The Only WayTo PreventGenocide

Creative diplomacy can make a différence.But in the end, it may all come down

to the willingness oftheUnited States to act.

By Tod lindberg

•AVE YOUEVER FOUNDyourself in the positionof asking, on your ownbehalf or on behalf ofothers, how many orprecisely which peopleit would be useful to killin order to secure a ben-

I efit for yourself or yourcause? And just how to do it? No? Others have. Theiranswers have ranged from Cain's original "Abel, withmy bare hands" to Hitler's "all the Jews, mainly by gas,"and the widespread Hutu view in the Rwanda of 1994,

TOD LINDBERG is a researchfellowat the Hoover Institution, Stanford University,and the editor o/Policy Review.

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"the TUtsis, with machetes." The question burns todayfor the government of Sudan and in the Congo.

Humanity will never be able to solve the problemof Cain, of fratricidal rage born of jealousy or someequivalent passion, nor of the more calculating retailimpulse to profit in some way from doing someone in.Thus, for individuals, we maintain a system of laws,police forces, courts, prisons, mental hospitals, and,for extreme cases, the apparatus of the death penaltyto punish those whom an impulse or cold calculationhas led to murder—thereby deterring (so we hope) atleast some others from embarking on a similar courseof action. But we understand that our system is nosolution to the problem of murder.

It is not obvious, however, or should not be, thatbecause the human condition gives us no prospect ofridding the world of murder, we must be similarly pes-

simistic about our ability to rid the world of murderon the scale of populations. Mass atrocities, up to thepoint of genocide, are not simply collective acts of in-dividual murder. Though genocides are not uniform incharacter, they are all political. Genocide constitutesthe most extreme possible terms for settling differ-ences: a stronger party's decision to annihilate or ex-tirpate the weaker. Genocide is organized. It entails aproject, which in turn requires leaders with a purposein mind and their acquisition of the means of death,including followers to do the dirty work.

We simply do not have to put up with this. By'Sve," let me be clear. I do not mean "humanity," al-though I would welcome the collective conclusion ofmankind that genocide is unacceptable. I do not meanthe "international community," although a decision onthe part of all national governments to refrain fromengaging in mass atrocities at home or abroad wouldbe most welcome, as would a collective intention tostop and punish leaders or would-be leaders seekingto deviate from the norm. What I really mean by "we"is "we who are strong enough to stop the murderousbastards before they can get away with it."

This "we" is an inclusive group; everyone with awill and a way is welcome. But its purpose must go farbeyond declaratory well-wishing. It is not a bad thingbut a grossly insufficient thing to join in choruses of"never again," the familiar refrain after somethingreally bad has happened—say, 6 million dead Jews, 2million dead Cambodians, or 800,000 dead Tlitsis. No,we must a£t to stop the malefactors.

And by "we," in the last analysis, I mean theUnited States.

WE HAVE the privilege tolive at a time of unprec-edented prosperity, and weknow howto generate moreof it. Anybody who thinksthe present financial crisishas changed these funda-

mental facts is engaged in the time-honored humanpropensity for self-dramatization Our prosperity isaccompanied by a likewise unprecedented confluenceof power and moral sensibility—or at least it seems tobe. With regard to atrocities on a mass scale, we havethe means at our disposal to stop what we and all right-thinking people know is wrong. It comes down to thechoice of whether to act or not.

If we are unable to muster the political will toprevent or halt genocide and mass atrocities, the long-term consequences are truly chilling to contemplate.This is of course especially true with regard to future

victims: the terror of being rounded up and held atgunpoint, especially in the final few seconds, as theshooting starts; of feeling the first slash of a swingingmachete, knowing that more are coming. But it is alsotrue for us. Future generations more committed tothe principles we espouse but fail to act on may lookhack with disdain or disgust on our failure. Or, morehorrifying still, future generations will conclude thatall moral reasoning in political matters is sentimentalsuperstructure that should be jettisoned in the interestof clarity about the first and only tnie principle of poli-tics: the strong take care of themselves and the weakare on their ovm.

The progress of politics and civilization itselfis nothing other than the long, difficult, incompletestruggle to overcome the original political principle ofself-regard by instilling in the strong an empathetic re-gard for others. The first successes came in the mists ofprehistory in the form of small groups ceasing to fightamong themselves—clan, tribe, city. With the spreadin terms of territory and clout of rights-regardingnation-states in recent centuries, it became possibleto imagine cooperative efforts among such states toextend a principle of regard for others across interna-tional boundaries, indeed globally. In 1998, the NATOalliance—led, of course, by the United States—wentto war against Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing andatrocities in Kosovo, averting a potential genocide inclose proximity to NATO territory. But in 2004, afterthe US. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, declared thatatrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan amounted togenocide, the response of the United States and oth-ers was uncertain and halting at best. Hundreds ofthousands of lives were lost and millions evacuatedtheir homes for refugee and displaced-persons camps.There they remain.

So, in recent memory, "we" have acted effective-ly, showing that we can, and "we" have failed to act ef-fectively, revealing a gap between our professed moralsense and what we are prepared to do to vindicate it.The test of progress for this generation is whether wewill be able to extend the principle of regard for othersby acting when necessary to prevent or halt genocide.

WORDS ARE NOT enough;however, words matter. Allthings considered, when itcomes to the importance ofpreventing genocide andmass atrocities, we talka pretty good game. First

there are American words. It is (or should be) a pointof pride for believer and atheist alike that our founding

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national document, the Declaration of Independence,affirms that people are endowed by their Creator with,first of all, a right to life. The right to live can be espe-cially difficult to vindicate. There is no one to whom adrowning man can appeal; it is not wrong for the waterto drown him. But it surely is wrong if governments,wholly the creations of people, deny or violate thisbasic right. The Declaration sets forth the correct aspi-ration. True, certain historical conduct—the treatmentof Native Americans in particular—miserably fails tomeasure up to tbe stated aspiration. But shouid wetherefore abandon the aspiration? Of course not. Wediscredit only ourselves when we fail to live up to ourideals. The ideals themselves are not discredited.

Then there are words inspired by America'sfounding that, in their drafting, sought to extend thoseideals to the rest of the world, words in the United Na-tions Charter and the Universal Declaration of HumanRights. These documents affirm the rights of the indi-vidual against states orother actors that vio-late those rights. Butthe affirmation is moretheoretical than actual,since the UN Charteralso embraces a doc-trine of sovereign rightaeeording to whichstates may not inter-fere in the intemal af-fairs of others.

This aspect of the Charter gives states so inclineda ready cloak behind which to repress their people-including by commission of mass atrocities. This iswhat I mean when I say that words matter but are notenough. The UN's universalist human-rights creedis honored far more in the breacb than in the obser-vance. At the same time, the UN Security Council isalso charged to act in the interest of peace and security,which can create an opening in response to extremesituations in which large numbers of lives are at risk.

In 1946, viith the dimensions of the horror of theHolocaust still unfolding, the UN General Assemblypassed a resolution declaring genocide a crime underintemational law. Genocide "shocks the conscience ofmankind," the resolution memorably declared. Tbis ef-fort to "intemationalize" the crime of genocide mighthave been the world body's finest hour. The ensuingGenocide Convention of 1948 provides for "the pre-vention and punishment of the crime of genocide"whether "committed in time of peace or time of war"and elaborates a definition, which includes "acts com-mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a

If you act to prevent genocide andsucceed, there is no genocide—

and so you cannot prove youhave prevented one.

national, ethnical, racial or religious group."The Convention isn't self-executing, in that it

doesn't compel its signatories to take any particularaction if the terms of the treaty are violated. But it doesprovide an international legal and, more important,moral framework for preventive action in response tothe risk of genocide.

Breakthrough though it was, one unintendedconsequence of the Genocide Convention has been aserious problem. The definition of genocide is good asfar as it goes, and the prevention mandate seems to al-low latitude for timely action against would-he perpe-trators. But whether "genocide" as defined in the treatyis actually occurring or about to occur is a complicatedquestion both epistemologically and legally. For if youact to prevent genocide and succeed, there is no geno-cide—and so you cannot prove you have preventedone. Moreover, those you act against can claim youhave violated their sovereign rights, and the argument

will carry weight.If, on the other

hand, there is a legalfinding of genocide,then it is too late forprevention. All thatis left is mitigation.Moreover, if "geno-cide" is the trigger foraction, then the bar israther high: Atrocities

short of genocide may somehow end up as tolerable, orat least tolerated. In 2005, a year after Colin Powell an-nounced the U.S. finding of a genocide in Darfur, a UNspecial inquiry issued a report saying that while crimi-nal atrocities had taken place in Sudan for which per-petrators needed to be held accountable, it lacked thebasis for a conclusion that those crimes amounted togenocide. The bloodstained mlers in Khartoum weredelighted to characterize the report as a vindication.

A further attempt to "internationalize" theDeclaration's "right to life" came in 2005, when theWorld Summit at the United Nations embraced in its"Outcome Document" the principle of the "responsi-bility to protect." The doctrine of "responsibility toprotect," known colloquially as "R2P," holds that astate has an obligation to protect those living on itsterritory from atrocities (specified in the OutcomeDocument as "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleans-ing, and crimes against humanity"). If a state is un-able or unwilling to fulfill this requirement, the pro-tection function falls to the international community,which can take measures up to and including the useof force in order to protect populations. With sover-

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eign right comes sovereign responsibility. The prin-ciple of noninterference gives way in circumstancesof mass atrocities.

I had a small role in the adoption of R2P.Congress (principally in the person of Erank Wolf, aRepublican member of the House of Representativesfrom Virginia) chartered a bipartisan task force onUN reform run by the U.S. Institute of Peace and co-chaired by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich andformer Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell. 1 ranthe Task Eorce's expert group on human rights. Notwithout difficulty, we were able to include in the June2005 consensus report a strong endorsement of the"responsibility to protect." This was the first major bi-partisan statement on behalf of R2P, which before hadmainly been the province of liberal internationalistsand human-rights groups on the Left.

The Task Eorce recommendation in turn influ-enced the Bush State Department to back the conceptat the World Summit. In the absence of the Gingrich-Mitchell recommendation, the State Department'straditional institutional wariness as well as ideologicalconservative skepticism would likely have led to U.S.opposition, which would have doomed the project.

As for the objections, the main concern hasbeen (and remains) that the United States, by em-bracing R2P, will subject itself to the whims of the"international community" on whether and when tointervene in fulfillment of the protection function.Thus Steven Groves of the Heritage Eoundation hasexpressed alarm that "the United States would cedecontrol—any control—of its armed forces to the ca-price of the world community without the consentofthe American people." In the extreme case, in thisview, the U.S. might incur a legal obligation to go towar whether it wants to or not. The latter concernis so far down a trail of speculation piled on intem-perate inference on top of worst-case hypothesizingthat it hardly bears consideration. In its less extremeform, this is the question of how much the U.S. shouldengage with others to find common ends or interestsand pursue them jointly.

Power is power, and the United States has moreof it than any other state. But international politicalsupport is of value, and the U.S. does benefit fromseeking it in fora that others regard as legitimate.We will never give the UN Security Council the lastword. Other countries don't like that, but then aKosovo comes along, Russia blocks Security Councilaction, and people of good will realize that the priceof calling off war because the Security Council hasn'tauthorized it will be several hundred thousand deadKosovars.

In other words, one should try one's best at theUN for the simple reason that one might succeed. Butfailure at the UN does not end the discussion, as theU.S. determination in the months leading up to thewar in Iraq demonstrated, and certainly should notwhen a genocide is brewing.

A more practical concern is that R2P would sim-ply be used against Israel. This is true, but no more ofR2P than of everything else, alas. Given bad will, anyprinciple can be distorted almost into its opposite inthe application. Vladimir Putin's Russia cleverly citedthe responsibility to protect as a reason for its invasionof Georgia in 2008—it was just acting to protect Rus-sians in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhaziaand South Ossetia, don't you see! It fell to the Swed-ish foreign ministry to inform the Russians that the"responsibility to protect" here was Georgia's, since itwas on Georgian territory that the supposed offenseagainst Russian ethnics was taking place—and that incase Georgia failed, the responsibility would fall to the"international community."

All of these documents, from the Declaration tothe UN Charter to the R2P language in the OutcomeDocument, are subject to the criticism that, again, theyare mere words on paper. Whom have these wordsactually protected? The answer is that these words aretools of moral suasion. Tlie principles they espouserepresent some of our best conclusions about how theworld should be and what we should do in pursuit ofsuch a world. They are, of course, works in progressand remain subject to refinement. But we can't say wehaven't really thought about genocide and mass atroci-ties, whether they matter to us or what we should dowhen confronted vAth them. By now, we know.

INSTITUTIONS cannot respond effectivelyto the threat of genocide and mass atrocitiesin the absence of political will on the part oftheir members. Nevertheless, institutions canhe more or less adroit, responsive, and effec-tive. Here, we have a long way to go, though arange of promising steps has been taken.

Let me offer two snapshots of the problem andthe response. The first comes from 2005, during workon the Gingrich-Mitchell report. The second comesfrom work I did last year on the Genocide PreventionTksk Eorce,* which issued a report in December 2008with recommendations to the U.S. government on

* The Task Force, chaired by former Secretary of StateMadeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense WilliamCohen, was ajoint project ofthe U.S. Holocaust MemorialMuseum, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the AmericanAcademy of Diplomacy.

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forestalling the threat of atrocities. The institutionalchange over the course of three years has been stag-gering.

In 2005, all was confusion, and the Darfursituation in particular was a frustrating daisy chain ofinaction: Everybody wbo was potentially in a positionto do something useful—from the Secretary General'soffice at the United Nations to the UN Security Councilto the European Union to NATO to the African Unionmission on the ground in Darfur to the United Statesgovernment itself—was full of explanations about whysomebody else had to do something first.

In 2004, the African Union (AU) deployed a smallnumber of troops to Sudan to protect outside monitorsof a cease-fire agreement. They were able to do little tocontain the depradations Sudanese government forceswere inflicting on Darfur in conjunction with theJanjaweed militia, irregular forces of nomadic Arabic-speaking tribes at odds with the sedentary populationof Western Sudan. Aswas well known to ev-eryone involved in ear-ly 2005, the AU forcewas too small and woe-fully underequippedand unprepared. To beeven minimally effec-tive, the African Unionneeded a package ofassistance that would

include communications and intelligence assets, lift,planning and headquarters help, and training. Whereto get it?

Well, maybe a military alliance with seriouscapabilities along those lines, like NATO. Or maybeNATO acting in conjunction with the European Union,which was already providing the main funding for theAU mission. Or maybe the European Union itself, if itcould get its act together on its desire for a "commonforeign and security policy." Or maybe just the UnitedStates, leading a coalition ofthe willing or even actingon its own, if necessary.

It turned out that in the previous year, in thesummer of 2004, the NATO military command underGeneral James Jones (now Barack Obama's national-security adviser) had begun a "prudent planning"exercise on Darfur—essentially, an inquiry into whatmight be done to help out the AU. It was undertakenwithout the authorization ofthe North Atlantic Coun-cil, NATO's political decision-making body.

That exercise was interrupted when several al-lies, notably France, objected to NATO assigning itselfa role in Africa. Some saw in tbe objection an effort to

Does this sound ridiculous? Hundredsof thousands of lives at stake overwhether the contents of a speech

are transferred to a letter?

h

protect the EU's turf. The planning didn't cease, butit moved out of NATO auspices to the U.S. EuropeanCommand, our military's headquarters on the con-tinent. As matters stood, there was no prospect of aNATO mission—but it seemed to us that matters neednot have stood there.

We knew that UN Secretary General Kofi Annanhad given a couple of speeches urging NATO to assistthe African Union's Darfur efforts. One ambassador atNATO told us he thought this represented an opening.The Europeans who were reluctant to involve NATOwould not change their minds based merely on aspeech by Annan, but if the Secretary General actuallysent a formal letter to NATO asking for alliance help,that might change the debate. It would be one thingto say NATO shouldn't insert itself into Africa, quiteanother to decline a UN request for help.

Does this sound ridiculous? Hundreds of thou-sands of lives potentially at stake over wheth-

er the contents of aspeech are transferredto a letter? It does,and this is an indica-tion of just how ill-equipped the "interna-tional community" aswhole was to deal v ithan emergency on thescale of Darfur.

Skeptics at theEuropean Union's headquarters in Brussels, mean-while, informed us that the African Union would be re-luctant to accept assistance from the West's military al-liance, since doing so would smack of neo-imperialismand colonialism. A better avenue would be through theEuropean Union, according to the European Union—not that the EU actually had a plan.

So why not have Annan send a letter? We askedthat question at a meeting with senior UN officialson the top floor of the organization's building in NewYork. The answer was that Annan's representativeshad sounded out NATO and determined that therewas simply no support for the alliance's involvementin Africa. Annan couldn't possibly ask for help only tobe rebuked, explained Mark Malloch Brown, Annan'stop adviser (now an intimate of British Prime MinisterGordon Brovra).

I found myself, to my surprise, shouting at Mal-loch Brown from the staff seats in the second row:Their information was simply wrong, there was sub-stantial will at NATO to do just that. What was neededwas a Zei/er—Annan had already given speeches sayingthe same thing, all he needed to do was send a letter,

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just a letter. My importuning, though impolitic, gotMalloch Brown's attention and drew an invitation forfollow-up on the matter. On the train on the way backto Washington, we drafted an e-mail explaining thesituation as we had found it, why everything was sohorribly stuck, and how it might at last get unstuck.

We quickly heard through intermediaries thatthough Annan was favorably disposed to the idea ofa formal request, he didn't think he had the authorityto write such a letter—he didn't want to get out too farin front of the Security Council on a matter that wassubject to difficult ongoing negotiations there.

So now what? Another avenue to change thedebate in NATO would be a letter directly from the Af-rican Union asking for assistance in Darfur—notwith-standing the patronizing assurance we had receivedthat the African Union could not conceivably acceptthe neocolonialist assistance of monstrous Americanswho had invaded poor Iraq.

Success. For whatAnnan could not writepersonally, he evidentlycould get written. Afterdays of back-channelexchanges with Annan'soffice, a letter arrived atNATO headquarters onApril 26, 2005 from Af-rican Union chairmanAlpha Konare specifi-cally requesting NATO's help in Darfur. Hard upon it,NATO's North Atlantic Council—the same body thathad insisted on an end to the previous year's "prudentplanning" exercise on how the genocide might beinterrupted—formally approved the assistance.

I make no claim about the efficacy or adequacyof that NATO assistance. The hest one can say aboutit is that things could have been worse. More than amillion people in displaced-person and refugee campsare better than more than a million dead. The presenceof peacekeepers, though woefully inadequate, seemsnevertheless to have had some deterrent effect on themonstrous Janjaweed militia and the government.

The chief fact we found as we tried to managethe rules of the international system in 2005 was ahigh level of dysfunctionality. Nobody really knewwhat was on the minds ofthe key players in the AfricanUnion. The United Nations Secretary General didn'tknow what was possible at NATO. NATO itself was un-certain about getting involved in Africa. Some Europe-ans seemed more interested in protecting their Africanturf than in action that might help those at risk. Mean-

The machinery of international politicswas not developed to address

problems like Daifur. To addressthem, we have to retool.

while, the only organization that seemed genuinelyinterested in taking action, the African Union, washobbled by a grievous lack of resources and capacity,and didn't know how or whom to ask for help.

So what do you need to deal with a situation likeDarfur? You need soldiers, and they had better be welltrained and well led, otherwise you can end up (as theUN unfortunately has on more than one occasion)with peacekeepers who also dabble as sexual predatorson the populations they are supposed to be protecting.You need equipment, like armored personnel carriers,and better still, helicopters. You need a mandate thatenables your soldiers to take effective action, so they'reactually able to protect the locals in danger (not justto protect, as was notoriously the case in Darfur, thecease-fire monitors). Above all, you need the politicalwill to take action.

And you really need to have figured out how toput together all of the above before a crisis spirals out

of control. That meansyou've got to do the te-dious work of gettingpeople, governments,and institutions tothink about what theyneed and plan in ad-vance on how to geti t It means a hundreddifferent letters andmemorandums of un-

derstanding. The machinery of intemational politicswas not developed to address problems such as Darfur.If we want to address them, and we must, then wehave to retool and refine what we've got. To that end,the Gingrich-Mitchell report included a number ofrecommendations on things like "capacity-building,"an unlovely bit of foreign policy jargon, but one thatnonetheless captures the imperative to close the gapbetween what you have and what you need.

I AST FORWARD a few years later:I Making the fact-finding rounds again,this time with the Genocide Preven-tion Task Force, I was astounded tosee that all of the things we recom-mended in Gingrich-Mitchell werestarting to happen. I don't say these

changes occurred because Gingrich-Mitchell recom-mended them. But we had clearly been onto some-thing in terms of identifying the gaps and roadblocksin the international system.

Far from resisting American or European as-

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sistance on neocolonial or any other grounds, theAfrican Union and other organizations on the conti-nent welcome help. They are increasingly finding thepolitical will to confront the continent's malefactors.They have been working to develop "early warning"systems. They have the troops, but they need trainingand equipment before they will be fully prepared toact swiftly in response to trouble, and that's where thedeveloped world can be useful.

NATO, meanwhile, is in the process of figuringout how to do more in partnership with others and isfavorably disposed to helping out with peace buildingand peacekeeping missions conducted under UN orother auspices. A deputy secretary general at NATOnow has the responsibility to serve as the focal pointfor engagement with other organizations and institu-tions. A document outlining how NATO will work withthe UN has been approved. And there is now a NATOliaison officer to the African Union.

The emphasis on Africa is obvious, but massatrocities are not, of course, a problem unique to Af-rica. For the first time, the charter of the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations now includes a provisionon human rights. The UN Secretary General now hasa special adviser on the "responsibility to protect" aswell as a special adviser on the prevention of genocide.These offices are small, and they necessarily view theirsubjects from a UN perspective, which is too limitingfor U.S. policymakers. But again, the more construc-tive the UN can be, the better.

One could go on. The point is that governmentsand international and regional organizations havemade a beginning of taking the problem of preventinggenocide and mass atrocities with the level of serious-ness the subject demands. On the home front, theGenocide Prevention Task Force offered a large doseof specific guidance on internal government reformthat holds out the promise of more effective and timelypolicymaking. This is no place for a discussion ofthespecifics ofthe interagency process and military plan-ning procedures. Suffice it to say that better internalorganization is within reach.

The missing institutional piece on the in-ternational scene now, it seems to me, fiows fromthe absence of coordination and mutual awarenessamong the various parties that are now taking theissue seriously. The T^k Force recommended thatthe US. government undertake a "major diplomaticinitiative" whose purpose would be to put together aformal network linking all the parties that engage onthe issue—governments, non-governmental organiza-tions, and regional and international institutions. The

idea would be to share information and strategizeresponses to emerging threats.

The report does not quite say so, but it would beprudent to have someplace to go where people with arecord of taking the issue seriously and with genuinemoral authority gather, in the all-too-likely event thatthe UN Security Council finds itself paralyzed onceagain in the face of mass atrocities. Such a networkwould have no legal authority, but it might well havemoral authority ofthe sort that contributes to the gen-eration of political will.

In the end, unsurprisingly, effective action maycome down to U.S. power and will. Those of us whosee an imperative for action in these cases should wel-come encouragement to that end from wherever it maycome. And realistically, it would most likely be dueonly to very poor diplomacy if the United States founditself without supporters and allies in preventing orstopping genocide.

THE RESPONSE to Darfur has to bejudged a failure. But it has perhapsbeen a constructive failure that hasgalvanized people to think abouthow to make the system more nimblein response to gathering dangers.Those with a profound distaste for

"nonconsensual military intervention"—that wouldbe an "invasion" to the plain speakers among us—should he all the more concerned about timely actionto identify the gathering danger of mass atrocitiesand nip the problem in the bud. Those with a will toargue for whatever is necessary to halt a slide intomass slaughter must realize that they will be mosteffective in galvanizing a response if they amass achorus of the like-minded to speak as one on themoral imperative.

But we cannot assure ourselves that our bestplanning will always enable us to act early, nor canwe count on having a phalanx of the like-mindedalongside us. In the extreme case, halting or failing tohalt genocide has come down to whether the politicalwill exists within the United States to act. We will notbe spared from such decisions in the future. If we areserious, we have to be willing to take upon ourselvesthe burden of providing the leadership, the arms, thetroops, and the resources, and of bearing the casual-ties, the reversals of fortune, and the inevitable com-plaints and second-guessing.

Because the would-be genocidaires are out there,thinking about it: whom to kill; how many; how to doit. Whether they can get away with it. ^^

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