the political context behind successful revolutionary movements, three case studies: vietnam...

8/6/2019 The Political Context Behind Successful Revolutionary Movements, Three Case Studies: Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria

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THE POLITICAL CONTEXT BEHINDSUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS,

THREE CASE STUDIES:VIETNAM (1955-63), ALGERIA (1945-62),

AND NICARAGUA (1967-79)

Raymond Millen

March 2008

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as denedin Title 17, United States Code, Section 101.As such, it is in thepublic domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United StatesCode, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authorand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government.This report is cleared for public release; distributionis unlimited.

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The author would like to thank Dr. John J. McCuen, ColonelAlex Crowther, and Professor Douglas MacDonald for insightfulcomments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any errors ormisinterpretations which remain are entirely my own.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to:Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA17013-5244.

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ISBN1-58487-346-9


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FOREWORD

Guerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage of afar vaster political contest, and no matter how expertlyit is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, itcannot possibly make up for the absence of a politicalrationale.

Bernard Fall

Contrary to the wave of euphoria following thecollapse of the Soviet Empire, the new world orderdid not bring about a closure of revolutionary warfare.In fact, the Soviet-inspired wars of liberation againstimperialism have been eclipsed by reactionary, jihadistwars. By all indications in Afghanistan, Chechnya,Somalia, and Iraq, Islamic militants have embracedrevolutionary warfare, although not Maos PeoplesWar model. In view of this assumption, a study of

revolutionary warfare is apt because the conictbetween the West and radical jihadism will continueto take place in dysfunctional, collapsing, or failedstates.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examines theextent to which some states create the conditions forrevolutionary movements to ourish.Employing JeffGoodwins analytical framework for exploring thepolitical context behind revolutionary movements,Lieutenant Colonel Millen explores how the govern-ments in Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nic-aragua (1967-79) unintentionally empowered revolu-tionary movements, resulting in these governmentsdemise. He supplements Goodwins framework byincluding an examination of the insurgent leaderships

political-military acumen.Lieutenant Colonel Millen extrapolates the political-

military lessons from these conicts to suggest that the


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United States should minimize the level and type ofassistance to states ghting in an insurgency because

these states possess greater advantages than previouslysupposed. The reader will nd his analysis compelling.Often, examining failure provides greater enlighten-ment than examining success.The Strategic Studies In-stitute is pleased to offer this insightful monograph asa topic of debate among counterinsurgency specialistsand the Department of Defense.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen is currentlyassigned as the Director of European Security Studiesat the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from theU.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned asan infantry ofcer, and has held a variety of commandand staff assignments in Germany and ContinentalUnited States. He has also served as the U.S. ArmyInfantry School Liaison Ofcer to the German InfantrySchool at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion ExecutiveOfcer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; andChief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief,Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He served in Kabulfrom July through November 2003 on the staff of theOfce of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusingon the Afghan National Army and the General Staff.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a Foreign Area Ofcer forWestern Europe. He has published articles in a numberof scholarly and professional journals to includeComparative Strategy Journal, Infantry Magazine, and theSwiss Military Journal. His book, Command Legacy, waspublished by Brasseys in April 2002. Lieutenant ColonelMillen is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree inNational Security Studies from Georgetown University.He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in World Politics atCatholic University of America.


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SUMMARY

The challenge with writing about revolutionarymovements is that they are largely regarded asCold War or decolonization phenomena, and hencelargely irrelevant today.Rhetoric aside, revolutionarywarfare is a struggle for political power over somedened geographic area regardless of the backdrop.With this in mind, winning the hearts and minds ofthe population is not necessarily an objective of theinsurgents (as the current wars with Islamic extremistsadduce).Although technically a subset of insurgencywarfare, revolutionary warfare was often usedinterchangeably during the Cold War, perhaps underthe belief that every struggle was somehow part of theoverarching communist wars of national liberation.Seen in this light, it is not surprising that much of the

literature on insurgency warfare was hyperbolizedto alert Western leaders of the insidious threat to theThird World. The most noteworthy hindsight is thatfew Cold War revolutionary movements actuallyconformed to Maos Peoples War strategy.

Insurgent strategic approaches, as Bard ONeillexplains in Insurgency and Terrorism, are inuencedby the physical and human environment, popularsupport, organization and unity, external support,and government response.Hence, the end of the ColdWar did not signal the end of revolutionary warfare,as contemporary Islamic extremist organizations havedemonstrated.Still, as ONeill points out, even thoughan insurgency can present a virulent threat to thegovernment, there is no guarantee the insurgents will

prevail.In fact, most fail.This fact can serve the UnitedStates regarding counterinsurgency approaches toclient states beleaguered by revolutionary insurgents.


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Understandably, the United States should remainvigilant to extremist groups which prey on failed states

for a base of operations, but it should also consider thetremendous advantages even weak states have overinsurgent threats.Foreknowledge of these advantagescan help the United States gauge the level and type ofassistance with condence rather than the inclinationfor direct intervention.

In his book,No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991, Jeff Goodwin developed anexcellent analytical framework for examining thepolitical context behind revolutionary movementsand how dysfunctional governance provides theopportunity for these movements to ourish andsometimes succeed in overthrowing the state. Thisframework can serve as an excellent reference for U.S.statesmen and government advisors when assessing

the state of affairs of a state engaged in an insurgency.Goodwins political context analysis comprises ve

government practices: 1) State sponsorship or protec-tion of unpopular economic and social arrangementsor cultural institutions; 2) Repression and/or exclusionof mobilized groups from state power or resources; 3)Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state violenceagainst mobilized groups and oppositional politicalgures; 4) Weak policing capacities and infrastructuralpower; and 5) Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rulethat alienates, weakens, or divides counterrevolution-ary elites.It must be stressed that each of these govern-ment practices must exist for a revolutionary movementto have a chance. Goodwin adds that the politicalcontext is not the only factor that leads to revolutionary

movements, but he contends it is the most importantfactor.To add greater depth to Goodwins framework,this monograph also examines the competency of the


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insurgent leadership in prosecuting its strategy.This monograph also examines how governments

can squander their advantages vis--vis insurgentsusing Goodwins framework for the political contextbehind revolutionary wars. Accordingly, the authorapplies this framework to three case studies: Vietnam(1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79)to gain a greater appreciation of how governmentpathologies, and not insurgent strategy, are the majordeterminant of insurgent success.

In each of these cases, the regimes alienated virtuallyevery sector of society to such an extent that moderateopposition and eventually popular support fell intothe orbit of extremist organizations out of desperation.The vast majority of the populace and political elitesmay have viewed the revolutionaries with suspicionor disdain, but fear of and debilitation by government

practices left them no other political alternatives.In theend, the regimes found themselves isolated, withoutthe necessary domestic allies and resources to prevail.

The political-military consequences of theseinsurgencies were profound. With the exception ofNicaragua, the insurgencies devastated the political,social, and economic institutions of their host countries.In Vietnam, the unnecessary Viet Cong escalation toguerilla war against the Diem regime in 1963 forcedthe United States to intervene incrementally, changingthe nature and the spectrum of the conict.In the end,the Viet Cong were destroyed, forcing North Vietnamto shoulder the main burden.In Algeria, by the timeCharles de Gaulle assumed the presidency of France in1958, a return to the status quo ante was impossible due

to the power bloc of the French colonialists.Breakingtheir power and putting the military back in its placeeclipsed defeating the insurgency.Only in Nicaragua


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did the revolutionary movement prosecute a swift coupde main against Somozas regime.Isolating the regime

through defections of government allies and severedrelations from the United States and the internationalcommunity created the momentum needed to challengethe regime in a short, violent campaign.

Recommendations.

U.S. National Security Strategy must take intoaccount the unique circumstances behind everyinsurgency and be circumspect when considering thelevel and type of involvement in a counterinsurgency.The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq are likelyanomalies because regime change preceded theinsurgency.The most likely national security scenariowill be the rendering of assistance to an established

government. Hence, political-military engagementwith dysfunctional governments should focus on thefollowing:

Using the political context framework as areference, U.S. political and military advisorsmust take every diplomatic opportunity withtheir counterparts to underscore the deleteriouseffects of dysfunctional governance and thedanger of inaction or half measures againstinchoate insurgencies.

In preparation for their mission, advisors mustunderstand the demographics, social structuresand values, the real economic system, the politi-cal culture, and the structure and performanceof the political system. This preparation not

only helps the advisor understand the rootsof the insurgency and anticipate governmentintransigence, but also provides awareness of


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counterproductive or inammatory reforms. The U.S. Government must remain cognizant

of the substantive advantages an establishedgovernment has over insurgents and not rush tointervene.The introduction of coalition groundforces carries ramications above the renderingof security. The client government may relaxits counterinsurgency efforts, a burden thecoalition soon shoulders. With the immediatethreat abated, the government may see no needto reform government practices, and the largerthe military contingent, the more difcult it isto extract the political commitment withoutthe stigma of failure. Hence, a minimumassistance package provides maximum politicalexibility.

The centerpiece of any counterinsurgency

strategy is separating the insurgents from thepopulation.How that is accomplished is a matterof strategy, but the historical record suggestsmilitary operations targeting insurgents aloneare rarely successful. Allowing the establish-ment of local police and militia, either throughlocal authorities or coalition cadre trainers, isthe most effective way to establish security forthe population centers.Thereafter, constructionand development initiatives can begin in thoseareas where security is established.

Like security, construction and developmentinitiatives have the greatest effect at the locallevel.Construction projects, which build whatthe local townspeople want, use local labor, and

provide training and salaries, are the best wayto spur the local economy and to ensure thepeople defend the completed projects.

The establishment of a UN reconstruction


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and development coordination center couldserve to harmonize, coordinate, and monitor

construction and development projects amongthe international organizations, nongovern-ment organizations, government organizations,provincial reconstruction teams, and variousengineer units in country. A national coordi-nation center serves as a clearing center forlegitimate organizations and prevents fraud,conicts, redundancies, and waste, whichinevitably result when separate organizationsare left on their own.

The use of sophisticated information operationsto inform, persuade, and inspire the affectedpopulation and rebut insurgent propaganda isa prerequisite to counterinsurgency success. Itis not a wise idea, however, for a U.S. administra-

tion to target the American people, includingCongress, with information operations. It ismuch better to give the domestic audience asober appraisal of the unfolding situation ratherthan try to bolster condence with exuberantoptimism. To do so risks creating a credibilitygap and possible backlash if a setback occurs.

Most experts agree that the War on Terror will lastfor years. To meet this challenge without emptyingthe national coffers and placing severe strains onmilitary readiness, the United States should adopt acircumspect national security policy. States involvedin an insurgency rarely need military intervention on alarge scale.A bit of political-military nesse will serve

U.S. interests far more than viewing every insurgencyas a zero-sum game.


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THE POLITICAL CONTEXT BEHINDSUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS,

THREE CASE STUDIES:VIETNAM (1955-63), ALGERIA (1945-62),

AND NICARAGUA (1967-79)

Introduction.

The challenge with writing about revolutionarymovements is that they are largely regarded as ColdWar or decolonization phenomena and hence largelyirrelevant today. With this in mind, winning thehearts and minds of the population is not necessarilyan objective of the insurgents (as the current warswith Islamic extremists adduce). Rhetoric aside,revolutionary warfare is a struggle for political powerover some dened geographic area regardless of the

backdrop. Although technically a subset of insurgencywarfare, revolutionary warfare was often usedinterchangeably during the Cold War, perhaps underthe belief that every struggle was somehow part of theoverarching communist wars of national liberation.Seen in this light, it is not surprising that much of theliterature on insurgency warfare was hyperbolizedto alert Western leaders of the insidious threat to theThird World. The most noteworthy hindsight is thatfew Cold War revolutionary movements actuallyconformed to Maos protracted war strategy.

Insurgent strategic approaches, as Bard ONeillexplains in Insurgency and Terrorism, are inuencedby the physical and human environment, popularsupport, organization and unity, external support,

and government response.1 Hence, the end of the ColdWar did not signal the end of revolutionary warfare,as contemporary Islamic extremist organizations have


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demonstrated. Still, as ONeill points out, even thoughan insurgency can present a virulent threat to the

government, there is no guarantee the insurgents willprevail. In fact, most fail.2 This fact can serve the UnitedStates regarding counterinsurgency approaches toclient states beleaguered by revolutionary insurgents.Understandably, the United States should remainvigilant to extremist groups which prey on failed statesfor a base of operations, but it should also consider thetremendous advantages even weak states have overinsurgent threats. Foreknowledge of these advantagescan help the United States gauge the level and typeof assistance with condence rather than indulge theinclination for direct intervention.

This monograph examines how governments cansquander away their advantages vis--vis insurgentsusing Jeff Goodwins framework for the political con-

text behind revolutionary wars. Accordingly, it appliesthis framework to three case studiesVietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79)inorder to gain a greater appreciation of how governmentpathologies, and not insurgent strategy, are the majordeterminants of insurgent success.

Political Context Framework.

For a revolutionary movement to take root andourish, certain essential ingredients must exist,creating what Jeff Goodwin calls the political contextbehind a revolution. Goodwin denes political contextas the manner in which a country governs and regulatesits society, as well as the degree of political participation

it permits society.3 As a tool for analysis, Goodwinsstate-centric approach provides a substantive andcompelling analytical framework for explaining the


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expansion of revolutionary movements. Furthermore,this framework helps explain the revolutionary

movements reliance on violence over popular supportto gain political control.

Goodwins framework comprises ve governmentmalpractices, which foster revolutionary movements:(1) State sponsorship or protection of unpopulareconomic and social arrangements or culturalinstitutions; (2) Repression and/or exclusion ofmobilized groups from state power or resources; (3)Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state violenceagainst mobilized groups and oppositional politicalgures; (4) Weak policing capacities and infrastructuralpower; and (5) Corrupt and arbitrary personalisticrule that alienates, weakens, or divides the elites ofsociety.4 Any of these practices alone is insufcient toempower a revolutionary movement, but as Goodwin

argues, in aggregate, they are explosive. To paraphraseGoodwin: State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economicand social arrangements or cultural institutions.Revolutionary movements are more likely to formwhenever the population views the governingleadership as intimately responsible for economicand social injustices or protecting unjust culturalinstitutions. Once this idea takes hold, the populationmay perceive even subsequent government reforms asa sign of weakness, further bolstering the revolutionarymovement. The existence of economic and socialinequities is not enough to alienate the people if theybelieve other individuals or lower-level agencies are toblame rather than the central government.5 Generally,

the majority of people will avoid joining or supportingan insurgency (unless coerced) if they believe thegovernment is not connected to their plight, no matterhow severe it is.6


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Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groups fromstate power or resources. Government exclusion of poli-

tical and activist groups from the political process, espe-cially through repression, serves to radicalize them tosuch an extent that they eventually turn against theregime. Repressive and exclusionary authoritarianregimes are particularly susceptible to revolutionarymovements because they push even moderateorganizations into radical camps. Revolutionarymovements in turn radicalize new members bymarginalizing their moderate elements.7

The process of alienation is often gradual and,in some cases, irreversable. People join insurgencymovements when they perceive the futility ofredressing grievances through political activity anddissent. The government exacerbates alienationwhen it uses violent and indiscriminant repression

against all groupsboth radical and moderate. Thesefactors sufce to provide antigovernment groups theopportunity to initiate open warfare.8

Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming, state violenceagainst mobilized groups and oppositional political gures.According to Goodwin, Indiscriminate state violenceagainst mobilized groups and oppositional gures islikely to reinforce the plausibility, justiability, and(hence) diffusion of the idea that the state needs tobe violently smashed and radically reorganized.9If government forces cannot extirpate the burgeoninginsurgency and begin to use indiscriminate violenceagainst the populace, insurgent recruitment is likelyto increase as the people seek protection through theinsurgents. Moreover, indiscriminate state violence

tends to undergird radical ideologies of state andsocial revolution. In short, radical movements thrivein this environment of intolerance, which causes theevanescence of the moderates.10


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Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power.Anything less than overwhelming force will endanger

the regimes capability to repress enemies of the state.Insurgencies can grow unabated if the governmentlacks the forces or the infrastructure to establish itsauthority over insurgent enclaves. Remote regions onthe periphery of the state, especially with mountainsor jungles, often serve as superb insurgent sanctuaries.Corrupt or politically compartmentalized governmentand security forces undercut the ability to wage acoherent counterinsurgency. Accordingly, insurgentsresort to open conict and economic crises to acceleratethe fall of the regime.11

Goodwins assessment here is a bit narrow andneeds some renement. Insurgency specialists John J. McCuen, David Galula, and Roger Trinquierassert that the primary task of the insurgency and

counterinsurgency is to gain control of the populationso as to garner its support.12 The amount and type offorce as well as the geographic conditions are merelyvariables that shape the conict. Galula elaborates onthe mechanisms of control in terms of the politicalstructure, the administrative bureaucracy, law enforce-ment, and the armed forces.13 This monograph willhighlight how deciencies in these mechanisms resultin a loss of control over the population.

Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates,weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. Goodwinbelieves that despotic and neopatrimonial dicta-torships are particularly susceptible to revolutionsbecause they facilitate the formation and persistenceof revolutionary movements. Because dictators often

view economic and military elites as threats, theycontinually seek to weaken and divide them. As aresult, the autocratic regime may lose its loyal base in


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times of revolutionary crisis by driving these elites intothe revolutionary camp.14

Neither Goodwin nor this monograph claims thatpolitical context is the only factor that explains theformation and fate of revolutionary movements, but itis generally the most important factor.15 Nevertheless,the reader may nd the state-centric approach lackingthe essential avor to complement the analysis. Thecompetence of the insurgent leadership most certainlyrequires at least some examination if only to serve as acontrast to the governments competence. The competence of the insurgent leadership to developand execute a successful strategy. Although a governmentmay create the conditions for the formation ofrevolutionary movements, the insurgency can stillfail if the leadership is unable to conduct a successfulcampaign. The primary task of the insurgency is

convincing the population that it is winning the conictand enjoys a wave of popular support. The politicaleffect dominates military considerations to such adegree that insurgents must focus on propaganda togain the initiative. The insurgent propaganda campaignseeks to isolate the government from the populace. Italso seeks to internationalize the conict so insurgentscan garner external support as well as increasinginternational criticism, diplomatic isolation, and eveneconomic sanctions on the government. Under theseconditions, military operations become increasinglyirrelevant to the outcome of the conict.

Before addressing the crux of this monograph,a small digression is necessary to avoid a basicmisunderstanding of a complex subject. The term

revolutionary warfare is misleading because itimplies an almost exclusive reliance on military forceto achieve political ends. Bernard Falls denition


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of revolutionary warfare as guerrilla warfare pluspolitical action furnishes a good conceptual deni-

tion.16

But to ensure there was no confusion regardingthe dominant ingredient, Fall added that it is so impor-tant to understand that guerrilla warfare is nothing buta tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest andthat, no matter how expertly it is fought by competentand dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly makeup for the absence of a political rationale.17 TruongChinh, former secretary general of the VietnameseCommunist Party and former president of the NorthVietnamese legislature, drives home this very point:

[There are] those who have a tendency only to rely onmilitary action. . . . They tend to believe that everythingcan be settled by armed force; they do not apply politicalmobilization, are unwilling to give explanations andto convince people; . . . ghting spiritedly, they neglect

political work; they do not . . . act in such a way thatthe army and the people can wholeheartedly help oneanother.18

As this monograph will underscore, governmentsubordination of political effect to military expediencyis a frequent cause of counterinsurgency failure. One critical aspect of revolutionary warfare is

the degree the conict polarizes the combatants,making compromise or even diplomacy extremelydifcult. Once a revolutionary insurgency reachesa tipping point, as Bernard Fall noted, it is difcultto suppress with the help of military specialistsaloneparticularly foreign specialists. And those anti-insurrectional systems that eventually prevailed over

the revolutionaries simply did so by accepting largeparts of the program advocated by the latter. . . .19 Aseach of the following cases suggest, failure to remain


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cognizant of the political nature of the conict canplace severe strains on the government.

Republic of Vietnam, 1955-63.

State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economicand social arrangements or cultural institutions. Contraryto much of the literature on the origins of the VietnamWar, the Viet Cong insurgency was not preordainedor even inevitable. Bernard Fall, the renowned experton the Indochina and Vietnam conicts, observed thatrevolutionaries cannot start an insurgency withouta basis because they will founder for lack of popularsupport. Writing in 1966, Fall reected that:

All Communist movements have a hard core of trainedmilitary or guerilla cadres. Some of them may neverhave a chance to use their military or organizationalskills; others do. It all depends on the local circumstances,and rarely vice-versa. Such Communist cadres will ex-ploit occasions when they arise, but they are incapableof creating a revolution from scratch. It is Diem whocreated the movement of discontent in South Vietnam.North Vietnam and the Viet Cong fed on it.20

Indeed, President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother

Ngo Dinh Nhu were the central gures in creatingthe conditions for the vitalization of the Viet Minhrevolutionary movement, which formally becamethe National Liberation Front (NLF) on December20, 1960.21 Diems abrogation of the village-as-an-institution created the grievances which the Viet Minhcadres could exploit among the peasantry.

In June 1956, Diem annulled the local elections ofvillage chiefs and village councils, replacing them withhis own political appointees. While Diem probably


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took this step to extend his personal control over therural areas, few of these appointees were native to the

villages and preferred to live in the nearby districttowns.22 By personally appointing village ofcials, Diemended a 500-year tradition of local elections. Villagersviewed these interlopers with animosity, particularlysince many of the appointees were corrupt.23 FrancesFitzgerald abstracts the commonly held view amongvillagers of Diems ofcials:

The governmentappointed village chief; the haugh-ty, arrogant ofcial who took bribes from the locallandlords and forced the villagers to work for him; thevillage security ofcera relative, perhaps of the districtchiefwho used his position to take revenge on old en-emies or to extort money from the villagers; the govern-ment soldiers who, like juvenile delinquents, drank toomuch, stole food, and raped the village girls; the villagedefense guards, who huddled in their earthwork fortseach night and ed when the Liberation Front came inforce to the village; [and] district and provincial ofcialswho, like Kafkas bureaucrats, seemed to inhabit a worldimpossibly remote from the village.24

Whenever the Viet Cong assassinated, kidnapped,or drove out these ofcials, the villagers regarded theViet Cong as benefactors rather than terrorists.25 By

replacing the village ofcials with their own electedcadre leaders, the NLF was able to subvert Diemsregime, village by village.26 One infers that villagerslikely did not accept the cadre leaders any more thanthey did Diems appointees, but the NLF held themonopoly of force once the government left a void.

Diems resettlement program proved disastrous

because it ignored the spiritual attachment peasantsheld towards their villages. Moreover, inadequateplanning, poor settlement design, and inattention tocrop requirements created wretched conditions in the


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new villages. Not surprisingly, at the rst opportunity,the inhabitants returned to their original homes.27

Fitzgerald noted that the peasant formed a ferventattachment to the village, believing that abandonmentof it would result in the abandonment of the soul aswell. Hence, the village represented an integral partof the peasants being.28 Under these circumstances,the concept of resettlement would tend to alienate thepeasantry even if the new villages increased the qualityof life (which they did not).

Diems land reform program was equally mis-managed and not pursued seriously, alienating boththe landlords and tenants.29 Incidentally, the delugeof American food imports and nancial assistance tothe cities impoverished peasant rice farmers, but theAmericans did not consider the economic consequencesof their assistance at the micro-economic level.30 Nor did

they seem to consider the seriousness of an insurgencygenerated at the grassroots level.

In 1962, the American and British advisors devisedthe Strategic Hamlet program, which had provendecisive in Malaya.31 But the program had someinherent difculties not present in Malaya. First, itinvolved some resettlement in order to concentratethe inhabitants in fortied villages. Unlike the squalidsettlements of the Chinese squatters in Malaya, thenew Vietnamese villages might not necessarily lead toan improvement in living conditions, and the villagerswould have to walk farther to tend their elds. Second,Nhu personally took charge of the program andmismanaged it to ruin. He senselessly pursued a rapid,haphazard construction program (trying to fortify two-

thirds of the 16,000 hamlets in just 14 months), whichresulted in a replay of the earlier, squalid resettlementvillages, and with less than 10 percent of the hamlets


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having any defensible capability.32 Had the governmentfollowed the advice of Sir Robert Thompson (the

architect of the Malayan new villages program), theplanning, provision of resources, and execution of theprogram would have been much more methodicaland organized. If Fitzgerald is correct, however, thenthe issue of the peasants identity with the villagewould have made the Strategic Hamlet programvery problematic as well. It could only be sold to thepeasantry as a temporary measure until the insurgencywas defeated. The government could have made itclear to the peasants that they retained the choice ofstaying or returning to their villages once hostilitieshad ended.

In short, Diem alienated the peasantry by adoptingprograms that ignored village institutions and culture.Diems intractable stance permitted the Viet Minh

cadres to gain a footing in the villages because thetraditional local leadership was absent to garner villageresistance. More signicantly, his policies led to theloss of government control in the rural areas. Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groupsfrom state power or resources. Diems rst act, with theassistance of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief ofstation Colonel Edward Lansdale, was to gain controlof the military by replacing General Nguyen Van Hinh,the military chief of staff, after he challenged Diemslegitimacy. Next, Diem defeated in detail the three mostpowerful sects in South Vietnam: the Hoa Hao, the CaoDai, and the Binh Xuyen. According to Bernard Fall,the success of this campaign, in large measure, wasdue to the popular support the Diem regime enjoyed

in ridding the country of these criminal and subversivesects, and not to any tactical prowess of the military.33Additionally, the 1955 Anti-Communist Denunciation


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Campaign successfully eliminated the Viet Minhcadres as a threat to the regime.34 These victories were

a propitious start for Diem internationally. He had,within a year of assuming power, secured the regimefrom internal threats, paving the way for economicreforms (almost totally through U.S. assistance) andpolitical reforms (or so the Americans had hoped).35The defeat of the sects reassured the Eisenhoweradministration and some inuential senators that Diemwas the type of leader that would bolster Americascontainment strategy in South East Asia.36

Unfortunately, Diem did not temper his achieve-ments with a subsequent policy of reconciliation. On thecontrary, his cleansing campaign turned increasinglyrepressive, spreading to all sectors of society, with theexception of the Catholics.37 In January 1956, Diemissued Ordinance No. 6 which gave him carte blanche

against perceived national security threats, imposingthe arrest and detention of state enemies, establishingconcentration camps, suspending habeas corpus,creating military tribunals without the right of defenseand appeal, and abolishing the right of assembly.38 Theconcentration camps included not only communists,but also members of various sects, political parties, themedia, and the trade unions.39

Repression, exclusion, and favoritism epitomizedthe Diem regime. Diem and Nhu blatantly barredopposition parties from the electoral process andhabitually suppressed newspapers critical of theregime.40 The regime viewed all political groups, notjust the communists, as threats and suppressed them.41Conversely, Catholics received favorable positions in

the administration, and Catholic villages received thelions share of economic assistance and other aid.42Within this political milieu, the Diem regime needlessly


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polarized the country into two camps, and Diemscamp grew smaller as his campaign of repression

became more expansive.Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming state violenceagainst mobilized groups and oppositional political gures.Diems campaign against all enemies, real or imagined,was pervasive. Without a doubt, many Viet Minh werearrested, but so were leaders of other political parties,and even nationalists whose only crime was to haveearlier opposed the French. Other ofcials, withoutDiems knowledge, used the anti-treason laws tosettle old scores with enemies, increase their economicposition, and gain a political advantage.43

The South Vietnamese army (ARVN) earned thereputation of rapaciousness concerning its treatmentof villagers.44 As Bernard Fall recorded, Americanadvisors in Vietnam continually reproached the

ARVN for stealing, raping, burning down villages,[and] generally kicking people around.45 Fitzgeraldbelieves this contempt from soldiers and governmentofcials created an atmosphere of paranoia among thevillagers to the extent they ceased to trust each otherto the point where they could not organize to defendthemselves.46 The crucial consequence of these actsbecame manifest during the later counterinsurgency.Conceptually, the villagers were the integral componentof the self-defense forces (local militias). If the regimeill-treated the peasantry, then the peasants would notght for the regime.

The tipping point against the regime came in thespring of 1963. The governments use of deadly forceagainst Buddhist demonstrators in Hue on May 8

resulted in an unprecedented but powerful anti-Diemopposition movement among the Vietnamese. Buddhistactivismexemplied by mass protests, hungerstrikes, and several self-immolationsresonated


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with the populace in a way the NLF could not.47Committed openly to the overthrow of the regime, the

Buddhist sects acted through the media to demandthe end of Diems tyranny, using self-immolations asa propaganda device more powerful than any NLFterrorist act.48 In a show of solidarity, students fromSaigon and Hue staged protests.49 Uncompromisingly,Nhu ordered the security forces on August 21 torepress the Buddhists with a wave of executions andarrests in Saigon, Hue, and other prominent cities.50Thereafter, Nhu had thousands of college and highschool students arrested for protesting the August 21atrocities. This last act appeared suicidal since it meantthe alienation of prominent families and the Catholicclergyvirtually the last supporters of the regime. Oneof Nhus subordinates believed his addiction to drugsmay have contributed to his irrational and paranoid

behavior, which eventually manifested in accusationsof a U.S. conspiracy against the Diem regime.51

For 8 years, the Diem regime had managed to pusha number of powerful sects and a sizable portion ofthe peasantry into the arms of the Viet Minh cadres.Furthermore, it had alienated the army, the Buddhists,and the urban elites to such an extent that it lost itssource of support. Finally, the Kennedy administrationconcluded that only regime change could salvage itscontainment strategy in Southeast Asia. Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power.Diems haphazard and ineffective centralization ofthe government resulted in several vacancies at theprovincial level, and in some parts of the country nogovernment presence existed.52 Wherever permanent

authority was absent, the government was sure tolose control of the populace. Analyzing the meaningof control during the Indochina conict and the NLF


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insurgency in South Vietnam, Bernard Fall assessedthat using military occupation as a measurement of

control is illusory. The real indicators of control arethe number of villages paying taxes, the presenceof teachers in villages, and the political activities ofvillage chiefs and councils. A decline in tax collection,an increase in teacher absenteeism in villages, and theloss of village authority in fact indicate a governmentloss of administrative control. By 1962, the insurgentshad killed upwards of 10,000 village chiefs out of 16,000villages. By mid-1963, Communist tax collections wereprevalent in 42 out of 45 provinces. Fall concluded thatbody counts and captured equipment are irrelevant ininsurgency warfare.53 When a country is being subvertedit is not being outfought; it is being outadministered.54(Emphasis in the original.) Fall believed that the falloutfrom government-appointed village chiefs resulted in

the severance of 80 percent of the population from thecentral government.55

As early as 1955, the United States had taken anactive role in Vietnams security. It reorganized theARVN into seven divisions equipped with Americanweapons and equipment. As the insurgency grew,the United States created the Popular Forces to patrolvillages and Regional Forces (50,000 total) to provideprovincial defense. In short, it had created an American-style military bureaucracy and organization.56 By 1963,the United States deployed 16,000 American advisorsfor the ARVN.57 The 300,000-man ARVN may havedominated geographic terrain most of the time, butthis fact was irrelevant because the NLF dominatedmost of the population centers. This terrain is where

insurgencies are won.58Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates,

weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. In


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many ways, Diem was a cipher, an embodiment ofcontradictions. He was personally an ascetic, but his

regime was extremely corrupt. Appointed by EmperorBao Dai as the premier for South Vietnam during thesummer of 1954, Diem had tenuous political supportto draw from initially. Vietnamese military and civilauthorities regarded him as an interloper since he hadnot lived in Vietnam for the previous 4 years, and theCochin Chinese landlords distrusted him because hewas Catholic and from central Vietnam. Fortunatelyfor Diems political future, Colonel Lansdale convincedthe Eisenhower administration to support him as amatter of foreign policy, which in turn convincedDiems rivals not to challenge him.59 Diems anti-Japanese and anti-communist credentials, as well as hisreputation for integrity and executive skills, certainlybolstered his international standing.60 Diems defeat

of the most powerful sects convinced the Eisenhoweradministration that Diem had the moxie to resist thecommunist threat, and it thereafter proceeded toprovide substantial nancial, military, and advisorysupport.61

Despite these credentials, Diem was not thechampion of democratic institutions as supposed. Evi-dence suggests he saw himself literally as a Confucianemperor, who ruled as a paternal and moral sovereign.As such, only he could determine what was best forthe people, and hence regarded voting and electionsas a means to establish the unanimity of his decisions.To Diem, permitting the uninformed and uneducatedmasses to have a voice in important politicalmatters would be an abrogation of his sovereign

responsibilities.62 In view of his political outlook, Diemsexcessive voter fraud in the presidential and legislativeelections of 1957, 1961, and 1963 is understandable; it


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was designed to ordain his reign and install ofcialswho would prosecute his edicts.63

Without a doubt, the catalyst for the Viet Minhrevolutionary movement was Diems obsession forcentralized control, even though he lacked the requisiteorganizational and managerial skills to ensure it. Fallclaims that until Diem began alienating the populace,the 6000-strong Viet Minh cadre in South Vietnamcommanded no popular support.64 The survivors ofthe Hoa-Hao, Cao-Dai, and the Binh Xuyen sects threwtheir support behind the Viet Minh almost immediatelydue to Diems relentless persecution.65 If properlycultivated, these sects could have been valuable alliesin combating the Viet Minh cadres, since they had noparticular afnity with the communists.

Although Diem inherited a functional administra-tion from the French, he failed to pursue judicial, eco-

nomic, and administrative reforms, empower subordin-ates to exercise government authority, or create a sys-tem of oversight to curb corruption.66 Consequently,corruption abounded in all forms. In spite of Diemspersonal revulsion of corruption, the Ngo family wasthe biggest practitioner of nepotism. His close relativeslled the top ambassadorial, cabinet, and civil serviceposts. Most signicant, his brother Nhu served ashis personal advisor and chief of central intelligence,making him the most powerful man in Vietnam.67

Cracks in the regime appeared frequently, whichmust have emboldened the NLF and North Vietnamese,while at the same time alarming the Americans. In1960, the Groupe Caravelliste, comprising 18 seniorVietnamese politicians, publicly condemned regime

oppression and corruption in detail. Weeks later, apoorly planned military coup provided the regime withthe opportunity to crack down even more, including


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the imprisonment of the Groupe Caravelliste.68 At thispoint, Diem began to withdraw into himself, reducing

his circle of condants, and isolating himself evenfurther from the public view.69 Nhu began to step up hispersecution of subversives, as well as factionalizingthe ofcer corps through corruption, extortion, andespionage. This environment not only created a climateof mistrust in the ofcer corps (making the formulationof a coup problematic), but it also undermined militaryprosecution of an effective counterinsurgency.70

The spontaneous demonstrations in the late springand summer of 1963 nally alerted the United Statesof the rot within the Diem regime. In August 1963,the Kennedy administration quietly hinted to the topARVN generals that a change in government mightbe in order. Further dissociation of the Diem regimeby the Kennedy administration in October convinced

the paranoid generals that they could count on U.S.acquiescence if a coup occurred. So it was on November1 that the generals coup toppled the regime, resultingin the execution of Diem and Nhu without fanfare.71

The competence of the insurgent leadership to developand execute a successful strategy. In the aftermath of theFrench Indochina War, the Viet Minh cadre in SouthVietnam reverted to a political struggle in anticipationof forming a new government in the aftermath of theproposed 1956 national elections. As a hedge, the cadrewould maintain its revolutionary organization in casethe elections were not held.72 Even though the Viet Minhcadre depended on North Vietnam for resources andstrategic guidance, it would be an overstatement to sayit was a mere appendage of North Vietnam.73 Often the

agendas of each clashed with major debates regardingwhether the cadre should start the military struggleas its leadership desired, or continue with political


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subversion as the northern leadership desired.74 Thegoal of unication was never in question; rather the

dispute revolved around the strategy. But the mainpoint is that the North Vietnamese government did nothave such control over the cadres that it could directall of their activities. The relationship was much looserthan that.

In 1957, the Viet Minh cadre began a two-prongedcampaign to sever the governments control from therural population. One prong focused on propagandawhile the other involved a campaign of assassinationsaimed at government ofcials, teachers, and membersof the Cong An (the Diemist secret police) in an effort toeliminate government institutions in the countryside.75Although North Vietnam was predominantly engagedin consolidating its domestic economic and politicalposition, Ho Chi Minh increasingly viewed the cadres

struggle favorably, appointing the principal cadreleaders, Le Duan and Pham Hung, to substantiveleadership positions in the Communist party, as wellas having them accompany him to Moscow in orderto lobby for Soviet aid and diplomatic support oftheir revolutionary struggle.76 By the end of 1958, therevolutionary movement (now called the Viet Cong)had begun to recover from Diems Anti-CommunistDenunciation Campaign, and Le Duan began lobbyingNorth Vietnam to support the Viet Congs escalationto an armed struggle, a decision North Vietnamsleadership declined to make at this juncture.77 NorthVietnam favored a continuation of the subversioncampaign, fearing an armed struggle would lead tothe intervention of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)

and increase the probability of American militaryintervention.78 Increased involvement would need towait until North Vietnam nished the consolidation


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of its socialist programs and the reorganization andmodernization of the NVA in accordance with its

5-year plan (1955-59).79

The last half of 1959 became the dening period forthe insurgency. Diems unrelenting counterinsurgencycampaign against the Viet Cong (and everyone else)pressured the North Vietnamese leadership to agreeto some intensication of the campaign into an armedstruggle.80 During this period, North Vietnam beganreorganizing and rearming the cadre units, as wellas revitalizing former base areas in South Vietnam.In January 1960, the Viet Cong armed struggle beganwith a series of attacks on the ARVN and governmentofcials in villages.81 In December 1960, the cadreformed the National Liberation of South Vietnam(NLFSV or NLF) to provide a political identity for thestruggle and for international assistance.82

Still, the debate raged within the VietnameseCommunist party (Lao Dong) between advocates ofan armed struggle and those in favor of continuingthe political struggle. Powerful party membersTruong Chinh and General Vo Nguyen Giap urgedcaution, believing that active resistance and continualexpansion of the movement would ultimately achievethe overthrow of Diems regime without riskingincreased American involvement.83 In the end, the VietCong leadership swayed the majority for an escalationto guerrilla warfare. As Giap had feared, the Americanmilitary assistance and intervention increased in kind,eventually escalating the conict beyond what theNorth Vietnamese had planned.84

Objectively, the opponents of an accelerated

timetable for armed conict were probably correct.Despite years of Diems cleansing operations, the VietCong still numbered 5,000 members in the 1958-59


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time frame. Admittedly, a substantial percentage ofcadre leadership positions had been eliminated in the

conict, but so long as the Viet Cong infrastructureremained in place, losses alone were not decisive.85

The cadres strategy of political struggle wasessentially sound, effective, and adaptive. The NLFdiscovered that the peasants did not automaticallytransfer allegiance with the elimination of the villagechiefs or landlords. Rather, they remained reserved,not wanting to get involved in a conict betweenoutsiders. Interestingly, the NLF land reformprogram did benet the peasants, and the affectedpeasants were appreciative but not enough to throwtheir support behind the NLF.86 Fitzgerald proposesthat the greatest factor in gaining the support of thepeasantry was an enduring NLF presence in thevillages and treating the villagers with politeness

and kindness. In contrast to the abhorrent behaviorof the ARVN, the NLF presence may have been moretolerable. Fitzgerald concludes that the Governmentof Vietnam (GVN) did not care for them [villagers].The GVN wanted not to win them over, but merelyto rule them.87 Reinforcing the rapport between thecadre cells and the peasants, the NLF emphasized itspolicy of respecting the centrality of the village withthe peasantry.88

The well-documented history of Viet Congterrorism, murder, intimidation, and atrocities againstthe population contradicts Fitzgeralds harmony ofmutual affections between the NLF and peasant. VietCong subversion depended on coercion. As the VietMinh had demonstrated during the Indochina War, only

through the establishment of a permanent presence ineach village could the NLF gain control of the peasantry.The cadres lived among the villagers and depended on


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them for sustenance, security, and intelligence. Theyalso meted out punishment and rewards as a means of

establishing their authority. By recruiting among thevillagers, fortifying the village, and creating weaponsand food caches, the politico-military cadres drew thepeasants into the conict. The ARVN only ran patrolsthrough villages and never established a permanentpresence. If the ARVN launched an operation againsta known/suspected Viet Cong-controlled village, itwas the villagers who suffered from the attack. TheViet Cong calculated the villagers would channel theiranger towards the government rather than the NLF.89Nevertheless, these attitudes, if they truly existed,seemed to have changed once the American militarybecame engaged, with villagers lambasting the VietCong for bringing the wrath of America repowerdown upon them.

Using each controlled village as a base, the NLFdevised the growth and split technique for expandingits control. The cadre would form a military unit (e.g.,a platoon) from the local villages, train it, and giveit experience through combat. Later, the survivingmembers would split into three cadres to serve asthe basis for three new platoons, and so forth.90 Thistechnique tended to churn out competent unitsrelatively quickly, especially when one considers thatthe evolving cadre consisted of survivors, who couldpass their proven skills to new recruits. In this manner,the NLF grew to 15,000 insurgents by 1961.91

This approach not only enhanced the movementsgrowth, it also demonstrated the dominant positionpolitical subversion plays in revolutionary warfare.

The government can win hundreds, even thousands,of military engagements, but if it loses control andthe support of the people in the process, it will lose


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its source of recruitment, labor, scal support (taxes),and ultimately perceived legitimacy as the sovereign.

As Thomas Hobbes observed, self-preservation is theprimary motivation of the individual caught in aninsurgency, so he will support whichever side canprovide him that security.92 It is not surprising, then,that through its political-military organization, theNLF was able to extend its control of 80 percent of therural population by 1963.93 Bernard Falls assessmentappears valid: The Viet Cong did not outght the Diemregime, it out-administered it. But the critical lesson isthat the Viet Cong movement would not have reachedcritical mass had the Diem regime not pursued suchself-defeating practices.

On the other hand, the Viet Cong leadership madethe strategic error of escalating the struggle into armedconict and in such an unrestrained manner that the

United States was compelled to intervene, changingthe complexion of the conict. As insurgency expert John J. McCuen concluded, the Viet Cong leadershipoverreached, causing its own demise:

This massive U.S. intervention and the new South Viet-namese Government which followed Diem successfullyreorganized the pacication program and radically

changed the military and political strategies to reestab-lish the control, security, and support of the South Viet-namese population. This success was culminated duringthe 1968 North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, when not onlythe offensive was bloodily repulsed, but almost all of theremaining Viet Cong cadres who surfaced, expecting ageneral uprising of the population, were either killed orarrested. The North Vietnamese tried unsuccessfully toreplace these Viet Cong cadres with North Vietnamese,

but the population would not accept them. In any event,the Viet Cong were never again a signicant force dur-ing the war . . . [primarily due to] the U.S. and SouthVietnamese pacication program and the military/po-


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litical strategies in the eld, which did reestablish thecontrol, security, and support of the population. This isin itself a key lesson.94

In short, the Diem regime created the conditionswhich fed the NLF movement. The fact that the NLFoverreached suggests the leadership lacked strategicpatience. In the end, the NLF brought in the UnitedStates, which possessed the power to destroy theNLFand it did.

Algeria, 1945-62.

State sponsorship or protection of unpopular economicand social arrangements or cultural institutions.AlthoughAlgeria had been a French province since 1870,affording it ideally all the privileges and obligationsof metropolitan France, the Algerian people did notenjoy the same status as Frenchmen, especially underthe European colonists (pied noiror colons) in Algeria.So many bureaucratic obstacles existed for Algeriansseeking citizenship that ofcial policies of assimilationbecame absurd notions.95 Throughout their tenancy inAlgeria, thepied noir(particularly the arch conservativeultras) consistently thwarted any government reforms

or reciprocation of Algerian wartime service.96In Alistair Hornes view, paltry Algerian repre-

sentation in the local government, an unjust socialsystem (commune mixtes), and discriminatory politicalpolicies were always at the heart of Algerian discontent.Racism, the unequal distribution of wealth (especiallyarable land), and economic hardships, as well aspoor vocational training and education, exacerbatedgrievances. Since its occupation of Algeria in 1830,France had treated Algerian nationalism with imperial


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contempt and arrogance. Even basic respect for theaverage Algerian was callously disregarded. Pied noir

voter fraud in the Algerian Assembly elections in 1948convinced a small number of Algerian conspiratorsthat independence through violence was the onlyrecourse.97

Still, a revolutionary movement may not haveemerged had World War II and the Indochina Warnot occurred. The German defeat of France in 1940damaged French prestige and baraka (honored position)among Algerians. The Viet Minh defeat of the Frenchat Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 broke the aura of Frenchinvincibility.98 Horne laments that despite all this,the tragedy of the Algerian insurgency might havebeen averted had the French shown a little moremagnanimity, [and] a little more trust, moderation andcompassion. . . .99

Repression and/or exclusion of mobilized groups fromstate power or resources. In contrast to the British colonialpractice, the French excluded all but a handful of Al-gerians from administrative posts. The paltry numberof French administrators, overworked and understaff-ed, had little contact with the populace. Frequently,they relied on Muslim intermediaries, the vast majorityof whom were corrupt and hated by the inhabitants.100Imperceptibly, resistance movements emerged in the1930s, cloaked in nationalism, but following distinctapproaches. The deeply inuential Ulema religiousmovement of Ben Badis sought a return to Islamicprinciples. The toile Nord-Africaine (forerunner tothe MTLD)101 revolutionary movement of MessaliHadj sought the redistribution of property among the

Algerian people. Finally, the liberal movement of FerhatAbbas initially embraced assimilation with Francebut on terms of equality. The Ulema and toile leaders


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were inveterate rebrands, calling for the expulsionof the Europeans from Algeria. The liberal movement

reluctantly moved towards that position in 1936 whenpied noirlobbies defeated the Blum-Viollette Bill whichsought assimilation of Algerians as bona de Frenchcitizens. The collapse of the bill not only marginalizedAlgerian moderates, but it also convinced thepied noirthat they were the ultimate arbiters of French policy inAlgeria.102 The French authorities exacerbated tensionsby arresting Messali and Abbas during World War IIfor publishing nationalist tracts. Thereafter, Algeriannationalists regarded French promises of reformsas platitudes, particularly if the pied noirremained apolitical force.103

The rst real shots of the insurgency rang out onMay 8, 1945, when an Algerian pro-independencedemonstration took place in Stif during the Victory

over Europe (V.E.) Day celebrations. Violence broke-out and rapidly spread to the surrounding areas, result-ing in the massacre of 103 Europeans, the wounding of100, and the raping of several women. Many corpseswere intentionally mutilated. In traditional fashion,the French garrisons responded with the ratissagethe indiscriminate raking over of villagesto pacifythe affected areas. Estimates of Algerian dead rangedfrom 1,300 to 50,000, depending on French or Algerianaccounts. The uprising struck fear into the Europeanpied noir, who not only supported the brutal methodsof the French authorities but also used the uprising tolibuster for reforms. As an illustration of unintendedeffects, many Algerians were more repulsed thanintimidated by the military reprisals and hardened

their resolve for eventual liberation from the Frenchorder.104


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After Stif, Messali was exiled to French Congo,and Abbas again arrested. Predictably, Abbas became

estranged from Messali for his role in the Stifmassacres, and upon release pursued his moderatecourse once more as a member of the AlgerianAssembly. Unknown to the French government,Stif only brought a respite, not preemption of theinsurgency. Worse, it gave the pied noira sense ofarrogant complacency. As mentioned, their arrogancewas best exemplied by the blatant voting fraud duringthe 1948 Algerian Assembly elections in which thepiednoirand their coterie retained their majority.105 Writingon the repercussions of the election, French professorCharles-Andr Juilen warned in 1953, It is by closingthe normal paths of legality to a mass of eight millionpeople that one risks driving it back into the arms of thedeclared adversaries of la prsence franaise, who aim

to solve the Algerian problem by violence.106

In short,while French insouciance towards the Algerian peoplecreated tensions,pied noirpolitical intrigue accountedfor the virulence of the insurgency when it erupted onNovember 1, 1954.

Indiscriminate, but not overwhelming state violenceagainst mobilized groups and oppositional political gures.In response to the inequities under French rule, thechicanery of the pied noir, and weakened position ofFrance following the Indochina War, the founders of theFront de Libration Nationale (FLN) determined in July1954 that the time was ripe for a popular uprising.107

Starting off with no more than 400 miscellaneoussmall arms, the Arme de Libration Nationale (ALN,the military component of the FLN) launched its

massive uprising on November 1, 1954.108 Smallgroups of insurgents conducted 70 attacks, all of whichmiscarried, resulting in few captured arms and little


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damage.109 Militarily, the operation was a completefailure. Worse, the expected popular uprising also

failed to materialize.110

In fact, the French authoritiesinitially thought it was just another tribal uprisingsince most of the attacks were conned to the remoteAurs mountain region (Wilaya 1 or AdministrativeZone 1).111 Unfortunately for the French government,ALN military ineptitude belied the superb FLNpolitical groundwork that created formidable enclavesin the Aurs and Kabylias (Wilaya 3) regions.

This misreading of the situation helps explain theFrench incremental, expedient, and short-sightedresponse. Butpied noirpolitical pressure on the Frenchgovernment also played a major part in the conict,and its political power in all matters concerningAlgeria cannot be overstated.112 Its political cloutwas such that it determined the rise and demise of

several metropolitan French governments during thewar. Hence, there was tremendous political pressurewithin the government to appeasepied noirinterests tothe detriment of the Algerianseven if this meant anescalation of the insurgency.113

Governor General Roger Lonard did not appreciatethe gravity of the threat unfolding in the rst weeksof the conict. France had just 3,500 combat troops inAlgeria, but the governor general requested only thedeployment of the 25th Airborne Division to deal withthe problema force much too small for the threat.114However, even as troop strengths increased from80,000 in January 1955, to 120,000 in August 1955, andto 200,000 in December 1955, the authorities (incitedby the ultras) continued to respond with inappropriate

methods to the insurgent threat.115 FLN provocationsand atrocities were met with French repression, massarrests, false imprisonment, collective punishments,


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torture, atrocities, and other pernicious acts associatedwith ratissages that drove ordinary Algerians into the

FLN ranks.116

The over-reaction was symptomaticof the schizophrenia infecting the various Frenchgovernments. Domestically, they wanted to appearstrong against the insurgents, yet repeatedly forbad anymilitary action that might result in collateral damage.Regardless, the governing authorities in Algeria eitherignored the ofcial rules of engagement or failed toimplement them in a timely manner. Meanwhile, piednoir paramilitary squads created their own reign ofterror.117

Inexplicably, the FLN never tried to compete forthe hearts and minds of the Algerians. Insurgents usedracketeering to obtain funds and food and terroristacts to intimidate the inhabitants into silence. JacquesSoustelle, the governor general in 1955, observed that

the FLN never sought to attach the rural populationsto their cause by promising them a better life, a happierand freer future; no, it was through terror threat theysubmitted them to their tyranny.118 Of FLN victims,86 percent were fellow Muslims during the rst 21/2 years of the conict. Part of an FLN recruits nalinitiation was to assassinate a government ofcer orinformant in order to solidify his status as a committedFLN insurgent. Mutilation of French loyalists waspart of the ritual so as to belittle the victim, but alsoto set an example for others. Muslim moderateswere singled out for immediate elimination becausethe FLN did not want any moderate interlocutorsavailable for the French to negotiate the peace (aprominent exception was Abbas, who joined the FLN

in 1956 out of exasperation with the French).119 Lastly,attacks on Europeans were designed to sever contactwith the Muslims.120 Ironically, the French were partlyresponsible for turning the population into veritable


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hostages because they had disarmed them out of fearof weapons falling into insurgent hands.

The insurgency appeared to be waning until thesummer of 1955, when the FLN in the Constantineregion (Wilaya 2), after suffering tremendous losses andoutraged by French ratissages and policies of collectiveresponsibility, raised the level of the conict bycommitting atrocities against European civilians andthe French military. On August 20, the FLN attacked26 localities around Philippeville, committing suchhorrible mutilations on men, women, and children thatthe massacre left a lasting imprint on the subsequentcourse of the war. The French military and pied noirreprisals were immediate, indiscriminate, and bloody.At this point, the war changed character. The Frenchgovernment placed the crushing of the rebels aboveany compromise or negotiations, and now considered

the conict as total war.121

Most signicant, the Frenchgovernment ceded its political authority to the militaryleadership in Algeria to end the insurgency by anymeans.122 This weakening of political direction andconstraints on military strategy virtually undercut anypolitical settlement of the insurgencyshort of thecomplete subjugation of the Algerians. In this context,the pro-Algerian reform initiatives of Governor General Jacques Soustelle and later Robert Lacoste remainedmoribund as long as the ultras retained their dominantpolitical position in Algerian matters.123 Lastly, anyhearts and minds benets accrued by Soustellescivic action teams (Sections Administratives Specialises)were offset by the ratissages, collective responsibility,and inhabitant relocation policies.124

Weak policing capacities and infrastructural power. Inview of the troubles elsewhere in the French empire(i.e., Indochina and Madagascar), the initial paltrynumber of French troops and policemen available to


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of bombings and shootings in Algiers in retaliation forthe execution of two FLN insurgents in June.132 The

French struck back with a vengeance. The militaryreaction might not have been so extreme had recentevents not sent them over the edge. The humiliationof Indochina was still fresh, and many of the ofcersand paratroopers sent in to establish order in Algierswere veterans of Indochina, specically Dien Bien Phu.Now smarting from the Suez debacle, the paratrooperswere in no mood for intellectualizing over the nuancesand contradictions of urban insurgencies. Worse, andprobably the most incendiary, thepied noirdecried thenew commander-in-chief of Algeria, General RaoulSalan. Associating him with the defeat in Indochina, thepied noiraccused Salan of wanting to sell out Algeria aswell. To make their stance absolutely clear, thepied noirattempted to assassinate Salan with a bazooka attack on

his ofce. This act seemed to spur Salan and his seniorsubordinate, General Jacques Massu, into crushing theinsurgency completely as a means of appeasing the pied noir.133 From February through October 1957, acombination of intelligence, much of it gained throughtorture, and relentless military and police actionsbroke the back of the FLN in Algiers and continuedthroughout Algeria until the core FLN leadership wasdriven into FLN-friendly Morocco and Tunisia.134 Toprevent FLN inltrations back into Algeria, the Frenchcompleted the Morice Line along the Tunisian border inSeptember 1957, a 200-mile electried fence augmentedby mineelds and electronic sensors.135 Manning theMorice Line, 80,000 French troops successfully insu-lated Algeria from insurgent inltrations.136 Next, the

French interior forces focused their efforts on eradica-ting the remaining FLN units and politico-militarycells.


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When Charles de Gaulle assumed power in June1958, France was no closer to a political settlement in

Algeria than before. Despite the tremendous initialsupport from the pied noirand the military for deGaulle, he appears rightfully to have regarded bothas part of the problem rather than the solution to theAlgerian insurgency. His initial focus was on domesticconcerns in France, particularly the new constitution.Hence, he empowered the new commander-in-chief ofAlgeria, General Maurice Challe, to launch a conclusivecampaign on the FLN so as to create the conditions fora political settlement, in which France would retainde facto authority over Algeria.137 Challe conducted aseries of offensives to crush the ALN, reducing theiroperative numbers from 30,000 in 1958 to 15,000 bythe end of 1959. Moreover, FLN sanctuaries were nowconned to the Aurs region.138

Satised with these results, de Gaulle offered theAlgerians an opportunity to achieve self-determinationwith the implication that he expected a moderategovernment with close ties to France.139 What hedid not expect, but should have, was a revolt by the pied noirin Algiers (Barricades Week, January 1960)and by some senior military ofcers. Even GeneralChalle turned on de Gaulle, perceiving the offer ofself-determination as a betrayal of the militaryssacrices.140 In turn, De Gaulle asserted his authorityover the military and the pied noir, removing severalleaders from both camps. In April 1960, General Crpinreplaced Challe and resumed military operationsagainst the FLN in the Aurs region, but with the clearunderstanding that a political settlement was integral

to the counterinsurgency strategy.141By the end of 1960, the FLN was reduced to around

8,000 insurgents, operating in small, ineffective bands,


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isolated from the population and from the FLNleadership abroad; most of their 6,500 weapons had

to be buried for lack of ammunition. Internal FLNpurges and combat with French forces had devastatedthe FLN leadership, and some leaders had evenbegun to surrender.142 Nevertheless, de Gaulle spentthe remaining 2 years of the conict trying to policethe pied noirand the military mavericks, all the whilenishing off the FLN and nding a moderate politicalentity to form an Algerian government.143 Not only didthis inghting detract from ghting the insurgents, italso gave hope to the FLN to hold out until de Gaullenegotiated terms more favorable to and only with theFLN.

Consequently, the FLNs ability simply to survivecontributed more to its success than any other factor.Pied noir political intrigue plagued every French

government, severely complicating the effectiveprosecution of the counterinsurgency. Hence, theFrench government was unable to translate militarysuccesses into the desired political settlement.

Corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates,weakens, or divides counterrevolutionary elites. The piednoir (especially the hard-line ultras) bear the lionsshare of the blame for fomenting the FLN revolutionarymovement and ultimately contributing to its success.Since 1870, they had dominated French policy in Algeriaand maintained a stranglehold on its legislation.144Arguably, the average Algerian regarded them as theembodiment of French rule in Algeria. The pied noirregarded Algerians as an inferior race and thoughtof them, when conscious of them at all, as merely a

source of cheap labor. As a political bloc, the pied noirlibustered reforms for assimilation and equalityupto the very end of the war. More than any other factor,thepied noirentangled the French military in political


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affairs, which eventually led to the Organisation ArmeSecrte (OAS) coup against President de Gaulle.145

Clearly, the rapid succession of seven Frenchgovernments during the war contributed to the politicalprominence of the pied noir.146 Moreover, the frequentshufing of government ofcials undercut a coherentand consistent policy towards Algeria. The Frencharmy in Algeria increasingly lled the policy voidincrementally and found itself totally politicized bythe conict. Thepied noiractively opposed governmentprograms and co-opted the army into supporting theircause. In contrast to thepied noir,however, the militaryardently pursued programs of assimilation and reformsamong the Algerian populace, but it became zealousin part because the French government abrogated itspolitical authority regarding the prosecution of thewar and in part because the military saw Algeria as

the means to redeem Frances honor and to stemthe empires decline.147 Alongside the pied noir, thearmy in Algeria actively sought the promotion of deGaulle to power, expecting he would provide thepolitical impetus for nal victory (even though eachheld a different denition of victory). When de Gaulledecided to offer Algeria self-determination, the piednoirand powerful military leaders revolted with some(i.e., the OAS) engaging in a campaign of domesticterrorism and an attempted coup dtat.148 Hence,the autocratic and corrupt grip on power by the piednoir caused severe rifts between themselves and theFrench government, between themselves and theAlgerian people, and between the army in Algeria andthe French government. Only a leader of de Gaulles

stature could have broken the political stranglehold ofthe pied noirand their military accomplices. As muchas he probably deplored the idea, de Gaulle had no


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choice but to negotiate an end to the insurgency withthe FLN. With everyone alienated and no moderate

individuals or groups available for negotiation, onlythe FLN was in a position to form a government.149

The competence of the insurgent leadership to developand execute a successful strategy. Of the nine originalFLN leaders (the neuf historiques), many had fought asFrench soldiers in World War II.150 For example, BenBella, the principal founder of the FLN and later therst president of Algeria, fought for France in 1940and later in Italy with the Free French. For his heroism,he was awarded the Croix de Guerre, and General deGaulle had personally pinned on his Mdaille Militaire.Similarly, Ben Boulaid was a highly decorated warrantofcer from the Italian campaign (1943-45). The notor-ious Belkacem Krim had also served in the militarybut upon discharge had become a political activist and

then full-edged guerrilla in 1947. Krims lieutenant,Omar Ouamrane, also served in the army beforebecoming a guerrilla.151 The point is that although theywere familiar with Mao Tse-tungs works on guerrillawarfare, they were not formally trained as communistrevolutionaries, but rather as French soldiers whounderstood intimately the strengths and weaknessesof the French military.

Because the FLN represented an amalgam of dif-fering ethnic groups and ideologies, the organizationopted for a collective leadership. The inability for theFLN to choose a prominent leader for the struggle wasboth a weakness and strength.152 Without a leader ofstature to reconcile differences and conicts withinthe FLN, internecine struggles inevitably emerged.153

Additionally, French diplomatic efforts remainedproblematic without an FLN central authority (until1959), particularly after the French had successfully


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scattered the FLN collective leadership into variouscountries. The primary strength of relying on a

leadership committee was that it was much moredifcult for the French to isolate and destroy the FLNleadership.154 The neuf historiques divided commandresponsibility as follows:

Operationally, the FLN adopted a triangularorganization of cells for the subversion of Frenchauthority.156 The cellular approach permitted the FLNto generate and regenerate new cells rapidly andpresented no organizational center of gravity for theFrench military to attack. As early as 1951, BelkacemKrim had experimented with this clandestine political-administrative system to gain control of 2,000 villagesin Wilaya III, and this infrastructure served as theFLN model for revolutionary warfare.157 Like the Viet

Minh cadres, a lightly armed cell would move into avillage; establish its authority by intimidation andterrorist acts; and then use the village for tax collection,

CRUA* Interior

Wilaya I Aures Mountains Ben BoulaidWilaya II North Constantine Mohamed DidoucheWilaya III Kabylia Belacem KrimWilaya IV Algiers and surrounding Rabah Bitat

areasWilaya V Oran and the western Ben Mhidi

areasWilaya VI Desert region south No assignment

of Atlas Mountains

CRUA Exterior

Paris Mohamed BoudiafCairo Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed,

Mohamed Khider155

*Comit Rvoltutionnaire dUnit et dAction, the operational headquarters forthe FLN.


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recruitment, and maintaining administrative control ofthe population.158 The revolutionary groundwork was

so well set that once hostilities broke out on November1, 1954, the ALN was able to expand from 400 to 2,000insurgents within 6 days in the Aurs region alone,turning it into a fortied enclave.159 In the followingweeks, FLN infestation became prolic throughoutAlgeria.

For the FLN, the primary step in controlling the localpopulace was isolating it from government authority.Any resistance from the inhabitants was met withimmediate execution so as to intimidate the rest. Aboveall, school teachers were singled out for expulsion.Lastly, the insurgent cell would burn all identicationcards and civil records in order to complicate Frenchefforts for regaining administrative control. Wheneverthe police or the military came through a village on

patrol, it was met with silence, reecting the plightof the villagers. As in Indochina and later SouthVietnam, the presence of government security forceswas only momentary, while the insurgent presencewas permanent. Any cooperation with the Frenchwould result in quick insurgent retaliation.160 That theFLN was able to survive the rst winter despite Frenchefforts was likely the greatest boon to recruitment.161As the war progressed, betrayals by Algerian soldiersserving in the French forces increased, causing a senseof paranoia in the ranks.162 With the exception of theAurs region, the situation during 1955 continued todeteriorate throughout Algeria, escalating into guerrillawarfare. The Aurs exception is attributed to BrigadierGeneral Gaston Palanges novel pacication strategy,

which completely regained control of the populationby 1956.163 Unfortunately, the rest of the military wasslow to embrace Palanges strategy, or at least it wasapplied unevenly.

8/6/2019 The Political Context Behind Successful Revolutionary Movements, Three Case Studies: Vietnam (1955-6

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