
has multiple readmission agreements with sub-Saharan countries, deals entailing
development aid, seasonal migration quotas and investment engagements, France as well,
whereas Italy has established a similar pattern of cooperation with Tunisia and Libya.45
Despite the precarious consequences of these externalized migration control instruments,
conditionality-based development aids and readmission agreements upon the lives of asylum
seekers, refugees and irregular migrants, de facto, this relentless politics of containment is
not resolving the migration crisis and certainly not preventing migrants from departing.
However, even though these policies prove to be failing to prevent migrants to reach the gate
of Fortress Europe, they are still in force and are being enhanced even more.
The roots and the ephemeral character of the restrictive approach when dealing with migrants
on EU level, can be identified even in 2002, during the European Council meeting in Seville,
when the Spanish Presidency gave a proposal for implementing a ‘negative conditionality’
principle when dealing with migration matters. The essence behind the Spanish ‘Eureka’
was the application of sanctions against third countries which fail to limit and control
irregular immigration. The ‘negative conditionality’ implied revoking or drastically reducing
the development aid for these countries, if they fail to manage migration flows, accordingly,
43 L. Gabrielli, “Securitization of Migration and Human Rights: Frictions at the Southern EU
Borders and Beyond”, Urban People, 16, 2014, 2. 44 J. P. Cassarino, “Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood”, The
International Spectator 42(2), pp. 179–196. 45 L. Bialasiewicz, “Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border Work
in the Mediterranea”, Geopolitics 17(4), 2012, pp. 843–866.
21
when meeting EU standards.46 At the end of the meeting, the short-sightedness and counter-
productiveness of such a proposal was realised, since the point of development aid is to
restore and improve the conditions in countries of origin, so that immigration can be tackled
on a grass-root level. Notwithstanding, this example is proof of the political atmosphere and
political stances of top EU heads on migration and sooner or later they influence and create
EU-level common migration and asylum policies, which are directed towards securitization
of EU’s external borders on the cost of life-losses and human rights violations against
migrants. In this direction, it is important to point out the topics that were included at the top
of the EU agenda after the Seville meeting, such as expulsion and repatriation instruments,
visas or readmission agreements, concomitantly with projects on border control cooperation
and assistance when dealing with migratory flows by positioning the cooperation with third
countries as a cornerstone of EU’s immigration policy and its security related policies.47
In the same fashion continued the Hague Program, adopted in 2004, when security was
prioritized over fundamental rights when dealing with migration matters. Namely, the Hague
Program provided the working agenda for the 2004-2009 period in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice, while accentuating capacity building in border controls and asylum
applications processing with third countries and mainstreaming readmission agreements in
EU’s external partnerships.48 Major considerations were paid on securing a platform for
cooperation on border management system, which later will be embodied in the
Agency/FRONTEX, and further developing the strategy of ‘external dimension of asylum
and migration’ by amalgamating the internal and external dimension of security.49 These
concepts were reiterated in Brussels, September 2007 in the Conclusion of the Council of
Justice and Home Affairs as stated:
{…} underlines the need to promote close cooperation with third countries of origin and
transit, including those third countries identified for the purpose of priority work, in order
to: enhance their capacity to manage their own borders; help them to fulfil their
responsibilities as regards search and rescue; fight organised crime involved in trafficking
46 J. P. Jiménez, The Migration-Security Nexus in Short: Instruments and Actions in The European
Union, The Amsterdam Law Forum, vol. 4:1, Winter Issue, 2012, pp. 36-57. 47 Ibid. 48 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions” 14292/1/04 (The Hague Programme),
4-5 November 2004, Brussels, 8 December, 2004. 49 Ibid.
22
in human beings and smuggling of human beings; enhance their capacity to provide
protection to those who need it; and provide and effective framework for returns including
through readmission agreements.50
The implementation of the goals envisioned in the Hague Program are left in the hands of
the Member States, without asking for sovereignty compromises of any type, making evident
the lack of political will for a European immigration policy. By putting the accent on
cooperation with third countries, countries of origin and transit countries, delegating and
externalising the migration and asylum policies beyond the borders of EU, once again shows
the paradigm of security behind migration and neglecting the human rights dimension of
migration. Failing to address and enforce provisions for immigrants integration and
establishing modes of legal immigration channels in the Hague program, attests the
aforementioned allegations.51
In this regards, the ‘externalization strategy of managing migration flows’ continued to
create buffer zones in the African continent, aimed at filtering the migration influx targeted
towards Europe. This filtering mechanism of moving the Europe-African border as south as
possible was weak in terms of infrastructural and human capacity to deal with the challenge
and it did not contribute towards decreasing the number of departing migrants. The only
result that it achieved, was re-shifting of migrants towards more dangerous routes in order
to reach European soil, while exposing their own and their families’ lives to danger. In this
context, which speaks volume to the European level response towards the rising migration
challenge presented through the strategy - Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
(hereafter: GAMM) in 2011, which concomitant with other mechanisms were devised for
enhancing the cooperation in migration control of the Mediterranean neighboring countries.
As an overarching framework of EU external migration and asylum policy its objectives are
meticulously wrapped around the following priorities:
Better organizing legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility;
50 Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs 2818th Council meeting, “Press
Release” 12604/07 (Presse 194), Brussels, 18 September 2007, pp. 9-10. 51 J. V. Selm, “The Hague Program Reflects New European Realities”, Migration Policy Institute, 1
January 2005.
23
Preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human
beings;
Maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility;
Promoting international protection, and enhancing the external dimension of
asylum.52
The externalization element of migration management is conveyed in the essence of the four
equally important presented priorities. This is evident also from the instruments through
which GAMM is being implemented and which entail:
Bilateral and regional policy dialogues and action plans;
Legal instruments such as visa facilitation and readmission agreements;
Operational support and capacity building;
Programs and supporting projects made available to third countries and stakeholders
such as civil society and international organizations.53
The commitments pledged on EU level for making the externalization of migration strategy
work were translated into EUR 1 billion to more than 400 migration related projects in the
period 2004-2013, positioning the Southern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan African
countries as major beneficiaries of the related EU funding.54 With the objectives set high to
avert unwanted migration influxes, these policies produced side-effects and have
emboldened irregular migration flows. Parts of the side-effects incur great humanitarian
detrimental costs in terms of human lives lost and worsened living conditions.
In particular enhancement of the argument, from the above mentioned instruments,
readmission agreements as a core component of the EU immigration and asylum policies are
very controversial in reference to human rights. In its essence, readmission agreements have
been consolidated with initially the Amsterdam and later the Lisbon Treaty, so that later with
52 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Global Approach to Migration and
Mobility”. 53 Ibid. 54 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Report: Global Approach to Migration
and Mobility – two years on” 21 February 2014”.
24
the Stockholm Program-an Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the Citizens in
2009, to be hailed as a condition sine qua non of the EU externalization migration strategy.
Defined as “agreements between the EU and/or a Member State with a third country,
generally on the basis of reciprocity, establishing rapid and effective procedures for the
identification and safe and orderly return of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the
conditions for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territories of the third country or one
of the Member States of the European Union, and to facilitate the transit of such persons in
a spirit of cooperation’’, Article 79(3) of the Lisbon Treaty, grants the authority to the EU
to conclude such agreements under the above mentioned conditions with third countries.55
However, despite the good will and spirit of cooperation enshrined in the definition of
readmission agreement, this legal framework lacks quintessential provisions when it comes
to refugees and their rights and access to protection respectively. In situations of emergency,
distress and massive migration influxes, which force accelerated migration-identification
procedure, the implementation of readmission agreements, due to border control indolence,
can prove to be detrimental and hinder the access to protection for asylum seekers, which
fall prey to a return procedure.
The weaknesses of the very process of ‘externalization’ of migration management converts
asylum-seekers to irregular migrants and places them into ‘’save third countries’’ which is
absolutely against the international human rights law and refugee law. These practices are
making the securitization-borders-migration nexus crowded by adding up human rights
violations in the equation. Concerns in the same direction were raised for the mobility
partnerships as an instrument of the GAMM framework, for their selectivity and failure to
accentuate development instead of securitization policies. In the Report of the UN Special
Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, it is noted the mobility partnerships have been
futile in their efforts to be a sophisticated political tool to strengthen dialogue and
cooperation with non-European Union countries on matters related to migration and
mobility.
Instead, the mobility partnerships in its practical steps have been misused by the European
Union as a key instrument in their efforts to strengthen the border controls and subject
limited labor opportunities, mainly for skilled migrants under a conditionality principle with
promises of visa liberalization/facilitation and other innovative measures which effectively
55 European Migration Network (EMN), Glossary, EMN’s Online Glossary
25
contribute towards externalization of migration control.56 The inherited fragility of these
partnerships is their incomprehensive legal nature, in terms of representing non-binding
agreements. Notwithstanding, this produces precarious implications on the legal certainty
aspect, with no guarantees that the participating Member States and/or third countries will
keep the ‘pacta sunt servanda’ spirit of law.
With no guarantees on compliance with the initiatives or commitments made, there is no
respective enforcement mechanism either upon committing parties, and no independent
evaluation, which makes a colossal vacuum in reference to a legal framework that will
incorporate human rights into the respective mobility partnerships.57
This puts a spotlight on mobility partnerships as ineffective instruments in reference to
promoting uniform human rights policy on migration, as, ab initio, envisioned on behalf of
GAMM to shed a light on the migrant itself. On the contrary, as stipulated by the report, this
legal uncertainty prevents them in acting so, whereas the absence in public scrutiny in the
process of negotiations of the terms of the partnerships also means that human rights may
not necessarily be mainstreamed within them.58
‘’ {…} For example, mobility partnerships are negotiated with the Directorate-General
Home Affairs, but also with the External Action Service (EEAS), which may in fact lead to
some confusion between priorities, competences and eventually impact upon a coordinated
integration of human rights into each of these programmes, particularly as the Directorate-
General Home Affairs negotiates the readmission agreements, while it is EEAS which has
the mandate on general human rights cooperation.’' 59
When it comes to assessing the EU’s institutional achievements and migration policies, is
evident that they were accentuating the seizure of irregular migration by means of
securitizing and militarizing the border controls. Threating irregular migration as a security
threat and the antagonizing public opinion in many EU Member States have further
56 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, François Crépeau: Regional study: management of the external borders of the European
Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants”, 2013. 57 Ibid. p.16 58 Ibid. p.17 59 Ibid. p.16
26
legitimized the externalization strategies of border control through readmission agreements
and establishment of detention centers. However, failing to address and incorporate human
rights guarantees and legal certainty of enforcement mechanisms in these policies has
delegitimized the righteousness behind their rationale.
Lacking the human rights perspective amidst EU’s migration and asylum policies, points to
severe misunderstanding of the security paradigm behind the migration challenge. The
utmost aim is to protect human rights and make lives better and not securing one part of the
world while filtering and selecting the appropriate ones from other parts of the world.
Therefore, in order to identify the flows behind the system, and its systemic errors when
dealing with irregular migration, the following Chapter will strive to address the pitfalls of
the current policies and instruments on EU-level and their precarious corollaries on human
rights of migrants in depth.
27
Chapter 2.
REALM OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS PROTECTING THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS AND THE PATHWAYS OF IRREGULAR
MIGRATION
2.1 Compliance of EU’s Externalization Migration Policies with the
International Human Rights Framework
In 2012 the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts in advancing
the cause of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.60 This
demonstrated recognition of the Union’s commitments to being a global leader in bringing
peace and instigating positive changes. However, despite the commitments and current
progress in the above mentioned areas, there is still room for advancement in the area of
protection of human rights of migrants. In its own playing field, namely, in some EU
Member States have been reported violations of human rights of migrants in several policy
fields. These violation spread from breaches of the right to family reunification, stipulated
by Council Directive 2003/86/EC from 2003 with the aim:
“To enable family members of non-EU nationals residing lawfully on the territory of the
European Union (EU) to join them in the EU country in which they are residing. The
objective is to protect the family unit and to facilitate the integration of nationals of non-
member countries.”61
These violations apply injustice and prevent numerous men, women and children from
rejoicing their granted right to be together as a family. Further on, the reported breaches
continue in reference to the rights of asylum, prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment, as well as protection from detention and removal.62 Within the right of asylum,
60 “Nobel Peace Prize 2012 awarded to European Union, one year on”, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/basic-information/eu-nobel/index_en.htm, 2012. 61"Family reunification”, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33118 62 Y. Pascouau, “Human rights violations in the field of migration: a collective responsibility”,
European Policy Center, 10 December 2012.
28
Belgium and Greece were found to be perpetrators for the violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention of Human Rights and were condemned by the European Court of
Human Rights for doing so. Article 3 enshrines the prohibition of torture as it reads: “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.63 The
hallmark case law of the M.S.S case, found Greece guilty for breaching the human rights of
the asylum seeker and placing him in degrading and live-threatening living conditions,
whereas, Belgium breached the non-refoulement principle laid out in the UN Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees:
Article 33(1):
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
Whereas, the applicable definition of refugee is under the criteria for refugee status as laid
down in Article 1(A) 2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention:
“...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.”64
The violations also indicated the pitfalls of the Dublin II regulations and the gaps in burden
sharing among EU Member States when it comes to receiving and processing of asylum
applications. It also points to the inaction of the European Commission to start infringement
procedures against these countries which are in breach of EU rules ensuring human rights
protections.
63 Council of Europe, European Court on Human Rights, “European Convention on Human Rights”. 64 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, “International Refugee
Law”, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/international_refugee_law.php
29
There are many international and European legal frameworks which protect the human rights
of migrants, by means of delegating responsibilities for protectionism, by setting an
enforcement mechanism and sanction procedure for violations.
In this regards with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, was
enhanced the obligation to respect human rights in the field of EU Law. Article 2, TEU
reiterates among other things that ‘’The Union is founded on the values of respect of human
rights’’.65
In the same spirit is the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, also
known as The Charter, which implies legally binding obligations of guaranteeing the human
rights when adopting EU rules by the EU institutions and when implementing the EU rules
by its Member States.
In this direction attests Article 54, stipulating the Prohibition of abuse of rights:
“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity
or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
in this Charter or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for herein.”66
Within the Charter, the necessity of further enhancing the protection of human rights at the
EU level was recognised, despite having the Council of Europe ensuring the respect of the
European Convention of Human Rights. Therefore the EU and its Member States were
delegated with the responsibility of preventing violations, especially in the area of human
rights of migrants.
Among the international law and European Law provisions, it is essential to indicate the
most important ones, in order to analyze to what extent are the current EU migration and
asylum policies compatible with the protection of rights of migrants when facing the EU
border.
65 “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union
C 115/13, 9.5.2008. 66 “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European
Communities C 364/1, 18.12.2000.
30
Rights at risk at EU borders:67
Right to life;
(UDHR Article 3, ECHR Article 2, the Charter Article 2, ICCPR Article 6)
Right to liberty and security of the person (prohibition on arbitrary detention);
(ECHR Article 5, the Charter Article 6, UDHR Article 9, ICCPR Article 9)
Prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
(UDHR Article 5, ECHR Article 3, the Charter Article 4, ICCPR Article 7, CAT
Article 2)
Right to leave any country, including one’s own;
(UDHR Article 13(2), ICCPR Article 12)
Right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution;
(UDHR Article 14, the Charter Article 18)
Right to effective remedy;
(ECHR Article 13, the Charter Article 47)
Prohibition of collective expulsion;
(ECHR Protocol 4 Article 4, the Charter Article 19(1))
Non-refoulement principle - No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a
State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death
penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(The Charter Article 19(2), 1951 Refugee Convention Article 33 and 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, CAT Article 3, customary international law)
67 Amnesty International, “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights Violations Against
Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders”, Amnesty International report, 2014.
31
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal
entry or presence;
(1951 Refugee Convention Article 31)
In all actions concerning children […] the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration;
(Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 3).
Notwithstanding, the glimpse into the enshrined human rights of migrants raises questions
regarding their compatibility with securitization of EU’s external borders, militarization of
borders and externalization of migration control mechanisms to third countries, or rather the
other way around. The practices of managing migration flows on the EU level since 2000
have a demonstrated downturn tendency towards numerous violations and precarious figures
of death losses in trials to surpass Fortress of Europe. What is certain is that EU’s Member
States have positive obligations stemming from the international instruments of refugee law
and human rights law, and in order to prevent humanitarian disasters from happening on
their borders, they should engage their full operational and human capacity in preventing it
from happening.
32
2.2 The Pathway of Irregular Migration
Due to different political, economic and societal rippling in Africa and the Middle East,
migratory movements have taken different patterns and routes, but what is evident is the
rising number of irregular migrants, who see no other alternative then taking the excruciating
road towards Europe. FRONTEX identified four main routes, taken by 96.5% of irregular
migrants to pave their way to EU: the Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean,
Western Balkan and Western Mediterranean routes as illustrated in Figure 1.68 Respective
to the reported detections of irregular border crossings, the Central Mediterranean route is
in these terms “Via Egnatia” with tripling figures of migration flows in comparison to the
others. Whereas the transit points vary in the last 20 years of migratory trends, Libya
emerged as the main transit point with the fall of the Qaddafi-regime.
Figure 1: Main routes of irregular migration in 2014
Source: FRONTEX, 2015
In order to understand the irregular migration developments, and the problems in juncture
with them, it is necessary to give an overview and scale the characteristics of these main
irregular migration pathways towards EU.
68 Ibid.
33
2.2.1 The Central Mediterranean Route
The Central Mediterranean route portrays the migration flow from North Africa directed to
Italy and to certain extent Malta, via the Mediterranean Sea as passage as illustrated in Figure
2.69 Libya here plays a crucial point for smugglers, since the country serves as a meeting
point for migrants coming from the Horn of Africa and Western Africa heading to the EU70.
The Central Mediterranean route is, in the same time, the main route but also the most
dangerous gate to the EU, because migrants expose their lives to smugglers’ vessels which
are often not equipped enough for making a safe journey through the sea. UNHCR’s
estimates of 3 500 lost lives in 2014,71 proves the case and makes the Mediterranean Sea the
largest cemetery for migrants coming from Northern Africa.
Figure 2: Central Mediterranean route
Source: i-Map (Interactive Map on Migration)
This pattern of migration flow from Tunisia, Somalia, Eritrea and Nigeria through the
Mediterranean Sea is characterised with intensity even since 2008, when 40,00072 irregular
69 “Central Mediterranean route”, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-
route/. 70 Ibid. 71 UNCHR, The UN Refugee Agency, “Latest Deaths on Mediterranean Highlight Urgent Need for
Increased Rescue Capacity”. 72 N. Frenzen, “Frontex Periodic Update on the Central Mediterranean”, Migrants at Sea. 2013.
34
detections were identified in Malta and Lampedusa. With the bilateral agreement between
Italy and Libya and repatriation agreement between Italy and Tunisia, efforts were made to
tackle this number, but the results were with ephemeral limitations. The emerging turmoil in
Tunisia and Libya in 2011, plummeted the figure of migrants using this route in order to
seek asylum on EU’ soil, with staggering effects reaching 64 000 arrivals in Lampedusa,
Sicily and Malta.73 The looming figures continued in 2013 as well, when events took an even
more tragic turn with 366 migrants losing their lives near Lampedusa, after the boat they
were transported in capsized. The intense migratory pattern of the Central Mediterranean
route culminates in 2014 with 170 760 migrants, as presented in Figure 3, 74 arriving in Italy
and mainly coming from Libya, when political havoc and lack of rule of law, increase the
margin of discretion of the smuggling networks.
Figure 3: Illegal border crossings on the Central Mediterranean route (including
Apulia and Calabria)
Source: FRONTEX, 2015
What is evident is that stricter border controls and securitization do not decrease irregular
migration influxes, but instead puts the lives of migrants and asylum seekers fleeing wars
and persecution under greater threat. When in the 1990s, Span and Italy have tightened their
visa regimes, irregular migration over sea increased, since both the EU’s securitization and
externalization approach when dealing with migration management policy converts asylum
seekers and refugees to ‘illegal’ migrants, with an accent on the illegal, as a most common
73 Ibid. 74 “Central Mediterranean Route”, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-
route/.
35
term used over ‘irregular’ migrants. On top of that, a research conducted based only on media
reports gave the number of 15 01675 live losses in desperate trials by migrants to cross the
Mediterranean Sea between January 1998 and 30th of September, 2014.
The situation with the Central Mediterranean route was further aggravated by the Libyan
political blackmail to Europe when it came to containing migrants from departing towards
EU. Ever since the 1990s, being pressured by international sanctions and embargos, Colonel
Qaddafi played on the card of releasing massive migration flows from Libya, which for years
was a country of destination for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.76 To the already massive
embarkation from the Libyan coast, numerous irregular migrants from Tunisia were added,
which were prevented from departing from Tunisian coasts due to introduction of stricter
border patrols.77 The heightened mayhem in Libya, and the events of beheadings Christian
migrant workers from Egypt and Ethiopia78, have urged more migrants to make the
dangerous crossings through the Mediterranean Sea.
The result was an increased death toll of migrants plunging into the Mediterranean Sea. As
a unilateral response to the migration crisis and the lives lost at sea, in 2013 on behalf of
Rome, a ‘Mare Nostrum’ maritime search and rescue operation was launched. The mission
involved patrolling in Italian and Maltese waters, nearly up to the Libyan coast, and was well
equipped and trained for saving immigrants in the Mediterranean waters. However the high
operational monthly costs of $ 12 million79 born only by Italy, pressured the government to
close the project only after a year. ‘Mare Nostrum’ was among the rarest migration
management instruments with a focus on the humanitarian dimension instead of the
securitization one, by saving 130 000 people from certain death.
However, on a European level, the focus remained border control operation and not support
for search and rescue operation mission in the Mediterranean. The EU Member States have
failed to assume their obligation stemming from the Refugee Convention in helping refugees
fleeing persecution and failed in offering them safe legal avenues for claiming their right to
75 P. Fargues and S. Bonfanti, “When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives
crossing the Mediterranean and what Europe is doing about it.”, Migration Policy Centre, EUI,
October 2014. 76 P. Fargues, “Work, Refuge, Transit: An Emerging Pattern of Irregular Immigration South and East
of the Mediterranean”, International Migration Review 43(3), 2010, pp. 544–577. 77 H. de Haas, “The myth of Invasion: Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the
European Union”, Oxford: International Migration Institute. University of Oxford. 2007. 78 F. Tassinari and H. Lucht, “Fortress Europe. Behind the Continent's Migrant Crisis.”, Foreign
Affairs, 29 April 2015. 79 Ibid.
36
seek asylum. $ 650 per saved live was the price for saving a single refugee by Mare Nostrum
as claimed by the former spokeswoman for the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Laura Boldrini, 80 and the EU Member States failed in their solidarity when co-
finding of the mission was put under question. $ 650 was beyond the political willingness
on EU level, which brought the asylum applications and the hope for a better life by the
refugees at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea.
2.2.2 The Western Mediterranean Route
FRONTEX identifies the Western Mediterranean route as the sea passage from North Africa
to the Iberian Peninsula, and in addition the land route through the Spanish enclaves Ceuta
and Melilla, which are located in Morocco, as can be seen from Figure 4.81 This route is
mainly used by Algerian and Moroccan nationals and also by significant numbers of Sub-
Saharan Africans who are striving to reach Spain irregularly, hiding in trucks or containers
on ferries.82
Figure 4: Western Mediterranean route
Source: i-Map (Interactive Map on Migration)
80 Ibid. 81 “Western Mediterranean Route”, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-
mediterranean-route/, 82 Ibid.
37
If we explore the migratory pattern of the Western Mediterranean route since 1999, we can
see that it has decreased in intensity since the Strait of Gibraltar has been subjected to stricter
patrolling which led to diversification of the routes and maid Libya the preferred point of
departure to the EU.83 However, decreasing the migratory trend did not mean disappearing
because in 2003, one-quarter of the detected irregular migrants were sub-Saharan Africans
attempting to cross the Strait of Gibraltar, and in 2005 the Western Mediterranean route was
used by thousands of sub-Saharan migrants who were persistent in their effort to climb the
fence in Melilla, as the major point of entry for irregular migrants towards the EU in this
region.84
In order to curb the numbers of irregular migrants, the Spanish authorities undertook serious
border control measures, including border checks at the ports, heavy patrolling activities and
setting up the maritime surveillance system SIVE, as elaborated in previous chapter, along
the Spanish coast.85 Nevertheless, the securitizing of the EU’s external border in this region
did not prevent the migratory pressure in 2011, 2012 and 2013 at the Ceuta and Melilla from
Algerian and increased number of Sub-Saharan nationals. The situation heightened in 2014
with the emerging conflicts and violence in Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Central
African Republic and Chad, when large numbers of people were displaced and fleeing
havoc.86
Figure 5: Illegal border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route
Source: FRONTEX, 2015
83 A. Triandafyllidou and T. Maroukis, “Migrant Smuggling: Irregular migration from Asia and
Africa to Europe”, Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 84 J. Carling, “Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain”, International Migration vol. 45 no. 4,
2007, pp. 3-37. 85“Western Mediterranean Route”, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-
mediterranean-route/ 86 Ibid.
38
This resulted in 7840 detected irregular migrants in 2014, illustrated on Figure 5, attempting
to pass the Western Mediterranean route, out of which 3087 were detected in land border
controls at Ceuta and Melilla, whereas, more than 60% of all the detections in the same year
were migrants which were trying to cross the route by sea point, making the attempts even
more life-threatening.87
2.2.3 The Eastern Mediterranean Route
The Eastern Mediterranean route is reckoned by FRONTEX, as the second largest migration
point of entry since 2008, marking the pathway of migrants crossing through Turkey in order
to get to the European Union, while passing by Greece, Cyprus and Southern Bulgaria, as
presented on Figure 6. The main hot spot of smuggling networks is therefore located in
Istanbul, Izmir, Edirne and Ankara paving the irregular entry of mainly refugees coming
from Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia and migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa.88
This route reflects a dynamic pattern of developments of irregular migration ever since 2008-
2009, when via this route 40% of all the arriving migrants were coming in the European
Union, reaching the number of 40 000 detected crossings in the region.89 Here the River
Evros has crucial importance, marking the land border of Turkey and Greece, which
witnessed increased figures in detections in 2010. Reaching 300 diurnal irregular crossings
of the border near Orestiada, in late 201090 led to deployment of the Rapid Border
Intervention Teams (hereafter RABIT) by FRONTEX, comprising of one hundred-ninety-
one guest officers coming from 26 EU Member States after following a request of the Greek
authorities for further securitization and militarization of the EU external border.
87 Frontex, “Annual Risk Analysis”, Warsaw, 2015. 88 Frontex, “Eastern European Borders Quarterly”, Quarter 1, January–March 2015 89“Eastern Mediterranean Route”, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/eastern-mediterranean-
route/, 90 Ibid.
39
Figure 6: Eastern Mediterranean route
Source: i-Map (Interactive Map on Migration)
Similar to the previous routes, the securitization migration management instruments had
temporal limitations in delivering results regarding the containment of migratory flow, since
the numbers in 2011 plummeted once again, reaching a figure of 57 000 irregular border
crossings91 at the Turkish border.
This was confirmed with the increased number of detections at the end of 2012, when a fence
was installed by the Greeks on the border with Turkey, cracking the Evros river route.
Eventually this triggered increased migratory flows from the Turkish coast towards the
Greek islands, additionally increasing the irregular migrants crossing into Bulgaria as well.92
Migrants were travelling by boat via narrow straits which divide the mainland Turkey and
the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, Mytilini, Samos, Chios and Leros, whereas due to the
visa liberalization between the Turkish government and several African countries, African
91 Ibid. 92 F. Düvell, “Transit Migration in the European Migration Spaces: Politics, Determinants and
Dynamics” in: F. Düvell, I. Molodikova and M. Collyer (eds.), “Transit Migration in Europe”,
Amsterdam, University Press - IMISCOE Research, 2014, pp. pp. 209-236.
40
migrants were legally entering Turkey by plane and then paving their irregular entries into
the EU via Bulgaria and Greece with speedy progress.93
Additional to the militarization and securitization policies from 2012 and the construction of
a fence along a 12.5-kilometre area of the north-eastern town of Orestiada, the Greek
authorities undertook range of additional measures in order to curb the migratory pressure.
However, all of them had the above explained triggering, or ‘displacement’ effect towards
the Bulgarian land border and the Greek sea border with Turkey.94
Among them, FRONTEX identifies the quintessential ones:95
Operation Aspida, with the deployment of additional Hellenic police officers and
equipment to the Evros region;
Greek operation Xenios Zeus focused on inland detections of illegal stays and their
return;
Extension of the maximum length of detention period for migrants;
Increase in the capacity of detention centres for identification and return;
Reduction of the time during which irregular migrants had to leave Greece if not in
detention centres from 30 to seven days;
Strengthened cooperation of the Hellenic authorities with the Turkish border guards.
In 2013, the increased migratory flow mirrored the migration influx from Turkey towards
the Greek island from previous year on top of the looming number of Syrian refugees
crossing Bulgaria from Turkey.
93 P. Fargues and S. Bonfanti, “When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives
crossing the Mediterranean and what Europe is doing about it.”, Migration Policy Centre, EUI,
October 2014. 94 Frontex, “Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN)”, Quarter 2, April - June 2014, Warsaw, 2014 95 “Eastern Mediterranean Route”, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/eastern-
mediterranean-route/.
41
Figure 7: Illegal border crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route
Source: FRONTEX, 2015
As for the 2014, FRONTEX marked increase by 50% than previous year of irregular
migrants crossing into the EU, using the Eastern Mediterranean route, which converted it to
the second largest area for detections of irregular border crossings in the EU96 mainly by
Syrian refugees, which were fleeing violation and unrest and were convicted of making
irregular attempts to reach safe avenues for asylum. As FRONTEX depicts on Figure 7, a
total of 50,830 detections were made in 2014 compared to 24,800 in 2013 and almost 87
percent of all detections made use of the Sea route to cross into the EU.97
2.2.4 The Western Balkan Route
The Western Balkan route makes for very interesting analysis since it is used on one side by
the Balkan countries themselves as a source of migration and on the other side it is used as
a transit route by the Asian migrants which have made initial crossings of the EU border via
the Bulgarian-Turkish and the Greek-Turkish land/sea borders as presented on Figure 8.98
Once they make their way to Macedonia for example, they further proceed towards Hungary
by making use of the smuggling networks that operate in Macedonia and Serbia. According
96 Ibid. 97 Frontex, “Annual Risk Analysis”, Warsaw, 2015. 98 Ibid.
42
to the records of detections by FRONTEX, this route is notorious for the highest relative
increase of detections of Syrian and Somali refugees on the EU level.
What makes this route specific and gaining importance is the introduction of visa
liberalization for the Western Balkan countries in relation to EU.99 This changed the
established pattern of migration flow following this route and made it a dominant transit
zone for irregular migrants who were temporally residing in Greece. After the visa
liberalization, in 2012 the citizens from the Western Balkan countries, Macedonia, Serbia,
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania submitted 33 000 asylum applications,
which is by 53% more than in 2011.100
Figure 8: Section of Western Balkan route
Source: i-Map (Interactive Map on Migration)
The migration tendency led to more complex dynamics on this route, apropos the change in
the Hungarian migration and asylum legislation in January 2013, allowing asylum seekers
to be transferred to open centres. This served as an open call for 20 000 migrants coming
99 Frontex, “Western Balkan Route”, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-balkan-
route/, 100 Ibid.
43
from Kosovo, Serbia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, Morocco and sub-Saharan countries,
many of whom were previously stationed in Greece, to illegally cross the Hungarian-Serbian
border in order to apply for asylum.101 In July 2013 the migration influx reached 130
irregular border detections per diem at the Hungarian-Serbian border, which forced the
Hungarian authorities to respond with legislation amendments and provisions, forcing them
to put illegitimate asylum seekers in detention centres and to strengthen their border control
instalments.102
This resulted in temporary reduction of the irregular crossing but only until 2014, when the
numbers of Kosovars, who were illegally attempting to enter Hungary and seek asylum via
the shared border with Serbia significantly increased in volume.103 The increase of irregular
attempts took its natural flow since Kosovo was not granted with visa liberalization,
therefore the only way of Kosovars to reach EU soil was by irregular border crossings.
Figure 9: Illegal border crossings on the Western Balkan route
Source: FRONTEX, 2015
In this regards, the reports from FRONTEX index 43,360 irregular detections into the EU
through the Western Balkan route, as can be seen from Figure 9, marking a 46% increase in
comparison to the previous year. Among the irregular detections, a vast majority of them
were Kosovars (22,059), Afghans (8,342) in transit from Greece and Turkey, and Syrians
(7,320).104 The peak was reached from the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015 when this
route was used for irregular entries towards Hungary by +334 more percent of Kosovars,
101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Frontex, “Annual Risk Analysis”, Warsaw, 2015. 104 Ibid.
44
+386 percent of Syrians, +123 percent of Afghans and +299 percent of Palestinians.105 The
trend continued in the first five months of 2015, when 50,000 irregular detections were
registered, attempting to irregularly enter the EU border, but this time the majority were
coming from Syria and Afghanistan.106
The armour-plated border control of the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea made an offset
and intensified the route through Greece and Macedonia or Bulgaria alternatively and further
through Serbia to Hungary, as a cheaper, quicker and safer alternative route. Greece has
significantly contributed towards an intensification of the migration flow on the Balkan
route, directly linking them with the Schengen area, with its legal indiscipline of acting
against the EU migration and asylum regulations and not registering the arriving refugees
and permitting them to move on towards Western Europe.107
105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107M. Szpala and A. Sadecki, “Migration pressure on the Hungarian border”, Ośrodek Studiów
Wschodnich, 1 July 2015.
45
CHAPTER 3.
THE HUMAN COSTS OF FORTRESS EUROPE
3.1 EU’s Restrictive Migration Policies - A Detriment to Human Rights of
Migrants
“The ability of migrants to reach European soil despite a huge investment in securing
international borders shows that sealing them is impossible, and only serves to empower
people smugglers in the Mediterranean. Such policies only serve to open a new and lucrative
market for smuggling rings, a market which could not exist without this prohibition today.
The European Union and its member states must recognize that irregular migration is a
result of policies prohibiting immigration. If Europe insists on focusing most of its resources
on securitisation, it will fail to defeat smuggling rings. Europe needs to destroy the
smugglers’ business model, which was created when barriers and prohibitions to mobility
were erected and which thrives by evading the restrictive migration policies of EU Member
States.” 108
François Crépeau, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants
addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva
Additionally, the ineffectiveness of restrictive migration policies on EU level to curb
irregular migration was proven by more than 200,000 migrants and asylum seekers who
arrived in Europe by sea in 2014, compared with 80,000 in 2013, as well as the 100,000
migrants and asylum seekers who have arrived by boat so far this year.109
The reinforcement of the border controls in EU and the externalization of control towards
places of transit, located outside of Europe, increases the risk of fatality for migrants and
108 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Sealing international
borders is impossible, it only empowers smugglers”, Geneva, 16 June 2015. 109 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nation Human
Rights Council, “29th session of the Human Rights Council: Reports”.
46
jeopardises their rights, making them even more vulnerable.110 On one hand the inter-
regional migratory governance of migration flow established between Europe and Africa,
widens the border-crossing market111 and increases the margin of discretion for making
clandestine attempts for border crossings. Because of high-tech securitization of the existent
borders, migrants make a shift in their migratory patterns and choose more dangerous routes,
with a parallel increase on the risk of their lives.
On the other hand, the externalities of the heightened external border control concomitantly
with the externalization mechanisms of migration containment create barriers for
distinguishing between economic migrants and asylum seekers, and at the same time it leads
to restrictive reverberations for their right to apply for asylum. In this context, as reported
by Amnesty International, it is extremely difficult for refugees to access European territory
in order to apply for asylum and this is why in the transit zones of North Africa the asylum
systems are non-existent or at best option, with limited effectiveness.112
In order to analyse the correlations of the securitization instruments and human rights of
migrants, referring mostly to refugees, we can look at different events and measures sine the
establishment of Fortress Europe.
For example, the establishment of walls and fences, with clear examples in Spanish enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa in 2005 and in Greece, posed a challenge to migrants
coming from Sub-Saharan countries by forcing them to risk their lives in order to try to
overcome the fortified breaches. Constructing fences indicates a clear problem within the
European asylum system and the flows of the Dublin II Regulation with overburdening
responsibilities to the first countries of entry.
Furthermore, the high-tech border control at the Spanish border, enhanced with the SIVE
along with the established cooperation with Morocco, create externalities in terms of
consolidating alternative, long and by far more dangerous route for irregular migrants,
especially when it comes to the reckoned Atlantic Route linking harbour cities in Senegal,
Mauritania, Guinea and Mali with the Canary Islands.113 The same effect was produced in
110 P. Rekacewicz, “Mapping Europe’s War on Immigration”, Le Monde Diplomatique [web blog],
October 2013,
111 T. Spijkerboer, ““The Human Costs of Border Control”, European Journal of Migration and
Law, Vol. 9, p. 127-139, 2007. Available from: Social Science Research Network. 112 Amnesty International, “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights Violations Against
Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders”, Amnesty International report, 2014, p. 54 113 G. Pinyol, “Spain’s Immigration Policy as a new instrument of external action”, in: E. Barbé
47
Italy when the control was heightened in the Straits of Otranto, migrants re-oriented towards
the more dangerous Sicily route. Even more precarious implications to the human rights of
the migrants had the securitization practices of the Moroccan authorities, when they
proceeded with deportation of the apprehended Sub-Saharan migrants to the Morocco-
Algeria desert border and leaving them with no protection.114 Therefore, 2005 was a crucial
year for the EU to rethink its migration policy in direction of solving the migration
conundrum and the consequent migratory pressure at the Spanish borders, Lampedusa, Malta
and the Eastern Greek islands. The response was tougher immigration policy, with further
detrimental effects for the desperate migrants in an attempt to reach safe havens.
3.1.2 Externalization-Migration Policies to a Detriment of Human Rights of Migrants
Due to its scrutiny and complexity, the issue of tackling irregular migration has been a
connecting niche of several cooperation networks. The European Union in its strife to
enforce a ‘cross-pillar approach’ to migration has established a platform for cooperation and
dialogue with third countries via injections of financial aids to foster development and abate
the intensity of irregular migration. In this regard, with initiation of the Euro Mediterranean
Partnership (EMP) between 15 EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean countries and as
stipulated by the Barcelona Declaration, the main aim is to turn the Mediterranean region
into an area of dialogue, stability and prosperity.115 However, several critics single out, that
the EMP work programme in terms of migration was vastly dealing with readmission of
irregular migrants and reducing irregular migration to the European Union.
This EU’ Migration policy of containment and deterrence is also visible in the efforts of
establishing the instrument of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) from 2003, with a
main aim of promoting “a ring of friends” throughout the EU’s neighbourhood. However,
when we look at the effects, the “ring of friends” appears to be envisioned as genuine “buffer
zone” preventing irregular migration influxes while consolidating the idea of “Fortress
(coord.), Spain in Europe 2004-2008, Monograph of the Observatory of European Foreign
Policy, Barcelona, Insititut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2008. 114 Ibid. 115 S. Eylemer and S. Şemşit, “Migration-Security Nexus in the Euro-Mediterranean Relations”,
Perceptions Summer-Autumn 2007, pp. 49-70.
48
Europe”.116 Famous for its stick and carrot politics in the Enlargement process, the EU is
also confident in applying the same principle in its migration policy, when it is connecting
the development aid that some African countries are receiving with their efforts for curbing
irregular migration. Such example is the so called Rabat Plan, devised after the first Euro-
African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development Later in 2006 in Rabat when
the focus was put on repressive measures and answering European priorities in terms of
migration management via reinforcement of border controls, readmission agreements and
return of undocumented African nationals.117
The conditionality mechanism is also evident in the recent, literal process of proliferation of
detention institutions supported and funded by the European Union, often by its Return Fund,
in Border countries and non-EU countries. In this context, in the 2013 Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, these kind of facilities were
recognized in Sicily, Greece, Albania, Turkey and Libya and the conditions under which
refugees and irregular migrants are kept detained is under precarious observation.118 It is
evident that this sophisticated approach in its substance is not solving the very grass-root
issues of migratory push-factors, but only preventing irregular migrants from departing to
Europe through legal and safer channels and smuggling its way deeper into the EU. This
externalization trend of shifting the responsibility for preventing irregular migration into
Europe, to countries of departure or transit is only showing Europe’s short blanket and short-
sightedness when it comes to tailoring an effective, comprehensive and integrated European
Migration Agenda.119
As already tackled in this analysis, the Hague Program contributed greatly towards
mainstreaming readmission agreements in many of the EU’s external partnerships and
envisaged further capacity-building in third countries via border controls and asylum
procession. Together with the Stockholm Program, they ensured a securitized border control
116 E. Guild, “Cultural and Identity Security”, in: Guild, E. and J. Selm Van (eds.), International
Migration and Security, London, Routledge, pp. 101-112. 117 European Parliament, “Illegal immigration: “close partnership” needed”. Available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+IM-
PRESS+20060717STO09891+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN, 118 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, François Crépeau: Regional study: management of the external borders of the European
Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants”, 2013, pp. 12-14. 119 Ibid.
49
on EU’s external borders embodied in FRONTEX with its key role of the coordination of
border management, both among member states and between the EU and third countries.120
However, what was not ensured in this externalization mechanism was a harmonized
approach when implementing the provisions, which on paper were protecting the human
rights of migrants, but in practice were recording numerous severe violations. In this regard
the EU-devised externalization migration practices also reflect incompatibility with plethora
of human rights legislative frameworks which enshrine utmost protection and international
obligation to abide.
Externalization policies are in breach on one hand with Article 18 of the Charter which
stipulates the right to asylum and recalls the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees
and its Protocol, ensuring that the principle of non-refoulement is respected by EU, while it
cooperates with third countries and by Member States while performing their patrolling
operations.121 In addition, the EU fails in protecting the rights of migrants which do not
qualify for an asylum, in concrete their A(1) right to human dignity, A(2) right to life, A(3)
the integrity of the person and A(4) protecting them from degrading and inhuman treatment.
FRONTEX is portrayed as the main perpetrator when it comes to violations of human rights
of migrants my many organizations and NGO that deal with protection of human rights. The
apprehended migrants are regularly captured and returned to third countries, often with no
individual case examination, which is in breach of the non-refoulement right of potential
asylum seekers.
Critical considerations also arise from the ‘safe third country’ principle, as stipulated in
Directive 2005/85/EC, regarding the procedures for receiving a refugee status. With this
Directive, the EU Member States are in a preferential position vis-à-vis the asylum seekers
since they are granted with the right to transfer the asylum seeker in the so-called ‘’safe’
third countries, where is it more appropriate to file their claim for asylum.122 However the
assessment of what represent a ‘safe’ third country is in the discretion of the Member State.
Hence, because of harmonization vacuum in the rule, asylum seekers are lacking the
120 European Council, “Presidency Conclusions” 14292/1/04 (The Hague Programme), 4-5
November 2004, Brussels, 8 December, 2004. 121 V. Todeschini, “The Externalisation of Migration Control: An Assessment of the European
Union’s Policy in the Light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights”, in: McCarthy, H. and A.
Patyna (eds.), Migration, Human Rights and Security in Europe: Migration Research Unit, MRU
Student Conference Proceedings, University College London 2012, pp. 18-24. 122 S. Morgades, “The Externalisation of the Asylum Function in the European Union”, GRITIM
Working Paper Series, no. 4, Spring 2010
50
opportunity of remaining in EU Member States of their preference which can result in
violation of their right to claim asylum in safe for them surrounding.
In the same fashion works the established Regional Protection Program as another form of
externalization instrument. With this program the EU asylum system is copied in another
non-EU country, with a purpose of preventing unwanted migrants to reach EU soil and to
decrease return operational costs. However, this copy-and-paste system is not flawless and
produces externalities, since these countries do not want to be solely responsible for the
protection of potential refugees and therefore have the incentive to introduce legal provisions
which will challenge the process of acquiring an asylum status.123
3.1.3 Push-backs and Outsourcing of Border-Policing
Moreover, the international refugee protection system is jeopardized with the creation of
buffer-zones especially in countries as Libya. This form of ‘policing from distance’ is
incorporated via offshoring visa controls, detention centres and maritime controls, but in
essence is a way to circumvent the responsibilities stemming from the 1951 Refugee
Convention.124 Succinctly, Libya cannot be held accountable for potential human rights
abuses of asylum seekers which are transiting or residing on its territory because, the country
has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention nor other international human rights
conventions. The European Union despite being aware of this fact continues with the push-
back practices, and relies on Libya to contain irregular migrants while in return injects
development aid to the country. The result leaves thousands of refugees in a limbo state, who
cannot return to their countries of origin because of persistent war and violence and are
therefore subject to the precarious alternative to seek refuge in some of the camps along the
land borders of Libya, where protection is minimal. These buffer zones, backfired in several
occasions with aggravated political atrocities happening in Libya, where migrants from Sub-
123 T. G. Hansen and H, G. Hansen, “The Right to Seek – Revisited. On the UN Human Rights
Declaration Article 14 and Access to Asylum Procedures in the EU”, European Journal of
Migration and Law, 10, 2008, pp. 439-459. 124 E. T. Nicholson, “Cutting off the Flow: Extraterritorial Controls to Prevent Migration”, The Chief
Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy, Issue Brief, Berkeley, University of
California, Berkeley Law School, 2011.
51
Saharan countries were labelled as governmental associates by rebels and therefore were
physically annihilated.125
Further on, as a consequence of the inherited flow of the regulation, all of the captured
migrants from Italy are being sent back to Greece, violating the non-refoulement principle.
However, instead of recognizing their own derogations of the international refugee systems
both countries are justifying their actions with the bilateral agreement that they have signed
in March, 1999 relating to the provision of ‘readmission of persons of irregular situation’.126
In the spirit of the international refugee protection framework, the European Court of Human
Rights has ruled that bilateral agreements cannot serve as a justification of practices which
are in odds with the human rights. Therefore in 2014, in the case of Sharifi and Others v.
Italy and Greece, the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the treatment of irregular
migrants who had entered Italy from Greece and then had been deported back to Greece,
with the fear of subsequent deportation to their respective countries of origin.127 It was
established by the Court that both countries have violated A (3) and A (13) of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and that Italy had violated
A (4) of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.128 Whereas, in 2012, in the case Hirsi Jamaa and
Others v. Italy, the court held that Italy had violated Articles 3, 4 and 14 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by returning Somali and
Eritrean migrants travelling by sea back to Libya.129
3.1.4 FRONTEX’ Security Practices in Breach of Human Rights of Migrants
In continuum to some of the purported breaches of human rights of migrants, in 2010 Human
Rights Watch singled out FRONTEX for being involved in exposing migrants to risk of
suffering, degrading and inhuman treatment in the detention facilities in Evros, Greece,
during RABIT 2010. Namely, FRONTEX directly facilitated the process of apprehension of
125 W. Wheeler and A. Oghanna, “After Liberation, Nowhere to Run”, The New York Times, 29
October 2011 126 K. Ifantis, “Addressing Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean”, Centre for European Studies.
p.26 127 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, François Crépeau: Mission to Sri Lanka”, A/HRC/29/36/Add.1, 2015, p. 9. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid.
52
irregular migrants and their transportation to detention facilities which were known for
offering degrading and inhuman conditions.130 In particular, in detention cases children
suffer most because until their age is verified, they are being kept in detention centres which
do not fulfil basic health and sanitary conditions for children which is in violation with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, particularly Article 3.
3.1.5 Dublin II and EURODAC Restricting Migrants’ Right of Free Movement
The established system under Dublin II imposes restrictions on the movement of asylum
seekers, which is not in line with the principle of freedom of movement within EU.131 By
restricting them to claim their right to asylum in the first country of entry into the EU,
migrants are often detained in front line countries, mainly Italy, Spain, Malta and Greece
which face the burden of processing the asylum applications. Despite the unilateral will by
some Member States to assist the process and to not return some of the migrants to the first
country of entry and despite pledges for binding quotas for sharing the burden among
Member States, the situation on the ground identifies violation of the human rights of
migrants in terms of restricting their movement in countries where there are limited
economic and social opportunities for them. These restrictions result with direct correlation
to increasing the margin of operation of smugglers, whom migrants rely on for making their
precarious attempt to reach their desired country of destination and to avoid the obliging
fingerprinting system.
With the EURODAC data basis, migrants are fingerprinted in their first country of entry and
registered in the data basis, which is shared among Member States.132 Therefore in order to
avoid being returned to countries of entry, they further on pave their clandestine and
dangerous way towards destination countries. The situation further escalates in terms of
violation of their rights with the legal provisions by some Member States as Greece, Italy
and Malta which allows them to use even force in case of resistance by migrants to be
fingerprinted.133
130 Human Rights Watch, “The EU’s Dirty Hands Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant
Detainees in Greece”, 2011, pp. 48-50. 131 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, François Crépeau: Mission to Sri Lanka”, A/HRC/29/36/Add.1, 2015. p.18 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid.
53
With these instruments the paradigm of migrants is strengthened as illegal persons and this
conceptualization has led to intensified use of detentions and has contributed towards
legitimizing policies which are in certain manner discriminative and xenophobic.134 It is
essential to distinguish that entering the European Union, with no documentation and fleeing
persecution on irregular manner is indeed an undocumented and unauthorized access, but by
no mean can be regarded as a criminal act.
134 Ibid.
54
3.2 Costs of Fortress Europe vs. Human Lives Costs
An the most dangerous consequence of the negligence from respecting the human rights
framework is the 50-fold increase in migrant and refugee deaths, year by year, tolling in
2015.135 Over 30 000 refugees and migrants died in their attempt to reach or stay in Europe
since 2000.136 From this reasons, at the end in Annex 1 a full list of recorded deaths of
migrants who lost their lives in desperate attempts to climb over Fortress of Europe is shown,
since their legal avenues for seeking protection were absent in the externalization and
securitization dimension of EU’s migration policy. The same line of concern is shared by
the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, who accentuates
in his Report to the Human Rights Council: “The European Union’s collective response to
the Syrian crisis exposes a remarkably intransigent refusal to offer Syrians any significant
migration opportunities and pushing them to smugglers’ networks.”137 On the other hand,
the operational cost for maintaining the Fortress of Europe is as follows.
The Directorate-General for Home Affairs of the European Commission allocated almost €4
Billion for the period 2007-2013 to the four funding instruments under the Solidarity and
Management of Migration Flows Programme (SOLID) to support member states’ activities
on asylum, integration, return of third country nationals and border control.138 Almost half
of this (€1,820 million) was allocated for activities, equipment and technological
infrastructure focusing on control of the external borders of the Schengen area.139 Just 17%
(€700 million) was allocated to support asylum procedures, reception services and the
resettlement and integration of refugees as illustrated on Figure 10.140
135 Amnesty International, “Mediterranean crisis: UN points to 50-fold increase in deaths amid
European government inaction”, 2015. 136 The Migrants Files, “The Money Trails”, http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/#/the-money-trails,
18 June 2015. 137 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, François Crépeau: Mission to Sri Lanka”, A/HRC/29/36/Add.1, 2015. 138 Amnesty International, “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights Violations Against
Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders”, Amnesty International report , 2014. 139 Ibid. 140 See website of the European Commission Directorate General for Home Affaires at:
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/index_en.htm.
55
Figure 10: Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Program (2007-2013)
Source: Amnesty International, 2014
The staggering inverse correlation between spending on border control and refugee support
is even more evident in EU funding allocations to individual member states which are
guarding the EU’s external borders. From Figure 11 it is evident, how for example, Bulgaria
was allocated only a little over 8% of the total amount under the SOLID Programme for
activities funded by the Refugee Fund, whereas almost 74% was for activities funded by the
External Borders Fund.141
Figure 11: Allocation of Refugee and External Borders Funds in some MS (2007-2013)
Source: Amnesty International, 2014
141Amnesty International, “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights Violations Against
Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders”, Amnesty International report, 2014.
56
While on one hand, refugees and migrants spend over 1 Billion Euros per year in order to
reach a European Soil, on the other hand, the European Union is paying even more to prevent
them from coming. This correlation is well presented in the Project Money Trails142,
assessing the financial costs of the main instruments of securitization and externalization of
EU’s migration policies presented as follows.
Detention Centers in Third Countries - 45,800,000 €
Technical Assistance to Third Countries - 74,658,000 €
Fortifications (Walls) - 76,600,000 €
(Melilla Wall - 47,000,000 €)
Gear for European Border Guards - 225,710,000 €
Research and Development Programs for Curbing Migration Influxes - 230,000,000€
Research on Artificial Noses that Sniff Refugees and Migrants - 16,000,000 €
European Coordination Efforts - 954,717,510 €
(Through programs such as Seahorse network, FRONTEX, EURODAC, eu-LISA
and more).
EURODAC - 8,117,510 €
FRONTEX - 669,600,000 €
Deportations - 11,300,000,000 €
(Excluding deportations within Europe under the Dublin Regulation).143
142 The Migrants Files, “The Money Trails”, http://www.themigrantsfiles.com/#/the-money-trails, 18
June 2015. 143 Ibid.
57
3.3 Recommendations
The human costs of the restrictive approach of the European Union’s border management
and migration policy are too high and are indicating inherited and consistent flows in the
system. Neglecting the human rights dimension when dealing with the migration crisis is
pouring further towards human suffering and under no mean is curbing the migration
pressure. Hence, it is quintessential to be developed a human-rights based framework
accompanied with political will to reform the course of EU’s migration policy. In this
direction archetypical recommendations for the European Union and its Member States
arise.
3.3.1 Changing the Threat Paradigm
Initially, it is necessary to learn from mistakes and change the paradigm that migrants are
threat and that with closing borders the incentives of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants
will minimize, since practices over the years have shown inverse results. Developing a
coherent and robust migration policy, which in it fullness reflects the human rights of
migrants as stipulated in international and regional legal frameworks is the panacea to the
migration humanitarian crisis.144
3.3.2 Investment in Regular Migration Avenues
The EU should take a global lead in regards to ending the civil war in Syria, the mayhem in
Libya and other humanitarian crisis which broadens the smuggling market and jeopardizes
lives of refugees. In meanwhile, it should be assured measures for establishing cooperation
with other countries in the global North and developing resettlement opportunities, in order
over 1 million of the world’s refugee to be safely accommodated in the European Union,
presenting 0.2 percent of the total population of the Union.145
3.3.3 Investment in Search and Rescue Missions
Search and rescue missions should be the cornerstone of the migration management strategy,
since EU Member States have to abide the obligations of the international law they are
signatures, when helping migrant in peril. In this context it is necessary to enhance solidarity,
144 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, François Crépeau: Mission to Sri Lanka”, A/HRC/29/36/Add.1, 2015, p. 12. 145 Ibid. p. 18
58
and develop burden and responsibility-sharing mechanisms between border and non-border
States in regards to search and rescue operation but also with resources assisting the asylum
applications processing.146
3.3.4 Ensuring Oversight and Control Mechanisms for Externalization Instruments
Here, the priority is to reform the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility towards
coherence and introduction of monitoring and oversight measures assuring the respect of
human rights of migrants.147 This is valid for all the external agreements signed between EU
and third countries of origin or transit, ensuring that human rights of migrant are taken into
utmost account. Moreover, all singed agreements including readmission agreements,
technical cooperation with police, border guards or coastguards, or other soft law
instruments such as mobility partnerships148 should be subjected to public scrutiny. Here,
both on EU level and on Member States’ level have to be taken all the necessary legal
measures in order their national legislation/regulations/ operational guidelines that
implement readmission agreements, explicitly to address effective substantive and
procedural safeguards, which guarantee the respect of non-refoulement principle.149
3.3.5 Reforming the Dublin Regulation
Developing instruments for responsibility – sharing and emboldening solidarity between EU
Member States as stipulated in A (80) TFEU and in the Communication on enhanced intra-
EU solidarity in the area of asylum.150 Notwithstanding, revision of the Dublin regulation is
a must in order to tackle the overburdened current guardians of EU’s external borders, Italy,
Greece, Malta, Spain and Bulgaria, when dealing with claims for asylum. In this direction,
speaks volume the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants when accentuating:
a) Reverse the present logic by allowing asylum seekers to register their asylum
claims in the country of their choice within the European Union, while supporting
146 Ibid. p. 19 147 Ibid. 148 Amnesty International, “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights
Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders”, Amnesty
International report, 2014. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. p.21
59
the countries receiving asylum claims with proportionate and adequate financial
and technical support.151
b) Invest in the considerable expansion and harmonization of the European Asylum
Support Office through several mechanisms, including through mutual
recognition of refugee status determination decisions, exchange of refugee judges
between States, a common European Union refugee determination appeal board
and common or shared reception mechanisms.152
3.3.6 Halt Push-Backs of Migrants
Considering the detriment that push-ups cause in relation to the right to asylum, it is
necessary this practice to be stopped and moreover the apprehended irregular migrant should
be granted with a temporary legal status, so that they can seek remedy in due time.153 In this
direction, Frontex Executive Director should activate Article 3(1)a of the Regulation (EU)
No 1168/2011 and suspend the parts of Joint Operations Poseidon Land and Poseidon Sea
relating to the patrolling of Greece’s borders with Turkey in the Evros region and the Aegean
Sea and deal with the allegations for massive push-backs.154 It is also in vital interest of the
asylum seekers, especially the ones that are institutionalized in detention centres to be
immediately offered with access to fair asylum procedure and to prevent their unjustifiable
transfer to a country where they can face persecution or harm. In order to ensure the
successful implementation of the procedure, monitoring mechanism should be developed to
tackle potential injustices.
3.3.7 Review of Border Management Polices
Proving the deadly effects of securitization of EU’s external border, the EU and its Member
States have to do a revision of their border management policies and instigate a human-rights
based approach when addressing migration influxes. The accent should be put on FRONTEX
and EUROSUR, as main border surveillance instruments, while performing their roles of
integrated border management to take into utmost account the human rights dimension
151 Ibid p.22 152 Ibid. 153 Amnesty International, “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe. Human Rights
Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders”, Amnesty International
report, 2014.
154 Ibid.
60
first155 and respect the human rights obligations to help refugees in distress situations.
Succinctly, they should protect EU’s external borders, while at the same time protecting and
saving the lives of migrants.
155 Ibid.
61
Conclusion
Driven by the aim to understand the current systemic failures of EU’s migration management
policies and identify the negative corollaries they produce towards human rights of migrants,
this thesis explored six research questions and one leading hypothesis. After the conducted
research, it can be inferred that the main hypothesis was confirmed in claiming that “The
externalization of migration border’s control and the securitization of EU’s external borders
are having detrimental effects on human rights of migrants, especially on refugees and
asylum seekers”.
In Chapter 1 were addressed two research questions “What is the genesis and which are the
factors of securitizing migration as a threat?” and “What are the current political strategies
on EU-level for curbing the irregular migration challenge?” It was established that the notion
of securitizing the borders in order to corner migration influxes became a norm with
incorporating legal obligations to Member States from the Schengen Convention of the 1990
and afterwards the EU Acquis within the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999. The securitization
process appeared to be developing along the ongoing Europeanization process. Additionally
the restrictive migration policy was implemented through the securitization of EU borders
via a genuine process of “Berlinization” and militarization on one hand, and on the other
hand via externalization of the border control, instrumented via readmission agreements,
offshore visa facilities, detention centres and developments aid programs with third
countries.
In Chapter 2 were tackled the following research questions “To what extent are the
securitization and externalization dimension of EU’s border management in compliance with
the international human rights legal framework and the international refugee protection
system?” and “Which are the latest migration developments and the most precarious
irregular migratory routes?”. In this regard were explored the weaknesses of the very process
of ‘externalization’ of migration management which converts asylum-seekers to irregular
migrants. These practices are making the securitization-borders-migration nexus crowded
by adding up human rights violations in the equation. Concerns in the same direction were
raised for the mobility partnerships as an instrument of the GAMM framework, for their
selectivity and failure to accentuate development instead of securitization policies. In the
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, it is noted the mobility
partnerships have been futile in their efforts as sophisticated political tool to strengthen
62
dialogue and cooperation with non-European Union countries on matters related to migration
and mobility.
While exploring the hallways of irregular migration, FRONTEX identified four main routes,
taken by 96.5% of irregular migrants to pave their way to EU: the Central Mediterranean,
Eastern Mediterranean, Western Balkan and Western Mediterranean routes. Respectively to
the reported detections of irregular border crossings, it was evident that the Central
Mediterranean route is in these terms “Via Egnatia” with tripling figures of migration flows
in comparison to the others.
Finally in Chapter 3 were elaborated the last two research questions “In what way is the
European border management and protection system hampering the human rights of
migrants, with a focus on refugees and asylum seekers?” and “Can Fortress Europe be
justified upon the human costs of protecting borders?”. In this direction it was elaborated
that the reinforcement of the border controls in EU and the externalization of control towards
places of transit, located outside of Europe, increases the risk of fatality for migrants and
jeopardises their rights, making them even more vulnerable. On one hand the inter-regional
migratory governance of migration flow established between Europe and Africa, widens the
border-crossing market and increases the margin of discretion for making clandestine
attempts for border crossings. Because of high-tech securitization of the existent borders,
migrants make a shift in their migratory patterns and choose more dangerous routes with a
parallel increase of the risk of their lives. Further on it was concluded that the most dangerous
consequence of the negligence from respecting the human rights framework is the 50-fold
increase in migrant and refugee deaths, year by year, tolling in 2015. Therefore the rationale
behind Fortress Europe cannot be justified over the price of over 30 000 dead refugees and
migrants, who desperately attempted to reach or stay in Europe, if one checks upon the
numbers since the year 2000.
Concluding, securitization of EU’s external borders and externalization of border controls
can be justified only with full respect of the fundamental rights and assuming and practicing
the obligations stemming from the 1951 Refugee Convention. This reflects a shared
responsibility of both the EU and the international community in order to tackle the urging
humanitarian disaster happening at the Mediterranean corridor. Devising migration
management policies while prioritising the paradigm of human rights is a moral,
humanitarian and a legal obligation to act upon.
63
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APPENDIX 1