the peace conference of lausanne, 1922-1923

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The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923Author(s): Joseph C. GrewSource: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Feb. 15, 1954), pp. 1-

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2/11

THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE, 1922-1923

JOSEPH C. GREW

(Read November 2, 1953)

As

I wroteto Justice

Roberts ast spring, he

invitation o

address this

Society is one of the

highest onors

hathas ever

come to me.

The

purposeof the

Society o review

ignificant

developmentsn all the

fields f

knowledge ies in

withmy own

feeling hat the

accuraterecording

of

history s

one of the most

important f the

disciplines nd

thisfeeling as

led me duringmy

forty-odd ears

ofpublic service

o keepfullper-

sonalcontemporaryecords. These are comprised

in some 168

bound volumes,

which I have felt

might ome

day add color and

atmosphere o the

perhaps drier

official eports from

our officers

abroad.

They are

now

in

theHarvard

Library.

I

have

felt hat an

obligation estedon

us, while

in

the

arena, tomake our

individual

ontributions

towardpiecing

ut the moreformal

ecord.

This,

togetherwith the

Society's further b-

jective to

develop

a

humane

and philosophical

spirit

s

myexcuse,

if

excuse be

needed,

for

my

papertonight

n certain spects

of thefoundingf

the

presentTurkish

Republic

on

the

wreckage

f

the formerOttomanEmpire,for few events in

history ave surpassed

n drama the

enlightened

transition

n a

remarkably

hort

period

of

time

from

he

old

to the new

and the alteration f "The

Sick

Man of

Europe" to

a

progressive

modern

state onscious

like of ts

nternationalbligations

and of ts

opportunitieso take

ts properplace

in

the

family

f civilized

nations.

The

Lausanne Peace

Conference

f

1922-1923,

which

ed

to the consolidation

ftheTurkishRe-

public,was one of

the most

dramatic nternational

meetings hat have

ever attended.

How could

it be otherwisewhensuchwell-known igures s

Mussolini,

Lord Curzon,

Venizelos, Poincare,

General smet

Pasha,

later

smet

n6nil,

President

of the

Turkish

Republic,

and

other

outstanding

statesmen

participated After

sitting

for three

months

n

the autumn

of

1922 and

the winter f

1923

the

conference

iterally

lew up and

it

was

not until three months ater that

t

reassembled,

and

finally,

fter

nother

hree

months,

roduced

a

treaty

f

peace

between

Turkey

and

the

Allies

of

the

First

World.War.

We Americans, ince

we had nevergone to

war

with Turkey,were

presentonlyas so-called

ob-

servers, ur dutybeing

two-fold: irst, o

help n

everyproperway toward

he attainment fpeace

and, second,

to protect egitimate

American n-

terestsn the Near

East. Duringthe first

artof

the conference ur

representatives ere Richard

W. Child,

Ambassador to Italy; Admiral

Mark

Bristol,High Commissioner

o Turkey; and

the

present peaker,whowas thenMinister o Switz-

erland. In the second

phase of the conference

he alone represented

he United States.

The

origins

of the Lausanne Conference

were

historically

f marked nterest nd

significancen

the development

f

Turkey's

future

world

rela-

tions. The transition

rom he Ottoman

Empire

to the TurkishRepublic

was notan easy process.

I well rememberhose

earlyyears of the Republic

for

was

closelyassociatedwith

that processof

transition.

Those

were the

years

of

great

re-

formswhich profoundlyffected

Turkish

life-

the new law codes,

new emphasisupon

liberal

education, he emancipation fwomenand many

other

progressive

nd constructiveevelopments.

I remember he

days when

Angora

was little

more than an undeveloped

provincial own,ad-

joining

the ancient itadel,

lmost

bereft f trees

and with

a mosquito-infested

wamp

on

the

out-

skirts. Malaria was

rife. Washingtonwas

prob-

ably even

more

primitive

hen t was

first hosen

as

our

own nation's apital.

In

fact, hirty-three

yearswent by

before heforeign iplomats

ould

be

persuadedto

move there

fromPhiladelphia.

In

Angora

our

representatives

here

before

my

own arrival n 1927,Robert mbrie nd Howland

Shaw,

had

to live

in a

railway

car

on a

siding

becausemodern abitation as

unavailable

r

non-

existent. It

was not

uncommon

n those

days

to

see

a

half-dozen

r morebodies

hanging

rom

he

execution

ripods

n the

main

square

of the town.

AdmiralBristol,

ur

High

Commissioner,

ived

n

Constantinople,

ow

Istanbul. Politics seemed

fairly

imple

n

those

days, too,

for

only

one

po-

litical party existed,

and that was the Govern-

ment

party.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE

AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, VOL.

98, NO. 1, FEBRUARY,

1954.

1

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/11

2

JOSEPH C.

GREW

[PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.

My own recollections ake the form f a series

of cliches. Far back, in 1905, I attended, s a

visitor,

he Selamlik, nd saw the Sultan Abdul

Hamnid rive through he narrow treets f Con-

stantinople o attend he Friday rites. Pictures-

queness nd beautywere there n fullmeasure, he

fascination f the mosques and bazaars in

old

Stambul, he perennial oveliness f the Bosporus.

How keenly remember he five summers ater

spent on that neffably eautifulwaterway. But

in those days of the OttomanEmpire, t was not

the beauty f a free ociety. The Turkishpeople

were

still

n

shackles.

Thencame the First World War and eventually

the Lausanne Conference. After he Allies had

completed heir eace treaty, eneral smet Pasha

and

I

sat down at

a small

table and together

negotiated a treaty between Turkey and the

United States.

It was

a

good treaty, romboththe American

and

the Turkishpoints f view. Even

today,

hat

treaty,

lthough t

is

now as dead as a door-nail,

is commemoratedy a bronzeplaque in the Beau

Rivage Hotel at Ouchy, Lausanne. In some re-

spects,

ndeed, t was more favorable o American

interests ven than the treatynegotiated y the

Allies was to their interestsbecause I simply

outsat

General smet.

I

broughtt

home

o

Wash-

ington,well pleased and expecting he accolade

"WNell onethougoodandfaithfulervant." But,

alas, alas, domestic

politics

intervened.

There

were

still

n

our

country

lementswhichwere

dis-

satisfied hat had notbeen able to

pull

mpossible

rabbitsfrom mpossible

hats.

I

was

openly

ac-

ctused

n

the

lUnited

tates

Senate

of having

sold

nmy-ation'sbirthrightor imess

f

pottage.

The

Americans of Armenianorigin in the

United

States wanted

to obtain

ll

of

Armenia s

a sort

of

independent

atherland. The

debate

in

the

Senate

was close

but

my reaty

was

finally

efeated

bv

six

votes.

Then,

a few

years

ater,

was sent

as

the

first

American Ambassador

to

the

new

TurkishRepublic onegotiate newtreaty.

Ah,

but

times

had

changed

hen.

By

thattime

the

Turks

were

ridinghigh. My

new

treaty

was

duly negotiated

n

Angora.

By

that

time

the

Armenians

n

our

country

had shot their

bolt,

and,

while

this

second

treaty

was not

one-half s

favorable

o

American nterests

s the first

ne,

it I)assed

the

Senate

viva

voce

without

ven a tal-

lied

vote.

Such

are

politics

But

I was satisfied.

The relations

between

Turkey

and the

United

States were

thenon

a firm

reatv

oundation

nd

the

ground

was laid for future

healthy

develop-

ment.

To

go back

to the

origins

f the

Lausanne

Con-

ference,

here

occurred,

uring

he war, the

Brit-

ish invasion

fGallipoli.

If

my

history

s correct,

theBritishCommanding eneral, fterhis troops

had swarmed

shoreon

the beaches, llowed

them

sometwenty-four

ours

to

washtheir

lothes

nd

rest,

before

proceeding

o the attack.

At

that

critical

moment,

he story

has it,

and

I believe

he

storv

s accurate,

he

Turkish

ine across

the

Gal-

lipoli

peninsula

had in

its center

dangerous

un-

filled ap

through

which

ny nvading

rmy

ould

have

poured.

This

situation

was reported

o

the

German

General,

Liman

von

Sanders,

in

com-

mand of

the defense

of Constantinople,

out

his

orders

ppearto

have

been

delayed.

And then

t

was thata comparativelyoungTurkishColonel

on his

own

nitiative

imself

ave

theorder

to

fill

the

gap

and

moved

his regiment

ntothe

unfilled

area

to complete

he Turkish

line.

WNhenhe

Allies

arrived

he

nextday,

t

was too

late.

The

gal)

had

been

filled.

Those twenty-four

ours

of

rest and

clothes-washing

ad been

fatal

to

the

attack.

Perhaps

need

hardly

ay

that

thename

oftheTurkish

Colonel

who

had taken

he

respon-

sibility

nd

given

thecommand

o

fill

he

line

of

defense

was Mustapha

Kemal,

later

President

Kemal

Atatuirk,

he

George

Washington

of

the

TurkishRepublic.

I

will

not take

up

your

time

by

a detailed

c-

count

of

the

developments

f the

next

four

years.

Suffice

t

to

say

that

n

the

Armistice

f

Mudros

in

1918,

after

Turkev

had

capitulated,

nd

in

the

grimPeace

Treaty

fSevres

n 1920.Turkey,

with

two

governments

unctioning,

ne in

Constanti-

nople

and

the

other

n

Angora,

was reduced o

a

helpless

fraction

f its

former elf.

The

Allies,

being

busy

with

other hings,

hen

pparently

or-

got

all about Turkey

nd overlooked

he fact

hat

the Sultan

had

refused

o

ratify he Treaty

of

Se'vres

and that

the

nationalists

had

simiply

re-

1)tldiated

t. Thus Turkey and the Allies were

still at

war.

In

the

meantime,

the

Greeks,

incited

largely

by

Lloyd

George,

had

in

1919

invaded

Anatolia

and

destroyed

Smyrna.

But

the Turks,

magnificent

fighters

hat

they

were,

led

by

Mustapha

Kemal

and

General

Ismet Pasha,

drove

the Greeks

from

Asia

Minor

in

September,

1922,

and

the

Armistice

of Mudanva

was

signed

on October

11,

1922.

by

which

Turkey

retained

all of

Anatolia

and

Eastern

Thrace.

It

was

in

that

situation

ain(l

atmosphere



4/11

VOL. 98 NO. 1, 1954] THE PEACE

CONFERENCE

AT LAUSANNE

3

that the Lausanne Conferencewas called

in the

autumn f 1922. By thenthe Turks

were fullof

confidence,s theyhad good reason to

be. Some

of the Allies failed

to recognize he great change

thathad come bout

n Turkey ince he Armistice

of Mudros and the Treaty of Sevres. They

pounded the conferenceable and demanded

one

concession after

another. General Ismet Pasha

sat quietly nd simply aid "no" to almost

every-

thing. He was in the driver's eat and

knew it.

The Allies had no stomach o fight o soon

again.

Today

a

strong

urkey tands ut

as a

force

or

stabilityn the Eastern

Mediterraneanrea. This

is a Turkey determinedo maintain ts

national

integrity,ut mindful f its responsibilities

o co-

operatewithotherfreedom-loving

ations o cre-

ate the kind of

world

n

which

t can survive

s

a free nation and proceed with its national

development.

The announcement

n 1945 byPresident

n6nii

that new

political

partiesto supersede

the

single

Government artywould be permitted

n

Turkey

was a

tangible ndication

f the

consolidation f

the

Republic.

In

recent

years,

the

multi-party

system as come to

be recognized

s

a permanent

feature

f

Turkish

political ife. While

united n

foreign olicy,

he various parties

re

expressing

themselvesopenly

in the Grand

National

As-

sembly,

n

the press

and

in

publicmeetings,

n the

differences hich separatethemin internal f-

fairs. They,

as well as the Turkishpeople,

have

been gaining

valuable experience n

democratic

processes, earning

he necessity f getting long

with each

other,

even

though holdingopposing

views,

n such a

way

as

to

promote

ather han

endanger he

national

security.

The

world will

watch

with great nterest

urther vidence

of the

maturity f the Turkishpeople.

THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

At theverybeginning nterest,

f course,

cen-

teredon Mussolini, he

new

hero,

untried

nd un-

known. He himself vidently ad a view to the

dramatic nd was anxious to

impress

hepeople

at

home

with his

independence mong foreign

statesmen.

Instead of coming straight

to

Lausanne,

he

stopped

at

Territet

and

made

Poincare

and Lord

Curzofi

ome to see

him

there.

In

the course

of the

evening

he

agreed

to meet

them n

Lord

Curzon's

room

t Lausanne the

next

morning unctually

t ten o'clock. At 10:20,

after

Poincare

and

Curzon

had fumed

p

and down the

room

waiting orhim, hey

ent secretary

o see

what

was the

matter.

The

Secretary,

who told

me the story, aid he found Mussolini

quietly

reading n his room nd, whenhe told himthat

he

was twentyminutes ate for his appointmentnd

that the two other

statesmenwere waitingfor

him,Mussolini aid: "Oh they're here, re

they?

Very well, I'll come." On anotheroccasion,he

sent representativeo Lord Curzon to announce

thathe woulddine withhim hat vening.

Curzon

sentback wordthathe would be veryglad to

have

Mussolinidine withhim at 8 :30. The messenger

remarked hat he was

sorry hat he had instruc-

tions

to say that

Mussoliniwould dine withLord

Curzon at

7:30.

Curzon threwup his arms

in

despair nd agreedto split he differencend

call

it 8 :00. But quite apartfrom hese ittle y-plays,

I was deeply mpressed y Mussolini's quiet re-

served orce nd the

greatpower fhis personality.

A story s told thatwhen Claire Sheridan, he

authoress nd sculptress,urnedup at Lausanne,

Mussolini okingly nvited er to come to see

him

in Rome and that he promptlyccepted he

sug-

gestion, raveled y

the same

train

nd took rooms

in the hotelwherehe was staying. Mussolini

till

regarded he matter s a joke until he day

after

their arrival several

men appeared at his room

withmanypails

of

plaster, oards,nails,etc.,

nd

whenhe

asked what

n thunder heywere for,

he

was

informed hatMrs.

Sheridan

was about

to

make a bust of him. Mussolini forcibly

ut the

men to flight nd is said to have writtenMrs.

Sheridan letter n

whichhe refused

ositively

o

be sculped adding that busts were made

only of

dead

men

and that

he himselfwas still

very

much

alive.

There

was

the late

Mr.

Stamboliski,

he

Prime

Minister f Bulgaria,hairy, normous,

with

fierce

upturnedmoustaches, ooking

far more like

a

brigand

han a statesman, itting tolidly

t the

conferenceablewith

his

secretary,

lle

Stancioff,

of the

Bulgarian

diplomatic ervice, ust

behind

him nterpretingis

words nd, imagine, lso

his

thoughts,

ecause for

halfdozen words

from

er

chiefMiss Stancioff ouldtalkperfect renchor

perfect nglish

for ten

or fifteen

minutes.

She

was

witty

nd had

many assages

of

armswith he

other

delegates.

One

day,

when

pleading

for

Bulgaria's outlet o

the

sea,

she said to Venizelos

"How can

you,

with

your

hundreds

of

harbors,

object

to the

egitimate

esires

of

poor

little

Bul-

garia,

which

has but threemiserable

orts

on the

Black

Sea?" Venizelos,

as

quick

as

a

flash,

e-

plied

"God

put

Greece in the middle of the

sea;

it

is

notmy

fault

"



5/11

4

JOSEPH C.

GREW

[PROC.

AMER.

PHIL. SOC.

There was Marquis Garroni,

the first talian

delegate, ged,

genial, oothing s a lullaby

t the

conference

able,but withnever a word

that was

original r

constructive.He simply agged

long.

There was

Barrere,

heold-school rench

diplo-

mat,whohad been Ambassador o Italyfor ome

twenty-five

ears. It is said that in

his youth

he was a rabid

communistnd that

when he pre-

sented his letters f credence

o King Humbert,

the atter sked himhow t was that uch

a change

had taken

place in his political deals.

Barrere

replied:

"Sire, a man who is not radical

in his

youthhas no heart,but

a man who is not con-

servativen his age has

no head."

There was Tchitcherine,

he Russian delegate,

who

talked

in

a high,squeaky voice

which re-

minded

me of

nothing

o much as a slate pencil.

During the conference was invited y my Nor-

wegiancolleague o meet

himat dinner, n an

en-

tirely nofficial ay, as

he had particularlysked

to meet heAmerican epresentative.

My inclina-

tion

t firstwas to

refuse, ut

my

colleaguesurged

me to accept

on

the ground

hat omething seful

might e

learned. And

so

I went.

There were

five of us

at table,the three Scandinavian

MNin-

isters, chitcherine,

nd myself. We sat there or

fourhours and the

talk was

intenselynteresting.

We discussed

ascism

t length

nd Tchitcherine's

summing p of Mussoliniwas "He

has a passion,

not a program." Once,

in

speaking

of

the

con-

ference,

e turned

o

me

and said: "Every

rebuke

Lord Curzon addresses

to me across the confer-

ence table strengthens

e

just

so

much

with

the

Soviet Government

nd

strengthens

he Soviet

Governmentroportionately."

n

reply

o

my

n-

quiry

as to whether

developments

were

taking

place in Russia tending

owards

more

moderate

and

less radical

regime,

e said:

"Yes,

but

don't

tell he

people

o.

The

people

mustnot

be

allowed

to

suspect

what

s

going

on

in this

direction.

If

they

were

openly

ware of

t,

further

evelopments

would

become

mpossible."

But the outstanding ersonalities f the first

phase

of

the

conference

ere,

n

myopinion,

ord

Curzon,

Venizelos,Montagna,

he second Italian

delegate,

nd Ismet

Pasha. Curzon

mpressed

me

greatly.

He was

said to be

pompous, onceited,

and

a martinet

o

his

subordinates,

ho still

refer

to the old

college egend

that

"George

Nathaniel

Curzon

is a

very superior

person."

But in

his

personal

relations

t the

conference e

saw

noth-

ing

whatever

f this

kind. He

was

always genial,

always courteous,

always entertaining.

Never

have

I

enjoyed

nything

morethan

the small

din-

ners

of

three

or four

which

he appeared

to

love,

and

where

he

would

sit

hour

after

hour

telling

stories,

necdotes,

xperiences,

n

a

delightful

ein.

But

at the

conference

able

his

attitude

nd

tac-

ticswere, nmyopinion,ll-judged ndproductive

of ittle

uccess.

He habitually

reated smet

ike

an

office

oy,

browbeat

im,

nd coveredhim

with

ridicule.

Ismet

bitterly

esented

his,

and it

did

notmake

for

spirit

f

conciliation

n the

part

of

theTurks.

At

thevery

beginning

ord

Curzon

adopted

team-roller

ethods

nd

refused

o

allow

the

Turks

to

have

any say

in

theorganization

f

the

conference.

One

decision

after

nother

was

adopted

over

Ismet's

protests

nd,

when

at

the

next

meeting

smet

was

faced

with

a "fait

ac-

compli"

and

ventured

o protest,

Lord

C(urzon

simply emarkedhat bjectionswerenowtoo ate

and

went

on to

the

business

of

the

conference.

Whenever

smet mentioned

urkey's

national

s-

pirations

or

her desire

for

independence

nd

sovereignty,

urzon

always

waxedfacetious.

He

once

said

"Ismet,

you

remind

me of

nothing

o

muchas

a

music

box,for

you

play

the

same

old

tune

overand

over

and

over

again-sovereignty,

sovereignty,

overeignty."

On

another

occasion

he said

"Ismet,

you

have

a perfect

mania

for

be-

lieving

we

are

depriving

ou

of

your ndependence

and you

have thought

bout

it

so

much

thatyou

reallybelieve

t is

true.

You

remind

me

of

King

William

who

used

to tellhis friends hathe had

led the

charge

of the

guards

at

Waterloo

and

he

told

it

so

often hat

he finally

ame

to believe

t

himself,

lthough,

s is well

known,

he was

fully

one

hundred

miles

away

when

the

battle

took

place."

Curzon

was

equally

facetious

with

the

Russians,

nd

once,

when

Tchitcherineuggested

that

the

discussions

regarding

he

Straits

were

making

no

progress

nd

that he

best

thing

o

do

was

to

get

down

to

work

and draft

a treaty,

Curzon

mmediately

eplied

MIonsieur

chitcher-

ine,

that

s

a most

excellent uggestion.

If

you

willshutyourselfp in a room ll aloneand draft

us

a

treaty,

can

assure

you

that

we shall

give

it

most

careful onsideration,

nd

I have no doubt

that

t

will

prove

o

be a document

f

most

unusual

interest."

But apart

from

his sarcasm

and

irony

with

the

Turks

and

the

Russians,

Curzon

was

an

admirable

Chairman.

It

was a

delight

to listen

to

his clear,

incisive

remarks,

his beautifully

chosen

words and phrases,

and

his well-rounded

sen-

tences.

At

the conference

able

he

was

never

for

a moment

t

a

loss.

Once,

when

asking

that



6/11

VOL. 98,

NO. 1, 1954] THE PEACE CONFERENCE

AT LAUSANNE

5

Turkey

deed

to

England

the

ground

where

the

Britishdead lay

buried t Gallipoli,

nd Ismet re-

marked

that therewas

no precedentfor

such

action

n

history, urzon

mmediatelyeplied

hat

the BritishGovernment

ad deeded

to France in

perpetuityhehouse andgroundwhere heGreat

Napoleon

died on the

Island of St. Helena

and

that he

Frenchflag erpetually lew rom he

staff

ofthebuilding.

As to Venizelos,he was

the fire-brandhrough-

out

and, althoughoften

llogicaland frequently

inaccurate n his

argumentsnd remarks,

very-

one

paid

attention

hen he spoke. He would

be-

gin gently

nd in a soft

ngratiating oice,

but

littleby little

would work himself

nto a fury,

bellow t the topof his

lungs andwildlywave

his

arms

in

the air, which,

s I was seated next

to

him, was not always conducive to my personal

comfort. On

one occasion during

one of these

transports

f

fury

he Chairman aid

"I

beg

ofyou

Mr.

Venizelos to be tranquil."

Whereup

Mr.

Venizelos beat

the tablewith

his

fists

n

redoubled

violence nd

shouted t thetop of

his lungs

I

am

tranquil,

am tranquil."

Riza Nour Bey,

the

Turk,

then turned

he solo into a

duet and pro-

ceeded to shout at Venizelos

across the

table.

Montagna,

the Chairman,pounded

on the

table

withboth

fists

rying

o restore rder,butfinding

it impossible

he declaredthe

meeting djourned.

This howeverhad no effectn Venizeloswhohad

worked

himself

nto a

frenzy.

Indeed his

pas-

sionateduels across the

tablewith

Riza Nour

Bey

were the

delight

f

the conference.

One

day

a dramatic

ncident

was

provoked

when

Tchitcherine

aid

he

hoped

Rumania would be

careful

nd not

allow herself

o

get

into the

posi-

tion

of

Greece

which

had suffered o

severely

t

the

hands

of

the

Turks.

Venizelos

immediately

challenged

im

aying

hat

t was not

customary

t

such nternational

onferenceso

make

cryptic

e-

marksof this

nature and

that

he demanded an

explanation.

Tchitcherine

huffled

is

papers,

consulted isexperts nd made a ratheramereply

that

he

was

referring

nly

n

general

erms o the

internationalituation,

t

which

Venizelosshrug-

ged

his shoulders

nd said thathe would

not

press

the

point

as

he

did

not wish to

delay

the

pro-

cedure.

Whether

we

sympathized

r

not,

we

all

listenedwhen Venizelos

spoke. He was a man

who

would

command ttention

n any situation

and his

free,

elf-confident,lear

deliverywas a

blessed relief fter

he halting ndistinct

peeches

of

some of the

otherdelegates.

I

mentioned

Signor

Montagna, the second

Italian delegate, s one of the outstanding igures

ofthe conference

ecause he understood he men-

tality f the Turk and

the propermethod f deal-

ing withhim better han ny otherdelegate; and,

not onlydid he bring he workof his sub-commit-

tees to

a

satisfactoryonclusionwhile other om-

mitteeswerestill

deep

in

acrid debate,but at the

criticalmoments f the

conferencet was always

he who, n a quiet and

unobtrusivemanner,man-

aged

to

smoothmatters ver

by his sensible nd

conciliatoryactics.

At

the end of the conference,

after

Montagna had,

in

my opinion contributed

more than any otherdelegate toward reaching

final greement, ld Marquis Garroni nsisted n

coming p

from

Rome to sign for taly,although

he was the onlyone of

the original irst elegates

to do this. And thusMontagnawas deprived f

the

prestige,

f t

could

be

regarded s such,which

he had earned by indefatigablework. In the

darkest

hours

of the

conference

Montagna was

always optimistic,

nd

I

am

convinced hat on

morethanone occasionhe

personally revented

rupture.

As for smet Pasha,

my opinion f

him

under-

went several changes

during

the

course of the

conference,

ut

my

final

udgment

s

that,

while

lacking any

of the

adaptability

r

finesse f

his

opponents,

e

played

a

straight

nd honest

game

throughout.He was often ccused ofgivinghis

word and then

withdrawing t,

but it must be

rememberedhat

he was

continuallyubject

to

in-

structions

rom

Angora,

which

have

every

rea-

son

to

believe

were

frequently

ore

ntransigeant

thanhe

himselfwishedto

be, and,

at least in our

own

negotiations,when,

from time to

time,

he

tentatively ccepted

a certain formula or

pro-

visionforour

treaty

nd

laterwithdrew is

agree-

ment,

e

always

made

t clear

n

advance hat

hese

provisional greements

were

subject

to instruc-

tions

fromhome.

In the course of our

negotia-

tions,

when

we

were

debating

ome

complicated

point,he wouldfrequentlyay to me "Mr. Grew,

you

are

a

diplomat

while

I am

nothing

but

a

soldier

and

I am

not versed

in the finesse of

diplomacy";

to which

I

always replied "Every

day

of

my twenty ears'

experience

n

diplomacy

has

shown

me the

advantage

of

expressing

ne's

mind

openly, andidly,

nd

honestly,

nd

you

will

never find

any

other kind of

diplomacy

n

my

part."

After

ll,

in

Ismet's

position,

t

was

the

bluff

ualities

of the soldier and not

the

subtlety

of the

old-school

diplomat

which he

needed

and



7/11

6

JOSEPH

C.

GREW

[PROC.

AMER.

PHIL. SOC.

whichhe

exercisedthroughout.

He was

in

a

besieged

tronghold

nd

all he

had to do was

to

hold

out against

all assaults

and he did

it with

conspicuous

success.

In actual

debate

he was

hopelessly

utclassed,

partly

through

he

handi-

cap of hisdeafness,whichnecessitatedveryword

thatwas

said at the

conference

eingwritten

own

for

him by the

secretary

t his

side,and,

also,

I

believe,

because

he was neither

uick-witted

or

keenof comprehension;

or

did he

appear to

have

a thorough rasp

of the details

of the

subjects

under

debate,

nd many

time

t the

conference

table he

missed n admirable

pportunity

o score

offLord

Curzon

and others

when

beingattacked

and browbeaten.

I remember

nce

when

Lord

Curzon

was attacking

smet's objection

to the

continuance

f

the

foreign tationnaire

hips

in

Constantinoplen the groundthat theywere a

relic

of the capitulations,

ord Curzon

said

"But

our only

reason

forkeepingthe

stationnaires

s

for hepurpose

of

obtaining

ransportation

o and

fro

like cabs

or taxi

automobiles."

What a

hit

Ismet would

have made

if

he had replied

Then,

Lord

Curzon,

assume

that

you will

have

no ob-

jectionto

our maintaining

Turkish

stationnaire

in London,which

s

also

a port

nd where

trans-

portation

s

equally

as

necessary

s

in Constanti-

nople."

The

element

of

intrigue

and

international

rivalrywhichwenton at Lausanne,of which

had

occasion

to observe

many

instances

nd

il-

lustrations,

pened

my

eyes to

the sorry

tate

of

old worlddiplomacy

nd caused

me to realize

that

even

theplots

of

E.

Phillips

Oppenheim

re not

all of them

o far-fetched. uring

the course

of

the first hase

of

the conference

room

of one

of

our secretaries

was

entered,

his locked

trunk

broken pen

and

an

envelope

bearing

he title

nd

seals

of

the

Department

f State

was

stolen

and

never found.

Fortunately,

t contained

nothing

more comprehensive

hanthe aissers-passers

and

personal

accounts

of the

secretary

n

question.

But,from hatmoment, e arranged o have one

of our

staff

n

the

Chancery

ay

and

night,

with-

out exception.

But

I must

not

dally

with these

various

side-

lights

nd

must ell

you

something

f

the

working

of the

conference.

On

January

hirty-first

ord

Curzon

decided

that drastic

measures

must be

taken

to conclude

negotiations

nd

he not only

presented

he Turks

with complete

raft reaty

based

in

part

on

theagreements

lready

reached,

but

containing

many

otherprovisions

which

had

not been

fully

discussed,

nd he also

drew

uip

timetable

mapping ut each

day's procedure

nd

ending

withhis

definite etermination

o

leave

Lausanne

on February

second,

which

was later

extendedto

February

fourth.

To make

a long

story hort, can perhapsnot do better hanread

to you the

entries

n my diary for that ast

day

of the

first

hase

of the

conference.

Sunday,

February4,

1923.

A fateful

day.

None of

us had any

idea what

it

would bring

forth.

We simplyknew

that the

Allied

draft

reatywas

to be on the

conference

able at

4 P.M.

for the Turks

to sign

or leave,

and that

Curzon had

sworn

to depart

t 9 P.M. whatever

he

result.

Duca,

the Rumanian

Minister

for Foreign

Affairs,

aid to

Mrs. Grew just

before unch,

n

a particularly

hoice

metaphor:

"The

abscess is

going to

break todaybut

we don't know whetherthe resultwill be good or

bad."

At

1

30 while

we were

all at lunch

the first

m-

portant

development

ccurred.

I

saw Arlotta,

the

Italian

secretary,

hurryinto the

dining

room and

hand

a

document

o Garroni

who

immediately

rose

and left the room.

It proved

to be

a

draft treaty

drawx~n

p by

the Turkish

delegation

and

handed to

the

Allies

in

reply

to their

draft,

containing

only

those

clauses

which had been

discussed

and

agreed

to by both

sides

in

committee

nd omitting

ll

others.

Ismet accompanied

t

by a

note in which

he said that

he

felt

the clauses

already

agreed

to constituted

sufficientasis forpeace, and thatother ubjects still

under

controversy

ould be

settled

ater. It

was a

clever

move.

The delegates

of the

Inviting

Powers

immediately

went

into conference

n Lord Curzon's

room.

At

3 :30 they

ummoned

smet

who

came

down

from

his

hotel with a

large group

of his experts.

At 7

Bentinck,

the

British

secretary,

called

me on

the

telephone

and

said

that

the Turks wvere

probably

going

to sign

in

a few

moments

nd

suggested

that

I

get

our

delegates

together

to

be

ready

to

go

to

Lord Curzon's

room to witness

the

ceremony.

I

collected

Ambassador

Child

and

Admiral Bristol

and

we

went into the

hall

at the

foot

of

the

staircase

in

theold partof thehotel eadingfromCurzon's floor.

The

hall

was packed

with members

of

(lelegations

and

newspaper

correspondents

waiting

for

the

final

denouement.

The air was

full

of

electricity;hardly

anyonetalked;

we

simply

istened and

waited.

The

hall

upstairs

was

littered

with

the

packed

trunks

of

the

British

delegation;

n fact

when

smet

was

calling

on

Curzon yesterday.

he

British

made a

point

of

bustling

about

and

removing

various

trunks under

Ismet's

nose so that

he

could

not

fail

to

be

impressed

with he

definite

lans

for

departure.

Thus we

waited,

expecting

ny

moment o be

summoned

o watch

the



8/11

VOL. 98, NO. 1,

1954]

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

AT LAUSANNE

7

signing

of

the

treaty.

Suddenly, at

8 o'clock, the

sound

of a door

opening above;

everyonegot

up and

moved toward

the staircase.

In

a moment smet

ap-

peared,

descending

he stairs followed

by his

delega-

tion;

he took off

his

bowler hat,

bowed right

nd

left

to the crowdin the hall, smilingbroadly nd leftthe

hotel.

Certainly shall

never forget

hat scene.

The

Conference

was broken;

there would be

no

signing.

AfterBentinck's

message n

hourbefore

we had hardly

doubted

that a settlement

would

be made.

Child,

Bristol

and I almost

immediately

went

to Lord

Curzon's

room.

Everyone

had left. In

a moment

Curzon appeared;

he burst into the

room like

an

angry bull, glared

at us and began

to pace up

and

down waving

his fist n the

air.

He was perspiring

and looked all

in. He

shouted,

"We

have been sit-

ting

here

for

four

mortal

hours and

Ismet has

re-

plied to

everything

we have said

by the

same old

banalities-independence

and

sovereignty.

We have

all done our best. Even Bompard (the Frenchdele-

gate)

beat his fist

on

the

table and told

Ismet

that

he was simply

tirringup

war. Bompard

made

the

strongest peech

I ever heard

him make." We

asked

Curzon

what

Ismet had broken

on.

Curzon

said

it

was the judicial

clauses.

(This

was only partially

correct

as

it

was

the economic

clauses

too.)

He

said that

at the

last moment

smet

had withdrawn o

another

room with

his

experts

and

that they

had

fullyexpected

him

to

come

back

and

sign.

Instead

he returned,

efused

o

sign,

bowed

and left he

room.

It was

all

over.

Curzon

was

in

a fearful tate.

We

asked

him if we

could

do

any good

by

seeing Ismet,

for as impartial bservers t was withinour province

while safe-guarding

American

interests o contribute

in

every proper

way

to the cause

of

peace.

He said

that

Bompard

and

Montagna

had

gone up

to

see

him

but

that t could

do no

good.

We

said

we

would

try

and

again

asked

him

if the

judicial

clauses

were the

real

stumbling

lock.

He answered

n

the

affirmative.

Child,

Bristol

and I

then

hurried downstairs.

I

had the

Hudson at the

door

in

a

minute

nd

we drove

quickly

o the Palace

Hotel.

Bompard

and

Montagna

were

with Ismet

but

we

were shown

into Hussein's

room. The

concierge

told us that

Lord Curzon's

train,

he Orient

Express,

was an hour ate

and

would

not leave before

ten o'clock.

This

proved to

be

wrong. Curzonhimselfhad had the train held back

for half

an hour

in

order

to hear

the

result

of

Bompard's

and

Montagna's

talk

with

Ismet,

but as

soon

as

they

eported

o

results

he

trainwas released

and actually

eft

t

9:25

or

thereabouts.

A

moment

after

we were seated

Ismet came in,

Bompard

and Montagna having

just

left. We

were

with

him

approximately

n hour.

We went over

mlch ground

with

regard

to

the udicial

clauses,

but

Ismet told

us at

once

that

the

economic

clauses

were

no less

the

cause

of

the

break

as

they

would

place

Turkey

in "financial

and industrial

slavery." We

asked him

if he would make

further oncessions

on

the

judicial clauses

provided

we

should

obtain

con-

cessions from he Allies in

other

respects.

He

asked

what we

suggested. We

said that firstof all

the

foreign

udicial

advisers

should

be

admittednot

only

to the courts of Constantinople nd Smyrna but to

those

of

Samsun and

Adana as well. The

argument

continued or

bout

half nd

hour; Ismet

kept

rubbing

his

forehead s if

almost

dazed. He

said

in

Turkish

"My

heart is

squeezing

me."

Finally he got

up and

went nto the

adjoining room,

tayed there for

three

minutes,

hen

returned. It

was evident

that he had

gone

to consult his

experts,

but he

continued

the

discussion

without a sign

that

he

had seen

them.

Then quite

suddenly

he said,

"All

right, will

con-

cede."

We said

"Samsun and

Adana?"

He

replied,

'No,

only

Samsun." We

said:

"That

is

not

enough

to

justify

our

retaining Lord

Curzon."

Another

twentyminutesof

discussion.

Again

Ismet left the

roomi-for we werepushing himhard-returned and

seated himself

gain.

He looked

awfully

ired. Then

after

a decent

nterval,

o as not to

give us

the

im-

pression

that he had

talked

with his

experts,he

said:

'All

right,

will give you

both Samsun

and

Adana,

but

you

must

give

me

your

word

of

honor

that

you

will

not

reveal

these

concessions

to

the Allies

before

you have

secured theirs."

We

agreed,

arose, shook

hands

and said

we

hoped and

believed

thatthis

would

be a fair

basis for

renewed

negotiations

nd

hurried

to

the

station

n

the car.

We were

elated for

these

concessions that

we had

obtained

were

by

no

means

unimportant,

smet

having

obstinately tood

out on

them withthe Allies. We felt sure at thatmoment

that Curzon

would remain.

At the

station

saw

Bompard

getting ntohis car

and wondered

why

he

was

leaving just

as

Curzon

was

about

to start.

Other

people

appeared to be

en-

tering

their cars also

and

I

saw

some

of

the Italians

coming

out

of

the station. I

went

up

to

McClure

who

was near

our

car as we

got

out

and

asked him

how

soon

Lord

Curzon's train was

starting.

"He's

just gone," he

said;

"The train has

just pulled

out.

They've

all

gone-the whole

delegation." And

that's

that.

It

is

idle to

speculate upon

whether

the Con-

ference of Lausanne could have been saved by our

arriving

five

minutes

earlier

at the

station.

It

is

not

impossible;

in

fact

I

hardly see how

Curzon

would have

dared to leave

after

what we had

to

tell

him,

for

it

showed

that

the

Turks

had

not

got

to the

end

of

their

rope

in

the matter of

conces-

sions

and

that with a

sufficient

mount

of

patience

still

other

concessions

might

be

gained.

Patience

was

the

necessary

element

which

Curzon lacked

and now I know

that

without

that

quality

it

is

use-

less

to

try

to

deal with the

Turk.



9/11

8

JOSEPH

C. GREW [PROC. AMER.

PHIL.

SOC.

The second

phase

of the Conference,

hich

be-

gan on

April 23

and ended

on July24, was

in

many

respects ar

more nteresting

hanthe

first

phase,

but I do not

wishto

wearyyou

withtoo

long an account

and

shall therefore

imit

myself

tospeaking f only woorthree f theoutstanding

features.

The first

difficult roblemwe

had

on

our hands

was,

strange s

it mayseem,

theneces-

sity of

establishing

riendly

elations

with

our

British olleagues.

Apparently

ord Curzon

had

gained

the impression,

uring

the

firstphase

of

the Conference,

hat our

delegation

ad been

dis-

tinctly ro-Turk

nd

had aided

and abetted

the

Turkish

delegation

n their

Machiavellian

man-

oeuvres. It

is true

that one

or two members

f

our delegation,

who had

lived long

in Constanti-

nople,

were somewhat

pro-Turkish

n their

at-

titude nd wereperhaps een too frequentlyn the

company f

members

f the

Turkishdelegation,

whichmay

have given

rise to

theseunwarranted

suspicions.

But the

charge hat

our delegation

t-

self was pro-Turk,

r took

any step,

or said

any

word contrary

o the interests

f

the Western

Powers was

wholly

without oundation.

Through-

out

the entireConference

e lived

up to the

pur-

pose

of

our

mission,

which

was

(1)

to

safeguard

American

nterestsnd

(2) to

contribute

n every

proper

way

towards

he conclusion

f peace.

Be that as

it

may,

we

learned

through

arious

channelsthat the British Governmentwas not

anxious

that

we

should

be

present

t the

second

phase

of the

Conference.

The

French

nd Italian

Governments,

owever,

ook

a differentiew

of

the

matter

nd,

whenthe notices

forthe

second

meeting

were

sent

out

by

the

SecretariatGeneral,

we

dulv

received

ur notice

with he

rest,

nd,

to

my

considerable pprehension,

was

appointed

o

represent

he

United

States

alone. At

the

very

beginning

made

a

point

of

seeing

each of

my

Allied

colleagues

and

telling

hem

exactly

where

we

stood

and

whatwe

proposed

o do at the

Con-

ference,

nd

that

I shouldtake

no

step

without

giving hemfull nformation.Thereafter, hen-

ever

saw Ismet,

which

was,

of

course,

promptly

known

o

all,

I

took

mmediateccasion

to see

my

Allied

colleagues

and tell

them

exactly

what

we

talked

about. To make

a

long story

hort,

his

policy

had its

desired

ffect,

ecause,

fter

having

strenuously

pposed

our

request

o

be

admitted

o

the deliberations

f

the

various

sub-committees

and

groups

of

experts,

ir

Horace

Rumbold,

he

British representative,

inally

withdrew

his ob-

jection

ometime

fter

he Conference ad started.

Instead,however, f coming o me and tellingme

frankly f his change

of attitude, s I should cer-

tainlyhave done in a

similar ase, he had to save

his face t all costs nd

merely enthis egal expert

to break the news to

me. About the same time

he calleduponme withgreat ceremony nd, tak-

ing a document ut of his pocket,he said that he

had been instructed y

his Government o read

to me the followingmessage:

His Majesty'sGovernmentalues the friendship

and cooperationf theAmerican elegation n(1will

be glad

o earn

tsviews

ndto nformt ofourviews

during hecourse f theConference.

This was the only all thatRumboldmade upon

me during he entire hree

months hat we were

colleagues at Lausanne,

although we had been

young secretaries ogethern Cairo some twenty

years

ago

and were

again colleagues

in

Berlin

before he war when we together ealed up the

archives f

the

British

mbassy. The

French nd

Italian

delegates,

n thecontrary, ame to see

me

as often s I went to see them, nd we were

in

the habitof

dropping

n on each other t any time

of

day or night o compare

notes and discuss

de-

velopments.

In

spite of the message

from the

British

Government,

ir Horace Rumbold

never

once

during

he Conference

onsulted

me or

gave

me his own opinion

or informationn his own

initiativewhile we were

in Lausanne. .\s a

re-

sult he miissedmuch hatmight ave beenofvalue

to

him,while

the nformation

e could

have given

me

I

was

able to obtain equally

well

from

ther

sources.

These

things

ount

n

the

ong

run.

It

makes one

inclined o

agree

with a

remarkmade

to

me one

day

by

one

of

my

other

colleagues

at

Lausanne

that

"the

French are

clever

in little

things

but

stupid

n

great

ones,

while the

British

are clever

n

great

ones

and

immensely tupid

n

the smallthings."

The

miost erious

development

n

the

second

phase

of

the

Conference

f Lausanne

was

unques-

tionablyheTurco-Greek ispute verreparations.

There

is

no

doubt

whatever

hat at

one moment

the

Conference

ung

on the brink f

rupture

nd

Europe

on the

brink f

war,

for f the Greek

rmy

had invaded

Eastern Thrace,

as

it

was

certainly

on

the

point

of

doing,

herewould

without

ues-

tion have

been a

general

conflagration

n

the

Balkans,

nd

there

s

no telling

how far

thatcon-

flagrationmight

have extended.

The

danger

be-

came

evident

about

Mav

10 on which date

I

learned hat

he

GreekGovernment as

consider-



10/11

VOL. 98, NO. 1, 19541

THE PEACE

CONFERENCE AT

LAUSANNE

9

ing an ultimatum o Turkey on the

following

grounds: (1) Maltreatment f Greekprisoners;

(2) theopening y theTurks of safedeposit aults

in the Greek banks in Constantinople,nd

(3)

the alleged expulsion f GreeksfromAsia

Minor.

Venizelos,however, onsidered hese pointsweak

and recommendedo his Governmenthat he ulti-

matum,f ssued, should be based on the

Turkish

claimsforreparations romGreece. Shortly

fter-

wards Venizeloscalled on Ismet and talked o him

in a most hreateningnd bellicosemanner. Ismet

said,

"Do

you

mean

you are threatening e with

war?" Venizelos calmeddown somewhat nd

of-

fered o agree to the principle f paying repara-

tions, but with the understanding hat no

cash

should be paid,

as

Greece was incapableof doing

it. Ismet proposedeither rbitration r the pay-

mentof a lump sum, both of which suggestions

Venizelosrefused.At

this

tage smetwas

visibly

anxious and asked permission f theAllies to send

Turkish

troops

nto

Eastern Thrace to meet the

threat

of

war,

which

was,

of

course,

refused.

About this time Alexandris, he Greek Minister

of

Foreign Affairs, rrived

n

Lausanne and took

an

even more bellicose attitudethan Venizelos

had done. He said that Greece was absolutely

determined

o

go to

war

rather

han

pay, and

he

remarked

o

Montagna hat,

s

the

Allies

had sup-

ported he

Greek offensive

efore, hey ould not

now deserther. Montagna orrected imbysay-

ing "certainAllies" and added that "victory

was

often

more costly

han defeat." Alexandris said

that

the

Greek

army

was the

stronghold

f the

Allied position

at

the conference nd was now

at

the

zenith f ts

efficiency,

ut

that

f

timewent

by

without ts

attacking

his

efficiency

ould de-

crease.

Montagna indignantly

efuted he

sug-

gestion

hat the Greek

army

had

anything

what-

ever to

do

with

supporting

he

Allied

position.

Alexandris

then went so far as to

say

thatthe

Greek

rmy

had

been

deprived

f

victory

nd that

its

officers

ow

demanded atisfaction

yinvading

Eastern Thrace. There is no doubt that this

whole

question

was one of nternalGreek

politics.

The

military arty

was

literally hamping

t the

bit

while

Venizelos'

party

lso

needed

some con-

crete sset to retain

power

and

they

were

clearly

pushing

him

towardwar.

During hesedays

the

Allies

had continualmeet-

ings to determine hatshouldbe done. I called

on Rumbold t this time to ascertain

his

opinion,

and

he

said

he considered he situation

angerous

but

not

necessarily

ritical.

With the

French nd

Italian delegates worked n constant

oopera-

tion.

Pelle,

the French

representative,bout this ime

proposed o smet

hat heTurks should ccept he

town

of

Karagach

from he Greeks n lieu of re-

parations.

On May 25

1

called on each of

the Allies and

said I could not ee war ntervene

ithout xerting

theimpartialnfluence f the United

States as a

totallydisinterested ower, and that

I proposed

on

my

own

initiative o extendmyunofficialood

offices or mediation.

Each of theAllies agreed

heartily o thisproposal.

In spite of continual nsistence

n the part of

Venizelos and Alexandris that

a final meeting

should be held, and, in spite of repeated hreats

on

their part to

leave Lausanne and to invade

Eastern Thrace unless satisfaction ere immedi-

atelygiven,

very ffort as made to postpone he

meeting ntil smet should have

had time to re-

ceive n answerfromAngoraregarding

aragach.

On

the

twenty-fifth

f

May

it

was

evident

hat he

meeting ould

be no longer ostponed.

I

spent he

greaterpart of

the nightbefore hemeetingwith

Venizelos

and Ismet

separately, sing everypos-

sible

argument

to induce

a

peaceful solution.

Venizelos

told

me that

he would

accept

the

Karagach proposal nd

I

so

informedsmet.

The

meeting

was held at five o'clock on the

following aywith nedelegate rom achcountry

present.

It took

place

in a small

room at the

Chateau

and

was

intensely

ramatic.

We

all

sat

close

together

t a small

table;

Pelle,

the

Presi-

dent,

and Ismet

sitting opposite

one another.

Diamandy placed

himself between Ismet and

Venizelos

with

a view to

separating

he

princi-

ples

in

the controversy.

The

meeting egan

with

the

utmost

olemnity.

Each

delegate

n

turnmade

a

speechemphasizing

heseriousness

f the situa-

tion nd

calling

or onciliationnd moderation

n

both

sides.

Rumbold used

calm

logic, Montagna

made

an

impassioned lea,

while

Pelle

summed

p

the ituationna masterfulddressfollowed ythe

Japanese,

he

Serbian,

he

Rumanian,

nd

myself.

Ismet then

began

to

talk

and

it was evident t

once that

he

was

trying

o

dodge

the ssue.

Dia-

mandy slipped

a note across the table

to

Pelle

begging

him

to

pin

Ismet

down

to

facts.

Pelle

then

sked

Ismet

whether

e had

telegraphed

he

Karagach proposal

to

Angora.

Ismet

replied

n

the affirmative. elle

said,

"Have

you

received

reply

"

Ismet

answered,

Yes." "Do

you

ac-

cept

" Ismet

again

tried to

ramble off

on



11/11

10

JOSEPH C.

GREW

[PROC. AMER. PHIL.

SOC.

tangents,

but

Pelle persisted

and

finally, fter

every effort o avoid the issue,

he gave a weary

assent.

All this had lasted two hoursduringwhichwe

were

all

under

the greatestpossible

strain and

when it finally ppeared thata solutionwas in

sight,the psychology f human nature took its

naturalcourse and the air of solemnity

hanged

immediatelynto one borderingn actual hilarity.

Diamandy, the Rumanian, got up and insisted

upon

Venizelos

moving

next

to

Ismet.

The

de-

tails

of

the

settlement

ere

then discussed

n

the

mostamicableway; Venizelos and

Ismet

calling

each other

"mon

cher

ami"

had

their hands on

each other's rms, aughed

ike school

boys,

and

appeared

to

be

on

the

point

of

actually mbracing.

The Serbian

danced about the room recording is

protest gainst the cession of Karagach, but as-

suring the meeting hat he would not think of

letting his stand n the way of peace and thathe

merelywished to go on

record,

Rumbold,

the

Englishman, howed his wild enthusiasmby a

contraction

f the facial

muscleswhich mounted

almost

o

a smile

nd the Jap beamedbenevolently

through

his

glasses

as

thoughhe had just eaten

a

most

excellent inner

nd

felt t

peace withthe

world.

Just

before

he

end

of the

meetingVeni-

zelos,

on

behalf f

Ismet

and himself,

hanked ll

those

who

had

helped

n

reaching

his

happy

olu-

tion, ncluding

he American Observer" and we

all

got up

and

shook

hands

all

round.

CAnd hat's

about the

whole

story.

the peace conference of lausanne, 1922-1923

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