The Official Histories of the

6994th Security Squadron

“Top 10” Questions

Question #1. What role did ARDF play in predicting, or failing to predict, the Tet offensive of 1968? Were EC-47 assets specifically tasked to support the defense of Khe Sanh (Operation Niagara, etc.?) Did ARDF contribute significantly to the defense of Khe Sanh? Did USAFSS address these sorts of questions and document the findings? Response. Brief extracts from

The 6994th history for 1 January 1968 - 30 June 1968 The Det. 2 history for the same period a USAFSS monograph, New Eyes in War: The Story of Airborne Radio Direction Finding.

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1 {) OCT 1970

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HIS TOR Y

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6 9 94th SEC URI T Y SQUADRON

1 January 1968 - 30 June 1968

RCS: AU-D5 (USS-l)

Tan Son Nhut"" Ai"r Base) V'letnam

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MHZ) and "A" band tuners (j 90 MHZ)" The

as sUPFort for p.r~ject Dye Mali' er/Muscle85

jor RT collection effort the 8quadron~

Sanh p and the employment of the IIQII system aircraft in an

implement their EW OPLAN 1...68;> which could result in the88

communications~ The situation became more serious with

FM apability.<> l."'rovided by the "E" band tune 9 facilitated

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band (60-260 MHZ) uners in the ~ J receivers were re-

tuners (10

RT communications below 30 MHZ that were tentativel iden-

During early January 1968» indications were that MACV J3 would~

CONTAINS liVGCO MATERfAl

iiizing sufficient RT communications to justify a greater effort.

ember 1967) the squ8.dron added a VHF capability to all "Z"84

a!rcraf at Detachment 2 ~ The linguist capability was also n-

additional TDY personnel from the 6990th Security Squad

nt pes influx of linguist enabled the squa on to conduct hear-

These ests owever~ yielded negative86

. the only source of RT continue from the r.MZ areae During

R1XX communications~

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active mode became imminent. Plans called for the deployment of the "Q"

system aircraft to Detachm~nt 23 therefore;; the detachment was 'instructed to

utilize factory=trained. IIQIi operators in the nrosrective target ar~as (MACV

Areas 6 ~ ?" 9;; 11 and 12L Th~ squadron also took fonow-up action on pending

modification to the "Qll eonaol€s wM.eh had been submitted d.uring November 1967-; 90

General Westmoreland8 howeveri) decided not to employ the system and directed

that it be retained in a constant state of readiness~

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PORTER j Captain~ USAFOfficer

I SECREY-IHISTORY OF DETACHMENT 2~ 6994th SECURITY SQUADRON

This docmnent contains information affecting th~ national defenseof the United States l<;J.thin the mea.ning of the Espionage Laws(Title 18~ USC p Sections 793 and 794) the transmission or revela­tion of which~ in any manner» to an unauthorized person, is pro­hibited by law"

HQ AF ISR Agency

Security OffiC{)J~Reviewed by: c/'Date: .ztJ./16 ) tUc-~~ClassificatiOn: 0-

MSgt JOHN Do MULKEYNCOIC~ Mission Management

Prepared by~

Res g AU~,D5 (USS=l)

January 1968 = 30 June 1969

TSgt JAMES P. CASSIDYNCOlC» Mission Control

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[SECREr]CONTAINS HVCCO MATERIAL

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: it to our advantage! .

I tain identification aids for the II Corps area, ~t~ S-r ~..C'! (srrvCCO) During the Tet offensive this section began worki.ng as a psuedo

., Idirect surrart unit~ in close coordination with the 509th Special Forces Unit

analyst stationed at USM~-604? Fixes attained in Kontum. Dak To~ Pleiku area

;\ .....ere immediately forwarded to the 509th Special Forces Unit via OPSCOMM, Ev.en

though reported to a normal direct support unit~ we found that by utilizing

. the OPSCOMM circuit we could provide the Special Forces the oprortunity to

evaluate and react to our area fix input before they received the fix through

CRITICOMM channels~ via direct support unit or recovery report media. This

support was commended by the Pleiku Air Base Commander verbally to the Detach­

ment Commander in March 1968, He stated that the close direct sUPfori provided

·by this unit to local area commanders, via liaison with the 330th Radio Re-

search Company and 509th Special Forces Unit~ provided them with intelligence

readily available p nor so rapid as their norma.l sources. Further, that

intelligence provided was instrumental in providing the local defense

of enemy intentionso

(SHVCCO) To increase the aids for the radio operators during their missions,

he Ground Analysis Section began providing them with the priority lAs of the

urrounding areas and of areas passed through to and from their mission area~

technical support allowed for t~~ ~uick identification of

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SECURITY SERVICE

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NEW EYES IN WAR

The ~tOl'Y ofAirborne Radio Direction Finding

ByThomas N. Thompson

Command Hi:3torical Office

SfhECftxL H1HJDLlf?TG J;;:;gQUIHrnJ!?'lJJT RELi5_"rSADLE "fOP8REfeN NAT'IONA1S3

·'he information contained Ln thisdocument will not be disclosed toforeign nationals or their repre­sentatives.

15 January 1970

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USAFSS FOR.... 86IJUN~7 a "'Et', I:

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EXCLUDED FRO"t;I AUTC::',\A:rICRJSGRADll"G; DOD Din :l:2()O.l(l

DOSS NOT APPLY

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~NCUSSIFlfO

ARDF Highly Competent; lV1o~Generally Recognized

(U) ~ SteadUy the appreciation of the value of AHDF increased among

field commanders up and down the line as the ARDF fleet covered the war

torn nation far and wide. GeneraL Westmoreland's enthusiasm at least

UNClASSIFIED

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equaled that of the most avid supporters when he said:

Except for those targets designated as "off limits" by this head­quarters, commanders are directed to take timely advantage of thisvalid intelligence to direct appropriate air str ikes, naval gunfire,artillery, ground maneuvers, visual reconnaissance, FACs or otheractivities in the vicinity to destroy the enemy. ARDF targets shouldbe involved in day and night harrassment and interdiction fi.res.

The operational fleet of nearly 50 EC-47s was just about full strength in

numbers and supporting, to one ext'2nt or another, all ground operations.

Paddington, Riley, Strike II, Shenandoah 11, Akron III, Santa Fe, Benton,

Wallowa/Wheeler, Pershing, Greeley, Ma1heur I & II, Bolling, Byrd,

Francis Marion, MacArthur, Dak To, and many others, became almost

household words in the nation I s news and demanded sustained effort over

1967 and into 1968.

(U)~ In some, where COMPASS DART provided all of the ARDF support,

the results could be seen and appreciated. Supporting special forces troops

in the Kontum Province, for instance, it flew the only coverage eliciting

comments from the field comrnander that the service had saved many lives

in his command; lives which might have been lost I' ••• without advance

warning of enemy element locations. II He said further:

... On behalf of my men and rnyself I would like to thank youand all personnel connected with l3upport operations to Blackjack25 fOt' a job extremely well done. It is assuring to know that wecan rely on Detachment 1, 6994th Security Squadron (Nha Trang) forsuperior and outstanding support in the future.

(U)~ L-1. November 1967, the same USAFSS unit played a major role in a

classic example of electronic intelligence in the Battle of Dak To. In

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;.;~Division, 174th Independent Rgt., 24th Independent Rgt., 2nd Division,c·

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173rd Airborne Bde. to reinforce the city. By the end of the first week in

DAHT followed the movements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front, 1st, .

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mid·October in response to 16t U. S. In£. Div requirements. COMPASS

general direction of Dak To. The U. S. 4th In£. Div. called in the U. S.

and other enemy units as they all headed from their last locations in the

November, enemy units had virtually encircled Dak To. and special intelli-

gence sources reported signs of impending attack. It came on 7 November,

and for lOcdays the fighting was fast and furious. But whenever the enemy

changed his tactical positions, ARDF detected the moves as radios chattered

orders.

(u)~ By the 17th of the month, the North Vietnamese began to withdraw

in the direction of the Cambodian bOl~der as U. S. artillery, air strikes and

infantry probes hounded their every move. The ARDF management agency

called 1st In£. Divisionis appetite for ARDF fixes "insatiable." As the

North Vietnamese withdrew from Dak To. a South Vietnamese regiment set

out to cut off his retreat. U. S. losses were high at Dak To, regardless, but

an Army visitor to Nha Trang several weeks later said they would have

been "infinitely higher 11 had it not be'3n for ARDF.

(u)~ Later, in the Spring of 1968, the story of Khe Sanh was similar,

although it was an even greater inte1J.igence effort over the long haul. The

rugged terrain and the inclement wea.ther reduced the use of normal intelli-

gence-eollection methods (radar, photography, visual, etc.) and ARDF

d ~ lASS I

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emerged as a most important tool in locating and identifying enemy units.

More significantly, however, was the spreading recognition of the tech-

niqueassomething of extreme value to field commanders. General

Westmoreland had already asked for twice as much ARDF time as he

was getting at the time; a demand later repeated by Gen. Creighton Abrams,

his replacement.

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