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THE PLANNING ACT 2008
THE INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING (EXAMINATION PROCEDURE) RULES 2010
Application by Transport for London
for An Order Granting Development Consent for the proposed Silvertown Tunnel
The Planning Inspectorate's Reference: TR010021
Summary of Written Representations on Behalf of the Health and Safety Executive
15TH November 2016
Examination Reference: SILV-354
HSE Reference: 4.2.1.4173
Contents
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
3 Basis for HSE’s Land Use Planning Advice ....................................................................................... 1
4 Relevant Major Hazard Sites ........................................................................................................... 2
5 Issues ............................................................................................................................................... 2
6 Proposed Solution ........................................................................................................................... 2
7 Deviations ....................................................................................................................................... 3
8 Other Matters ................................................................................................................................. 3
1
1 Introduction
1.1 This is a summary of the Written Representations submitted by the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE).
1.2 For the purpose of rule 10(4), HSE does not agree with the Southern Tunnel Approach, as
shown on Sheet 1 of 3 of the General Arrangement Plan Rev P03 (APP-005), and its formal advice is
to Advise Against that part of the proposal due to its proximity to two major accident hazard sites;
East Greenwich Gasholder Station (EGGS) and Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd (BICL).
2 Background
2.1 The safety implications of land use development in the vicinity of major accident hazard sites
were first recognised in the late 1960s. Later, in response to a major accident at Flixborough in 1974,
which left 28 dead on-site and much damage to homes nearby, the Health and Safety Commission
set up the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH). ACMH identified a three part strategy,
part three of which comprised recognising that zero risk is unattainable; mitigation of the
consequences of any accidents that occurred through emergency planning, information to the public
and the control of off-site populations at risk through Land Use Planning.
2.2 HSE is specified as a statutory party in the examination of all infrastructure planning cases.
HSE’s role in the Land Use Planning (LUP) process is an advisory one, that is, to provide independent
safety advice to decision makers. HSE’s advisory role implements key requirements of Directive
2012/18/EU (“the Seveso III Directive”) in relation to limiting the consequences of major accidents
through the planning process.
3 Basis for HSE’s Land Use Planning Advice
3.1 HSE’s advice on LUP issues is based on the risk that unavoidably remains after all reasonably
practicable risk control measures have been taken by the operator of a major accident
establishment in complying with the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974
and other legislation (i.e. residual risk). The on-site controls may not eliminate the hazard completely
and there remains a chance that a catastrophic accident could still happen.
3.2 To facilitate the provision of its advice, HSE sets public safety Consultation Zones around
hazardous installations, usually comprising Inner, Middle and Outer Zones. The Zones represent
2
decreasing levels of residual risk, with the Inner Zone being the highest and the Outer Zone being
the lowest.
3.3 When considering planning applications, HSE uses the LUP methodology to give its advice.
The LUP Methodology is a codification of LUP advice given by HSE for over 35 years. The LUP
Methodology groups development types broadly according to size, nature (indoor/outdoor),
inherent vulnerability of the exposed population, proportion of time people are likely to be present,
and ease of evacuation/other emergency measures. These development types are then given a
Sensitivity Level categorisation.
4 Relevant Major Hazard Sites
4.1 The Greenwich Peninsula end of the Silvertown Tunnel falls within HSE's consultation zones
around EGGS and around BICL.
4.2 EGGS has hazardous substances consent for the storage of 182.92 tonnes of natural gas. A
release of the natural gas may result in fire hazards; one of which may be a fireball.
4.3 BICL hold consent for 17 tonnes of very toxic substances, named as:
hydrofluoric acid (10te)
sodium cyanide (3te),
potassium cyanide (3te),
sodium dichromate (0.5te), and
potassium dichromate (0.5te),
4.4 The very toxic substances may be released and present a toxic inhalation hazard to people.
5 Issues
5.1 HSE Advises Against the proposed Southern tunnel approach in view of the density of traffic
that is likely to be present at this proposed transport link within the consultation Inner Zone (highest
level of residual risk) for each of the two major hazard sites. The busy transport link currently
proposed is classed as Sensitivity Level 2 in HSE’s published LUP methodology due to potentially
large numbers exposed to risk, although the exposure of an individual is only for a short period.
6 Proposed Solution
6.1 There are means by which HSE would be prepared to reconsider its safety advice. If changes
were made to the hazardous substances consents held by EGGS and the BICL site, such that the
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quantities and/or positioning of the hazardous substances were limited on each site, HSE would
review its consultation zones and the advice may change. The Written Representations also explain
the potential to add a suitable Requirement to the DCO to address adequately HSE’s concerns,
which, in summary, would prevent use of the southern approach roads until such time as the
quantities and/or positioning of the hazardous substances on the sites are limited and HSE confirms
that it no longer Advises Against the proposal. The proposed draft wording of the Grampian
requirement is yet to be negotiated by the relevant parties.
7 Deviations
7.1 Article 5 of the Draft DCO provides for limits of deviation to allow for a lateral deviation from
the lines and situations of the authorised development shown on the works plans. Within the areas
of the proposal that HSE are concerned there appears to be insufficient scope for deviation to
change HSE’s advice.
8 Other Matters
8.1 While not forming part of its Advice Against the proposal, also addressed in the Written
Representations are the following matters that HSE wishes to bring to the attention of the Examining
Authority:
Part of the proposal involves temporary possession of land around an explosives
licensed site, General Marine (Tugs & Barges) Ltd. If a DCO is granted which includes
the temporary possession of the licensed berth, as is proposed under Works No. 20,
then this is likely to affect the types and quantities of explosives GMTB is allowed to
handle there and could put the commercial viability of the operation in jeopardy.
This potential incompatibility could be overcome by a requirement in the DCO, but
this would be for TfL and GMTB to consider.
In the draft DCO references are made to HSE guidance documents which may be
withdrawn or changed over time. The references are not made in such a way that
these changes would be picked up on.
Part 3 of the draft DCO references assets specifically owned by National Grid Gas.
HSE is aware that National Grid Gas are in the process of selling many of their assets
across the country.
THE PLANNING ACT 2008
THE INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING (EXAMINATION PROCEDURE) RULES 2010
Application by Transport for London
for An Order Granting Development Consent for the proposed Silvertown Tunnel
The Planning Inspectorate's Reference: TR010021
Written Representations on Behalf of the Health and Safety Executive
15TH November 2016
Examination Reference: SILV-354 HSE Reference: 4.2.1.4173
Contents
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3
HSE’s advisory role .............................................................................................................................. 5
Context in the wider planning framework .......................................................................................... 6
Hazardous substances consent ........................................................................................................... 7
3 Basis for HSE’s Land Use Planning Advice ....................................................................................... 9
Basis of Consultation Zones .............................................................................................................. 11
Land Use Planning Methodology ...................................................................................................... 12
4 Relevant Major Hazard sites ......................................................................................................... 15
East Greenwich Gasholder Station ................................................................................................... 15
Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd .................................................................................................... 15
5 Issues ............................................................................................................................................. 17
East Greenwich Gasholder Station ................................................................................................... 17
Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd .................................................................................................... 18
6 Proposed Solution ......................................................................................................................... 19
Variation and revocation of hazardous substances consent ............................................................ 19
Determination of the 2012 Brenntag Hazardous Substances Consent Application ......................... 19
Change in Control of Part of the Land .............................................................................................. 20
Requirement equivalent to a “Grampian” condition ........................................................................ 21
7 Deviations ..................................................................................................................................... 22
Southern Tunnel Approach ............................................................................................................... 22
Southern Portal Building ................................................................................................................... 22
8 Conclusion and HSE’s Advice on LUP matters............................................................................... 24
9 Other Matters ............................................................................................................................... 25
General Marine (Tugs and Barges) Ltd ............................................................................................. 25
Summary of the statutory regime ................................................................................................. 25
GMTB’s Licence ............................................................................................................................. 25
The draft DCO ................................................................................................................................ 26
HSE’s Advice .................................................................................................................................. 26
Draft DCO: References to HSE guidance documents ........................................................................ 27
Draft DCO: Reference to National Grid Assets .................................................................................. 27
List of Appendices
[1] European Parliament and the Council, “Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending
and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC,” 2012.
[2] Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations, 2015.
[3] Advisory Committee on Major Hazards, “Health and Safety Commission Advisory Committee on
Major Hazards Second Report,” HMSO, 1979. [Online].
[4] Department for Communities and Local Government, “Planning Practice Guidance - Hazardous
Substances,” [Online]. Available:
http://planningguidance.communities.gov.uk/blog/guidance/hazardous-substances/. [Accessed
October 2016].
[5] Regina V Tandridge District Council ex Parte Mohamed Al Fayed, 1999.
[6] The Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act, 1990.
[7] Health and Safety Executive, “Risk criteria for land-use planning in the vicinity of major
industrial hazards,” 1989.
[8] Health and Safety Executive, “Reducing Risks Protecting People - HSE's Decision Making
Process,” 2001.
[9] Health and Safety Executive, “HSE’S Land Use Planning Methodology,” [Online]. Available:
http://www.hse.gov.uk/landuseplanning/methodology.pdf.
[10] Transport for London, RE: HSE contribution to the draft SoCG, 4th November 2016.
[11] Health and Safety Executive, Land Use Planning Consultation Zones for East Greenwich
Gasholder Station and Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd, 2016.
[12] Health and Safety Executive, Land Use Planning Consultation Inner Zones for East Greenwich
Gasholder Station and Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd, 2016.
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1 Introduction
1.1 These Written Representations are made on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
by Karen Helena Fearon, HM Specialist Inspector of Health and Safety. I have been a Specialist
Inspector since August 2014. Prior to this I worked as a risk management consultant to major hazard
industries. My qualifications include an MEng in Mechanical Engineering. I have conducted various
assessments of residual risk for the HSE including, amongst others, those for chemical storage and
distribution establishments, chemical manufacture and processing establishments and Liquefied
Petroleum Gas sites. My responsibilities also include the assessment of duty holder Safety Reports
for their installations to ensure they comply with their duties under Control of Major Accident
Hazards (COMAH) legislation.
1.2 These Written Representations are submitted in pursuance of rule 10(1) of the
Infrastructure Planning (Examination Procedure) Rules 2010 in relation to an application under the
Planning Act 2008 for a Development Consent Order (DCO) for the proposed Silvertown Tunnel
submitted by Transport for London (TfL) to the Secretary of State.
1.3 For the purpose of rule 10(4), HSE does not agree with the Southern Tunnel Approach, as
shown on Sheet 1 of 3 of the General Arrangement Plan Rev P03 (APP-005), and its formal advice is
to Advise Against that part of the proposal. HSE has already provided a summary of its principal
concerns in its relevant representations, submitted to the Planning Inspectorate in August 2016 [RR-
298]. This document describes HSE’s detailed case and its reasons for Advising Against part of the
proposal at the Southern Tunnel Approach due to its proximity to two major accident hazard sites;
East Greenwich Gasholder Station and Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd. It also explains the
potential to add a suitable requirement to the DCO to address adequately HSE’s concerns, which
may cause its advice to change.
1.4 A statement of common ground between HSE and TfL has also been drafted to complement
this detailed case (SOCG 023).
1.5 While not forming part of its advice against the proposal, also addressed in these Written
Representations are the following matters that HSE wishes to bring to the attention of the Examining
Authority:
Part of the proposal involves temporary possession of land around an explosives
licensed site, which may affect the commercial viability of that site.
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In the draft DCO references are made to HSE guidance documents which may be
withdrawn or changed over time. The references are not made in such a way that
these changes would be picked up on.
Part 3 of the draft DCO references assets specifically owned by National Grid Gas.
HSE is aware that National Grid Gas are in the process of selling many of their assets
across the country.
1.6 The indicative layout of the Silvertown Tunnel given in application document 2.2 General
Arrangements (APP-005) is taken as the basis of the advice provided in these Written
Representations, noting that the layout may deviate. Within the areas of the proposal that HSE are
concerned there appears to be insufficient scope for deviation to change HSE’s advice. More detail is
given in Section 7 of these Written Representations.
1.7 Throughout these representations, any number appearing in square brackets is a reference
to the relevant Appendix number.
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2 Background
2.1 The safety implications of land use development in the vicinity of major accident hazard sites
were first recognised in the late 1960s and led to the issue in 1972 of DoE Planning Circular 1/72
“Development involving the use or storage in bulk of hazardous material”. This circular advised
planning authorities to consult HM Factory Inspectorate (now part of HSE) before granting planning
permission for certain classes of development (known as major hazards) and for other developments
in the vicinity of existing major hazard sites.
2.2 An incident at Flixborough in 1974 involved a sudden release of cyclohexane followed by a
huge explosion that left 28 dead on-site and much damage to homes nearby. The experience of this
major accident had a significant impact on the legislative approach to major hazard sites throughout
Europe.
2.3 The regulatory response in this country, following the incident at Flixborough, was swift. The
Health and Safety Commission set up a committee of experts, the Advisory Committee on Major
Hazards (ACMH), which identified a three part strategy comprising:
a. Identification of hazardous installations which had the potential for major accidents
that could harm the public or employees;
b. Prevention of accidents through controls over the design, operation and
maintenance of the installation; and,
c. Recognising that zero risk is unattainable; mitigation of the consequences of any
accidents that occurred through emergency planning, information to the public and
the control of off-site populations at risk through land-use planning.
2.4 In 1976, a release of dioxins from a chemical manufacturing plant in Seveso in Northern Italy
resulted in severe environmental contamination. This accident, along with differing standards of
controls over industrial activities within the European Community, led the European Commission to
propose a Directive on the control of major industrial accident hazards. The Directive on the Major
Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities (82/501/EEC) was adopted on 24 June 1982 and is
generally known as the Seveso Directive.
2.5 The Directive, which was implemented in Great Britain by the Control of Industrial Major
Accident Hazards Regulations (CIMAH) in 1984, drew heavily on the ACMH approach. Land use
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planning was not included in the Directive, though in Great Britain controls had already been
established over the siting of installations and developments in their vicinity through planning policy
and legislation1.
2.6 An updated Seveso Directive (Seveso II (96/82/EC)) came into force on 3 February 1997 with
a broader and simplified application. It introduced several important changes including land use
planning controls for major hazard sites and on developments in their vicinity aimed at first
stabilising, and in the longer term reducing, populations at risk. The elements of preventing major
accidents included within Seveso II were implemented in Great Britain primarily through the Control
of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH) in 1999. The mitigation measures (i.e. the third
limb of the ACMH strategy) was mainly implemented through land use planning.
2.7 The latest Directive 2012/18/EU (the "Seveso III Directive") is the over-arching legislative
framework within which decisions are made in the UK on the prevention and control of major
accidents [1]; it was implemented in Great Britain through COMAH and land use planning in 2015.
Most relevant to planning is Article 13 of the Directive which has the stated aim of ensuring that the
objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents for human
health and the environment are taken into account in Member States’ land-use policies.
Significantly, this provides the legal framework within which planning policies should be interpreted
and planning decisions made. Article 13 of the Seveso III directive states:
1. Member States shall ensure that the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting
the consequences of such accidents for human health and the environment are taken into
account in their land-use policies or other relevant policies. They shall pursue those objectives
through controls on:
(a) the siting of new establishments;
(b) modifications to establishments covered by Article 11;
(c) new developments including transport routes, locations of public use and
residential areas in the vicinity of establishments, where the siting or developments
may be the source of or increase the risk or consequences of a major accident.
2. Member States shall ensure that their land-use or other relevant policies and the
procedures for implementing those policies take account of the need, in the long term:
1 Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations, 1982
Town and Country Planning General Development (Amendment) Order, 1983 These are no longer in force so are not included in the appendices (but copies can be made available on request)
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(a) to maintain appropriate safety distances between establishments covered by this
Directive and residential areas, buildings and areas of public use, recreational areas,
and, as far as possible, major transport routes;
(b) to protect areas of particular natural sensitivity or interest in the vicinity of
establishments, where appropriate through appropriate safety distances or other
relevant measures;
(c) in the case of existing establishments, to take additional technical measures in
accordance with Article 5 so as not to increase the risks to human health and the
environment.
3. Member States shall ensure that all competent authorities and planning authorities
responsible for decisions in this area set up appropriate consultation procedures to facilitate
implementation of the policies established under paragraph 1. The procedures shall be
designed to ensure that operators provide sufficient information on the risks arising from the
establishment and that technical advice on those risks is available, either on a case-by-case
or on a generic basis, when decisions are taken...
HSE’s advisory role
2.8 In implementing the requirements of Article 13 of the Seveso III Directive, HSE’s role in the
land use planning (LUP) process is an advisory one, that is, to provide independent safety advice to
decision makers.
2.9 To facilitate the provision of its advice HSE sets consultation zones around sites which are
known to be major hazard sites, i.e. those sites that have hazardous substances consent to store
hazardous substances in quantities above those specified in the Planning (Hazardous Substances)
Regulations 2015 [2].
2.10 Local Planning Authorities (LPA) are required by law to consult HSE on certain proposed
development in the vicinity of major hazard establishments and to take into account advice from
HSE when making planning decisions (see Article 18 of the Town and Country Planning
(Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015). HSE is also specified as a statutory
party in the examination of all infrastructure planning cases (s. 88(1) of the 2008 Act and reg. 3(1)(a)
of the Infrastructure Planning (Interested Parties and Miscellaneous Prescribed Provision)
Regulations 2015).
2.11 In the process of forming a judgement, HSE has recognised the views of the ACMH as
expressed in paragraphs 102 and 109 of their Second Report [3] which reads as follows:
SILV-354
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Paragraph 102 “One of the main objectives of planning controls is to ensure that
incompatible land uses are kept apart…”
Paragraph 109 “The overall objective should always be to reduce the number of people at
risk, and in the case of people who unavoidably remain at risk, to reduce the likelihood and
the extent of harm if loss of containment occurs …”
Context in the wider planning framework
2.12 In giving its advice HSE recognises that safety implications, however important, cannot be
divorced from other relevant planning matters and policies. The decision-making framework for
Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs) is set out in the Planning Act 2008 and relevant
national policy statements (NPS) for major infrastructure. It is acknowledged at paragraph 3 of the
National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF)), that the NPPF may still be an important and relevant
matter to take into account in NSIP decision-making. The National Networks NPS, which provides the
basis for examination for NSIPs on the national road and rail networks, does not address
developments within HSE consultation zones, but the NPPF does. It follows that the NPPF is likely to
be an important and relevant consideration in the decision on the Silvertown Tunnel NSIP for the
consideration of development within HSE consultation zones, in order to ensure that all material
considerations are taken into account and the aims of Article 13 of the Seveso III Directive are
satisfied.
2.13 The requirement to consult the HSE is reiterated at paragraph 194 of the NPPF and further
guidance is provided in DCLG’s Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) in a section entitled Hazardous
Substances: for ease of reference, a copy of the relevant section of this well-known document can
be found at [4]. It is understood that this is the relevant guidance at the time of submission of these
Written Representations, but that DCLG are in the process of revising the guidance.
2.14 This PPG and its predecessor Planning Circular 04/2000, recognises the HSE as the
Government's provider of independent and impartial public safety advice to local planning
authorities so that these authorities, and other planning decision-makers, can implement the LUP
recommendations of ACMH, and where appropriate the associated requirements of Seveso III, to
manage development that would increase the risk or consequences of major accidents.
2.15 The PPG directs that any advice from HSE that planning permission should be refused for
development for, at or near to a hazardous installation or pipeline should not be overridden without
the most careful consideration (see paragraph 071 of [4]).
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2.16 Furthermore, where HSE’s LUP advice is material to the decision-maker, the High Court has
held that on technical issues, decision-makers, while not bound to follow the advice of statutory
bodies, should nevertheless give great weight to their advice: R v Tandridge District Council ex parte
Mohamed Al Fayed Times LR, (2000) 79 P & CR 227 (see page 232 of the judgement at Appendix [5]).
2.17 The Mayor of London has developed a Spatial Development Strategy for London, The
London Plan (AS-006), which the Mayor considers can be seen as the expression of national policy
for London, tailored to meet local circumstances. Policy 5.22 of The London Plan (AS-006) relates to
hazardous substances and installations.
2.18 The Plan directs that, in addition to other responsibilities, advice should be sought from the
HSE, where appropriate, and development decisions should take account of Planning Circular
04/20002. The direction is also given that it is important that [hazardous substances] consents are
kept under review to ensure that changes that could affect the location of development around
installations (such as utilities’ plans to decommission gas holders) are taken into account.
2.19 Royal Greenwich Local Plan: Core Strategy with Detailed Policies outlines the spatial
framework for future development and land use within Royal Greenwich. Policy E(d) on Hazardous
Substances affirms that it is the Royal Borough’s policy to seek to control the location of new
establishments where hazardous substances are present and the development of land within the
vicinity of such establishments.
Hazardous substances consent
2.20 The system of hazardous substances consent, under the Planning (Hazardous Substances)
Act 1990 (relevant extract at [6]) and Regulations under that Act, requires consent to be obtained for
the presence on, over or under land of a hazardous substance in an amount at or above a specified
controlled quantity. The controls give hazardous substances authorities (usually the LPA) the
opportunity to consider whether the proposed storage or use of the proposed quantity of a
hazardous substance is appropriate in a particular location, having regard to the risks arising to
persons in the surrounding area and to the environment.
2.21 The hazardous substances consent controls are designed to regulate the presence of
hazardous substances so that they cannot be kept or used above specified quantities until the
2 N.B. Planning Circular 04/2000 was withdrawn in April 2014 and replaced by Planning Practice Guidance [4],
however this has not been reflected in the London Plan.
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responsible authorities have had the opportunity to assess the risk of an accident and its
consequences for people in the surrounding area and for the environment. They complement, but
do not override or duplicate, the Town and Country Planning system of development control, in the
manner described below.
2.22 The hazardous substances authority (HSA) must consult bodies including the HSE and the
Environment Agency (EA) in England before making a decision on any application for consent. If
consent is granted, as a matter of practice, a consultation zone will be established by HSE within
which proposals for future development will also be referred to consultees to consider possible
effects on public safety.
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3 Basis for HSE’s Land Use Planning Advice
3.1 HSE’s Land Use Planning (LUP) advice is provided on the basis of HSE’s understanding of the
hazardous substances consents which are held by land in the vicinity of the development proposal
(see paragraphs 68 and 74 of Planning Practice Guidance - Hazardous Substances [4]).
3.2 HSE notifies the LPA of a consultation distance for each site where a Hazardous Substances
Consent is in place. The consultation distance is sub-divided into Zones which represent levels of
residual risk. Residual risk is the risk that unavoidably remains after all reasonably practicable risk
control measures have been taken by the operator of a major accident hazard establishment in
complying with the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and other
legislation such as COMAH. The on-site controls may not eliminate the hazard completely and there
remains a chance that a catastrophic accident could still happen. This risk that remains is recognised
as the residual risk.
3.3 HSE’s LUP advice seeks to mitigate the consequences by controlling the population numbers
being introduced into the vicinity of a major hazard. For this purpose, in most cases HSE identifies
an Inner, Middle and Outer Zone within the consultation distance, which each represent different
levels of residual risk. The Inner Zone is the area where the residual risk is highest, with the residual
risk decreasing through the Middle Zone and into the Outer Zone.
3.4 For the purposes of providing its LUP advice to facilitate the development controls around
Major Hazard sites HSE has developed a framework for judging the significance of the residual risk at
a new development. The LUP framework is described in documents such as ‘Risk Criteria for Land
Use Planning in the vicinity of major industrial hazards’ (Risk Criteria) which was first published in
1989 [7].
3.5 For the purposes of providing this advice, the HSE quantifies residual individual risk in terms
of that received by a 'hypothetical house resident' which is then 'mapped' to the populations likely
to be present at non-residential development (see paragraphs 74-80 of the Risk Criteria at [7]).
However, in light of experience, the development groups described in paragraph 81 of the Risk
Criteria have now been redefined and expanded to those described in the section below on HSE's
current LUP methodology, paragraphs 3.20 to 3.28. In the context of a busy transport link this
approach takes into account the fact that any individual will only spend a small amount of time in
the vicinity of the major hazard but for long periods of time there will be many people present and
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exposed to the risk. Individual risk values are therefore used as a surrogate for considering the
societal risk to the travelling public.
3.6 Furthermore HSE’s assessment of residual risk takes account of the fact that history shows
us that even the best risk control measures can occasionally fail and that major accidents can occur.
It is for this reason that it is appropriate that HSE makes an assessment of the risks that arise from a
particular type of major hazard site. This is done in a consistent way for all of the sites that have
hazardous substances consent.
3.7 Account is taken of the maximum quantity of a hazardous substance that is permitted by
Hazardous Substances Consent, and any conditions attached to the consent (see paragraph 68 of the
PPG at [4]). The current operational status of the major hazard site is not a matter that HSE takes
into account because hazardous substances consent runs with the land and the maximum consented
quantity of hazardous substances could be present at any time without further application through
the planning system (see paragraph 74 of the PPG at [4]). For a logistics business like Brenntag
Inorganic Chemicals Ltd this is particularly appropriate because there are likely to be continual
deliveries and exports to and from the site. At any time the total stored on site can approach the
maximum permitted quantity for which consent exists.
3.8 HSE's LUP advice is summarised by the level of the residual risk - the higher the risk, the
stronger HSE advises against the development (Risk Criteria, paragraph 86 [7]).
3.9 Furthermore, if the potential harm (i.e. the level of injury and the number of people
affected) is high, then the likelihood of a major accident occurring should be very low for a
development to proceed. This takes account of society's abhorrence of accidents which cause many
simultaneous casualties (Risk Criteria paragraph 43(d) of [7]). It is also in line with HSE's published
precautionary approach to risk control, whereby HSE attaches more weight to the consequences of
an accident than to the likelihood of it occurring when a hazard may give rise to societal concerns,
such as the potential for a public fatalities, e.g. a major explosion in a built-up area (Reducing Risks
Protecting People - HSE's Decision Making Process, paragraph 94 [8]).
3.10 HSE’s LUP approach balances the principle of stabilising and not increasing the numbers at
risk with a pragmatic awareness of the limited land available for development in the UK; see
appendix 5 of the Risk Criteria [7] which provides further detail on HSE’s approach.
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3.11 This does not mean that HSE LUP Policy prevents development; HSE advice is concerned
with the appropriateness of development which factors population type (vulnerability), size and
density in relation to the level of residual risk. These factors in effect create thresholds for HSE LUP
criteria and advice.
Basis of Consultation Zones
3.12 The approaches adopted for providing LUP advice include:
the "Protection Concept", where the residual risk to people is quantified in terms of
the consequences of a representative, worst case major accident; and
Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA).
3.13 There are several types of hazard that may arise from an incident at a major hazard
installation. Where possible, LUP advice takes explicit account of risk (i.e. the likelihood of a major
accident occurring and the possible extent of injury). However, where the quantification of risk is
difficult, uncertain, or potentially misleading, the advice is based on residual risk as represented by
the consequences of a representative foreseeable major accident. This is known as the Protection
Concept (Risk Criteria, paragraphs 12 and 16 of [7]).
3.14 HSE’s advice is based on the risk of serious injury, not just fatality, with particular weight
given to proposed development which might result in large numbers of casualties in the event of an
accident. When judging the compatibility of development with major hazard establishments HSE
uses the concept of a ‘Dangerous Dose’ of harm to people (Risk Criteria, paragraph 52 of [7]). A
Dangerous Dose is defined as one that produces all the following effects:
severe distress to almost everyone;
a substantial fraction requires medical attention;
some people are seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment; and
any highly susceptible people might be killed.
3.15 In view of the uncertainties involved in predicting risk, particularly at residual levels, the HSE
uses a 'Cautious Best-Estimate' (CBE) approach when providing its LUP advice (Risk Criteria, Paras 26
& 27 of [7]). A CBE approach accepts some overestimation when justification of assumptions and
methods is difficult. This approach allows to some extent for combinations of uncertainties,
unidentified causes of accidents and also helps to offset possible grossly abnormal human behaviour
during a major accident.
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3.16 When assessing the risk of flammable substances (e.g. natural gas in a gasholder) HSE
generally uses the Protection Concept. The effect of thermal radiation (on people and buildings) is
best predicted using a combination of the radiation level and the time of exposure (i.e. dose). The
HSE quantifies the dose of thermal radiation received by a person in terms of 'thermal dose units' or
'tdu' (with units of [kW/m2]4/3.s).
3.17 When the effects of thermal radiation on people are used to determine the Consultation
Zones, a Cautious Best-Estimate thermal dose of 1800 tdu is taken as the Inner Zone. A thermal dose
of 1800 tdu would be expected to cause at least 50% deaths in any population group exposed to the
thermal radiation. This dose is sometimes assumed to be that which would result in the death of an
'average' person.
3.18 The HSE assumes that people in the open and in buildings with significant openings will die if
engulfed in a flame. For people inside buildings without significant openings, the HSE takes the
effect of flame engulfment as resulting in at least a Dangerous Dose of harm.
3.19 Where risk is explicitly taken into account in determining the consultation zones, the
consequences and likelihoods of a range of representative events are predicted using a Cautious
Best-Estimate. These are combined to predict the risk of Dangerous Dose at various locations. When
consultation zones are determined in this way, the Inner Zone is located at the furthest point that
the residual risk to a hypothetical house resident of receiving a Dangerous Dose is 10 chances per
million per year (cpm).
Land Use Planning Methodology
3.20 HSE’s LUP methodology is a codification of LUP advice given by the HSE over more than 35
years. When considering planning applications, HSE uses a Land Use Planning methodology to obtain
HSE advice. The up to date methodology is set out in HSE's Land Use Planning Methodology (the
“LUP Methodology”) [9].
3.21 HSE’s advice policies are based on numbers of people at risk, but this information is not
always available with an application, so HSE has developed rules, described within its LUP
Methodology [9] to be used in conjunction with areas of development lying within each of the
consultation zones as a surrogate for numbers of people at risk.
3.22 The LUP Methodology groups development types broadly according to size, nature
(indoor/outdoor), inherent vulnerability of the exposed population, proportion of time people are
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likely to be present, and ease of evacuation/other emergency measures. These development types
are then given a Sensitivity Level categorisation; more detail of the development types can be seen
in pages 12 to 20 of the LUP Methodology [9].
3.23 The Sensitivity Level of a development is based on a clear rationale in order to allow
progressively more severe restrictions to be imposed as the sensitivity of the proposed development
increases. There are 4 sensitivity levels:
i) Level 1 – Based on normal working population
ii) Level 2 – Based on the general public – at home and involved in normal activities
iii) Level 3 – Based on vulnerable members of the public (children, those with mobility
difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger); and,
iv) Level 4 – Large examples of Level 3 and very large outdoor developments.
3.24 HSE’s LUP methodology then uses the following two inputs:
a) The first is which Zone the development is located in of the 3 Zones that HSE sets around
the major hazard site; and,
b) The second is the ‘Sensitivity Level’ of the proposed development which is derived from
an HSE categorisation system of “Development Types”.
3.25 They are combined and using a matrix to generate the HSE’s formal LUP advice of either
Advise Against (AA) or Do Not Advise Against (DAA) which is reproduced below from the LUP
Methodology [9].
Level of Sensitivity
Development in inner zone
Development in middle zone
Development in outer zone
1 DAA DAA DAA
2 AA DAA DAA
3 AA AA DAA
4 AA AA AA
DAA = Do not Advise Against development AA = Advise Against development
3.26 HSE’s policy approach to the application of this decision matrix has the following aspects
that are relevant to the proposed development. At all levels of residual risk around major hazard
establishments, as a matter of policy, HSE Does Not Advise Against (DAA) low population density
industrial and equivalent developments3 (Development Type 1.1 in the LUP Methodology [9]). Low
3 The exception to this is where industrial and equivalent developments are specifically for disabled people, in
which case the Sensitivity Level would be higher.
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population density industrial developments are considered to be those which provide for less than
100 occupants and less than 3 occupied storeys and are considered to be Sensitivity Level 1 (See
Table 1 in the LUP Methodology [9]). Based on the information that HSE has been given by TfL [10],
TfL envisage the Southern Portal Building to be the secondary tunnel services building and as a result
it would be unmanned. Therefore, the current proposal for the Southern Portal Building meets the
description of low population density industrial development (Development Type 1.1).
3.27 It is HSE’s LUP policy to Advise Against housing and equivalent developments, and
developments involving a public presence including major road routes, in the consultation Inner
Zone. Major transport links are Development Type 2.3 in the LUP methodology [9] and are
considered to be Sensitivity Level 2. Potentially large numbers of people are exposed to the risk,
although exposure of an individual is only for a short period of time.
3.28 Where developments are large and involve a significant number of members of the public
who could be involved in a single major accident, then HSE is more likely to Advise Against (AA) the
development.
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4 Relevant Major Hazard sites
4.1 The Greenwich Peninsula end of the Silvertown Tunnel falls within HSE's consultation zones
around East Greenwich Gasholder Station (EGGS) and around Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd
(BICL), a chemical distribution warehouse formerly known as Hays Chemicals and then Albion
Chemicals. The extent of the LUP consultation zones developed by HSE for the two sites are
presented in Appendix [11]4.
East Greenwich Gasholder Station
4.2 EGGS is operated by Southern Gas Networks (SGN) and currently comprises a single
watersealed gasholder (Holder No.1). The gasholder station benefits from hazardous substances
consent for 182.92 tonnes of natural gas. The original 1992 deemed consent has been continued
twice (2000 & 2002) and the currently consented land is roughly square-shaped with a section
extending from the south western corner. On the extended part are two buildings which house
above ground installations (AGIs) associated with the gas network.
4.3 For clarity the extent of consultation Inner Zone for the EGGS site, which is the area of HSE’s
concern, is presented in Appendix [12] overlaid to scale on the Silvertown Tunnel Work Plans (APP-
008).
Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd
4.4 BICL currently occupy land for which Hays Chemicals claimed deemed consent under the
transitional arrangements for the established presence of hazardous substances (following the
amendment of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations in 1999) for 17 tonnes of very toxic
substances, named as:
hydrofluoric acid (10te)
sodium cyanide (3te),
potassium cyanide (3te),
sodium dichromate (0.5te), and
potassium dichromate (0.5te),
4.5 The deemed consent claim did not include a substance location plan but did specify that all
hazardous substances are stored only in moveable containers.
4 The BICL consultation distance consists of only 2 zones: the Inner Zone and Middle Zone. When the
Consultation Zones were developed by HSE a decision was made to represent both the Middle and Outer Zones as a single Zone due to the proximity of the predicted Middle and Outer Zones to one another.
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4.6 Consequently, BICL’s consent allows any of the named substances to be held anywhere
within the site boundary in moveable containers.
4.7 The extent of consultation Inner Zone developed by HSE for the BICL site is given in
Appendix [12] overlaid to scale on the Silvertown Tunnel Work Plans (APP-008).
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5 Issues
5.1 HSE’s advice is provided based on the hazardous substances consent entitlement which is
currently held by land in the vicinity of the development proposal, and the current proposed General
Arrangements for the Silvertown Tunnel contained within the NSIP application document 2.2 (AP-
005).
5.2 In view of the density of traffic that is likely to be present at this proposed transport link
within the Inner Zone of two major hazard sites, HSE Advises Against this proposed development.
The busy transport link currently proposed is classed as Sensitivity Level 2 in HSE’s published LUP
methodology [9] due to potentially large numbers exposed to risk, although the exposure of an
individual is only for a short period.
5.3 This is expanded upon below.
East Greenwich Gasholder Station
5.4 For water-sealed gasholders, HSE’s assessment methodology to determine the consultation
distances is based on a representative worst-case major accident. The representative worst case
major accident for water-sealed gas holders is taken to be a catastrophic release of an amount of
natural gas representing half the maximum amount that can be held in the gasholder. This gas
ignites and forms a fire ball.
5.5 Based on this representative worst-case major accident at Holder No.1, most of the new
Southern Tunnel Approach dual carriageway from the Silvertown Tunnel south portal and the part of
the associated Southern Portal Building would fall within HSE's consultation Inner Zone. Since the
Inner Zone for water-sealed gasholders is coterminous with the fireball radius, people on most of the
proposed new dual carriageway would be within or directly below the burning fireball. A significant
number of fatalities would be expected. Those on the rest of the new carriageway are predicted to
receive serious burn injuries with some deaths.
5.6 It is HSEs understanding that the Southern Portal Building is for equipment and is not
normally occupied by people [10]. If it was occupied, people within would also be predicted to
receive serious burn injuries with some deaths.
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Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd
5.7 HSE’s assessment methodology to determine the consultation distances around sites which
store toxic substances, such as the BICL site, is based on a risk assessment of representative
scenarios. The representative scenarios are various sized releases of toxic substances which disperse
and which may affect people. The hydrofluoric acid which may be on the site dominates the offsite
residual risk from the BICL site.
5.8 Based on this, the entire new Southern Tunnel Approach dual carriageway and most of the
tunnel services compound, including the buildings, would fall within HSE’s consultation Inner Zone.
In HSE’s view, there is a sufficiently high risk of people on the dual carriageway being exposed to
toxic substances in air which could cause fatalities for HSE to Advise Against the proposal.
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6 Proposed Solution
6.1 There are means by which HSE would be prepared to reconsider its safety advice. If changes
were made to the hazardous substances consents held by EGGS and the BICL site, such that the
quantities and/or positioning of the hazardous substances were limited on each site, HSE would
review its LUP consultation zones and the advice may change.
6.2 There are powers within the planning system to vary hazardous substances consents, as
discussed below. There are also means within the planning system to revoke hazardous substances
consents. As with the power to determine hazardous substances consents applications, these
powers of variation and revocation rest with the Hazardous Substances Authority (HSA), in this case
Royal Borough of Greenwich (RBG).
Variation and revocation of hazardous substances consent
6.3 An application can be made to the hazardous substances authority under the Planning
(Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 to vary or remove any conditions associated with a hazardous
substances consent (see paragraph 056 of the PPG [4]). If the hazardous substances authority
decides that the conditions should be varied or removed, it will grant a new consent. If it decides
that the conditions should not be changed, the application will be refused, but the original consent
will still stand. If either SGN or BICL applied to vary their consent HSE would review its LUP
consultation zones and the advice may change.
6.4 The hazardous substances authority also has the power to modify or revoke a hazardous
substances consent. Section 14(1) of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 gives the HSA a
general power to revoke or modify a hazardous substances consent to such extent as they consider
expedient if it appears to them, having regard to any material consideration, that it is expedient to
revoke or modify it; there are also other grounds in section 14(2). A revocation or modification order
under section 14 does not take effect unless it is confirmed by the Secretary of State (section 15).
Variation to or revocation of hazardous substances consent by this means may be subject to claims
for compensation (section 16). If either of the hazardous substances consents were modified or
revoked under these provisions, the HSE would again review the LUP consultation zones and its
advice in relation to the proposal may change.
Determination of the 2012 Brenntag Hazardous Substances Consent Application
6.5 In August 2012, HSE was consulted by RBG, acting as the HSA, on a consent application from
BICL for 199te of substances sodium hypochlorite in bulk tanks and in moveable containers, for
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which hazardous substances consent had not previously been sought. Although sodium hypochlorite
is classified as dangerous to the environment, another hazard is that it may react with the acids
which BICL handle to produce chlorine.
6.6 The 2012 consent application was also accompanied by a substance location plan showing
the areas for the deemed consent substances which had not been included within the 1999 deemed
consent claim. With BICL’s agreement, this hazardous substance location plan was used as the basis
for a wider reassessment by HSE. It is understood that the application has not yet been determined
by RBG.
6.7 The 2012 consent application, if granted by Greenwich Council and subject to any
conditions they may apply, has the potential to reduce the risks and the extent of HSE's consultation
zones around the Brenntag establishment. However, at the time of writing, the application has not
been determined by the authority and it is not possible for HSE to say with any certainty how the
final decision will affect HSE's advice on the proposed tunnel.
6.8 However, HSE’s advice against would remain for the EGGS, unless its consent also changed.
Change in Control of Part of the Land
6.9 Like planning permission, hazardous substances consent will normally run with the land,
rather than being personal to the applicant. This means that if the land is sold in its entirety, the new
owner will be able to implement the consent. However, Section 17 of the Planning (Hazardous
Substances) Act 1990 [6] states that a hazardous substances consent is revoked if there is a change
in the person in control of part of the land which holds consent (e.g. part of the land is sold, but not
all of it) unless an application for continuation of the consent has previously been made (see
paragraph 055 of the PPG [4]).
6.10 The NSIP proposes to acquire permanent rights over land owned by Southern Gas Networks
around the Gas Holder (see Part 3 of the Draft DCO and Application Documents 2.3 and 4.1). The
proposal is also to acquire temporary possession of land on which the pressure reduction station is
currently located and would require pressure reduction station to be moved.
6.11 If SGN wished to retain hazardous substances consent for the land of which it remains in
control, it must apply to RBG (as the HSA) for continuation of consent prior to the change in control
of part of the land. If this application is not made, the hazardous substances consent would be
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automatically revoked and the HSE consultation zones would be removed, as SGN would be unable
to store large quantities of gas at the site.
6.12 The NSIP proposal also includes the permanent acquisition of rights over land occupied by
BICL. As with SGN, if BICL wish to retain hazardous substances consent for the land that it remains in
control of, they must first apply for continuation of consent. Failure to do so would result in
automatic revocation of the consent.
6.13 An application for continuation of the hazardous substances consent may be an opportunity
for a hazardous substances location plan to be submitted, which would confine hazardous substance
storage on the BICL site to the areas identified in the plan. Through the inclusion of a hazardous
substance location plan, it may be possible to reduce the Inner Zone sufficiently to remove HSE’s
advice against the NSIP proposal. A consent application is entirely a matter for the HSA to
determine, however HSE is available to provide safety advice as is necessary.
Requirement equivalent to a “Grampian” condition
6.14 As the hazardous substances consent situation at both EGGS and BICL may change over the
course of the NSIP examination or early stages of tunnel construction (if approved), there may be an
opportunity to include a suitably worded “requirement” of the DCO along the lines of a “Grampian”
condition, which could also result in HSE withdrawing its Advice Against the proposal. The
Grampian-style requirement would need to prevent the use of the new southern approach roads to
the tunnel and possibly the southern control room [depending on final location and use] unless or
until the hazardous substances consents for the two major hazard sites are revoked or modified such
that HSE no longer Advises Against the proposed new transport link, and such advice was confirmed
by the HSE in writing. The proposed draft wording of the Grampian requirement is yet to be
negotiated by the relevant parties.
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7 Deviations
7.1 The indicative layout of the Silvertown Tunnel given in the General Arrangement plans (APP-
005) and Work Plans (APP-008) is taken as the basis of the advice provided in these Written
Representations. Since the development involves linear works, Article 5 of the Draft DCO provides
for limits of deviation to allow for a lateral deviation from the lines and situations of the authorised
development shown on the works plans. The limits of deviation on the works plans are co-extensive
with the Order limits. This section discusses the impact of those deviations on the areas with which
HSE is concerned and on HSE’s advice.
Southern Tunnel Approach
7.2 Sheet 1 of 3, revision P02 of the Work Plans (APP-008) shows the extent by which the
Southern Tunnel Approach may deviate. It is not possible within the Order Limits for the Southern
Tunnel Approach to deviate closer to the BICL site. It may be possible for part of the Southern Tunnel
Approach to deviate further from the BICL site, however the extent of the deviation within the Order
Limits is insufficient to change HSE’s advice, as it would not be possible to entirely remove the
proposed dual carriageway from the BICL Inner Zone [12]. In order to tie into the existing road
network, a significant part of the new dual carriageway must be located within the area that forms
the current BICL Inner Zone. The possible deviations will not impact on the solution proposed from
paragraphs 6.5 to 6.8.
7.3 It is possible within the Order Limits for the Southern Tunnel Approach to deviate closer to
the East Greenwich Gasholder Station. Part of HSE’s reason for advising against the proposal is the
proximity of the new dual carriageway to the gasholder station. If the Southern Tunnel Approach
moved closer to the gasholder station HSE’s advice would not change, because the development
would remain within the Inner Zone.
Southern Portal Building
7.4 The proposed location of the Southern Portal Building is shown as Work No. 12 on Sheet 1 of
3, revision P02 of the Work Plans (APP-008). Based on information that HSE has been given by TfL, it
is understood that the proposed Southern Portal Building would not normally be occupied [10],
therefore HSE do not advise against the current proposal for the Southern Portal Building. However,
should this building become occupied it must meet the criteria given in para 3.26 of these Written
Representations in order to be considered as a Sensitivity Level 1 development, which is the only
Sensitivity Level that would yield ‘Do Not Advise Against’ (DAA) advice in the Inner Zone. If the
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criteria were not met (i.e. if more than 2 storeys of the building are occupied or there are more than
100 occupants) HSE would Advise Against the proposal if it fell within the Inner Zone of either major
hazard site.
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8 Conclusion and HSE’s Advice on LUP matters
8.1 The Southern Tunnel Approach to the Silvertown Tunnel is proposed to be constructed
within HSE’s consultation Inner Zone of two major accident hazard sites; East Greenwich Gasholder
Station (EGGS) and Brenntag Inorganic Chemicals Ltd (BICL).
8.2 The busy transport link currently proposed is classed as Sensitivity Level 2 in HSE’s published
LUP methodology [9] due to potentially large numbers exposed to risk, although the exposure of an
individual is only for a short period. In view of the density of traffic that is likely to be present at this
proposed transport link within the Inner Zone of two major hazard sites, HSE Advises Against this
proposed development.
8.3 The representative worst case major accident for EGGS is taken to be a catastrophic release
of natural gas which ignites and forms a fire ball. Based on this representative event people on most
of the proposed new dual carriageway would be within or directly below the burning fireball and a
significant number of fatalities would be expected. Those on the rest of the new carriageway are
predicted to receive serious burn injuries with some deaths.
8.4 A risk assessment of representative major accident scenarios which may occur at BICL shows
that people on the Southern Tunnel Approach dual carriageway and most of the tunnel services
compound, including the buildings, would be at risk of being exposed to toxic substances in air which
could cause fatalities.
8.5 There are means by which HSE would be prepared to reconsider its safety advice. If changes
were made to the hazardous substances consents held by EGGS and the BICL site, such that the
quantities and/or positioning of the hazardous substances were limited on each site, HSE would
review its LUP consultation zones and the advice may change.
8.6 A suitably worded “requirement” of the DCO along the lines of a “Grampian” condition could
also result in HSE withdrawing its Advice Against the proposal. The proposed draft wording of the
Grampian requirement is yet to be negotiated by the relevant parties.
8.7 The power to determine changes to hazardous substances consents rests entirely with the
Hazardous Substances Authority, however HSE is available to provide safety advice as is necessary.
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9 Other Matters
General Marine (Tugs and Barges) Ltd
9.1 General Marine (Tugs and Barges) Ltd (GMTB) holds an explosives licence under the
Dangerous Goods in Harbour Areas Regulations 2016 (DGHAR) for a berth on the River Thames in
Silvertown. The berth falls within an area, Works No. 20, for which TfL are seeking temporary
possession during tunnel construction. If this use results in an increase in the number of people
nearby then it could put the commercial viability of GMTB's explosives operation in jeopardy. This
potential incompatibility could be overcome by a requirement in the DCO, but this would be for TfL
and GMTB to consider.
9.2 This is not an objection that HSE itself raises against the DCO, but a matter that is drawn to
the ExA’s attention for consideration during the examination period of the proposed development.
Summary of the statutory regime
9.3 Because of the inherent danger of explosives, their handling in a harbour area, including
transfer between land and water, is generally only permitted if it has been licensed by the
appropriate authority. In most cases this will be a licence issued by the HSE under Part 5 of the
DGHAR. Licenses issued under the previous Dangerous Substances in Harbour Area Regulations 1987
remain valid through Regulation 30 of DGHAR.
9.4 A Part 5 licence provides the means to specify conditions and restrictions to ensure public
safety including limits on the types and quantities of explosive that may be handled. Under the
regulations, those responsible for the explosives are also required to take necessary precautions to
secure them against loss, theft and wrongful use.
9.5 The compliance by the licence-holder with the terms of the licence is monitored, regulated
and enforced by the HSE pursuant to DGHAR.
GMTB’s Licence
9.6 GMTB holds a licence under Part 5 of DGHAR to handle explosives at a berth in Thames
Wharf, Silvertown, on the North Bank of the River Thames in the Port of London. According to their
website (http://www.general-marine.co.uk/), GMTB have in the past handled explosives at their
licensed berth on the River Thames for pyrotechnic displays associated with the annual Thames
Festival and the New Year’s Eve event at the London Eye.
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9.7 Under the terms of their licence, GMTB are required to keep the surrounding area clear of
people, both in the open and inside buildings, when handling explosives. If GMTB cannot control the
areas required for safety and security, for example because permission has been granted for
incompatible development, then the types and maximum quantities of explosives permitted to be
handled are reduced, possibly to zero. This may make the licence inoperable and have an impact on
the commercial viability of the explosives handling.
The draft DCO
9.8 Works Plans Sheet 3 of 3, Revision P02 (APP-008) submitted with the Silvertown Tunnel
application show that GMTB's licensed berth at Gate 53, Dock Road falls within the Order Limits and
Limits of Deviation for the proposed tunnel. Furthermore, Land Plans Sheet 5 of 7, Revision P00
(APP-006) shows that the berth is within the area for which the applicant is seeking temporary
possession during construction.
9.9 Works Plans Sheet 3 of 3 shows that the licensed berth is within that area marked for Work
No. 20, which according to the draft DCO is for the construction of a temporary river jetty and
related development. Work No. 20 includes the tunnel's main construction compound, offices, mess
rooms and administrative accommodation.
HSE’s Advice
9.10 Based on the Silvertown Tunnel application at time of writing, HSE's advice is that if a DCO is
granted which would allow an increase in the number of people present near the licensed berth,
then this is likely to affect the types and quantities of explosives GMTB is allowed to handle there
and could put the commercial viability of the operation in jeopardy. However, in view of the
temporary nature of the proposed development, it may be possible to address any potential
incompatibility through a requirement in the DCO. This would need to ensure that the area
necessary for safe and secure handling was kept clear when explosives were present, but the terms
and practicality of such a requirement would be a matter for the applicant and GMTB to consider.
9.11 TfL have stated in the Statement of Reasons (APP-015) that they have made initial contact
with GMTB during pre-application consultation and will continue to seek engagement regarding its
land use proposals.
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Draft DCO: References to HSE guidance documents
9.12 The Draft DCO makes reference to HSE guidance documents which, over time, may be
withdrawn or changed. These documents are updated from time to time, and the Draft DCO is
written in a way that does not allow for such revisions. The draft provisions concerned are:
Schedule 13, Part 3, paragraph 22 (11)
At all times when carrying out any works authorised under the Order comply with… the
Health and Safety Executive’s guidance note “Avoiding Danger from underground
services HSG47”.
Schedule 13, Part 3, paragraph 23(12)
At all times when carrying out any specified works TfL must comply with… the Health
and Safety Executive’s guidance note 6 “Avoidance of Danger from Overhead Lines”
Draft DCO: Reference to National Grid Assets
9.13 Recent correspondence between HSE and National Grid Gas indicates that National Grid Gas
are in the process of selling their assets. Part 3 of the draft DCO relates to National Grid is drafted in
a way that may mean, should National Grid Gas Plc sell their assets, Part 3 would not apply to the
future owner.
