the politics of heritage - cms · might seem of bad taste, funny or just sad. but we believe that...

The Politics of Heritage and Memory ▬ ▬

Conference papersOctober 9 ̶ 10, 2013, Zadar

Kulturna baština i politike sjećanja ▬ ▬

Radovi s konferencije 9. ̶ 10. listopada 2013., Zadar

▬ Tamara Banjeglav, Saša ŠimpragaDotrščina Virtual Museum▌ photos / fotografijeVirtualni muzej Dotrščina

▬ Elvan CobbCompeting over World Heritage at Places of Diversity in the Middle East: Mardin/Svojatanje statusa Svjetske baštine na mjestima s etnički raznolikim stanovništvom na Bliskome istoku: Mardin

▬ Branko ČolovićAbandoned Heritage: Serbs in Croatia/Napuštena baština: Srbi u Hrvatskoj

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▬ Anthony DerisiotisGreece – Turkey, 1974 to 1987: Events and State Policies That Haunt Their Bilateral Relations/Grčka – Turska, od 1974. do 1987.: zbivanja i državne politike koje opterećuju njihove bilateralne odnose

▬ Jonathan Eaton, Lejla HadžićRestoration, Reconciliation, Hopes for the Future: Cultural Heritage without Borders – 17 years in the Western Balkans▌ photos / fotografijeObnova, pomirenje, nada za budućnost: Kulturna baština bez granica – sedamnaest godina na zapadnome Balkanu

▬ Alon GelbmanHeritage Tourism in Israel and Its Neighboring Countries as a Peace Promoter▌ photos / fotografijeTurizam kulturnoga naslijeđa u Izraelu i susjednim zemljama kao poticaj miru

▬ Andrew HerscherPoints of No Return: Cultural Heritage and Counter-Memory in Post-Yugoslavia▌ photos / fotografijeTočke bez povratka: kulturna baština i protusjećanje u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije

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▬ Monika Kokalj KočevarThe National Museum of Contemporary History and the Witnesses of WW2/ Muzej novejše zgodovine Slovenije i svjedoci Drugoga svjetskog rata

▬ Kalina LechevskaSkopje 2014 Project and Its Effects on the Perception of Macedonian Identity among the Citizens of Skopje▌ photos / fotografijeProjekt “Skopje 2014.” i njegov utjecaj na percepciju makedonskoga identiteta među stanovnicima Skopja

▬ Ana PanićYugoslavia: An Individual Recollection of a Collective History▌ photos / fotografijeJugoslavija: individualno sećanje na kolektivnu prošlost

▬ Vjeran PavlakovićBlowing Up Brotherhood and Unity: The Fate of World War Two Cultural Heritage in Lika▌ photos / fotografijeDizanje u zrak bratstva i jedinstva: sudbina kulturnoga naslijeđa Drugoga svjetskog rata u Lici

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▬ Milan RadanovićPlaces of Suffering in Belgrade during World War II and Their Post-War Commemoration/Mesta stradanja u Beogradu iz vremena Drugog svetskog rata i njihova posleratna memorijalizacija

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CaveatThe papers published in this book were presented at the conference The Politics of Heritage and Memory in Zadar, organized by the Centre for Peace Studies, October 9-10, 2013, as a part of the University of Zagreb project Jankovic Castle: historic site, generating sustainable development of the Ravni kotari region.

The environment we live in, and the stories we are surrounded by through our own memories or our families’ memories, seem to be equally political and affect how we think about things or how we act, as the official historical narratives and the news we are exposed to on a daily basis. Thus the issues we wanted to highlight in this conference are what can be defined as cultural heritage of a certain area, and how is it (mis)used - be it material or intangible heritage, equally important regardless of the fact whether it is something tangible, or exists only in picture, and what happens to its memory if all traces of it are long gone.

The impetus for the Centre for Peace Studies to work on this topic comes from the inspiration we get from the Stojan Jankovic Castle, an unusual place in a lovely and hospitable area of the Ravni kotari («the flat lands» in the Zadar hinterland in northern Dalmatia), a place that reminds us of the long and laborious process of creating something, not necessarily in its physical sense, but also in the sense of a place that gathers and connects people, at the water spring, around the table, working in the fields, or around books in

Hvala profesoru Miljenku Domijanu za stručni obilazak zadarskog poluotoka i profesorici Nataši Desnici-Žerjavić (Udruga "Mostovi") za predstavljanje Kule Jankovića.

We would like to thank Professor Miljenko Domijan who served as the expert guide of the Zadar historical centre, as well as Professor Nataša Desnica-Žerjavić (association "Bridges") for showing us around the Janković Castle.

its former library. It also reminds of how quickly, so quickly it is hard to fathom, the moment of destruction can be, both of physical things and the memory of them. Apart from the example of the Jankovic castle and how long it takes to remove the layers of (the remembrance) of conflict and violence, and the importance of what is done with it today for both the people living around it as well as the country where it is placed, and this country's history, we discussed the ways in which the other is devalued, through direct violence to passive aggression typical of post-conflict societies, and ways of how to overcome this.

Two events mark the days in which this book was being edited – one was the anniversary of the Great War, a catastrophe which has yet to end – minefields throughout Western Europe are still being cleared, often funded from the reparations countries had been paying to one another until only very recently (not to mention that the story of that particular war is also the story of today’s Iraq and the Middle East as well). The second one is the umpteenth escalation of violence in the area of Palestine and Israel, Gaza primarily. It was exactly in Gaza where the Sephardic Cabalist Sabbatai Zevi lived in peace in Ottoman Palestine. (Who remembers this anyway?). The supposedly backward past, the one before the tolls of nation-building, seems to have the upper hand when it comes to coexistence.

One of the examples portrayed in this book comes from that particular corner of the world. Faced with the rising death statistics, talking about running for peace might seem of bad taste, funny or just sad. But we believe that there always are chances for not only tolerance which sometimes means just the bare permission to stay alive

(but does represent some sort of a civilisation landmark) but also a chance for the good life and happiness, to borrow from Aristotle, and it is worth working on these chances – they provide a refuge from what we hear on the news with horror, almost every day of any year. We see this conference as a definite contribution towards that chance.

Petra Jurlina, Centre for Peace Studies, Zagreb, July/ August 2014

CaveatRadovi objavljeni u ovoj zbirci predstavljeni su 9. i 10. listopada 2013. godine u Zadru na konferenciji Kulturna baština i politike sjećanja organiziranoj od strane Centra za mirovne studije, održanoj u Europskom centru za međusektorsku suradnju IMPACT, u sklopu projekta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Kula Stojana Jankovića – pokretač održivog razvoja Ravnih kotara.

Prostor u kojem živimo i priče s kojima smo okruženi kroz vlastita i obiteljska sjećanja jednako su politična i važna za formiranje naših stavova i utječu na naše postupke kao i službeni povijesni narativi i vijesti kojima smo svakodnevno izloženi. Teme koje smo zato željeli aktualizirati ovom kon-ferencijom su što je sve kulturna baština i kako se sve može instrumentalizirati, bilo da je materijalna ili samo usmena, jednako važna i kad postoji samo na slici ili ako je sagrađena od betona, te gdje odlazi ako je uništena, a njezini tragovi zau-vijek zatrti?

Izravan povod za razgovore o ovoj temi dolazi iz stalne inspiracije koju Centar za mirovne studije crpi iz Kule Stojana Jankovića, neobičnog mjesta u predivnom i gostoljubivom kraju Ravnih kotara, koje nas podsjeća koliko je dug proces stvaranja, ne nužno u fizičkom smislu građenja i zidanja, već i u onom prostora koji okuplja ljude, kod izvora vode, oko stola, na polju, ili oko knjige, a koliko je nestvarno kratak trenutak materijalnog uništenja i uništenja sjećanja. Osim primjera revitalizacije Kule i dugotrajnog odstranjivanja slojeva sukoba

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i nasilja, značenja onog što se s njom i u njoj radi za stanov-ništvo koje ju okružuje, ali i za podneblje i zemlju u kojoj je smještena, i povijest te zemlje, slušali smo i razgovarali o metodama obezvrjeđivanja drugog, da li kroz direktan sukob i nasilje, ili pasivnu agresiju tipičnu za društva s iskustvom sukoba, kao i načinima kako to sve prevazići.

Dva su događaja obilježila dane u kojima se završavala ova knjiga: prvi je stogodišnjica Velikog rata – minski zaga-đena područja zapadne Europe i dalje se čiste od tog sukoba, često iz fondova ratnih reparacija koje su se isplaćivale do vrlo nedavno. Priča o tom ratu priča je i o današnjem Iraku i Bliskom istoku. Drugi je ponovna eskalacija nasilja na području Gaze, odnosno Palestine i Izraela. Tko se još sjeća vremena kada je baš u Gazi, u otomanskoj Palestini, mirno živio sefardski kabalist Sabbatai Zevi? Kada pričamo o suživotu, izgleda da nas navodno nazadna prošlost pobjeđuje, možda jer je bilo lakše živjeti u razdoblju prije tereta procesa izgradnje nacije. S ovog područja dolazi i jedna priča pred-stavljena u ovom zborniku. U svjetlu statistike smrti kojoj svjedočimo svaki dan fotografije maratona za mir bi mogle izgledati smiješno (ili tužno). No, smatramo da šanse za ne samo toleranciju, koja je često bezlična i znači samo puku dozvolu za život, ali predstavlja kakav takav civilizacijski minimum, već i za “ugodan, odnosno sretan život” (Aristotel) uvijek ima, i na takvim šansama vrijedi raditi – one su uto-čište protiv svega što slušamo na vijestima bilo kojeg dana u bilo kojoj godini. Događaje poput ove konferencije svakako vidimo kao važan doprinos toj šansi.

Petra Jurlina, Centar za mirovne studije, Zagreb, srpanj/ kolovoz 2014.

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Dotrščina Virtual Museum

Tamara Banjeglav, Saša Šimpraga1

1 Tamara Banjeglav is a PhD candidate at the University of Graz, Austria, where she is writing her doctoral dissertation on the relation between public (official) and private (personal) memories and narratives of the 1990s war in Croatia. Her research interests fall in the field of memory studies, transitional justice and dealing with the past in post-conflict societies. She worked as coordinator of the culture of memory program in a civil society organization Documenta – Centre for Dealing with the Past from Zagreb. She is a member of a transnational platform on history and memory, Memory Lab, which deals with issues of conflicting memories in post-conflict societies, in the field of dealing with difficult pasts in Western Balkans and Western Europe.

Saša Šimpraga is a writer and activist from Zagreb. He is author of the book "Zagreb, javni prostor" ("Zagreb - Public Space") and founder of the volunteer platform 1POSTOZAGRAD (One Percent for the City), aimed at improving the city and its public goods. He is author of a number of artistic interventions. In the area of culture of memory, he has developed projects such as Dotrščina Virtual Museum, and Crni paviljon (The Black Pavilion) - the latter marked the anniversary of the breakthrough of prisoners from Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia.

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It is a fact that many citizens of Zagreb do not know where the Dotrščina Memorial Park is located, much less what happened there and why that area is a cultural monument. The forest of Dotrščina was once considered to be on the periphery of the city, but is now the largest park in Zagreb. It was the scene of the biggest mass crime in the modern history of the capital of Croatia when several thousand people were killed there by fascists. Most of the victims were citizens of Zagreb or the surrounding areas.

Pre-war Zagreb had a population of over 200,000, and current uncompleted research indicates that 19,000 people from Zagreb were killed on the antifascist side. That fact alone is indicative of the scale of suffering the city has gone through. The largest number of those 19,000 were shot by Ustasha authorities in the area of Dotrščina. Although the biggest proportion of victims in Dotrščina were citizens of Zagreb and from the surrounding areas, people from outside the immediate vicinity were also brought there to be shot.

The exact number of people killed in Dotrščina has never been precisely confirmed, but scientific research puts the number at the scale of about 7,000, with some authors recently proposing 3,500 as the number of victims. At any rate, several thousand people were killed in the area of Dotrščina, making it undeniably a systematic crime of huge proportions, the largest scale crime in the history of Zagreb.

The Dotrščina scientific project conducted from 1980 to 1986, under the leadership of the historian Josipa Paver and carried on by Igor Graovac, remains incomplete. The results so far are presented in 113 books, relating to researc-hing the victims of “fascism and fascist terror”, and contain 18,627 names of people who had been killed. Josipa Paver

claimed that further research could “significantly increase that number”2. The project confirmed that over 600 persons were killed in Dotrščina, while the majority of others were indicated to have been killed there according to numerous testimonies, indications and the character and role of the location within the system of mass crime of the Ustasha aut-horities. The fact remains that people have been brought to Dotrščina individually or in groups over the course of four years to be executed.

The area of the Dotrščina forest has been landscaped according to the design of the architect Josip Seissl and his associates since the 1960s. Five impressive monuments, the works of esteemed artists, are located within the memorial park: Vojin Bakić (two monuments), Branko Ružić, Stevan Luketić and Kosta Angelio Radovani. Ambitiously planned, the park was set to receive a museum building designed by Neven Šegvić and several other monuments, along with numerous other unrealized elements. However, all of that remained in the planning phase. Even though the park is still well maintained today, the fact that the park was originally designed to be a memorial park remains mostly forgotten by the general, and even cultural, public.

That is why the Dotrščina Virtual Museum project was started: with the basic goal of reaffirming this area as a cultural site, an area quintessential to Croatian and Zagreb’s history and the history of (anti)fascism in Croatia, i.e. retur-ning it into the collective memory of the city.

2 Ivo Goldstein, Zagreb 1941.– 1945., Novi Liber, Zagreb, 2011., str. 390.

T. Banjeglav, S. Šimpraga

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The idea for the project came from Saša Šimpraga, and the project itself was conducted from 2012 within the framework of Documenta – the Centre for Dealing with the Past. The project was financed by the European Union during its first years, through the Active European Remembrance/Europe for Citizens program, and additional funding was provided by the Office for Cooperation with NGOS of the Croatian government and the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust, Education, Remembrance and Research. During its second year, it was funded by the Ministry of Culture in Croatia.

In essence, the Dotrščina Virtual Museum is a web site – www.dotrscina.hr – offering basic information about the location and events which should be added with additio-nal content over time. In addition to its virtual existence, the Museum also acts in the physical space through its tempo-rary thematic exhibitions in public areas, e.g. the temporary memorial artistic intervention within the area of the memo-rial park itself.

The first exhibition was presented when the Virtual Museum was opened in 2012 on Zagreb’s central square on September 21, during World Peace Week. The exhibition presented several noted writers killed in Dotrščina (Božidar Adžija, Otokar Keršovani and Ognjen Prica). This first exhibition was created in cooperation with the historian and museum advisor Nataša Mataušić from the Croatian History Museum. By placing it inside a public area, as opposed to a museum, gallery or similar venue, we insured it would be seen by a wider, unselected audience. The aim of the pro-ject is to have various authors analyze and present various topics connected to Dotrščina (or further) in a similar way

and gradually build a lasting virtual exhibition through a series of topics temporarily presented in the city’s public spaces. Professional texts were planned to be present on the Museum’s web site regardless of the exhibition itself.

In addition to the exhibition in the town centre, on World Peace Day 2012 when the Virtual Museum was offici-ally opened, the area of the memorial park itself saw its first temporary memorial landscape intervention in the Valley of the Graves, with the goal of creating a visual, symbolic and immediate presentation of the scale of murder in Dotrščina. It was a simple action – 7,000 white ribbons, inspired by the approximate number of casualties in Dotrščina, were each tied around a tree. The number itself, even though somewhat controversial and imprecise in certain segments, was chosen as part of the artistic freedom, although it doubtlessly reflects only a part of the plight of citizens of Zagreb during World War II.

The practice of temporary artistic interventions was continued during the second year of the Museum’s existence, when 23 proposals were received by the first public tender for a temporary artistic intervention in the area of the memo-rial park published at the beginning of the year. The winning proposal was that of Davor Sanvincent with his piece Spiegel im Spiegel. Sanvincenti’s “acoustic walk” included the music by Estonian composer Arvo Pärt and a dramaturgic script by the playwright Ivana Sajko with a temporarily constructed woodland theatre hall, accessible to its audience during that month of May.

The mission of temporary memorial interventions in the area of the park is twofold. On one side it preserves and strengthens the memory of historic events in an authentic


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location, and on the other it encourages contemporary artistic production and new ways of recording memories. The general goal of the project was to develop a culture of memory which aims at not reducing antifascism to comme-morations only, but to make it a living memory instead. In other words, the goal of the temporary memorial interven-tions was towards a culture of memory, and not (only) the politics of remembrance.

One of the goals of the Museum is to encourage research activities. Seeing as conducting research can be rather expensive, the project did not envision the resources or the capacity and ambition to conduct large scale rese-arch which should be in the domain of relevant institutions anyway. That is why directing attention to Dotrščina opens up additional possibilities for raising scientific issues and other issues with the location and events that define it. It is through those means that the Museum project and activities around it, though raising awareness, have the possibility to influence and revitalize and elucidate the problematic atti-tude towards this area. The topics up for exploration through various aspects of the Virtual Museum’s work range from historic, artistic, to cultural and political. We believe the lack of scientifically based and publically available exhibitions covering the anti-fascist uprising (People’s Liberation War/ Narodno-oslobodilačka borba), an extremely important for-mative period for the present day Croatia, from which the borders of the present-day Croatia were formed, serves as an initiative towards working on this topic.

One of the project’s current activities is documen-tary production. Preparations are underway, thanks to the initiative of the Dotrščina Virtual Museum, to produce a

documentary film about Dotrščina. The work is being done by the director and screenwriter Jadran Boban, the author of the acclaimed documentary film “The Ghosts of Zagreb” which focused on a similar subject. Because it is one of the places where the largest scale murder occurred during World War II in Croatia, one of the goals of this project is for Dotrščina to become a part of the state protocol to commemorate appropriate dates, and strengthen the culture of memory in that way as well, i.e. to return this place to collective awareness.

As part of cooperation with other projects within Documenta, this year we had the first organized educational park-visit for high-school students (Lucijan Vranjanin high school in Zagreb).

A series of custodial and other visits were a part of the project, all with the aim of getting to know the location. Within the context of the project’s life, a continuity of action is important, and the scale of production i.e. the realization of single elements of the project will depend on the fun-ding received from public tenders. Primarily, the Dotrščina Virtual Museum was conceived as a long-term project whose exhibits would be supplemented and presented every year in various segments in (different) public spaces, preferably in different ways as well as by temporary artistic interventions in the memorial park’s public space.


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1 Virtual museum Dotrščina, map and visual identity by Niko Mihaljević and Petra Milički

1 Virtualni muzej Dotrščina, karta i logotip muzeja, autori vizualnog identiteta Niko Mihaljević i Petra Milički

2 First temporary memorial intervention – 7,000 ribbons for 7,000 victims of Dotrščina, September 2012, implemented on the occasion of the World Peace Day and the opening of the museum

2 Prva privremena memorijalna intervencija – 7000 traka za 7000 žrtava Dotrščine, rujan 2012., izvedeno povodom Svjetskog dana mira, odnosno otvorenja Muzeja


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3 First exhibition of Virtual Museum Dotrščina in public space, on the Zagreb main square, on the topic of "Writers and publicists killed at Dotrščina“, September 2012, implemented on the occasion of the World Peace Day and the opening of the museum

3 Prvi postav Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina u javnom prostoru glavnog zagrebačkog trga na temu “Pisci i publicisti ubijeni na Dotrščini”, rujan 2012., izvedeno povodom Svjetskog dana mira, odnosno otvorenja Muzeja

4 Second temporary memorial intervention in Dotrščina memorial park, "Spiegel im Spiegel" by the author Davor Sanvincenti, selected at the public call for proposals and presented in May 2013, photo by Ana Ogrizović

4 Druga privremena memorijalna intervencija u spomen parku Dotrščina autora Davor Sanvincentija bila je naslovljena “Spiegel im Spiegel”, a odabrana temeljem javnog natječaja te predstavljena u svibanju 2013., fotografija: Ana Ogrizović


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5 Monument to the victims of Dotrščina at the main entrance to the park, Vojin Bakić, 1968

5 Spomenik žrtvama Dotrščine na glavnom ulazu u spomen park, Vojin Bakić, 1968.

6 One of six different crystals by sculptor Vojin Bakić in the Valley of Graves

6 Jedan od šest različitih kristala Vojina Bakića u Dolini grobova


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7 Peculiar characteristic of crystals is sun reflection at certain parts of the day in sunny weather, photo by Mario Krištofić

7 Osebujna karakteristika kristala je odbljesak sunca u određeno doba dana za sunčanog vremena, fotografija: Mario Krištofić

8 Mayor Milan Bandić opened the first memorial race in Dotrščina memorial park, May 2014

8 Prvu memorijalnu utrku u spomen-parku Dotrščina otvorio je gradonačelnik Zagreba Milan Bandić, svibanj 2014.

9 First memorial race was held at the initiative and as part of Virtual Museum Dotrščina activities and in cooperation with Dotka League, May 2014 ►


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9 Prva memorijalna utrka održana je na inicijativu i u sklopu aktivnosti Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina te u suradnji s Ligom Dotka, svibanj 2014.

Virtualni muzej Dotrščina

Tamara Banjeglav, Saša Šimpraga1

1 Tamara Banjeglav trenutno radi na svojoj doktorskoj disertaciji o odnosu između javnog (službenog) i privatnog (osobnog) sjećanja i narativa o ratu 1990-ih u Hrvatskoj (Sveučilište u Grazu, Austrija). Njezin znanstveni interes spada u područja kulture sjećanja, tranzicijske pravde i suočavanja s prošlošću u postkonfliktnim društvima. Radila je kao koordinatorica programa kulture sjećanja u organizaciji civilnog društva Documenta - Centar za suočavanje s prošlošću iz Zagreba. Članica je međunarodne platforme o povijesti i sjećanju, Memory Lab, koja se bavi pitanjima sukobljenih sjećanja u postkonfliktnim društvima na zapadnom Balkanu i u zapadnoj Europi.

Saša Šimpraga je publicist i aktivist iz Zagreba. Autor je knjige “Zagreb, javni prostor” i osnivač i voditelj volonterske platforme 1POSTOZAGRAD usmjerene na poboljšanja grada i javna dobra. Autor je niza umjetničkih intervencija. U području kulture sjećanja, autor je projekata kao što su Virtualni muzej Dotrščina i Crni paviljon kojim je 2013. obilježena godišnjica proboja logoraša iz koncentracijskog logora Jasenovac.

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Činjenica je da danas mnogi građani i građanke Zagreba ne znaju gdje se nalazi Spomen-park Dotrščina, a još manje što se u njemu dogodilo i zašto taj prostor uživa status spomenika kulture. Danas najveći zagrebački gradski park, dotrščinska šuma, koja je nekad bila nadomak gradu, poprište je najvećega masovnog zločina koji se dogodio u modernoj povijesti glavnoga grada Hrvatske kada su fašisti ubili nekoliko tisuća osoba, ponajviše Zagrepčana i ljudi iz okolice grada, ali i drugih.

Prijeratni Zagreb imao je nešto više od 200.000 sta-novnika, a dosadašnja i nedovršena istraživanja pokazuju da je na antifašističkoj strani tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata ubijeno više od 19.000 osoba iz Zagreba. Već ta činjenica ukazuje na razmjer stradanja koja su se u gradu dogodila. Pritom su najveći broj Zagrepčana te osoba iz okolice grada strijeljale ustaške vlasti upravo na prostoru Dotrščine. Iako je najveći broj žrtava bio iz Zagreba i okolice, na Dotrščini su strijeljane i osobe koje nisu bile iz Zagreba i okolice.

Broj ubijenih osoba na Dotrščini nikada nije u potpu-nosti utvrđen, a na temelju znanstvenih istraživanja nedvoj-beno se radi o nekoliko tisuća žrtava. Od dosad poznatoga broja žrtava za puno njih se ne može sa sigurnosti utvrditi gdje su točno ubijene, no znatan broj njih ubijen je upravo na Dotrščini. Najčešće se spominje oko 7000 žrtava, a u novije vrijeme neki autori spominju i oko 3500 žrtava. U svakome slučaju, na prostoru Dotrščine ubijeno je neko-liko tisuća osoba te se nedvojbeno radilo o sustavnome zlo-činu ogromnih razmjera pa i o najvećemu zločinu u povijesti Zagreba.

Znanstveni projekt Dotrščina koji se provodio od 1980. do 1986. godine, pod vodstvom povjesničarke Josipe Paver, a

koji je nastavio Igor Graovac, ostao je nedovršen. Dosadašnji rezultati tih istraživanja objedinjeni su u 113 knjiga, a odnose se na istraživanja žrtava “fašizma i fašističkoga terora” te sadržavaju 18 627 imena ubijenih. Josipa Paver tvrdila je da bi se daljnjim istraživanjima taj broj “mogao znatno povećati”2. Projektom je za nešto više od 600 osoba nedvojbeno utvrđeno da su stradali na Dotrščini, a za većinu se to pretpostavlja s obzirom na brojna svjedočanstva, indi-cije te karakter i ulogu lokacije u sustavu masovnih zločina ustaških vlasti. Ostaje činjenica da su četiri godine ljudi, pojedinačno ili u skupinama, dovođeni na Dotrščinu kako bi bili ubijeni.

Prostor dotrščinske šume uređivan je od 1960-ih prema krajobraznome rješenju arhitekta Josipa Seissla i suradnika. U okviru spomen-parka nalazi se pet monu-mentalnih spomenika, radovi istaknutih umjetnika: Vojina Bakića (dva rada), Branka Ružića, Stevana Luketića i Koste Angelija Radovanija.

Park je bio ambiciozno zamišljen i s vremenom je trebao dobiti i zgradu muzeja prema projektu Nevena Šegvića, još nekoliko spomenika te niz drugih neostvarenih elemenata. Sve je, međutim, ostalo samo na planovima, a iako je sada uglavnom dobro održavan, činjenice zbog kojih je taj prostor uopće uređen kao spomen-park danas su za širu pa i kulturnu javnost uglavnom zaboravljene.

U tome je smislu pokrenut projekt Virtualni muzej Dotrščina čiji je osnovni cilj vraćanje toga, za povijest

2 Ivo Goldstein, Zagreb 1941. – 1945., Novi Liber, Zagreb, 2011., str. 390.


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Zagreba i antifašizma u Hrvatskoj, važnog mjesta na kul-turnu kartu, odnosno u kolektivnu memoriju grada. Idejni je autor projekta Virtualni muzej Dotrščina Saša Šimpraga, a projekt se provodi u okviru Documente – Centra za suoča-vanje s prošlosti od 2012. godine. Projekt je u prvoj godini realiziran sredstvima Europske unije kroz program Active European Remembrance/Europe for Citizens i sufinanci-rali su ga Ured za udruge Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust, Education, Remembrance and Research, a u drugoj je godini realiziran sredstvima Ministarstva kulture Republike Hrvatske.

Projekt Virtualni muzej Dotrščina je internetska stra-nica – www.dotrscina.hr ̶ koja pruža osnovne informacije o mjestu i zbivanjima i koja bi se s vremenom trebala puniti sadržajima. Osim virtualno, Virtualni muzej Dotrščina dje-luje i u fizičkome prostoru grada kroz privremene tematske postave u javnome prostoru te privremene memorijalne umjetničke intervencije na prostoru spomen-parka. Prvi postav bio je predstavljen povodom otvorenja Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina 2012. godine na središnjemu zagrebačkom trgu u tjednu Svjetskoga dana mira, 21. rujna, i to na temu nekih od istaknutih pisaca i publicista ubijenih na Dotrščini (Božidar Adžija, Otokar Keršovani i Ognjen Prica). Taj prvi postav postavljen je u suradnji s povjesničarkom i muzej-skom savjetnicom Natašom Mataušić iz Hrvatskoga povi-jesnog muzeja. Smještajem u javnome prostoru grada, a ne u muzeju, galeriji ili sličnome prostoru tangira se brojnija i neselektirana publika. Cilj je projekta i da u budućnosti različiti autori na sličan način obrade i prezentiraju različite teme vezane uz Dotrščinu, ali i šire pa bi se kroz niz tema predstavljenih privremeno u javnome prostoru grada ujedno

postepeno gradio i trajni virtualni postav. Zamišljeno je i da stručni tekstovi na stranici Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina budu zastupljeni i mimo samoga postava.

Osim postava u centru grada na Svjetski dan mira 2012. godine kada je Virtualni muzej Dotrščina i službeno otvoren, na prostoru spomen-parka u Dolini grobova pred-stavljena je i prva privremena memorijalna krajobrazna intervencija kojoj je cilj bio neposredno te na vizualan i sim-bolički način prikazati brojnost stradanja na Dotrščini. Riječ je bila o jednostavnoj akciji, tj. o 7000 bijelih vrpci koliko se najčešće spominje da je tamo ubijenih, a od kojih je svaka bila privezana oko jednoga stabla. Taj je broj u nekim segmentima sporan, tj. precizno neutvrđen i zato treba istaknuti da je uzet i s dozom umjetničke slobode iako nedvojbeno odražava tek dio stradanja Zagrepčana u Drugome svjetskom ratu.

Praksa privremenih umjetničkih intervencija nastav-ljena je i u drugoj godini postojanja Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina kada je na prvi javni natječaj za privremenu umjetničku intervenciju na prostoru spomen-parka koji je proveden početkom ove godine pristiglo 23 prijedloga, a pobijedio je Davor Sanvincenti s radom Spiegel im Spiegel. Sanvincentijeva “zvučna šetnja” koja uključuje glazbu eston-skoga skladatelja Arva Pärta te dramaturški zapis nastao u suradnji s dramaturginjom Ivanom Sajko i s privremeno konstruiranom svojevrsnom šumskom dvoranom potom je realizirana na prostoru spomen-parka, a rad je bio dostupan publici tijekom mjeseca svibnja.

Zadaća je privremenih memorijalnih intervencija na prostoru spomen-parka dvojaka. S jedne strane čuva i osna-žuje memoriju na povijesne događaje na autentičnoj lokaciji, a s druge se strane potiče suvremena umjetnička produkcija


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i novi načini bilježenja sjećanja. Uopće je cilj projekta razvoj kulture sjećanja i to na način da se antifašizam ne svodi samo na komemoracije, već da postane živo sjećanje. Drugim rije-čima, cilj je kultura sjećanja, a ne (samo) politike pamćenja.

Jedan je od ciljeva Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina poti-canje istraživačke djelatnosti. Pritom, a budući da je u pravilu riječ o skupim aktivnostima, projekt ne raspolaže resursima, kapacitetima ni ambicijom za bilo kakvim velikim istraživa-njima koja su u domeni ustanova kojima je to zadaća. Zato se upravo skretanjem pozornosti na Dotrščinu otvara dodatna mogućnost znanstvene i druge problematizacije mjesta i događaja koji su ga obilježili, čime projekt Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina i pratećih aktivnosti, kroz podizanje svije-sti, na skromni način ima mogućnost utjecaja na oživljavanje i rasvjetljavanje problematike. Teme koje se planiraju dota-knuti kroz različite aspekte djelovanja Virtualnoga muzeja Dotrščina variraju od povijesnih, likovnih te kulturoloških i političkih. Potreba za takvim djelovanjem je očita pa i kroz činjenicu da danas u Hrvatskoj ne postoji znanstveno uteme-ljeni i javno dostupni postav koji bi problematizirao razdoblje Narodno-oslobodilačke borbe kao za suvremenu Hrvatsku izuzetno važnoga formativnog razdoblja iz kojega je iznikla i prva hrvatska republika, njezine današnje granice itd.

Jedna od tekućih aktivnosti projekta je i dokumentarna produkcija. Na incijativu Virtualnoga muzeja Dotrščina već su u tijeku pripreme za dokumentarni film o Dotrščini reda-telja i scenarista Jadrana Bobana, autora hvaljenoga filma “Duhovi Zagreba” vezane tematike. Jedan je od ciljeva, a s obzirom da se ipak radi o jednome od najvećih stratišta Drugoga svjetskog rata u Hrvatskoj, da Dotrščina postane dio državnoga protokola o prigodnim datumima te i na taj

način osnaži kulturu sjećanja, odnosno vrati u kolektivnu svijest postojanje tog mjesta.

Tijekom suradnje Saše Šimprage na drugim projek-tima Documente, ove je godine po prvi put realiziran i orga-niziran edukativni posjet parku za gimnazijalce (Gimnazija Lucijana Vranjanina iz Zagreba). U sklopu tog projekta, pod nazivom Moj zavičaj kroz vrijeme, realiziran je i niz kusto-skih i drugih posjeta, a sve s ciljem upoznavanja mjesta. U kontekstu života projekta Virtualnog muzeja Dotrščina sva-kako je važan kontinuitet djelovanja, a obim produkcije, tj. realizacija pojedinih elemenata projekta ovisit će o dodijelje-nim sredstvima dobivenim putem javnih natječaja.

Primarno je Virtualni muzej Dotrščina zamišljen kao dugoročni projekt čiji će se postav nadograđivati i svake godine u određenome segmentu predstavljati u (različitome) javnom prostoru grada i po mogućnosti na različite načine te putem privremenih umjetničkih intervencija u javnome pro-storu spomen-parka.


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Competing over World Heritage at Places of Diversity in the Middle East: Mardin1

Elvan Cobb2

1 The research presented in this paper has been primarily compiled as part of the author’s Master’s thesis in historic preservation from the University of Pennsylvania. An extended version of this research, covering the case study of Jerusalem, is forthcoming as “Politics of Place in the Middle East and the World Heritage Status of Jerusalem,” in Sacred Precincts: Non-Muslim Religious Sites in Islamic Territories, edited by Mohammad Gharipour. Brill.

2 Elvan is a PhD student in the History of Architecture and Urban Development Program at Cornell University. She is interested in the interaction of the historic built environment with contemporary society. She works on heritage management issues, including outreach activities and architectural documentation.

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In 1507, an anonymous merchant from Venice visited Mardin, now located in Southeastern Turkey, and recorded his observations in The Travels of a Merchant in Persia:“...This city is so high, that from within, looking down towards the east, it appears hanging over the land, like the battlement of a fortress...This city is inhabited far more by Armenian Christians and Jews than by Mahometans, and each sect officiates in its separate church, according to their custom.” 3 Right after his visit, the Ottomans conquered the city in 1516, but the diversity of the town continued under Ottoman control. Many eighteenth and nineteenth-century writers commented on the extraordinary diversity of Mardin’s inhabitants. For example, in 1766, traveler C. Niebuhr counted 1,000 Christian and 2,000 Muslim inha-bitants.4 Another traveler, Dupre, estimated the population of the town at 27,000, of whom 20,000 were Turks, 3,200 Jacobites, 2,000 Armenians and 800 Shamsiyya.5 In 1835, J. Hammer-Pugstall wrote that “Sunnis and Shias, Catholic and Schismatic Armenians, Jacobites, Nestorians, Chaldeans, Sun-, Fire-, Calf- and Devil-worshipers dwell one over the head of the other.” 6

3 Barbaro, Giosofat, and Ambrogio Contarini, translated by William Thomas, 1873, Travels to Tana and Persia, New York: B. Franklin.

4 Quoted in Minorsky, Mārdīn. (C. Niebuhr, 1766, Reisebeschreibung, Copenhagen 1778, ii, 391-98.) and (A. Dupre, 1808, Voyage, i, Paris 12 (rep), iv, 242)

5 ibid.

6 Quoted in Marco Polo et al., The book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian concerning the kingdoms and marvels of the East / e3. ed. rev. throughout in the light of recent discoveries; Henry Cordier; With a memoir of Henry Yule by his daughter Amy Frances Yule. (London:, 1903) p. 62.

Following the Turkish War of Independence, a Turkish Republic was established in 1923 and became directly descended from the Ottoman Empire despite the continu-ing attempts of the new nation to distance itself from its Ottoman history. Passage into nationhood was not a pain-less process. Population exchanges were considered to be a solution to the conflicts among people. In a report written by Nobel Peace Prize winner Fridtjof Nansen to the League of Nations, it was stated that “to unmix the populations of the Near East... will secure the pacification of the Near East.”7

Since then, the populations of the Middle East have been ‘unmixing’, both as a result of population exchanges but also through national assimilation policies that favor homogenous societies that are unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge the cultural, religious and ethnical diversity and fluidity that had dominated the region for millennia. Turkey, like most nations emerging in the 20th century, formed its nation around ideas of a unified people. This now westward looking nation enforced the idea of Turkish solidarity through the implementation of reform movements, trying to gather the remnants of a variety of ethnic and religious groups around a common nationalistic idealism.

Before the formation of the Republic, however, a series of events took place that continue to haunt the Turkish Republic. The highly politicized events of 1915 displaced a large number of Armenians from Anatolia. According to Ottoman sources over 400,000 Armenians were relocated

7 Quoted in Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants (London: F. Cass, 2003), pg. 104.

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under the Temporary Law on the Measures Implemented by Military against those Opposing the Government Implementations at Wartime, which was put into effect on June 1, 1915.8 The estimates concerning the number of people killed during the events varies greatly, ranging from two hundred thousand in official Turkish accounts to one and a half million in some Armenian accounts.9 The events surrounding this relocation in 1915 have been a continu-ing source of conflict between Armenia and Turkey. Many Armenians would like the large scale population move-ment imposed upon them to be classified as ‘genocide.’ The Armenian and Turkish governments cannot agree on the terminology, the death toll and the objectives of this displa-cement. Both sides do acknowledge, however, that a large number of Armenians were displaced and perished under terrible circumstances.

Today, many Armenian churches and monasteries remain in Turkey, stripped from their once active commu-nities, within a society that has been mainly secular but nominally Muslim. Despite the most recent shifts in Turkey’s ideas of secularization and an increase in expressions of Islam, for decades the fate of any religious property, espe-cially of non-Muslim faiths, was uncertain. While these religious monuments share the fate of many historical and

8 Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, ed. Turkish Ministry of Culture. Available from http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D313A781CAA92714FCE089326D2B69E01EEB.

9 Cihan Tugal, “Memories of Violence, Memoirs of Nation,” in Politics of Public Memory in Turkey, ed. Esra Özyürek. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 138. p. 143-44)

archaeological remains in Turkey, it is difficult to judge the motives behind the negligence shown towards some heri-tage of the ‘other’. Scarce resources make it impossible for the Turkish government to properly take care of the nation’s vast architectural heritage. Yet, many question the ‘not-so-benign’ neglect of the monuments of the ‘other’ in Turkey. Robert Bevan is one of the harsher critiques of Turkey’s acti-ons as he states that: “The architectural legacy of Ottoman multiculturalism was a witness to the security and strength of the Pax Ottomanica. The careful and partial promotion by the Turks of only favored elements of that heritage is, by contrast, evidence of modern Turkey’s insecurity and weakness.”10

Mardin and World HeritageMardin is one of the few places in Turkey where a diversity of people continued despite the policies that aimed to unify the diverse populations of the newly established Turkish Republic under the modicum of ‘Turkishness’. Perhaps due to the importance of the city for their religion, the major non-Muslim group that continues its existence in the city is the Syriac population followed by an important but smaller Yezidi population. During the early decades of the Turkish Republic, Mardin continued to be a small provincial town despite its significant religious role and its spectacular urban-scape. Starting in the 1980s and until a few years back, this region was considered an unsafe place to travel due to the conflict between the Turkish Army and the PKK, a Kurdish nationalist

10 Bevan, The destruction of Memory: Architecture at War, p. 58-59.

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group that Turkey considers a terrorist organization. With the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK in 1999, the region became more stable as the clashes between the Turkish Army and PKK subsided. The tension in the region, however, remains as the claims to a Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq continue.

In 2009, the Turkish Minister of Culture stated that Gaziantep, Şanliurfa and Mardin, proximate cities in Southeastern Turkey, could become focal points of worldwide faith and culture tourism. However, to capitalize on this fully, he stated that Turks “need not to have the mines underground and the traitors above ground,” referring to the land mines left behind from various conflicts and the people who would like to see the creation of a Kurdish State in the region. The Minister of Culture’s perceptions of the difficulties in deve-loping tourism in this conflicted region are obvious in this statement. Despite this politically challenging situation in the region, Mardin was placed on the tentative list to become a World Heritage Site for Turkey as a cultural landscape11 12:

The Turkish Ministry of Culture sent a nomination file for the inscription of Mardin to the World Heritage

11 According to the World Heritage website: The Convention, which was established in 1972, is an “international legal instrument through which countries voluntarily commit themselves to protect monuments and sites within their territory that are recognized to be of such outstanding value that safeguarding them concerns humanity as a whole.” (ICOMOS, http://www.icomos.org/en/.)

12 Nation-states who are party to the World Heritage Convention independently make the decision on which sites they would like to nominate for the World Heritage List. These sites are placed on the nation’s tentative list until a full nomination can be submitted to the World Heritage Committee.

Committee in 2002. However, this initial nomination file did not include the significant Deyrulzafaran Monastery. In addition, it was not accompanied by a management plan. Taking these issues into consideration and afraid of a nega-tive result, the Ministry withdrew the nomination file.13

Therefore, the nomination for Mardin was not examined in the 27th session of the World Heritage Committee in 2003.14

A new dossier, however, has been under preparation. As the updated description from the tentative list indicates, the Deyrulzafaran Monastery is an important focal point of the new claim to World Heritage:

Mardin is a city in a rocky region in southeastern Anatolia. The city is mainly medieval in origin and is situa-ted on the slopes of a rocky hill, crowned by a fortress built on its citadel. This barren stone region around Diyarbakır and Mardin stretches as far as Sanlıurfa and Gaziantep. The city as a whole with its traditional stone, religious and vernacular architecture and its terraced urban pattern is the best preserved example of Anatolian soil. Deyrulzafaran Monastery is one of the living religious centers of Syrian Jacobites in Mardin, an impressive architectural complex in the Mesopotamian plain.15

13 “Teftiş Kurulu Başkanliği ” [cited 2010]. Available from http://www.kultur.gov.tr/teftis/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFF3D828A179298319F9B93B76674042401.

14 World Heritage Committee, Decisions Adopted by the 27th Session of the World Heritage Committee, (Paris: UNESCO, 2003.)

15 “Mardin Cultural Landscape - UNESCO World Heritage Centre.” Available from http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1406/.

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With additional regional stability and an intensive local marketing campaign that heavily utilized the possible World Heritage status, tourism in Mardin increased dra-matically. In a 2008 article, the Mayor of Mardin, Mehmet Kılıçlar, stated that the city welcomed over 600,000 tou-rists during the year of 2007 and that they were expecting to exceed a million visitors in 2008. He also stated that the main challenge had been increasing the number of beds for accommodation. A 1,600 bed-capacity in the city was insu-fficient to accommodate the tourism boom that was being experienced in Mardin. The opening of 3 hotels, two of which are boutique hotels, was expected to help the shorta-ge.16 Considering that in 2002, Mardin recorded only about 50,000 tourists, the jump to over a million tourists is a signi-ficant one that must have drastic effects on the city.17

The first observable effect of this increase in tourism associated with World Heritage status, has been the skyroc-keting of real estate prices. One could buy a historic stone house in Mardin for 20,000 Turkish Liras in 2002. This is not the case anymore. According to several newspaper articles, these houses appreciated their value 100 fold and by 2010, they were generally valued at 2,000,000 Turkish Liras. The diversity of the people living in the city, inclu-ding Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Syriacs and Yezidis, and the architectural heritage of this mix is stated as the main draw

16 “Mardin`in hedefi bir milyon turist,” Sabah, March 25, 2008.

17 “Mardin`e 2009`da 1 milyon 200 bin turist bekleniyor,” Zaman Gazetesi, Dec 24, 2008.

to the city.18 While the attraction of the city may be related to faith or diversity to a certain extent, it seems that most domestic tourists visit the city because it is the new popular place in Turkey.

A private local publication, Mardin Life, has been performing several online surveys. A few of them are of interest. For example, as part of a new initiative, Mardin got a new logo that depicts a minaret and a dome. The rea-ders of the online magazine were asked to comment on the relevance of the logo. A total of 255 votes were recorded and only 15% of the votes approve of the new logo. Another survey inquired about the primary problems in the city of Mardin with the following results: Infrastructure (17%), transportation (%8), education (16%), health (9%), parking (9%), trash collection (12%), irregular development (11%), Mardinspor (soccer team) (9%), Mardin Castle (9%).19 While the survey results have to be taken into consideration with a grain of salt, the numbers are telling and show that partici-pants viewed heritage related issues with a certain level of ambiguity and perhaps not as significant to their daily lives.

AnalysisAt a first glance, the heightened status of diverse heritage, through the medium of becoming World Heritage, seems

18 Şeyhmus Edis, “Mardin’de Ev Fiyatlari Milyon Doları Buldu Haberi,” Zaman Gazetesi 2010.

19 “Mardin İletişim Gazetesi, Mardin Life, Mardin Haber, Mardin İnternet Haber, Mardin, Haber, Son Dakika, Mardin İletişim Gazetesi.” Available from http://www.mardinlife.com/haberler/yazardetay.asp?id=921&kategori=Ekrem Arslan.

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to have done much good for increasing the visibility of different groups in Mardin. The diversity is openly cherished and the amicable relationships among different people are emphasized. The city is fondly called “Mardin: City of Peace.” The official website of the Mardin Mayor’s Office proudly advertises the existence of ten historic monasteries and churches in the city of Mardin.20

The new status of Mardin as a tolerant multi-religon, multi-ethnic city has led to the city being the venue for the first Kurdish Language and Literature Program in Artuklu University. The university is also a new addition to Mardin, founded only in 2008. The construction for the university is still ongoing, but it is interesting to note that the campus will include a mosque, a Syriac chapel and a Yezidi temple. The University Rector Serdar Bedii Omay, demonstrated early interest in a Syriac language program. In a tour I took of the Deyrulzafaran Monastery in 2000, before the World Heritage efforts started and the region was still politically challenged, monks at the monastery voiced their concerns on the loss of a Syriac speaking population in the area. This new possibility of language education may give a boost to this community that has been marginalized for the duration of the Republic.

The new initiatives in Mardin could also be related to Turkey’s bid for becoming a full member of the European Union. As Turkey was trying to gain full membership to the European Union, the government was trying to prove its reli-gious and ethnic tolerance. In this effort, Mardin was treated

20 “Kiliseler Manastırlar.” Available from http://www.mardin.gov.tr/turkce/turizm/turizmkiliselermanastirlar.asp.

as the poster child of Turkey in the country’s bid to EU mem-bership. Whatever the reason, the selection of Mardin as the locale for the new university that is to teach these formerly banned languages is a step in the direction that may allow the survival of the ethnic and religious minorities in the region. Such changes in attitude may also spark objective scholarly attention to formerly unstudied aspects of life that have been existent in Mardin and elsewhere in southeastern Turkey.

Additionally, the city’s new elevated status attrac-ted a new non-governmental family-foundation sponsored museum to the city. The Sakıp Sabancı City Museum “aims to display and promote the urban formation and culture of life in the city of Mardin, while the Dilek Sabancı Art Gallery aspires to establish a modern and contemporary art platform in Mardin, through temporary exhibitions.”21 In its first three months, the museum welcomed over 30,000 visi-tors. It is located in a historic building that was constructed in 1889 as army barracks. Sarkis Elyas Lole, an architect of Armenian descent, oversaw the building’s construction, again demonstrating the importance of religious and ethnic groups in the formation of the city’s built environment.22

While these are efforts worthy of notice, there is also room for caution in the way that Mardin approaches beco-ming a World Heritage City. First of all, Mardin is freely called a ‘museum city.’ This approach may hinder the long

21 “Sakip Sabanci Museum Web Site - Sakıp Sabancı Mardin City Museum and Dilek Sabancı Art Gallery.“ Available from http://muze.sabanciuniv.edu/news/news.php?lngGeneralNewsID=66&bytLanguageID=2.

22 ibid.

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term sustainability of the city. Cities are places where people live and interact with each other and with their built envi-ronment. Therefore, the ‘museum city’ approach may under-mine the dynamisms that resulted in this significant cultural landscape. Rather than managing the change, the effort seems to be to restore buildings to their former state in order to showcase them to the world. As the old city center is beco-ming more and more a tourist attraction and a ‘museum’, the urban sprawl in the form of apartment developments has already taken its effect on the outskirts of the city.

The increase in the real estate prices can result in a very fast rate of gentrification that will probably either force or encourage the local residents to leave the city. Again, resulting in a city devoid of the dynamic and diverse popu-lation that has been making this a special place. If the local population moves out of the city, part of the draw to the city will be lost with that withdrawal. The stone houses of the city are being transformed into boutique hotels, bed and bre-akfasts and get-aways for Istanbul socialites. All these will ultimately lead to a transient population that does not have a long term stake in the well-being of the city.

We must also not ignore that this region has been unsta-ble for a long time and the issues that caused these conflicts are not yet resolved. Therefore, it is possible that the conflicts that made this a region a difficult place to travel to just ten years ago may come back. For the few who traveled in the region as outsiders before the improvements in the security situation, the transportation involved several security checks, special permissions and the like. If the conflicts flare up once more, the tourism that is hoped to sustain Mardin would also halt very quickly. Therefore, resulting in a severe decline in

the city’s now upward trend. Indeed, the recent events in Syria seem to have cooled down the tourist activities of the region and brought a large group of refugees into the city increasing the city’s financial responsibilities in providing amenities.

Moreover, the ethnic and religious diversity of the city seems to be exploited as a tourist attraction. Mardin is presented as the ‘other’ in the modern Turkish Republic. Its representation in TV series such as ‘Sıla’ presents Mardin as being different from the rest of the ‘modern’ Republic. As Ussama Makdisi elaborates in his article, Ottoman Orientalism, the 19th century Ottoman Empire found its own ‘orient’, its own ‘other’ in the lands dominated by Arabs.23 It seems that modern day Turkey also found its orient within its borders in Mardin. However, rather than celebrating the diversity of the city, the tourism efforts exploit the cultural and historic richness of Mardin.

Lastly, ‘the Armenian Issue’ is glaringly absent from official documents that provide information on Mardin. While the Turkish government sources acknowledge that massacres occurred on the outskirts of the city, this period is usually skipped over in informationals. This region, which has been the stage of conflicts both at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, is being presented as the ‘City of Peace and Tolerance’, and discourse on the negative memories is completely omitted.

23 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” American Historical Review 107, no. 3 (2002): p. 768-796.

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ConclusionPeople of different identity groups have lived in the Middle East and in Mardin side by side for many centuries. Since the seventh century, most of this area has been under the control of Islamic Empires. Throughout this time period and in its last expression under the Ottoman Empire, people of other faiths, especially those of monotheistic ones, had a degree of autonomy despite being dependent and subservient to the Muslim power holders. While this may not be an ideal situation from a contemporary humanitarian perspective, the system did allow these groups to maintain their communities and architectural legacies. What is and what could be the role of World Heritage within the context of conflict as examined in the Middle East and specifically in Mardin? Could World Heritage be a response to the conflicts centered around heritage? As it is implemented today, World Heritage is highly dependent on nationalistic agendas. Only countries with sovereignty over a site or city can nominate that place to be inscribed on the World Heritage List. The management of these sites is also under the jurisdiction of these governments. Therefore, the attitudes towards heritage in these countries determine the way in which World Heritage operates. Within this framework, some stories are automatically censored while others are made prominent. For example, in Mardin, World Heritage is acting very much as a branding mechanism, tourism generator and a demonstration of tolerance associated with Turkey's bid to join the European Union. However, it is not emerging as a mechanism to uncover the stories of a troubled past.

Svojatanje statusa Svjetske baštine na mjestima s etnički raznolikim stanovništvom na Bliskome istoku: Mardin1 Elvan Cobb2

1 Istraživanje predstavljeno u ovome radu sastoji se prvenstveno od podataka iz autoričina magisterija na temu očuvanja povijesne baštine na Sveučilištu Pennsylvania. Proširena inačica toga istraživanja, koja uključuje i studiju slučaja na primjeru Jeruzalema, je u pripremi kao “Politics of Place in the Middle East and the World Heritage Status of Jerusalem” u Sacred Precincts: Non-Muslim Religious Sites in Islamic Territories, ur. Mohammad Gharipour (Brill).

2 Studentica doktorskog studija pri programu Povijest arhitekture i urbani razvoj Sveučilišta Cornell (Ithaca, SAD). Zanima ju odnos povijesne baštine i suvremenog društva. Radi na pitanjima koja se tiču upravljanja kulturnom i povijesnom baštinom.

60 61

Anonimni mletački trgovac je 1507. godine posjetio Mardin u današnjoj jugoistočnoj Turskoj i svoja zapažanja zapisao u Putovanjima trgovca u Perziji: “... Ovaj je grad previsok, tako da gledan iznutra izgleda kao da se saginje prema istoku, ukoso, poput zidina tvrđave. U gradu živi mnogo više armenskih kršćana i Židova nego Muhamedovaca, i svaka sekta održava svoje obrede u vlastitoj crkvi, u skladu sa svojim običajima”3. Osmanlije su osvojili grad ubrzo nakon tog posjeta, 1516. godine, ali njegova raznolikost se održala i pod osmanskom vlašću. Mnogi pisci iz osamnaestog i devet-naestog stoljeća pisali su o iznimnoj raznolikosti stanovnika Mardina. Na primjer, putopisac C. Neibuhr je 1766. godine izbrojao je 1000 kršćana i 2000 muslimana u gradu4. Drugi, Dupre, je procijenio da u gradu živi 27000 ljudi, od kojih su 20000 Turci, 3200 Jakobiti, 2000 Armenci i 800 Shamsiyya5. J. Hammer-Pugstall je godine 1835. napisao da “suniti i šijiti, katolici i pravoslavni Armenci, jakobiti, nestorijanci, Kaldejci, štovatelji sunca, vatre, goveda i đavla žive jedni drugima iznad glava.”6

3 Barbaro Giosofat i Ambrogio Contarini, preveo William Thomas, 1873., Travels to Tana and Persia, New York: B. Franklin.

4 Citirano u Minorsky, Mārdīn. (C. Niebuhr, 1766, Reisebeschreibung, Copenhagen 1778, ii, 391-98.) i (A. Dupre, 1808, Voyage, i, Paris 12 (rep), iv, 242).

5 Ibid.

6 Citirano u Marco Polo et al., The book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian concerning the kingdoms and marvels of the East / e3. ed. rev. throughout in the light of recent discoveries; Henry Cordier; With a memoir of Henry Yule by his daughter Amy Frances Yule.

Nakon turskoga Rata za nezavisnost Republika Turska osnovana je 1923. godine i postala je izravni sljednik Osmanskoga Carstva unatoč brojnim pokušajima nove nacije da se udalji od svoje osmanske prošlosti. Postupak prijelaza u državnost nije bio bezbolan. Razmjene stanovništva sma-trale su se rješenjem za sukob među ljudima. U izvještaju dobitnika Nobelove nagrade za mir Fridtjofa Nansena Ligi Naroda piše da će “odmješavanje stanovništva na Bliskome istoku.... osigurati pacifikaciju Bliskoga istoka.”7 Od tada se stanovništvo Bliskoga istoka “odmješava” i kao rezultat razmjene stanovništva, ali i zbog politika nacionalne asimi-lacije koje su bile usmjerene prema homogenim društvima nesvjesnim ili nevoljnim da priznaju svoju kulturnu, religi-jsku i etničku raznolikost i fluidnost koja je dominirala u toj regiji tisućama godina. Turska se, kao i većina nacija koje se pojavljuju u 20. stoljeću, formirala oko ideje ujedin-jenoga naroda. Ta nova, sada zapadno orijentirana nacija poticala je ideju turske solidarnosti kroz provođenje reformi, pokušavajući okupiti ostatke raznolikosti etničkih i religi-jskih skupina oko zajedničkoga nacionalističkog ideala.

Niz događaja koji i danas opterećuju Tursku odvio se prije nego što je republika uspostavljena. Visoko politizirani događaji 1915. godine izmjestili su veliki broj Armenaca iz Anatolije. Prema osmanskim izvorima, preko 400.000 tisuća Armenaca premješteno je u skladu s Privremenim

(London, 1903) p. 62.

7 Citirano u Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger, Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants (London: F. Cass, 2003), str. 104.

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zakonom o mjerama koje provodi vojska protiv onih koji se protive vladinim odredbama za vrijeme rata, koji je stupio na snagu 1. lipnja 1915. godine.8 Procjene o broju ubijenih za vrijeme tih događaja znatno variraju, od dvjesto tisuća prema službenim turskim navodima do jednoga i pol mili-juna prema nekim armenskim navodima.9 Zbivanja koja su pratila to premještanje 1915. godine ostaju trajan izvor konflikta između Armenije i Turske. Mnogi Armenci žele da se to veliko prisilno preseljenje klasificira kao “geno-cid”. Armenska i turska vlada ne mogu se složiti oko ter-minologije, broja mrtvih niti ciljeva toga preseljenja. Obje strane ipak priznaju da je veliki broj Armenaca preseljen ili ubijen u strašnim okolnostima.

Mnoge armenske crkve i samostani i danas se nalaze u Turskoj, ali bez nekada aktivnih zajednica koje su ih pohodile, u društvu koje je uglavnom sekularno, ali nominalno muslimansko. Unatoč najnovijim promjenama u turskome pristupu sekularizaciji i povećanoj vidljivosti islama, desetljećima je sudbina svih religijskih posjeda, posebno onih nemuslimanskih vjera, bila neizvjesna. I dok ti religijski spomenici dijele sudbinu mnogih povijesnih i arheoloških ostataka u Turskoj, nije lako odrediti razloge koji stoje iza nemara prema dijelu baštine “drugih”. Turska se vlada jednostavno ne može propisno brinuti o ogromnoj

8 Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, ur. tursko Ministarstvo kulture. dostupno na http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D313A781CAA92714FCE089326D2B69E01EEB.

9 Cihan Tugal, “Memories of Violence, Memoirs of Nation”, u Politics of Public Memory in Turkey, ur. Esra Özyürek. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 138. p. 143–44.

arhitektonskoj baštini cijele nacije zbog ograničenih sred-stava. Ipak, mnogi dovode u pitanje “ne baš benigno” zane-marivanje spomenika “drugih” u Turskoj. Robert Bevan je jedan od najoštrijih kritičara turskih poteza pa tako kaže: “Arhitektonska baština osmanskoga multikulturalizma bila je svjedok sigurnosti i snage Pax Ottomanice. Pažljiva i pristrana promocija samo Turcima poželjnih elementata te baštine je, nasuprot tomu, dokaz nesigurnosti i slabosti mod-erne Turske.”10

Mardin i svjetska baštinaMardin je jedno od rijetkih mjesta u Turskoj gdje se razno-likost održala unatoč politici kojoj je bio cilj ujediniti razno-vrsno stanovništvo pod zajednički nazivnik “Turčinstva” u sklopu novostvorene turske republike. Glavnu nemusliman-sku religijsku skupinu u gradu, vjerojatno zbog važnosti samoga grada za tu religiju, sačinjavaju pripadnici Sirijske pravoslavne Crkve, a uz njih nalazimo i manju, ali važnu skupinu Jesida. Mardin je tijekom prvih nekoliko desetljeća turske republike bio mali provincijalni grad, unatoč svojoj važnoj ulozi u nekim religijama i spektakularnomu urbanom pejzažu (urban landscape). Od početka 1980-ih do unazad nekoliko godina regija u kojoj se Mardin nalazi smatrala se nesigurnom za putovanje zbog sukoba turske vojske i PKK, kurdske nacionalističke skupine koju Turska smatra terori-stičkom organizacijom. Situacija se u regiji stabilizirala 1999. godine uhićenjem Abdullaha Öcalana, vođe PKK, nakon čega

10 Bevan, The destruction of Memory: Architecture at War, str. 58–59.

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su sukobi između turske vojske i PKK prestali. Napetosti su ipak ostale jer Kurdi nastavljaju zahtijevati formiranje kurd-ske države u jugoistočnoj Turskoj i sjevernomu Iraku.

Godine 2009. turski ministar kulture izjavio je da bi Gaziantep, Şanliurfa i Mardin, gradovi koji su u blizini jedan drugoga u jugoistočnoj Turskoj, mogli postati svjetska središta vjerskoga i kulturnoga turizma. Da bi se ta ideja mogla ostvariti, izjavio je da Turci “ne smiju imati mine pod zemljom i izdajnike nad zemljom”, referirajući se na nagazne mine zaostale iz brojnih sukoba i ljude koji rade na stvaranju kurdske države u regiji. Percepcija ministra kulture o poteškoćama u razvijanju turizma u toj konfliktnoj regiji je očita iz te izjave. Unatoč trenutačnoj politički izazovnoj situ-aciji u regiji, Mardin je stavljen na tentativnu listu mjesta

Svjetske baštine za Tursku kao kulturni pejzaž.11 Tursko ministarstvo kulture poslalo je zahtjev za

uvrštenje Mardina komitetu Svjetske baštine 2002. godine. Ta prva nominacija nije uključivala važan samostan Deyrulzafaran. Osim toga, uz nominaciju nije bio priložen plan upravljanja. Imajući to na umu i strahujući od odbijen-ice, ministarstvo je povuklo dokumentaciju sa zahtjevom.12

11 Prema web-stranici Svjetske baštine: Konvencija uspostavljena 1972. godine je “međunarodni pravni instrument s pomoću kojega se države svojevoljno obvezuju štititi spomenike i lokalitete na vlastitu teritoriju za koje se smatra da su toliko vrijedni da se njihovo očuvanje tiče cjelokupnoga čovječanstva (ICOMOS, http://www.icomos.org/en/). Države članice Konvencije neovisno odlučuju koje lokalitete žele nominirati za popis Svjetske baštine. Ti se lokaliteti stavljaju na državnu tentativnu listu dok se ne steknu uvjeti za punu nominaciju komitetu Svjetske baštine.

12 “Teftiş Kurulu Başkanliği” [citirano 2010]. Dostupno na http://www.kultur.gov.tr/teftis/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F889

Stoga nominacija za Mardin nije razmatrana na 27. sjednici komiteta za Svjetsku baštinu 2003. godine.13 Novi je dosje u pripremi. Iz novoga opisa na tentativnoj listi vidljivo je da je samostan Deyrulzafaran važna točka u novome zahtjevu za proglašenje Svjetske baštine:

Mardin je grad u stjenovitome kraju u jugoistočnoj Anatoliji. Pretežito srednjovjekovna podrijetla nalazi se na obroncima stjenovitoga brežuljka s tvrđavom na vrhu. Neplodno stjenovito područje oko Diyarakbira i Mardina proteže se sve do Șanlıurfe i Gaziantepa. Grad je, kao cjelina sa svojom tradicionalnom kamenom duhovnom i svjetovnom arhitekturom i terasama, najbolje očuvan primjer anatolske zemlje. Samostan Deyrulzafaran je impresivan arhitektonski kompleks u mezopotamskoj ravnici i jedno od živućih religi-jskih središta sirijskih Jakobita u Mardinu.14

Uz dodatnu stabilnost u regiji i intenzivnu lokalnu reklamnu kampanju koja se snažno oslanjala na mogući status Svjetske baštine, turizam je u Mardinu procvjetao. U članku 2008. godine gradonačelnik Mardina, Mehmet Kılıçlar, izjavio je da je grad posjetilo 600.000 turista tijekom 2007. godine i da se očekuje preko milijun turista u 2008. godini. Naglasio je i da je najveći izazov bio kako povećati smještajne kapacitete. Postojećih 1600 kreveta nije bilo dovoljno za rast turizma koji se dogodio u Mardinu. Otvaranjem triju hotela, od kojih su dva

2433CFF3D828A179298319F9B93B76674042401.

13 World Heritage Committee, Decisions Adopted by the 27th Session of the World Heritage Committee, (Paris: UNESCO, 2003.)

14 Mardin Cultural Landscape UNESCO World Heritage Centre.” Available from http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1406/.

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tzv. butik hoteli, trebalo je ublažiti nestašicu.15 S obzirom da je Mardin 2002. godine službeno imao tek oko 50.000 turista, skok na preko milijun turista je značajan i mora se značajno odraziti na grad.16

Prvi opipljiv rezultat rasta turizma povezanoga sa sta-tusom Svjetske baštine bio je veliko povećanje cijena nekret-nina. Godine 2002. bilo je moguće kupiti staru kamenu kuću u Mardinu za 20.000 turskih lira. To više nije slučaj. Prema nekim novinskim napisima, vrijednost kuća porasla je 100 puta i 2010. godine je njihova vrijednost uglavnom iznosila 2.000.000 turskih lira. Raznovrsnost ljudi koji žive u gradu, uključujući Turke, Kurde, Armence, Sirijce i Jeside, i arhitektonska baština te mješavine ljudi proglašeni su glavnim činiteljima privlačnosti grada.17 I dok privlačnost grada može imati veze s vjerom ili raznolikošću do određene mjere, čini se da većina domaćih turista dolazi u grad jed-nostavno zato što je to novo popularno mjesto u Turskoj.

Privatna lokalna publikacija, Mardin Life, napravila je nekoliko “on-line” anketa. Neke od njih su zanimljive. Primjerice, Mardin je kao dio jedne nove inicijative dobio novi logo koji sadržava minaret i kupolu. Čitateljima web-časopisa omogućeno je da komentiraju relevantnost loga. Od 255 glasova samo ih je 15 % odobravalo novi logo. Druga anketa bavila se glavnim promblemima u Mardinu i dobiveni

15 “Mardin`in hedefi bir milyon turist”, Sabah, March 25, 2008.

16 “Mardin`e 2009`da 1 milyon 200 bin turist bekleniyor”, Zaman Gazetesi, Dec 24, 2008.

17 Şeyhmus Edis, “Mardin’de Ev Fiyatlari Milyon Doları Buldu Haberi”, Zaman Gazetesi 2010.

su ovi rezultati: infrastruktura (17 %), prijevoz (8 %), obrazovanje (16 %), zdravstvo (9 %), odvoz smeća (12 %), divlja gradnja (11 %), Mardinspor (nogometni klub) (9 %) i mardinska tvrđava (9 %).18 I dok se rezultate treba uzeti sa određenom dozom skepse, brojevi otkrivaju da ispitanici na pitanja vezana uz baštinu gledaju s određenom dozom ambivalentnosti i da ona možda ipak nije toliko bitna za njihovu svakodnevicu.

AnalizaNa prvi pogled čini se da je viši status raznolike baštine, s obzirom na Svjetsku baštinu, pogodovao povećanju vidljivosti različitih skupina u Mardinu. Raznolikost se otvoreno cijeni i naglašeni su prijateljski odnosi među pripadnicima različitih naroda. Grad od milja zovu “Mardin: Grad Mira”. Službena web-stranica Ureda gradonačelnika Mardina ponosno ističe postojanje deset povijesnih samostana i crkava u Mardinu.19

Novi status Mardina kao tolerantnoga multireligijskog i multietničkog grada doveo je do toga da je grad postao lokacija za prvi program kurdskoga jezika i književnosti na Sveučilištu Artuklu. Sveučilište je također novost u Mardinu, a osnovano je tek 2008. godine. Izgradnja još traje, ali zanimljivo je da će kampus sadržavati džamiju, sirijsku

18 Mardin İletişim Gazetesi, Mardin Life, Mardin Haber, Mardin İnternet Haber, Mardin, Haber, Son Dakika, Mardin İletişim Gazetesi.” Dostupno na http://www.mardinlife.com/haberler/yazardetay.asp?id=921&kategori=Ekrem Arslan.

19 “Kiliseler Manastırlar”. dostupno na http://www.mardin.gov.tr/turkce/turizm/turizmkiliselermanastirlar.asp

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crkvu i jesidski hram. Rektor sveučilišta Serdar Bedii Omay pokazao je i interes za program sirijačkoga jezika (dijalekt aramejskog jezika). Pri obilsaku samostana Deyrulfazaran 2000. godine, prije početka procesa Svjetske baštine dok su političke napetosti u regiji još uvijek bile aktivne, monasi su izrazili zabrinutost zbog opadanja i gubitka stanovništva koje priča sirijački u regiji. Nova mogućnost jezičnoga obra-zovanja mogla bi dati poticaj toj zajednici koja je bila mar-ginalizirana tijekom postojanja turske republike.

Nove inicijative u Mardinu mogle bi se također pro-matrati u okviru turskih nastojanja za punopravno članstvo u Europskoj uniji. Kako Turska radi na dobivanju punoga članstva u u Europskoj uniji, vlada radi na dokazivanju svoje religijske i etničke tolerancije. S tim je ciljem Mardin postavljen kao glavni primjer uspješne prakse u toleranciji. Bez obzira na razlog, izbor Mardina kao sjedišta novoga sveučilišta na kojemu će se predavati ovi donedavno zabran-jeni jezici korak je prema očuvanju etničkih i vjerskih manjina u regiji. Takve promjene stajališta mogu biti poti-caj objektivnim stručnim analizama dosad neproučavanih vidova života u Mardinu i drugdje u jugoistočnoj Turskoj.

Uz to, novi status koji grad uživa razlogom je otvaranja novog muzeja u gradu, financiranog od strane nevladine obiteljske fondacije. Gradski muzej Sakıp Sabancı ima za cilj “promovirati urbanu gradnju i kulturu življenja u Mardinu, a Dilek Sabancı umjetnička galerija teži uspostavljanju mod-erne suvremene umjetničke platforme u Mardinu s pomoću privremenih izložbi.”20 Muzej je obišlo 30.000 posjetitelja

tijekom prvih triju mjeseca. Nalazi se u povijesnoj zgradi izgrađenoj 1889. godine za vojnike. Sarkis Elyas Lole, arhi-tekt armenskoga podrijetla, nadgledao je izgradnju, što također upućuje na važnost vjerskih i etničkih skupina u formiranju urbanoga izgrađenog okoliša.21

I dok su svi ovi napori hvalevrijedni, postoje i razlozi za oprez kako se Mardin približava statusu grada Svjetske baštine. Kao prvo, Mardin otvoreno nazivaju “gradom muzejom”. Taj pristup mogao bi otežati dugoročnu održivost grada. Gradovi su mjesta gdje ljudi žive i imaju interakcije međusobno i sa svojim izgrađenim okolišem. “Grad muzej” može ugroziti dinamiku tih interakcija koje su nastale u značajnom kulturnom pejzažu poput onog u kojemu se raz-vijao Mardin. Umjesto da se upravlja promjenom, čini se da je glavnina napora usmjerena na obnovu zgrada kako bi ih se prikazalo svijetu. Kako staro središte grada postaje sve veća turistička atrakcija i “muzej”, širenje grada u vidu apartman-izacije već je uzelo maha u rubnim područjima grada.

Povećanje cijena nekretnina može rezultirati ubrza-nom gentrifikacijom koja će vjerojatno ili prisiliti ili ohrabriti lokalno stanovništvo da napusti grad. Posljedica će biti grad bez dinamike i raznolikoga stanovništva koje ga je i činilo poseb-nim. Ako lokalno stanovništvo napusti grad, dio privlačnosti grada nestat će s tim napuštanjem. Kamene kuće pretvaraju se u butik hotele, pansione i utočišta bogataša iz Istanbula. Sve će to

20 Sakip Sabanci Museum web Sakıp Sabancı Mardin City Museum and Dilek Sabancı Art Gallery”. dostupno na http://muze.sabanciuniv.edu/news/news.php?lngGeneralNewsID=66&bytLanguageID=2.

21 ibid

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u konačnici dovesti do prolaznoga stanovništva koje neće imati dugoročan interes za dobrobit grada.

Ne smijemo zanemariti ni činjenicu da je regija dugo bila nestabilna i da pitanja koja su bila u podlozi tih kon-flikta još uvijek nisu razriješena. Stoga je moguće da se kon-flikti koji su prije samo deset godina činili regiju mjestom nepoželjnim za putovanja ponove. Za malobrojne koji su dolazili u regiju izvana prije poboljšanja sigurnosne situ-acije prijevoz je uključivao nekoliko sigurnosnih provjera, posebne dozvole i slično. Ako bi se žarišta sukoba opet akti-virala, turizam za koji se računa da održava Mardin bi vrlo brzo nestao pa bi grad vrlo brzo skliznuo sa svoje uzlazne putanje. Čini se da su nedavni događaji u Siriji smanjili turističku aktivnost u regiji i doveli veliku skupinu izbjeglica u grad, što je stvorilo financijski pritisak na gradske vlasti.

Nadalje, etnička i religijska raznolikost grada eksp-loatira se kao turistička atrakcija. Mardin je predstavljen kao “drugo” u modernoj turskoj republici. U televizijskim serijama, poput “Sile”, Mardin je predstavljen kao mjesto koje je drugačije od ostatka “moderne” republike. Ussama Makdisi piše u svojemu članku Osmanski orijentalizam da je Osmansko Carstvo 19. stoljeća našlo vlastiti “orijent”, svoje vlastito “drugo” na područjima kojima dominiraju Arapi.22 Čini se da je moderna Turska našla svoj orijent unutar svojih granica u Mardinu. Pa ipak, umjesto da slavi raznolikost grada, turistička ponuda usmjerena je na eksploataciju kul-turnih i povijesnih bogatstava Mardina.

22 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism”, American Historical Review 107, br. 3 (2002): str. 768 – 796.

Na kraju “armensko pitanje” nije spomenuto u službenim dokumentima koji sadržavaju podatke o Mardinu. Iako turska vlada priznaje da su se u predgrađima grada dogodili masakri, to je razdoblje načelno preskočeno u izvorima informacija. Ta se regija, nakon sukoba koji su je obilježili na kraju 19. i 20. stoljeća, predstavlja kao “grad mira i tolerancije” te je diskurs o negativnim sjećanjima nepostojeć.

ZaključakPripadnici različitih identiteta žive stoljećima rame uz rame na Bliskome istoku i u Mardinu. Od sedmoga je stoljeća većina toga područja bila pod kontrolom islamskih carstava. Tijekom cijeloga tog vremena ljudi drugih vjera, naročito monoteističkih, imali su određeni stupanj autonomije unatoč ovisnosti i podložnosti muslimanskim vladarima. I dok to nije idealna situacija iz današnje perspektive ljudskih prava, takav je sustav omogućio tim skupinama da održe svoje za-jednice i arhitektonsku baštinu.

Što je i što bi mogla biti uloga statusa svjetske baštine (World Heritage Site) u kontekstu sukoba na primjeru Bliskoga istoka i Mardina? Bi li takav status mogao biti odgovor sukobima oko vlasništva nad baštinom određenih mjesta? Način na koji se danas primjenjuje koncept stjecanja titule svjetske baštine jako je podložan nacionalističkim agendama. Samo države koje imaju suverenitet nad lokaci-jom ili gradom mogu nominirati određeno mjesto da ga se upiše na popis svjetske baštine. Upravljanje takvim lokalitetima također je u nadležnosti njihovih vlada. Stoga stajališta prema baštini u tim državama određuju način na koji funkcionira koncept svjetske baštine. Unutar tih

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okvira neke se priče automatski cenzuriraju dok se druge naglašavaju. Primjerice, Mardinu ta titula služi kao sredstvo za brendiranje, promociju turizma i demonstraciju tolerancije povezanu s turskim nastojanjima za priključenje Europskoj uniji. S druge strane, status ne funkcionira kao mehanizam kojim bi otkrili priče iz problematične prošlosti.

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Abandoned Heritage: Serbs in Croatia

Branko Čolović1

1 Branko Čolović (PhD), Serbian National Council (NGO), Zagreb/ Knin, Croatia

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One of the biggest reductions of the complex term of he-ritage, the sum of cultural achievements of a community within a set period of time and space, refers to its attribute of belonging. It mandatorily receives a certificate of ownership becoming either ours or theirs, a fate that encyclopedias, syntheses, monographies, exclusively nationally oriented institutions and their leaders never managed to avoid. It is on this separation that entire determinants, theoretically diffi-cult to justify, and mostly unscientific, were created. Along with them came the big careers and implanted imitators with the sole purpose of abusing their authority to uncritically and passionately defend the proclaimed truths, and poison textbooks, the media and the consciousness of the entire population. Using superficial facts and confabulated data, you can always incite your subjects, narcissistically reflect on your own cultural boastings, shamelessly claim that to which you have no right, including the remains of that which your ancestors have not managed to exterminate, and, ultimately, if necessary, start a war to gain control of a part of land whi-ch is not currently inside the usually unjust state borders.

It is almost impossible to contemplate heritage bereft of its national determinant in today’s circumstances, and leave it to be devoured by the imperial appetites of large countries and cultures. Small nations are mostly reduced to cultural periphery, forced to partake in cultural consumer-ism in an attempt to mimic foreign ideals that are difficult to reach, or, in extreme cases, forced to partake in garbage. It is for those reasons that such cultures will continually nurture envy, which will greatly surpass the value of the heritage itself. Well paid professionals and newly introduced local measures and values will take care of that. Due to the

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dominant concept by which global qualitative standards are ignored, heritage is today primitively rated accord-ing to hierarchical rules. Although not legally binding, the heritage of the collective is put before private or individual heritage, spiritual heritage takes precedence over physical heritage (although there are reverse cases), older heritage usually holds more weight than younger structures, objects or layers, and, contrary to the principle of inflation, the more widespread heritage has more worth than the smaller or miniscule heritage, while in our local context the national heritage of the majority has an obvious advantage over that of the minority. The issue of priority is also raised according to that logic, which we can witness with the transformation of the ancient principle “owner of the land owns the faith” into the modern “owner of the land owns the heritage”. The fact that before the churches in the area became Catholic or Orthodox, and, by virtue of that same logic, Croat or Serb, they were universally Christian and cosmopolitan, remains blatantly ignored. And they are certainly neither the first nor the most representative parts of the total heritage. They just replaced, and then completely overcame the long gone Illyric, Greek, Roman and Indo-European monuments and contributions in our minds warped by our education systems. The proponents of the blood and soil theory will find them-selves in an uncomfortable position here should they rely on common sense, if not on existing knowledge, but their rigid views are not changeable anyway.

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The archaeologist Branka Miggioti2 proved at the beginning of 1990s on a series of selected examples that there is clear continuity of Christian churches in this area. Not only that, but they are usually preceded by ancient Greek or Roman religious sites. It is reflected in toponomastics, the regular passing over of the name of the patron, in the sense of construction where literally every subsequent building has a continuum with the one that preceded it, absorbing its archi-tectural concept, materials and spoils. General knowledge is regarded as a curiosity here. Every national-confessional determination of these objects is pure reduction, with a logic that is only valid to the level where the conscious intent of the researcher was to define a single chronological layer while mystifying others. However, in spite of everything we know, old habits persist, as does the mutual grabbing of heritage sites.

When one is well aware of the situation in Europe and the world, the specifics of relations of Croats and Serbs, including the issues of heritage, stop being unique. They are both victims of the logical principle that the stronger always has advantage over the weaker, and that this strength must be constantly demonstrated. Small changes to the context or geo-political situation are enough to keep them switch-ing those roles. The experience of coexistence of these two peoples as well as the experience of living as part of large empires taught them those practices. To say anything else would be just paying lip service.

2 Branka Miggoti, Antičko-srednjovjekovni sakralni kontinuitet na području Dalmacije, Opuscula archaeologica / Vol. 16, Zagreb 1992, 225-249; id, Naslovnici ranokršćanskih crkava u Dalmaciji, Arheološki radovi i rasprave 12, Zagreb 1996, 189-247.

The state of Serb heritage in Croatia today, especially the relationship towards it, can only be understood within the relations of political powers. Seeing as the political stock of the Serb community in Croatia is not particularly valued, or is worth something only from the aspect of internal political shuffling and external considerations, it stands to assume that its heritage is in no better position. By paraphrasing the basic conservatory principle on heritage that a monument, and heritage is most often embodied in monuments, is protected only by being documented, we reach the simple conclu-sion that national heritage barely exists, only in traces. We know shamefully little about it. We regretfully note that the specialized institutional infrastructure simply does not exist for any reason that could be justified. The centuries long inveteracy in space, the erection of an extraordinary number of sacral monuments, the oral history, the profane, rural con-struction are just some of the elements that would justify the existence of individual institutions whose jurisdiction would be the study, protection and presentation of specific national heritage. Official institutes, departments and offices, con-sciously or not, disregard its existence. The encyclopedias, if not outright passing over its very existence, show just the tiniest bit of interest for the values that are proven to exist. Proven in the sense that the Serbian and more often than not even global culture value them. Bibliography, especially the newer one, is exceptionally limited regarding the subjects of national cultural history. We reliably know that that even the basic procedures, such as gathering the material and its selection, all the way to the presentation of the monuments are still not conducted by professional standards. It is a paradox that the syntheses from the end of XIX century by

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Manojlo Grbić3 and Nikodim Milaš4 or the beginning of the XX century by Radoslav Grujić5 are still irreplaceable for today’s researchers, more so because they recorded the state of sacral heritage before the destruction and pillage brought on by the 20th century wars. And those were on such a scale that we sometimes do not hesitate to use the ultimate quali-fications to point that fact out. Of the 190 churches in the Gornjokarlovačka diocese, the largest diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church by territory and number of objects, only 24 survived World War II and the Independent State of Croatia6. And all that is an insignificant echo of the immense scale of human suffering.

Today we are witness to sporadic, mostly individual efforts to change this trend and the state of affairs, opposed by political opportunism on one hand and easy to prove programmatic neglect on the other. To put it bluntly, it is not only the students of, for example, art history or literature at our university who do not know the basics of the heritage of the second most numerous ethnicity in the country, or could single out its most important ethnic works of art or locations

3 Manojlo Grbić, Karlovačko vladičanstvo 1-3, Karlovac 1891-3

4 Nikodim Milaš, Pravoslavna Dalmacija, Novi Sad, 1901

5 Radoslav M. Grujić, Pakračka eparhija, Novi Sad, 1930

6 Milan Radeka, Gornja Krajina-Karlovačko vladičanstvo, Zagreb 1975, 285. The tragedy is not only in the impressive number of destroyed objects, but also in the fact that only a fraction of them was restored since those days. One can still see ruins from seventy years ago along main roads. There was, apparently, never enough goodwill and, of course, money for their restoration. The responsibility for that is certainly shared by state and Church.

– it is their esteemed professors as well. They do not know because the tradition of mutual ignorance has been persis-tently enforced for more than half a century and ignorance is almost always a good foundation for every kind of intoler-ance. Especially for various types of manipulation. The pro-nouncedly Serb heritage, that of the Orthodox aesthetic and spiritual approach, and it seems this needs to be repeated all the time, is built into the location with its very essence, the tissue of both peoples, integrative in its ambitions, and it never stopped working with its conceptual, aesthetic and especially human values.

Therefore, it is in essence an issue of representation. A pronouncedly national heritage that is not disputable as such has no one to present it to the professional or general cultural public, and the reason for that is that the intellectual base among the Serbs, at least concerning history which is by definition preoccupied with heritage, is extremely thin and unmotivated and, due to institutional unavailabil-ity, made worthless resulting in only a handful of experts studying the national heritage of Serbs in Croatia. I call on someone to explain to us the reason for non-existence of, for example, an institute for the culture of Serbs in Croatia, a specialized museum or department for linguistic studies, writing and special history, ethnology of that non negli-gible ethnic community. Even posing such a question in this social atmosphere raises eyebrows. The active, but numeri-cally insignificant society is supplemented by a handful of researches working from outside, but who are linked to this area by ancestry or the subjects they are researching. The few cultural societies whose interest and concern is the preservation of national identity are in constant financial

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uncertainty, mostly reduced to folklore. From the author-ity’s viewpoint, it is easier to support dance as a hedonistic, evening activity of youth than the subversive research of national topics. If minorities are actually allowed into the open spaces or media, it is better to look at the shining por-celain faces of smiling and dancing dolls, than on the scowl-ing faces of bookish people, it is better to hear the yells of a playful kolo (wheel) than disloyal critical remarks at profes-sional conferences, it is better to sing drinking songs and jest than it is to read rebellious patriotic poetry of some poets over there, to paraphrase the cynical remark of one of the (step)fathers of modern Croatia.

The recent 1991-95 war, as well as all past wars, has had a lasting impact on the life of the entire society, includ-ing the attitude toward heritage7. Heritage was considered as something hostile during the conflict, and since the war ended until today it has not had the basic support of the pop-ulation, literally no one to take care of it, protect it, look after it, advance it and study it. From the moment it was conceived and during the long time of its development, it grew into something far too big for the remaining community in con-tent, numbers and geographic spread. State institutions dis-play just the right amount of goodwill and inexhaustible rou-tine that is needed to keep the monuments from disappearing

7 The recent war was equally merciless toward heritage as those preceding it. This can easily be learned through various publications that have an amount of ideology and religious exclusivity, but their factual foundations are mostly true: see Slobodan Mileusnić, Duhovni genocid, pregled porušenih, oštećenih i obesvećenih crkava, manastira i drugih crkvenih objekata u ratu 1991-1995 (1997) Beogread 1997: Ranjena crkva u Hrvata, Zagreb 1995.

completely, and sometimes it still happens. From the nine-ties when books written in Cyrillic script by Serb and other authors were publicly and clandestinely removed from librar-ies8, representative memorials were devastated9 (both sacral and worldly), monuments for the victims of war – themselves works of art of the best artists – destroyed and finally to entire settlements bereft of people, left to decline, which are now cynically being awarded memorial qualities of protected rural units, ethno villages – all that indicates seri-ous issues regarding the survival of national heritage. The circumstances in which numerous town squares and parking lots are placed on the holy grounds of churches and chapels destroyed during previous wars can only be called cynical. Those that did survive receive painful and regular doses of graffiti chauvinism being sprayed on their walls. Shadows of a forgotten past are moving through our geography, and the cartography that remembers the names of sources, peaks, gorges, gullies, streams, mills, shepherd shelters and villages named after people and clans that are long gone has become almost pointless.

8 Ante Lešaja, Knjigocid: Uništavanje knjiga u Hrvatskoj 1990-tih, Zagreb 2012

9 ‘Spomenici u tranziciji. Rušenje spomenika NOB-a u Hrvatskoj’ is the name of the exhibition presented in late 2012 in Zagreb at Galerija Nova. The number of destroyed monuments and memorial plaques is estimated to be between two thousand and four thousand. The real number was never determined. These monuments, by a weird logic, became places synonimous with Serb heritage, although the names on them mostly were not Serb, and as such needed to be desecrated or, preferrably, destroyed.

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Lament over the state of Serb heritage in Croatia is not so much intellectual posturing as it is the concern for the survival of that heritage as a whole. Due to the war and post-war depopulation of ethnic Serbs, this concern has increased, and the systematic assimilation of its urban component has not helped. The urban component is mostly unaware of the heritage and, in the interest of painless inte-gration, is not interested in learning about it. In extreme cases, it can cause feelings of shame. Sociology views issues such as rural – urban migration as an example of a big move from one cultural circle to another, and after the recent war from one stage to another, from a cultural autonomy of sorts, until now recognizable in the language, customs and mentalities to comfortable urban conformism. Loyalist intel-lectuals conclude that we are all Croatian citizens anyway. If it were not for the elements of post-war existential fear, we could generally agree with that assumption. If it already stands that way, we conclude that heritage, if it even exists as something other than a private characteristic is not a distin-guishing factor of the two ethnic groups and the two parallel cultures, and that its contents are not vital for the formation of national consciousness. We will stop here in order to avoid being labeled a revisionist.

The attitude of the community towards Orthodox heritage, on the example of Dalmatia (and we see no reason to claim it is any different in other parts of the country) is apparent in things as plain as traffic signalization. A lot of time needed to pass before the signs pointing to Catholic churches and chapel became accompanied by signs contain-ing the names of objects of different confessions, and when the time finally came it coincided with their chronological

degradation. An official, as I doubt it was up to a random road worker, considered it would be better to reduce the age of an object and through that establish the right of prece-dence in the eyes of the general public. There really are no reasons not to label a Catholic church as a relic from the time it was originally built, the Middle ages, for example, even though it had obviously been renovated and redesigned in Baroque. Where Orthodox churches are concerned, however, the date stated is always the one of the most recent, final phase of construction, as if by some unwritten rule. Many examples in two central Dalmatian counties make this rule obvious. Finally, it takes little courage to state out loud that the Orthodox have taken over a part of the older Catholic objects and have transformed them according to their own worshipping needs, just like the newly arrived Croats had done to a part of ancient Greek and Roman, old-Christian and early Byzantium monuments during the first stages of Christianization.

Therefore, guideposts are not just innocent signs in space but are in fact the result of someone’s conscious choice, in toponyms as well as in dates, hugely suggestive towards the local population as well as to welcomed tour-ists. We would especially like to point out that there are still plenty of temples that are unmarked, and are not illuminated by anything but the stars at night, not even the prosaic neon light as is customary these days. And they are unmarked because a part of those monuments is not even included on the list of protected cultural goods, which creates additional misunderstandings. Problems abound with the confirmed cultural goods as well because too little understanding is being demonstrated by the authorities for the ancient

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customs of the Orthodox Church, as well as a certain level of mistrust of the Orthodox structures towards the good inten-tions of relevant institutions. However, where the protection of monuments is concerned, things are starting to go in the right direction, and at an increasingly good pace.

Generally speaking, the situation with heritage is not too good these days. In addition to the reigning lack of edu-cation, heritage is today taken for granted and, devoid of its immanent meaning, is being turned into yet another useful and inspiring lie by the ideologists and managers. We live in a time of celebrated, and for some realized, living luxury that, in spite of itself, keeps fidgeting and turning towards the past, metaphorically trying to catch its own tail. We are witnessing daily the revival of all sorts of things, from fash-ion to architecture, with the purpose to awaken a commer-cially motivated sentimentalism in the past and a heritage that only exists in traces or is imagined altogether, resulting in the discovery of new ideas through old patterns, and yet more ways to profit.

The amount of heritage created by history in this area is huge but, unfortunately, its intrinsic values are incompre-hensible to today’s people. Serb heritage did not avoid that fate. It must fight for something as simple as social recogni-tion, of its authenticity and its aesthetic value as well as its overall representation from schoolbooks to tourism text-books. In order to have that happen, one must count on the following elements that have been missing so far: goodwill, the European spirit of the community and serious intentions of state institutions.

Napuštena baština: Srbi u Hrvatskoj

Branko Čolović1

1 Dr. Čolović radi u organizaciji Srpsko narodno vijeće.

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Jedna od najvećih redukcija složenog pojma baštine, sume kulturnih postignuća neke zajednice u zadanom historijskom vremenu i određenom prostoru odnosi se na na njezino svoj-stvo pripadanja. Baština tako obično dobiva “vlasnički list”, nužno postaje ili naša ili njihova i tomu usudu nisu odoljele kako enciklopedije, sinteze i monografije, tako ni isključivo nacionalno usmjerene institucije i njihovi predvodnici. Baš na tom odvajanju nastale su čitave teorijski teško branjene, uglavnom nenaučne odrednice, zasebne katedre i velike karijere, a napose posijano mnoštvo epigona spremnih silom autoriteta nekritički prihvatiti i strastveno braniti prokla-mirane istine te njima kontaminirati udžbenike, medijski prostor i ukupnu svijest građanstva.

S površnim činjenicama, kao i iskonstruiranim podac-ima, uvijek možete u poželjnom smjeru preparirati podanike, narcistički se ogledati po vlastitim kulturnim zasadama, bezobrazno svojatati i ono za što nemate ni najmanjih zasluga, čak i preostatke onoga što vaši predci nisu uspjeli ili nisu stigli istrijebiti, a na kraju, ako zatreba, poduzeti rat oko onoga dijela koji nije okupljen unutar često proizvoljnih državnih granica.

U sadašnjim prilikama gotovo je pa nemoguće promišljati baštinu bez nacionalne odrednice i prepustiti je imperijalnim apetitima velikih zemalja i kultura. Mali se narodi uglavnom nalaze u ulozi periferije prisiljene na kulturni konzumerizam, epigonsko podražavanje teško dostižnih, a drugdje stvorenih vrijednosti ili, u krajnjemu slučaju, na proste otpatke. Stoga će takva kultura trajno gajiti osjećaj zavisti koji mnogo puta zna nadrasti vrijednosti same baštine, a za to će se pobrinuti plaćeni stručnjaci i novous-postavljene mjere lokalnoga metra. Zbog prevladavajućega

poimanja u kojemu se zanemaruju svjetski kvalitativni standardi baština se danas vulgarno ravna prema hijerarhijs-kim pravilima. Iako nije zakonomjernost, baština kolektiva pretpostavlja se privatnoj ili individualnoj, duhovna nad prostom, fizičkom, mada ima i obrnutih slučajeva; starija baština obično ima prevagu nad mlađim objektima, pred-metima ili slojevima, a suprotno načelu inflacije, raspros-tranjenija nad onom manjom ili minijaturnom, dok u našim lokalnim prilikama nacionalna baština većinske zajednice ima očitu prednost nad onim manjinske. Pritom se po toj logici postavlja i pitanje prvenstva pa svjedočimo kako se prastaro načelo čija zemlja onoga i vjera, preobražava u onaj suvremeni, čija zemlja onoga i baština. Pritom se svjesno zanemaruje notorna činjenica da prije nego što su na prostorima današnje Hrvatske hramovi postali katolički ili pravoslavni, slijedom iste logike hrvatski ili srpski, bili su općekršćanski i kozmopolitski. A zasigurno ti hramovi nisu prvi, često niti najreprezentativniji dijelovi sveukupne ostavštine. Oni sami su u našoj krhkoj, školski dirigiranoj svijesti nadomjestili, a potom i u potpunosti nadišli davno iščezle Indoeuropljane, Ilire, Grke i Rimljane te njihova zna-menja i doprinose. Zagovornici teorija tla i roda, ako barem polažu na zdrav razum kad već ne na postojeće znanje, ovdje će se naći u nepriličnom položaju, ali se oni u svojim tvrdim stanovištima ionako ne daju pokolebati.

Arheologinja Branka Miggoti2 još je ranih devedesetih

2 Branka Miggoti, Antičko-srednjovjekovni sakralni kontinuitet na području Dalmacije, Opuscula archaeologica / Vol. 16, Zagreb 1992, 225 – 249; id, Naslovnici ranokršćanskih crkava u Dalmaciji, Arheološki radovi i rasprave 12, Zagreb 1996, 189 – 247.

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godina 20. stoljeća na mnoštvu odabranih primjera pokazala i dokazala da postoje jasni kontinuiteti kršćanskih crkava na prostorima jugoistočne Europe. I ne samo to, njima po pravilu prethode antička svetišta. Ogleda se to u topono-mastici, redovitom nasljeđivanju imena patrona, nadasve u prostornom smislu gdje se doslovno svaka potonja gradnja nadovezuje na prethodnu, pritom preuzimajući arhitektonsku koncepciju, materijal i spolije. Ono što je u svijetu znanja općepoznato mjesto na našim južnoslavenskim prostorima se uzima kao kuriozum. Svako nacionalno-konfesionalno određenje fluidnih objekata je čista redukcija i razumije se samo do one razine kada je u pitanju svjesna namjera istraživača da apstrahirajući ostale definira samo jedan kronološki sloj. Međutim, i pored utemeljenih spoznaja stare navike traju, međusobna posezanja također.

Ako se dobro upozna situacija u Europi i svijetu, specifičnosti relacija Srba i Hrvata, pa i po pitanju odnosa prema baštini, prestaju biti posebni. I jedni i drugi su žrtve logičkoga načela da je jače uvijek u prednosti prema slabi-jemu i da jače iskazuje snagu nad slabijim i samo mala promjena konteksta ili geopolitičke situacije dovoljna je da se jedni i drugi nađu čas u jednoj, čas u drugoj ulozi. Iskustva zajedničkoga života tih naroda, kao i iskustva života pod okriljem velikih imperija u daljnjoj prošlosti, naučila su ih toj praksi. Ostalo je moraliziranje.

Stanje baštine Srba u Hrvatskoj danas, posebno odnos prema njoj može se razumjeti samo u odnosima političke moći. Budući da je bjelodano da političke akcije srpske zajednice u Hrvatskoj ne kotiraju na burzi kao posebne vri-jednosti, ili samo onda kada su sa stajališta unutarpolitičkih preslagivanja i vanjskopolitičkih obzira postaju upotrebljiva,

može se pretpostaviti da se niti njena baština ne nalazi u ništa boljem položaju. Parafrazirajući temeljnu konzerva-torsku postavku da spomenik (a baština nam se najčešće ukazuje u obliku spomenika) štitimo isključivo tako što ga dokumentiramo, dolazimo do jednostavnoga zaključka da nacionalna baština jedva i da postoji, a ako postoji, onda je to samo u tragovima. O njoj neoprostivo malo toga znamo. Sa žalošću možemo konstatirati da posebna institucionalna infrastruktura naprosto ne postoji, za što doista ne postoje opravdani razlozi. Višestoljetna ukorijenjenost u prostoru, podizanje vanrednoga broja sakralnih spomenika, usmena tradicija te profano, posebno ruralno, graditeljstvo su samo neki elementi koji bi opravdali postojanje zasebnih ustanova u čijemu bi djelokrugu bilo proučavanje, zaštita i prezenti-ranje specifične nacionalne baštine. Zvanični instituti, zavodi i katedre svjesno ili ne, zanemaruju njezino postojanje; enciklopedije, ako već ne prešućuju i samo njeno postojanje onda pokazuju mali interes za ipak dokazane vrijednosti. Dokazane utoliko što ih na takav način vrednuje srpska, a nerijetko i svjetska kultura. Bibliografija, posebno ona novija na teme iz nacionalne kulturne povijesti, izrazito je mala, a pouzdano znamo da ni temeljni postupci kao što su priku-pljanje građe, njezin odabir i prezentiranje samih spomenika još uvijek nisu urađeni na struci i nauci primjeren način. Paradoks je u tome što su još uvijek za današnje istraživače nezamjenjive sinteze, nastale krajem 19. stoljeća iz pera Manojla Grbića3 i Nikodima Milaša4 ili početkom 20. stoljeća

3 Манојло Грбић, Карловачко владичанство 1-3, Карловац 1891-3.

4 Никодим Милаш, Православна Далмација, Нови Сад 1901.

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Radoslava Grujića5, utoliko važne što su fiksirale stanje sakralne baštine prije strahovitih ratnih pustošenja i uništenja. A ona su bila tolika da se ponekad ne libimo najtežih kvali-fikacija da bismo istakli tu činjenicu. U Gornjokarlovačkj eparhiji, koja je opsegom i brojem objekata bila najveća unutar Srpske pravoslavne Crkve, za vrijeme Drugoga svjetskog rata i trajanja NDH-a od 190 hramova samo su 24 ostala sačuvana ili tek s manjim oštećenjima6. A sve to je samo neznatni materijalni eho ogromnoga ljudskog stradanja.

Danas svjedočimo tek sporadičnim, uglavnom indi-vidualnim naporima da se stanje stvari i trend promijeni, pri čemu se s jedne strane ispriječio politički oportunizam, a s druge lako dokazivo programsko zanemarivanje. Prostim rječnikom rečeno ne samo da studenti, npr. povijesti umjet-nosti ili književnosti na našim fakultetima ne znaju osnovne postavke o baštini drugoga po brojnosti naroda u zemlji, ili izdvojiti najvažnije nacionalne umjetničke naslove ili topose, nego to često ne znaju niti njihovi profesori. Ne zato što se tradicija međusobnoga nepoznavanja uporno provodi već neko vrijeme, a ignorancija je, mada ne i obvezatno, dobra podloga za svaku vrstu netrpeljivosti i razne vidove manipu-lacije. Izrazito srpska baština, ona pravoslavnoga, estetsk-oga i duhovnoga prosedea, izgleda da to treba neprestano

5 Радослав М. Грујић, Пакрачка епархија, Нови Сад 1930.

6 Милан Радека, Горња Крајина-Карловачко владичанство, Загреб 1975, 285. Tragedija se ne ogleda samo značajnom broju postradalih objekata koliko u tome što je tek mali broj od tih ratnih vremena obnovljen. Još uvijek uz glavne ceste mogu da se vide preko sedamdeset godina stare ruševine za čiju obnovu, očito, nikada nije bilo dovoljno dobre volje i, naravno, novca. Sasvim sigurno da odgovornost za takvo stanje ravnopravno dijele Crkva i Država.

ponavljati, samim je svojim bićem naprosto ugrađena u pros-tor, tj. tkivo obaju naroda, integrativna je po ambicijama, a svojim idejnim, estetskim, a posebno općečovječanskim vri-jednostima nije prestala djelovati ni do današnjeg dana.

Dakle, u osnovi se radi o pitanju reprezentativnosti. Izrazito nacionalnu baštinu, koja kao takva uopće nije sporna, doista nema tko predstaviti uskostručnoj ili općekuturnoj javnosti zbog toga što je intelektualna osnovica kod Srba, barem ako su u pitanju historijske nauke, po definiciji zaokupljena baštinom, izrazito je tanka, demoti-virana i zbog institucionalne deficitarnosti obezvrijeđena, tako da se na kraju nacionalnom baštinom Srba u Hrvatskoj bavi svega nekolicina stručnjaka. Neka nam netko razložno objasni izostanak postojanja, primjerice, instituta za kul-turu Srba u Hrvatskoj, specifičnog muzeja ili zavoda za izučavanje jezika, pisma, posebne povijesti, etnologije te svega samo ne zanemarive narodne zajednice. Čak i samo postavljanje takvoga pitanja u ovome društvenom ambi-jentu biva zazorno. Aktivno, ali brojem neznatno društvo upotpunjuje tek nekoliko istraživača koji djeluju izvana, ali su podrijetlom ili tematskom zaokupljenošću vezani uz ovaj prostor. Loše stanje intelektualne elite uzrokuje i katatonično stanje duha zajednice, a napose ne pridonosi produktivnomu radu po ovim pitanjima. Malobrojna kul-turna društva čiji je cilj očuvanje nacionalnoga identiteta, u stalnoj su novčanoj oskudici, uglavnom svedeni na folklor. Sa stajališta državotvoraca poželjnije je poticati ples kao hedonističku večernju aktivnost mladih, nego (potencijalno subverzivni) istraživački rad na nacionalne teme. Ako se već manjine prepuštaju na otvoreni ili medijski prostor, bolje je gledati sjajna porcelanska lica našminkanih i rasplesanih

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lutaka nego mrgodne maske knjiških ljudi, bolje slušati vrisku razigranih kola negoli nelojalne kritičarske opaske na stručnim skupovima, bolje pjevati napitnice i doskočice nego čitati buntovnu rodoljubnu poeziju tamo nekih pjesnika, da parafraziramo ciničnu izjavu jednog od očeva-očuha mod-erne Hrvatske.

Protekli je rat (1991. – 1995.) svojim posljedicama trajno odredio život čitavoga društva, ali i odnos prema baštini7. Za vrijeme trajanja sukoba baština sama je hos-tilizirana, i vice versa doduše, a od kraja rata pa sve do danas ona nema osnovnu populacijsku podršku, doslovno nema tko o njoj da brine, da je čuva, štiti, unapređuje i da je proučava. Od trenutka kada se začela i u dužemu vremen-skom slijedu stvarana ona je brojem, sadržinom i geografs-kom rasprostranjenošću predviđena za daleko veću zajednicu od ove koja je preostala. Državne institucije pokazuju taman toliko dobre volje i nepresušne rutine koliko je potrebno da spomenici posve ne iščeznu, a nekad se upravo i to događa. Od devedesetih godina kada su tajno i javno iz knjižnica uklanjane ćirilićne knjige srpskih i drugih pisaca8, devasti-

7 Protekli rat bio je jednako nesmiljen prema baštini kao i oni koji su mu prethodili. O tome se može obavijestiti preko raznolikih publikacija koje nisu lišene ideološkoga naboja i vjerskoga ekskluzivizma, ali čiji činjenični sloj uglavnom nije upitan: v. Слободан Милеуснић, Духовни геноцид, преглед порушених, оштећених и обесвећених цркава, манастира и других црквених објеката у рату1991 – 1995 (1997) Београд 1997: Ranjena crkva u Hrvata, Zagreb 1995.

8 Ante Lešaja, Knjigocid: Uništavanje knjiga u Hrvatskoj 1990-ih, Zagreb 2012.

rale reprezentativne spomeničke cjeline9, bilo svjetovne bilo sakralne, rušili spomenici žrtvama rata i same nerijetko umjetničke cjeline djela ponajboljih umjetnika, pa napo-sljetku do obezljuđenih, propadanju prepuštenih naselja kojima sada, nakon svega, cinično udjeljujemo spomenička svojstva zaštićenih ruralnih cjelina, status etno sela - sve to ukazuje na ozbiljna pitanja same opstojnosti naciona-lne baštine. Samo kao cinizam mogu se krstiti okolnosti da mnogi trgovi i parkirališta u našoj zemlji zaposjedaju osvećena tla u drugom ratu porušenih crkava i kapela, a one koji su uprkos svim nedaćama ipak preživjele, u pojedinim sredinama dobivaju redovite i bolne doze šovinističkih grafita po fasadama. Našom geografijom promiču sjeni zaboravljene prošlosti, a kartografija koja pamti imena izvora, vrhova, klanaca, jaruga, potoka, mlinova, čobanskih stanova, sela, nazvanih po iščezlim rodovima i ljudima čijih ni potomaka više nema, postala je gotovo pa besmislena.

Lament nad stanjem baštine Srba u Hrvatskoj nije tek intelektualna poza koliko izraz stvarne brige za opstanak te baštine u cjelini. Zbog činjenica ratne i poratne depopu-lacije srpskoga življa ona se još i uvećava, a u prilog joj nije išla ni ranija, sistematski provedena asimilacija kod onog njenog urbanizovanog dijela koji baštinu uglavnom ne poznaje, u interesu što bezbolnije integracije u životnu

9 ‘Spomenici u tranziciji. Rušenje spomenika NOB-a u Hrvatskoj’ naziv je izložbe koja je krajem 2012. održana u Zagrebu u galeriji Nova. Broj srušenih spomenika i spomen-ploča, budući da nisu utvrđeni potpuni podatci, procjenjuje se na oko dvije do četiri tisuće. Po nekakvoj čudnoj logici takvi spomenici, mada se na njima nalaze brojna imena ljudi koji očito nisu Srbi, postali su sinonimi za njihovo naslijeđe koje je kao takvo trebalo oskrnaviti ili prema prilici uništiti.

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sredinu ne želi je upoznati, a u drastičnome vidu ponekad je se stidi. Sociologija promatra stvari kao migraciju selo ̶ grad, kao primjer ogromnoga opkoračenja iz jednoga kulturnog kruga u drugi, a poslije recentnog rata iz jednoga stanja u drugo, iz svojevrsnoga kulturnog autonomizma, dotada pre-poznatljivoga u jeziku, običajnosti i mentalitetima, u naoko udobni građanski konformizam. Lojalistički usmjereni intelektualci zaključuju da smo ionako svi hrvatski građani. Da nije elemenata poslijeratnoga egzistencijalnog straha s ovom bi se tezom načelno mogli i složiti. Ako već tako stoje stvari, zaključujemo da baština nije razlikovni činitelj dvaju naroda i dviju uporednih kultura i da njezin sadržaj nije presudan za oblikovanje nacionalne svijesti ako, osim kao privatno obilježje, uopće postoji. Tu zastajemo da ne bismo stekli nezahvalnu ulogu revizioniste.

Odnos zajednice prema pravoslavnoj baštini na prim-jeru Dalmacije, a nemamo razloga tvrditi da slično nije i u ostalim dijelovima zemlje, ogleda se i u prometnoj signal-izaciji. Dosta je vremena trebalo proći da se na putokaze, pored onih koji ukazuju na katoličke crkve i kapele, postave nazivi objekata drugačijega konfesionalnog predznaka, pa kada su stekli to važno mjesto krajputaša po pravilu se događa njihova kronološka degradacija. Netko je od zvaničnika, sumnjam da je u pitanju proizvoljnost nekoga namještenika poduzeća za ceste, smatrao da je bolje umanjiti starost i tako pučanstvu dokazati prosto pravo prvenstva. Doista nema jakih razloga da se za neku katoličku crkvu koja je očito preinačena u barokno doba ne navede pravo vrijeme osnutka, srednji vijek npr., dok će se kod pravo-slavnih, kao po pravilu, hramovi datirati uvijek sa završnom, dakle onom najmlađom fazom gradnje. Na području dviju

srednjodalmatinskih županija na mnoštvu primjera ova se situacija može potvrditi kao pravilo. Najzad, nije nikakva hrabrost naglas izreći činjenicu da su pravoslavni preuzeli dio starijih katoličkih hramova i opremom ih saobrazili vlas-titim liturgijskim zahtjevima baš kao što se i jednim dijelom antičkih, starokršćanskih i ranovizantijskih spomenika u prvoj kristijanizaciji poslužili novopridošli Hrvati.

Pošto ni putokazi svojom pojavom nisu bezazleni znaci u prostoru, oni su uvijek čin nečijega svjesnog izbora, kao u toponimima tako i u datacijama, s velikom moći sug-estije usmjerenom prema “našijencima”, ali sve više i prema dobrodošlim turistima. Posebno ističemo što još uvijek ima podosta hramova koji nisu označeni, a noću ih osim one nebeske ne osvjetljava prozaična neonska svjetlost kako se to ovih dana uobičaji činiti. A nisu označeni jer jedan dio spo-menika uopće nije niti uvršten na listu zaštićenih kulturnih dobara, što onda stvara dodatne nesporazume. Problemi pak postoje i kod potvrđenih spomeničkih vrijednosti upravo zato što se od strane vlasti ne pokazuje dovoljan takt prema drevnim običajima pravoslavne crkve, kao i izvjesno nepovjerenje pravoslavne nomenklature prema dobrim nam-jerama zvaničnih ustanova. Ipak, ako je u pitanju zaštita spo-menika, stvari se u posljednje vrijeme kreću u dobrom smjeru.

Općenito govoreći, situacija s baštinom danas ne stoji najbolje. Pored carujuće neobrazovanosti baština se danas ionako prihvaća kao gotova datost oslobođena imanent-noga smisla, od strane ideologa i menadžera pretvorena u još jednu korisnu i nadahnjujuću laž. Živimo u vremenu hvaljenoga i za neke ostvarenoga životnog luksuza koje se uprkos tomu zadovoljstvu neprestano vrpolji i okreće prema prošlosti, metaforički hvata za vlastiti rep. Dnevno

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svjedočimo “revival-ima” svega i svačega, od mode do arhitekture, da bismo u prošlosti, s više ili manje uspjeha izmaštanoj i u tragovima očuvanoj baštini, pobudili komerci-jalno usmjereni sentimentalizam i posredstvom starih uzor-aka pronašli nove ideje i nove načine za još veću zaradu.

Količina baštine koju je na ovom terenu proizvela povijest je ogromna, ali nažalost svojim unutarnjim vrijed-nostima ostaje uglavnom nerazumljiva suvremenicima. Tom usudu nije se uklonila ni srpska baština kojoj predstoji borba za puko društveno priznanje, kako njezine autentičnosti i estetske vrijednosti, tako i posvemašnje zastupljenosti u rasponu od školskih programa i udžbenika do turističke privrede. Da bi se te zamisli ostvarile, treba računati na dosad nedostajuće elemente: dobru volju, europski duh zajednice i ozbiljne namjere države.

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Greece – Turkey, 1974 to 1987: Events and State Policies That Haunt Their Bilateral Relations

Anthony Derisiotis1

1 (PhD), Departement of Turkish and Modern Asian studies, Faculty of Letters, National and Kapodestrian University of Athens

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Greece and Turkey are two neighboring nation-states in the south of the Balkan peninsula with opposing coastlines on the Aegean sea. Despite being NATO allies for sixty years, relations between Greece and Turkey have long been char-acterized by mutual suspicion and a hostility and rivalry that has led them to the brink of war on more than one occasion.2 Their bilateral relations throughout the 20th century can be summarized as turbulent and unstable, especially in the post-1974 period.

In order to comprehend the complex framework of such a relationship, one should study its formation from the years of the Ottoman Empire and the Greek revolution in 1821, to the end of the First World War, the dissolution of the ailing empire and the birth of the Turkish national state in 1923. It is in that period that a number of historical events have shaped the approach of each nation vis-à-vis the other.

In the decades that followed 1923, one can view the frail relations of the October 30th 1930 Greek-Turkish Friendship Agreement rapidly deteriorate after the harsh state policies towards the Orthodox (Rum) minority of Istanbul3, the less harsh but also oppressive treatment of the

2 F. Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish relationship and NATO, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 146.

3 The most significant examples of the way the orthodox minority was treated by the Turkish state, after 1940, are the Varlık tax, the 6-7 September 1955 riots against the minority and the 1964 deportation of the Greek citizens of Istanbul.

A. Derisiotis

Muslim minority in Greece4 and the emerging Cyprus issue.5 The July 20th 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus was the land-mark event that triggered a complete collapse in the bilateral relations between Athens and Ankara and more problems emerged, in the form of disputes over Aegean Sea sover-eignty issues.

The Cyprus issue played a leading part in Greek-Turkish relations from the 1950s to the mid 1970s.6 However, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was a shock for Greece, strong enough to ignore the fact that the Greek military regime was equally to blame for the disaster, as were the Turks and the Cypriots. In Turkey on the other hand, the euphoria deriving from the successful intervention in Cyprus was followed by political instability. The coalition govern-ment between B. Ecevit and N. Erbakan that authorized the Cyprus invasion was dissolved and a period of political tur-moil began, that lasted until the military intervention of 1980.

4 St. Katsikas, “Hostage minoruty: the Muslims of Greece”, in B. Forthna, St. Katsikas, D. Kamouzis and P. Konortas, State-nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 170-171.

5 A. Alexandris, The Greek minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918-1974, (Athens: Center for Asia Minor studies, 1992), pp. 252-256, 274-296.

6 For detailed analysis of the Cyprus issue see: N. Kranidiotis, Ανοχύρωτη Πολιτεία Κύπρος 1960-1974 (Unfortified state, Cyprus 1960-1974), (Athens: Estia, 2008), N., Kızılyürek, Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι, η Τουρκία και το Κυπριακό (The Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey and the Cyprus issue), (Athens: Papazisis Publishers, 2009), G. Tenekidis, G. Kranidiotis, (eds) Κύπρος: Ιστορία, προβλήματα και αγώνες του λαού της (Cyprus: History, problems and the battles of its people), (Athens: Estia, 2009).

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In the meantime, relations between Athens and Ankara were at a stalemate and the social framework both in Greece and Turkey was not ideal for rapprochement. In Greece, the mili-tary regime had collapsed and the country was in the process of returning to democracy, under the effects of the Cyprus disaster, while Turkey was in a politically fluid period.

Konstantinos Karamanlis assumed premiership to lead Greece out of the political crisis, in the shadow of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. However, Cyprus was not the only issue between the two states anymore. A number of other problems have emerged related to the Aegean Sea, as consequences of the failed bilateral relationship. The capital issue was that of the northeast Aegean continental shelf.

This issue was related to the search for oil under the Aegean seabed and was already causing friction from the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was to become the fuse in four cases of Greek-Turkish tension: 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1987. The last one has brought the two countries in the brink of war and also was the catalyst for the short-lived rapproche-ment of the Davos meeting in 1988.7

Along came the dispute on the delimitation of the territorial sea, where Turkey deemed any Greek attempt to extend its territorial sea further than 6nm, as a casus belli, despite the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty. Related to the ter-ritorial sea issue is the dispute of the territorial airspace. The geek paradox of maintaining a 10-mile long territorial airspace whereas its territorial sea is only 6, is the core of

7 Th. Veremis, Ιστορία των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων 1453-2005 (History of greekturkish relations 1453-2005), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2005), p. 204.

the dispute. Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea dictates that all countries must have as many miles of territorial airspace as they have in territorial sea.8

There is also the Flight Information Region dispute, where Turkey contested the Athinai FIR limits, set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation in 1952, forcing the ICAO to close the Aegean airspace for all commercial flights in 1974 for six years. There are still remaining FIR issues between the two countries, that preserve, along with the territorial airspace dispute, a status of regular military aircraft activity in the form of the so-called dogfights over the Aegean Sea, that have mounted a huge financial, politi-cal and human cost for both countries. Additionally, the demilitarization of the east Aegean sea islands is another issue, that emerged post-1974, when Greece started mili-tarizing the islands of Lemnos, Chios, Lesvos and the Dodecanese islands.

The last of the Aegean Sea issues is NATO-related and it concerns the Alliance’s Aegean sea air-defense, that was given to Greece in 1964, by merging NATO’s early warning line to the limit between FIR Athinai and FIR Istanbul. Issues between the two neighboring states also include a number of newer or short-lived or indirectly related or of smaller scale issues, the likes of the 1996 Imia/Kardak issue, the S-300 missiles, the PKK, the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

8 A. Alexandris, Th. Veremis, P. Kazakos, V. Koufoudakis, Chr. Rozakis, G Tsitsopoulos, Οι ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 1923-1987 (Greek-Turkish relations 1923-1987), (Athens: Γνώση, 1988), pp. 276-281.

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From the above, it is clear that the collapse of Greek-Turkish relations in 1974, destroyed any remaining level of trust between the two states. However, the early post 1974 years, when emotions were running high especially for Greece, were the ones that Athens adopted moderate policies towards Ankara, in an attempt to diffuse bilateral tensions and avoid escalation of the 1974 war in Cyprus. Karamanlis assumed government, amidst the Cyprus crisis and the continental shelf issue that was surfacing at the time. Understanding that further escalation would not serve any of the two countries’ interests, he engaged Ankara on a dia-logue, promoting a joint appeal to the International Court of Justice for the continental shelf dispute. By 1975, Turkey was already arguing on the territorial sea and airspace issues as “vital issues” and expressed its preference on tackling the disputes through bilateral negotiations, although it did not turn down the possibility of a joint appeal to the ICJ.

Ankara feared that Greece had revived parts of the irre-dentist concept of Greek nationalism of late 19th - early 20th century, called Megali Idea (Big Idea) and wanted to alter the Aegean sea status and transform it to a closed “Greek lake”, by means of the Law of the Sea provisions, ignoring Turkey’s needs and interests. The continental shelf clause, together with the new and expanded limits of the territorial waters that would be included in the upcoming 1982 Montego Bay Treaty, but were already expected from the early stages of the 1973 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, were going to be the main Greek arguments according to Ankara. Karamanlis’ reputation in Turkey was that of a modest and prudent man, so he tried to reassure Ankara that Greece was not aiming at blocking Turkey out of the Aegean Sea. He also underlined

that geography and history bind both countries and it is in their interest to live in peace. In his words:

“Greece comprehends this and believes in Greek-Turkish friendship. The restoration of this friendship, how-ever, depends on our neighboring country that has injured it in a cruel way”. Karamanlis was referring to the Turkish inva-sion in Cyprus.

Political instability hatches populism. The Turkish polit-ical system was rather harsh on the interim PM Sadi Irmak and after a 1975 vote of no confidence he resigned, under the accusation of being too compliant to Greece -his strongest critic being B. Ecevit. The coalition government that followed, comprising of Demirel’s Justice Party, Erbakan’s islamists and Türkeş’s far rightists, altered the Turkish approach to the bilateral disputes, focused on the negotiations approach, how-ever initially it did not turn down an appeal to the ICJ. Soon, though, it became clear that the two countries were resulting to different approaches; Greece was set for the ICJ while Turkey preferred bilateral negotiations. Just like Irmak, Demirel also received strong criticism for being too compliant, once again from Ecevit, and the coalition government distanced itself from the joint appeal to the ICJ possibility.

The following year the Ankara-induced continental shelf related crisis increased the pressure on Karamanlis’ domestic front. The leader of the socialist opposition party PASOK, Andreas Papandreou, demanded from the govern-ment to sink the Hora, the Turkish expedition ship that was researching the Aegean continental shelf in disputed areas, hence the 1976 crisis. He also demanded Greece to expand its territorial waters to 12nm. Papandreou’s populist nation-alistic views were rapidly earning him votes and Karamanlis

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was feeling the pressure.9 His reaction to recourse unilaterally both to the ICJ and to the UN Security Council,10 on the one hand impressed Ankara, on the other it received criticism from legal experts in Greece as striking but meaningless. Demirel’s move to deploy the Hora was due to Ecevit’s increasing criticism.11

Clearly, when both Greek and Turkish ruling parties in the 1974 aftermath were trying to get emotions to sub-side, the opposition parties invested in populist, nationalistic approaches towards the neighbor, earning votes and further polarizing the two coasts of the Aegean sea. The 1976 crisis ended with the Berne Declaration,12 where the two countries agreed that they will both abstain from any initiatives on the Aegean Sea continental shelf, that may disturb the bilateral negotiations.

In the end, by 1980, the only actual positive result was the withdrawal of Ankara’s NOTAM and the end of the Aegean airspace blockage for commercial flights. All other issues

9 For a detailed analysis of the Karamanlis-Papandreou comparison, see: J.S.Koliopoulos and Th. Veremis, Modern Greece-A history since 1821, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), pp. 186-190.

10 A. Alexandris, Th. Veremis, P. Kazakos, V. Koufoudakis, Chr. Rozakis, G Tsitsopoulos, Οι ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 1923-1987 (Greek-Turkish relations 1923-1987), pp. 288-297.

11 A., Wilson, “The Aegean dispute”, Adelphi Papers, p.7. Also, A. Heraklides, Άσπονδοι γείτονες-Ελλάδα-Τουρκία: Η διένεξη του Αιγαίου (Irreconcilable neighbors-Greece-Turkey: the Aegean dispute), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2007), pp.102-103.

12 D. Bölükbasi, Turkey and Greece, the Aegean disputes: A Unique case in International Law, (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2004), p. 285. Also, T. Bahçeli, Greeek-Turkish relations since 1955, (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 137.

remained and the domestic political conditions both in Greece and Turkey were not good. During the 1974-1981 period, Athens kept a rather stable approach to the issues, whereas Ankara’s stance was variable, due to the internal instability.

Conditions changed when Papandreou’s social-ist PASOK won the 1981 elections in Greece, whereas in Turkey the 1977 political crisis caused yet again another mil-itary intervention in 1980, the third coup d’état in 20 years.13

Papandreou believed that Turkey was trying to alter the status in the Aegean sea, so Greece would be on the losing side if it engaged in any negotiation. Hence the criti-cism on Karamanlis’ government the previous years. He ini-tiated a hostile attitude towards Turkey, by breaking off the Greek-Turkish dialogue and cancelling all scheduled bilateral diplomatic contacts. Confronting the “Turkish threat”14 as opposed to the threat “from the north” referring to the Cold War fear of communism, he set it as the top priority of his foreign policy15 and in that he enjoyed the support of a large part of the Greek population due to his populist rhetoric in the 1974-1981 period.16 His simplistic, ethnocentric view

13 E.J. Zürcher, Σύγχρονη Ιστορία της Τουρκία (Modern Turkish history), translated by V. Kechriotis, (Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια, 2004), pp. 358-359.

14 M. Fırat, Οι τουρκοελληνικές σχέσεις και το Κυπριακό (The turkish-greek relations and the Cyprus issue), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2012), p. 238. See also, R., Clogg, “Greek-Turkish relations in the post-1974 period” in D. Constas, The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s (London: McMillan, 1991), p.19

15 I. Valinakis, Εισαγωγή στην ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική, 1949-1988 (Introduction to the Greek foreign policy, 1949-1988) (Θεσσαλονίκη: Παρατηρητής, 1989), p. 214.

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(good vs bad - Greece vs Turkey), was easily comprehended by the Greek society, that did not know the ambiguities of the Aegean disputes. Additionally, it touched the sensitive Cyprus issue that still shocked a large part the Greeks.

The self-declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on November 15, 198317 worsened the bilateral relations and the following month Papandreou adopted the New Defense Doctrine, focusing on the Turkish threat instead of the Warsaw Pact countries. By the end of 1983 the bilateral relations were at the worse level since 1974.

It is at that time when the first elections since the mili-tary coup took place in Turkey. The charismatic Turgut Özal won emphaticaly, despite not being the army’s favorite.18 His aim, as a new politician and a practical person, was to modernize Turkey and guide her towards a European perspec-tive. Despite the opposing voices of the military and Turkey’s diplomatic circles and Papandreou’s antiturkish rhetoric, he initiated a new approach towards Athens. There was no actual progress, apart from Papandreou’s recognition of an existing legal dispute on the continental shelf issue, which Greece was willing to solve only by a joint appeal to the ICJ. The political initiative between 1984-1986 belonged to Özal who approached Papandreou, despite his notoriety for being a

16 Th. Veremis, Ιστορία των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων 1453-2005 (History of greekturkish relations 1453-2005), pp. 202-203.

17 M. Fırat, Οι τουρκοελληνικές σχέσεις και το Κυπριακό (The turkishgreek relations and the Cyprus issue), pp. 232-233.

18 Op. cit., E.J. Zürcher, p.363.

nationalist, an antiturk and an unbalanced leader.19 The belief in Ankara was that Papandreou’s extremes were only to serve his aim of extracting increased aid from Washington, in order to enhance his and PASOK’s grip on the Greek political scene.

Özal’s approach was based on convincing Athens that Ankara did not have a revisionist agenda, neither on the Aegean, nor in Cyprus. He believed that through low politics measures he could lower mutual suspicion. He withdrew visa restrictions for Greek citizens entering Turkey, ended some state obstructions on the Greek minority of Istanbul and pro-moted bilateral trade. However, Athens kept a firm antiturk-ish policy on the bilateral and international level, as well as Turkey’s European integration efforts. Özal’s efforts failure, eventually caused increasing criticism from the opposing military and diplomats, accusing him of compliance towards Greece. The lack of trust and communication inevitably bore a new crisis on March 1987. This crisis brought the two countries on the brink of war, but also created the conditions for new approaches towards a solution.

Papandreou and Özal met in Davos on January 30-31, 1988 and agreed that the 1987 crisis should not be repeated and the two sides should focus on peace-ful relations.20 In his statement upon returning to Athens,

19 M.A. Birand, “Turkey and the ‘Davos Process’: Experiences and Prospects”, in D. Constas (ed), The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s (London: McMillan, 1991) p. 30..

20 A. Heraklides, Άσπονδοι γείτονες-Ελλάδα-Τουρκία: Η διένεξη του Αιγαίου (Irreconcilable neighbors-Greece-Turkey: the Aegean dispute), p. 154.

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Papandreou spoke of Ankara’s sincerity and the joint deci-sion of “not war”. However, the majority of the Greek society, after six years of PASOK’s antiturkish policies and thirteen years of antiturkish rhetoric was not ready for such a turn and rejected it. The people could not comprehend how Papandreou’s “no” to dialogue, two days before his departure to Davos transformed to an uncondiotional “yes”. A small minority of the Greek society stretched to the other end and expected that after Davos the Greek-turkish disputes would be solved.

This “spirit of Davos” lasted for five months only. It did not produce any long term results the likes of the 1999 thaw in the bilateral relations. Papandreou, under the strong criticism of the nationalists within PASOK, a group that he himself nurtured for years, rejected the spirit of Davos with a “mea culpa” parliament speech.21

In the post-1974 era Athens was positive that Ankara was attempting to block Greece from claiming its rights according to international law, while Ankara, on the other hand, was convinced that Athens intended to alter the status of the Aegean Sea.22 Mutual suspicion, deriving from for-eign policies -supposedly serving national interests- that were actually aiming towards populist domestic politics and canvassing, instead of constructing a bilateral environment based on mutual respect and understanding.

21 A. Heraklides, Άσπονδοι γείτονες-Ελλάδα-Τουρκία: Η διένεξη του Αιγαίου (Irreconcilable neighbors-Greece-Turkey: the Aegean dispute), pp.156-158.

22 A. Wilson, “The Aegean dispute”, Adelphi Papers, (London: IISS, 1979-80), pp.13, 27-29.

Bibliography

Alexandris, A., The Greek minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918-1974, (Athens: Center for Asia Minor studies, 1992)

Alexandris, A., Th. Veremis, P. Kazakos, V. Koufoudakis, Chr. Rozakis, G Tsitsopoulos, Οι ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 1923-1987 (Greek-Turkish relations 1923-1987), (Athens: Γνώση, 1988)

Anastasakis, Oth., Nicolaidis, K., Öktem, K., (eds) In the long shad-ow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the era of postnationalism, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009)

Aydin, M., Yfantis, K., (eds), Turkish-Greek relations: The security dilemma in the Aegean, (London: Routledge, 2004)

Bahçeli, T., Greeek-Turkish relations since 1955, (Boulder: Westview, 1990)

Bal, Id., Turkish foreign policy in post Cold War era, (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004)

Birand, M.A., “Turkey and the ‘Davos Process’: Experiences and Prospects”, in D. Constas (ed), The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s (London: McMillan, 1991)

Bölükbasi, D., Turkey and Greece, the Aegean disputes: A unique case in International Law, (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2004)

Clogg, R., “Greek-Turkish relations in the post-1974 period” in D. Constas, The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s (London: McMillan, 1991)

Fırat, M., Οι τουρκοελληνικές σχέσεις και το Κυπριακό (The turk-ishgreek relations and the Cyprus issue), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2012)

Hale, W., Turkish foreign policy, 1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2000)

Heraklides, A., Άσπονδοι γείτονες-Ελλάδα-Τουρκία: Η διένεξη του Αιγαίου (Irreconcilable neighbors-Greece-Turkey: the Aegean dispute), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2007)

Katsikas, St., “Hostage minoruty: the Muslims of Greece”, in B. Forthna, St. Katsikas, D. Kamouzis and P. Konortas, State-nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013)

Kızılyürek, N., Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι, η Τουρκία και το Κυπριακό (The Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey and the Cyprus issue), (Athens: Papazisis Publishers, 2009)

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Koliopoulos, J.S., and Veremis, Th., Modern Greece-A history since 1821, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010)

Lewis, B., The emergence of modern Turkey, (N.York: Oxford University Press, 2002)

Moustakis, F., The Greek-Turkish relationship and NATO, (London:

Frank Cass, 2005

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Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003)

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(London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1922)

Veremis, Th., Ιστορία των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων 1453-2005

(History of greekturkish relations 1453-2005), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2005)

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1949-1988 (Introduction to the Greek foreign policy, 1949-1988)

(Θεσσαλονίκη: Παρατηρητής, 1989)

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(London: IISS, 1979-80)

Zürcher, E.J., Σύγχρονη Ιστορία της Τουρκία (Modern Turkish his-

tory), translated by V. Kechriotis, (Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια, 2004)

Grčka – Turska, od 1974. do 1987.: zbivanja i državne politike koje opterećuju njihove bilateralne odnose

Anthony Derisiotis1

1 Profesor Derisiotis predaje na Odsjeku Turskih i Suvremeno-azijskih studija pri Nacionalnom Kapodestrian sveučilištu u Ateni.

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Grčka i Turska su susjedne nacionalne države na jugu bal-kanskoga poluotoka na suprotnim obalama Egejskoga mora. Unatoč tomu što su NATO saveznici već 60 godina, odnosi između Grčke i Turske dugo su karakterizirani uzajamnom sumnjom, neprijateljstvom i rivalstvom koji su ih doveli na rub rata više puta.2 Njihove bilateralne odnose kroz cijelo 20. stoljeće može se opisati kao turbulentne i nestabilne, osobito u razdoblju nakon 1974. godine.

Kako bismo shvatili komplicirane okolnosti unutar kojih se takav odnos razvio, trebamo proučiti njegovo nas-tajanje od vremena Osmanskoga Carstva i Grčke revolucije (poznate kao i Grčki rat za neovisnost, op. ur.) 1821. godine do kraja Prvoga svjetskog rata, raspada oslabljenoga carstva i rađanja turske nacionalne države 1923. godine. U tome se razdoblju odvio niz povijesnih događaja koji su oblikovali pristup obiju nacija jedne prema drugoj.

U desetljećima koja su uslijedila nakon 1923. godine klimavi odnosi uspostavljeni 30. listopada 1930. godine Grčko-turskim ugovorom o prijateljstvu brzo su se pogoršavali uslijed oštre državne politike prema pravoslavnoj (rumskoj) manjini u Istanbulu3, manje oštroga, ali također ugnjetavačkoga tretmana muslimanske manjine u Grčkoj4

2 F.Moustakis,The Greek–Turkish relationship and NATO,(London: FrankCass, 2005), str. 146.

3 Najvažniji primjeri tretmana pravoslavne manjine od strane turskih vlasti nakon 1940. godine bili su varlik porez, demonstracije 6. i 7. 9. 1955. protiv manjine i deportacija Grka, građana Istanbula 1964. god.

4 St.Katsikas, “Hostageminority: the Muslims of Greece”, B.Forthna,St.Katsikas, D.Kamouzis and P.Konortas, State–nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945, (Abingdon:Routledge,2013),str.170–171.

i ciparskoga pitanja koje se počelo nametati5. Turska invazija na Cipar 20. srpnja 1974. godine bio je odlučujući događaj koji je potaknuo potpuni raspad bilateralnih odnosa Atene i Ankare nakon čega su se pojavili novi problemi u obliku pri-jepora oko suvereniteta nad Egejskim morem.

Pitanje Cipra imalo je ključnu ulogu u grčko-turskim odnosima od 1950-ih do sredine 1970-ih6. Unatoč tomu, turska invazija Cipra šokirala je Grčku dovoljno snažno da se ignorira činjenica da je grčki vojni režim jednako odgovoran za katastrofu kao i Turci i Ciprioti. U Turskoj je, s druge strane, nakon euforije izazvane uspješnom inter-vencijom na Cipru, nastupilo doba političke nestabilnosti. Koalicijska vlada B. Ecevita i N. Erbakana koja je odobrila invaziju na Cipar raspala se i otpočelo je razdoblje političkoga nemira koje je trajalo do vojne intervencije 1980. godine. U međuvremenu su odnosi Atene i Ankare bili na mrtvoj točki, dok društvo ni u jednoj ni u drugoj zemlji nije bilo zain-teresirano za zbližavanje. U Grčkoj se vojni režim raspao i država je bila u procesu demokratizacije pod utjecajem ciparske katastrofe, a Turska je bila u politički fluidnome razdoblju.

5 A. Alexandris, The Greek minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918–1974, (Athens: Center for Asia Minor studies, 1992), str. 252–256, 274–296.

6 Za detaljnu analizu ciparskoga pitanja vidi: N. Kranidiotis, Ανοχύρωτη ΠολιτείαΚύπρος 1960-1974 (Nutvrđena država, Cipar 1960.–1974), (Athens: Estia, 2008), N., Kızılyürek, Οι Του ρκοκύπριοι, η Του ρκίακαιτο Κυπριακό (Turski Ciprioti, Turska i ciparsko pitanje), (Athens: Papazisis Publishers, 2009), G. Tenekidis, G. Kranidiotis, (eds) Κύπρος: Ιστορία, προβλήματακαια γώνεςτουλαούτης (Cipar: povijesti, problemi i borba njegovog naroda), (Athens: Estia, 2009).

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Konstantinos Karamanlis postao je premijer koje je izveo Grčku iz političke krize u sjeni turske okupacije Cipra. Cipar ipak nije bio jedino otvoreno pitanje između tih dviju država. Pojavili su se brojni drugi problemi po pitanju Egejskoga mora kao posljedica propalih bilateralnih odnosa. Glavno pitanje bilo je ono o sjeveroistočnome egejskom kontinentalnom šelfu.

To se pitanje svodilo na potragu za naftom na dnu Egejskoga mora i izazivalo je trvenja još od kraja 1960-ih. Bilo je okidač u četirima slučajevima grčko-turskih napeto-sti: 1973., 1974., 1976. i 1987. godine. Slučaj iz 1987. godine doveo je države na rub rata i bio je katalizator za kratkotrajno približavanje na sastanku u Davosu 1988. godine.7

Pojavilo se i pitanje granice teritorijalnih voda na moru, gdje je Turska proglasila da bi bilo koji grčki pokušaj da proširi svoje teritorijalno more na više od 6 nm bio casus belli, unatoč Sporazumu o pravu mora iz 1982. godine. S pitanjem teritorijalnih voda povezano je i pitanje teritorija u zračnome prostoru. Srž je toga problema grčki paradoks u kojemu održava teritorijalni zračni prostor od 10 milja dok joj je duljina teritorijalnoga mora 6 milja. Članak 2. Ženevske konvencije prava na moru kaže da sve države moraju imati onoliko teritorijalnog zračnog prostora koliko imaju teritorijalnog mora.8

7 Th. Veremis, Ιστορία των ελλην οτο ρυκικ ών σχέσ εων 1453–2005 (Povijest grčko-turskih odnosa 1453–2005), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2005), str. 204.

8 A. Alexandris, Th. Veremis, P. Kazakos, V. Koufoudakis, Chr. Rozakis, G Tsitsopoulous, Οι ελληνο το υρκικές σχέσεις 1923–1987 (Grčko-turski odnosi 1923–1987), (Athens: Γνώση, 1988), str. 276–281.

Postoji i prijepor oko Zračne Informacijske Regije, gdje Turska nije priznavala granice atenske ZIR koju je odre-dila Međunarodna udruga za civilnu avijaciju (ICAO) 1952. godine, što je prisililo ICAO da zatvori egejski zračni prostor za sve komercijalne letove 1974. na šest godina. Problemi povezani s FIR još uvijek postoje i uz prijepore oko zračnoga prostora izazivaju situaciju u kojoj je vojno zrakoplovstvo stalno aktivno u obliku borbi u zraku koje imaju ogromnu financijsku, političku i ljudsku cijenu u objema državama. Uz to je i demilitarizacija istočnoegejskih otoka otvoreno pitanje koje se pojavilo nakon 1974. godine kada je Grčka počela militarizirati otoke Lemnos, Chios, Lesvos i Dodekaneze.

Posljednje pitanje vezano uz Egejsko more ima veze s NATO-om i tiče se zračne obrane Egejskoga mora u sklopu NATO-a koja je dodijeljena Grčkoj 1964. godine stapanjem NATO-ova sustava ranoga upozorenja s granicom između ZIR Atene i ZIR Istanbula. Problemi između tih dviju sus-jednih država uključuju i nekoliko novih ili kratkotrajnih ili neizravno povezanih ili manje opsežnih pitanja poput pitanja Imia/Kardak iz 1996. godine, S-300 projektila, PKK i Ekumenskoga patrijarhata.

Iz gore navedenoga jasno je da je raspad grčko-turskih odnosa 1974. godine uništio povjerenje među dvjema državama. Ipak, baš je u godinama neposredno nakon 1974., dok su, pogotovo u Grčkoj, emocije još uvijek bile snažne, Atena prihvatila umjereniju politiku prema Ankari u pokušaju da smanji bilateralne napetosti i izbjegne eskalaciju rata na Cipru 1974. godine. Karamanlis je stupio na vlast usred ciparske krize i pitanje kontinentalnoga šelfa se tada taman počelo nametati. Shvativši da eskalacija sukoba nije u interesu ni jednih ni drugih, započeo je dijalog s Ankarom

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i zalagao se za zajedničko obraćanje Međunarodnomu sudu pravde (ICJ) po pitanju kontinentalnoga šelfa. Turska je do 1975. godine već zastupala stajalište da su pitanja teritori-jalnoga mora i zračnoga prostora ključna pitanja i izrazila je želju da se o njima raspravlja bilateralno, iako nije odbila mogućnost zajedničkoga obraćanja ICJ-u.

Ankara je strahovala da je u Grčkoj djelomično oživio iredentistički koncept grčkoga nacionalizma kasnoga 19. i ranoga 20. stoljeća koji se zvao Megali Idera (Velika Ideja) i težio je mijenjanju statusa Egejskoga mora njegovim pret-varanjem u zatvoreno “grčko jezero” s pomoću odredbi Zakona o pravu mora, ignorirajući turske potrebe i interese. Prema Ankari, glavni grčki argumenti bili bi klauzula o kontinentalnome šelfu zajedno s novim i proširenim grani-cama teritorijalnih voda koje bi bile uključene u nadolazeću Konvenciju u Montego Bayu 1982. godine, što se očekivalo na temelju ranijih pregovora s UN-ove konferencije o Zakonu o pravu mora iz 1973. godine. Karamanlis je u Ankari imao reputaciju skromnoga i razboritoga čovjeka pa je pokušao uvjeriti Ankaru da Grčka ne cilja na blokiranje Turske iz Egejskoga mora. Istaknuo je i da povijest i geo-grafija povezuju obje države i da je miran suživot zajednički interes. Njegovim riječima:

Grčka to razumije i vjeruje u grčko-tursko pri-jateljstvo. Obnova toga prijateljstva ipak ovisi o susjednoj državi koja ga je i ugrozila na okrutan način.

(Karamanlis se referirao na tursku invaziju Cipra)Politička je nestabilnost plodno tlo za populizam.

Turski politički sustav bio je prilično grub i premijer Sadi Irmak izgubio je glasanje o povjerenju 1975. godine te je podnio ostavku pod optužbom da je bio previše

popustljiv prema Grčkoj. Njegov najglasniji kritičar bio je B. Ecevit. Koalicijska vlada koja je uslijedila sastojala se od Demirelove Stranke pravde, Erbakanovih islamista i Türkeşovih tvrdih desničara. Nova vlada promijenila je turski pristup otvorenim bilateralnim pitanjima te se više usmjerila na pregovore, iako nije odmah odbila ni obraćanje ICJ-u. Uskoro je postalo jasno da obje države zagovaraju različite pristupe; Grčka je inzistirala na ICJ-u, a Turska je htjela bilateralne pregovore. Poput Irmaka i Demirel je bio predmet kritika da je previše popustljiv, naročito od Ecevita i koalicijska je vlada napustila mogućnost zajedničkoga obraćanja ICJ-u

Naredne je godine Ankara izazivanjem krize oko kontinentalnoga šelfa povećala pritisak na Karamanlisa na domaćoj fronti. Vođa socijalističke oporbene stranke PASOK, Andreas Papandreou, zahtijevao je od vlade da potopi Horu, turski istraživački brod koji je radio mjerenja u egejskome kontinentalnom šelfu na osporavanome području, čime je kriza i izazvana. Zahtijevao je i da Grčka proširi svoje teritorijalne vode na 12 nm. Papandreouov populistički nacionalistički pristup pogodovao je njegovoj popularnosti i Karamanlis je bio pod pritiskom9. Njegova reakcija očitovala se u unilateralnome zahtjevu ICJ-u i Vijeću Sigurnosti UN-a10, što je s jedne strane impresioniralo Ankaru, a s

9 Za detaljnu analizu usporedbe Karamanlis–Papandreou, vidi: J. S. Koliopoulos and Th. Veremis, Modern Greece–Ahistory since 1821, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), str. 186–190.

10 A. Alexandris, Th. Veremis, P. Kazakos, V. Koufoudakis, Chr. Rozakis, G. Tsitsopoulos, Οιελληνο τουρ κικέςσ χέσεις 1923-1987 (Greek -Turkish relations 1923-1987), str. 288–297

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druge je strane bilo kritizirano od strane domaćih pravnih stručnjaka kao besmislena gesta. Demirelov potez da pošalje Horu bio je rezultat rastućih Ecevitovih kritika.11

Očito je da su i turske i grčke vladajuće stranke nakon događaja 1974. godine radile na smirivanju strasti, ali je opozicija imala populistički, nacionalistički pristup prema susjedima, što joj je povećavalo rejting i dodatno polar-iziralo obale Egejskoga mora. Kriza 1976. godine završena je Bernskom deklaracijom12 kojom su se obje države obvezale na uzdržavanje od bilo kakvih inicijativa na egejskome kontinentalnom šelfu koji bi mogao poremetiti bilateralne pregovore.

Na kraju je do 1980. godine jedini pozitivni rezul-tat bio povlačenje Ankarina inzistiranja na granicama atenske ZIR, čime je blokada komercijalnih letova u ege-jskome zračnom prostoru konačno prestala. Sva druga pitanja ostala su neriješena i unutarnja politička situacija u objema državama nije bila dobra. Tijekom razdoblja od 1974. do 1981. godine Atenin je pristup bio relativno kon-stantan, a stajališta Ankare su se mijenjala zbog unutarnje nestabilnosti.

11 A. Wilson, “The Aege and is pute”, Adelphi Papers, str. 7. Također, A. Heraklides, Άσπον δοιγείτονες-Ελλάδα-Τουρκία: Ηδιένεξη του Αιγαίου (Nepomirljivi susjedi Grčka i Turska: Egejska zavada), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2007), str. 102–103.

12 D. Bölükbasi, Turkey and Greece, the Aege and is putes: A Unique case in International Law, (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2004), str. 285. Također, T. Bahçeli, Greek-Turkish relations since 1955, (Bou lder: West view, 1990), str. 137.

Prilike su se promijenile dolaskom Papandreouva PASOK-a na vlast u Grčkoj 1981. godine, a politička kriza iz 1977. godine u Turskoj rezultirala je još jednom vojnom intervencijom 1980. godine, što je bio treći državni udar u 20 godina.13

Papandreou je bio uvjeren da Turska pokušava promi-jeniti stanje na Egejskome moru kako bi Grčka bila u nepo-voljnoj poziciji u slučaju bilo kakvih pregovora. To je bio i uzrok njegova kritiziranja Karamanlisove vlade prethodnih godina. Preuzeo je neprijateljsko stajalište prema Turskoj prekidanjem grčko-turskoga dijaloga i otkazivanjem svih ugovorenih bilateralnih diplomatskih kontakata. Prvi pri-oritet njegove vanjske politike bio je suočavanje s “turskom prijetnjom”14, a ne “prijetnja sa sjevera”, što se odnosilo na hladnoratovski strah od komunizma15 i u tome je imao potporu velikoga dijela grčke javnosti zahvaljujući svojoj populističkoj retorici u razdoblju od 1974. do 1981. godine.16 Njegovi pojednostavljeni etnocentrični pogledi (dobro

13 E.J. Zürcher, Σύγχρονη Ιστορία της Τουρκία (Moderna povijest Turske), preveo V. Kechriotis, (Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια, 2004), str. 358–359 .

14 M. Fırat, Οι τουρκο ελληνικέςσ χέσεις και το Κυπριακό (Tursko-grčki odnosi i ciparsko pitanje), ( Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2012), str. 238. Pogledati i R. Clogg, “Greek-Turkish relations in the post – 1974 period” i u D. Constas, The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s, (Lond on: Mc Millan, 1991), str. 19.

15 I. Valinakis, Εισα γωγήστην ελληνικήεξ ωτερική πολιτική, 1949 – 1988 (Uvod u grčku vanjsku politiku, 1949–1988) (Θεσσαλονίκη: Παρατηρητής, 1989), str. 214.

16 Th. Veremis, Ιστορία των ελληνοτουρκικών σχέσεων 1453–2005 (Povijest grčko-turskih odnosa 1453–2005), str. 202–203.

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protiv lošega – Grčka protiv Turske) bili su lako shvatljivi grčkomu stanovništvu koje nije bilo upućeno u dvosmislen-osti egejskih neslaganja. Ti su pogledi imali i dodirnu točku s osjetljivim pitanjem Cipra kojim je većina Grka još uvijek bila šokirana.

Samoproglašena nezavisnost turske republike Sjeverni Cipar 15. studenoga 1983. godine17 pogoršala je bilateralne odnose i narednoga je mjeseca Papandreou usvojio Doktrinu Nove Obrane, usredotočivši se na tursku prijetnju umjesto na države Varšavskoga pakta. Bilateralni odnosi su do kraja 1983. godine bili na najnižoj razini od 1974. godine.

U to su vrijeme održani prvi izbori od vojnoga udara u Turskoj. Karizmatični Turgut Özal pobijedio je iako nije imao podršku vojske na izborima18. Kao novi političar i praktična osoba, njegovje cilj bio modernizirati Tursku i dati joj europsku perspektivu. Unatoč opoziciji iz turskih vojnih i diplomatskih krugova i unatoč Papandreouvoj antiturskoj retorici, pokrenuo je novi pristup prema Ateni. Pravih pomaka nije bilo osim Papandreouva priznanja postojećega pravnog neslaganja po pitanju kontinentalnoga šelfa koje je Grčka bila voljna rješavati samo putem zajedničkoga obraćanja ICJ-u. Političku inicijativu između 1984. i 1986. godine imao je Özal koji je pristupio Papandreou unatoč njegovu političkom imidžu nacionalista, antiturka i neuravnoteženoga vođe19. Ankara je

17 M. Fırat, Οι τουρκο ελληνικέςσ χέσεις και το Κυπριακό (Tursko-grčki odnosi i ciparsko pitanje), str. 232 – 233

18 Op. cit., E. J. Zürcher, str . 363.

19 M.A. Birand, “Turkey and the ‘Davos Process: Experiences and Pros pects”, u D. Constas (ur), The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990 s (London: Mc Millan, 1991) str. 30.

vjerovala da je Papandreouov ekstremizam bio tek predstava sa svrhom izvlačenja pomoći od Washingtona i jačanja vlastita i PASOK-ova položaja na grčkoj političkoj sceni.

Özalov pristup temeljio se na uvjeravanju Atene da Ankara nema revizionističku agendu niti na Egejskome moru niti na Cipru. Vjerovao je da bi se uzajmna sumnjičavost mogla umanjiti kroz neke niže političke mjere. Ukinuo je vizna ograničenja za grčke posjetitelje u Turskoj, zaustavio neke državne opstrukcije grčke manjine u Istanbulu i promo-virao je bilateralnu trgovinu. Unatoč tomu, Atena je zadržala čvrst antiturski pristup na bilateralnoj i međunarodnoj razini, kao i po pitanju turskih eurointegracija. Neuspješnost Özalovih napora izazivala je sve glasnije kritike opozicijskih vojnih i diplomatskih krugova koji su ga optuživali za popustlji-vost prema Grčkoj. Nedostatak povjerenja i komunikacije neizbježno su doveli do nove krize u ožujku 1987. godine. Ta je kriza dovela dvije države na rub rata, ali i stvorila uvjete za nove pristupe nalaženju rješenja.

Papandreou i Özal sastali su se u Davosu 30. i 31. siječnja 1988. godine i složili se da se kriza iz 1987. godine ne smije ponoviti te da se dvije strane moraju usredotočiti na miran odnos.20 Nakon povratka u Atenu Papandreou je imao izjavu o iskrenosti Ankare i zajedničkoj odluci o “neratu”. Grčka javnost nije bila spremna na takav okret nakon 6 godina PASOK-ove antiturske politike i 13 godina antiturske retorike te ga je odbila. Javnost nije mogla shvatiti kako je Papandreouovo “ne” dijalogu samo dva dana prije odlaska u

20 A. Heraklides, Άσπονδοι γείτονες - Ελλάδα - Τουρκία: Ηδιένεξη του Αιγαίου (Nepomirljivi susjedi – Grčka – Turska: Egejska zavada), str. 154.

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Davos odjednom postalo bezuvjetno “da”. Manji dio grčkoga društva otišao je u drugu krajnost i očekivao je da će nakon Davosa grčko-turska zavada jednostavno nestati.

Ovaj “duh Davosa” trajao je samo pet mjeseci. Nije imao dugoročnih učinaka poput zatopljenja u bilateralnim odnosima 1999. godine. Papandreou je uslijed teških kritika nacionalista u PASOK-u, koje je sam godinama odgajao, odbacio duh Davosa s “mea culpa” govorom u parlamentu.21 Atena je u eri nakon 1974. bila uvjerena da Ankara blokira napore Grčke da ostvari svoja prava u skladu s međunarodnim zakonima, a Ankara je, s druge strane, bila sigurna da Atena planira izmijeniti status Egejskoga mora22. Iz vanjskih politika dviju država, koje su navodno služile nacionalnim interesima, a zapravo su bile u službi domaćeg populizma, nastajala je uzajamna sumnja umjesto konstruktivnog bilateralnog okvira temeljenog na razumijevanju i poštivanju.

21 A . Heraklides, Άσπονδοιγείτονες-Ελλάδα-Τουρκία: Ηδιένεξη του Αιγαίου (Nepomirljivi susjedi – Grčka – Turska: Egejska zavada), pstr. 156 – 158.

22 A. Wilson, “The Aegeand is pute”, Adelphi Papers, (London: IISS, 1 979. – 80.), str. 13., 27 – 29.

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Alexandris, A., Th. Veremis, P. Kazakos, V. Koufoudakis, Chr.Rozakis, G. Tsitsopoulos, Οι ελληνο τουρκικές σχέσεις 1923-1987 (Greek - Turkish relations 1923 – 1987), (Athens:Γνώση, 1988)

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Bölükbasi, D., Turkey and Greece, the Aegean disputes: A unique case in International Law, (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2004)

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Heraklides, A., Άσπονδοι γείτονες-Ελλάδα-Τουρκία: Η διένεξη του Αιγαίου (Irreconcilable neighbors-Greece-Turkey: the Aegean dispute), (Αθήνα: Σιδέρης, 2007)

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Restoration, Reconciliation, Hopes for the Future: Cultural Heritage without Borders – 17 years in the Western Balkans

Jonathan Eaton, Lejla Hadžić1

1 Jonathan is a Program Coordinator at Cultural Heritage without Borders (Tirana, Albania); Lejla is the Regional Coordinator of the same organization.

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We would like to begin this essay with a disturbing reminder about the level of destruction of cultural heritage experienced during the war in Bosnia (1992-1995). According to András Riedlmayer (1995), “historic architecture (including 1200 mosques, 150 churches, 4 synagogues and over 1000 other monuments of culture), works of art, as well as cultural insti-tutions (including major museums, libraries, archives and manuscript collections) have been systematically targeted and destroyed.” This is a remarkably sobering set of figures, especially considering that these destroyed cultural works were not the collateral damage of the war but one of its spe-cifically designated targets. Destruction of cultural heritage was used as a tactic of war, in an attempt to erase the historic landscape of an entire people and to discourage them from ever returning to their homes.

As a response to the destruction wrought by this war, a group of Swedish professionals founded Cultural Heritage without Borders in 1995. One of its guiding principles would be based on a central tenet of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: “Damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.” The organization became active on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, then Kosovo in 2000 (with an offshoot project in Tibet that same year) and Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia in 2004.

Cultural Heritage without Borders (CHwB) is predi-cated on the understanding that the restoration of historic buildings and cultural resources following conflict or natural disasters is an important means of facilitating reconciliation,

J. Eaton, L. Hadžić

recovery and hope for the future in devastated communi-ties. As an organization, CHwB is neutral when it comes to conflicting parties, but not when it comes to the rights of all people to cultural heritage. CHwB operates on the principle that the thoughtful and professional restoration of a common cultural heritage is important for building the path towards reconciliation, re-integration and understanding. In other words, cultural destruction, particularly of the kind found in an ethnic-based conflict, should be countered by cultural reconstruction, in which heritage regeneration is a step toward social healing (Nordström 2012:18).

Over the past 17 years of work, CHwB has evolved a set of working principles that apply to its activities wherever they may be. First, it is important to work with all groups in the area, in order to have a broad impact and avoid allega-tions of prejudice or favoritism. Second, cooperate with local expertise; they will be able to share invaluable information about the local situation, as well as extend the effects of the project after CHwB is gone. Third, tasks should be set according to the local priorities identified by the commu-nity, ensuring that their needs come first. Fourth, CHwB’s work is, as much as possible, non-political; as such, it is not funded by the local state bodies, and CHwB works hard to maintain a healthy working relationship with a variety of political and cultural actors. Fifth, there should be a focus on ‘hands-on’ education, involving young people and the local community in a tangible way to conserve or restore their heritage. Finally, CHwB supports gender equality in its hiring, training and partnership decisions. While these principles form the cornerstone of CHwB’s working ethic for all kinds of projects, there is also a specific set of values

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that guides restoration projects themselves. Specifically, the restoration should serve as an educational model for profes-sionals; it should use only authentic materials and methods; a local workforce should be hired alongside international expertise; the remaining original parts of the structure should be retained as historical evidence; any reconstruc-tive acts should be done only when supported by archival or on-site evidence; the building and its environment should be restored to a functioning state; and, lastly, we do not beautify history, meaning that we do not enhance or alter unneces-sarily that which was there before. When working under dif-ficult conditions in post-conflict situations, these principles give CHwB staff a common focus and a set of higher goals upon which to base their work.

Conflict prevention and reconciliation is just one of CHwB’s four target areas for the past 17 years, which also include cultural freedom and diversity; democracy and human rights; and, social, economic and environmental development. However, the strategy of using heritage as a force for community reconciliation is central to the orga-nization’s work, whether in a community devastated by war, economic turmoil or political unrest. In any society, mutual respect for cultural heritage is crucial for peace and community-building. For this reason, CHwB uses cultural heritage as a tool for promoting reconciliation, through a four-pronged approach: 1) Restoring historical buildings; 2) Building trust/collaboration; 3) Networking and dialogue amongst heritage institutions and organizations; and, 4) Confronting the past.

Since 1996, CHwB has restored dozens of monu-ments across the Western Balkans, in Albania, Montenegro,

Serbia and especially the post-conflict countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo [photo 1]. Restoring historic buildings helps to focus the energy of the community around something that represents an important part of their history and identity. In situations where the building was destroyed as an act of ethnic violence, its restoration is crucial both to encourage expelled communities to return and to make a strong statement that such acts of destruction cannot and will not remain unchallenged and un-rectified. Examples of res-toration projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina include, among many others, 18th- century houses in Jajce [photo 2], shops in the historic bazaar of Mostar [photo 3], and the 16th-century Orthodox monastery in Zavala [photo 4]. In Kosovo, CHwB has restored a number of historic 19th-century kulla (tower) houses [photo 5], the Hadum mosque in Gjakova [photo 6] and many other historic buildings important to local communities across the country. In Stolac, Bosnia and Herzegovina, restoration projects went a step further than stones and mortar. As a part of an EU-funded project there, CHwB teamed up with the Spanish firm Tecnalia to develop an augmented reality smartphone application, which shows Stolac residents and visitors how the city looked in the past, the destruction caused by the war, and the possibilities for a prosperous and shared community in the future [photo 7].

Extended restoration projects are also a means of building trust and collaboration within and among com-munities. At the heart of this push are CHwB’s Regional Restoration Camps. The Camps developed primarily out of the work on reconciliation that CHwB was conducting in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, projects that always involved gathering together young professionals from around


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the Balkans. However, at times it was difficult or impos-sible to convince people to travel outside of their country, for example, Serbians attending an activity in Kosovo or vice versa. Therefore, a training point in Albania was suggested as a neutral ground. Since Albania did not taken part in the Yugoslav wars, there is a lack of ethnic tension there, which is more evident in other countries of the region. People of all backgrounds could gather in Albania and feel themselves on equal footing, with their restoration work creating a platform for reconciliation. When people come together to focus on a concrete task, such as re-plastering a wall or rebuilding an entrance gate, they can for a moment forget their differ-ences as they work toward a common goal. As the Camps developed, they became a means not only of restoring build-ings, but also of restoring cultural connections in the region and restoring the connection between heritage professionals and traditional materials & techniques. And, by preserving and promoting these traditional techniques as master crafts, they began to help reverse the trend of decay in historic Gjirokastra. The Camps now form part of a Balkans-wide push to encourage people to value and care for their local heritage. The main objectives are to use cultural heritage to: 1) build relations among young professionals, creating condi-tions for reconciliation as a prerequisite for peace and democ-racy; and, 2) preserve traditional crafts and techniques.

Over the course of two weeks, Regional Restoration Camp participants follow a rigorous but fulfilling sched-ule, combining theory – through engaging lectures and presentations – with hands-on restoration work on historic monuments in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo or Serbia. Each intervention directly helps local residents

– using traditional materials and techniques to repair their valuable buildings and providing a new means of understand-ing, interpreting and revitalizing them. Some figures from the Camps so far can help give an idea of the broad impact they have had. Between 2007 and 2013, there have been 15 Camps held, at which at total of 440 participants representing 22 countries completed more than 65 restoration interven-tions with an estimated 30,139 hours of hands-on work.

By attracting a diverse, committed, Balkan-focused base of participants, the Camps have brought together and created ties amongst people who would never have had the chance to meet otherwise. And, they are making meaning-ful connections. The 2011 Indevelop external evaluation of CHwB found that “out of 216 participants, some 100 have contacted each other after attending the camp, and at least 30% of that number is still in touch” (31). The links that were cut by the wars of the 1990s are slowly being restored through the Camps’ focus on peace-building through build-ing relations, with Albania as buffer zone and space for rec-onciliation. For example, the Camps in Gjirokastra, Albania provided the neutral space for Serbian participants to work with Albanian Kosovar craftsmen, two of whom then trav-elled to teach at the 11th Camp in Rogljevo, Serbia, their first trip to Serbia since the 1999 war in Kosovo. And, in Stolac, B&H, the 12th Camp (July 2013) was a chance for partici-pants of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s three major ethnicities to work together restoring historic sites that had been destroyed by war and building the vision for a shared future together—their contributions went toward the development of the above-mentioned augmented reality smartphone application, showing the past, present and future of Stolac.


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Aside from the Camps, CHwB pursues its community reconciliation efforts by developing regional networking and dialogue amongst heritage-related institutions and organiza-tions. The first of these efforts is the Southeast European (SEE) Heritage Network, which serves as a platform for NGOs from around the region to connect with each other and collaborate on important common issues in the field of cultural heritage. This network now operates independently from CHwB, with its secretariat based in Kotor, Montenegro. The other regional platform is the Balkan Museum Network (BMN), currently supported by CHwB but in the process of becoming an independent entity. This network of 19 national, regional and local museums focuses on institutional development, while tackling important issues facing Balkan museums today. Many of the network’s training activities focus on accessibility within museums, in partnership with the Stavros Niarchos Foundation, while a network of female directors within the BMN helps to counter gender imbalance prevalent in the field. In a major cross-border collaboration in 2012, all of the founding members of the BMN opened a simultaneous exhibition entitled 1+1 Life and Love. These kinds of initiatives not only help to develop staff capacities and promote professional networking; they also encourage museums to interact with their communities in new and more engaging ways. And, they help museums to lobby with one voice in order to take a stand on important social issues facing communities in the Balkans.

In the past year, CHwB’s office in Albania has begun to take another approach to confronting difficult pasts in Albania by developing ways to facilitate constructive dia-logue surrounding sites of memory. From 1945 to 1992,

Albania experienced perhaps the harshest dictatorial rule in Eastern Europe. While implementing a regime of complete state control, motivated by fear, the Communist government left its mark across the Albanian landscape, constructing some 41 new, planned urban centers, 23 prisons, 43 intern-ment camps, thousands of monuments and plaques and, most spectacularly, 400,000 – 700,000 concrete bunkers (Rugg 1994:63; Howden 2002) [photo 8]. These works were intended to intimidate and to remind the populace that the state existed everywhere. Today, these sites of memory rep-resent the painful past of an oppressive regime. But, they also hold the hope for a way of confronting the traumatic memory and lasting consequences of that past. In Albania today, there is a tension between forgetting and remember-ing the Communist past—between those who would try to erase the traces of the former regime and those who would confront it openly in order to address its lingering legacies. CHwB believes that the most effective way to address the long-lasting effects of Albania’s Communist regime is to tell the stories of the people that lived through that time and to preserve some of the important sites of memory from that period, so that future generations can see and touch and learn from that experience. However, the process of deal-ing with a difficult past is not something that Albania faces alone. While situations vary from country to country, there is a wealth of prior experience to draw upon for inspiration, when working with difficult recent heritage. For this reason, CHwB is looking to the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience, of which it is a member, for guidance, profes-sional connections and best practices, as the organization begins to work with Communist heritage in Albania.


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Why confront the past in Albania? As with the post-conflict situations described above, Albania’s communities also need to heal and recover from the wounds of a difficult history. CHwB believes that cultural heritage has an impor-tant role to play in that process, providing a safe place for people to encounter, discover, learn about and, in some cases, confront and overcome their heritage, both good and bad. For this reason, CHwB works to restore, conserve and interpret cultural heritage, building networks and dialogue amongst professionals and trust and collaboration within communities.

Works Cited

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict

1954 Text of the Convention and its 1st Protocol. UNESCO. Online. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-con-flict-and-heritage/the-hague-convention/text-of-the-convention-and-its-1st-protocol/#hague, accessed January 22, 2014.

Howden, Daniel2002 Albania’s Relics of Paranoid Past. BBC News:

World Edition, July 5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2098705.stm, accessed March 3, 2012

Ljungman, Cecilia M. and June Taboroff 2011 Final Report: Evaluation of Cultural Heritage without Borders (2008-2011). Rep. Stockholm: Indevelop.

Nordström, Rachel2012 The Challenges of Cultural Heritage Preservation: A

Case Study of Kosovo and Cultural Heritage without Borders. MA Dissertation, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenberg, Sweden.

Riedlmayer, András J1995 Libraries Are Not for Burning: International

Librarianship and the Recovery of the Destroyed Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Paper presented at the 61st IFLA General Conference. 20 – 25 August 1995.

Rugg, Dean S. 1994 Communist Legacies in the Albanian Landscape.

Geographical Review 84(1):59-73.


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1 A map showing the locations of CHwB restoration projects in the Western Balkans, from 1996 to 2013

1 Karta s lokacijama projekata obnove CHwB-a na zapadnome Balkanu, od 1996.–2013.

2 Two 18th-century houses in Jajce, Bosnia & Herzegovina, restored 2001-2003

2 Dvije kuće iz 18. stoljeća u Jajcu, BiH, obnovljene 2001.–2003.

3 Restoration of the 16th-century kujundziluk bazaar in Mostar, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 2001.–2003. Next page, clockwise from top left: destruction left by the war; a historical view; following restoration; an active and living marketplace ►


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3 Obnova kujundžiluka u Mostaru, BiH, 2001. – 2003. S lijeva na desno, u smjeru kazaljke na satu: ratna oštećenja; pogled kako je bilo nekad; nakon obnove; aktivna i živa tržnica


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4 Exterior and interior views of the chapel of the 16th-century Orthodox monastery at Zavala, Bosnia & Herzegovina, restored 2001 – 2003

4 Eksterijer i interijer kapelice u manastiru iz 16. stoljeća na Zavali, BiH, obnovljene 2001. – 2003.


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◄ 5 A 19th-century kulla house before and after restoration in Isniq, Kosovo, 2001 – 2002

◄ 5 Kula iz 19. stoljeća u Isniqu, Kosovo, prije i nakon obnove,2001. – 2002.

6 Before and after views of the 16th-century Hadum mosque in Gjakova, Kosovo, restored 2003 – 2004 ►


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6 Slike Hadum džamije u Đakovici, Kosovo, prije i poslije obnove 2003. – 2004.

7 A series of three bunkers (now destroyed) lines a beach in southern Albania in 2010. Right: A 2013 photograph of the prison and forced labor camp called Spaç in the northern Albanian mountains. The complex, listed as a protected monument, is abandoned aside from people scavenging for metal

7 Niz od triju bunkera (sada uništenih) na plaži u južnoj Albaniji 2010. Desno: fotografija iz 2013. zatvora i radnoga logora Spaç u planinama sjeverne Albanije. Kompleks je zaštićen spomenik i napušten osim sakupljača sekundarnih sirovina


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8 Views from the completed Stolac cultural route smartphone application, developed 2013

8 Prikazi gotove aplikacije za pametne telefone za kulturne stazeu Stocu, razvijena 2013.

Obnova, pomirenje, nada za budućnost: Kulturna baština bez granica – sedamnaest godina na zapadnome Balkanu

Jonathan Eaton, Lejla Hadžić1

1 Organizacija Kulturna baština bez granica; Jonathan radi kao programski koordinator u Tirani, Lejla kao regionalna koordinatorica.

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Želimo započeti ovaj rad s uznemiravajućim podsjećanjem na stupanj uništenja kulturne baštine tijekom posljednjeg rata u Bosni i Hercegovini (1992. – 1995.). Prema Andrásu Riedlmayeru (1995), “povijesna arhiterktura (uključujući 1200 džamija, 150 crkava, 4 sinagoge i preko tisuću drugih spomenika kulture), umjetnička djela, kao i kulturne institucije (ukljućujući glavne muzeje, knjižnice, arhive i kolekcije rukopisa) bili su sustavno stavljani na nišan i uništavani.” To je izuzetno otrežnjujući niz brojeva, imajući osobito na umu da ta uništena kulturna dobra nisu bila kolateralna šteta u tome ratu, već jedna od njegovih posebno odabranih meta. Uništenje kulturne baštine upotrijebljeno je kao ratna taktika, s pokušajem da se izbriše povijesni pejzaž cijeloga naroda i da ga se obeshrabri da se ikad vrati kući.

Kao odgovor na uništenje koje je taj rat izazvao, sku-pina švedskih stručnjaka osnovala je organizaciju Kulturna baština bez granica 1995. godine. Jedan od njezinih osnovnih načela bio bi zasnovan na središnjoj postavci Haške konven-cije o zaštiti kulturnoga vlasništva u slučaju ratnoga sukoba iz 1954. godine: “Šteta počinjena na kulturnome vlasništvu bilo kojega naroda znači da je ta šteta počinjena na kultur-nome naslijeđu cijeloga čovječanstva, s obzirom da svaki narod daje svoj doprinos svjetskoj kulturi”. Udruga je postala aktivna na terenu u BiH 1996. godine, a potom na Kosovu 2000. godine (sa srodnim projektom u Tibetu iste godine) i Albaniji, Srbiji, Crnoj Gori i Makedoniji 2004. godine.

Kulturna baština bez granica (CHwB) počiva na shvaćanju da je obnova povijesnih građevina i kulturnih resursa nakon sukoba ili prirodnih katastrofa važno sred-stvo za facilitaciju pomirenja, obnove i nade u budućnost u uništenim zajednicama. CHwB je kao udruga neutralna kada

se radi o sukobljenim stranama, ali i kada se radi o pravu svih ljudi na kulturnu baštinu. CHwB djeluje prema načelu da je promišljena i stručna obnova zajedničke kulturne baštine važna za izgradnju puta prema pomirenju, reinte-graciji i razumijevanju. Drugim riječima, kulturnoj destruk-ciji, osobito onoj kakvu nalazimo kod etničkih sukoba, treba suprostaviti kulturnu obnovu u kojoj je regeneracija baštine korak prema društvenome ozdravljenju (Nordström 2012:18).

Tijekom proteklih sedamnaest godina rada CHwB je razvila načelo rada koje se primjenjuje na njezine aktivnosti svugdje gdje udruga djeluje. Kao prvo, važno je raditi sa svim skupinama u nekome području kako bi se osigurao širok utjecaj i kako bi se izbjegle optužbe za predrasude i preferencije. Kao drugo, važna je i suradnja s lokalnim stručnjacima jer će oni moći podijeliti neprocjenjivo vri-jedne informacije o lokalnim okolnostima i proširiti učinke projekta nakon što organizacija prestane djelovati. Kao treće, zadaće se trebaju odrađivati u skladu s lokalnim pri-oritetima koje određuje zajednica kako bi se osiguralo da se prvo zadovoljavaju njezine potrebe. Kao četvrto, rad orga-nizacije je, koliko je god to moguće, apolitičan i kao takva ga ne financiraju lokalna državna tijela, a CHwB ozbiljno radi na održavanju zdravoga radnog odnosa s raznovrsnim političkim i kulturnim akterima. Kao peto, fokus treba biti na neposrednoj edukaciji koja uključuje mlade ljude i lokalnu zajednicu na opipljiv način kako bi se očuvala i obnovila njihova baština. Na kraju, CHwB podržava ravnopravnost spolova u svojemu zapošljavanju, educi-ranju i odlukama o partnerstvu. Dok ova načela sačinjavaju temelje radne etike CHwB-a za sve vrste projekata, postoji i specifičan skup vrijednosti na temelju kojih se vode sami


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projekti obnove. Točnije, obnova bi trebala služiti kao obrazovni model za stručnjake, treba upotrebljavati samo autentične materijale i metode, lokalna radna snaga treba biti angažirana uz međunarodne stručnjake, preostali originalni dijelovi građevina trebaju biti sačuvani kao povijesni dokazi, bilo kakvi rekonstruktivni zahvati smoju se raditi samo uz arhivsku podršku ili podršku dokaza na samoj lokaciji, zgrada i njezin okoliš moraju biti obnovljeni do stanja funk-cionalnosti i na kraju, mi ne uljepšavamo povijest, što znači da ne obavljamo nepotrebna poboljšanja i promjene onoga što je ranije bilo tamo. Ova načela daju osoblju CHwB-a zajednički fokus i niz viših ciljeva na kojima temelje svoj rad u teškim uvjetima u postkonfliktnim situacijama.

Prevencija konflikta i pomirenje bili su samo jedno o CHwB-ovih četiriju ciljanih područja rada tijekom ovih sedamnaest godina, uz kulturne slobode i raznolikost, demokraciju i ljudska prava te društveni, ekonomski i okolišni razvoj. Ipak, strategija korištenja baštine kao sile za pomirenje u zajednici je središnja u radu organizacije, bilo da je zajednica razorena ratom, privrednim teškoćama ili političkim nemirima. Međusobno poštivanje kulturne baštine ključno je za mir i izgradnju zajednica u svim društvima. Zato CHwB upotrebljava kulturnu baštinu kao alat za promicanje pomirenja u četverostrukome pristupu: 1. Obnova povijesnih građevina, 2. Izgradnja povjerenja/suradnje, 3. Umrežavanje i dijalog između institucija i udruga koje se bave baštinom i 4. Suočavanje s prošlošću.

CHwB je obnovila desetke spomenika diljem zapad-noga Balkana od 1996. godine u Albaniji, Crnoj Gori, Srbiji i naročito u postkonfliktnim državama Bosni i Hercegovini i Kosovu [slika 1].

Obnova povijesnih građevina pomaže usredotočiti energiju zajednica na nešto što predstavlja važan dio njezine povijesti i identiteta. U situacijama kada je neka građevina uništena kao postupak etničkoga nasilja, njezina je obnova ključna da se ohrabre prognane zajednice na povratak i da se da jasna poruka da će takvi postupci uvijek biti osporavani i ispravljani. Primjeri projekata obnove u BiH uključuju, između ostaloga, kuće u Jajcu iz 18. stoljeća [slika 2], lokale na povijesnoj tržnici u Mostaru [slika 3] i pravoslavni samostan iz 16. stoljeća u Zavali [slika 4]. Na Kosovu je CHwB obnovila više povijesnih kula iz 19. stoljeća [slika 5], Hadum džamiju u Đakovici [slika 6] i mnoge druge povijesne građevine važne za lokalne zajednice diljem države. U Stocu u BiH projekti obnove otišli su korak dalje od kamenja i žbuke. CHwB se tamo udružio sa španjolskom tvrtkom Tecnalia u sklopu projekta Europske unije na raz-vijanju “augmented reality” (proširena stvarnost) aplikacije za pametne telefone koja pokazuje kako su stanovnici Stoca i posjetitelji gradu izgledali kroz povijest, ratom iza-zvano uništenje i mogućnosti za imućnu zajednicu svih u budućnosti [slika 7].

Prošireni projekti obnove su također sredstvo za izgradnju povjerenja i suradnje unutar i između zajed-nica. Srž tih nastojana su CHwB-ovi regionalni kampovi za obnovu. Ti su kampovi proizišli prvenstveno iz rada na pomirenju CHwB-a u BiH i na Kosovu, a uvijek su uključivali okupljanje mladih stručnjaka s cijeloga Balkana. Ipak, ponekad je bilo teško ili nemoguće nagovoriti ljude da putuju izvan svojih država, primjerice, Srbi na Kosovo ili obrnuto. Stoga je predloženo mjesto za trening u Albaniji kao neutralnome području. S obzirom da Albanija nije


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sudjelovala u jugoslavenskim ratovima, tamo nema etničkih tenzija koje su prisutnije u drugim državama regije. Ljudi svih podrijetla mogli su se okupiti u Albaniji i osjećati da su u istome položaju, a njihov rad na obnovi stvorio je platformu za pomirenje. Kada se ljudi okupe da bi obavili konkretan zadatak, poput žbukanja zida ili obnove kapije, mogu nakratko zaboraviti na svoje različitosti dok rade na zajedničkome cilju. Kako su se kampovi razvijali, postali su sredstvo ne samo obnove zgrada, nego i obnove kul-turnih veza u regiji i obnove veze između stručnjaka za baštinu i tradicionalnih metoda i tehnika. Pridonijeli su, kroz očuvanje i promicanje tih tradicionalnih tehnika obrta, zaustavljanju trenda propadanja u povijesnome gradu Gjirokastri. Kampovi sada potiču ljude na cijelome Balkanu da vrednuju svoju lokalnu baštinu i brinu o njoj. Glavni su ciljevi upotrijebiti kulturnu baštinu za: 1. izgradnju odnosa među mladim stručnjacima i stvaranje uvjeta za pomirenje kao preduvjeta za mir i demokraciju i 2. očuvanje tradiciona-lnih obrta i vještina.

Kampovi regionalne obnove tijekom dva tjedna traja-nja imaju rigorozan, ali i ispunjavajući sadržaj kombinirajući teoriju – kroz zanimljiva predavanja i prezentacije – s konkretnim radom na obnovi povijesnih spomenika u Albaniji, BiH, Kosovu i Srbiji. Svaka intervencija izravno pomaže lokalnomu stanovništvu – korištenjem tradicio-nalnih materijala i vještina za popravak njihovih vrijed-nih građevina i omogućavanjem novih pristupa njihovu razumijevanju, interpretaciji i revitalizaciji. Neke brojke iz dosad održanih kampova mogle bi predstaviti koliko su širok utjecaj ti kampovi imali. Između 2007. i 2013. godine održano je 15 kampova na kojima je sudjelovalo ukupno

440 sudionika iz 22 države koji su do kraja obavili više od 65 restauracijskih intervencija s procijenjenih 30,139 sati konkretnoga rada.

Privlačenjem raznovrsne, predane skupine sudionika usmjerene na Balkan kampovi su spojili ljude koji se inače nikada ne bi sreli. A sada su značajno povezani. Vanjska evaluacija CHwB-a koju je radio Indevelop 2011. godine otkrila je da je 100 od 216 sudionika uspostavilo međusobne kontakte nakon sudjelovanja u kampu, a barem 30 % od toga broja je još uvijek “u vezi” (31). Veze koje je presjekao rat u devedesetima polako se obnavljaju usredotočenošću kam-pova na izgradnju mira kroz izgradnju odnosa s Albanijom kao tampon zonom i prostorom za pomirenje. Primjerice, kampovi u Gijrokastri u Albaniji pružili su neutralni teren srpskim sudionicima za rad s obrtnicima Albancima s Kosova, od kojih su dvojica putovala kako bi predavali na jedanaestome kampu u Rogljevu u Srbiji, što je bio njihov prvi posjet Srbiji od rata na Kosovu 1999. godine. I u Stocu u BiH je dvanaesti kamp (srpanj 2013.) bio prilika sudion-icima triju glavnih naroda BiH za zajednički rad na obnovi povijesnih lokaliteta uništenih u ratu i izgradnji vizije za zajedničku budućnost – oni su pridonijeli ranije spomenu-toj aplikaciji za pametne telefone koja pokazuje prošlost, sadašnjost i budućnost Stoca.

Osim kampova CHwB radi na pomirenju u zajed-nici i putem regionalnoga umrežavanja i poticanja dijaloga između institucija i organizacija koje se bave baštinom. Tu se prvo ističe Mreža baštine jugoistočne Europe (the Southeast European Heritage Network) koja ima ulogu platforme za nevladine udruge iz cijele regije putem koje se one međusobno spajaju i surađuju u rješavanju zajedničkih


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problema na polju kulturne baštine. Mreža sada djeluje neovisno o CHwB-u sa sekretarijatom u Kotoru u Crnoj Gori. Druga regionalna platforma je Balkanska muzejska mreža (BMM) koju CHwB jš uvijek podupire, ali je u postupku prelaska u neovisno tijelo. Ta mreža devetnaest nacionalnih, regionalnih i lokalnih muzeja orijentirana je na instituciona-lni razvoj baveći se istodobno važnim problemima s kojima se balkanski muzeju danas susreću. Mnoge mrežne trening aktivnosti usredotočene su na pristupačnost unutar muzeja, u partnerstvu sa Stavros Niarchos Foundation, dok se mreža ravnateljica unutar BMM bori i protiv rodne neravnoteže koja prevladava u ovome polju. Sve osnivačke članice BMM-a su, u sklopu velike međunarodne suradnje, 2012. godine ist-odobno otvorile izložbu pod naslovom “1 + 1 Život i Ljubav”. Takve inicijative ne samo da pomažu u razvijanju kapaciteta osoblja i promoviranju profesionalnoga umrežavanja, nego i ohrabruju muzeje na nove, uključive načine interakcije s njihovim zajednicama. Također, pomažu muzejima da jedno-glasno lobiraju po pitanju važnih društvenih tema kojima se zajednice na Balkanu bave.

Tijekom prošle godine ured CHwB-a u Albaniji preuzeo je novi pristup u suočavanju s teškom prošlosti u Albaniji – razvijao je načine na koje se mogao facilitirati konstruktivan dijalog na temu mjesta sjećanja. Albanija je u razdoblju od 1945. do 1992. godine iskusila možda i najoštriju diktaturu u istočnoj Europi. Primjenjujući režim potpune državne kontrole temeljen na strahu, komunistička je vlada ostavila tragove preko cijeloga albanskog krajolika izgradivši 41 novo planirano urbano središte, 23 zatvora, 43 sabirna logora, na tisuće spomenika i spomen-ploča i, najdojmljivije, od 400.000 do 700.000 betonskih bunkera (Rugg 1994:63;

Howden 2002) [slika 8]. Svrha toga bila je prestrašiti narod i podsjetiti ga da je država postojala svugdje. Danas ta mjesta predstavljaju bolnu prošlost ugnjetavajućega režima, ali i nadu za suočavanjem s traumatskim sjećanjima i trajnim posljedi-cama prošlosti. U Albaniji danas postoji napetost između zab-oravljanja i sjećanja na komunističku prošlost – između onih koji bi izbrisali sve tragove bivšega režima i onih koji bi se s tim naslijeđem, čiji neki elementi još uvijek postoje u društvu, otvoreno suočili i uhvatili u koštac s njima. CHwB smatra da je najdjelotvorniji način suočavanja s dugotrajnim poslje-dicama komunističkoga režima u Albaniji taj da se ispričaju priče ljudi koji su živjeli u tome vremenu i da se sačuvaju mjesta sjećanja iz toga razdoblja kako bi buduće generacije mogle vidjeti i opipati to iskustvo te nešto iz njega i naučiti. Naravno, Albanija nije jedina zemlja koja se mora nositi s procesom suočavanja s teškom prošlošću. Iako se prilike raz-likuju od države do države, postoji obilje prijašnjega iskustva za inspiraciju kada se radi s teškom nedavnim naslijeđem. Iz tog razloga traži i savjete Međunarodne koalicije mjesta sjećanja (International Coalition of Sites of Conscience), čija je članica, za stručne kontakte i najbolje prakse dok se počinje baviti naslijeđem komunizma u Albaniji.

Zašto se suočavati s prošlosti u Albaniji? Kao u gore opisanim postkonfliktnim prilikama, zajednice u Albaniji trebaju se oporaviti od trauma koje je izazvala teška prošlost. CHwB vjeruje da kulturna baština ima važnu ulogu u tome procesu pružajući utočište ljudima da se susreću, otkrivaju, uče i, u nekim slučajevima, suoče se i prevladaju svoje naslijeđe, i dobro i loše. Zato CHwB radi na obnovi, očuvanju i razumijevanju kulturne baštine gradeći mreže i dijalog među stručnjacima i povjerenje i suradnju unutar zajednica.


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Literatura

Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954

Text of the Convention and its 1st Protocol. UNESCO. Online. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-and-heritage/the-hague-convention/text-of-the-convention-and-its-1st-protocol/#hague, accessed January 22, 2014.

Howden, Daniel2002 Albania’s Relics of Paranoid Past. BBC News: World Edition,

July 5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2098705.stm, accessed March 3, 2012

Ljungman, Cecilia M. and June Taboroff2011 Final Report: Evaluation of Cultural Heritage without Borders

(2008-2011). Rep. Stockholm: Indevelop.Nordström, Rachel2012 The Challenges of Cultural Heritage Preservation: A Case

Study of Kosovo and Cultural Heritage without Borders. MA Dissertation, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenberg, Sweden.

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Review 84(1):59-73.

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Heritage Tourism in Israel and Its Neighboring Countries as a Peace Promoter

Alon Gelbman1

1 Alon Gelbman (PhD) is a Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Tourism and Hotel Management at Kinneret College on the Sea of Galilee, Israel. He is a Cultural Geographer and his research interests include international tourism and geopolitical borders, tourism and peace, urban/rural tourism, hosts-guests relationships and wellness tourism. His research papers published in leading scientific journals such as Annals of Tourism Research, Tourism Geographies and Current Issues in Tourism. Dr. Gelbman is also an Associate Editor of the Journal of Tourism and Peace Research and a reviewer for various scientific journals in the field of tourism. More information can be found at: http://kinneret.academia.edu/AlonGelbman.

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Heritage and culture have long been recognized as core com-ponents of tourism. Whether we are dealing with visits for cultural interaction, or elaborating on other forms of visitor activities, tourism has always been an important element of such meetings and culture-based tourism interactions. Tourism has been discussed as a social force that can contri-bute to and promote international understanding, coopera-tion, and global good will for establishing and maintaining world peace. The geopolitical relationships between Israel and its neighboring countries are complicated and include both conflicts as well as peace agreements. The main aim of this paper is to present and analyze the inherent potential of two tourism and heritage sites in border areas between Israel and its neighbors to promote peaceful relations and good nei-ghborly relations, to improve the image of areas involved in geopolitical conflicts and to contribute to strengthening pea-ceful ties. The case studies under discussion are the Island of Peace at Naharaim on the Israel-Jordan border, a tourism site which according to existing plans is to become a transnatio-nal peace park in the future, and the International Peace Run traversing the security fence separating Bethlehem in the Palestinian Authority and Jerusalem in Israel.

Keywords: Heritage Tourism, Peace Tourism, Geopolitical Borders, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Jordan

Heritage, Tourism and Peace Heritage is what we take from the past and transmit to current and future generations, both in terms of cultural traditions and physical elements (Hardy, 1988). It is the ele-ments of the past that society attempts to preserve (Hall and McArthur, 1988; Timothy and Boyd, 2003; Tunbridge and

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Ashworth, 1996). Heritage tourism ranges from the examina-tion of physical remains of the past and natural landscapes to the experience of local cultural traditions (Zeppel and Hall, 1992). The place of tourism as a social force that can contri-bute to and promote international understanding, coopera-tion, and global good will for establishing and maintaining world peace has been discussed and debated in literature (D’Amore, 1988; Litvin, 1998; Kim, Prideaux and Prideaux, 2007; Cho, 2007). Studies of international relations include a debate about the possibility of peace between states, and the role of transnational person-to-person contacts in the develo-pment of peaceful relations. While those with liberal percep-tions hold out more hope for the potential of tourism to pro-mote peace, those with more realistic attitudes are skeptical about this process (Kim, Prideaux and Prideaux, 2007).

A study about creating warmer peace relationships examined the interaction between Israeli tourists vacatio-ning on the shores of the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt (south of the international border with Israel) and the Egyptian hosts, and its effect on reducing prejudice and negative stereotypes (Maoz, 2010; Uriely, Maoz, and Reichel, 2009). The peace element may be a significant and central component in the development of border tourism sites, considering that border areas are characterized by social, political, economic and environmental contrasts between nations. Many border areas have known – and some still suffer today from – disputes, wars and conflicts that are the inheritance of conflicting interests or historical struggles from the past (Timothy, 2001). Around these factors, and others, attractions develop that bear witness to the values of historical and national heritage, nature and ecology. When tourism planning and

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development are added to this mix, tourism potential can be realized. When tourism development and peace play central roles in the story of an area, it becomes more attractive to tourists (Gelbman, 2010).

Tourism and the Geopolitical Relationships of Israel and its Neighboring Courtiers

Israel is located in the Middle East on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, bounded to the north by Lebanon, to the northeast by Syria, to the east by Jordan and to the southwest by Egypt. As a country, Israel offers a rich tou-rism product combining historical, cultural, heritage and religious sites as well as modern attractions and amenities, diverse landscapes and climates. Thanks to this wealth of culture, history and nature – all in a small geographic area – Israel attracted more than 3 million international visitors in 2013. Incoming tourism to Israel fluctuates over the years, mainly as the result of geopolitical developments in the region, which is understandable as tourism is particularly sensitive to political frontiers and their problems (Tucker and Sundberg, 1988). For many years, Israel’s tourist potential was not fulfilled as people felt reluctant to travel to a country rife with insecurity and unstable geopolitical conditions.

Conflict in the area is not new. Arab attacks against Jews began in the 1920s and 1930s as a reaction to Zionist activity to re-establish Jewish settlements. Six Arab coun-tries organized joint armed opposition to the 1947 United Nations decision to partition the former British Mandate in Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs living there. In the battle that followed (Israel’s War of Independence), Israel’s army emerged victorious. What had been Palestine was

divided into three: Israel, areas annexed by the Kingdom of Jordan, and the Gaza strip, ruled by Egypt. As a result of the 1967 War, in which Israel overcame an alliance of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, the whole of historic Palestine fell into Jewish hands. The future of the areas taken over, with their large Arab population and growing Palestinian nationalism, has become an issue of debate and contention.

While a peace agreement was signed with Egypt in 1978, five years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Palestinian question remained unresolved. It came into shar-per focus in 1988, with the outbreak of a civil uprising by the Arabs (the ‘Intifada’). After the 1991 Gulf War, pressure by the United States brought Israel, its Arab neighbors and the Palestinians into talks about a possible peace agree-ment. The result was formal border and peace agreements between Israel and Jordan in 1994, followed by a process of delimiting and demarcating the boundaries between the two states. This border, as well as the one with Egypt, is now open for tourism from both sides. Agreements signed with the Palestinians have still not led to a final border arrange-ment between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Gelbman, 2008).

Despite the peace agreements between Israel and Egypt and Jordan, the borders between these countries have not become normalized free crossing sites for tourists, but they retain that potential. In contrast, the borders with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority have remained three complex, unresolved issues. Israel also controls occupied areas (the Golan Heights in the north and Judea and Samaria in the east). Based on agreements signed with the Palestinian Authority during the 1990s, significant parts of Judea,

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Samaria and the Gaza strip, including Arab cities, are contro-lled by the Palestinian Authority (Gelbman, 2008).

The construction of a security fence (sometimes called a “wall” in urban areas) began in the early 2000s. This step was taken by the Israel government, in order to prevent infiltrations from the Palestinian Authority and terrorist acti-ons against targets in Israel. The fence has been an issue of contention both regionally and internationally (Gelbman & Keinan, 2007). It is important to emphasize that despite the complex and sensitive geopolitical reality described above, tourism to Israel and the Palestinian Authority (to destina-tions such as Bethlehem and Jericho) continue to develop and entail cooperation and ongoing coordination between the sides (such as enabling tourists to cross from Jerusalem to Bethlehem and to allow them to fly into and out of the Palestinian Authority area through the airport in Israel).

There is also trans-border tourism between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, with whom peace agreements were signed even though, as mentioned, the dynamics of crossing these international borders are not as free as between countries in Western Europe, for example. Undoubtedly, the complex geopolitical reality enveloping Israel and its neighboring countries, as well as the relati-ons between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel, constitute a challenge for developing cultural heritage tourism to promote peace and cooperation, especially in the international border areas, where contrast and differences dominate today.

Heritage Tourism and Peace: Case Studies in Israel and its Neighboring Countries

The complex geopolitical reality described above again raises questions about the potential of tourism and heritage to serve as a lever for creating warmer peace relations and reconciling peoples and countries that have experienced or continue to experience prolonged conflicts, as is the case with Israel and its neighbors. In light of these questions, the aim of this chapter is to examine and analyze the potential of two peace tourism sites in Israel to transmit a message of cooperation and reconciliation and to contribute to impro-ving the image regarding relations between the nations in the region as played out on the background of past and present conflicts. The first case study is the Island of Peace, a tou-rism site on the Israel-Jordan border, for which future plans call for the establishment of a peace park. The second case study is the International Peace Run traversing the security fence that separates Bethlehem in the Palestinian Authority from Jerusalem in Israel.

The Island of PeaceAccording to the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, the ‘The Island of Peace’ area was to be used for promoting peace through tourism. A special tourist gate was erected, through which Israelis can visit the island (and thus enter Jordan) for a short time, always in a group and always in a guided tour conduc-ted by licensed Israeli guides. The Island of Peace, which as mentioned above is supposed to become a peace park (ECOTECH Jordan, 2008), is an Israeli-Jordanian site at the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, on the border between Israel and Jordan and near the tri-point with Syria.

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The island on the Syrian-African rift has been of strategic importance for years. The Jordan River forms part of the borderline along the rift and as such the island has suffered because of its proximity to the border where Syria, Jordan and Israel meet. Now it is a tourist attraction on the banks of the Jordan River. In April 1948, this was the first settlement to be attacked by the Arab Legion. In May of that year, it was also the target of an Iraqi attack. The site includes three old bridges, an old British police station, historic railway tracks, and an old khan (caravanserai) from the Middle Ages [photo 1] (Ashdot Tourism Infrastructure Development, 2007; Gelbman, 2008).

Between 1948 and 1994, the island was part of the borderland territory dividing Israel and Jordan. However, the 1994 peace agreement between the two countries turned the entire island over to Jordan. The border itself was moved to the river branch west of the island. Today the island is completely under Jordanian sovereignty with Israeli land ownership rights. Tourists consider it a popular destination, with its fine views of the Jordanian and Israeli borderlands. Tourists do not need a Jordanian visa to enter the area but are limited to visits in groups accompanied by a locally aut-horized tourist guide (Gelbman, 2008). For several years, the Friends of Earth in the Middle East, a non-government organization (NGO), has been planning to establish a peace park, with cooperation from both sides and encouragement and support from international bodies. A recently signed agreement between the heads of the regional councils from Israel and Jordan recognized the importance of preserving the Jordan River and noted the potential for promoting peace by creating a cross-border peace park based on ecological

values and the cultural heritage in the Island of Peace area at Naharayim. Among possible projects in the park are a bird sanctuary around an artificial lake and canals, ecologically friendly guest houses, a tourist center at the defunct power station and restored historical sites such as the Roman bridge and the customs house (ECOTECH Jordan, 2008; Gelbman and Maoz, 2012).

By creating a protected area on both sides of the river, more opportunities will be available for protecting biodi-versity, cooperative management, joint research programs, education and collaboration on nature-based tourism. While the necessity of a border zone is obvious to both sides, the two countries have already created precedents for opening the border fence for controlled guided tourism at several locations. The heads of the Jordan Valley Regional Council (Israel), the Beit Shean Valley Regional Council (Israel) and the Muaz Bin Jabal Municipality (Jordan) signed a Memorandum of Understanding which promulgates the cre-ation of the Peace Park as a site that will restore the pride of place to the river valley and create new opportunities for the local populations (Friends of the Earth Middle East, 2008). Difficulties in implementation can be expected but the very act of planning and working to promote a vision of coopera-tion among decision makers on both sides of the border, with the encouragement and support of international organizati-ons and NGOs, augurs well as the process is both important and positive and encourages ties and contacts from both sides of the border. It is also a good way to try to turn vision into reality, using tourism development as a means of stren-gthening and warming peace relations (Gelbman, 2008).

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The Bethlehem-Jerusalem Cross Border Run for Peace

The annual Run for Peace (which is also called a Marathon even though it does meet the official requirements for such a run) was conducted from 2004 to 2011 and is planned for the future as well. It is dedicated to the memory of Pope John II. The Run is an unusual international sport activity, being held, as it is, in the heart of a very complex and tense geographical region in the Holy Land. Its aim is to make a small but meaningful contribution to aspirations for peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The event was established during the period of the “Intifada” (the Palestinian uprising that began at the end of 2000), when geopolitical tensions reduced the number of overseas visitors to Israel. Opera Romana Pellegrinaggi, the pilgrimage organizer attached to the Vatican, requested that Israel’s Ministry of Tourism help to organize a special Jerusalem-Bethlehem Marathon in which Israelis, Palestinians and Europeans would parti-cipate with the stated objective of promoting peace in the region and also encouraging Catholic pilgrimages to the Holy Land. At first sight, the initiative was daunting, as few could imagine that Palestinians runners would be able to run alongside Israelis and Italians, particularly considering the process involved in crossing the border between Bethlehem and Jerusalem.

The main goals of the run as defined by the Catholic Church in the Vatican were: to perpetuate the legacy of Pope John Paul II for peace, brotherhood and interfaith coopera-tion; to increase Catholic pilgrimage to the Holy Land and to use the pilgrimage-sport combination as a ‘winning formula’ to promote dialogue between people. The vision of the run

was to conduct an annual run as a symbolic sport-pilgrimage event. Integrating sport and religious aspects was intended to arouse public interest. It was to be an interfaith event invol-ving Catholics, Jews and Moslems – Israelis, Palestinians and Europeans.

The route of the non-competitive 10 km run inclu-des the road separating Bethlehem from Jerusalem, a road that is traveled by pilgrims, athletes and the public at large (Italians, Israelis and Palestinians). The organizers believe that the combination of pilgrimage and sport has good poten-tial for opening dialogue between people. They also believe that the universal language of sport needs no translation and the pilgrimage, or in this case the individual pilgrim, carries a message of peace.

The runs conducted from 2004 to 2011 were conside-red successful by the organizers, meeting the aims set for them. The number of participants grew from 15 runners in 2004 to 300 in 2011, in addition to many other visitors who observed the event. But the main contribution of the run was the intensive media coverage it received [photo 2]. It inclu-des several elements that emphasize the symbolism of peace such as runners crossing the fence separating Bethlehem from Jerusalem, sports and games near the wall and signing a joint declaration for peace. These elements were also hig-hlighted in the media coverage of the events.

The picture of participants from Italy, the Palestinian Authority and Israel – Catholics, Moslems and Jews – running together was exciting for the participants and attracted extensive photographic coverage in the written and electronic media locally, regionally and internationally. While international coverage of the news from the region

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usually entails security events such as terror and violence, in the case of the Run for Peace, the surprise was that an item emphasized cooperation, good will, friendship and efforts to attain peace.

Conclusions Cultural heritage focuses on those material and immaterial vestiges of the historic past that a society chooses to preserve for present and future generations, and heritage tourism plays an important role in this process. When the heritage includes elements of a conflicted geopolitical past, or of cold peace relations, as is the case for Israel and its neighbors, it is especially important to develop tourist sites that encourage a heritage of peace, cooperation between peoples and good neighborly relations. The tourism sites located along the geo-political borders, which in the past (or present) suffered (or continue to suffer) from conflicts and disagreements, such as the borders between Israel and its neighbors, can also become sites that encourage peace relations when the geopo-litical reality changes, or alternatively, when both sides are interested in encouraging cooperation and transmit a mes-sage of reconciliation or coexistence.

The two case studies in this article deal with sites loca-ted on the geopolitical borderline between Israel and its nei-ghbors. In the case of the Island of Peace, this is an agreed-upon, orderly peace border between Israel and Jordan, which in the past suffered from confrontations and conflicts; in the case of the Run for Peace from Bethlehem to Jerusalem, it entails the border between Israel and the Palestinian Authority which is not agreed upon and which often serves as a source of debate and conflict. Despite vestiges of the

past and difficulties in the present, it appears that both case studies indicate significant potential for developing tou-rism that transmits a message of peace and cooperation. In the case of the Island of Peace, plans are to declare the site a Park for Peace that includes attractions with historical remnants, preservation and ecological tourism that will bring together tourists from Israel, Jordan and the rest of the world.

The Run for Peace is an event of highly symbolic sport tourism in which Israelis, Palestinians and international par-ticipants cross the border and together transmit the message that cooperation and good neighborly life are achievable. Regarding the ongoing debate about whether tourism can influence the promotion of peace and understanding between nations, it appears that even if the effect of developing these peace tourism attractions is limited, their importance is still great, not only for the tourists visiting these sites or events, but even more for creating a sliver of change and improving the image of a place with its clouded past, and for transmi-tting messages of good will and cooperation between the nations that build a more positive image for the present gene-ration and for coming generations.

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D’Amore, L. (1988). Tourism: The World’s Peace Industry. Journal of Travel Research 27, 35–40.

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Gelbman, A., & Keinan, O. (2007). National and transnational borderlanders’ attitudes towards the security fence between Israel and the Palestinian authority. GeoJournal, 68(4), 279–291.

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Maoz, D. (2010) Warming up Peace: an encounter between Egyptian Hosts and Israeli guests in Sinai. In: Moufakkir, O. and Kelly, I. (Ed.) Tourism Progress and Peace (pp. 83-89), Willingford: CABI.

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1 The flags of Israel and Jordan flying side by side on the bridge at the entrance to the Island of Peace

1 Zastave Izraela i Jordana vijore se jedna do druge na mostu na ulazu na Otok mira

2 Catholic runners from Italy as well as Palestinians and Israelis running together in the Run for Peace from Bethlehem to Jerusalem

2 Katolici iz Italije, Palestinci i Izraelci zajedno trče na Utrci za mir od Betlehema do Jeruzalema

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Turizam kulturnoga naslijeđa u Izraelu i susjednim zemljama kao poticaj miru

Alon Gelbman1

1 Redoviti profesor i pročelnik Odsjeka za turistički i hotelijerski menadžment na sveučilištu Kinneret na Galilejskome jezeru u Izraelu. Stručnjak je na polju kulturne geografije, a znanstveni mu interesi uključuju međunarodni turizam i geopolitičke granice, turizam i mir, urbani/ruralni turizam, odnose domaćina i gostiju te wellness turizam. Njegovi su znanstveni članci objavljivani u znanstvenim časopisima poput Annals of Tourism Research, Tourism Geographies i Current Issues in Tourism. Dr. Gelbman je također su-urednik znanstvenoga časopisa Journal of Tourism and Peace Research i recezent raznih znanstvenih časopisa iz područja turizma. Više informacija dostupno je na adresi: http://kinneret.academia.edu/AlonGelbman.

Kulturu i kulturno naslijeđe već dugo prepoznajemo kao ključne sastavnice turizma. Bilo da govorimo o posjetima u svrhu sudjelovanja u kulturi ili se bavimo drugim oblicima aktivnosti posjetitelja, turizam je oduvijek važan dio takvih susreta i sudjelovanja utemeljenih u kulturnome turizmu. O turizmu se raspravlja kao o društvenoj silnici koja može pridonijeti i služiti kao poticaj razumijevanju među narodi-ma, suradnji i globalnoj dobroj volji za uspostavljanje i odr-žavanje svjetskoga mira. Geopolitičke veze između Izraela i susjednih zemalja složene su i uključuju kako sukobe, tako i mirovne sporazume. Glavni je cilj ovoga rada predstaviti i analizirati prirodni potencijal dviju turističkih lokacija kultur-noga naslijeđa na graničnim područjima Izraela i susjednih država u svrhu promicanja mirnih odnosa i doprinosa osnaže-nju mirnih veza. Studije slučajeva koje ovaj rad obrađuje su Otok mira u Naharajimu na granici Izraela i Jordana, turistič-ko središte koje bi prema planovima trebalo postati transnaci-onalni park mira te međunarodna staza mira koja prolazi kroz sigurnosnu ogradu koja odvaja Betlehem na palestinskome teritoriju od Jeruzalema na izraelskom teritoriju.

Ključne riječi: turizam kulturnoga naslijeđa, mirovni turizam, geopolitičke granice, Izrael, Palestina, Jordan.

Uvod: kulturno naslijeđe, turizam i mirKulturno je naslijeđe ono što uzimamo iz prošlosti kako bismo ga prenijeli sadašnjim i budućim generacijama kako u smislu kulturnih tradicija, tako i u smislu fizičkih preed-meta (Hardy, 1988.). Ti su elementi prošlosti ono što društvo pokušava očuvati (Hall i McArthur, 1988.; Timothy i Boyd, 2003.; Tunbridge i Ashworth, 1996.). Turizam kulturnoga naslijeđa obuhvaća sve od istraživanja fizičkih ostataka

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prošlosti i prirodnih krajolika do uranjanja u lokalne običaje i tradicije (Zeppel i Hall, 1992.). Uloga turizma kao društve-ne sile koja može pridonijeti i služiti kao poticaj razumijeva-nju među narodima, suradnji i globalnoj dobroj volji za uspo-stavljanje i održavanje svjetskoga mira predmet je rasprave u literaturi (D’Amore, 1988.; Litvin, 1998.; Kim, Prideaux i Prideaux, 2007.; Cho, 2007.). Studije međunarodnih odnosa uključuju raspravu o mogućnosti mira među državama, kao i o ulozi transnacionalnih odnosa između pojedinaca u ra-zvoju mirnih odnosa. Dok oni liberalnih svjetonazora polažu veće nade u potencijal turizma kao promicatelja mira, oni nešto realističnijih pogleda skeptični su prema tomu procesu (Kim, Prideaux i Prideaux, 2007.).

Studija o stvaranju prisnijih mirnih odnosa ispitala je interakciju izraelskih turista na odmoru na obalama Sinajskoga poluotoka u Egiptu (južno od međunarodne gran-ice s Izraelom) i egipatskih domaćina, kao i njezin utjecaj na smanjenje predrasuda i negativnih stereotipa (Maoz, 2010.; Uriely, Maoz i Reichel, 2009.). Element mira mogao bi biti značajan i ključan dio razvoja turizma graničnih područja, uzevši u obzir da granična područja karakter-iziraju društveni, politički, ekonomski i ekološki kontrasti među narodima. Mnoga su granična područja pretrpjela – a neka još uvijek trpe – svađe, ratove i sukobe koji su naslijeđe sukoba interesa ili povijesnih borbi preostalih iz prošlosti (Timothy, 2001.). Oko tih se čimbenika, kao i drugih, razvi-jaju znamenitosti koje svjedoče vrijednostima povijesnoga i nacionalnoga naslijeđa, prirode i ekologije. Kada se toj kombinaciji dodaju i razvoj i planiranje turizma, otvara se mogućnost za realizaciju turističkoga potencijala. Kada razvoj turizma i mir počnu igrati glavne uloge u povijesti

nekoga područja, ono postaje atraktivnije kao turističko odredište (Gelbman, 2010.).

Turizam i geopolitički odnosi Izraela i susjednih država

Izrael se nalazi na Bliskome istoku, na istočnoj obali Sredozemnoga mora, okružen Libanonom sa sjevera, Sirijom sa sjeveroistoka, Jordanom s istoka i Egiptom s jugozapada. Kao država, Izrael nudi bogat turistički proizvod kroz kombinaciju povijesnih, kulturnih i vjerskih lokacija, kao i moderne znamenitosti i pogodnosti, raznolik krajolik i klimu. Zahvaljujući ovoj raskoši kulture, povijesti i prirode – na tako malenome geografskom području – Izrael je 2013. godine privukao više od 3 milijuna međunarodnih posjetitelja. Turistički dolasci u Izrael fluktuiraju kroz godine, uglavnom kao rezultat geopolitičke situacije u regiji, što je razumljivo ako uzmemo u obzir da je turizam posebno osjetljiv na probleme koje u sebi sadržavaju političke granice (Tucker i Sundberg, 1988.). Niz je godina turistički potencijal Izraela ostajao neiskorišten jer je postojala odbojnost prema putovanju u zemlju punu nesigurnosti i nestabilnih geopolitičkih uvjeta.

Sukob u regiji nije ništa novo. Arapski su napadi na Židove započeli 20-ih i 30-ih godina 20. stoljeća kao reakcija na cionističku aktivnost ponovnoga uspostavljanja židovskih naselja. Šest je arapskih zemalja organiziralo zajednički oružani otpor odluci Ujedinjenih naroda iz 1947. godine da nekadašnji britanski mandat u Palestini podijeli između Židova i Arapa koji tamo žive. Iz sukoba je uslijedio rat koji se u Izraelu službeno zove Izraelski rat za nezavisnost. Nekadašnja je Palestina tako podijeljena na tri dijela: Izrael,

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dijelove koje je pripojilo Kraljevstvo Jordan i pojas Gaze pod egipatskom vlašću. Kao ishod rata 1967. godine, u kojemu je Izrael nadjačao savez Egipta, Sirije i Jordana, čitava je historijska Palestina pala u ruke Židova. Budućnost zauzetih područja i njihova značajnoga arapskog stanovništva, kao i sve većega palestinskog nacionalizma, postala je predmetom rasprave i neslaganja.

Dok je mirovni sporazum s Egiptom potpisan 1978. godine, pet godina nakon Jomkipurskoga rata 1973. godine palestinsko je pitanje ostalo neriješeno. U središte je pozor-nosti opet došlo 1988. godine izbijanjem civilnoga ustanka Arapa (“Intifada”). Nakon Zaljevskoga rata 1991. godine pritisak Sjedinjenih Američkih Država rezultirao je pregov-orima o mogućnosti mirovnoga sporazuma između Izraela, njegovih arapskih susjeda i Palestinaca. Ishod je bio for-malna granica i mirovni pregovori između Izraela i Jordana 1994. godine nakon kojih je uslijedio proces određivanja i označivanja granica između dviju država. Ova je granica, jednako kao i egipatska, sada otvorena za turizam s obiju strana. Sporazumi potpisani s Palestincima još uvijek nisu doveli do konačnoga dogovora o granicama između Izraela i Palestinske samouprave (Gelbman, 2008.).

Unatoč mirovnim pregovorima između Izraela, Egipta i Jordana, granice tih država nisu normalizirani kako bi postali slobodni prijelazi za turiste, no potencijal postoji. Za razliku od njih, granice sa Sirijom, Libanonom i Palestinskom samoupravom ostaju tri kompleksna, neriješena problema. Izrael također kontrolira okupirana područja (Golansku visoravan na sjeveru i Judeju i Samariju na istoku). Na temelju sporazuma potpisanih s Palestinskom samoupravom tijekom 90-ih godina značajni dijelovi Judeje,

Samarije i pojasa Gaze, uključujući arapske gradove, pod kontrolom su Palestinske samouprave (Gelbman, 2008.).

Postavljanje sigurnosne ograde (ponekad nazivane “zidom” u urbanim sredinama) započelo je početkom prvoga desetljeća 21. stoljeća. Taj je korak poduzela izraelska vlada kako bi spriječila infiltracije s područja Palestinske samou-prave i terorističke akcije usmjerene protiv meta u Izraelu. Ograda je kamen spoticanja, kako na regionalnoj, tako i na međunarodnoj razini (Gelbman i Keinan, 2007.). Važno je istaknuti da se unatoč složenosti i osjetljivosti spome-nute geopolitičke situacije, turizam u Izraelu i Palestinskoj samoupravi (na odredištima poput Betlehema i Jerihona) kontinuirano razvija uz suradnju i koordinaciju s obiju strana (primjerice, omogućujući turistima prijelaz iz Jeruzalema u Betlehem i letove u i iz područja Palestinske samouprave preko zračnih luka u Izraelu).

Također postoji i prekogranični turizam između Izraela i susjednoga Egipta i Jordana, gdje – unatoč spo-menutim mirovnim sporazumima – dinamika prijelaza tih međunarodnih granica nije tako slobodna kao, primjerice, među državama zapadne Europe. Neprijeporno je da složena geopolitička stvarnost koja okružuje Izrael i susjedne države, baš kao i odnosi židovske većine i arapske manjine u Izraelu, predstavlja izazov razvoju turizma kulturnoga naslijeđa kao sredstva promicanja mira i suradnje, pogotovo u pograničnim područjima, gdje i danas vladaju kontrasti i razlike.

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Turizam kulturnoga naslijeđa i mir: studije slučajeva u Izraelu i susjednim zemljama

Složena geopolitička stvarnost opisana u prošlim odlomcima nanovo otvara pitanje potencijala turizma i naslijeđa da služe kao pokretač stvaranja bliskijih mirovnih odnosa i pomirenja ljudi i zemalja koje su pretrpjele ili trpe produljeni sukob, kao u slučaju Izraela i susjednih zemalja. Iz perspektive tih pitanja cilj je ovoga poglavlja ispitati i analizirati potencijal dvaju lokaliteta mirovnoga turizma u Izraelu za odašiljanje poruke suradnje i pomirbe i doprinos poboljšanju slike odno-sa među nacijama u regiji u kontekstu prošlih i trenutačnih sukoba. Prva je studija slučaja Otok mira, turističko središte na izraelsko-jordanskoj granici, čiji planovi za budućnost uključuju otvaranje parka mira. Drugi je slučaj Međunarodna staza mira koja prelazi granicu koja odvaja Betlehem u Palestinskoj samoupravi od Jeruzalema u Izraelu.

Otok miraPrema izraelsko-jordanskom mirovnom sporazumu, područ-je Otoka mira treba služiti promicanju mira kroz turizam. Izgrađen je poseban ulaz za turiste kroz koji Izraelci mogu posjetiti otok (a time i ući u Jordan) makar nakratko i uvijek u skupini uz pratnju licenciranih izraelskih turističkih vo-diča. Otok mira koji – kao što je spomenuto – treba postati parkom mira (ECOTECH Jordan, 2008.) lokacija je na ušću rijeke Jordan i rijeke Jarmuk, na samoj granici Izraela i Jordana i blizu tromeđe sa Sirijom.

Ovaj otok na sirijsko-afričkomu grebenu od strateške je važnosti već niz godina. Rijeka Jordan čini dio granice duž brazde te je otok dosta patio zbog blizine tromeđe Sirije, Jordana i Izraela. Sada je turistička atrakcija na obalama

rijeke Jordan. U travnju 1948. godine bio je prvo naselje koje je napala Arapska legija. U svibnju iste godine bio je metom i iračkoga napada. Sam lokalitet uključuje tri stara mosta, jednu staru britansku policijsku postaju, stare željezničke tračnice te jedan stari khan (svratište za putnike) iz srednjega vijeka [slika 1] (Ashdot Tourism Infrastructure Development, 2007.; Gelbman, 2008.).

Između 1948. i 1994. godine otok je bio dijelom pograničnoga teritorija koji je razdvajao Izrael od Jordana. Međutim, mirovni je sporazum dviju zemalja iz 1994. godine čitav otok stavio pod upravu Jordana. Sama se granica pomaknula na rukavac rijeke zapadno od otoka. Danas je otok posve pod jordanskom upravom s pravom izraelskoga vlasništva zemlje. Turisti ga smatraju popularnim odredištem, uključujući lijep pogled na granicu Jordana i Izraela. Turistima nije potrebna viza za Jordan kako bi ušli na otok pod uvjetom da su u skupini i u pratnji licenciranoga lokal-nog turističkog vodiča (Gelbman, 2008.). Nevladina udruga Friends of the Earth in the Middle East već nekoliko godina planira uspostaviti mirovni park uz suradnju obiju strana i ohrabrenje i podršku međunarodnih tijela. Nedavno potpisani sporazum između čelnika regionalnih vijeća Izraela i Jordana prepoznaje važnost očuvanja rijeke Jordan te ističe potenci-jal promicanja mira u stvaranju međugraničnoga mirovnog parka utemeljenoga na ekološkim vrijednostima i kulturnome naslijeđu područja oko Otoka mira u Naharajimu. Među mogućim se projektima u parku spominju utočište za ptice oko umjetnoga jezera i kanala, ekološke gostinjske kuće, turistički centar u napuštenoj elektrani i obnovljena područja od povijesnoga značaja poput rimskoga mosta i carinarnice (ECOTECH Jordan, 2008.; Gelbman I Maoz, 2012.).

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Stvaranjem zaštićenoga područja s obiju strana rijeke otvorit će se više mogućnosti za zaštitu bioraznolikosti, zadružno upravljanje, zajedničke istraživačke programe, obrazovanje i suradnju na prirodnome turizmu. Dok je nužnost granične zone očita objema stranama, ove su dvije zemlje već stvorile presedane otvaranju granica za nadzi-rani turizam s vodstvom na nekoliko lokacija. Čelnici Regionalnoga vijeća jordanske doline (Izrael), Regionalnoga vijeća doline Beit Šean te općine Muaz Bin Džabal (Jordan) potpisali su memorandum o razumijevanju kojim se službeno proglašava osnivanje parka mira kao mjesta koje će povratiti ponos dolini rijeke i stvoriti nove prilike za lokalno stanovništvo (Friends of the Earth Middle East, 2008.). Poteškoće u ostvarenju ovoga plana posve su očekivane, no sam čin planiranja i rada na promicanju vizije suradnje među odgovornima s obiju strana granice, uz ohrabrenje i podršku međunarodnih organizacija i udruga, dobar je znak jer je proces kao takav i važan i pozitivan, a i potiče veze i kontakte s obiju strana granice. Također je to dobar način da se viziju pokuša pretvoriti u stvarnost s pomoću razvoja tur-izma kao sredstva jačanja i zatopljavanja mirovnih odnosa (Gelbman, 2008.).

Betlehemsko-jeruzalemska prekogranična utrka za mir

Godišnja Utrka za mir (ponekad nazivana maratonom, iako ne ispunjava službene kriterije za to) održavala se od 2004. do 2011. godine, a njezino se održavanje planira i za budućnost. Posvećena je spomenu na papu Ivana Pavla II. Ta je utrka neobična međunarodna sportska aktivnost s obzirom da se održava u samome srcu kompleksnoga i

napetoga zempljopisnog područja Svete zemlje. Njezin je cilj dati mali, ali značajan doprinos mirovnim nastojanjima između Izraelaca i Palestinaca. Prvi se put počela održavati tijekom “Intifade” (palestinskoga ustanka koji je započeo krajem 2000. godine) kada je zbog geopolitičkih napetosti broj vanjskih posjeta Izraelu opao. Opera Romana Pellegrinaggi, organizator hodočašća iz Vatikana, uputio je zahtjev izraelskomu ministarstvu turizma da pomogne pri organizaciji posebnoga betlehemsko-jeruzalemskoga maratona u kojemu bi Izraelci, Palestinci i Europljani sudjelovali s jasnim ciljem promicanja mira u regiji, kao i poticanja katoličkih hodočašća u Svetu zemlju. Na prvi je pogled ovakva inicijativa djelovala zastrašujuće s obzirom da nekima nije bilo lako zamisliti Palestince kako trče rame uz rame s Izraelcima i Talijanima, posebno s obzirom na proces prelaska granice između Betlehema i Jeruzalema.

Glavni su ciljevi utrke, prema Vatikanu, bili sljedeći: nastaviti naslijeđe pape Ivana Pavla II. za mir, bratstvo i međuvjersku suradnju; povećati katolička hodočašća u Svetu zemlju i upotrebljavati kombinaciju hodočašća i sporta kao “pobjedničku formulu” za promicanje dijaloga među lju-dima. Vizija utrke bila je organizacija godišnjega natjecanja kao simboličnoga sportsko-hodočasničkoga događaja. Objedinjavanje sportskoga i vjerskoga aspekta trebalo je pobuditi javni interes za međuvjersku manifestaciju koja spaja katolike, židove i muslimane – Izraelce, Palestince i Europljane.

Prijateljska utrka od 10 km obuhvaća cestu koja odvaja Betlehem od Jeruzalema, cestu kojom putuju hodočasnici, sportaši i šira javnost (Talijani, Izraelci i Palestinci). Organizatori vjeruju da ta kombinacija hodočašća i sporta

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ima dobar potencijal za otvaranje dijaloga među ljudima. Također vjeruju i da univerzalni jezik sporta ne treba pri-jevod, dok hodočašće – odnosno, u ovome slučaju, svaki hodočasnik – nosi poruku mira.

Utrke koje su se održavale od 2004. do 2011. godine organizatori smatraju uspjelima jer su ispunile postavljene ciljeve. Broj sudionika narastao je od 15-ero 2004. godine do 300 2011. godine, uz mnoge druge posjetitelje koji su gledali utrku. No glavni je doprinos utrke došao u obliku iscrpne medijske pokrivenosti koju je dobila [slika 2]. Ona je uključivala nekoliko elemenata koji ističu simboliku mira, poput trkača koji prelaze ogradu koja razdvaja Betlehem i Jeruzalem, igre i sportske aktivnosti pored zida te potpisiv-anje zajedničke mirovne deklaracije. Ti su se elementi odra-zili i u medijskome pokriću događaja.

Slika sudionika iz Italije, Palestinske samouprave i Izraela – katolika, muslimana i židova – kako trče zajedno bila je uzbudljiva samim sudionicima, ali je i privukla značajan medijski interes, pa su fotografije događaja prenijeli tiskani i elektronski mediji na lokalnoj, region-alnoj i međunarodnoj razini. Dok se vijesti iz regije u međunarodnim medijima uglavnom svode na pitanja sigurn-osti poput terorizma i nasilja, u slučaju Utrke za mir radilo se o vijesti koja naglašava suradnju, dobru volju, prijateljstvo i trud za ostvarenje mira.

ZaključciKulturno se naslijeđe odnosi na one materijalne i nematerijalne tragove povijesne prošlosti koje društvo bira očuvati za sadašnje i buduće naraštaje, a turizam kulturne baštine igra važnu ulogu u tome procesu. Dok to

naslijeđe uključuje elemente prošlih geopolitičkih konflikata ili zahladnjelih mirovnih odnosa, kao u slučaju Izraela i susjednih država, osobito je važno raditi na razvoju turističkih odredišta koja potiču naslijeđe mira, suradnje među narodima i dobrosusjedskih odnosa. Turistička odredišta na geopolitičkim granicama koje su patile – ili pate – od sukoba i neslaganja, poput granice Izraela i susjednih država, također mogu postati i mjesta koja potiču mirovne odnose jednom kada se geopolitička situacija promijeni, ili alternativno, kada obje strane budu zainteresirane za poticanje suradnje i slanje poruke pomirbe ili suživota.

Dvije studije slučaja u ovome članku bave se lokaci-jama na geopolitičkoj granici između Izraela i susjednih država. U slučaju Otoka mira radi se o dogovorenoj, ured-noj granici Izraela i Jordana koja je u prošlosti pretrpjela sučeljavanja i sukobe, a u slučaju Utrke za mir od Betlehema do Jeruzalema radi se o granici između Izraela i Palestinske samouprave oko koje ne postoji dogovor i koja često služi kao izvor rasprava i sukoba. Unatoč tragovima prošlosti i sadašnjim poteškoćama, čini se da obje studije slučaja uka-zuju na znatan potencijal za razvoj turizma koji promiče poruku mira i suradnje. Plan je da se Otok mira pro-glasi parkom mira koji će uključivati znamenitosti poput povijesnih ostataka, kao i mjestom ekološkoga turizma, te da tako spoji turiste iz Izraela, Jordana i ostatka svijeta.

Utrka za mir primjer je visoko simboličnoga sportskog turizma gdje Izraelci, Palestinci i međunarodni sudionici prelaze granicu i zajedno prenose poruku da su suradnja i dobrosusjedski odnosi mogući. Glede tekuće debate oko pitanja može li turizam utjecati na promicanje mira i razu-mijevanja među narodima, čini se da čak i ako je utjecaj

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razvoja ovih znamenitosti mirovnoga turizma ograničen, njihov je značaj svejedno ogroman i to ne samo za turiste koji ih posjećuju, već i zato što stvaraju kap promjene i mijenjaju predodžbu o mjestu mutne prošlosti nabolje, a i zato što prenose poruke dobre volje i suradnje među nar-odima koje pomažu izgraditi pozitivniju sliku za sadašnje i buduće naraštaje.

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Points of No Return: Cultural Heritage and Counter-Memory in Post-Yugoslavia

Andrew Herscher1

1 Andrew Herscher received his PhD from Harvard University in 2002. His work explores the architectural and urban forms of political violence, cultural memory, collective identity, and human rights, focusing on modern and contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. He has been particularly involved in the Balkans, where he has worked for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as an investigator and expert witness on the war-time destruction of cultural heritage; directed the Department of Culture of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo; and co-founded and co-directed the NGO, Kosovo Cultural Heritage Project. His book, Violence Taking Place: The Architecture of the Kosovo Conflict, was published by Stanford University Press in 2010 in the series “Cultural Memory in the Present.”

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“Preserve it: it’s yours!” In Albanian, Serbian and English, this message—or, more precisely, this command—appeared on billboards throughout Prishtina, the capital of Kosovo, in the summer of 2004 [photo 1]. The billboards displayed what the people of Kosovo ought to preserve in a series of twelve images. Each image showed a historical site: the Dečani and Gračanica Monasteries, the Sinan Pasha Mosque, an Ottoman-era konak, the Prizren League Building, traditional stone tower houses, the Roman-era Ulpiana archaeological excavations, and so on. These sites comprised an exemplary set. Including Byzantine and Ottoman heritage, Christian and Islamic patrimony, Serb and Albanian monuments, and high and vernacular culture, this set represented nothing less than the United Colors of Kosovo, a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Kosovo of vivid and complementary differen-ces. Looming above all other images on the billboards was the extra-terrestrial form of a Neolithic figurine, among the oldest products of human culture discovered in the territory that is now known as Kosovo. The figurine’s size and posi-tion on the billboard were easy to understand; as a pre-ethnic artifact, it was the only heritage object whose multi-ethnic credentials were truly impeccable.

Sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, the billboards were a response to what Kosovo’s government, as well as many international institutions, delicately termed the “March events.” In these “events,” which took place a few months previously in the same year, Kosovar Albanian demonstrators expelled many of the few remaining Serbs in Kosovo and destroyed 35 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries, as well. This was the destruction of the property of a despised ethnic other, an

A. Herscher

other judged responsible for prior acts of violence, including violence against heritage that Albanians identified with. At least according to the Ministry, however, all this heri-tage actually belonged to all ethnicities in Kosovo, hence the injunction to preserve it—not because it was the other’s, it is important to note, but because it was everyone’s. The Ministry’s preservation campaign thus attempted to enlist Kosovo’s citizenry in what may be regarded as a state-spon-sored curatorship of cultural heritage. The Ministry posed the “memory” of a common multi-ethnic heritage as an antidote to what is usually understood as “ethnic violence.” Heritage was thereby recruited as a medium of interpella-tion, an instrument to produce the subjects and subjectivities deemed appropriate to a post-violent regime of order, stabi-lity and reconciliation.

On one level, however, this curatorial project merely extended the project it was designed to overcome—the war-time project of enlisting heritage as the patrimony of a vio-lent ethnic other. In that case, heritage was also a medium of interpellation, producing the ethnic(ized) subjects appro-priate to and supportive of communal violence.2 Postwar preservation fixed on the same objects, but merely transfor-med their significations from narrowly ethnic to broadly multi-ethnic—“the common patrimony of all of Kosovo’s ethnic, religious and linguistic communities,” in the acade-mically-inflected words of the preservation campaign. In the campaign, then, the difficult knowledge of Kosovo’s recent

2 See Andrew Herscher, Violence Taking Place: The Architecture of the Kosovo Conflict (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

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past of ethnicizing violence was thus not only curated but disappeared, with its material remainders reinscribed into the seemingly kinder, gentler context of postwar multi-ethnic brotherhood and unity.3

Yet there were a number of different responses to the state’s curatorial project. As theorists of interpellation have described, analysis of interpellation must account for diverse and often contradictory reactions that interpellation sponsors—“the multitude of heterogeneous resistances and revolts,” in the words of Michel Pecheux, “which smolder beneath dominant ideology, threatening it constantly.”4 It is these “resistances” and “revolts” that establish interpellation as a fraught, contested interface between the institutions of government and the governed; interpellation thus becomes enmeshed in what Michel Foucault termed the “strategic reversibility” of power relations—the ways in which prac-tices of governing can be reformulated as objects of resi-stance, or “counter-politics,” on the part of the governed.

In the context of memory studies, such counter-poli-tics have typically been considered in terms of what James E. Young has termed the “counter-monument.”5 Young’s

3 On the institution of multi-ethnicity in post-Yugoslavia, see Robert M. Hayden, “Intolerant Sovereignties and ‘Multi-Multi’ Protectorates: Competition Over Religious Sites and (In)tolerance in the Balkans,” in Postsocialism: Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia, ed. C. M. Hann (New York: Routledge, 2002).

4 Michel Pecheux, Language, Semantics, Ideology: Stating the Obvious, trans. Harbans Nagpal (London: Macmillan, 1982), 26.

5 James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

notion of counter-monumentality is itself indebted to Pierre Nora’s formative historicization of collective memory. Nora posited a primordial time in which memory was “a real part of everyday existence.”6 This was a time, according to Nora, when communities existed in “ethnographical slumbers,” when “ideologies based on memory… smoothed the tran-sition from past to future,” when “memory without a past … eternally recycles a heritage”; this was, that is, a time without history.7 For Nora, history—as change, dispersal or alterity—“eradicated” memory and milieux de mémoire; “at the heart of history,” he wrote, “is a criticism destructive of spontaneous memory.”8 To live in history, for Nora, is to be able to access memory only from a distance, through medi-ation, in a virtual, incomplete or inauthentic form: “the less memory is experienced from within, the greater its need for external props and tangible reminders.”9 Nora’s supposition is that authentic memory, “experienced from within”, does not rely on non-human or inhuman sites, forms or objects; the latter, which Nora calls lieux de mémoire, are “exterior” to memory, substituting for human memory work, and so historically subsequent to the pre-historical time when such memory work proceeded unimpeded, unrepresented, in sublime ignorance of itself. For Nora, the time of memory

6 Pierre Nora, The Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1.

7 Nora, The Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, 2.



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was not only a time without history, but also a time without monuments.

By posing “memory” as temporally prior to and con-ceptually independent of “history,” Nora is compelled to regard contemporary sites of memory and other forms of historical inscription as compensatory at best and inadequate at worst, mere substitutes for memory work undertaken in the fullness of time, without need for material prostheses, by human consciousness itself. For Nora, the contemporary monument assumes “the responsibility of remembering,” an assumption that involves a loss for the human subject, who is divested of remembrance as a fundamental and proper mode of existence.10 Here, Kosovo’s heritage preservation campa-ign could be posed as symptomatic, with Kosovo’s citizens enlisted not to remember anything of the past, but merely to preserve the objects and sites that seemingly perform that memory work in their stead.

James Young fully assimilates Nora’s distinction between memory and history in his formulation of the coun-ter-monument. For Young, as for Nora, monuments, “in shouldering the memory work … may relieve viewers of their memory burdens.”11 The critical task for a monument, according to Young, is to work against this relief and deliver this burden back to the human subject, to whom it properly belongs. Young uses the term “counter-monument” to des-cribe those monuments that fulfill this task, that “return the


11 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 5.

burden of memory to visitors themselves by forcing visitors into an active role.”12 The effect of a counter-monument, he therefore writes, should be to leave “nothing but the visitors themselves standing in remembrance, left to look inward for memory”—a temporary return to what Nora described as the pre-historical milieu de mémoire.13

Young understands the counter-monument as a device to recuperate memory as human praxis, the praxis it suppo-sedly once was, the praxis that Nora poses as displaced by history. From this position, Young has discovered counter-monumentality in projects whose physical form is somehow negated, elusive, transient or nondescript. In these discove-ries, the humanist narrative of living memory becoming dis-placed by the dead forms of history is played out in reverse; the undead forms of the counter-monument bring memory back to life. This revival of memory is valorized on its own terms, as if the preservation of memory was valuable in and of itself. Thus, Young privileges the “perpetual irresolution” of memory questions because only this guarantees the “life of memory.”14 “The countermonument reminds us that the best German memorial to the fascist era and its victims may not be a single memorial at all—but simply the never-to-be-resolved debate over which kind of memory to preserve,

12 James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 118.

13 Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture, 96.


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how to do it, in whose name, and to what end.”15 What’s at stake in the counter-monument, then, is the perpetuation of memory—a substitution for the inadequate lieu de mémoire and a recuperation of the lost milieu de mémoire.

For Young, the “never-to-be-resolved debate” about the past that the counter-monument should initiate and maintain is opposed to sheer forgetting. At the same time, however, Young’s investment in unresolvable memory can also be understood as an investment in the psychic state that Sigmund Freud defined as “melancholia.” In a now-famous distinction, Freud opposed mourning, in which a subject works through the loss of a love object and comes to accept that loss, to melancholia, in which the subject, unconsci-ous of loss, withdraws its attachment to the lost object into itself.16 In Freud’s words, “the shadow of the object (falls) upon the ego” of the melancholic subject, who then obsessi-vely acts out its identification with the lost object.17 Thus, if mourning involves a coming-to-terms with what may be regarded as the “difficult knowledge” of loss, then melan-cholia involves acting-out of this difficulty instead. Young’s stake in the sheer perpetuation of memory represents a rehabilitation of melancholia as critical practice—a gesture, moreover, that has been rehearsed and reprised in many other


16 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in On Metapsychology, ed. A Richards (Harmondsworch: Penguin, 1984).

17 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 258.

contemporaneous contexts and discourses.18 His idealization of unresolvable debates about memory, of endless discussions of how and what to remember—in short, of remembrance as an end in and of itself—testify to a melancholic atta-chment, an attachment that should not be worked through and overcome but one that should be acted out, over and over, without hope of or even desire for release. As theorists of melancholy have pointed out, the focus of the melancholic attachment is not so much a lost object as an unobtainable one.19 In this sense, Young’s reading of the counter-monu-ment would become not so much a response to the loss of Holocaust memory, as it poses itself, but to the epistemic absence of memory in the historical era as described by Nora. This absence is irrecuperable. How to remember the loss of memory? A perfect question for melancholic revery.

But could more be at stake in the question of memory than merely the perpetuation of memory itself? What if memory could provide not only such a perpetuation, a reflection of a time before history a la Nora, but also an intervention into history, an intervention with unique possi-bilities and agencies? What if the difficult knowledge of past violence offers itself up for more than simply remembering or forgetting? What if counter-memories of such difficult

18 See Slavoj Žižek, “Melancholia and the Act,” Critical Inquiry 26 (Summer 2000).

19 “Melancholy would not be so much the regressive reaction to the loss of the love object as the imaginative capacity to make an unobtainable object appear as if lost.” See Giorgio Agamben, Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, trans. Ronald I. Martinez (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 20.

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knowledge provide not only representations of the past but also intimations of the future, of ways to propel memory into politics? What if the possibility of counter-memory, of “memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger,” is to bring about change—a “real state of emergency”—which is to say, history?20 What if a self-reflexive curatorship of knowledge of loss would be one that could acknowledge its own historical contingency, its own passage into something different—its own loss?

In raising these questions, I would like to explore the counter-politics of memory without fixing on the counter-monument as the decisive instrument of those politics and without positing memory-as-such as their only possible outcome. Rather, in what follows, I will examine some of the multifarious forms in which resistance to historic preser-vation has assumed, in Kosovo and throughout post-Yugo-slavia. In particular, my interest is in how memory is not simply “perpetuated” in this resistance, but actively displa-ced, distorted, parodied, exaggerated or otherwise transfor-med. My examination will be organized according to what Pecheux calls “counter-identifications” and “disidentificati-ons” with interpellation. These other forms of identification have yielded alternatives to the preservative respect towards heritage that states, post-conflict and otherwise, typically seek; they have also comprised attempts to enlist heritage in the acknowledgement and political mobilization of the diffi-cult knowledge of the past, rather than in the disappearance

20 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 255, 257.

of this knowledge in the name of post-conflict reconciliation. What follows, then, is not organized around the opposed poles of “remembering” and “forgetting”; rather, I am inte-rested in the many forms that remembrance can take, some which may even appear like forgetting and all which com-prise, in relation to state-sponsored memory, remembering otherwise. Attention to these alternative forms of memory suggests not only that, as Young has already argued, “the monument has increasingly become the site of contested and competing meanings,” but also that the monument has become a medium by which individuals and collectives enter into and participate in political discourse and action.21

Counter-identifications have contested the status of cultural objects as heritage deserving of respect, as patri-mony of specified communities, and as artifacts necessary to preserve. More generally, counter-identifications also contest the seemingly agentive nature of identification; they pose identification with heritage not so much as a possibility as a necessity, the only legitimate relation to heritage in a context where identification with heritage is a means of assuming and maintaining order. Counter-identifications with heritage can take the form of either under- or over-identification, each embodying a refusal of the affective response, social action or political effects that cultural heritage conventionally soli-cits. These refusals, however, are not symmetrical.

Under-identification is the explicit opposite of identi-fication; withholding, protesting or contradicting the respect


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for heritage that identification engenders, under-identifica-tion comprises what Slavoj Žižek has termed an “inherent transgression.” As such, under-identification is structured into heritage ideology insofar as that ideology presumes resi-stance as part of its very operation. A critical refusal of this ideology, then, does not take the form of its explicit refusal, or under-identification, but rather its obsessive acceptance, or over-identification. As Žižek has argued, In so far as power relies on its ‘inherent transgression’, then, sometimes, at least, overidentifying with the explicit power discourse—ignoring this inherent obscene underside and simply taking the power discourse at its (public) word, acting as if it really means what it explicitly says (and promises) can be the most effective way of disturbing its smooth functioning.22

Whether a particular intervention comprises under-identification, over-identification, or identification, however, is itself a matter of interpretation. Consider, for example, vandalism, which aims not at the preservation of heritage but rather at its deformation or destruction. The vandalism of the cultural heritage of ethnic others during the wars of Yugoslav succession can easily be regarded as under-iden-tifications with that heritage, withholding and even contra-dicting the respect that heritage conventionally demands. And yet, in the context of postwar reconstruction, vandalism is a highly-charged aesthetic practice mediating multiple forms of identification. In one example from 1998, the pro-ject Black Peristyle (Crni Peristil), a large black circle was

22 Slavoj Žižek, “Da Capo senza Fine,” in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony and Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (New York: Verso, 2000), 220.

clandestinely painted on the stone floor of the peristyle of Diocletian’s Palace in Split, Croatia [photo 2].23 The peristyle was the center of the palace, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and one of the most historically-significant cultural heritage sites in Croatia. The painting of a black circle in the peristyle was thus classified by public authorities in Split as an act of vandalism against a monument of cultural heritage—an act of under-identification.

Yet a note, signed “Black Peristyle” and left on the door of a nearby tourist agency, read: “In honor of the group Red Peristyle (Crveni peristil), thirty years later, the Peristyle, as a magic mirror, reflects the state of society’s conscience.”24 This note referred to a project, completed thirty years earlier to the day, when the floor of the peristyle was painted red—an artistic project that was also classi-fied as vandalism. Under-identification with the peristyle as heritage of antiquity also involved an identification with Red Perityle as heritage of modernity. The invocation of modernist heritage extended beyond Red Peristyle: the black circle painted on the palace’s floor, potentially reminiscent of Kazimir Malevich’s black circles, was later termed by Grubić “a legacy from Suprematism and Constructivism.”25

At stake in Black Peristyle, then, is not simply whether

23 The project was eventually claimed by the artist, Igor Grubić; see Suzana Marjanić, “Aktivizmom protiv crne mrlje na duši: razgovor s Igorom Grubićem,” Zarez, 219 (29 November 2007), http://www.zarez.hr/219/kazaliste3.html.

24 Marjanić, “Aktivizmom protiv crne mrlje na duši: razgovor s Igorom Grubićem.”

25 Marjanić, “Aktivizmom protiv crne mrlje na duši: r. s I. Grubićem.”

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or not to remember cultural heritage; rather, the project suggests a modernist alternative to a classical genealogy of heritage. At the same time, this alternative wasn’t posed in the spirit of liberal politics as simply the object of a “choice”; it was, rather, an active and even violent displacement, an alternative that took the place of what it was posed as an alternative to. The under-identification with Diocletian’s Palace as cultural heritage in its given form thus mediated an identification with another formulation of heritage, the heri-tage of modernism.

The status of an under-identification with one heritage object as, simultaneously, an identification with other heri-tage objects is pronounced not only in vandalism, but also in protests over the definition of cultural objects as heritage. For example, in May 2007, the Kosovar Albanian NGO, Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), protested the building of a protective wall around the Byzantine-era Patriarchate in Peć, Kosovo, seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church and focal point of Kosovo’s Serb cultural identity. For the Serbian Orthodox Church, the wall was an objectively-necessary instrument of protection, especially important after the destruction inflicted on Serbian Orthodox churches and monuments in the “March events.” After those events, the low wall surrounding the Patriarchate appeared wholly inadequate to block hostile acti-ons against its buildings and grounds.

For Vetëvendosje, however, the wall was a symbolic expression of the Patriarchate’s status as exclusively Serb property, unavailable to both the predominantly Albanian city of Peć and the predominantly Albanian state of Kosovo. In a demonstration outside the Patriarchate, Vetëvendosje members built a section of a barbed-wire barricade and

displayed posters proclaiming “No New Walls,” “Kosovo Will Not Be Palestine” and “Peja is Not Mitrovice”.26 Vetëvendosje’s protest did not refuse the status of the Patriarchate as heritage as such; rather, it refused its pre-sumed status as specifically Serb heritage, managed not by the Kosovar state but by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Yet Vetëvendosje’s refusal was not made in the name of secula-rism or the state, but of Kosovar Albanian nationalism. Thus, the organization conjoined protests against the Patriarchate’s new wall with the publication of historical narratives docu-menting the Orthodox Church’s supposedly Albanian roots and political narratives asserting exclusive Albanian soverei-gnty in Kosovo.27 The protest thus comprised both an under-identification with the Patriarchate’s status as Serb patri-monial heritage and an identification with the Patriarchate’s cryptic status as Albanian heritage.

If the preceding two examples are typical, then under-identification with one heritage object or genealogy is a vehicle for identification with yet another object or genea-logy. This slippage between under-identification and identi-fication might be understood to testify to the status of under-identification as implicitly included in dominant systems of heritage management and historic preservation. Under-identification, in this sense, would be a kind of oppositional identification, explicitly positioned against an existing or

26 Peja is the Albanian name of Peć and Mitrovice is a city that was divided between Serbs and Albanians in the aftermath of the 1998-99 war.

27 Vetëvendosje!, 43 (23 May 2007).

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dominant alternative. Yet if under-identifications are thereby inscribed in ideological systems of heritage management and preservation, over-identifications present such systems with a more profound challenge by presuming to take its claims and imperatives more rigorously than it is capable of doing itself.

One example of such an over-identification is the piece, “JBT 27.12.2004,” in which the Croatian artist Dalibor Martinis photographed himself standing on a plinth formerly occupied by a bronze statue of Josip Brož Tito, founder of socialist Yugoslavia [photo 3]. The statue, in Tito’s birt-hplace of Kumrovec, Croatia, was destroyed—a perfor-mance of under-identification with socialist heritage—on 27 December 2004, a date commemorated in the title of Martinis’ piece. Mere identification with the statue would yield either a project to reconstruct it or, perhaps, preserve its empty plinth. But Martinis over-identified with the pre-servationist agenda by collapsing the distinction between the preserving subject and the preserved object; on the plinth, he became both subject and object, both preserving and preserved. In so doing, Martinis’ work makes manifest the distance that is maintained in “normal” identification with heritage and raises questions about just what sort of effects this identification can have. When human beings preserve “their” heritage in conventional ways, in other words, how can this preservation actually shape or alter them? Narrating his experience in an interview, Martinis said that, “when I stood on the marble pedestal with the inscription ‘Josip Brož Tito,’ I realized that I was at a place where it is not possible—neither physically, politically, or symbolically—

for anyone to stand except Tito himself.”28 His realization frames identification, in the form that states typically solicit it, as inherently incomplete, founded on unacknowledged gaps—physical, political and symbolic—between subject and object, between public and monument.

A similar registration of such gaps was accomplished by the Monument to Bruce Lee, erected in Mostar, Bosnia and Hercegovina, in November 2005 by the Bosnian NGO, Urban Movement [photo 4]. Mostar was heavily damaged during the Bosnian war, with the city becoming divided between Bosniaks, in East Mostar, and Croats, in West Mostar. According to Nino Raspudić, Urban Movement’s co-founder and director, Mostar’s division was only amplified in postwar reconstruction: “each one of the two constituent parts of the city is trying to give ‘their own’ space ‘their own’ characteristics, to “possess” it even more by construc-ting their religious and cultural objects and symbols.”29 The sectarian instrumentalization of heritage produced a possibi-lity for heritage to be instrumentalized as, in contrast, multi-ethnic or universal. But instead of reframing local cultural objects as unifying works of heritage, as post-ethnic national governments have tended to do, Urban Movement posed the hero of 1970s kung-fu movies, Bruce Lee, as this object. Lee, according to Raspudić, “was dear to all, no matter our political or ideological convictions … (he) was, above all,

28 Silva Kalčić, “Strategija kušača vina,” Zarez, 147 (27 January 2005), http://www.zarez.hr/147/zariste3.htm.

29 Nino Raspudić, “The Monument to Bruce Lee—Yes and Why?,” http://www.projekt-relations.de/en/get/pressematerial/de_construction.php

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a symbolic bridge between the East and the West.”30 Thus, Raspudić concluded, it was quite appropriate to memorialize Bruce Lee in between the divided Eastern and Western parts of Mostar.

Bruce Lee, a product of late capitalist global culture, was the object of a cosmopolitan and post-ethnic identifi-cation that revealed other objects of such identification as merely ideological. The universality of the cultural heritage that served as the object of “normal” identification becomes a fantasy when compared to the universality of an object of global culture such as Bruce Lee; by over-identifying with the universality of cultural heritage, the Monument to Bruce Lee radicalizes and literalizes universality. In Mostar, the Monument thus stands in sharp contrast to the city’s most renowned work of heritage, the Stari most (Old Bridge), an Ottoman-era bridge over the Neretva River. While it was held by Bosniaks in East Mostar, the bridge was destroyed by Croat army artillery in 1993. This destruction provided a symbol of sectarian conflict in Mostar, while the bridge’s reconstruction, completed in 2004, was framed by its spon-sors and state officials as a sign of that conflict’s overco-ming.31 The Monument to Bruce Lee foregrounds the artifice of such a framing by memorializing a cultural object whose heritage was shared in a far more profound fashion between East and West Mostar. It also raises the question of what counts as heritage and who arrogates responsibility for defi-

30 Raspudić, “The Monument to Bruce Lee—Yes and Why?”

31 See Emily Gunzburger Makaš, “Interpreting Multivalent Sites: New Meanings for Mostar’s Old Bridge,” Centropa 5:1 (January 5).

ning heritage. To see the Monument to Bruce Lee as merely ironic, a parody of “authentic” heritage or an expression of fatigue with heritage politics, is to hold onto conventional notions of authentic heritage and of the state as the arbiter of heritage politics. The radical proposition that the Monument to Bruce Lee advances is that 1970s kung-fu movies are just as much cultural heritage as Ottoman bridges for the popula-tion of Mostar, whether Bosniak or Croat.

In Pecheux’s theorization of the positions that are possible to assume in response to ideological interpella-tion, both identification and counter-identification confirm ideology, the former by passively accepting it and the latter by contesting it. In what Pecheux terms “disidentification,” by contrast, ideology is neither accepted nor contested as such; rather, according to Pecheux, ideology is problema-tized, or disidentified with, with the disidentifying subject correspondingly thrust into new forms of subjectivity.32 Disidentification, in other words, comprises a transformation in ideology from within.

I see this sort of transformation as staged in an inter-vention sited on either side of the reconstructed Old Bridge in Mostar. The intervention comprises two small stone blocks on which are painted the words, in English, “Don’t Forget” [photo 5]. The stones frame views of the bridge from a distance and precede and follow passages over the bridge; the injunction against forgetting is connected both visually and experientially to the bridge, whose reconstruction was

32 Pecheux, Language, Semantics, Ideology: Stating the Obvious, 156-158.

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framed as a crucial recovery of cultural memory. But the message on the stones neither accepts nor rejects this reco-very. Indeed, the message accommodates both acceptance and rejection: the injunction to remember could be read as a confirmation of the reconstruction of the bridge as a reco-very of memory or as a contestation of this recovery.

What should not be forgotten? That an Ottoman bridge once spanned the Neretva River in Mostar? Or that this bridge was destroyed in war and is now reconstructed? Or that this reconstruction involved a destruction of the traces of destruction: a loss of loss, a loss of the memorialization of war? The memory that “Don’t Forget” enjoins is reducible to all of these memories and thus irreducible to any one of them in particular. The intervention raises similar questi-ons about its author and the audience who that author hails. Written in English, the message on the stones is available to both Bosniaks and Croats, as well as to both residents of Mostar and to visitors to the city. Who is authorized to ask for memory? And who is required to remember? These que-stions, too, are posed but not answered.

What ideology typically does is provide answers to these sorts of questions, answers that, in the context of cultural heritage, define subjects in terms of their relation-ship to historical objects. Here, however, this definition is gestured towards but left incomplete. Subjects are implo-red not to forget, but not told what not to forget. Historical objects are confirmed as repositories of memory in general, but not a specified memory in particular. History is situated not in some set of heritage or another, but in the agencies that endow that heritage with meaning. These small stones around the Old Bridge, then, comprise neither a strategic

intervention in the existing order, an identification with heri-tage, or the destructive negation of such an intervention, a counter-identification, but rather, a miniature but nevertheless decisive opening onto a “trans-strategic intervention which redefines the roles and contours of the existing order.”33 According to Pecheux, that is, the command “Don’t Forget” poses questions without answers, but these are not unanswe-rable questions, questions that can only be rehearsed over and over, in melancholic pain/pleasure. Instead, answering is cast as acting, as taking a position, as making an intervention that can change something of “the existing order.”

While identification with heritage is sponsored by post-conflict states as a way to manage difficult knowledge of the past and thereby overcome conflicts and their legacies, counter-identifications and disidentifications with heritage involve the initiation of new conflicts—conflicts over the nature, interpretation and functions of heritage. If identifi-cation with heritage promotes order and stability through return to a putatively ordered and stable past, then counter-identifications and disidentifications promote change premi-sed not on returns but turns.

Figured as a return, identification suppresses histo-ricity: the possibility of transformation and alterity. To suppress these possibilities is to manage temporality, to render the present not as an actively produced reality but a mere reflection of the past. Figured as a return, the present is interred in the past as its inevitable legacy. Temporal

33 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2004), 81.

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linearity, continuity and repetition, figured as “history,” allow for the mimetic representation of the past and, thus, for the suppression of historicity. This kind of representation poses itself as a “recovery” of the past, a mimesis of the past in the present. History becomes, then, a site of recoveries and a destination of revisits, always out there, waiting for us to rediscover it.

Counter-identifications and disindentifications with heritage are, by contrast, potential openings onto historicity, onto the generation of difference. They contest the seemin-gly natural status of heritage as a representation of an objec-tive, neutral past and they explore the capacity of heritage to embody or engender different pasts or even novel pasts. In so doing, they invoke not only counter-histories, alternative pasts to those produced according to a mimetic model of inheritance, but also a counter-concept of history, the con-cept of history as an intervention or eruption of alterity. The object of counter-identifications and disidentifications, heri-tage becomes not a site of actual or even contested pasts, but a generator of new pasts for new futures: points of no return.

1 “Preserve it: it’s yours!” In Albanian, Serbian and English, this message—or, more precisely, this command—appeared on billboards throughout Prishtina, the capital of Kosovo, in the summer of 2004

1 Poruka, ili točnije rečeno naredba "Očuvaj ga: tvoje je!“, na albanskome, srpskome i engleskome jeziku, stajala je na jumbo-plakatima diljem Prištine, glavnoga grada Kosova, u ljeto 2004. godine

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◄ 2 Black Peristyle (Crni Peristil), a large black circle was clandestinely painted on the stone floor of the peristyle of Diocletian’s Palace in Split, Croatia

◄ 2 Projekt "Crni Peristil", veliki crni krug potajno je naslikan na kameni pod peristila Dioklecijanove palače u Splitu u Hrvatskoj

◄ 3 Croatian artist Dalibor Martinis photographed himself standing on a plinth formerly occupied by a bronze statue of Josip Broz Tito

◄ 3 Dalibor Martinis fotografirao je sebe kako stoji na postolju na kojemu je prethodno bio brončani kip Josipa Broza Tita

▲ 4 The Monument to Bruce Lee, erected in Mostar, Bosnia and Hercegovina, in November 2005 by the NGO, Urban Movement

▲ 4 Spomenik Bruce Lee-u, postavljen u Mostar u BiH u studenome 2005. godine od strane nevladine organizacije Urbani pokret

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5 An intervention sited on either side of the reconstructed Old Bridge in Mostar. The intervention comprises two small stone blocks on which are painted the words, in English, “Don’t Forget”

5 Intervencija postavljena na objema stranama obnovljenoga Starog mosta u Mostaru. Intervencija se sastoji od dvaju malih kamena na kojima je na engleskome jeziku napisano “Don’t Forget” (Ne zaboravi)

Točke bez povratka: kulturna baština i protusjećanje u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije

Andrew Herscher1

1 Andrew Herscher doktorirao na Sveučilištu Harvard 2002. godine. Njegov rad istražuje arhitektonske i urbanističke oblike političkog nasilja, kulturnog pamćenja, kolektivnog identiteta i ljudskih prava, s naglaskom na suvremenu Srednju i Istočnu Europu. Posebno je bio uključen na Balkanu, gdje je radio za Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju kao istražitelj i vještak o ratnom uništavanju kulturne baštine; bio je na čelu Odjela za kulturu misije Ujedinjenih naroda na Kosovu; suosnivač je nevladine organizacije Kosovo Cultural Heritage Project. Njegova knjiga ‘Violence Taking Place: The Architecture of the Kosovo Conflict’ je objavljena od Stanford University Press 2010. godine.

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Poruka, ili točnije rečeno naredba “Očuvaj ga: tvoje je!”, na albanskome, srpskome i engleskome jeziku, stajala je na jumbo-plakatima diljem Prištine, glavnoga grada Kosova, u ljeto 2004. godine [slika 1]. Plakati su prikazivali ono što bi kosovski građani trebali očuvati, u nizu od dvanaest slika. Svaka slika pokazivala je povijesni lokalitet: manastire Dečani i Gračanica, Sinan Paša džamiju, konak iz vremena Osmanskoga Carstva, zgradu Prizrenske lige, tradicionalne kule, rimske iskopine Ulpiana itd. Ta su mjesta sačinjavala pokazni skup. Uključivala su bizantsku i osmansku baštinu, kršćansko i islamsko naslijeđe, srpske i albanske spomenike, visoku i narodsku kulturu – bile su to ni manje ni više nego Ujedinjene Boje Kosova, multikulturalno i multietničko Kosovo živahnih razlika koje se međusobno nadopunjuju. Nad svim tim slikama na plakatima nadvijalo se nezemaljsko obličje neolitske figurice, jednoga od najstarijih proizvoda ljudske kulture nađenoga na području koje danas poznajemo kao Kosovo. Veličina i položaj figurice na plakatima lako su razumljivi. S obzirom na svoju “pred-etničnost”, bio je to jedini predmet čija je multietnička akreditacija bila uistinu besprijekorna.

Plakate je sponzoriralo Ministarstvo kulture, mladih i sporta kao odgovor kosovske vlade zajedno s mnogim međunarodnim institucijama na ono što se oprezno naziva “događajima u ožujku”. U tim su “događajima”, koji su se odvili nekoliko mjeseci ranije te iste godine, kosovski albanski prosvjednici prognali mnoge od nekolicine preo-stalih Srba s Kosova i uništili 35 srpskih pravoslavnih crkvi i manastira. Bilo je to uništenje vlasništva omraženoga etničkog drugog, drugoga koje se smatralo odgovornim za prethodno nasilje, uključujući i nasilje nad baštinom s kojom

su se identificirali Albanci. Ministarstvo kulture, mladih i sporta smatralo je da sva ta baština pripada svim etničkim skupinama na Kosovu pa otuda dolazi i nalog za njezinim očuvanjem – važno je primijetiti da se na zahtijeva njezino očuvanje jer pripada drugomu, nego jer pripada svima. Kampanjom Ministarstva kulture, mladih i sporta pokušalo se mobilizirati kosovsko građanstvo za očuvanje kulturne baštine pod pokroviteljstvom države. Ministarstvo kulture, mladih i sporta predstavilo je “sjećanje” koje proizlazi iz zajedničke multietničke baštine kao protutežu onomu što se obično naziva “etničko nasilje”. Baština je tako stavljena u ulogu medija za interpelaciju kao instrument koji će proiz-voditi subjekte i subjektivnosti koje se smatra prikladnim za režim mira, stabilnosti i pomirenja u razdoblju koje je uslije-dilo nakon nasilja.

Ipak, u neku ruku je projekt brige za baštinu bio nastavak onoga projekta kojeg je tek trebalo prevladati: ratnoga projekta mobilizacije baštine kao naslijeđa nasil-noga etničkog drugog. U tome je slučaju baština također i medij za interpelaciju koji proizvodi etničke ili etni-cizirane teme koje su prikladne i podržavaju javno nasilje.2 Poslijeratno očuvanje ostalo je usredotočeno na iste objekte, tek mijenjajući njihovu karakteristiku uske etničnosti u široku multietničnost – “zajedničko naslijeđe svih kosovskih etničkih, vjerskih i jezičnih zajednica” na akademski intoni-ranome jeziku kampanje za očuvanje. U kampanji je, dakle, teška činjenica etničkoga nasilja u nedavnoj prošlosti na

2 Vidi Andrew Herscher, Violence Taking Place: The Architecture of the Kosovo Conflict (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

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Kosovu ne samo neobjašnjena, već u potpunosti nestala, a njezine materijalne posljedice utkane su u naoko ugodniji, nježniji kontekst poslijeratnoga multietničkog bratstva i jedinstva.3

Na državni projekt javili su se različiti odgovori. Kako objašnjavaju teoretičari interpelacije, analiza inter-pelacije mora uzeti u obzir različite i često kontradiktorne reakcije koje interpelacija zastupa – “mnoštvo heterogenih otpora i pobuna”, riječima Michela Pecheuxa, “koje tinjaju pod dominantnom ideologijom, stalno joj prijeteći.”4 Upravo ti “otpori” i “pobune” uspostavljaju interpelaciju kao ispun-jeno sučelje oko kojega se sukobljavaju institucije vlade i oni kojima one vladaju; interpelacija tako postaje isprepletena u, kako je to Michel Foucault rekao, “strateškome reverzibil-itetu” odnosa moći – načina na koje se prakse vladanja mogu preformulirati u predmete otpora ili “protupolitike” od strane onih kojima se vlada.

U kontekstu proučavanja sjećanja takve protupoli-tike su se najčešće proučavale u sklopu onoga što je James E. Young nazvao “protuspomenicima”5. Youngov koncept “protuspomeništva” svoje korijene vuče iz Pierre Norine

3 O instituciji multietničnosti u postJugoslaviji, vidi Robert M. Hayden, “Intolerant Sovereignties and ‘Multi-Multi’ Protectorates: Competition Over Religious Sites and (In)tolerance in the Balkans”, u Postsocialism: Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia, ur. C. M. Hann (New York: Routledge, 2002).

4 Michel Pecheux, Language, Semantics, Ideology: Stating the Obvious, prev. Harbans Nagpal (London: Macmillan, 1982), 26.

5 James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002)

formativne historizacije kolektivnoga sjećanja. Nora je predložio postojanje primordijalnoga vremena u kojemu su sjećanja bila “prava sastavnica svakodnevnoga postojanja”6. Bilo je to vrijeme kada su zajednice bile u “etnografskim drijemanjima” kada su “ideologije temeljene na sjećanju (...) izglađivale tranziciju iz prošlosti u budućnost”, kada “sjećanje bez prošlosti... vječno reciklira baštinu”; bilo je to, dakle, doba bez povijesti7. Za Noru je povijest – kao promjena, rasipanje ili drugotnost – “iskorijenila” sjećanje i milieux de memoire; “u srži povijesti”, napisao je, “postoji kriticizam koji uništava spontano sjećanje”8. Za Noru je živjeti u povijesti mogućnost dopiranja do sjećanja samo iz daljine, kroz meditaciju u virtualnome, nepotpunome ili neautentičnome obliku: “što manje sjećanja iskusimo iznu-tra, veća je potreba za vanjskim pomagalima i opipljivim podsjetnicima”9. Norina je pretpostavka da autentična sjećanja, “dolaze iznutra” i ne oslanjaju se na lokalitete, forme i objekte koji ili nemaju veze s ljudima (non-human) ili se smatraju neljudskima (inhuman); potonji, koje Nora naziva lieux de memoire, su “eksterijer” sjećanju, zam-jena za ljudsko sjećanje i tako povijesno nastavni na pred-povijesna vremena kada se takvo sjećanje odvijalo nesmetano, neposredno, u blaženoj nesvjesnosti samoga

6 Pierre Nora, The Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1, prev. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1.




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sebe. Za Noru vrijeme sjećanja nije bilo samo vrijeme bez povijesti, nego i vrijeme bez spomenika.

Postavljajući “sjećanje” kao nešto što prethodi i kon-ceptualno je nevezano uz “povijest”, Nora današnja mjesta sjećanja i druge oblike povijesnih zapisa vidi u najboljemu slučaju kao nešto kompenzatorno, a u najgoremu kao jed-nostavno neprimjereno – tek zamjene za sjećanje koje se odvija u punini vremena u ljudskoj svijesti, bez potrebe za materijalnim protezama. Za Noru suvremeni spomenici preuzimaju “odgovornost sjećanja” – ova pretpostavka uključuje gubitak ljudskoga subjekta kojemu je sjećanje kao fundamentalan i ispravan način postojanja oduzeto.10 Kampanja za očuvanje baštine na Kosovu simptomatična je u tome pogledu jer se građane Kosova ne angažira da se sjećaju ičega iz prošlosti, već samo da očuvaju predmete i mjesta koji naoko odrađuju to sjećanje umjesto njih.

James Young u potpunosti preuzima Norino raz-likovanje sjećanja i povijesti u svojoj formulaciji protuspo-menika. Za Younga, kao i za Noru, spomenici “odrađujući sjećanje (...) oslobađaju gledatelje tereta sjećanja”11. Glavni zadatak spomenika je, prema Youngu, da radi protiv toga rasterećenja i da prepusti teret ljudskomu subjektu kojemu stvarno i pripada. Young upotrebljava termin “protuspo-menik” da opiše spomenike koji odrađuju tu zadaću i koji “vraćaju teret sjećanja samim posjetiteljima prisiljavajući


11 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 5

ih da preuzmu aktivne uloge”12. Rezultat protuspomenika trebali bi biti “sami posjetitelji koji se prisjećaju, gledajući prema unutra u potrazi za sjećanjem” – privremeni povratak u ono što je Nora nazvao prijepovijesnim milieu de mémoire.13

Young protuspomenik smatra sredstvom za oporavak sjećanja kao ljudskoga djelovanja, djelovanja koje je nekada postojalo, djelovanja za koje Nora tvrdi da je zamijenjeno poviješću. Iz te je perspektive Young otkrio protuspomeništvo u projektima čije je fizičko obličje na neki način negirano, neuhvatljivo, prolazno ili neopisivo. U njima je humanistički narativ živućega sjećanja koje su zamijenili neživi povijesni oblici igran u obrnutome smjeru; nemrtvi oblici protuspo-menika daju nov život sjećanjima. To oživljavanje sjećanja valorizira se u vlastitim okvirima, kao da je očuvanje sjećanja vrijedno samo po sebi. Zato Young privilegira “vječitu nerješivost” pitanja sjećanja jer samo ona garantira “život sjećanja”14. “Protuspomenik nas podsjeća da najbolji njemački spomenik razdoblju fašizma i njegovim žrtvama ne mora biti jedan jedini spomenik – već bi to mogla biti upravo ta beskonačna rasprava o tome koje sjećanje treba očuvati, kako, u čije ime i s kojim ciljem.”15 Dakle, kod protuspomenika je

12 James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 118

13 James E. Young, At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 118.


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na kocki perpetuacija sjećanja – zamjena za neprimjereno lieu de mémoire i oporavak izgubljenoga milieu de mémoire.

Za Younga je “beskonačna rasprava” o prošlosti, kao ono što bi protuspomenik trebao inicirati i održavati, suprotna čistomu zaboravu. S druge strane, Youngovo inzistiranje na neriješivim sjećanjima moglo bi se shvatiti i kao prepuštanje psihičkomu stanju koje je Sigmund Freud opisao kao “melankoliju”. U danas poznatoj distinkciji Freud je u nasuprotan odnos stavio žalovanje, u kojemu se subjekt suočava s gubitkom voljenoga objekta i na kraju prihvaća taj gubitak, i melankoliju, u kojoj subjekt, nesvjes-tan gubitka, potiskuje svoju povezanost s objektom unutar sebe.16 Riječima samoga Freuda “sjena objekta (pada) preko ega” melankoličnoga subjekta koji se onda opsesivno identi-ficira s izgubljenim objektom.17 Pa ako žalovanje uključuje prihvaćanje onoga što bi se moglo smatrati “teškom spozna-jom” o gubitku, tada melankolija uključuje bavljenje tom teškoćom. Young smatra da je sama perpetuacija sjećanja zapravo rehabilitacija melankolije kao kritičke djelatnosti – gesta, štoviše, koja se uvježbavala i reprizirala u mnogim drugim suvremenim kontekstima i diskursima.18 Njegova idealizacija nerješivih rasprava o sjećanju, beskrajnih dis-kusija o tome koga i čega se sjećati – ukratko, sjećanja kao


16 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”, u On Metapsychology, ed. A Richards (Harmondsworch: Penguin, 1984).

17 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”, 258.

18 Vidi Slavoj Žižek, “Melancholia and the Act”, Critical Inquiry 26 (Summer 2000).

svrha samomu sebi – dokaz su melankolične vezanosti, vezanosti koju ne treba razrađivati da bi je se prebrodilo, nego je treba uvijek iznova proigravati bez nade ili želje za oslobođenjem. Kako teoretičari melankolije ističu, srž melankolične vezanosti nije toliko izgubljeni objekt koliko nedostižni.19 U tome smislu Youngovo iščitavanje protus-pomenika ne bi toliko bio odgovor na gubitak sjećanja o Holokaustu, što se samo nameće, već na epistemološko odsustvo sjećanja u povijesnome razdoblju u skladu s Norinim konceptom. To je odsustvo nepopravljivo. Kako se sjetiti gubitka sjećanja? To je savršeno pitanje za melankolično sanjarenje.

Ali može li na kocki biti više od perpetuacije samoga sjećanja? Što ako sjećanje može pružiti ne samo per-petuaciju, prisjećanje na vrijeme prije povijseti a la Nora, nego i intervenciju u povijest, intervenciju s jedinstvenim mogućnostima i sredstvima? Što ako teške spoznaje o prošlome nasilju nude više od pukoga sjećanja ili zaboravl-janaj? Što ako protusjećanja o tim teškim spoznajama nude ne samo prikaze prošlosti, već i nagovještaje budućnosti, kako uključiti sjećanja u politiku? Što ako je mogućnost protusjećanja, “sjećanja koje se pojavljuje u trenutcima opas-nosti”, to da stvori promjenu – “pravo izvanredno stanje” –

19 “Melankolija ne bi bila toliko regresivna reakcija na gubitak voljenoga objekta koliko imaginarni kapacitet da se nedostižni objekt percipira kao izgubljen.” vidi Giorgio Agamben, Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, prev. Ronald I. Martinez (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 20.

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dakle, povijest?20 Što ako je samorefleksivna briga o spoznaji o gubitku takva da priznaje vlastitu povijesnu slučajnost, vlastiti prelazak u nešto drugačije – gubitak sebe same?

Postavljanjem ovih pitanja volio bih istražiti protu-politiku sjećanja bez usredotočavanja na protuspomenike kao odlučujuće sredstvo tih politika i bez pretpostavke da je sjećanje kao takvo jedini mogući rezultat tih politika. Umjesto toga, u onome što slijedi proučit ću raznolika obličja koja je preuzeo otpor očuvanju povijesti na Kosovu i diljem bivše Jugoslavije. Točnije, zanima me to što sjećanje nije samo “očuvano” u tome otporu, već je aktivno izmješteno, iskriv-ljeno, parodirano, pretjerano ili drugačije mijenjano. Moj je pregled organiziran prema onome što Pecheux naziva “pro-tuidentificiranjima” i “disidentificiranjima” s interpelacijom. Ti drugi oblici identificiranja rezultirali su alternativama očuvanju i poštivanju baštine kojima države, postkonfliktne i ostale, uglavnom teže; uključili su i pokušaje da angažiraju baštinu u spoznaji i političkoj mobilizaciji teške prošlosti umjesto da rade na nestanku znanja o toj prošlosti u ime post-konfliktnoga pomirenja. Ono što slijedi nije posloženo oko suprotnih polova “sjećanja” i “zaboravljanja” već me, umjesto toga, zanimaju razni oblici sjećanja od kojih neki mogu izgle-dati kao zaboravljanje, a svi sačinjavaju, u odnosu na sjećanje koje promovira država, drugačije prisjećanje. Pozornost prida-vana tim alternativnim oblicima sjećanja ne samo da upućuje, kako Young tvrdi, da “spomenik sve više postaje mjesto ospo-ravanih i konkurentnih značenja”, već da spomenik ujedno

20 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, u Illuminations, prev. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 255, 257.

postaje i medij putem kojega pojedinci i skupine mogu ući u politički diskurs i akciju i sudjelovati u njima.21

Protuidentificiranje osporava status kulturalnih objekata kao baštine koja zaslužuje poštovanje, kao naslijeđa određenih zajednica i kao predmeta koje se mora očuvati.

Općenitije, protuidentificiranja također osporavaju naoko posredovnu ulogu identificiranja; ona postavljaju identificiranje s baštinom ne kao mogućnost, već kao obvezu, jedini legitimni odnos prema baštini u kontekstu u kojemu je identificiranje s baštinom sredstvo uspostavljanja i održavanja reda. Protuidentificiranja s baštinom mogu uzeti vid podidentificiranja ili predidentificiranja, a s obama utjelovljuju odbijanje afektivnoga odgovora, društvenoga djelovanja ili političkih učinaka koje kulturna baština kon-vencionalno nameće. Ta odbijanja ipak nisu simetrična.

Podidentificiranje je eksplicitna suprotnost identi-ficiranju; suzdržavanje, prosvjedovanje protiv ili kontri-ranje poštovanju prema baštini koju identificiranje usađuje, podidentificiranje sačinjava ono što je Slavoj Žižek nazvao “inherentnom transgresijom”. Podidentificiranje je strukturi-rano u ideologiju baštine utoliko da ta ideologija uključuje otpor kao dio vlastita djelovanja. Kritičko se odbijanje te ideologije stoga ne pojavljuje u obliku otvorenoga odbijanja ili podidentificiranja, već kao opsesivno prihvaćanje ili pre-identificiranje. Kako Žižek tvrdi,

Dok god se moć oslanja na svoju “inherentnu trans-gresiju”, moguće je barem ponekad preidentificirati se s


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eksplicitnim diskursom moći – ignoriranje te inherentne opscene donje strane i jednostavno preuzimanje diskursa moći doslovno, ponašanje kao da je njegovo značenje baš ono što eksplicitno izriče (i obećava) može biti najučinkovitija metoda remećenja njegova neometanog funkcioniranja.22

Predstavlja li neka intervencija podidentificiranje, predidentificiranje ili identificiranje pitanje je interpretacije. Osvrnimo se, primjerice, na vandalizam čiji cilj nije očuvanje baštine, već njezina deformacija i uništenje. Vandalizam nad kulturnom baštinom etničkoga drugog tijekom ratova u bivšoj Jugoslaviji može se lako promatrati u kontekstu podidenti-ficiranja s tim naslijeđem., uskraćujući ili čak proturječeći poštovanju koje ta baština konvencionalno zaslužuje. A ipak u kontekstu poslijeratne obnove vandalizam je visoko nabijena estetska praksa koja objedinjuje više oblika identificiranja. U jednome slučaju iz 1998. godine projekt “Crni pristil”, veliki crni krug potajno je naslikan na kameni pod peristila Dioklecijanove palače u Splitu u Hrvatskoj [slika 2].23 Peristil je središte palače koja je na popisu UNESCO-ove Svjetske baštine i jedna od povijesno najznačajnih lokacija kulturne baštine u Hrvatskoj. Ostavljanje crnoga kruga na peristilu vlasti u Splitu su okarakterizirale kao čin vandalizma protiv spomenika kulturne baštine – čin podidentifikacije.

22 Slavoj Žižek, “Da Capo senza Fine”, u Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony and Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (New York: Verso, 2000), 220.

23 Odgovornost za projekt je na kraju preuzeo umjetnik Igor Grubić; vidi Suzana Marjanić, “Aktivizmom protiv crne mrlje na duši: razgovor s Igorom Grubićem”, Zarez, 219 (29 November 2007), http://www.zarez.hr/219/kazaliste3.html.

Ipak, poruka potpisana s “Crni peristil” i ostavljena na vratima obližnje turističke agencije sadržavala je sljedeće: “U čast skupine “Crveni peristil” trideset godina kasnije, “Peristil”, kao čarobno ogledalo, odražava stanje društvene svijesti.”24 Ta se poruka referencirala na projekt od prije trideset godina na isti datum kada je pod peristila bio obojan u crveno – umjetnički projekt koji je također bio okarakter-iziran kao vandalizam. Podidentifikacija s peristilom kao antičkom baštinom uključivala je i identifikacije s Crvenim peristilom kao baštinom modernih vremena. Zazivanje mod-erne baštine išlo je dalje od Crvenoga peristila: crni krug naslikan na podu palače koji potencijalno podsjeća na crne krugova Kazimira Malevicha Grubić je kasnije nazvao i “naslijeđem suprematizma i konstruktivizma.”25

Ono što je na kocki kada pričamo o Crnom peristilu, stoga, nije samo sjećati se ili ne kulturne baštine, već to što projekt nudi modernu alternativu klasičnoj genealogiji baštine. Istodobno ta alternativa nije ponuđena u duhu lib-eralne politike kao predmet “izbora”; već je aktivno i čak nasilno nametnuta, to je alternativa koja je preuzela mjesto onomu čemu je trebala biti alternativa. Podidentificiranje s Dioklecijanovom palačom kao kulturnom baštinom u njezinu danom obliku posredovalo je identificiranju s drugačijom for-mulacijom baštine, baštine modernizma.

24 Marjanić, “Aktivizmom protiv crne mrlje na duši: razgovor s Igorom Grubićem”.

25 Marjanić, “Aktivizmom protiv crne mrlje na duši: razgovor s Igorom Grubićem”.

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Podidentificiranje s pojedinim predmetom baštine kao istodobno identificiranje s drugim predmetima baštine nije izraženo samo u vandalizmu, nego i u pros-vjedima oko definiranja kulturnih objekata kao naslijeđa. Primjerice, u svibnju 2007. godine kosovska albanska NVO, Vetëvendosje (Samoodređenje), prosvjedovala je protiv izgradnje zaštitnoga zida oko bizantskoga Patrijarhata u Peću na Kosovu, sjedišta Srpske pravoslavne Crkve i središnje točke kulturnoga identiteta kosovskih Srba. Za SPC je zid bio objektivno nužan instrument zaštite, naročito nakon uništenja srpskih crkava i spomenika tijekom “događaja u ožujku”. Nakon tih događaja se niski zid koji je dotad okruživao Patrijarhat doimao potpuno neprimjerenim da spriječi činove agresije na tlu i zgradama Patrijarhata.

Za Vetëvendosje je, pak, zid bio simboličko iskazivanje statusa Patrijarhata kao isključivo srpskoga vlasništva, nedostupnoga i većinski albanskomu Peću i većinski alban-skoj državi Kosovo. U prosvjedima pred Patrijarhatom članovi Vetëvendosje postavili su barikade i transparente na kojima je pisalo “bez novih zidova”, “Kosovo nije Palestina” i “Peja nije Mitrovica”.26 Prosvjed Vetëvendosje nije ospo-ravao status Patrijarhata kao baštine, već status isključivo srpske baštine kojom ne upravlja kosovska država nego SPC. Ipak, Vetëvendosjeovo odbijanje nije bilo u svrhu sekular-nosti države, nego u svrhu kosovskoga albanskog nacional-izma. Stoga je organizacija spojila prosvjede protiv novoga zida oko Patrijarhata s izdavanjem povijesnih narativa koji

26 Peja je albanski naziv za Peć, a Mitrovica je grad podijeljen između Albanaca i Srba nakon rata 1998. – 99.

dokumentiraju navodne albanske korijene Pravoslavne crkve i političkih narativa kojima uspostavljaju isključivo albanski suverenitet na Kosovu.27 Prosvjed je tako objedinio i podi-dentificiranje sa statusom Patrijarhata kao srpskoga naslijeđa i identificiranje s nejasnim statusom Patrijarhata kao alban-skoga naslijeđa.

Ako su prethodna dva primjera tipični, onda je podi-dentificiranje s jednim naslijeđem ili genealogijom sredstvo identifikacije s nekim drugim predmetom naslijeđa ili gene-alogijom. To klizanje između podidentificiranja i identifici-ranja može se shvatiti kao stanje u kojemu je podidentifici-ranje implicitno uključeno u dominantne sustave upravljanja baštinom i očuvanja prošlosti. Podidentificiranje u tome smislu bilo bi neka vrsta opozicijskoga identificiranja, eksplic-itno postavljeno protiv postojeće ili dominantne alternative. Ako je podidentificiranje urezano u ideološke sustave uprav-ljanja i očuvanja baštine, predidentificiranje postavlja pred takve sustave veći izazov podržavajući njegove imperative i zahtjeve rigoroznije nego što je sam sustav to sposoban činiti.

Jedan je primjer takva predidentificiranja rad “JBT 27. 12. 2004.” u kojemu je hrvatski umjetnik Dalibor Martinis fotografirao sebe kako stoji na postolju na kojemu je pre-thodno bio brončani kip Josipa Broza Tita, utemeljitelja socijalističke Jugoslavije [slika 3]. Kip u Titovu rodnom Kumrovcu u Hrvatskoj uništen je 27. 12. 2004. godine, što je bio čin podidentificiranja sa socijalističkim naslijeđem. Taj datum nalazi se u naslovu Martinisova rada. Samo identificiranje s kipom značilo bi ili njegovo ponovno

27 Vetëvendosje!, 43 (23 May 2007).

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postavljanje ili ostavljanje praznoga postolja. Ali Martinis se predidentificirao s agendom koja teži očuvanju na način da je ukinuo razliku između očuvanoga objekta i očuvanoga subjekta; na postolju je on postao i subjekt i objekt, i onaj koji radi na očuvanju i onaj na čijemu se očuvanju radi. Čineći to, Martinisov rad otkriva udaljenost koja se smatra “normalnom” za identificiranje s naslijeđem i postavlja pitanja o tome kakve učinke takvo identificiranje može imati. Kada ljudi čuvaju “svoju” baštinu na konvenciona-lne načine, drugim riječima, kako ih taj proces oblikuje ili mijenja? Prepričavajući svoje iskustvo u intervjuu, Martinis je rekao da, “kada sam stajao na mramornome postolju s natpisom ‘Josip Broz Tito’, shvatrio sam da sam bio na mjestu na kojemu je nemoguće – bilo fizički, politički ili simbolički – da stoji itko drugi osim Tita samoga.”28 Njegova spoznaja obuhvaća identificiranje u obliku u kojemu ga države načelno podupiru, kao inherentno nepotpuno, temeljeno na nepriznatim prazninama – fizičkim, političkim i simboličkim – između subjekta i objekta, između javnosti i spomenika.

Slično bilježenje tih praznina postigao je spomenik Bruce Leeu, postavljen u Mostar u BiH u studenome 2005. godine od strane bosanske NVO, Urbani pokret [slika 4]. Mostar je doživio teška razaranja tijekom rata u BiH, a grad je podijeljen između Bošnjaka u istočnome Mostaru i Hrvata u zapadnome Mostaru. Prema Nini Raspudiću, suosnivaču i ravnatelju Urbanoga pokreta, podjela Mostara samo je

28 Silva Kalčić, “Strategija kušača vina”, Zarez, 147 (27 January 2005), http://www.zarez.hr/147/zariste3.htm

povećana tijekom poslijeratne obnove: “obje konstitutivne strane grada htjele su dati ‘vlastitu’ prostoru ‘njihove vlas-tite’ osobine da ga ‘posjeduju’ još više postavljanjem svojih religijskih i kulturnih objekata i simbola.”29 Sektaška instru-mentalizacija naslijeđa stvorila je mogućnost da se naslijeđe instrumentalizira i na suprotan način – multietnički ili uni-verzalno. Ali umjesto stavljanja lokalnih kulturnih objekata u okvir zajedničkoga naslijeđa, kako postetničke vlade načelno rade, Urbani pokret postavio je heroja kung-fu film-ova iz sedamdesetih Brucea Leea kao takav objekt. Prema Raspudiću, Lee je “drag svima, bez obzira na politička ili ideološka uvjerenja... (on) je, iznad svega, simboličan most između Istoka i Zapada.”30 Tako je, zaključuje Raspudić, bilo sasvim prikladno postaviti spomenik Bruceu Leeu između istočnoga i zapadnoga dijela podijeljenoga Mostara.

Bruce Lee, proizvod kasne kapitalističke globalne kulture, bio je objekt kozmopolitskoga i postetničkoga iden-tificiranja koje je otkrilo da su drugi objekti takva identifici-ranja tek ideološki. Univerzalnost kulturnoga naslijeđa koja je služila kao objekt “normalnoga” identificiranja postaje mašta kada se usporedi s univerzalnosti objekta globalne kulture poput Bruce Leea; predidentificiranjem s univer-zalnosti kulturnoga naslijeđa spomenik radikalizira uni-verzalnost i čini je doslovnom. U Mostaru spomenik stoji u jarkome kontrastu prema najpoznatijemu predmetu gradske

29 Nino Raspudić, “The Monument to Bruce Lee – Yes and Why?”, http://www.projekt-relations.de/en/get/pressematerial/de_construction.php

30 Raspudić, “The Monument to Bruce Lee – Yes and Why?”

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baštine, Starome mostu, osmanskome mostu preko Neretve. Hrvatsko topništvo ga je 1993. godine srušilo dok je bio u rukama Bošnjaka iz istočnoga Mostara. To je rušenje postalo simbol sektaškoga sukoba u Mostaru, a obnova mosta, dovršena 2004. godine, bila je prepuna sponzora i državnih uglednika kao znak prevladavanja sukoba.31 Spomenik Bruce Leeu u prvi plan stavlja lažnost toga sponzorskog i ugledničkog okvira memorijalizacijom kulturnoga objekta čije naslijeđe stanovnici istočnoga i zapadnoga Mostara dijele na puno dublji način. Taj spomenik postavlja i pitanje o tome što sačinjava baštinu i tko preuzima odgovornost za definiranje baštine. Promatrati Spomenik Bruce Leeu tek kao čin ironije, parodiju “autentične” baštine ili izraz zamorenosti s politikama naslijeđa, znači zadržavati konven-cionalni koncept autentičnoga naslijeđa i države kao arbitra politika naslijeđa. Radikalna propozicija spomenika Bruce Leeu jest da su kung-fu filmovi iz 1970-ih jednako toliko kulturna baština kao i osmanski mostovi za stanovništvo Mostara, bilo Bošnjake ili Hrvate.

U Pecheuxovoj teoretizaciji o stajalištima koja je moguće zastupati kao odgovor na ideološku interpelaciju, i identificiranje i protuidentificiranje potvrđuju ideologiju, prvi tako što je pasivno prihvaća, a potonji tako što je osporava. Za razliku od toga, u onome što Pecheux naziva “disidenti-ficiranjem”, ideologija nije niti prihvaćena niti osporavana. Umjesto toga, prema Pecheuxu, ona je problematizirana, s njom se disidentificira, a subjekt koji se disidentificira

31 Vidi Emily Gunzburger Makaš, “Interpreting Multivalent Sites: New Meanings for Mostar’s Old Bridge”, Centropa 5:1 (January 5).

odgovarajuće je gurnut u nove oblike subjektivnosti.32 Disidentifikacija je, drugim riječima, transformacija ide-ologije iznutra. Takvu vrstu transformacije vidim na djelu u intervenciji postavljenoj na objema stranama obnovljenoga Starog mosta u Mostaru. Intervencija se sastoji od dvaju malih kamena na kojima je na engleskome jeziku napisano “Don’t Forget” [slika 5]. Ti kameni uokviruju poglede na most iz daljine i prethode te slijede prelaske preko mosta; nalog protiv zaboravljanja povezan je i vizualno i iskust-veno uz most čija se obnova smatra ključnom za oporavak kulturnoga sjećanja. Ali poruka na kamenju niti prihvaća niti odbacuje taj oporavak. Ona čak ostavlja prostor i za prihvaćanje i za odbijanje: nalog za sjećanjem mogao bi se iščitati kao potvrda da je obnova mosta obnova sjećanja ili kao dovođenje te obnove u pitanje.

Što ne bi trebalo zaboraviti? Da je osmanski most nekada spajao obale Neretve u Mostaru? Ili da je most uništen u ratu i sada obnovljen? Ili da je ta obnova uključivala uklanjanje tragova uništenja; gubitak gubitka, gubitak memorijalizacije rata? Sjećanje koje “Ne zabo-ravi” nalaže može se svesti na sva ta sjećanja te se stoga ne može svesti ni na jedno od njih posebno. Intervencija postavlja slična pitanja o svojemu autoru i publici kojoj se obraća. Napisana na engleskom, dostupna je i Bošnjacima i Hrvatima te stanovnicima grada i posjetiteljima. Tko je ovlastio da se zahtijeva sjećanje? I tko se treba sjećati? Ta pitanja su također postavljena, ali na njih nije odgovoreno.

32 Pecheux, Language, Semantics, Ideology: Stating the Obvious, 156-158.

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Ono što ideologija obično radi jest da daje odgovore na takva pitanja koji, u kontekstu kulturne baštine, defini-raju subjekte s obzirom na njihov odnos prema povijesnim objektima. Ovdje je, pak, ta definicija insinuirana, ali nije dovršena. Od subjekata se traži da ne zaborave, ali ne kaže im se što da ne zaborave. Povijesni objekti potvrđeni su kao skladišta općenitoga sjećanja, ali ne i specifičnoga. Povijest se ne nalazi u jednome ili drugome nizu baštine, već u sred-stvima koja toj baštini daju značenje. Ta dva kamena oko Staroga mosta stoga ne sačinjavaju ni stratešku intervenciju u postojeći sustav ni identificiranje s naslijeđem ili destruk-tivnu negaciju takve intervencije, protuidentificiranje, već minijaturni, ali odlučni otvor prema “transstrateškoj inter-venciji koja redefinira uloge i obrise postojećega stanja.”33 Prema Pecheuxu, naredba “Ne zaboravi” predstavlja pitanja bez odgovora, ali to nisu pitanja na koja je nemoguće odgovoriti, koja se samo mogu opetovano prežvakavati u melankoličnoj boli i užitku. Umjesto toga, odgovaranje dobiva ulogu djelovanja, zauzimanja stajališta, kao što rađenje intervencije može promijeniti nešto u “postojećemu poretku”.

I dok identificiranje s baštinom kojeg postkonfliktne države potiču kao način da se ljudi nose s teškim spozna-jam iz prošlosti i tako prebrode sukobe i njihova naslijeđa, protuidentificiranja i disidentificiranja s baštinom uključuju započinjanje novih sukoba – sukoba oko prirode, inter-pretacije i funkcija baštine. Ako identificiranje s baštinom

33 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2004), 81.

promiče red i stabilnost kroz povratak pretpostavljenoj sređenoj i stabilnoj prošlosti, onda protuidentificiranja i disidentificiranja promiču promjenu koja nije zasnovana na ponovnome nego na novome.

Shvaćeno kao ponovno, identificiranje potiskuje povijesnost: mogućnost transformacije i drugosti. Potiskivanje tih mogućnosti znači upravljanje privremenošću, smatranje da sadašnjost nije aktivno stvorena realnost, već tek odraz prošlosti. Shvaćanje kao ponovno, sadašnjost je zatočena u prošlosti kao njezino neizbježno naslijeđe. Vremenska linearnost, kontinuitet i ponavljanje, shvaćeni kao “povijest”, omogućuju mimetičke reprezentacije prošlosti i time potiskivanje povijesnosti. Taj način reprezentacije postavlja se kao “povratak” prošlosti, mimeza prošlosti u sadašnjosti. Time povijest postaje mjesto povrataka i odredište ponovnih posjeta, uvijek tamo negdje, čekajući nas da je ponovno otkrijemo.

Protuidentificiranja i disidentificiranja s baštinom su, nasuprot tomu, potencijalna vrata prema povijesnosti, prema stvaranju drugačijega pristupa. Oni dovode u pitanje naoko prirodan status baštine kao reprezentacije objektivne, neu-tralne prošlosti i istražuju kapacitet baštine da utjelovi ili prizove drugačije ili nove prošlosti. Na taj način oni prizivaju ne samo protupovijesti, alternativne prošlosti onima koje postoje prema mimetičkome modelu nasljeđivanja, nego i protukoncept povijesti, koncept povijesti kao intervenciju ili erupciju drugosti. Kao objekt protuidentifikacija i dis-identifikacija, baština ne postaje predmet stvarnih ili čak osporavanih prošlosti, već tvorac novih prošlosti za nove budućnosti: točke bez povratka.

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The National Museum of Contemporary History and the Witnesses of WW2

Monika Kokalj Kočevar1

1 Museum Consultant at the National Museum of Contemporary History, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

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The National Museum of Contemporary History is the central institution for research into the contemporary history of Slovenians from 1914 until today. The historical material spans the following periods: the First World War, the interwar period (1918-1941), the Second World War (1941-1945) the period of socialism (1945-1990) and the period of independent Slovenia (after 1991).

The museum collects, preserves, researches and exhibits museum items, photographic, fine arts, archival and library material.

The museum was established in 1948, but its origins go back to WW2 when a team with a scientific institute started collecting material predominantly of partisan origin and, already in 1944 and 1945, organised exhibitions in the liber-ated territory of the southern Slovenia.

Since 1953 the museum is housed in a beautiful baroque manor house from the 18th century in the Tivoli Park. The first permanent exhibition was organised in 19552 and in 1961 and 1965 two new permanent exhibitions fol-lowed. The main stress at the displays was on liberation strug-gle 1941-45 in Slovenia. After a renewal and rebuilding of the museum in 1990-1992 a new permanent exhibition with a title “Slovenians in the XXth century” was opened in 1995. The display presented the whole 20th century and ended with a presentation of the Slovenian war for independency in 19913. In the next years the exhibition faced many renewals, and

2 Nataša Urbanc, 50 let Muzeja, Muzej novejše zgodovine 1948-1998, Ljubljana 1998, p.13.

3 Slovenci v XX. stoletju, Katalog stalne razstave, Ljubljana 1999.

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redecorations. The curators accepted the policy of adding the new information and items resulted from long term in depth researches and studies to the exhibition every few years. The museum and the exhibition has been nominated for the 1998 European Museum of the Year Award. The present permanent exhibition, still with the same title, presents Slovenian history up to 2008 when Slovenia was the chair of EU Council from 1st January to 30th June 2008.

The museum has 22 collections, over 50,000 museum items and 3,000,000 photographs and negatives.

The WW2 material housed in the museum is classi-fied into the following collections: weapons, textiles, partisan workshops and printing houses, partisan sanitary service, terror during WW2, postcards, medals and decorations, badges and insignia, rubber stamps, seals and printing blocks, fine arts.

In 2004 a very quickly increasing Audio /Video col-lection of interviews, predominantly with survivors of WW2 was started. The museum started including audio or video witnesses’ statements in the temporary exhibitions in 2004. In the first exhibition The Wheel of Terror, in 2004, we added short parts from the interviews but they were at that time only presented on the walls in written form. In the exhibition dedicated to the victims of Third Reich terror - Hitler’s long shadow, in 2007, we also presented the statements together with update photos and video interviews. The presentation had much more effect when we added to the photo of high 179 steps in the concentration camp of Mauthausen and a large, at least 50kg, granite stone from the quarry. A survivor who spoke of work in the quarry said: “It was very impor-tant what sort of a stone you chose. If you find a flat stone

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it looked bigger but it was not that heavy!”4 In the exhibi-tion, Slovenians and Fascism in 2008 we also display items, predominantly works of art, connected to the story of the individuals. In 2011 we put testimonies of WW2 also to our permanent exhibition where visitors can listen to different life stories of the survivors.

Many witnesses are not alive any longer, but remain visible through their works, in this way we again speak about them - for example- many painters were sent to concentra-tion camps in Italy and produced in very poor conditions a number of drawings and paintings. These are the drawings of brothers Vidmar, Ivan Čargo etc. The special item in our museum collection are playing cards: Tarrock cards, made in the Allach concentration camp by architect Boris Kobe. He depicted the everyday life in the concentration camp and struggle for survival.

Another special collection are the works of prisoners and inmates from the concentration camps and prisons. In high spirit they made different items out of material they were able to collect. Predominantly women made symbolic boxes or messages in the shape of hearts, or other designs with short stimulating slogans on them.

The active groups of participators in WW2 in Slovenia could be divided into five main groups: the partisans and supporters, the expellees, the concentration camps inmates and prisoners, the ones forcibly mobilised into occupiers’ armies, the collaborators and supporters. No one could remain indeterminate.

4 Exhibition Hitlerjeva dolga senca, Cveto Kobal’s testimony, 2007.

The reasons why one would join one of these groups were various: from violence and terror of the occupying forces, to propaganda and volunteery involvement. People have experienced the war differently and had on the bases of their role in the interwar events faced different fates at the end of the war. Number of individual members of particular group differs, from about 40,000 members of the partisan units at the end of the war, 80,000 exiles, to over 40,000 forcibly mobilized into the German army, 30,000 prisoners and concentration camps inmates and 20,000 members of the anti-partisan units.

Besides personal items which the survivors brought from WW2, their personal stories were predominantly told only to their family members, if at all. Depending on the number of active participants we would expect a wide and extensive opus of available published personal testimo-nies, if not of all the group, at least of partisans, who were among the most favoured active participants after the war. Some recollections were published during the war. Among some testomonials there were three describing life in the Mauthausen concentration camp and written by inmates who were released from the concentration camp. In the 60 and 70’s of the 20th century severalmonographs were published of partisan units, stories of individual partisans did not really count at that time. Mostly those are monographs of shock brigades and divisions focused on a concentrated display of their activities. In the 70’s the first monographs of some con-centration camps where Slovenes were, had been published. The memories of individuals were described in the same way and more or less only the events counted and not the experi-ence. It is worth noting series of testimonies of partisans in

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the newspaper Dolenjski list in the years 1972-73, a radio weekend show “Do you remember comradesˮ and later “Memorizingˮ as well as a newspaper of partisan veterans TV -15 or the magazine “Free thought ,ˮ which constantly publishes many memoirs of the partisans. All other journals, monographs and anthologies in which the activities of other groups are enumerated, have emerged later. The changed attitudes towards individual memories occurred in 80 and 90’s of the last century when the witnesses slowly, one by one, expressed the wish to be heard and, began to publish individual experiences, thoughts and memories. In this way they often cross borders of collective memory of the group. The status of oral history has changed and in general the society became “more inclined to listeningˮ to the collecting of oral history sources .

Depending on the number of active participants, there are a few published autobiographical testimonies in all groups. Although initially encouraged by nearly 700 names of books with keywords memories of World War II in Cobiss, by the criterion of life stories and autobiographical memo-ries, we find 73 partisan stories, 56 about exiles, 19 about concentration inmates and 52 about being forcibly mobilized into the German army . In particular, the latter and the tes-timonies of exiles, are published most since 1991 when the two groups acquired the official status of victims of war, which was also an important moment for the individual and collective memory and consciousness of these two groups. Most of the commemorative publication, after year 2000 are self- published. A special group consists of written memoirs of anti-partisan groups that were published shortly after the war in exile.

Oral history is a history built around people on the memories of past experiences . It represents the so-called living heritage that enables new understandings and provides insight into the main direction of experience, and as such represents a source of dynamic in behavior of structures. Interviews maintain the perspective of the individual. The purpose of an interview is to capture and preserve individu-als’ views, judgments and remembrance of past events and thus succeed in obtaining a certain historical information to which one otherwise would not have had access .

In the process of creating a collective memory it comes to the process of unification and convergence of memories of individuals. An individual creates a collective memory, as a carrier of events. He or she creates, renews and trans-forms memories together with other members of the group to which he or she belongs. Collective memory twist around individual memories, but does not mix with them. The indi-viduals, namely the members of the group who are unable or unwilling for various reasons to be caught up in their own individual memory, they use the collective memory and often take it up as his/hers own . Meanings of the group and the collective memory intensifies, so that many people, members of a particular group, take over the ideas and thoughts that are inspired by the group and are not aware that they did not contribute to the creation of collective memory at all. Their individual memory actually has summarized the collective memory . It is important that individuals find himself/herself in the collective memory, and thus feel an individual belong-ing to a group.

At the same time we speak about the placement of the collective memory into the historical memory .

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The collective memory was also affected by establish-ment of various associations and societies, League of com-batants-partisan veterans and within the concentration camp survivors, the Association of Slovenian Exiles 1941-1945, Association of Slovenian forcibly mobilized into the German army and the New Slovenian Commitment-association of anti-partisan survivors and their supporters.

Finally, various public institutions have shown in the last ten years the desirability of collecting individual testimonies and thus are interested to have insight into the individual memories also of “small peopleˮ, which was not very common in the past. Oral history testimonies were always thought to be a second class document, only because of subjectivity present in them. On the other hand also in the European scienfitic sphere, more and more open projects are oral history orientated and also present a possible source to obtain financial support.

I myself started being involved in oral history in the late 80’s because I researched themes for which I could not find much written material or I onyl found documents that were mainly destroyed. These were specificaly on the topic of collaboration during WW2 in Slovenia and anti-partisan formations. On the other hand I, as a museum curator, am in charge of different collections of WW2 and I thought of another dimenson of the items which we keep – making a story about items, finding their creators and find a relation item-creator-museum. Again there was a question which or who will prevail, but no doubt together they form an integrity. The oral history interview has the same status as any other museum item. When made they get the accessory number and after documenting also and inventory number

and are kept in museum negotheque. A version is also kept in our data base on the museum server.

Speaking of witnesses, we still encounter problems in persuading them to talk. In many cases they are still afraid to talk. As if they think still something bad could happen to them. Especially witnesses belonging to the anti-partisan group are not very often prepared to speak out. Also the wit-nesses from the group of partisan supporters are no longer as prepared to speak about WW2. Perhaps the new findings around presentation of the end of WW2 and mass graves being found gave them a sort “of not being at easeˮ. The witnesses relatives of all groups often persuade them not to speak about the past. Very often they want to be present at the interview.

The museum also participated in three international oral history projects. In 2005-06 we collected interviews of forced and slave labours in projects financed by Erinnerung und Zukunft fundation. Afterwards a book was published in English and German.5 In 2008 we carried out, together with colleagues from Germany and Austria a project with 15 youths, aged from 15-20. We collected testimonies of par-tisans. In 2008-09 we participated in a project of collecting non-jewish survivors of WW2 for Holocaust Museum from Washington.

We also had a dilemma how much and whom to include into the narrative of WW2 at our permanent exhibi-tion that it would not be too petty or impersonal or that we favour some groups.

5 Alexander von Plato et all, Hitlers Sklaven, Berlin 2009.

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The curators try to keep contacts with the witnesses and the witnesses quite often want to stay in contact as they feel they opened a part of themselves to the curator.

Often the museum organises thematic presentations and the witnesses play an important role. It is a very narrow path which we have to be attentive to not cross before becoming to petty and emotional. The interested public at such presentations is usually on the side of the group being presented and they support the ideas and feelings of the wit-nesses and the events. Sometimes the witneses of different opposing groups from WW2 meet at the same event. In the past this has brought about harsh words beign said. Such was the case when we opened an exhibition on anti-partisan formations in 1999. I must say, from the present perspective, that it was too soon for the exhibition. The public had not reached the maturity to have a dialogue on these themes. The reconciliation of the groups from WW2 from the opposing sides is still far away.

The museum also started publishing memories and diaries of witnesses. Quite a few peoplewrote memoirs during the war and their diaries are an important item in the museum. We also encourage individuals to write down their memories through this we were able to pubish a life story of Mr. Polde Gošnik in 2010. He was forcibly mobilised into the German army, captured in African battlefield, brought to England and from there went to the USA where he spent some years in four POW camps.

The museum is also an active collaborater with vet-eran organisations, as well as in International comittee of Concentration camp Mauthausen. In this way we stay in touch with witnesses, participate in research and studies of

material and exchange ideas and knowledge with colleagues from other countries.

On the other hand, the presentation of the past is presented as our main museum’s task- to present the past . In these frames we take school groups to the memorials of WW2 where Slovenians suffered. Each year we take a group of grammar school children to Mauthausen Memorial where they get introduced to the past events and our curator takes them around the camp . Before the trip, a witness -the sur-vivor of Mauthausen and a museum curator come in a few times to school lesons and prepare the school group for the visit. Every year The veterans have a commemoration at the Slovenian Mauthausen memorial 6which is a copy of the one located at Ljubelj concentration camp which was a branch of Mauthausen concentration camp. Every year a commemora-tion is organised on the site of the memorial to remember all Slovenians who died in concentration camps all over Europe.

The tradition of commemorating WW2 events is very vivid in Slovenia. Partisan veteran organisation prepare at least six commemorations of different war events and people a month.

The biggest commemoration which has seen is getting new frames is the so called Path of rememberance and com-radeship in Ljubljana. In 1942, the Italian occupiers put the whole city of Ljubljana within the confines of a wire fence. Ljubljana was a very open city, the partisan groups came into the city the inhabitants of Ljubljana walked freely into

6 Dušan Stefančič, Vodnik po koncentracijskem taborišču Mauthausen, Ljubljana 2013.

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partisan units and the outskirts of town supported Ljubljana with food. In February 1942, the Italians put a wire around the city and prevented commuting. They also put the block-ades in different parts of the city and carried out raids. One thousand people were arrested and put into prisons and Italian concentraation camps in Gonars, Rennici etc. The whole wire was 29km long and had 102 bunkers each was about 20 m wide7. There were only few crossings where only the people with documents and so called lascia passare could pass. The liberation organisation found secret passes where the connection with the outskirt still went on. Ljubljana was 1170 days behind this wire. At the end of war the wire was taken down, and many bunkers were demolished. People in commemorating the days of hardship in Ljubljana started walking the way around the wire. The first organised march was in 1957. Six new memorials were erected on the place where the crossings were. Architect Vlasto Kopč, himself an concentration inmate in Dachau, designed the columns. In the beginning of 60’s architect Edo Ravnikar made a design for 102 smaller columns on the places of bunkers. Ljubljana got a respectable title “The hero city. In 1975 the Path of rememberance and comradeship started to be arranged. Many youth brigades worked on the laying out of sanded ways and by 1985 it was finished together with a new project design. The path has many boards and signs reminding visi-tors of importance of the path and after 1991 when Slovenia became an independent republic, the path transformed and regain a new sense-no longer only a historical path, but more

7 Aleksander Jankovič Potočnik, Utrjena Ljubljana, Ljubljana 2006.

of an area of recreation and a place to meet friends and go with family for walks.

The museum keeps many items connected to the path. We store many photos, books, posters, badges and plaquettes which as a witnesses of a time speak for themselves.

The witnesses in their broad meaning, including items and persons, add a museum presentation a new dimension to the narrative of the time and enable visitors to familiarize themselves with situations in the past.

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Muzej novejše zgodovine Slovenije i svjedoci Drugoga svjetskog rata

Monika Kokalj Kočevar1

1 Muzej novejše zgodovine Slovenije, Ljubljana. Magistra Kokalj Kočevar radi kao muzejska savjetnica.

Nacionalni muzej suvremene povijesti središnja je insti-tucija koja se bavi istraživanjem slovenske povijesti od 1914. godine do danas. Povijesna građa obuhvaća Prvi svjetski rat, međuratno razdoblje (1918. – 1941.), Drugi svjetski rat (1941. – 1945.), socijalističko razdoblje (1945. – 1990.) i razdoblje neovisnosti Slovenije (nakon 1991. godine).

Muzej sakuplja, čuva, istražuje i izlaže predmete, foto-grafije te arhivski i knjižnični materijal. Osnovan je 1948. godine iako početci sežu u razdoblje Drugoga svjetskog rata kada su članovi znanstvenoga instituta počeli prikupljati materijal većinom povezan s partizanima i izlagati ga na oslobođenim područjima u južnoj Sloveniji.

Od 1953. godine muzej je smješten unutar prekrasnoga baroknog zdanja iz 18. stoljeća koji se nalazi u parku Tivoli. Prvi trajni postav otvoren je 1955.2 godine, a 1961. i 1965. godine otvorena su i druga dva stalna postava. Naglasak trajnih postava bio je na narodnooslobodilačku borbu u Sloveniji od 1941. do 1945. godine. Nakon obnove muzeja u razdoblju od 1990. do 1992. godine novi trajni postav pod naslovom “Slovenci u 20. stoljeću” otvoren je 1995. godine. Postav je prikazivao čitavo 20. stoljeće i završavao je prikazom rata za slovensku neovisnost 1991.3 godine. U godinama koje su uslijedile postav je doživio niz izmjena. Kustosi muzeja prihvatili su politiku dodavanja novih infor-macija i premeta koji su proizišli iz dubinskih istraživanja i studija svakih nekoliko godina. Muzej i izložba nominirani

2 Nataša Urbanc, 50 let Muzeja, Muzej novejše zgodovine 1948. – 1998., Ljubljana 1998, p.13.

3 Slovenci v XX. stoletju, Katalog stalne razstave, Ljubljana 1999.

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su za nagradu European Museum of the Year 1998. godine. Trenutačni stalni postav, još uvijek pod istim naslovom, predstavlja slovensku povijest do 2008. godine kada je Slovenija predsjedala Vijećem Europske unije od 1. siječnja do 30. lipnja 2008. godine. Muzej ima 22 zbirke, preko 50.000 predmeta i tri milijuna fotografija i negativa.

Materijal iz Drugoga svjetskog rata koji se nalazi u muzeju podijeljen je u nekoliko kategorija: oružje, tkanine, partizanske radionice i tiskare, partizanski sanitet, teror tijekom rata, razglednice, medalje i ordeni, značke i znakov-lje, žigovi, pečati i otisci te umjetnička djela.

Godine 2004. osnovana je i brzorastuća audio i video zbirka intervjua, ponajviše s ljudima koji su preživjeli Drugi svjetski rat. Muzej je počeo uključivati audio i video svjedočanstva u privremene izložbe te iste godine. Na prvoj izložbi, naslovljenoj “Kolo užasa”, 2004. godine predstav-ljeni su isječci iz svjedočanstava, ali samo u obliku tekstova ispisanih na zidu. Na izložbi posvećenoj žrtvama terora Trećega Reicha – “Hitlerova duga sjenka” – 2007. godine svjedočanstva su predstavljena zajedno s fotografijama i videointervjuima. Izložba je ostavljala još dublji utisak nakon što je dodana fotografija 179 visokih stuba iz koncen-tracijskoga logora Mauthausena i 50 kg težak komad granita iz kamenoloma uz izjavu jednoga preživjelog: “Bilo je vrlo važno odabrati kamen. Ako nađeš ravan kamen, čini se velik, ali nije tako težak!”4

Na izložbi “Slovenci i fašizam” iz 2008. godine pred-stavljeni su većinom umjetnički predmeti povezani s pričama

4 Izložba “Hitlerjeva dolga senca”, svjedočanstvo Cvete Kobala, 2007.

pojedinaca. Godine 2011. dodana su i svjedočanstva iz Drugoga svjetskog rata u trajni postav, gdje posjetitelji mogu poslušati različite životne priče preživjelih.

Mnogi svjedoci više nisu među živima, ali njihov rad omogućuje nam da se o njima i dalje govori – npr. mnogi slikari poslani u koncentracijske logore u Italiju i u vrlo teškim uvjetima naslikali su niz crteža i slika. To su braća Vidmar, Ivan Čarko i mnogi drugi. Posebno mjesto u našoj muzejskoj zbirci zauzimaju igraće karte, karte za tarot koje je u koncentracijskome logoru Allack izradio arhitekt Boris Kobe. Kroz njih je Kobe opisivao svakodnevni život u logoru i borbu za preživljavanje.

Još jedna posebna zbirka sastoji se od radova zatvore-nika koncentracijskih logora i zatvora. Puni duha izrađivali su različite predmete od dostupnih materijala. Tako su žene uglavnom izrađivale kutijice sa simbolima ili poruke u obliku srca te druge predmete s motivirajućim parolama.

Aktivni sudionici Drugoga svjetskog rata u Sloveniji mogu se podijeliti u pet glavnih skupina: partizani i njihovi simpatizeri, prognanici, zatvorenici iz koncentracijskih logora, nasilno unovačeni u okupatorsku vojsku te kolaboracionisti i njihovi simpatizeri. Nitko nije mogao biti nešto drugo.

Razlozi da se netko pridruži tim skupinama bili su različiti, od nasilja i terora od stane okupatora, do propagande i želje za sudjelovanjem. Ljudi su iskusili rat na različite načine te su prema svojemu djelovanju tijekom rata iskusili drugačije sudbine po njegovom završetku. Procjene koliko je ljudi bilo dio koje skupine variraju te se procjenjuje da je na kraju rata partizana bilo oko 40.000, prognanih oko 80.000, prisilno mobiliziranih u njemačku vojsku oko 40.000, logoraša i zarobljenika oko 30.000 te oko 20.000 protivnika partizana.

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Osim osobnih predmeta iz Drugoga svjetskog rata, osobne priče preživjelih pričane su najčešće samo članovima vlastite obitelji. Ovisno o broju aktivnih sudionika, očekivao bi se širok opus dostupnih objavljenih osobnih svjedočanstava, ako ne svih skupina, onda barem partizana, koji su nakon završetka rata bili najpoštovaniji.

Neka od svjedočanstava objavljena su još tijekom rata. Među njima su i tri prisjećanja zatvorenika iz logora Mauthausen. Tijekom 1960-ih i 1970-ih objavljeno je i nekoliko monografija posvećenih partizanskim jedinicama. Individualne priče partizana nisu se smatrale toliko bitnima te su monografije većinom posvećene udarničkim divizijama i njihovim aktivnostima. Prve monografije posvećene kon-centracijskim logorima u kojima su bili zatvoreni Slovenci objavljene su 1970. godine. Pojedinačna sjećanja opisivana su na isti način i bila su važna samo konkretna zbivanja, a ne osobni doživljaji. Valja spomenuti niz svjedočanstava partizana u “Dolenjskom listu” u razdoblju od 1972. do 1973., nedjeljnu radioemisiju “Sjećaš li se drugova” te kas-nije “Sjećanja”, kao i novine partizanskih veterana TV-15 ili časopis “Slobodna misao” koji objavljuje partizanska prisjećanja. Sve ostale monografije, časopisi i antologije publicirani su kasnije. Promjena stajališta prema vrijed-nosti individualnih prisjećanja dogodila se 1980-ih i 1990-ih nakon što su svjedoci izrazili želju da se čuju i njihova osobna iskustva te počeli publicirati vlastita razmišljanja i prisjećanja. Na taj način prelazili su granice kolektivnih sjećanja skupine. Promijenio se status usmene povijesti i javnost je “imala sluha” za skupljanje i obradu usmenih povijesnih izbora.

Ovisno o broju sudionika, postoji nekoliko objavljenih

autobiografskih sjećanja iz svake skupine sudionika rata. Iako u početku ohrabreni činjenicom da u Cobsissu postoji preko 700 naslova knjiga s ključnim riječima sjećanja iz Drugoga svjetskog rata, koristeći kriterij osobnih iskustava i autobiografskih prisjećanja pronašli smo 73 partizanske priče, 56 prognaničkih priča, 19 logoraških priča i 52 priče od strane prisilno mobiliziranih u njemačku vojsku. Sjećanja prognanika i prisilno mobiliziranih većinom su objavljivana nakon 1991. godine kada je tim skupinama priznat status žrtava rata, što je također važan trenutak u osobnome i kolektivnome sjećanju i svijesti pripadnika tih skupina. Većina komemorativnih publikacija nakon 2000. godine izdana su od strane samih autora. Posebni dio čine pisana sjećanja antipartizanskih pripadnika koja su izdana ubrzo nakon rata u egzilu.

Usmena povijest izgrađena je oko ljudi na temelju sjećanja i prošlih iskustava. Predstavlja tzv. živuću baštinu koja omogućuje nova saznanja i daje uvid u glavni smjer iskustva te kao takva predstavlja izvor dinamičkoga ponašanja struktura. Intervju zadržava individualnu perspe-ktivu i njegova je svrha uhvatiti i sačuvati osobne poglede, sudove i sjećanje na prošla iskustva i kao takav prikupiti određene povijesne informacije kojima inače ne bismo imali pristupa.

U procesu stvaranja kolektivnoga sjećanja dolazi do ujedinjavanja i konvergiranja pojedinačnih sjećanja. Pojedinac stvara kolektivno sjećanje kao nositelj događaja. On ili ona stvaraju, obnavljaju i mijenjaju sjećanja zajedno s drugim pripadnicima skupine kojoj pripadaju. Kolektivno sjećanje savija se oko individualnih sjećanja, ali se s njima ne miješa. Pojedinci, posebice oni članovi skupine koji ne

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žele ili ne mogu prolaziti kroz iskustva vlastita prisjećanja upotrebljavaju kolektivna sjećanja kao svoja. Značenje skupine i kolektivnoga sjećanja tako se pojačava te mnogo ljudi prihvaća ideje i misli inspirirane skupinom, nesvjesni da sami nisu pridonijeli stvaranju kolektivnoga sjećanja. Njihovo je individualno sjećanje ustvari proizišlo iz kolek-tivnoga sjećanja. Važno je za pojedince da se pronađu u kolektivnome sjećanju i da putem toga osjećaju pripadnost vlastitoj skupini.

U isto vrijeme govorimo o smještanju kolektivnoga sjećanja u povijesno sjećanje.

Kolektivno sjećanje pod utjecajem je osnivanja različitih udruga i društava, partizanskih, logoraških, prognaničkih, udruge Slovenaca prisilno mobiliziranih u njemačku vojsku i Nove Slovenske Zaveze kao antipartizan-ske udruge.

Na kraju su razne javne institucije pokazale u posljed-njih deset godina želju za prikupljanjem pojedinačnih svjedočanstava i kao takve pokazuju interes za sjećanja “malih ljudi”, što prije nije bio čest slučaj. Usmena povijest uvijek se smatrala dokumentacijom slabije kvalitete samo zato jer su bila subjektivna. S druge je strane u europskoj znanosti sve više projekata koji se temelje na usmenoj povijesti i predstavljaju mogući izvor financiranja u budućnosti.

Sama sam se uključila u istraživanja usmene povijesti krajem 1980-ih jer sam se bavila temama za koje nije postojalo dovoljno pisanoga materijala ili su dokumenti bili uglavnom uništeni. To su posebice bili dokumenti povezani s temom kolaboracije tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata i s antipartizanskim skupinama. S druge strane, kao kustosica

muzeja koja je nadležna za različite postave iz Drugoga svjetskog rata, dosjetila sam se nove dimenzije predmeta koje čuvamo – pričanje priča o predmetima, pronalaženje njihovih tvoraca i pronalaženje veze predmet – tvorac – muzej. Tu se ponovno postavilo pitanje tko ili što će prev-ladati u toj vezi, ali svi ti dijelovi nesumnjivo tvore cjelinu. Usmena povijest u vidu intervjua ima jednak status kao i bilo koji drugi muzejski izložak. Kada se zabilježe, dobiju redni broj te se zavedu u muzej kao dio inventara te se drže u muzejskoj negoteci. Podatci o izlošku pohranjeni su i na muzejskome serveru.

Kada govorimo o svjedocima, valja naglasiti činjenicu da ih još uvijek nije lako nagovoriti da podijele svoja sjećanja. U mnogim slučajevima to je radi straha, kao da vjeruju da bi im se moglo dogoditi nešto loše. Posebice svjedoci antipartizanske skupine vrlo nevoljko iznose vlas-tita sjećanja. Također ni partizanski simpatizeri se više ne odlučuju lako na iznošenje svojih sjećanja. Možda su nova otkrića povezana s krajem Drugoga svjetskog rata i maso-vnim grobnicama utjecala na to. Rodbina i obitelj vrlo često nagovara svjedoke da odustanu od prisjećanja prošlosti i vrlo često žele biti nazočni tijekom intervjua.

Muzej je sudjelovao i u trima međunarodnim pro-jektima iz usmene povijesti. Tijekom 2005. i 2006. godine intervjuirali smo prisilne radnike za projekt financiran od strane fondacije Erinnerung und Zukunft. Nakon toga objavljena je knjiga na engleskome i njemačkome jeziku.5 Godine 2008. zajedno s kolegama iz Njemačke i Austrije

5 Alexander von Plato et all, Hitlers Sklaven, Berlin 2009.

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proveli smo projekt koji je uključivao 15 sudionika između 15 i 20 godina. Prikupljali smo sjećanja partizana. U 2008. i 2009. godini sudjelovali smo u projektu prikupljanja sjećanja nežidovskih sudionika rata za Muzej holokausta u Washingtonu.

Između ostalog, bili smo u nedoumici koliko i s čije strane uključiti narativa iz Drugoga svjetskog rata u naš trajni postav kako ne bi bio previše patetičan, neosoban ili kako se ne bi stekao dojam da se neka skupina favorizira u odnosu na drugu.

Kustosi nastoje ostati u kontaktu sa svjedocima čiji su iskazi pohranjeni u muzeju, a sami svjedoci često izražavaju želju za kontaktom jer osjećaju da su dali jedan dio sebe i otvorili se prema kustosima.

Muzej često organizira tematske prezentacije u kojima svjedoci igraju važnu ulogu. Nije jednostavno uvijek balan-sirati između patetike i iskrenih osjećaja. Zainteresirana publika na takvim prezentacijama obično je na strani jedne od skupina koja se predstavlja i podupire ideje i osjećaje tih svjedoka i njihovih opisa događaja. Ponekad se svjedoci suprotstavljenih skupina iz Drugoga svjetskog rata susretnu na takvim prezentacijama . Znale su pasti i teške riječi, kao kada smo 1999. godine otvorili izložbu o antipartizanskim formacijama. Iz današnje perspektive moram reći da je za takvu izložbu bilo prerano. Javnost nije dosegla dovoljnu razinu zrelosti da bi mogla voditi dijalog na tu temu. Pomirenje suprotstavljenih skupina iz Drugoga svjetskog rata još uvijek je vrlo daleko.

Muzej je također počeo objavljivati sjećanja i dnevnike preživjelih. Mnogi su pisali dnevnike za vrijeme rata i to su sada vrijedni muzejski izlošci. Osim toga, ohrabrujemo

pojedince da i dalje zapisuju svoja sjećanja te smo tako objavili životnu priču G. Polde Gošnika 2010. godine. On je prisilno mobiliziran u njemačku vojsku, zarobljen u Africi, doveden u Englesku i zatim prebačen u Sjedinjene Američke Države gdje je proveo nekoliko godina u logorima za ratne zarobljenike.

Muzej aktivno surađuje s veteranskim organizaci-jama te s Međunarodnim odborom koncentracijskoga logora Mauthausen. Na taj način i dalje smo u kontaktu sa svjedo-cima, sudjelujemo u istraživanjima te izmjenjujemo ideje i znanje s kolegama iz drugih zemalja.

S druge strane, prezentacija prošlosti uključena je u glavni zadatak našega muzeja. U sklopu toga vodimo djecu školskoga uzrasta u memorijalne centre Drugoga svjetskog rata i na mjesta slovenskoga stradanja. Svake godine sa sku-pinom osnovnoškolaca posjećujemo Mauthausen memori-jalni centar gdje se djeca upoznaju s prošlim događanjima, a kustos ih povede u obilazak kampa. Prije samoga putovanja preživjeli iz logora Mauthausen zajedno s kustosom muzeja posjećuju školu i pripremaju djecu za posjet memorijalnomu centru. Veterani svake godine održavaju komemoraciju u slovenskome memorijalnom centru Mauthausen6 koji je napravljen kao kopija onoga smještenog u koncentracijskome logoru Ljubelj (koji je bio ogranak koncentracijskoga logora Mauthausen). Komemoracija se održava svake godine kako bi se prisjetili svih Slovenaca koji su umrli u koncentracijs-kim logorima po čitavoj Europi.

6 Dušan Stefančič, Vodnik po koncentracijskem taborišču Mauthausen, Ljubljana 2013.

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Tradicija komemoracija događaja iz Drugoga svjetskog rata vrlo je živa u Sloveniji. Partizanski veterani organiziraju barem šest komemoracija raznih događaja iz Drugoga svjetskog rata mjesečno.

Najveća komemoracija koja dobiva nove okvire naziva se Put sjećanja i drugarstva u Ljubljani. Talijanski okupatori 1942. godine okružili su čitavu Ljubljanu žičanom ogradom. Ljubljana je do tada bila vrlo otvoren grad, partizanske sku-pine nesmetano su dolazile i odlazile iz grada i komunicirale sa stanovništvom, a periferne zone opskrbljivale su grad hranom. Nakon 1942. godine Talijani su spriječili takav oblik komunikacije. U raznim dijelovima grada postavljene su blokade, a događale su se i racije. Tisuće je ljudi uhapšeno i otpravljeno u koncentracijske logore Gonars i Rennici itd. Čitava žičana ograda bila je dugačka 29 km i brojala je 102 bunkera od kojih su neki bili široki i do 20 m7. Postojalo je samo nekoliko mjesta gdje se moglo proći kroz ogradu s propusnicama, tzv. “lascia passare”. Organizacije otpora pronašle su tajne prolaze gdje je komunikacija mogla biti nastavljena. Ljubljana je bila okružena žicom 1170 dana, a žica je uklonjena tek krajem rata kada su uništeni i bun-keri. Ljudi koji su odlučili obilježiti te događaje počeli su održavati mimohode na mjestima gdje je bila postavljena žica. Prvi mimohod održan je 1957. godine. Šest spomenika podignuto je na mjestima gdje je bilo moguće proći kroz blokadu. Arhitekt Vlasto Kopč, zatvoren u logoru Dachau, osmislio je spomenike u obliku stupova. Početkom 1960-ih arhitekt Edo Ravnikar osmislio je 102 manja stupa smještena

7 Aleksander Jankovič Potočnik, Utrjena Ljubljana, Ljubljana 2006.

na mjestima gdje su bili bunkeri. Ljubljana je dobila titulu “grada heroja”, a 1975. godine Put sjećanja i drugarstva počeo se uređivati. S pomoću radnih akcija izgrađene su staze i radovi su završeni 1985. godine zajedno s novim pro-jektnim dizajnom. Na putu se nalazi niz ploča i znakova koji podsjećaju posjetitelje na važnost događaja koje obilježava, a nakon 1991. godine i slovenske neovisnosti promijenilo se značenje Puta sjećanja i drugarstva i više nije samo komem-orativna staza, već i rekreacijska zona za obitelji i susrete s prijateljima u prirodi.

Muzej čuva mnoge predmete povezane s Putem sjećanja i drugarstva. Čuvamo fotografije, knjige, postere, bedževe i plakate koje kao svjedoci vremena govore sami za sebe.

Svjedočanstva u najširemu smislu riječi, koja uključuju i predmete i osobe, dala su dodatnu dimenziju muzeju i kroz priče omogućila posjetiteljima da se upoznaju s vremenom i događajima iz prošlosti.

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Skopje 2014 Project and Its Effects on the Perception of Macedonian Identity among the Citizens of Skopje

Kalina Lechevska1

1 Researcher and Associate Professor at the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities - Skopje. She has a PhD in Sociology, from the Department for Sociology at the Institute for Sociological, Political and Legal Research, at the University “St.Cyril and Methodius”

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Four years ago, the Macedonian Government and the Municipality of Centre officially promoted a project named “Skopje 2014”. At the beginning, it was communicated that the Project aimed to make the centre of the city more beauti-ful. On a six minute video2 the planned buildings, monu-ments and sculptures in Skopje were presented. There were buildings in neoclassic style with some approximation of baroque- style that has never been characteristic for the archi-tecture of Skopje. The promotion of the project and the video instantly divided the wider public.3 Most of the comments referred to the central monument in the Project- the sculpture of Alexander the Great on the main square. The country was in middle of negotiations about the name dispute with Greece and for an accession in EU, so many experts thought that this was one way to provoke the neighbor.

One of the first monuments from the project was pre-sented in honor of the 20 years of Independence.4 The statute of Alexander the Great was placed on the central square but under another name “Warrior on a Horse”.5

2 “Визуелизација на центарот на Скопје во 2014” [“Visualization of Skopje 2014”], available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBYtmAOt7RI, accessed on 25 October 2013.

3 “Скопје 2014 погледано од ”Аватар” [“Skopje 2014 video more watched than “Avatar”] available at http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=261092332&id=9&setIzdanie=21903, accessed on 25 October 2013.

4 “Ова е наша Македонија” [“This is our Macedonia”] available at http://www.vecer.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=7277B6EAFE21B44E907E505F32BF8B6C, accessed on 25 October 2013.

K. Lechevska

The “Project Skopje 2014” began with lightning speed through building numerous sculptures, new objects and monuments, remaking the existing facades... All of that was accompanied by introducing historic stories and heroes, whi-ch had not been important before. The Government encoura-ged new myths about the antique roots of the Macedonians and the importance of Alexander the Great for Macedonian identity (which started to appear in public some ten years ago). Obviously, their purpose was to create an uninterrupted historical continuity of the “Macedonian self” from Antiquity via the Slavic period, former Yugoslav federation, early 20th century, up to the establishing of an independent state.

In 2013 the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities- Skopje conducted a study named “Skopje 2014 Project and its Effects on the Perception of Macedonian Identity among the Citizens of Skopje”. The name of the study explains its biggest motive. It is a fact that projects like “Skopje 2014” provoke changes in the perceptions of the national identity of the citizens. The main purpose was to explore the success of the Project in regards to its own ambi-tions. The comparison between the Government’s narrative and the perceptions among the citizens of Skopje was one of the motives for the research.

5 “Macedonia statue: Alexander the Great or a warrior on a horse?” available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/14 alexander-great-macedonia-warrior-horse, accessed on 25 October 2013.

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The main questions in the study were:• Can these newly introduced myths, symbols, monu-

ments etc. change the perception of the national identity of the Macedonians?

• How much is this project supported by the citizens?• Does this project produce additional divisions of the

population (ethnic, political, social)?

The ResearchIn order to explore this topic the study was divided into two stages and combined a few research methods.

In the first phase, over 50 people who live in Skopje took part through participating in: focus groups, in-depth interviews with experts and a closed panel group with opin-ion makers.

The second phase was conducting a telephone poll on a representative sample of 1200 participants from the whole country. They answered a short questionnaire related to the Project “Skopje 2014” and the perception of the Macedonian identity.

Focus groupsThe survey contained four focus groups with citizens of Skopje representative by: level of education, social status, gender, age, political inclination and ethnicity.

One of the four groups consisted only of ethnic minor-ity representatives which provided insight into the differ-ences between Macedonians and other ethnic groups as far as the perception of the Macedonian identity is concerned and the effects of “Skopje 2014” on it.

The questions in the focus groups contained everyday culture and they were answered from a point of personal experience and perception. The participants commented about the most important historic periods and heroes for the Macedonian Identity, the main characteristics that define the Macedonian identity and the Project “Skopje 2014”.

The Main FindingsAfter summarizing the results, we can say that the partici-pants find the following characteristics as defining for the essence of the Macedonian identity:

• Inferiority, • Weakness,• Not knowing who we are,• Identity confusion,• Lack of self-respect • Lack of higher awareness

It is interesting to note is that the focus group which consisted of ethnic minorities expressed the same perceptions. Therefore, the aspect of cultural intimacy inciting shame can be described as the “core of the national identity.” 6

As far as the mobilization of everyday culture and its “codes of cultural intimacy”, the findings show that the project “Skopje 2014” is distant from the elements which are recognized as the codes of cultural intimacy and perceived as characteristics of the Macedonian culture and cultural

6 Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State (New York and London: Routledge), 3-5.

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heritage. The defining and most valuable marks of the Macedonian culture belong to the immaterial culture:

• The traditional folk music and dances, • The food,• The language • The traditional lifestyle linked the Orthodox

Christian values. There was no exception among the respondents in this

respect and the ethnic minorities group confirmed having the same perception.

Regarding the historical period defining the Macedonian identity, the respondents singled out the two most important periods:

• The 19th century ( the fight for liberation from the Ottoman empire)

• The period of former YugoslaviaIt is interesting that the respondents expressed either a

sense of opposition or indifference to the period of Antiquity. The feelings of indifference were present also among those who have nothing against, or support the building of the statue of Alexander the Great at the central square of Skopje.

According to the respondents, the most important person for building the Macedonian identity is Goce Delcev. He was a Macedonian revolutionary at the turn of the 20th century who fought against the Ottomans.7 Alexander the Great was mentioned only by one respondent.

7 “Goce Delcev” available at http://makedonija.name/history/goce-delcev, accessed on 25 October 2013.

Regarding the monuments and the architectural proj-ects from “Skopje 2014” there were divided opinions. The majority disapproves of them, while a certain percentage approves “creating and building monuments”. Yet, the ones who approve are at the same time critical towards: the great number of monuments, style, spent money etc. They also disapprove of the fact that some more important historical periods and heroes are neglected in favor of Antiquity.

Interviews with expertsThe research conducted ten interviews with experts (univer-sity teachers, researchers and NGO activists). They served to provide confirmation or reservation regarding the findings of the focus groups. The answers of all respondents are not a surprise regarding the findings, especially not from the nega-tive definition of the “Macedonian self” which they prescribe to the Macedonian history. The predominant view among the experts is that the national identity is a discursive construct, or rather a political product. The cultural identity is rooted in the predominantly orally transmitted history and tradition. The predominant position is that it is possible - from a posi-tion of power- to intervene and change the sense of cultural belonging and its symbols. One of the examples is a greater presence of Antiquity in the educational system which could produce such change in future.

Panel of Opinion MakersThe research organized to meet with non-political expert groups with professionals from related fields (cultural studi-es, anthropology, ethnology, history, political science, media and communication) who commented the results from the

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focus groups. All of them have international carriers and they are not involved in any form of political party activity.

They find the identity confusion to be the result of the complexity of the Macedonian history. It refers to the promo-tion of the idea for a Macedonian state, which was not cre-ated until the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The experts think that Macedonia never had the chance to build its own iden-tity while the public discourse continues to focus on creating new historical myths.

For them, the Project “Skopje 2014” has no aesthetic value and represents “revenge from the province”. Its main purpose is spending money in record time. If the aim was to build or strengthen the Macedonian identity it’s been done totally wrong, violating the existing sense of identity and, thus, creating confusion.

Obviously, the so called “competent public” does not agree with “Skopje 2014”, which does not mean it is not acceptable for the wider population.

Telephone PollThe second stage of the research was conducting a telephone poll about “Skopje 2014” and its effects on the perception of the national identity among the citizens of Skopje and the other cities in Macedonia. Over 1200 respondents were randomly chosen, but at the same time representative by: gender, age, education and ethnicity, answered a short questionnaire.

Only two general frequencies will be presented in this paper because the final results and the data crossing are still being processed.

One of the questions was “Do you like the project “Skopje 2014?”. According to the results (presented in the table below) the first impressions is that for the wider popu-lation of Macedonia, “Skopje 2014” is not as unacceptable as it is for the experts and professionals.

“Do you like the project “Skopje 2014?”

Regarding the other studies done in Macedonia a few years ago, it should be pointed that Ancient Macedonia and Alexander the Great were mainly perceived as just one piece among many in the history. Present results are mostly simi-lar, although the number of people, who point at Alexander the Great as most important, is increasing.

In response to the question “Who is the most impor-tant person for building the Macedonian national identity” (table below) most of the respondents singled out Brothers Cyril and Methodius and Goce Delcev.

I like it 24.4%

I partly like it 22.6%

I don’t like it 45.1%

I don’t know 6.8%

Without answer 1.2%

Total 100%

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“According to you who is the most important person for building the Macedonian national identity?”

Summarizing these short results, it is obvious that Macedonians are divided regarding the perception about the roots of their identity.

Beside the illustrative data about the perceptions and acceptance of the project “Skopje 2014”, the main question remains open: How much change or confusion in identity will this new mythology produce?

It is probably too early for any long-term progno-sis, and undoubtedly it depends on how long it goes on. However, it should not be forgotten that there young genera-tions are already growing who received their primary educa-tion only in this context, among those monuments and with those stories. For them, it will be the only truth they know.

Alexander the Great 10.5

Brothers Cyril and Methodius 24.4

Goce Delchev 23.3

Others 41.8

Total 100%

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1 Statue of Alexander the Great, photo by Nikola Naumoski

1 Spomenik Aleksandru Velikom, fotografija: Nikola Naumoski

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2 Triumphal Arch, photo by: Nikola Naumoski 2 Triumfalni luk, fotografija: Nikola Naumoski

3 Statue of Philip II, photo by: Nikola Naumoski

3 Spomenik Filipu II, fotografija: Nikola Naumoski

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Projekt “Skopje 2014.” i njegov utjecaj na percepciju makedonskoga identiteta među stanovnicima Skopja

Kalina Lechevska1

1 Istraživačica i profesorica pri Institutu za društvene i humanističke znanosti u Skopju. Doktorirala je na Katedri za sociologiju pri Institutu za sociološka, politološka i pravna istraživanja Sveučilišta Sv. Ćiril i Metod.

Prije četiri godine makedonska vlada i gradska vlast u Skopju počeli su sa službenom promidžbom projekta “Skopje 2014.”. U početku je rečeno da je cilj projekta urediti centar grada. U šestominutnom videu predstavljene su plani-rane građevine i spomenici Skopja. Građevine su zamišljene u neoklasicističkome stilu s elementima baroka koji nikad nisu bili karakteristični za arhitekturu grada. Promidžbeni video2, čim se pojavio, izazvao je podijeljene reakcije3. Većina komentara odnosila se na središnji dio projekta – spomenik Aleksandru Velikom na glavnome gradskom trgu. Država je bila usred pregovora s Grčkom u vezi spora oko imena te pregovora s Europskom unijom oko procesa pristupanja i mnogi su stručnjaci ovo smatrali provokacijom usmjerenom prema susjednoj državi.

Jedan od prvih spomenika povezanih s projektom predstavljen je u čast makedonske 20. obljetnice nezavis-nosti4. Kip Aleksandra Velikoga otkriven je na glavnome gradskom trgu, ali pod imenom “Ratnik na konju”.5

2 “Визуелизација на центарот на Скопје во 2014” [“Vizualizacija Skopja 2014.”], http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YBYtmAOt7RI, pristupljeno 25. 10. 2013.

3 “Скопје 2014 погледано од “Аватар” [“Skopje 2014.” gledanije od “Avatara”], http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=261092332&id=9&setIzdanie=21903, pristupljeno25. 10. 2013.

4 “Ова е наша Македонија” [“Ovo je naša Makedonija”], http://www.vecer.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=7277B6EAFE21B44E907E505F32BF8B6C, pristupljeno 25. 10. 2013.

5 “Macedonia statue: Alexander the Great or a warrior on a horse?”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/14/alexander-great-macedonia-warrior-horse, pristupljeno 25. 10. 2013

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Spomenik Aleksandru VelikomuProjekt “Skopje 2014.” ubrzo se nastavio razvijati brzinom svjetlosti kroz izgradnju brojnih skulptura, novih objekata, uređenja postojećih fasada itd. Sve to praćeno je uključivanjem povijesnih priča i junaka koji se do tada nisu smatrali važnima. Vlada je poticala mitove o antičkim korijenima Makedonaca (koji su se pojavili u javnosti prije desetak godina). Očito je njihov cilj bio stvaranje neprekinutoga povijesnog kontinuiteta makedonske samostojnosti od antike, preko slavenskoga razdoblja, Jugoslavije pa sve do stvaranja neovisne države.

Slavoluk pobjede / Kip Filipa II.Godine 2013. Institut društvenih znanosti i humanisti-ke – Skopje proveo je istraživanje “Projekt Skopje 2014.” i njegov utjecaj na percepciju makedonskoga identiteta među stanovnicima Skopja. Naziv istraživanja objašnjava i njegovu glavnu motivaciju. Činjenica je da projekti poput projekta “Skopje 2014.” stvaraju određene promjene u per-cepciji nacionalnoga identiteta stanovnika. Glavni cilj bio je istražiti uspješnost projekta “Skopje 2014.” u odnosu na njegove ciljeve. Usporedba između političkoga diskursa i percepcije među građanima Skopja bila je glavna motivacija istraživanja.

Glavna pitanja bila su: • Mogu li nova mitologija, simboli i spomenici promi-

jeniti percepciju nacionalnoga identiteta Makedonaca? • Koliku potporu ima projekt među stanovništvom?• Stvara li projekt dodatne podjele među

stanovništvom (etničke, političke, ekonomske)?

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IstraživanjeKako bi se tema istražila, istraživanje je podijeljeno u dvije faze i uključivalo je nekoliko istraživačkih metoda.

U prvome dijelu nešto više od 50 ljudi iz Skopja sudjelovalo je u fokus-grupama, intervjuima sa stručnjacima i panel-grupama s opinion makerima.

Drugi dio sastojao se od telefonskoga istraživanja na reprezentativnome uzorku od 1200 ispitanika iz čitave zemlje. Pitanja su se ticala projekta “Skopje 2014.” i percep-cije makedonskoga identiteta.

Fokus-grupeIstraživanje se sastojalo od četiriju fokus-grupa građana Skopja prema razini obrazovanja, socijalnoga statusa, spola, dobi, političkih pogleda i etniciteta.

Jedna od grupa sastojala se isključivo od pripad-nika manjina i dala je uvid u razlike između Makedonaca i građana drugih etničkih skupina što se tiče percepcije makedonskoga identiteta i učinka projekta “Skopje 2014.” na njegovu percepciju.

Pitanja postavljena fokus-grupi sadržavala su neka kulturna polazišta, a na njih se odgovaralo iz vlastite per-spektive i iskustva. Sudionici su komentirali najvažnija povijesna razdoblja i junake povezane s makedonskim iden-titetom, glavne karakteristike samoga identiteta i projekt “Skopje 2014.”.

Glavni rezultatiNakon analize rezultata može se zaključiti da glavnim karakteristikama koje definiraju makedonski identitet sudionici smatraju:

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• inferiornost• slabost• neznanje o tome tko su• zbunjenost oko identiteta• manjak samopoštovanja• nedostatak više svijesti.

Zanimljivo je primijetiti da je fokus-grupa koja se sas-tojala od pripadnika manjinskih skupina imala istu percep-ciju te se aspekt kulturne intimnosti koja izaziva sram može opisati kao “jezgra nacionalnoga identiteta”.6

Što se tiče mobilizacije popularne kulture i njezinih “kodova kulturne intimnosti”, rezultati pokazuju da je pro-jekt “Skopje 2014.” udaljen od elemenata koji se prepoznaju kao kodovi kulturne intimnosti i koji se percipiraju kao elementi makedonske kulture i baštine. Najvažniji i najvred-niji elementi koji definiraju makedonsku kulturu pripadaju njezinoj nematerijalnoj domeni:

• tradicionalna narodna glazba i plesovi• hrana• jezik• tradicionalni način života povezan s makedonskim

pravoslavljem.

Nisu opažene razlike u odgovorima na ova pitanja između fokus-grupa, a etničke i druge manjine potvrdile su da posjeduju isto viđenje kulture i identiteta.

6 Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State (New York and London: Routledge), 3-5.

Što se tiče povijesnoga razdoblja koje definira make-donski identitet, ispitanici su izdvojili dva ključna razdoblja kao najvažnija:

• 19. stoljeće (borba za oslobođenje od osmanske vladavine)

• razdoblje bivše Jugoslavije.Zanimljivo je da je većina ispitanika izražavala negativno ili indiferentno stajalište prema razdoblju antike. Indiferentnost su izražavali i oni koji nemaju ništa protiv izgradnje spomenika Aleksandru Velikomu u centru Skopja.

Prema ispitanicima, najvažnija osoba za izgradnju makedonskoga identiteta je Goce Delčev. On je bio make-donski revolucionar na prijelazu u 20. stoljeće koji se borio protiv Osmanlija. Aleksandra Velikoga spomenuo je samo jedan ispitanik.

Što se tiče spomenika i arhitektonskih ostvarenja pro-jekta “Skopje 2014.”, mišljenja su podijeljena. Većina ih ne odobrava, a dio općenito izgradnju spomenika smatra pozi-tivnom. Međutim, i oni koji podržavaju izgradnju spomenika kritički su prema njihovu broju, stilu, potrošenome novcu itd. Također ne odobravaju činjenicu da su neki drugi, važniji junaci i povijesna razdoblja zanemareni u odnosu na antiku.

Intervjui sa stručnjacimaIstraživanje je uključivalo 10 intervjua sa stručnjacima (sve-učilišnim profesorima, istraživačima i aktivistima nevladinih udruga). Njihova uloga bila je potvrditi ili opovrgnuti rezul-tate dobivene s pomoću fokus-grupa. Odgovori ispitanika nisu bili neočekivani, pogotovo što se tiče negativne definici-je “makedonstva” koju oni pripisuju makedonskoj povijesti. Dominantno je gledište ispitanih stručnjaka da je nacionalni

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identitet objekt diskursa i politički produkt. Kulturni iden-titet ukorijenjen je u uglavnom usmenoj povijesti i tradiciji. Dominantno stajalište je da je iz pozicije moći moguće inter-venirati i izmijeniti osjećaj kulturne pripadnosti i s tim pove-zane simbole. Kao primjer izdvojili su veću prisutnost antike u obrazovnome sustavu i mogućnost mijenjanja elemenata identiteta kao posljedice toga.

Panel opinion makeraU sklopu istraživanja organizirane su i zatvorene skupine koje su se sastojale od profesionalaca iz različitih područja (kulturne studije, antropologija, etnologija, povijest, političke znanosti, mediji i komunikacije) koji su komentirali rezultate fokus-grupa. Svi oni imaju inozemne karijere i nisu uključeni u rad političkih stranaka.

Smatraju da je zbunjenost u vezi identiteta posljedica kompleksnosti makedonske povijesti. Uključuje ideju make-donske države koja nije stvorena sve do raspada Jugoslavije. Stručnjaci smatraju da Makedonija nikad nije imala stvarne mogućnosti da izgradi vlastiti identitet sve dok se javni dis-kurs fokusira na stvaranje novih povijesnih mitova.

Za njih projekt “Skopje 2014.” nema estetsku vrijed-nost i predstavlja “osvetu iz provincije”. Glavni cilj bio je potrošiti što više novca u što kraćemu roku. Ako je cilj i bio ojačati makedonski identitet, to je učinjeno na potpuno pogrešan način, narušavajući postojeći sustav vrijednosti i osjećaj identiteta, što stvara zbunjenost. Očito je da se tzv. “stručna javnost” ne slaže s projektom “Skopje 2014.”, što ne znači da isto mišljenje dijeli šira javnost.

Telefonska anketaDruga faza istraživanja sastojala se od telefonske ankete o projektu “Skopje 2014.” i njegovu utjecaju na percepciju nacionalnoga identiteta među stanovnicima Skopja i drugim gradovima Makedonije. Preko 1200 ispitanika odabrano je nasumičnim putem, ali je uzorak bio reprezentativan prema dobi, spolu, razini obrazovanja i etnicitetu.

Rezultati odgovora na samo dva pitanja bit će pred-stavljeni u ovome radu jer se detaljna statistička obrada upitnika još uvijek obavlja. Jedno od pitanja bilo je: “Sviđa li vam se projekt “Skopje 2014.?” Prema rezultatima (pri-kazanima u tablici 1.), stječe se dojam da široj makedonskoj javnosti projekt nije toliko neprihvatljiv koliko stručnjacima i profesionalcima.

Tablica 1.: Sviđa li vam se projekt “Skopje 2014.?”

Prema drugim istraživanjima provedenima u Makedoniji prije nekoliko godina, treba istaknuti da su antička Makedonija i Aleksandar Veliki smatrani samo jednim djelićem makedonske povijesti. Slični rezultati dobi-veni su i ovim istraživanjem iako je broj ljudi koji ističe

Sviđa mi se 24.4%

Dijelom mi se sviđa 22.6%

Ne sviđa mi se 45.1%

Ne znam 6.8%

Bez odgovora 1.2%

Ukupno 100%

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Aleksandra Velikoga kao najvažniju osobu makedonske povi-jesti u porastu.

Kao odgovor na pitanje: “Tko je najvažnija osoba za izgradnju makedonskoga nacionalnog identiteta?” najviše ispitanika odabralo je braću Ćirila i Metoda te Gocu Delčeva.

Tablica 2.: Prema vama, tko je najvažnija osoba za izgradnju makedonskoga nacionalnog identiteta?

Kao zaključak ovoga dijela istraživanja nameće se činjenica da su Makedonci podijeljeni oko percepcije vlastita identiteta.

Osim ovih ilustrativnih podataka o percepciji i prihva-ćanju projekta “Skopje 2014.”, glavno pitanje ostaje otvoreno: “Koliko će promjena i konfuzije u pitanjima identiteta stvo-riti nova mitologija?”

Vjerojatno je prerano za bilo kakve dugoročne pro-gnoze koje ovise i tome koliko će ovakva politika trajati. S druge strane, ne treba smetnuti s uma činjenicu da već postoje mlade generacije koje su tijekom obvezatnoga školovanja bile izložene samo ovomu aspektu povijesti, narativa i kulturnih spomenika. To će za njih biti jedina istina koju poznaju.

Alexander the Great 10.5

Brothers Cyril and Methodius 24.4

Goce Delchev 23.3

Others 41.8

Total 100%

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Yugoslavia: An Individual Recollection of a Collective History

Ana Panić 1

1 Curator and art historian at the Museum of Yugoslav History, Belgrade, Serbia.

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“The reduction of Yugoslavia’s story to a pile of data, objects and documents should provide us with a distanced and objective picture on what it was like to live in Yugoslavia, while ignoring the fact that it was an experience which entire generations of citizens of ex Yugoslavia had lived through Generations of former Yugoslavs themselves are thus transformed into objects of history.” (Petrović 2012: 187)

Yugoslavia vanished from world maps more than two decades ago, but it clearly remains more than a geographic term for a number of people, and its heritage still strongly influences the lives of people in the area. Yugoslavia offi-cially became an object of history when the Museum of Yugoslav History was founded, pushing it into the past wit-hout the possibility of embedding the Yugoslav experience into policies of the future, i.e. the process of reshaping post-Yugoslav societies. The name “Yugoslavia” persisted until 2003, retained in the official name of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia composed of Serbia and Montenegro only, in an attempt of continuity with the previous state of Yugoslavia. The placing of an existing state’s name into a museum (not explicitly specified, but obviously referring to socialist Yugoslavia) was an act of open abandonment of the Yugoslav idea which now belongs in a museum.

It may sound like a paradox, but by following the linear narrative of the Museum of Yugoslav History, a superposition becomes apparent with the historiographic narrative of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The history of a museum is always the history of world views and the history of control and power. Negative interpretations of socialist ideology, and the ideas of yugoslavness, and brotherhood and unity along with it, surfaced as early as the beginning

A. Panić

of the 1980s. New nationalist symbols started taking over Serbian public space in order to perfidiously create the foun-dations of war in ex-Yugoslavia (Stojanović 2010: 13-31). The relationship towards Tito and his heritage changed in the culture of memory, historiography and everyday memory along with the changes of state interests after 1990. And “the less distant history is, the stronger the influence of current agendas in its interpretation becomes” (Kuljić 2003: 97-116). The Museum entered a period of instability during the dark 90s in the 20th century. Those were the years during which Vojislav Šešelj, head of the Serbian Radical Party and the Chetnik movement, called for Tito’s remains to be returned to his birthplace in Kumrovec in a protest held on May 4th, 1991 (the eleventh anniversary of Tito’s death) in front of the House of Flowers on account of Tito being the greatest enemy the Serbian people ever had. That never happened, but the House of Flowers, along with the entire Memorial complex, became eerily empty ever since. In 1992, Dobrica Ćosić, as the first president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, raised the issue of the purpose and use of the buildings, Memorial center and Museum of the Revolution of the People and Nations of Yugoslavia. During that same year, the buildings of “25. maj” and “4. jul” museums, which were part of the “Josip Broz Tito” Memorial center, were returned under the control of the town council, and the buil-ding of the “25. maj” museum was handed over for use to the History Museum of Serbia. In the same year, the Society of Art Historians organized a round table: “Josip Broz Tito Memorial Centre” – How to proceed? during which a pro-grammatic transformation of the Centre was discussed. Each participant had his or her own suggestion. Some of the

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suggestions were to institute a Centre for the Popularization of Science within the Memorial Centre, to provide a space for the Museum of the City of Belgrade which did not have its own building or to found the Museum of Vassalage (Prodanović 1998: 35-77). The idea to found the Museum of Yugoslav History was also mentioned there for the first time, and it was founded in 1996 by government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia decree. The founding of a museum dedicated to a non existing country only five years after its break-up during the bloodiest European war in the second half of the twentieth century was a purely political act. By no means was it the result of a thought out cultural policy, or the desire for musealization of Yugoslavia and socialist heri-tage. On the contrary, the heritage needed to be dealt with as something undesirable. Just like the heritage of antifas-cism, preserved in the Museum of Revolution which covered the National Liberation War in WW2 from which socialist Yugoslavia was created, the development of the Communist party of Yugoslavia and the workers movement, was undesi-rable. The memories had to be erased, eradicated or at least altered with regard to WW2, making room for a revision of history. The regime of Slobodan Milošević (the last presi-dent of Yugoslavia, and the first president of Serbia, 1989 – 2000) had an ambivalent approach to the historical heritage of Tito’s Yugoslavia, described as both the dungeon of the Serbian people and the country in which all the Serbs in the region had lived. Due to this ambivalence, the de-titoization of Serbia was sudden and chaotic. As of the beginning of the nineties, symbols of socialism were gradually and continu-ally removed from public space. Photographs of Tito in scho-ols were replaced with those of Vuk Karadžić – the Serbian

language reformer, Saint Sava - the first Serbian archbishop and Slobodan Milošević – the president of Serbia (1989 – 1997) and FR Yugoslavia (1997 – 2000) – the symbols of construction of Serbian national identity. The turbulent events of the 90s, along with the cessation of media activities which affirmed Tito’s name, had a strong influence on the public perception of his character. Tito’s name was removed from the names of towns, photos of him were taken off the walls of offices and factory halls, and his busts were remo-ved from public spaces. In spite of that, many towns in ex-Yugoslav countries kept the names of streets and squares that were named after Josip Broz. The name was often moved from main streets to the suburbs. Belgrade’s periphery con-tains twelve streets and a square named after Tito. After Slobodan Milošević’s regime had fallen, the new gover-nment took things even further, trying to establish itself as the liberator that cast off the shackles of communism2 and of everything that the Socialist party of Serbia represented during the 1990s. This was apparent in their equation of the Chetnik movement with the Partisans in the eyes of the law, its affirmation in public as an antifascist movement and in the changes to the names of streets, holidays, laws, schoolbo-oks and monuments. Milošević was presented to the public as the last European communist in order to divert attention from his nationalism which had not disappeared when he left the political scene, since his national agenda was shared by

2 After the opposition had won the local elections, Zoran Đinđić, the first democratically elected mayor, personally took down the five pointed star from the Town hall on February 21st 1997, replacing it with the two-headed eagle

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numerous parties that participated in the new government (Stojanović 2010: 17). Societies undergoing transition look for new identities by revising previous ones.

The confusion in society was mirrored by the confu-sion within which the museum operated within the federal framework, outsider the jurisdiction of the Ministry of cul-ture or any other ministry. It was an independent federal organization until April 2003 when the National Assembly of Serbia accepted a provision which determined that the MYH would become an organization of the State of Serbia within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Local Self Government. In November 2007, the Government of Serbia decided to re-found the MYH as an institution devoted to culture, with the House of Flowers and the Old Museum incorporated in it, and with the right to use the exhibition space of the “25. majˮ museum that had been returned to the MYH in 2000. The Museum of Yugoslav History has had a permanent venue for its exhibitions since then as well as the status of a cultural institution. It began to define itself in line with this new role and has organized numerous exhibitions and programs on the subjects of history and popular culture of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Along with this, it has been working on developing future permanent exhibitions about the history 1918 - 1991 of Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito since 2009. The reasons for the existence of the same collections have changed and the artifacts in the museum received new meanings within the context of the culture of memory and yugonostalgia. It is important to note that the changes after 2000, when the House of Flowers once again became a tourist attraction, came from the bottom up; from its visitors, and not in a state-organized manner or as a

product of the Ministry of Culture’s cultural policies. “The House of Flowers has a different meaning in 2010 than it did in 1980. As time went by, it became multifaceted and its main meaning has changed. Visiting the House of Flowers in the 1980s meant demonstrating one’s allegiance to the exi-sting regime of the Communist party, and now the visit is a demonstration of protest against the current regime.ˮ (Kuljić 2011: 149-150) It is not only visited by old veterans, there are increasing numbers of young people from all countries of former Yugoslavia as well as an ever increasing number of foreign tourists3. What is causing this resurgence of interest in Tito and socialist Yugoslavia? When the focus is directed at the memories of former Yugoslavs, now citizens of new national states of southeastern Europe, Tito stands out as the central historical figure in numerous polls being conducted, often marked as both the most significant and the most posi-tive historical figure from this area4.

3 The Museum of Yugoslav History has over 100,000 visitors every year.

4 According to an opinion poll in Serbia, conducted by IPSOS Strategic Marketing in March 2010 for the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 10% of the population consider Tito to be the most significant figure in the history of the world, second to Nikola Tesla (21%). Adolf Hitler was in the third position (8%), followed by Jesus Christ (5%). As much as 19% viewed Tito as the most significant figure in the history of Serbia, and most citizens remember him as a great statesman (64%). 87% knew the year in which he died, with 47% remembering the exact date. Within one of the most representative public opinion polls of the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana, Tito was viewed as a very positive figure by 18% of the respondents, 65.5% viewed him as positive, and 8.4% viewed him as negative. Mladina magazine received the following answers in its 1995 poll in which it asked “Was Tito a positive or a negative figure for you”: 67.2% positive, 10%

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Less visible, but by no means less important as a spe-cific aspect of reconstruction, are the papers dealing with image studies, i.e. the reception of Tito’s personality in an attempt to reconstruct the phenomenon from a socio-cultural viewpoint. The culturologist Mitja Velikonja introduced the term titostalgia, which labels a nostalgic relationship towards Tito’s personality and the heritage of titoism (Velikonja, 2010). The causes for titostalgia are recognizable in all the countries of ex-Yugoslavia. Sometimes they are similar, sometimes completely different: from personal and emotio-nal, to systematic, political and economical. Titostalgia is a message to the present moment, “a more glorious backdrop for the present times which have nothing worth celebrating .ˮ It is a form of the golden age myth which supplements the cult of personality from the past with new content. Outsid of this theoretical framework, titostalgia is a form of protest and spite, as well as a vision of a better and more just soci-ety. Tito is the focus of it as the central figure of recent past, appearing in its content in different forms- from an idealized statesman to a pop icon.

How is the Yugoslav experience perceived by those whose memories are anchored in socialist Yugoslavia beca-use it represented the best period of their lives, and how is it

negative and 22.8% do not know; in 1998 the results were: 63.9% positive, 10.8% negative and 25.4% do not know. In 2001 79.3% declared Tito to be a positive figure, 7.2% negative and 13.5% do not know. The same poll resulted in 81.4% positive, 10.6% negative and 8% do not know in 2007. According to: Reše, Božo, 2011: Slovenci i Tito u prošlosti i danas. Edited by: Olga Manojlović Pintar, Tito – viđenja i tumačenja, Institut za noviju istoriju, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 270-271

viewed by the generations who can remember socialism only by proxy? Without an institutional or state support, yugono-stalgia surfaced among various groups, with different ambi-tions and potential. We find it among the young, post-Yugo-slav generations, in the Diaspora, even among right-wingers (Velikonja 2010: 131-146). The Belgrade Centre for Human Rights conducted an opinion poll on a representative sample of 1086 Serbian citizens over the age of 18, with the aim to explore the sense of history in Serbia. Interesting results appeared, according to which as much as 82% considered they were better off in socialist Yugoslavia than they are today, and almost 70% of the respondents had regrets about the break-up of Yugoslavia. When the present is difficult and uncertain, the past seems stable, and the feeling of insecurity additionally embellishes and romanticizes that past. Tanja Petrović (Petrović 2012: 191) insists that “yugonostalgia is a specific configuration of affect and emotion, and as such is a productive analytical category and an important way of mobilizing socialist heritage in political negotiations about the present and future.ˮ . It is true that, compared to the pre-sent state of affairs in a society ruled by rampant capitalism, Yugoslavia was a democratic country where the working class had far greater rights than it does now. A worker could not be fired without a ruling by the workers’ council, beca-use it was not only up to the manager during those times. Self-management cannot be entirely reduced to totalitaria-nism, but socialism should not be idealized either. The truth is, as always, somewhere in between – between the fact that it was a single party system and the fact that direct demo-cracy existed at the lowest levels of decision making because everyone took part, but there was no democracy at higher

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instances because the Party controlled everything, just like the economy that was somewhere between being centrally planned as per the Soviet model, and a market economy of the West (Kuljić 2011: 103). From the perspective of someone who had a free education, after which he or she got a job and an apartment from the state, had free medical care and had a vacation every year without sacrificing too much, Yugoslavia was the ideal country, or at least better than any post-Yugo-slav country. Such a person is prone to myths and refuses to face the problems that self-management, offered here as just one example, brought with it. An underdeveloped agrarian country with large regional differences (a developed north and an underdeveloped south with an almost tribal social structure) was supposed to create a modern working class sufficiently educated to be able to participate in decision making, self aware enough not to spend all profits on sala-ries, but to invest some into the company itself to keep it healthy, all in a country that had no tradition of political cul-ture. It is, however, only natural for people to demand a right to their memories no matter how politically ill suited they are in present circumstances5. As an example of an emoti-onal relationship with the past, we will show a part of the

5 The statements of car factory workers born in the 1950s, taken from the movie Yugo, a Short Autobiography, directed by Mina Đukić (2010): “My husband, my son in law, we all work in the car factory and travel 15km out of town. We really went of our own volition.“; “I started a family as a young man, had two children in the meantime, was building a house, so my life was going on an upward curve until the beginning of the 90s.“; “It was an enormous physical effort, but there was a will, a desire, to make it, to have our own vehicle. We were extremely happy when we finally made it and Yugo production had started.“

presentation of Aleksandar Kraus, the president of the Union of Antifascists of Serbia at the formal academy in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Second Session of the AVNOJ and the Day of the Republic, which the Society for the Truth about the National Liberation War (NLW) and the Union of Antifascists of Serbia held on November, 29th 2013 at the MYH: “When we talk about AVNOJ today, maybe someone will think we are doing it because we are yugonostalgic, as usual. And those who think and speak like that always use the term pejoratively. As if it is bad to have nostalgia, especially for Yugoslavia. Who in his right mind would not feel sorry for such a beautiful country and everything it has accomplished and meant to the world and to its citizens? However, here and now, it is not about nostalgia.ˮ

The builders of Yugoslavia cannot accept that everyt-hing in their country was not ideal, because by defending Yugoslavia (even when it is not being attacked), they defend their own history, feeling that the abandonment of socialist heritage means abandonment of themselves. A good example of that would be the Society for the Truth about NLW and Yugoslavia which organized a round table discussion on May 22nd - 24th, 2012 in honor of the 120th anniversary of Josip Broz Tito’s birth. It was dedicated to criticizing the internati-onal scientific conference held on May 7th – 9th, 2010 orga-nized by the Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Yugoslav Archive and the Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung from Regensburg because they disagreed with their histo-rical narrative. Branko Kosić writes: “The time of Tito and his contemporaries will be marked in history with golden letters. It will not be possible to edit out that period by these new editors of history, no matter how much they try.” When

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criticizing the design of the anthology of the Institute for Recent History he writes: “The purport of the terms “view-point” and “interpreting” is not explanation. There are seven portraits of Tito on the covers from different periods, all of them irregularly cropped and narrowed by height. The criteria for the selection of participants are unclear, 94% of the participants were born in the SFRY and went to school here (children of socialism), and yet their contributions are rife with animosity towards Tito’s personality and socia-lism, which is not a trait of scientists with titles, nor is it congruent with the spirit of ethical science. The title (theme) of the discussion, the design of the cover and the illustrati-ons are unusual and unfit for a scientific debate.” Further: “The international conference with the motto the time has come to scientifically elucidate Tito’s age, was followed by the opening of the controversial exhibition Yugoslavia: From the Beginning to the End in the “25. maj” museum, and the projection of movies Kino Komunisto, Goli Otok and others, which clearly shows that this was all part of a greater and long-term denunciation of the NLW, socialism, SFRY and Tito, with the support of foreign sponsors and the government.” (Kosić 2011: 385-393). Opinions that differ from their own even slightly are discarded and perceived as an attack on Yugoslavia, and themselves as well. They see themselves as Yugoslavia’s makers who know the truth about it the best (as implied by the name of the organization). They are unaware that the perpetuation of such myths hinders research, and that different scientific viewpoints are to be treasured, as they offer different perspectives, interpretations of various problems. Only through dialogue and multiple voices, mutual respect and acceptance of the other historic

truths and a mature relationship towards be history can be reached, which is the constitutive element for the building of any society.

The visitors of MYH are increasingly members of the new, so called e-mail generation formed at the start of the 21st century, or the generation of late patriots which does not carry socialism in its experience, but receives it by proxy as an authoritarian and stable past. Tito is remembered in Croatia because of his reputation as a statesman, in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina his time is remembered as a period of stable social circumstances and absence of conflict, in the eyes of many Slovenians today (Tito was half-Slove-nian, his mother’s maiden name was Javoršek). Tito is the last Habsburg, the enlightened monarch, the ruler with Vienna flair, a charismatic player, the guarantor of peace and unity of a multinational state, the fighter against Stalin, ski-llfully balancing between blocs, a Third way guru. Tito is definitely a positive character in the eyes of the young in Slovenia, partly because the memory of him has “cooled downˮ sufficiently, as opposed to the other countries that were embroiled in ethnic conflict for longer periods (Kuljić, Todor, 2003; 97-116). The already mentioned research reve-als that the largest prejudice in Serbia was demonstrated by the youngest respondents between ages 18 and 29, the gene-ration born after 1981. Although most recently out of school, this group considers their knowledge of history as “not particularˮ or “scantˮ (87%), while only 1% of this genera-tion thinks the know history “very well .ˮ They perceive history much more through family stories and the picture painted through media, movies, literature, computer games and social networks. The history learned that way – through

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immediate and everyday surroundings, remains a constitu-tive part of one’s personality for much longer than that lear-ned in school. For the purpose of this paper, I have conduc-ted interviews with members of the generation born or growing up in post-Yugoslav societies, who grew up with the wars and the break-up of the former country of which they only know from the stories of their elders, but they still say everyone has their own story linking them to SFRY. Unlike the previous group, they are aware that it was not an ideal society, but they see it as an important constitutive element in visions of the future. They recognize universal values in the socialist past that are not present today – social justice, solidarity, perception of self as a social factor, a citizen of an internationally recognized country which is important on a global level. An excellent example is the play at the Dadov Youth Theatre “The Ballad of Pišonja and Žuga ,ˮ written by Vladimir Đurđević and directed by Vladan Đureković, crea-ted from the motives of the songs “Ballad of Pišonja and Žugaˮ and “Pišonja and Žuga in a Drug Induced Hellˮ by the 80s cult band “Zabranjeno Pušenjeˮ whose fans were the parents of the actors (who were born in the late 80s and early 90s themselves). Vladan Đureković6 said that his intent was to break down the prejudice about nations which is why he placed the play in the 1990s and the friendship of the two protagonists Pišonja and Žuga was presented as a friendship between a Serb and a Muslim. Their elders are trying to con-vince them that they are different7, although they do not see

6 Interview with Vladan Đureković held on 11.01.2014.

it and, like the real Pišonja and Žuga from the song who were seventeen year old boys, they only have one goal – to go to Dubrovnik for a summer sea-side vacation8. Dubrovnik is symbolic for the director himself, as he took his first steps in that town and has never visited again, a dream of a normal, desired future that has been taken away. Neoyugonostalgia among the youth is not just a retro fad; it is also a message to the post socialist present and European future, used to irritate the corrupt system and to remind of the more just society that they want along with the economic heritage of the socialist system that was taken away from them as a generation. To align oneself with the SFRY as a progressive, anti-nationalist, antifascist, cosmopolitan state within the presently polarized society, as opposed to the nati-onalist, backwards, primitive, traditional and patriarchal countries created from its break-up is to denounce the logic of war, nationalism, ethnic cleansing, rural mentality and even turbo-folk music. In a country where 44% of secondary school pupils never visited a foreign country, 33% are unable to estimate what their future will be like, 27% of the youth

7 Murga: “There is just one problem here. You two are not the same.“ Pišonja: “What do you mean, not the same?“ Murga: “Well you’re not... He eats pork, you don’t. Innit? He paints eggs once a year, you don’t, which means you’re not the same.“ Pišonja: “Of course we’re not as he supports Želja and I support Sarajevo, and that will never be the same.“ˮ The play “The Ballad of Pišonja and Žuga“, written by Vladimir Đurijević, directed by Vladan Đureković, premiere was on March 7. 2012. in Atelje 212.

8 “Dubrovnik rules! You ain’t gonna see a prettier town in this world.“ Pišonja and Žuga are told by Lepi in the play, advising them on where to go at the sea-side “There are less Sarajevans in Baščaršija than there are on the Makarska riviera.“

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participated in some form of violence more than twice during the last two months, 45.8% of youth spend their free time in front of the TV, and every tenth secondary school pupil feels worthless9, it is not surprising that they see socia-lism as a past that contains more future than the present. It could even be said that, for them, it is a lost vision of the future. It is also not surprising that the youngest respondents, ages 18-29, are confused regarding fascism and antifascism and are unaware on who deserves the most credit for victory in WW2, and who collaborated with the enemy10, when they can watch the controversial series Ravna Gora on Serbia’s national public broadcaster. Historic events are portrayed with bias and unrealistically, which, let us be honest and leave our personal affinities aside, is also apparent in movie spectacles from the times of the SFRY such as Battle of Neretva, Sutjeska and other partisan movies which are being broadcast on the same channel. Although the official disco-urse in Serbia is often labeled as revisionist, describing it as confusing or even schizophrenic would be more accurate. Claiming that there is a collision between the official inter-pretation of history and the private interpretations of the citi-zens of Serbia and their collective memories is invalid as

9 Data taken from Kokan Mladenović’s independent project “Slučajevi/Lost in Serbia“, premiered on December 27, 2013 at the Dadov Youth Theatre

10 A disappointing fact revealed by dr. Jovo Bakis, associate professor at the Departmenf of Sociology at Belgrade’s Faculty of Philosophy: during his lecture held on March 27. not a single sociology student could respond when asked what happened on that day in 1941. From the interview with Jovo Bakić held on February 23, 2013.

there is no such thing as an official interpretation of history. It simply does not exist. The relationship towards the socia-list past is not unambiguous. It is contextual and changes as needed to make it suitable to our present identities. Antifascism, that is declaratively strived to as a basic European value, is marginalized in public discourse and pushed into the background. Collaborators are being rehabi-litated, their actions are being justified. The Serbian Prime Minister Dačić stated on October 26th, 2013 at the funeral of Jovanka Broz, Tito’s widow, that this is yet another goodbye to Tito’s times and a goodbye to the recollection of the fight against fascism and joint livelihoods of the Yugoslav peoples which many today are turning away from. The same party officially started its election campaign on a former state holi-day, the Day of the Republic on November 29th, with the citizens of Ođaci county receiving a performance by folklore groups and bean stew with wine as a present from the Socialist Party of Serbia. Various reminders11 are encounte-red in the media on the day the state whose holiday many remember with nostalgia was created, because the new states did not manage to (re)vitalize the new national holidays. The band “Zabranjeno Pušenje ,ˮ whose video for the song Day of

11 A. Apostolovski, “Day of the Republic – a holiday we all used to love celebrating“, Politika, November 29th, 2013., with bizzare commemorative practices such as the election for miss and mister Partisan at the November 29th celebration in Požarevac, although the participants had no idea what they are participating in, so we had Milena Tomić (11), a pioneer from Kragujevac, saying: “I think Tito was the leader of the Partisans, but I have no idea who the Partisans were“, with the first runner-up, also her age, the “Partisan“ Abnita Matejić saying: “It is not my fault I don’t know much about the Partisans, that stuff is not in the schoolbooks anymore“

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the Republic has almost half a million views on Youtube, traditionally has a concert in Belgrade on November 29th. In 2013, it was not just about the Day of the Republic, but also the 70th anniversary of the Second Session of AVNOJ in Tito’s Jajce, with a call for all the pioneers, working people, citizens and peasants to come to the concert and mark the occasion of the big round 70 adequately, with songs and jokes. On the same night, the first concert of the Pika-Točka-Tačka cycle was held at the Belgrade philharmonic. The cycle was started several years earlier with the aim to rebuild the cooperation of the region’s philharmonics – Slovenian, Zagreb and Belgrade. The Zagreb Youth Theatre held a guest performance at the Yugoslav Drama Theatre, and an exhibition was opened on the same date in the MYH – NEO N.O.B. (Un)popular culture of memory of the Croatian scul-ptor Ivan Fijolić. A manifestation was held in Jajce organized by the Museum of the Second Session of AVNOJ and sup-ported by Jajce county for the Day of the Republic. This year, the manifestation was followed by a two day scientific conference The Second Session of AVNOJ and the Statehood of Yugoslavia’s Successor States 1943 – 2013.

We can conclude that “Yugoslavia, in the countries created by its break-up, although “buried alive ,ˮ still partici-pates in the changes in the society and people’s heads, while post-Yugoslav creations are struggling to become legitimate nations such as their predecessor was during its golden age from the 1950s to the 1970s. There is no chance for the supposedly dead SFRY to ever really die, because an entire mythology has been constructed around it.ˮ (Perica and Velikonja 2012: 8). Each generation has its symbols, myths, memories and reasons for their existence. Yugonostalgia

holds many optimistic and emancipating attitudes and can be a call for societal changes as a result for a yearning for a better tomorrow, based on a better yesterday (Velikonja 2010: 139-140). It raises awareness on the possibility of a more just, more developed, more modern society, opposed to those negating the Yugoslav/socialist experience. The latter is much more dangerous as it means the renunciation of moving forward and all the changes in the quality of people’s lives that happened in the Yugoslav socialist society, as well as the renunciation of the emancipating practices, antifas-cism and all the undeniable successes of that country, such as modernization and industrialization, offering instead a return to a deeply patriarchal model.

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Literature:

Kosić, Branko 2013: O viđenju i tumačenju Tita u Zborniku Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije. U: Zbornik radova sa Okruglog stola o Josipu Brozu Titu, Beograd: Društvo za istinu o NOB i Jugoslaviji, 385-393.

Kuljić, Todor 2003: Tito u novom srpskom poretku sećanja. Ed: Marija Babović (editor), Sociologija,vol. 45, br. 2, Sociološko udruženje Srbije i Crne Gore i Filozofski fakultet - Institut za sociološka istraživanja, 97-116.

Kuljić, Todor 2011, Sećanje na Titoizam: između diktata i otpora, Beograd: Čigoja štampa

Kuljić, Todor 2011: Yugoslav Workers’ Self-Menagment. Ed: Naoim iHenning, Jovana Komnenović (Eds), Raumschiff Jugoslawien – Die Aufhebungder Zeit // Spaceship Yugoslavia – The Suspension of Time. Berlin: Agrobooks.

Manojlović Pintar, Olga 2010: Rat i nemir – o viđenjima socijalističke Jugoslavije, Drugog svetskog rata u kome je nastala i ratova u kojima se raspala. Ed: Vojin Dimitrijević (urednik), Novosti iz prošlosti, Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 83-106.

Petrović, Tanja 2012: Yuropa: Jugoslovensko nasleđe i politike budućnosti u postjugoslovenskim društvima, Beograd: Fabrika knjiga

Perica, Vjekoslav and Velikonja, Mitja 2012, Nebeska Jugoslavija: interakcija političkih mitologija i pop-kulture. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek

Prodanović, Mileta 1998: Geniusloci ili o umetnosti i pokornosti. Ed: Irina Subotić (urednica), QuadrofoliumPretense / Detelina sa četiri lista, Beograd: Kulturni centar Beograda i Clio, 35-77.

Stojanović, Dubravka 2010: U ogledalu “drugih”. Ed: Vojin Dimitrijević (urednik), Novosti iz prošlosti, Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 13-31.

Velikonja, Mitja 2010: Titostalgija, Beograd: Biblioteka XX vekVelikona, Mitja 2010: Politička mitologija nepostojećeg - narativni

sadržaji jugonostalgije u postjugoslovenskim zemljama. Ed: Mitovi epohe socijalizma, Novi Sad: Centar za istoriju, demokratiju i pomirenje i Fakultet za evropske pravno-političke studije, 131-146.

1 Destruction of the monument to Josip Broz (Tito), Užice, August 28, 1991, photo by Miloš Cvetković

1 Demontaža spomenika Josipu Brozu, Užice, 28. avgust 1991., fotografija: Miloš Cvetković

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2 The removal of the five-pointed red star from the dome of the City Assembly building, Belgrade, February 21, 1997., photo by Mileta Prodanović

2 Skidanje petokrake sa kupole Skupštine grada, Beograd, 21. februar 1997., fotografija: Mileta Prodanović

► 3 Vojislav Šešelj, the president of the Serbian Radical Party, selling off the busts of Tito at the auction in the Zemun local council building, Belgrade, June 1997, photo by Vuk Marković, source: the photography archive of the “Vreme” magazine

► 3 Vojislav Šešelj, predsednik Srpske radikalne stranke, prodaje Titove biste na licitaciji u Opštini Zemun, Beograd, jun 1997., fotografija: Vuk Marković; Izvor: foto dokumentacija nedeljnika Vreme

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4 The monument to Tito in the company buying raw materials from people, Sevojno, May 20, 1998, photo by Miloš Cvetković

4 Spomenik Titu u magacinu preduzeća za otkup sekundarnih sirovina, Sevojno, 20. maj 1998., fotografija: Miloš Cvetković

▲ 5 The busts of Tito in the company buying raw materials, Sevojno, May 20, 1998, photo by Miloš Cvetković

▲ 5 Biste Josipa Broza u magacinu preduzeća za otkup sekundarnih sirovina, Sevojno, 20. maj 1998., fotografija: Miloš Cvetković

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6 The monument to Tito blown up, Kumrovec, Croatia, December 27, 2004. Source; Croatian News Agency, the national government-owned news agency, photo by Tomislav Pavlek

6 Miniran spomenik Josipu Brozu, Kumrovec, 27. decembar 2004. godine. Izvor: Hrvatska izvještajna novinska agencija (HINA), fotografija: Tomislav Pavlek

► 7 Signing of the petition for the removal of the tomb of Josip Broz Tito from the House of Flowers, Belgrade, February 5, 2004., photo by Imre Sabo

► 7 Potpisivanje peticije za izmeštanje groba Josipa Broza iz Kuće cveća, Beograd, 5. februar 2004., fotografija: Imre Sabo

► 8 Citizens signing the petition against a street being named after Tito, Ljubljana, Slovenia, April 20, 2009, photo by Tamino Petelinšek, source: Slovenian press agency

► 8 Građani potpisuju peticiju protiv imenovanja ulice po Josipu Brozu, Ljubljana, 20. april 2009., fotografija: Tamino Petelinšek, izvor: Slovenska tiskovna agencija

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9 Tranzicija (the company Autoput/ Highway), the time of the photograph unknown. Photo by Vladimir Dobričić, source: the photography archive of the “Vreme” magazine

9 Tranzicija (Preduzeće Autoput), vreme nastanka fotografije nepoznato, fotografija: Vladimir Dobričić, izvor: foto dokumentacija nedeljnika Vreme

▲ 10 Tito, a series of photographs, Sarajevo, 1992–1995,photo by Milomir Kovačević

▲ 10 Tito, serija fotografija, Sarajevo, 1992–1995.,fotografija: Milomir Kovačević

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◄ 11 The commemoration of May 25, former Youth Day in the Museum of Yugoslav history, Belgrade, May 25, 2009, photo by Ana Panić

◄ 11 Obeležavanje 25. maja, nekadašnjeg Dana mladosti u Muzeju istorije Jugoslavije, Beograd, 25. maj 2009., fotografija: Ana Panić

◄ 12 Protests against the commemoration of May 25, former Youth Day, in Kumrovec, May 22, 2010, photo by: Davorin Vujčić

◄ 12 Protesti protiv obeležavanja 25. maja, nekadašnjeg Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu, 22. maj 2010., fotografija: Davorin Vujčić

▲ 13 Marshal Tito street sign in the toilet of a Belgrade bar, February 28, 2010, photo by Ana Panić

▲ 13 Tabla nekadašnje ulice Maršala Tita u toaletu jednog beogradskog kafića, 28. februar 2010., fotografija: Ana Panić

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◄ 14 Original items from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia induce nostalgia during the exhibition Cheers for Life, January 10, 2014, photo by Ana Panić

◄ 14 Originalni predmeti iz SFRJ izazivaju nostalgiju na izložbi Živeo život, 10. januar 2014., fotografija: Ana Panić

15 Scene from the theatre play The Ballad of Pišonja and Žuga (photo documentation of the Youth Theatre Dadov)

15 Scena iz predstave Balada o Pišonji i Žugi (foto dokumentacija Omladinskog pozorišta Dadov)

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16 Through her works from the cycle of paintings Factory in 2012, the artist Martina Grlić looks at the cult of work, and today’s relationship of man and work, photo by Ana Panić

16 Martina Grlić kroz svoja ulja na platnu iz ciklusa Tvornica (2012.) otvara pitanje kulta rada i današnjeg odnosa prema radu, fotografija: Ana Panić

17 Train compartment factory “Gredelj”, Zagreb, 2013, photo by Igor Kuduz

17 Tvornica željezničkih vagona “Gredelj”, Zagreb, 2013.,fotografija: Igor Kuduz

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Jugoslavija: Individualno sećanje na kolektivnu prošlost

Ana Panić1

1 Kustoskinja, istoričarka umetnosti, Muzej istorije Jugoslavije, Beograd.

“Svođenje priče o Jugoslaviji na skup podataka, predmeta i dokumenata trebalo bi da nam pruži distanciranu i objektivnu sliku o tome šta je značilo živeti u Jugoslaviji, a pri tome se ignoriše činjenica da je za čitave generacije građana na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije to deo proživljenog iskustva. Generacije bivših Jugoslovena tako i same postaju objekti prošlosti.” (Petrović 2012: 187)

Jugoslavija je pre više od dve decenije nestala sa mape sveta, ali jasno je da je za mnoge ona i dalje više od geo-grafskog pojma i da njeno nasleđe i danas snažno utiče na živote ljudi sa ovog prostora. Jugoslavija zvanično postaje objekat istorije osnivanjem Muzeja istorije Jugoslavije, čime se potiskuje u prošlost bez mogućnosti da se jugoslovensko iskustvo ugradi u politike budućnosti, tj. proces oblikovanja postjugoslovenskih društava. Iako se u želji da se postigne kontinuitet s prethodnom državom reč Jugoslavija zadr-žala do 2003. godine u imenu države Savezna Republika Jugoslavija u kojoj ostaju samo Srbija i Crna Gora, sme-štanjem formalno još uvek žive Jugoslavije (ne kaže se eksplicitno koje, ali se zna na koju Jugoslaviju se misli – socijalističku) u muzej, čin je koji jasno pokazuje odricanje odjugoslovenske ideje kojoj je mesto još samo u muzeju.

Možda paradoksalno zvuči, ali praćenjem linearnog narativa Muzeja istorije Jugoslavije, uočava se poklapanje sa istoriografskim narativom raspada države čije ime nosi. Istorija muzeja je uvek i istorija viđenja sveta i istorija kon-trole i moći. Već početkom osamdesetih godina 20. veka javljaju se negativna tumačenja socijalističke ideologije a sa njome i ideje jugoslovenstva i bratstva i jedinstva, novi nacionalistički simboli prevladavaju u srpskom javnom pro-storu kako bi perfidno stvorili psihološku i ideološku bazu

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za ratove u bivšoj Jugoslaviji (Stojanović 2010: 13-31). Kako su se državni interesi nakon 1990. godine promenili, promenio se i odnos prema Titu i njegovom nasleđu u kul-turi sećanja, istoriografiji i svakodnevnom sećanju. A “što je prošlost bliža, to je uticaj aktuelnih interesa u njenom posredovanju snažniji” (Kuljić 2003: 97-116). Muzej ulazi u period nestabilnosti tokom mračnih 90-ih godina prošlog veka. To su godine u kojima Vojislav Šešelj, čelnik Srpske radiklane stranke i vođa četničkog pokreta, na mitingu održanom 4. maja 1991. godine (na jedanaestu godišnjicu Titove smrti) ispred Kuće cveća predlaže da se Tito kao najveći neprijatelj srpskog naroda prenese, tj. “vrati” u rodni Kumrovec. To se nije dogodilo, ali Kuća cveća i ceo Memorijalni kompleks postaju avetinjski prostori u koje više niko ne dolazi. Dobrica Ćosić, kao prvi predsednik Savezne Republike Jugoslavije, 1992. godine pokreće pitanje namene i korišćenja dvorova, Memorijalnog centra i Muzeja revo-lucije naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije. Te godine se zgrade Muzeja “25. maj” i “4. jul” u okviru Memorijalnog centra “Josip Broz Tito” vraćaju na upravljanje Skupštini grada, a zgrada Muzeja “25. maj” predata je na korišćenje Istorijskom muzeju Srbije. Iste godine Društvo istoričara umetnosti organizuje okrugli sto: Memorijalni centar “Josip Broz Tito” – Kako dalje? na kome je raspravljano o programskoj tran-sformaciji Centra. Svako od učesnika imao je svoj predlog, pa se tom prilikom čulo za ideju o Centru za popularizaciju nauke u okviru Memorijalnog centra, udomljavanju Muzeja grada Beograda koji nije imao svoju zgradu pa i osnivanju Muzeja podaništva (Prodanović 1998: 35-77). Tada se prvi put pominje ideja o osnivanju Muzeja istorije Jugoslavije koji je uredbom vlade Savezne Republike Jugoslavije osnovan

1996. godine. Osnivanje muzeja nepostojeće države svega pet godina nakon njenog raspada u najkrvavijem ratu u Evropi u drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka bilo je isključivo politički čin, nikako posledica promišljanja ili kulturne politike, a ponajmanje želje za muzealizacijom Jugoslavije i socijalističkog nasleđa. Naprotiv, trebalo je rešiti ga se kao nepoželjnog nasleđa, kao što je nepoželjno bilo i nasleđe antifašizma koje je baštinio Muzej revolucije, a koje se u najvećoj meri ticalo Narodnooslobodilačke borbe u Drugom svetskom ratu iz koje je socijalistička Jugoslavija nastala, razvoja Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i radničkog pokreta. Trebalo je zatrti sećanje, izbrisati ili bar izmeniti istoriju Drugog svetskog rata i ustupiti mesto reviziji istorije. Režim Slobodana Miloševića (poslednji predsednik Jugoslavije i prvi predsednik Srbije, 1989 – 2000. god.) je imao ambiva-lentan odnos prema istorijskom nasleđu Titove Jugoslavije, koja je opisivana i kao tamnica srpskog naroda i kao država koja je okupljala sve Srbe. Usled ove podvojenosti i detitoi-zacija Srbije bila je stihijska. Od početka 90-ih simboli soci-jalizma su postepeno, ali kontinuirano potiskivani iz javnog prostora. Titove slike su u školama zamenjene slikama Vuka Karadžića – reformatora srpskog jezika, Svetog Save – prvog srpskog arhiepiskopa i Slobodana Miloševića – pred-sednika Srbije (1989 – 1997) i SR Jugoslavije (1997 – 2000) – simbolima izgradnje srpskog nacionalnog identiteta. Burni događaji 90-ih, kao i prestanak medijskog delovanja usme-renog ka afirmisanju Titovog imena, snažno su uticali na promenu percepcije njegovog lika. Titovo ime uklanjano je iz imena gradova, fotografije Josipa Broza skinute su sa zidova kancelarija i fabričkih hala, a biste uklonjene iz javnih pro-stora. Mada su mnogi gradovi na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije

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zadržali nazive ulica i trgova sa imenom Josipa Broza. Često je Titovo ime pomerano iz glavnih ulica na periferiju, pa tako na periferiji Beograda i danas postoji dvanaest ulica i jedan trg koji su dobili ime po Titu. Nakon pada režima Slobodana Miloševića, nova vlast vrši još veći zaokret pred-stavljajući sebe kao oslobodioce od komunizma2 i onoga što je 1990-ih predstavljala Socijalistička partija Srbije, što se ogleda u izjednačavanju četničkog pokreta sa partizanskim pred zakonom i njegove afirmacije u javnosti kao antifaši-stičkog, ali i promeni naziva ulica, praznika, zakona, udžbe-nika i spomenika. Milošević je u javnosti predstavljan kao poslednji evropski komunista da se ne bi dovodio u pitanje njegov nacionalizam koji nije nestao njegovim odlaskom sa političke scene s obzirom na to da su njegov nacionalni program delile i mnoge stranke nove vlasti (Stojanović 2010: 17). Društva u tranziciji traže svoj novi identitet revidira-njem prethodnog.

U skladu sa ovom konfuznom situacijom u društvu i muzej je u konfuziji i funkcioniše u okviru saveznih organa, van nadležnosti Ministarstva kulture ili bilo kog drugog ministarstva, kao samostalna savezna organizacija do aprila 2003. godine, kada je Narodna skupština Republike Srbije donela Odluku o prihvatanju sporazuma država članica kojom je utvrđeno da MIJ postaje organizacija države Srbije u nadležnosti Ministarstva za lokalnu samoupravu. U novembru 2007. godine, Odlukom vlade Republike Srbije,

2 Zoran Đinđić, prvi demokratski izabran gradonačelnik nakon pobede opozicije na lokalnim izborima, kao simbolički činlično skida zvezdu petokraku sa Skupštine grada 21. februara 1997. godine i umesto nje postavlja dvoglavog orla.

MIJ je ponovo osnovan kao ustanova u oblasti kulture s objektima Kuća cveća i Stari muzej na upravljanju i kori-šćenju i sa pravom korišćenja izložbenog prostora Muzej “25. maj” koji je Skupština grada vratila Muzeju istorije Jugoslavije 2000. godine. Muzej istorije Jugoslavije od kada ponovo ima prostor za izlaganje i status ustanove kulture počinje da se profiliše u skladu sa svojom novom ulogom i organizuje brojne izložbe i programe sa temama iz isto-rije i popularne kulture SFRJ, a od 2009. godine radi se na razvijanju budućih stalnih postavki o istoriji Jugoslavije od 1918. do 1991. godine i o Josipu Brozu Titu. Razlozi posto-janja istih zbirki se menjaju i muzejski predmeti dobijaju novo značenje u kontekstu kulture sećanja i jugonostalgije. Neophodno je naglasiti da promena koja nastupa nakon 2000-ih, kada Kuća cveća ponovo postaje turistička atrakcija dolazi odozdo (bottom-up), od njenih posetilaca, a ne orga-nizovano od strane države ili kao proizvod kulturne politike Ministarstva kulture. “Kuća cveća ima drugačiji smisao 1980. i 2010. Sa protokom vremena postala je višeznačna i promenio joj se hegemoni smisao... Obići Kuću cveća 1980-ih značilo je demonstrirati lojalnost postojećem režimu SKJ, a danas je poseta istom mestu više protest protiv aktuelnog režima.” (Kuljić 2011: 149-150) Ne hodočaste više samo stari borci, dolazi veliki broj mladih iz svih država naslednica nekadašnje Jugoslavije, ali i sve veći broj stranih turista3. Šta je to šta uzrokuje pojavu ponovnog interesovanja za Tita i socijalističku Jugoslaviju? Kada se fokus usmeri na sećanja bivših Jugoslovena, sada građana novih nacionalnih država

3 Preko 100.000 posetilaca godišnje obiđe Muzej istorije Jugoslavije.

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na prostoru jugoistočne Evrope, Tito izranja kao centralna istorijska ličnost u brojnim anketama koje se sprovode, ne tako retko označen i kao najznačajnija i najpozitivnija isto-rijska ličnost sa ovih prostora4. Ono što je manje vidljivo, no ne i manje važno kao specifičan vid rekonstrukcije, jesu naučni radovi koji se bave studijama imidža, odnosno recep-cije Titove ličnosti u pokušaju da se fenomen rekonstruiše iz socio-kulturološke vizure. Kulturolog Mitja Velikonja uveo je u upotrebu pojam titostalgija, kojim je imenovao

4 Prema ispitivanju mišljenja građana Srbije, koje je za Beogradski centar za ljudska prava obavila agencija IPSOS Strategic Marketing u martu 2010. godine, 10% populacije smatra Tita najznačajnijom ličnošću u istoriji sveta, odmah posle Nikole Tesle (21%). Trećeplasirani je Adolf Hitler (8%), a iza njih je Isus Hrist (5%). Čak 19% je Tita označilo kao najznačajniju ličnost u istoriji Srbije, a većina građana Srbije ga pamti kao velikog državnika (64%). Godinu smrti Josipa Broza zna 83%, a tačan datum je navelo 47% građana. U jednoj od najreprezentativnijih anketa slovenačkog javnog mnjenja Fakulteta društvenih nauka u Ljubljani, 1995. godine Tita je kao veoma pozitivnu ličnost ocenilo oko 18% ispitanika, 65,6% pozitivno, a 8,4% negativno. Revija Mladina je na pitanje “Da li je Tito za vas bio pozitivna ili negativna ličnost?” 1995. godine dobila odgovor: pozitivna 67,2%, negativna 10% i ne znam 22,8%; 1998. godine – pozitivna 63,9%, negativna 10,8% i ne znam 25,4%. Tita je kao pozitivnu ličnost 2001. ocenilo 79,3% anketiranih, kao negativnu 7,2% a sa “ne znam” odgovorilo je 13,5%. Merenje u 2007. godini pokazalo je 81,4% pozitivnih ocena, 10,6% negativnih, a sa “ne znam” odgovorilo je 8% upitanih. Navedeno prema: Repe, Božo, 2011: Slovenci i Tito u prošlosti i danas. U: Olga Manojlović Pintar (urednica), Tito – viđenja i tumačenja, Institut za noviju istoriju, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 270-271.U anketi Hrtvatske radio televizije 1997. godine 70% anketiranih smatralo je Broza za “velikog državnika”. U anketi Jutarnjeg lista, godinu dana kasnije, Tito je izabran za “najznačajnijeg Hrvata tisućljeta”. Godine 2003. na pitanje ko je najveća ličnost u hrvatskoj istoriji opet je pobedio Tito sa 26,4%, ispred Tesle sa 20,7%, Ruđera Boškovića sa 8%, Miroslava Krleže sa 6,6% i Tuđmana sa 4,4%.

nostalgičan odnos prema Titovoj ličnosti i nasleđu titoizma (Velikonja 2010). U svakoj od država nastalih raspadom Jugoslavije moguće je, zavisno od unutrašnjeg konteksta, prepoznati nekada slične, a nekada sasvim različite uzroke nastanka ove titostalgije: od ličnih i emotivnih do sistem-skih, političkih i ekonomskih. Titostalgija je poruka savre-menom trenutku, “slavnija pozadina za sadašnjost koja nema šta da slavi”. Ona je i jedan oblik mita o zlatnom dobu koji novim sadržajem upotpunje nekadašnji kult ličnosti. Ali izvan ovih teorijskih okvira, titostalgija je i izraz protesta i bunta, a istovremeno i vizija boljeg i pravednijeg društva. Tito se u njoj fokusira kao središnja ličnost novije prošlosti, javljajući se u njenom sadržaju raznim formama, od idealizo-vanog državnika do pop-ikone.

Na koji način jugoslovensko iskustvo danas vide gene-racije čije su uspomene usidrene u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji jer je ona predstavljala najbolji period njihovog života, a kako generacije koje se socijalizma mogu sećati samo preko pamćenja posrednika? Bez državne ili institucionalne podrške, jugonostalgija se javlja kod veoma različitih grupa, sa raznim ambicijama i potencijalima. Nalazimo je među mladima, postjugoslovenskim generacijama, u dijaspori, čak i među desničarima (Velikonja 2010: 131-146). U peri-odu od 19. do 29. marta 2010. godine Beogradski centar za ljudska prava sproveo je ispitivanje mišljenja građana Srbije na reprezentativnom uzorku od 1086 građana starijih od 18 godina sa ciljem istraživanja istorijske svesti u Srbiji. Dobijeni su vrlo zanimljivi rezultati po kojima čak 82% smatra da se bolje živelo u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji nego danas, a skoro 70% građana žali što se Jugoslavija raspala. Kada je sadašnjost teška i neizvesna, prošlost deluje stabilno,

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a osećaj nesigurnosti dodatno ulepšava i romantizuje tu prošlost. Tanja Petrović (Petrović 2012: 191) insistira na tome da je “jugonostalgija kao specifična konfiguracija afekta i emocija produktivna analitička kategorija i važan način mobilizacije socijalističkog nasleđa u političkim pregovara-njima o sadašnjosti i budućnosti.” Istina je da je poredeći sa današnjim stanjem u društvu u kome vlada divlji kapitali-zam Jugoslavija bila demokratska zemlja u kojoj je radnička klasa imala prava koja danas nema, radnik nije mogao biti otpušten bez odluke radničkog saveta jer u to vreme to nije mogla biti odluka isključivo direktora. Samoupravljanje se ne može svesti u celini na totalitarizam, ali ne treba ni ide-alizovati socijalizam. Istina je, po običaju, negde između – između činjenice da je to bio jednopartijski sistem i činje-nice da je postojala direktna demokartija na najnižem nivou odlučivanja jer su svi učestvovali u donošenju odluka, ali nije bilo mnogo demokartije na višim nivoima jer je sve kon-trolisala Partija, kao što je i ekonomija bila između central-noplanske po uzoru na sovjetski model i tržišne po uzoru na Zapad (Kuljić 2011: 103). Iz perspektive nekoga ko je imao besplatno školovanje, nakon čega se zaposlio i od države dobio stan, mogao besplatno da se leči i bez većih odricanja ide na odmor svake godine, Jugoslavija je bila idealna zemlja ili bar bolja od bilo koje postjugoslovenske države. Takva osoba sklona je mitologizacijama i ne želi da se suoči sa pro-blemima koje je npr. samoupravljanje, dato ovde samo kao jedan primer, nosilo sa sobom. Nerazvijena agrarna zemlja sa velikim regionalnim razlikama (razvijeni sever i zaostali jug sa još uvek plemenskom strukturom društva) trebalo je da stvori modernu radničku klasu koja je dovoljno obrazo-vana da bi bila spremna da odlučuje, dovoljno samosvesna

da ne podeli sav prihod na plate već da uloži u preduzeće kako se ono ne bi urušilo, a sve to u državi koja nije imala tradiciju političke kulture. Ipak, sasvim je prirodno da gra-đani žele pravo na svoja sećanja ma koliko ona bila poli-tički nepodobna u današnjim okolnostima5. Kao primer emotivnog odnosa prema prošlosti navešćemo deo izlaga-nja Aleksandara Krausa, predsednika Saveza antifašista Srbije na svečanoj akademiji u čast 70-e godišnjice Drugog zasedanja AVNOJ-a i Dana Republike, koju su Društvo za istinu o NOB i Jugoslaviji i Savez antifašista Srbije održali 29. novembra 2013. godine u MIJ: “Kada danas govorimo o AVNOJ-u, neko će možda pomisliti da mi to radimo kao nekakvi jugonostalgičari, kako se to obično kaže. I pri tome, ti koji tako govore, uvek tome daju pežorativni prizvuk. Kao da je nešto loše biti nostalgičan, pogotovu na Jugoslaviju. Kome normalnom ne bi bilo žao onako divne zemlje i svega što je postigla i značila i u svetu i za svoje građane. Ipak, ovde i sada se ne radi ni o kakvoj nostalgiji.”

Graditelji Jugoslavije ne mogu da prihvate da u toj zemlji nije sve bilo idealno jer braneći Jugoslaviju (čak i onda kada je niko ne napada) oni brane sopstvenu prošlost osećajući da brisanjem socijalističkog nasleđa brišu i sebe.

5 Izjave radnika u fabrici automobila rođenih 1950-ih, preuzete iz filma Yugo, kratka autobiografija, rediteljke Mine Đukić (2010): “Moj muž, moj zet, svi radimo u fabrici automobila i putujemo 15 km daleko od grada. Stvarno sa voljom smo dolazili.”; “Kao mlad čovek formirao sam porodicu, u međuvremenu se rodilo dvoje dece u mojoj porodici, pravio sam kuću, tako da je život do početka 90-ih išao jednom uzlaznom putanjom.”; “To je bio veliki fizički napor, ali je postojala volja, želja, da uspemo da imamo svoje vozilo. Sreći nije bilo kraja kada smo to uradili i kada je počela proizvodnja Yuga.”

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Kao dobar primer za to poslužiće nam Društvo za istinu o NOB i Jugoslaviji koje je organizvalo okrugli sto od 22. do 24. maja 2012. godine povodom 120. godišnjice rođe-nja Josipa Broza Tita na kome su se bavili kritikovanjem međunarodnog naučnog skupa Tito: viđenja i tumačenja, održanog u Arhivu Jugoslavije od 7. do 9. maja 2010. godine u organizaciji Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije, Arhiva Jugoslavije i Instituta für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung iz Regensburga jer se ne slažu sa istorijskim narativom. Tako Branko Kosić piše: “Vreme Tita i njegovih savremenika istorija će pisati zlatnim slovima. To vreme neće moći da prekroje nikakvi novi krojači istorije, ma koliko se trudili.” Kritikujući izgled i dizajn Zbornika Instituta za noviju isto-rije Srbije piše: “Sadržaj pojmova “viđenje” i “tumačenje” nije objašnjenje. Na koricama je sedam Titovih portreta iz raznih vremena, nekorektno isečenih i suženih po visini. Ne zna se po kom kriterijumu i projektu su birani učesnici, 94% učesnika skupa je rođeno u SFRJ i ovde se školovalo (deca socijalizma), a ipak se u njihovim prilozima oseća vidna doza animoznosti (odbojnost, neraspoloženje) prema Titovoj lič-nosti i socijalizmu, što nije obeležje naučnih istraživača sa titulama, niti je u duhu časne naučne etike. Naslov (tematika) rasprave, idejno rešenje korica kao ilustracije su neobične i neprimerene naučnoj raspravi.” I dalje: “Nakon izvođenja ovog međunarodnog skupa pod motom da je došlo vreme da se Titovo doba naučno rasvetli, došlo je do otvaranja sporne izložbe Jugoslavija: od početka do kraja u Muzeju 25. maj, do prikazivanja filmova Kino komunisto, Goli otok i dr., što uka-zuje da se radio o obuhvatnijem i dugoročnijem osporavanju NOB, socijalizma, SFRJ i Tita i to pod pokroviteljstvom ino-stranih sponzora pa i aktuelne vlasti.” (Kosić 2011: 385-393).

Svako imalo drugačije mišljenje negiraju i shvataju kao napad na Jugoslaviju, a time i na njih same jer sebe doživljavaju kao njene tvorce koji nabolje znaju istinu o Jugoslaviji (na šta i naziv udruženja upućuje) ne shvatajući da takve mito-logizacije otežavaju istraživanja i da su različita viđenja u nauci bogatstvo jer nude različite perspektive, interpretacije i akcentovanje problema i da samo kroz dijalog, multivokal-nost, uvažavanje drugog i prihvatanje drugosti može da se dođe do istorijske istine i zrelog odnosa prema prošlosti kao konstitutivnog elementa izgradnje svakog društva.

Posetioci MIJ sve češće su i pripadnici nove, kako Kuljić kaže, tzv. e-mail generacije koja se formira početkom 21. veka, ili generacije poznih patriota, koja socijalizam ne nosi u iskustvu, već ga posredno prima kao autoritarnu i stabilnu prošlost. U Hrvatskoj Tita pamte zbog velikog državničkog ugleda u svetu, u Srbiji i BiH se Titovo doba pamti po stabilnoj socijalnoj situaciji i odsustvu sukoba, a u očima mnogih Slovenaca danas je Tito (polu-Slovenac, jer mu je majka bila Javoršek), poslednji Habzburg, prosve-ćeni monarh, vladar sa bečkim šlifom, harizmatski igrač, garant mira i jedinstva mnogonacionalne države, borac protiv Staljina, vešt balanser između blokova, guru Trećeg puta. Tito je definitivno pozitivna figura u očima mladih Slovenije i otuda što se sećanje na njega u dovoljnoj meri ohladilo, za razliku od ostalih delova zemlje koji su bili dugo uvučeni u međunacionalne sukobe (Kuljić, Todor, 2003: 97-116). Već pomenuto istraživanje pokazuje da su u Srbiji najveće predrasude pokazali najmlađi ispitanici između 18 i 29 godina, dakle generacija rođena posle 1981. godine, koja iako je najskorije završila školu smatra da istoriju poznaje “ne naročito” ili “malo” (čak 87%), dok samo 1% pripadnika

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ove generacije misli da “veoma mnogo” poznaje istoriju. Oni prošlost percipiraju mnogo više preko porodičnih priča i slike koju o prošlosti stiču putem medija, filmova, literature, kompjuterskih igrica, društvenih mreža. Tako zapamćena prošlost kroz okruženje i svakodnevicu ostaje konstitutivni deo ličnosti mnogo duže nego naučena u školi. Za potrebe pisanja ovog rada obavila sam razgovore sa pripadnicima generacije rođene ili odrasle u postjugoslovenskim druš-tvima koji su rasli sa ratovima i raspadom bivše države o kojoj znaju samo iz priča starijih, ali ipak kažu da svako ima svoju priču koja ga vezuje za SFRJ. Za razliku od prethodno navedene grupe, svesni su da to nije bilo idealno društvo, ali Jugoslaviju vide kao važan konstitutivni element u vizijama budućnosti. U socijalističkoj prošlosti su prepoznali univer-zalne vrednosti kojih danas nema poput socijalne pravde, solidarnosti, doživljaja sebe kao društvenog aktera, pripad-nika međunarodno priznate države koja je važna u svetskim razmerama. Odličan primer je predstava omladinskog pozo-rišta Dadov “Balada o Pišonji i Žugi” po tekstu Vladimira Đurđevića u režiji Vladana Đurkovića, koja je nastala po motivima pesama “Balada o Pišonji i Žugi” i “Pišonja i Žuga u paklu droge” kultnog benda 80-ih “Zabranjeno pušenje” koji su slušali roditelji aktera predstave s obzirom na činje-nicu da su svi rođeni krajem 1980-ih i početkom 1990-ih. Vladan Đurković6 kaže da mu je namera bila da mladima razbije predrasude o nacijama zbog čega je radnju predstave prebacio u 1990-e, a prijateljstvo glavnih likova Pišonje i Žuge predstavio kao prijateljstvo između Srbina i Muslimana

6 Razgovor sa Vladanom Đurkovićem, vođen 11.01.2014.

kojima stariji nameću da su različiti7 iako oni to ne vide i kao i pravi Pišonja i Žuga iz pesme, sa svojih nepunih 18 godina, imaju samo jedan cilj – da odu u Dubrovnik na more8. Dubrovnik je i samom reditelju simbol jer je u njemu prohodao i nikad više nije tamo bio, san o normalnoj, želje-noj i oduzetoj budućnosti. Neojugonostalgija kod mladih nije samo pomodni retro stil, ona je takođe poruka postsocija-lističkoj sadašnjosti i evropskoj budućnosti, koriste je da bi iritirali korumpirani sistem u kome žive, podsetili na pra-vednije društvo kakvo žele i socijalne i ekonomske tekovine socijalističkog sistema koje su im kao generaciji oduzete. U polarizovanom društvu opredeliti se za SFRJ kao pro-gresivnu, antinacionalističku, antifašističku, kosmopolitsku državu nasuprot nacionalističkim, zaostalim, retrogradnim, tradicionalnim i patrijarhalnim društvima država naslednica znači odbaciti logiku nacionalizma, rata, etničkog čišćenja, ruralni mentalitet, pa i turbofolk muziku. U zemlji u kojoj 44% srednjoškolaca nije nikada putovalo u neku stranu zemlju, 33% ne može da proceni kakva će im biti budućnost, 27% mladih je učestvovalo u nekom vidu nasilja više od dva puta za protekla dva meseca, 45,8% mladih slobodno vreme

7 Murga: “Samo tu ima još jedan problem. Vas dvojica niste isto.” PIŠONJA: “Kako to misliš, nismo isto?” Murga: “Pa niste... on jede svinjetinu ti ne jedeš. Je l tako? On jednom godišnje farba jaja, ti ne farbaš, što znači da vi niste isto.” Pišonja: “Normalno da nismo jer on navija za Želju, ja za Sarajevo, a to nikad neće biti isto.” Predstava “Balada o Pišonji i Žugi”, po tekstu Vladimira Đurdjevića u režiji Vladana Đurkovića, premijerno izvedena 7. marta 2012. godine u Ateljeu 212.

8 “Dubrovnik. To je zakon. Na svjetu ljepši grad ne’š vid’ti.” kaže u predstavi Lepi Pišonji i Žugi savetujući ih gde da idu na more jer “Na Baščaršiji imaš manje Sarajlija nego na Makarskoj rivijeri.”

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provodi uz televizor, a svaki deseti srednjoškolac se oseća potpuno bezvredno,9 nije neobično što socijalizam vide kao prošlost koja u sebi sadrži više budućnosti nego sadašnjica, može se reći čak da je za njih to izgubljena vizija buduć-nosti. Ne čudi ni što su najmlađi ispitanici između 18 i 29 godina zbunjeni po pitanju fašizma i antifašizma i ne znaju ko je bio najzaslužniji za pobedu u Drugom svetskom ratu, a ko je bi saradnik okupatora 10 kada na Radio-televiziji Srbije kao javnom servisu gledaju kontroverznu seriju Ravna gora koja pristrasno prikazuje istorijske događaje i ne pruža realnu sliku koju, budimo iskreni i pored ličnih afiniteta, ne pružaju ni daleko kvalitetnije urađeni filmski spektakli iz vremena SFRJ sa stranim glumcima poput Bitke na Neretvi, Sutjeske i drugih partizanskih filmova koji se prikazuju na istoj televiziji. Iako se često može čuti da je zvanični diskurs u Srbiji revizionistički, najbliže se može opisati kao konfu-zan ili šizofren. Ne može se tvrditi da su u koliziji zvanične interpretacije istorije i privatna tumačenja prošlosti građana Srbije, kolektivno pamćenje i individualna sećanja, kad zvaničnog tumačenja nema, ono ne postoji. Odnos prema socijalističkoj prošlosti nije jednoznačan, kontekstualan je i po potrebi se menja kako bi odgovarao našim današnjim identitetima. Antifašizam, kome se bar deklarativno teži kao

9 Podaci preuzeti iz autorskog projekta Kokana Mladenovića “Slučajevi/Lost in Serbia”, premijerno izvedenog 27.12.2013. godine u Omladinskom pozorištu Dadov.

10 Poražavajući je podatak koji iznosi dr Jovo Bakić, docent na Odeljenju za sociologiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu, da na predavanju koje je održao 27. marta niko od studenata sociologije nije znao da kaže šta se dogodilo toga dana 1941. godine. Razgovor sa Jovom Bakićem, vođen 23. februara 2013.

temeljnoj evropskoj vrednosti, marginalizovan je u javnom diskursu i potisnut u drugi plan, kolaboracionisti se rehabili-tuju i njihovi postupci opravdavaju, da bi na sahrani Jovanke Broz, udovice Josipa Broza 26. oktobra 2013. godine srpski premijer Dačić poručio da je to još jedan oproštaj od Titove epohe i podsećanje na borbu protiv fašizma i zajednički život jugoslovenskih naroda kojeg se danas mnogi odriču. Ista stranka zvanično započinje predizbornu kampanju na nekadašnji državni praznik, Dan Republike 29. novembra i kao poklon od Socijalističke partije Srbije građani opštine Odžaci dobili su nastup kulturno-umetničkih društava i kuvanje pasulja u kotliću uz kuvano vino. U medijskom pro-storu srećemo različita podsećanja11 na dan kada je stvorena država čijeg praznika se mnogi sećaju sa nostalgijom, jer nove države ne uspevaju da ožive nove nacionalne praznike. Muzička grupa Zabranjeno pušenje, čiji spot za pesmu Dan Republike na web sajtu You Tube ima skoro pola miliona prikaza, već tradicionalno održava baš 29. novembra koncert u Beogradu. Povod je opet bio obeležavanje Dana Republike, ali 2013. godine okrugle, sedamdesete godišnjice drugog zasedanja AVNOJ-a u Titovom Jajcu, a u pozivu je stajalo da svi pioniri, pionirke, radni ljudi, građani i seljaci dođu u

11 A. Apostolovski, “Dan Republike – praznik koji su svi nekada rado slavili”, Politika, 29. novembar 2013, a organizuju se i bizarne komemoracijske prakse poput izbora za najlepšu partizanku i partizana na proslavi 29. novembra u Požarevcu, iako učesnici ne znaju u čemu učestvuju, pa tako Milena Tomić (11), pionirka iz Kragujevca, kaže: “Mislim da je Tito bio vođa partizana, ali ne znam ko su bili partizani”, a njena vršnjakinja, prva pratilja lepotice, “partizanka” Anita Matejić “Nisam ja kriva što ne znam mnogo o partizanima, nema više toga u udžbenicima.”

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SKC i na adekvatan način uz pesmu i šalu, zajedno s grupom Zabranjeno pušenje obeleže taj veliki, okrugli 70. Dan Republike. Iste večeri u Beogradskoj filharmoniji održan je prvi koncert iz ciklusa Pika-Točka-Tačka koji je pokrenut pre nekoliko godina sa ciljem da se obnovi saradnja filharmonija u regionu: Beogradske, Zagrebačke i Slovenačke filharmo-nije, Zagrebačko kazalište mladih gostovalo je te večeri u Jugoslovenskom dramskom pozorištu, a u Muzeju istorije Jugoslavije je na nekadašnji Dan Republike otvorena izložba NEO N.O.B. (Ne)popularna kultura sećanja hrvatskog vajara Ivana Fijolića. U Jajcu se u organizaciji Muzeja Drugog zasedanja AVNOJ-a uz podršku opštine Jajce održava mani-festacija Dani AVNOJ-a, a ove godine je manifestaciju pratio i dvodnevni naučni skup Drugo zasedanje AVNOJ-a i držav-nost zemalja nasljednica Jugoslavije 1943-2013.

Možemo zaključiti da “u državama na tlu bivše SFRJ ta zemlja, iako ‘živa pokopana’, ipak i dalje sudjeluje u pro-mjenama i u društvu i u ljudskim glavama, dok se postjugo-slavenske tvorevine s mukom trude postati legitimne nacije kakva je bila njihova prethodnica u zlatno doba, recimo od 1950-ih do 1970-ih. Nema ni šanse da ta navodno mrtva SFRJ ikada umre, jer se oko nje u međuvremenu konstru-irala mitologija.” (Perica i Velikonja 2012: 8). Svaka gene-racija ima svoje simbole, mitologije, sećanja i razloge za njihovo postojanje. Jugonostalgija sadrži mnoge optimističke i emancipatorske stavove i može biti poziv na društvene pro-mene kao rezultat čežnje za boljim sutra koji je zasnovan na boljem juče (Velikona 2010: 139-140) produbljujući svest o mogućnosti postojanja pravednijeg, razvijenijeg i modernijeg društva nasuprot onih koji negiraju jugoslovensko/socijali-stičko iskustvo. To je mnogo opasnije jer znači odricanje od

modernizacijskog iskoraka i svih promena u kvalitetu života koje su se desile u jugoslovenskom socijalističkom društvu, kao i odricanje od emancipatorskih praksi, antifašizma i svih onih neospornih uspeha te zemlje poput modernizacije i industrijalizacije i povratak na duboko patrijarhalni model.

Literatura:

Kosić, Branko 2013: O viđenju i tumačenju Tita u Zborniku Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije. U: Zbornik radova sa Okruglog stola o Josipu Brozu Titu, Beograd: Društvo za istinu o NOB i Jugoslaviji, 385-393.

Kuljić, Todor 2003: Tito u novom srpskom poretku sećanja. U: Marija Babović (urednica), Sociologija, vol. 45, br. 2, Sociološko udruženje Srbije i Crne Gore i Filozofski fakultet - Institut za sociološka istraživanja, 97-116.

Kuljić, Todor 2011, Sećanje na Titoizam: između diktata i otpora, Beograd: Čigoja štampa

Kuljić, Todor 2011: Yugoslav Workers’ Self-Menagment. U: Naoim iHenning, Jovana Komnenović (Eds), Raumschiff Jugoslawien – Die Aufhebungder Zeit // Spaceship Yugoslavia – The Suspension of Time. Berlin: Agrobooks.

Manojlović Pintar, Olga 2010: Rat i nemir – o viđenjima socijalističke Jugoslavije, Drugog svetskog rata u kome je nastala i ratova u kojima se raspala. U: Vojin Dimitrijević (urednik), Novosti iz prošlosti, Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 83-106.

Petrović, Tanja 2012: Yuropa: Jugoslovensko nasleđe i politike budućnosti u postjugoslovenskim društvima, Beograd: Fabrika knjiga

Perica, Vjekoslav i Velikonja, Mitja 2012, Nebeska Jugoslavija: inter-akcija političkih mitologija i pop-kulture. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek

Prodanović, Mileta 1998: Geniusloci ili o umetnosti i pokornosti. U: Irina Subotić (urednica), QuadrofoliumPretense / Detelina sa četiri lista, Beograd: Kulturni centar Beograda i Clio, 35-77.

Stojanović, Dubravka 2010: U ogledalu “drugih”. U: Vojin Dimitrijević (urednik), Novosti iz prošlosti, Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 13-31.

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Velikonja, Mitja 2010: Titostalgija, Beograd: Biblioteka XX vekVelikona, Mitja 2010: Politička mitologija nepostojećeg - narativni

sadržaji jugonostalgije u postjugoslovenskim zemljama. U: Mitovi epohe socijalizma, Novi Sad: Centar za istoriju, demokratiju i pomirenje i Fakultet za evropske pravno-političke studije, 131-146.

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Blowing Up Brotherhood and Unity: The Fate of World War Two Cultural Heritage in Lika

Vjeran Pavlaković1

1 PhD (University of Washington); Head of the Cultural Studies Department at the University of Rijeka, Croatia.

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Following the widespread destruction and interethnic violence of World War Two, the socialist regime in Yugoslavia initiated a massive reconstruction and modernization project within the framework of a social revolution. Rejecting the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s attempts at forging a single Yugoslav identity and the radical nationalist extermination agendas from 1941-1945 (particularly by the Ustaša and Četnik movements), the new political elite sought to create a federal state with increasingly autonomous republics that was nonetheless ruled by a single Party. Since the one-party system established by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ, renamed the League of Yugoslav Communists in 1952) and its wartime leader, Josip Broz Tito, based its legitimacy on the victory of the Partisan resistance movement, memory politics after 1945 relied heavily on preserving the monopoly over the Party’s narrative of the war. One of the key elements of this narrative, quickly incorporated in all segments of society after the war, was the motto of “brotherhood and unity.”2 Rather than focus on the internecine bloodletting, the official version of the past emphasized the unified struggle of all of Yugoslavia’s peoples against foreign occupiers and domestic collaborators. Under the motto of brotherhood and unity, the regime allowed individual national identities to flourish in each of the country’s six republics, but used repressive means against any perceived appearance of nationalism or anti-government dissent.

2 Snježana Koren, Politika povijesti u Jugoslaviji 1945.-1960., (Zagreb: Srednja europa, 2012), pp. 312 – 313.

V. Pavlaković

In socialist Croatia, interethnic relations between Croats and Serbs were particularly delicate. Croats had chafed under Belgrade’s efforts at centralization and the legacy of Greater Serbian ideology which sought to erase Croatian identity, as well as post-war repression against the Catholic Church and mass killings such as the Bleiburg tragedy. Meanwhile, Croatia’s Serb population had been tra-umatized by the attempted genocide of the wartime Ustaša regime and divisions resulting from the federal structure of socialist Yugoslavia that were interpreted as a deliberate effort to weaken the Serb nation. Relations between Serbs and Croats were especially sensitive in the region of Lika, not only because of long-term historical reasons but due to the nature of the violence during World War Two. Ustaša forces had committed massive atrocities against Serb civilians early during the war, while overzealous communists (at times sup-ported by the local Serb population) carried out reprisals aga-inst Croats suspected of collaboration that often resulted in the imprisonment or even execution of innocent civilians.

Thus the successful transmission of the heroic narra-tive of the antifascist resistance was crucial for restoring interethnic trust in the Lika region and throughout Croatia. Civilian victims of the Ustaše, Četniks, Italians, and Germans were woven into the narrative, but were not the central focus of commemorative events. The regime prohi-bited the memorialization of the victims of Partisan forces and those who died fighting in collaborationist units, altho-ugh collective memories of them persisted in the private sphere. Within these parameters, the state authorities, as well as local organizations and administrations, constructed a memoryscape of brotherhood and unity throughout Lika

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from 1945 until socialist Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991. The physical monuments and memory objects were not only ideological markers of the socialist regime, but were impor-tant symbols of identity for Croatian Serbs. As such these memorials, along with the monumental abstract structures and memory parks of the later socialist period, can be consi-dered to be significant cultural heritage sites. Croatia’s War of Independence (or Homeland War, 1991–1995) was accom-panied by the systematic rewriting of historical narratives, specifically those related to the traumas of World War Two, and the widespread destruction of the cultural heritage of the Partisan resistance. This text offers an introductory over-view of the construction and transformation of World War Two cultural heritage in Lika during the socialist era (1945-1991) and then the transformation – oftentimes destruction – during the Croatian War of Independence and the nation-building project of the 1990s. Rather than presenting an exhaustive list of the fate of all monuments in Lika, I have chosen to portray the memory landscape in broad brushstro-kes punctuated by more detailed descriptions of several significant sites that remain contested politically.

World War Two in LikaWhy Lika? Although this former frontier region, already subjected to demographic losses even without the destructive periodic cycles of violence in the twentieth century, is far from the center of Croatian political, cultural, and economic life, it nevertheless forms a strategic zone connecting northern and central Croatia to Dalmatia and the southern islands. Centuries of war and an unforgiving climate have hardened the inhabitants of this seemingly uninhabited

and barren land. But it is precisely the tenacity of Lika’s people which has made both Croats and Serbs the most loyal brothers in arms as well as bitter enemies during the conflicts which have swept through the region’s villages and towns.

Serb-Croat relations have undoubtedly characterized the history of Lika in the twentieth century. According to the posthumously published memoirs of Marija-Vica Balen, a former Partisan and later dissident, tension between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs in Lika began with the “divide and conquer” policies of the Hungarian-imposed administra-tor of Croatia, Ban Karoly Khuen-Herdervary (r. 1883-1903). She describes how the regime’s politics of issuing privileges to Serbs at the end of the nineteenth century contributed to the sharpening of nationalist stereotypes:

From the Croats one could hear accusations that the Serbs were ‘always on the side of the regime’ as was the case under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and during the old [Kingdom of] Yugoslavia, and that it is still true today [1980s]. They were and remain the ‘firebrands’ who were always ready to spread the blaze of anti-Croat politics for the rulers from Vienna, Budapest, or Belgrade. The Serbs, on the other hand, always considered Gospić to be a hotbed of ‘Frankists’ [interwar Croat extremists] and later Ustaše… However, for centuries all the Serbs and Croats of Lika, as well as Gospić, shared the same harsh fate living in the fron-tier…3 Before the Homeland War, the population of Lika had been nearly equally divided between Serbs and Croats. In

3 Marija-Vica Balen, Bili smo idealisti: Uspomene jedne revolucionarke (Zagreb: Disput, 2009), p. 24.

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1981, the region had a total of 90,336 inhabitants (including 39,772 Croats, 41,929 Serbs, and 7,278 Yugoslavs), while in 2001 the total population had fallen to 53,677 (of which there were 46,245 Croats and 6,193 Serbs), revealing a catastrophic demographic loss as well as homogenization of the populati-on.4 Gospić, Lika’s biggest settlement, had a Croat majority throughout the twentieth century, as did Otočac and Perušić, although many of the surrounding villages were populated by Serbs.5 In 1991, ethnic Croats constituted 64 percent and ethnic Serbs 31 percent of the total number of around 30,000 people. Ten years later, out of a total of 12,980 inhabitants of the Gospić municipality, 93 percent (12,050) were Croats and 5 percent (650) were Serbs.6 Although a number of incidents during Interwar Yugoslavia, including political assassinati-ons and repression by the gendarmerie, exposed Serb-Croat tensions, the tragedy of World War Two represented the nadir relations between these two ethnic communities.

The Axis invasion of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and the subsequent establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) resulted in an explosion of interethnic violence throughout Lika. The Ustaša7 regime,

4 For Croatian census information, see the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, online at www.dzs.hr.

5 Nenad Pokos and Ivo Turk, “Demografska obilježa naselja Gospić i grada Gospića,” in Željko Holjevac, ed., Gospić: grad, ljudi, identitet (Zagreb: Institut Ivo Pilar, 2013), pp. 63-83.

6 The Croatian Bureau of Statistics, online at www.dzs.hr. The numbers for the 2011 did not show any dramatic shifts: out of total of 12,745 inhabitants of the Gospić municipality, 93 percent (11,860) were Croats and 5 percent (609) were Serbs.

7 The Ustaša (plural: Ustaše) movement, after the Croatian word

which had a number of pre-war supporters in Gospić, formed a system of internment and extermination camps in the town, the surrounding hills (the Jadovno camp and the numerous karst pits where the bodies were dumped), and on the island of Pag for communists, Serbs, Jews, and political opponents. Although the camp system only functioned from June to August 1941, it is estimated that the Ustaše killed thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of civilians from all over the NDH during these few months.8 Hundreds of other civilian victims died as a result of attacks by Ustaša units who plundered and burned Serb villages. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia began organizing an armed resistance against the NDH, and in the first years of the conflict recru-ited primarily from Serbs fleeing the Ustaša terror. Other Serbs joined the Četnik movement, which carried out brutal

for “insurgent”, was formed in the early 1930s by Ante Pavelić, a member of the Croatian Party of Rights who had fled into exile after the assassination of several Croatian deputies in the Yugoslav Assembly in 1928. This radical Croatian separatist movement was dedicated to the violent destruction of the Yugoslav state, was alternatively supported and suppressed by Mussolini’s Italy, and eventually came to power in April 1941 on the heels of the Axis destruction of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

8 Mišo Deverić and Ivan Fumić, Hrvatska u logorima 1941.-1945. (Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske, 2008), pp. 43-44. As is the case with many of the extermination sites from World War Two, especially when the perpetrators dumped the bodies into karst pits, the number of victims of Jadovno and other camps around Gospić are hard to determine exactly and continue to provoke debates. Research by Đuro Zatezalo in the 1980s identified over 10,000 victims by name, while victims’ organizations claim that the true number is between 20,000 and 40,000, the majority of whom were Serbs. Novosti, 1 July 2011, p. 20. See also the official website of the victims’ organization at www.jadovno.com.

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reprisals against Croat and Muslim civilians, fought for a return of the Serb-dominated royal Yugoslav state, and openly collaborated with the occupying Italian troops.

While individual acts of resistance and isolated acti-ons by communists had been taking place all summer, a full-blown revolt against the Ustaša dictatorship began in the village of Srb near the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mass uprising that began on 27 July, the date subsequ-ently celebrated as Croatia’s Uprising Day, involved a small number of KPJ members, but also many Četniks and Serb extremists. The towns of Srb and Donji Lapac, located in isolated valleys along the Una River, served as the staging area for the Serb uprising against the regime, in coordination with Bosnian Serbs in Drvar. In early July, an Ustaša unit under the command of Vjekoslav “Maks” Luburić carried out a number of attacks against Serbs in Suvaja, Bubanj, Osredak, and Nebljusi (villages near Srb and Donji Lapac), driving the local population “onan irreversible path towards an uprising.”9 The initial skirmishes were directed at the small Ustaša garrisons in the valley, but the revolt grew as reinforcements tried unsuccessfully to quell the uprising and the armed peasants overran villages and towns.

Although the uprising in Srb was commemorated as a Partisan and communist rebellion, a significant number of the rebels fell under the influence of local Četnik forces. These groups, led by members of pre-war political par-ties, took advantage of the weak communist presence and

9 Danilo Damjanović Danić, Ustanak naroda Hrvatske 1941. u Srbu i okolini (Zagreb: Progres, 1972), pp. 44-45; Slavko Goldstein, 1941. Godina koja se vraća (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2007), pp. 125-126.

negotiated a ceasefire agreement with Italian commanders shortly after the uprising. More problematic for interethnic relations were the subsequent atrocities they committed against the Croat and Muslim civilian populations and the destruction of settlements such as Boričevac and Kulen Vakuf.10 Historian Max Bergholz has shown how the inno-cent victims killed in Kulen Vakuf in the summer of 1941 were never commemorated because they were murdered by Serb insurgents who later joined the Partisans and even held important postwar political positions.11 Yet it was pre-cisely the events of 27 July and the KPJ’s interpretation of them which would form the central commemorative event in Croatia promoting brotherhood and unity.

10 For a Croatian nationalist perspective on the events of July and August 1941, see Josip Pavičić, ed. Dossier Boričevac (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2012). In certain publications and memoirs, the Partisan participants in the uprising admitted to crimes had been committed against Croats as well. For example, in a 1963 book one of the leaders of the 27 July uprising, Đoko Jovanić, not only admits that pro-Četnik elements among the rebels killed Croat civilians and burned villages, but that the KPJ’s control over the revolt were minimal. Đoko Jovanić, “Ustanak u južnoj Lici 1941. godine,” in Đoko Jovanić, ed., Lika u NOB 1941. (Belgrade: Vojno delo, 1963), pp. 123-124. However, in subsequent texts and especially in commemorative speeches, Jovanić and other authors neglected to mention that the rebels were themselves perpetrators of atrocities against innocent civilians. Đoko Jovanić, “Razvoj oružane borbe u Lici od početka oružanog ustanka do formiranja 6. ličke divizije,” in Lika u prošlosti i sadašnjosti (Karlovac: Historijski arhiv u Karlovcu, 1973), pp. 269-271. In this version Jovanić emphasizes that “the Communist Party organized the uprising and had things under control from the first day.” Ibid., p. 271.

11 Max Bergholz, “The Strange Silence: Explaining the Absence of Monuments for Muslim Civilians Killed in Bosnia during the Second World War,” East European Politics and Societies 24, no. 3 (2010).

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Lika remained bitterly contested territory for the rest of the war. Even though the Partisan movement steadily grew in strength, and was able to draw more Croats into its ranks, Gospić remained an Ustaša stronghold up until the final months of the NDH.12 On April 4th 1945, Partisan forces finally shattered Gospić’s remaining defenses. While this date was added to the commemorative calendar as a moment of liberation, the victorious Partisans meted out harsh punishment against real or suspected collaborators, predomi-nantly Croats, whose fates would remain a taboo subject for the next forty-five years. On May 8th Tito’s troops entered a mostly deserted Zagreb, although battles with the retreating Ustaša forces lasted until the final capitulation at Bleiburg field in Austria seven days later. The war had ended but the socialist revolution was just beginning, and all vestiges of democracy were discarded as class enemies and suspected collaborators were brutally repressed. While the number of fallen Partisans from Lika was estimated at 9,000, along with 6,000 individuals listed as victims of fascist terror, the casu-alty figures for those killed while fighting in NDH units or in post-war Partisan liquidations is unknown.13

12 Todor Radošević, ed., Kotar Gospić i Kotar Perušić u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu, 1941-1945. (Karlovac: Historijski arhiv u Karlovcu, 1989); and Davor Kovačić, “Drugi svjetski rat na području Gospića,” in Željko Holjevac, ed., Gospić: grad, ljudi, identitet (Zagreb: Ivo Pilar, 2013), pp. 201-214.

13 Juraj Hrženjak, ed. Rušenje antifašističkih spomenika u Hrvatskoj, 1990-2000 (Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca hrvatske, 2002), p. 98. Ivan Vukić’s book, Lika i Podgorje: Na braniku doma i naroda, claims that “the Četnik-communist army” killed 1,000 local Ustaša and anti-communist-oriented ethnic Croats in

Building Brotherhood and Unity:Lika in Socialist Yugoslavia

The post-war socialist regime strictly controlled all commemorations and other political rituals. Already on 25 July 1945 the revolutionary authorities in Zagreb declared that 27 July was a “people’s holiday” to celebrate the uprising of 1941, one of the central commemorations of the socialist republic of Croatia. Each Yugoslav republic celebrated its own Uprising Day, and in the hierarchy of remembrance, Serbia’s came first (7 July), followed by Montenegro (13 July), Slovenia (22 July), Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (27 July, commemorating the uprisings in Srb and Drvar), and finally Macedonia (11 October). Renata Jambrešić-Kirin, writing on the politics of memory related to World War Two, concluded that “the Yugoslav animators of cultural memory” were important in “affirming the political order, the ideology of brotherhood and unity, and the legitimacy of the ruling party, while repressing the problem of interethnic conflicts.”14

The actors in question were not only political leaders in the socialist regime who engaged in the “construction” of the dominant commemorative discourse to legitimize their political power, but also members of the central veterans’

just forty-eight hours, although other sources suggest much lower numbers. www.likaplus.hr/gospic/vremeplov/lika_i_podgorje_na_braniku_doma_i_naroda/default.aspx.

14 Renata Jambrešić-Kirin, “Politička sjećanja na Drugi svjetski rat u doba medijske reprodukcije socijalističke kulture,” in Lada Čale Feldman and Ines Prica, eds., Devijacije i promašaji: Etnografija domaćeg socijalizma (Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 2006), p. 166.

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organization, SUBNOR (Federation of Veterans Associations of the People’s Liberation War of Yugoslavia).15 Instead of “collective memory”, the phrase “collective remembrance” more accurately refers to the commemorative processes because the agency or “action of groups and individuals” play a critical role.16 The fact that interethnic violence in Lika was more significant than the struggle between occupi-ers and patriots or communists and fascists influenced post-war memory politics, which meant that forgetting the past was just as important as remembering it. The participation of large numbers of Serbs in the resistance movement resul-ted in their overrepresentation in the local administration, the police, the Yugoslav Army, and the Party. Out of 8,292 members of the Communist Party from Lika, only 1,877 were Croats (i.e., 23 percent), while 5,610 were Serbs, 703 Yugoslavs, and 102 others.17

As historian of the Great War Jay Winter has noted, memories are not merely snapshots of the past but are recon-structions and recreations imbued with feelings, beliefs,

15 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

16 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 17; Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 6.

17 Lički vjesnik (12 July 1989), p. 3. The disproportionate number of Serbs in the political, military, and police structures in Croatia relative to their percentage of the population had been one of the arguments used by Croatian nationalists to as proof of Serb domination even after 1945. For a more detailed discussion and statistics, see Zdenko Radelić, Stvaranje hrvatske države i domovinski rat (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), pp. 75-82.

knowledge gained after the experience, and interpretations which are socially framed.18 Although the political rituals which take place at the key sites of memory and their tran-smission to the broader public via print and electronic media are an important part of the collective remembrance process, this article focuses on the sites themselves, and particularly on their transformations during political transition. Almost three hundred monuments, statues, busts, obelisks, comme-morative plaques, and other memory objects dedicated to World War Two were erected throughout Lika in the deca-des after the war. Almost every village and town had some kind of memorial marker to the People’s Liberation War. Monuments were often placed in central locations in settle-ments, but could also be found on buildings associated with local heroes, sites of battles or other important events, and cemeteries. Some of these memorials were built by local aut-horities or veterans’ organizations, while others were funded as part of republican-level initiatives. Even though the monu-ments recorded various events in the Liberation War, they were almost always unveiled on dates associated with the central Partisan narrative, such as July 4th (Veterans’ Day) or July 27th (Uprising Day).

Heike Karge’s extensive research on socialist Yugoslav monuments reveals that contrary to the perception of a top-down monolithic policy of memorialization, there was in fact a constant “mediation of remembrance” as local actors nego-tiated their commemorative practices within the parameters

18 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 3.

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set by the Party and federal authorities.19 She notes that while the phrases “socialist revolution” and “brotherhood and unity” were omnipresent in political speeches, textbo-oks, and the state controlled media, they were surprisingly absent from many of the monuments built to preserve local war narratives in stone and bronze. As the introduction to a volume cataloging monuments from the region of Banovina (Banija) shows, there was often a lack of coordination with the authorities:

Many of the memorials were erected without previo-usly consulting expert institutions, so it is understandable that there were occasional oversights in their construction. Climactic conditions were ignored when choosing building materials, the conceptualization and construction of the memorials was entrusted to unskilled individuals, and the texts on the monuments are frequently vaguely worded and grammatically incorrect.20

Similar discrepancies can be observed in the memoryscape throughout Lika.

The memory markers around the town of Srb signify the importance of this memorial site despite the contro-versies associated with the events of the summer of 1941 as described above.21 Visitors heading towards Srb in the

19 Heike Karge, “Mediated Remembrance: Local Practices of Remembering the Second World War in Tito’s Yugoslavia,” in European Review of History, vol. 16, no. 1 (2009), p. 50.

20 Ivica Šuštić, Spomenici revolucionarnog radničkog pokreta, NOB-a i socijalističke revolucije na području općine Sisak (Sisak: Muzej Sisak, 1982), p. 5.

21 Although considered to be part of the Lika region, Srb was

isolated valley of the Una River, perhaps to attend the annual Uprising Day commemorations, would first drive by a simple memorial marker several kilometers after turning off the Gračac-Knin road. Located in the pass (Srbski klanac) just before road switch-backs down into the valley, the now bullet-riddled text claims “the first rifle shots of the uprising called for by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia” took place at this location, referring to a skirmish between the rebels and Ustaša reinforcements heading to Srb. A monument consisting of fifty-seven rifles [photo 6] for each inhabitant of Srb who died fighting in the Partisan ranks stands at the entrance of the town. A complete list of all the war casual-ties, divided into fallen Partisans (pali borci) and civilians (victims of fascist terror, or žrtve fašističkog terora), was carved into marble plaques placed in the elementary school, which also functioned as a memorial museum (spomen dom). Other nearby towns had modest monuments to the uprising (Mazin, Dobroselo), while Donji Lapac featured a large bronze statue of Stojan Matić, one of the local commanders killed in battle in 1942.

The dominant memorial in Srb, however, was the monument to the Uprising of the Peoples of Croatia, a 15.5 meter white obelisk decorated with bronze figures scul-pted by Vanja Radauš [photo 5]. The figure on top of the obelisk carried the flag of the Communist Party, while two other figures depicted a rebel with a rifle and a villager armed with a pitchfork. At the front of the monument was

administratively removed from the Lika-Senj county (županija) and added to the Zadar county in 1997, which local residents believe was an effort to dilute the Serb population in Lika.

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the figure of a mother in traditional peasant garb, while the base was encircled by reliefs depicting scenes from the war. Completed in 1950 on a hilltop near the center of the town, the monument was formally unveiled on the tenth anniver-sary of the uprising in 1951. The decision to use stone from the island of Brač for this monument proved to be unwise, as the harsh Lika winters quickly eroded the building materials and it had to be renovated in the 1960s. While the monu-ment in Srb was the focal point of commemorative events and established the narrative of what was to be remembered, two neighboring villages are testimony to what the regime wanted forgotten. According to local Nikola Čanak, there was never any memorial built in Suvaja, one of the villages destroyed by Luburić’s Ustaše on July 2nd, 1941.22 Čanak’s interpretation was that a monument to such an atrocity would have complicated efforts at reconciliation with Croats after the war. The other “site of amnesia” was Boričevac, the Croat town burned by the rebels in the early days of the uprising. After the war the original inhabitants were prohibi-ted from returning, and there was no memorial marker until 2011 when the association of exiles placed a commemorative plaque on the ruins of the village’s Catholic Church.23

22 Goldstein, 1941., p. 125; and interview with Nikola Čanak in Srb, Croatia, 25 November 2009. Since most of the men had already fled to the woods, the majority of the nearly two hundred victims were women and children. Čanak claimed the Ustaše came from Boričevac and Kulen Vakuf, apparently as a way of justifying the subsequent revenge killings in these towns.

23 Novi list, 28 July 2011, p. 21.

The monumental topography around Srb was des-cribed in such detail because it reveals to what degree a landscape can be shaped by policies of both remembering and forgetting that were negotiated between the interests of local authorities and the highest echelons of the ruling Party. Furthermore, the various communities responded in different ways to the official narrative and the public rein-forcement of that narrative, either by embracing it fully or preserving counter-narratives in the private sphere which were suppressed until the fall of communism in the 1990s. Srb demonstrates how problematic it is to convey the com-plexity of the events from the summer of 1941 through monuments intended to permanently record the version selected by the victorious Partisans. The uprising had the elements of a communist revolution: traditional Serb peasant uprisings, spontaneous reactions to mass murder by Ustaša forces, Greater Serbian and Četnik ideology perpetuated by pre-war politicians, and revenge attacks against different religious communities,but in the cultural memory of socia-list Yugoslavia it was recast as the beginning of the heroic resistance led by the Communist Party under the brilliant guidance of Tito.

Gospić, although held by Ustaša forces until the last months of the war, had its share of monuments. The cen-tral monument dedicated to fallen Partisans and victims of fascist terror was located the park in front of the county courthouse. Erected on July 4th 1958, the bronze figures by sculptor Pavao Perić depicted male and female Partisans in heroic poses, imprisoned civilians in agony, and pitchfork-

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wielding peasants.24 A monument featuring three stone gallows and the figure of a grieving mother by Radauš was unveiled on 27 July 1961 on Jasikovačka street in honor of the “thousands of innocent victims from Lika and other parts of our homeland killed by the Ustaše in the Jadovno camp and other locations on Velebit mountain.” The inscription does not identify either the victims or the perpetrators by nationality, but states that the spilled blood “gave the people from the region even more strength and determination, under the command of the Communist Party and Comrade Tito, to persevere in the struggle for freedom, brotherhood and unity, and the victory of the revolution.”25 An ossuary built in 1964 in the shape of a boat located in the Orthodox cemetery held the remains of forty-two “Partisans of 1941” (prvoborci) who “died fighting the occupiers and domestic traitors.”26 All of these monuments were completely destroyed in the 1990s by unknown individuals.

While a large garrison of Ustaše held Gospić thro-ughout the war, the resistance movement sprouted in the surrounding villages. Local communists organized the first Partisan detachments in Vrebac, Mogorić, and Barlete. While the Vrebac memorial graphically depicts pitchfork-wielding peasants attacking German soldiers, the obelisk in Barlete calls for “preserving brotherhood and unity” and

24 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948-1963), box 3, “Gospić”.

25 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948-1963), box 3, “Gospić - Jasikovačka ulica”.

26 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948-1963), box 3, “Gospić”.

“remembering those who gave their lives for the new soci-alist Yugoslavia.” Whereas Četniks supported by Italian forces operated out of Medak, Divoselo became a hotbed of Partisan activity and was subjected to numerous attacks by the Ustaše stationed in Gospić. In addition to a number of commemorative plaques and busts, a memorial museum (spomen dom) was built in the center of the village with the names of 1,300 fallen Partisans and civilian victims. A memorial on the outskirts of Divoselo erected on Veterans’ Day in 1964 celebrated the Partisan defense of the village in November 1941 from an “attack by traitors,” which was described as “the strongest hymn of freedom, the hymn of brotherhood and unity of Serbs and Croats.”27 Another monument dedicated on the same day in Smiljan featured the following poetic inscription:

One living sparkTurns everything into a flame, brotherhood and unityOpens the sunny path forward.One living sparkEntwined the brotherly heartsCroats and Serbs, Serbs and CroatsAnd led them to freedom.28

27 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948-1963), box 3, “Divoselo”.

28 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948-1963), box 3, “Smiljan”.

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The central monument in Perušić [photo 8], which has a Croat majority, did not depict masses of peasants, but wor-kers being mobilized, presumably by local communists. The list of fallen Partisans is preceded by the names of twelve locals who had fought in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), which further adds to the ideological, rather than national, symbolism of the monument. Otočac, likewise a city with a majority of Croats, was home to a large memorial museum dedicated to the founding session of ZAVNOH (State Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia, the governing body of the Croatian Partisans established in 1943), which, among other important declarations, esta-blished the equality of Croats and Serbs in the future socia-list Yugoslavia.

The abovementioned memorials featured both Partisans killed in battle as well as victims of fascist terror, which supported the brotherhood and unity narrative, but there were also monuments dedicated only to massacres. The monument in Kruškovac (built in 1956), where Ustaša units killed several hundred civilians fleeing from Divoselo and other villages, described how the victims “died in unnatural agony” at the hands of “Ustaša criminals.”29 In Mlakva, another village near Gospić, locals had organized

29 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948-1963), box 3, “Kruškovac”. The inscription on the monument states that “907 men, women, and children were killed,” while a detailed article about the event published in 1989 suggests that “after the three day orgy of killing by the Ustaša villains” a total of 426 civilians lost their lives. Dane Rajčević, “Zločini ustaša nad stanovnicima Divosela, Čitluka i Ornica u prvoj polovici augusta 1941. godine,” in Radošević, ed., Kotar Gospić i Kotar Perušić, p. 227.

the erection of a monument a year earlier that contained even more graphic descriptions of violence: “On 4.VIII.1941, Ustaša criminals massacred and burned 270 innocent patri-ots and victims in this village.”30 Although the perpetrators were identified, the victims were not. But it was of course known that the victims had been killed just because they were Serbs; according to research which did not include casualty figures of “the other side”, 91.45 percent of the vic-tims of fascist terror were Serbs, and 68.02 percent of those deaths occurred in 1941.31

The most systematic murders carried out by the Ustaše in Lika did not take place with the attacks against Serb villa-ges, but during the first months of the NDH when the short-lived Gospić-Jadovno-Pag camp system exterminated the regime’s enemies. But the Jadovno camp, located in the foot-hills of the Velebit mountain range was marginalized in the hierarchy of memorialization. Only a simple monument, erec-ted in 1961, marked the location of the camp, and the occasio-nal commemoration focused primarily on youth competitions and military maneuvers. The identity of both victims and per-petrators were left vague in commemorative speeches given at the site. For example, in 1973 several thousand young pio-neers and other citizens gathered at the former location of the camp and listened to a speech by Milan Rukavina, the vice president of the Croatian Parliament’s Executive Council,

30 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948-1963), box 3, “Mlakva”.

31 Zdenka Krivokuća, “Pali borci i žrtve fašizma s područja kotara Gospić i kotara Perušić tokom NOR-a 1941-1945.,” in Radošević, ed., Kotar Gospić i Kotar Perušić, p. 978.

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who reflected upon the nature of the camp and its victims: [Y]ou are here to honor and remember the tens of

thousands of men, women, and children who were thrown into pits and abysses across the Velebit mountain range for one single reason: because they hated fascism and they rose up against the enemy and the quisling forces. In Jadovno everyone who rose up against fascism and refused to acknowledge the occupation was killed, these were all patri-ots and were of all nations and nationalities...32

The official narrative defined the Ustaša crimes within the scope of the antifascist struggle, even though the vast majority of the victims were civilians who had nothing to do with the resistance movement.

In the 1980s, as the commemorative discourse across Yugoslavia increasingly focused on victims, local groups complained openly that Jadovno had been marginalized and that the memorial space needed to be expanded. In an article from 1985 in the Gospić bi-weekly Lički vjesnik, the author calls for the creation of a committee to introduce a new approach to commemorating the victims that was signifi-cantly different from the official narrative:

Forty years of peace and freedom have passed since the end of World War Two, which witnessed the darkest slaughterhouses of human kind and the never before seen genocide, barbarity, and bestiality of the dark forces of fas-cism and their bloody henchmen, Ustaše and Četniks. From the end of the war until today there were efforts to properly mark this memorial place, but unfortunately these all ended

32 Ličke novine (15 June 1973), p. 2.

in meager symbolic actions (placing a few memorial plaques, the occasional visit, and some other minor activities).33

The initiative resulted in numerous articles and memo-irs of camp survivors in the following years, as well as the partial construction of a memorial site near one of the karst pits (Šaranova jama) in 1988. The central monument was an obelisk made of bodies, piled on top of each other in a horrific tableau of suffering and death [photo 3]. This was a striking shift from the earlier representations of either heroic resistance or death in battle, since now the corpses of the victims were explicitly on display, a disturbing precursor of the new cycle of violence that was to come in the 1990s.

As James Young argues in his book on Holocaust memorials: “by creating common spaces for memory, monuments propagate the illusion of common memory.”34 What is evident from the memorialization efforts in Lika, the monuments were only an illusion of the true collective remembrance that existed below the surface of official dis-course. While Serbs could identify with the monuments chronicling their suffering and contribution to the war effort, the full scope of their trauma was left unspoken for the sake of brotherhood and unity. For those Croats who had been on the wrong side, their memories were absolutely taboo, and for many brotherhood and unity represented a return to a Greater Serbian domination of the interwar period.

33 Lički vjesnik (15 November 1985), p. 1.

34 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 6.

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Yugoslavia’s greatest experiment in memorialization, the explosion of socialist modernism in architecture and epic monument building from the 1960s onward, generally bypassed Lika. Most of the central memory sites had already been marked by the early 1960s, and they generally consi-sted of figures in the style of socialist realism or memorial plaques, as described above. While Lika continued to build realistic depictions of Partisan heroes and suffering civilians, a new generation of artists and architects were designing radical and powerful monuments across the country. Gal Kirn, a leading scholar of Yugoslav modernist monuments, explains that the abstract forms represented universalist values, timelessness, and an antifascism that was not tied to a single nationalism.35 These memorials, even when located at the site of some of the most notorious death camps such as Jasenovac, shared the same vision for modernization and education which Yugoslavia strove for, but was ultima-tely unable to achieve due to its internal lack of cohesion. Tourist maps of Yugoslavia from 1988 include many of these monuments alongside other examples of cultural heritage such as cathedrals, Roman ruins, palaces, monasteries, and castles, indicating that the regime considered the antifascist monuments to be its contribution to the cultural mosaic of

35 Gal Kirn, “A Few Critical Notes on the Destiny of the Yugoslav Partisan Memorial Sites in the Contemporary, Post-Yugoslav (Croatian) Context,” in Nataša Ivančević, ed., Vojin Bakić: Lightbearing Forms – A Retrospective (Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, 2013), p. 288. See also Gal Kirn and Robert Burghardt, “Jugoslovenski partizanski spomenici: Između revolucionarne politike i apstraktnog modernizma,” in Jugolink, vol. 2, no. 1 (2012), pp. 7–20.

Yugoslavia.36 The shift towards memory parks was not only intended for foreigners and to showcase Yugoslav artists, but to rekindle the domestic population’s interest in the Partisan legacy. These sites were not just for laying wreaths, but for a number of leisure activities such as picnicking, camping, concerts, and youth events.

Like in the case of many other aspects of the Yugoslav modernization project, Lika remained peripheral in Yugoslavia’s shift in monumental styles. Road-building and electrification did bring change to this impoverished region, but even during peacetime the region experienced constant demographic losses as young people moved to the cities and the economy stagnated. In the 1970s, SUBNOR in Lika ini-tiated a campaign to designate Bijeli potoci – Kamensko as a memory park which would not only mark over forty-two historical sites related to the organization of some of the first Partisan detachments in the area, but would attract tourists for picnicking, hiking, and other outdoor activities. According to the founding committee, the memory site would provide “primarily young generations with new and deeper under-standings of the People’s Liberation War and its legacy.”37 The complex was completed in the 1980s and included large, abstract pyramid structures as well as a series of bronze figu-res by Radauš. In the Plitvice Lakes National Park, Lika’s Partisan veterans initiated a project to build a conference and

36 Yugoslavia Tourist Map (Belgrade: Turistički savez Jugoslavije, 1988).

37 Spomen područje Bijeli potoci – Kamensko (Gospić: Odbor za uređenje Spomen područja Bijeli potoci – Kamensko, 1974), p. 17.

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hotel complex bearing the name of the legendary VI. Lička divizija, another example of how the growing tourist economy was fused with memory politics related to World War Two.

Blowing up Brotherhood and UnityAs Yugoslavia slid towards ethnic war in the late 1980s, the ghosts and suppressed traumas of World War Two bubbled to the surface and contributed to a new cycle of violent revenge. The political discourse, disseminated by media outlets ali-gned with the newly emerging nationalist politicians, mobi-lized both Serbs and Croats with patriotic pride as well as fear of the Other’s extremist bogeymen: Četniks and Ustaše crawled out from dark, forgotten corners of the country to take up positions in the front lines of the upcoming war. Paradoxically, instead of imbuing Yugoslavia’s youth with a belief that cooperation across ethnic lines would solve the political and economic crises facing their generation, the memorialization policies had created a framework for demo-nizing political opponents and terrifying those generations who still remembered the bloodshed of the previous war.

When it became clear that controversial historian Franjo Tuđman was poised to take over the Croatian res-ponse to Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian nationalist project in the announced multiparty elections, the press under Belgrade’s control ramped up the hysteria of an imminent Ustaša takeover in Croatia. Serb nationalists in Croatia organized massive rallies at sites of memory such as Petrova Gora and the Jasenovac memorial to draw parallels with the tragedy of 1941, a process which culminated in the summer of 1990 in Srb itself. An estimated 120,000 people attended the Serb Assembly in Srb (Srpski sabor u Srbu)

on 25 July, where the organizers issued the Declaration of the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serb People.38 The authors of the declaration insisted that only nations (peo-ples), and not states, could decide whether or not to secede from socialist Yugoslavia, and carried out a referendum on Serb autonomy within Croatia in August and September 1990. Although the mass meeting in Srb was held at one of Croatia’s most important Partisan memorial sites and only two days before the official commemoration, there was no longer any talk of brotherhood and unity.

The war that ensued was rarely fought between armies, but consisted mostly of armed formations “ethni-cally cleansing” territories inhabited by civilians. During the initial phase of the war in Croatia (1991-1992), rebel Croatian Serbs supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army and a variety of paramilitary forces occupied over 30 percent of the territory and expelled the majority of the non-Serb population. After the Croatian Army liberated most of the occupied zones in a series of operations in 1995, it was the Serb civilian population which fled into exile. Apart from human losses, vast swathes of Croatia were heavily damaged in the fighting: houses, barns, churches, apartment buildings, factories, and the infrastructure built up during Yugoslavia’s widespread modernization effort were destroyed. The memorial landscape of brotherhood and unity, which had saturated the towns and countryside, was likewise a casu-alty of the war. Unlike many civilian victims caught in the

38 Davor Pauković (ed.), Uspon i pad Republike Srpske Krajine (Zagreb: Centar za politološka istraživanja, 2005), pp. 70–71.

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crossfire, Partisan monuments in regions such as Lika were not simply collateral damage, but were specifically targeted by the warring sides.

According to statistics obtained by Croatia’s antifascist organization, 2,964 monuments and memorial plaques were destroyed between 1990 and 2000.39 Their analysis of the data indicates that most targeted memorials were those that commemorated Serb and Jewish victims of fascism, emp-hasized the role of the Communist Party in the resistance movement, featured prominent red stars or the Cyrillic script, and highlighted brotherhood and unity. Furthermore, the damage to monuments was widespread in Serb-majority areas liberated by the Croatian Army in the spring and summer of 1995. Milorad Pupovac, a deputy in the Croatian Parliament and the president of the Serbian National Council, noted that participation in the Partisan resistance movement was a crucial element of Croatian Serb identity and cultural heritage, and that the systematic destruction of antifascist monuments in the 1990s had served to erase that part of Croatia’s cultural memory.40 For this reason the Serbian National Council included the renovation of antifas-cist monuments as one of the key goals in its program.41

The destruction of monuments is certainly not limi-ted to the former Yugoslavia or the modern era. The Romans

39 Hrženjak, Rušenje antifašističkih spomenika, p. XII.

40 Interview with Milorad Pupovac in Zagreb, Croatia, 1 October 2009.

41 Saša Milošević, ed. Srbi u Hrvatskoj 2007 (Zagreb: Vijeće srpske nacionalne manjine grada Zagreba, 2007), pp. 20–21.

practiced damnatio memorae (“condemnation of memory”) in order to erase all material evidence of their opponents or former emperors whose successors sought to build their legacy on a clean slate. Invading armies throughout history were particularly fond of turning the cultural heritage of subjected peoples into piles of rubble. Dozens of monuments erected during France’s Third Republic, which had enga-ged in a kind of “statuomania” at the turn of the twentieth century, were turned into scrap metal after the German occupation in 1940, particularly in Paris.42 Interestingly, this German policy was supported by a significant number of French bureaucrats and members of the intelligentsia, who saw the removal of republican-themed monuments as a settling of old scores. The communist authorities in Yugoslavia encouraged their own statuomania after taking power in 1945, but first they removed the symbols of the previous regimes and occupying powers. In Zagreb, for example, the regime tore down the minarets of the newly established mosque (formerly an art pavilion designed by Ivan Meštrović), dismantled the statue of Ban Josip Jelačić (considered to be a counterrevolutionary by Marx for his role in squashing the 1848 uprising in Hungary), plowed up the graves of Ustaša and German soldiers in the Mirogoj Cemetery, and destroyed all of the wartime monuments built during the short-lived NDH.

The fall of communism in Eastern Europe was accompanied by the widespread dismantling of many of the

42 Sergiusz Michalski, Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage, 1870-1997 (London: Reaktion Books, 1998), pp. 49–55.

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socialist-realist monuments seen as markers of the Soviet Union’s influence. Some countries, like Hungary, remo-ved the monuments deemed to be “unwanted heritage” but rather than destroying them, placed them in a giant outdoor museum (Memento Park). But the destruction of memorials in Croatia (and to a much lesser extent in other Yugoslav successor states) was more violent and, if possible to use such terms in describing attacks against stone and bronze, more brutal. While local authorities sometimes used administrative methods to remove memorials from public spaces, there were hundreds of instances when unknown (or possibly known but not prosecuted) perpetrators blew up or severely damaged monuments and sculptures that were created by some of Croatia’s most celebrated artists of the twentieth century, such as Vojin Bakić, Antun Augustinčić, Dušan Džamonja, Vanja Radauš, and Edo Murtić. The level of destruction varied from region to region and often corresponded with the war zones, although rarely were the memorials damaged in fighting but rather were deliberately targeted. Thus Istria and the Littoral region around Rijeka saw few attacks on the Partisan cultural heritage, while Lika and parts of Dalmatia were cleansed of nearly all monuments associated with socialist Yugoslavia.

In Lika the intensity of the violence against cul-tural heritage associated with Serbs, communism, and Yugoslavia left few monuments standing after the Croatian Army crushed rebel Serbs and the Croatian state regained control of the entire region in the summer of 1995. [photo 7] Officials and commanders in Gospić, which saw heavy fighting at the beginning of the war and a series of massa-cres of civilians on both sides, thoroughly purged the urban

landscape of all Partisan monuments. The authorities remo-ved the central monument in front of the county courthouse with its pitchfork-wielding peasants and replaced it with one featuring a stylized cross dedicated to the fallen branitelji from the Homeland War [photo 2]. It is flanked by busts of Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian archbishop during World War Two, Alojzije Stepinac. The authorities leveled Radauš’s statue at Jasikovačka street, the memorial at the Jadovno concentration camp was blown up by unknown perpetra-tors, and in a tragicomic twist, an obelisk-monument next to the bridge over the Lika River at the entrance into town was transformed into a restaurant sign [photo 1]. The fact that in 1992 unknown perpetrators also blew up the statue of Croatian Serb inventor Nikola Tesla which had stood in the center of Gospić indicates that the monuments being destroyed were not identified only as ideologically unaccep-table, but were considered to be associated with Serb cul-tural heritage. While the Croatian government restored the Jadovno monument in 2011, the municipal authorities have resisted returning the statue of Tesla to the city center.43

Croatian armed forces razed the memorials in Divoselo [photo 9], Čitluk, and Počitelj to the ground, along with the villages themselves, during and after the Medak Pocket operation in September 1993. During Operation Storm in 1995, Croatian Army tanks blew the imposing monument in Srb, the center of the contested history of 1941, into pieces [photo 4]. Croatian troops pillaged the town after its population fled. Even the holiday on July 27th was

43 Novi list, 29 June 2010, p. 2; Novosti, 15 July 2011, pp. 16-17.

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removed from the commemorative calendar and replaced with June 22nd(Antifascist Struggle Day), marking the day the first Partisan detachment, with a majority of Croats, was established near Sisak The monument was finally restored in 2010 as part of a coalition agreement between Pupovac’s Serbian National Council and the HDZ which was then in power, although the annual commemorations draw counter-commemorations organized by right-wing political parties protesting what they consider to be a “Četnik celebration.”44 The monument to fallen Partisans and civilians in Perušić, however, remains standing, likely because the victims are all Croats.

Croat extremists or members of the Croatian Army were responsible for much of the destruction of the World War Two monumental heritage, but Serb units of the Republika Srpska Krajina likewise destroyed memori-als dedicated to brotherhood and unity. For example, Serb extremists tore down the statue of Croat Partisan Marko Orešković in Korenica, and devastated the Bijeli potoci - Kamensko memorial park, but preserved many other memorials chronicling Serb victimization at the hands of the Ustaše. In the political and cultural vacuum left by socialist Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the Krajina Serbs rebelling aga-inst the Croatian state constructed a new culture of memory

44 See Vjeran Pavlaković, “Contested Pasts, Contested Red-Letter Days: Antifascist Commemorations and Ethnic Identities in Post-Communist Croatia,” in Ljiljana Šarić, Karen Gammelgaard, and Kjetil Ra Hauge, eds., Transforming National Holidays: Identity Discourse in the West and South Slavic Countries, 1985-2010 (London: John Benjamins Publishing, 2012).

that focused on select, traumatic moments from the recent past that excluded coexistence with all other ethnic groups.

ConclusionDespite the rhetoric that the destruction of socialist Yugoslavia has finally allowed the full truth of World War Two to emerge, the recent past remains hotly contested in Croatian society and particularly in the political arena. While it is true that the Party’s monopoly of the past has allowed some of the suppressed traumas to emerge in demo-cratic Croatia, the revisionist process has in many cases resulted in the complete demonization of the entire antifas-cist movement while simultaneously rehabilitating, and to some extent glorifying, the Ustaše as Croatian patriots. In certain regions such as Lika, the systematic destruction of the Partisan memorial landscape, for all of their ideological and even aesthetic shortcomings, was akin to brutally tea-ring pages out of a history book instead of carefully editing and revising the communist narrative legitimating the poli-tical system. At the same time that certain monuments were being razed to the ground, organizations of NDH veterans erected new memorials to the previously suppressed cate-gories of wartime casualties – members of the NDH armed forces and civilians liquidated by the Partisans after the end of the war. While these individuals certainly also deserve the dignity of being recognized on a memorial or gravestone, the fact that it comes at the expense of other victims being erased from the memoryscape indicates that a truly open dialogue about the past remains elusive in Lika.

The statuomania of the socialist regime appears to be repeating in the present as the veteran organizations of

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the War of Independence erect a new layer of memories etched in stone across Croatia. Although they are not nearly as monumental as their socialist predecessors, sites such as the recently built memory park in Otočac to fallen Croatian soldiers evoke many parallels to Partisan monuments, albeit with a different set of symbols and inscriptions.45 Unfortunately, the practice of denying the defeated side to commemorate their losses has also been inherited from the socialist period, as even Serb civilian victims of the war in the 1990s have relatively few memorials – the first official one was erected in Varivode in 2010, with others in Gošić, Golubić, and Borovo – while Croatian veteran organizations have fervently banned any memorial markers for members of Serb armed units, regardless of how they were killed and whether or not they were suspected of war crimes. Even the few modest monuments that have been built have been damaged or defaced, indicating that certain segments of Croatian society refuse to allow the recognition of the other sides’ victims.

As 2013 came to a close, Lika once again drew the country’s attention because of memory politics. On December 30th, the minister of veteran affairs, Predrag Fred Matić, attended a ceremony for the building of the first government monument for victims of communist repression

45 At the unveiling of the monument in Otočac, the gathered officials emphasized that memorials such as this would allow younger generations to understand the history of the War of Independence, just as the Partisan memory spaces were intended to convey the official narrative of the People’s Liberation War. Novi list, 9 November 2011, p. 43.

in the village of Sinac. Building a memorial for individuals killed by the Communist Party, the political predecessor of the ruling Social Democratic Party, was considered an important step in coming to terms with their own past. However, the event turned into somewhat of a debacle as the Church and some victims’ families boycotted the ceremony. While the pretense of the boycott were claims that the gover-nment had desecrated the remains of the victims by using a bulldozer during the exhumation with the intention of cove-ring up communist crimes, the underlying motive appears to be the ongoing effort of the right-wing to discredit the ruling party through the symbolic and emotional machinations of memory politics.46 In Lika, the memoryscape of World War Two continues to be a battleground long after the Partisans, Ustaše, and Četniks fired their last shots.

46 Novi list, 31 December 2013, p. 34; Novi list, 2 January 2014, p. 34.

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1 Former World War Two monument at the bridge over the River Lika converted into a restaurant sign, photo by Vjeran Pavlaković

1 Bivši spomenik Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi na mostu preko rijeke Like, pretvoren u reklamu za restoran, fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

2 Monument to fallen Croatian soldiers and civilians in the Homeland War in front of the county courthouse in Gospić, photo by Vjeran Pavlaković

2 Spomenik hrvatskim vojnicima i civilima poginulim u Domovinskom ratu, ispred Županijskog suda u Gospiću, fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

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3 Monument at Šaranova jama near the site of the Jadovno camp (erected in 1988, destroyed in 1991, restored in 2011), photo by Vjeran Pavlaković

3 Spomenik u Šaranovoj jami u blizini mjesta na kojem se nalazio koncentracijski logor Jadovno (podignut 1988. godine; uništen 1991., te obnovljen 2011. godine), fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

4 Devastated monument in Srb in 2009, photo by Vjeran Pavlaković.

4 Uništeni spomenik, Srb, 2009., fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

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5 Monument dedicated to the 27 July 1941 uprising in Srb designed by Vanja Radauš (erected in 1950, destroyed in 1995, restored in 2010), photo by Vjeran Pavlaković

5 Spomenik posvećen ustanku u Srbu (27. 6. 1941.); autor Vanja Radauš (podignut 1950., uništen 1995., obnovljen 2010. godine), fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

6 Monument in the shape of fifty-seven rifles at the entrance of Srb representing locals who died fighting in Partisan ranks, photo by Vjeran Pavlaković

6 Spomenik u obliku pedeset sedam pušaka na ulazu u Srb. Puške predstavljaju ljude iz mjesta poginule u redovima partizana, fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

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7 Damaged monument in Mazin, near Donji Lapac, photo by Vjeran Pavlaković

7 Oštećeni spomenik u Mazinu, kraj Donjeg Lapca, fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

8 Intact monument to fallen Partisans and Spanish Civil War volunteers in Perušić, photo by Vjeran Pavlaković.

8 Perušić, neoštećen spomenik palim partizanima i dobrovoljcima u Španjolskom građanskom ratu, fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

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9 Memorial center (spomen dom) in Divoselo that was destroyed by the Croatian Army during Operation Medak Pocket in 1993, photo by Vjeran Pavlaković

9 Spomen dom u Divoselu, uništen od strane Hrvatske vojske tijekom operacije Medački džep, 1993., fotografija: Vjeran Pavlaković

Dizanje u zrak bratstva i jedinstva: sudbina kulturnoga naslijeđa Drugoga svjetskog rata u Lici

Vjeran Pavlaković 1

1 Prof. dr. Pavlaković doktorirao je na Sveučilištu Washington u SAD-u, a danas je pročelnik Odsjeka za kulturalne studije, Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci.

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Nakon sveopćega razaranja i međuetničkoga nasilja u Drugome svjetskom ratu socijalistički režim u Jugoslaviji pokrenuo je veliki projekt obnove i modernizacije u okviru društvene revolucije. Odbacujući pokušaje Kraljevine Jugoslavije da u vremenu između dvaju ratova stvori jedin-stven jugoslavenski identitet, kao i radikalne nacionalističke pokušaje istrebljenja od 1941. do 1945. godine (naročito ustaškoga i četničkoga pokreta), nova politička elita radila je na stvaranju federalne države sa sve autonomnijim repu-blikama koja je ipak bila pod vladavinom jedne Partije. S obzirom da je jednopartijski sustav uspostavljen od strane Komunističke partije Jugoslavije (KPJ, preimenovane u Savez komunista Jugoslavija 1952. godine) i njezina ratnog vođe, Josipa Broza Tita, temeljio svoj legitimitet na pobjedi partizanskog pokreta otpora, politika sjećanja se nakon 1945. godine jako oslanjala na očuvanje monopola nad partijskim narativom rata. Jedan od ključnih elemenata toga narativa, koji je vrlo brzo bio ukomponiran u sve segmente društva nakon rata, bio je moto “bratstvo i jedinstvo”.2 Umjesto da se usredotočila na međusobno krvoproliće, službena ver-zija prošlosti naglašavala je ujedinjenu borbu svih naroda Jugoslavije protiv stranoga okupatora i domaćih kolabora-cionista. Pod motom bratstva i jedinstva režim je dopuštao pojedinačnim nacionalnim identitetima da se razvijaju u svakoj od šest republika, ali je na svaki percipirani znak nacionalizma ili protuvladinoga neslaganja odgovarao repre-sivnim mjerama.

2 Snježana Koren, Politika povijesti u Jugoslaviji 1945.-1960. (Zagreb: Srednja europa, 2012.), str. 312 – 313.

U socijalističkoj su Hrvatskoj međuetnički odnosi Hrvata i Srba bili posebno osjetljivi. Hrvati su bili razdraženi beogradskim pokušajima centralizacije i ostavštinom veliko-srpske ideologije kojoj je jedan od ciljeva bio brisanje hrvat-skoga nacionalnog identiteta, kao i poslijeratnom represijom protiv Katoličke Crkve i ubijanjima poput onoga u Bleiburgu. Hrvatski su Srbi u međuvremenu bili traumatizirani ustaš-kim pokušajem genocida za vrijeme rata i podjelama s obzi-rom na federalnu strukturu socijalističke Jugoslavije koju su doživljavali kao očitu namjeru kojoj je cilj bio slabljenje srpske nacije. Odnosi Hrvata i Srba bili su posebno osjetljivi u Lici, ne samo zbog dugotrajnih povijesnih razloga, već i zbog prirode nasilja tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata. Ustaške postrojbe počinile su ogromne zločine nad srpskim civilima na početku rata, dok su prerevni komunisti (ponekad uz potporu lokalnoga srpskog stanovništva) vršili odmazdu nad Hrvatima za koje se sumnjalo da su surađivali s okupatorom, što je često rezultiralo zatvaranjem ili čak pogubljenjem nedužnih civila.

Stoga je uspješan prijenos herojskoga narativa antifaši-stičkoga otpora bio ključan za obnovu međuetničkoga povje-renja u Lici i diljem cijele Hrvatske. Civilne žrtve ustaša, četnika, Talijana i Nijemaca utkane su u narativ, ali nisu bile središte komemorativnih događaja. Režim je zabranio kome-moraciju žrtava partizana i onih koji su poginuli boreći se u kolaboracionističkim jedinicama, iako je kolektivno sjećanje na njih opstalo u privatnoj sferi. Državne su vlasti, zajedno s lokalnim udrugama, unutar tih parametara stvorile pejzaž sjećanja bratstva i jedinstva diljem Like od 1945. godine do raspada Jugoslavije 1991. godine. Fizički spomenici, kao i predmeti sjećanja, nisu bili samo ideološki pokazatelji

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socijalističkoga režima, već i važni simboli identiteta hrvat-skih Srba. Kao takvi, ti se spomenici, zajedno s monumen-talnim apstraktnim građevinama i memorijalnim parkovima kasnijega socijalističkog razdoblja, mogu smatrati značajnim lokalitetima kulturne baštine. Hrvatski rat za nezavisnot (ili Domovinski rat, 1991. –1995.) pratilo je sustavno prerađivanje povijesnih narativa, posebno onih koji su se ticali trauma iz Drugoga svjetskog rata, i masovno uništenje kulturne baštine partizanskoga otpora. Ovaj tekst predstavlja uvodni pregled stvaranja i transformacije kulturne baštine Drugoga svjetskog rata u Lici za vrijeme socijalizma (1945. – 1991.) i njezinu transformaciju – često uništavanje – tijekom Domovinskog rata i projekta izgradnje države u devedesetima. Umjesto predstavljanja iscrpnoga popisa sudbine svih spomenika u Lici, odlučio sam prikazati pejzaž sjećanja širokim potezima kista upotpunjenim detaljnim opisima nekoliko važnih loka-cija koje su još uvijek predmet političkoga sporenja.

Drugi svjetski rat u LiciZašto Lika? Iako je ova, nekad pogranična, regija već izlo-žena gubitku stanovništva čak i bez razornih periodičkih ciklusa nasilja u dvadesetome stoljeću, daleko od centra hrvatskoga političkog, kulturnog i ekonomskog života, ona ipak predstavlja strateško područje koje spaja sjevernu i središnju Hrvatsku s Dalmacijom i južnim otocima. Stoljeća rata i nezahvalna klima očvrsnuli su stanovništvo te naoko rijetko naseljene i neplodne regije. Ali upravo je ta izdržlji-vost Ličana pretvorila i Hrvate i Srbe u najodanije suborce i ljute neprijatelje tijekom sukoba koji su se širili selima i gradovima regije.

Odnosi Srba i Hrvata nesumnjivo su okarakterizirali povijest Like u 20. stoljeću. Prema posthumno objavljenim memoarima bivše partizanke i kasnije disidentkinje Marije-Vice Balen, napetosti između katoličkih Hrvata i pravoslav-nih Srba u Lici počele su s “podijeli pa vladaj” politikom mađarskoga upravitelja Hrvatske, bana Károlyja Khuena Héderváryja (vladao 1883. – 1903.). Ona opisuje kako je režimska politika davanja privilegija Srbima krajem 19. sto-ljeća pridonijela zaoštravanju nacionalističkih stereotipa:

Od Hrvata si mogao čuti optužbe da su Srbi “uvijek na strani režima” kao što je bio slučaj u Austrougarskome Carstvu i tijekom stare (Kraljevine) Jugoslavije, a to vrijedi i danas [1980.]. Oni su bili i ostali “podstrekači”, uvijek voljni potpiritvati protuhrvatsku politiku za vladare iz Beča, Budimpešte ili Beograda. Srbi su, s druge strane, uvijek smatrali Gospić rasadištem “Frankista” [hrvatski ekstremisti između dvaju ratova] i kasnije ustaša... Ipak, stoljećima su svi Srbi i Hrvati u Lici, uključujući Gospić, dijelili tešku sud-binu života na granici...3

Prije Domovinskoga rata udio Hrvata i Srba u sta-novništvu Like bio je gotovo jednak. Godine 1981. regija je imala 90,336 stanovnika (uključujući 39,772 Hrvata, 41,929 Srba i 7,278 Jugoslavena), a 2001. godine broj ukupnoga stanovništva pao je na 53,677 (od čega 46,245 Hrvata i 6,193 Srba), otkrivajući katastrofalni pad naseljenosti kao i homogenizaciju stanovništva.4 Gospić je, kao najveće

3 Marija-Vica Balen, Bili smo idealisti: Uspomene jedne revolucionarke (Zagreb: Disput, 2009), str. 24.

4 Popis stanovništva RH: vidi Državni zavod za statistiku, www.dzs.hr

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naselje u Lici, imao hrvatsku većinu tijekom cijeloga 20. stoljeća, kao i Otočac i Perušić, iako su mnoga okolna sela bila srpska.51991. Hrvati su sačinjavali 64 %, a Srbi 31 % od ukupnih tridesetak tisuća stanovnika. Deset godina kasnije od 12,980 stanovnika općine Gospić 93 % (12,050) bili su Hrvati, a 5 % (650) Srbi6. Iako je niz incidenata u Jugoslaviji između dvaju ratova, u što su uključena ubijanja i represija od strane policije, razotkrio srpsko-hrvatske tenzije, tragedije iz Drugoga svjetskog rata predstavljale su nadir [najlošije razdo-blje, op. ur.] u odnosima između tih dviju etničkih skupina.

Invazija sila osovine na Kraljevinu Jugoslaviju u trav-nju 1941. godine i naknadna uspostava Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) rezultirala je eksplozijom međuetničkoga nasilja diljem Like. Ustaški režim, koji je imao brojne podr-žavatelje u Gospiću prije rata, oformio je sustav logora za sakupljanje i ubijanje u gradu, na okolnim brdima (logor Jadovno i brojne krške jame gdje su se bacala tijela) i na otoku Pagu za komuniste, Srbe, Židove i političke protivnike novoga režima. Iako je logorski sustav funkcionirao samo od lipnja do kolovoza 1941. godine, procjenjuje se da su tije-kom tih nekoliko mjeseci ustaše tamo ubile tisuće, možda i desetke tisuća civila iz cijele NDH.7 Stotine drugih civilnih

5 Nenad Pokos i Ivo Turk, “Demografska obilježa naselja Gospić i grada Gospića”, u Željko Holjevac, ur., Gospić: grad, ljudi, identitet (Zagreb: Institut Ivo Pilar, 2013.), str. 63-83.

6 Državni zavod za statistiku, www.dzs.hr. Brojke iz 2011. godine ne pokazuju bitnije promjene: od ukupno 12 745 stanovnika općine Gospić, 93 % (11860) su Hrvati, a 5 % (609) Srbi.

7 Mišo Deverić i Ivan Fumić, Hrvatska u logorima 1941.-1945. (Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske, 2008.), str. 43-44. Kao što je slučaj s mnogim stratištima iz Drugoga

žrtava poginulo je za vrijeme ustaške pljačke i paleži srpskih sela. KPJ je počela organizirati oružani otpor protiv NDH i u prvim godinama sukoba novačila je većinom Srbe koji su bili u bijegu pred ustaškim terorom. Drugi Srbi pridružili su se četničkomu pokretu koji je poduzimao brutalne osvetničke pohode protiv hrvatskoga i muslimanskoga civilnog stanov-ništva boreći se za povratak kraljevske jugoslavenske države otvoreno surađujući s talijanskim okupatorom.

Dok su se pojedinačni činovi otpora i izolirane komu-nističke akcije odvijale tijekom cijelog ljeta, pravi ustanak protiv ustaške diktature počeo je u selu Srb kraj bosanske granice. Masovna pobuna započela je 27.7., na datum koji se kasnije slavio kao Dan ustanka Hrvatske. Uključivala je nekolicinu članova KPJ, ali i mnogo Četnika i srpskih ekstremista. Gradovi Srb i Donji Lapac, smješetni u izoli-ranim dolinama uz Unu, bili su odskočna daska za Srpsku pobunu protiv režima, u koordinaciji s bosanskim Srbima u Drvaru. Početkom srpnja, ustaška jedinica pod vodstvom Vjekoslava “Maksa” Luburića izvršila je niz napada na Srbe u Suvaji, Bubnju, Osredku i Nebljusima (sela kraj Srba i Donjeg Lapca), tjerajući lokalno stanovništvo na “nepovratni put prema pobuni.”8

svjetskog rata, posebno kada bi počinitelji bacali tijela u krške jame, broj žrtava Jadovna i ostalih logora oko Gospića je teško točno utvrditi i uvijek izaziva rasprave. Istraživanja Đure Zatezala u osamdesetima identificirala su preko 10.000 žrtava po imenu, dok udruge žrtava tvrde da se pravi broj kreće između 20.000 i 40.000, od čega su većina Srbi. Novosti, 1. 7. 2011., str. 20. Vidi i službenu stranicu udruge žrtava www.jadovno.com

8 Danilo Damjanović Danić, Ustanak naroda Hrvatske 1941. u Srbu i okolini (Zagreb: Progres, 1972), str. 44-45; Slavko Goldstein, 1941. Godina koja se vraća (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2007.), 125-126.

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Početni sukobi bili su usmjereni na male ustaške garnizone u dolini, ali pobuna je rasla kako su je pojačanja neuspješno pokušavala ugasiti i naoružani seljaci pregazili su sela i gradove.

Iako se ustanak u Srbu obilježava kao partizanska i komunistička pobuna, znatan dio pobunjenika pao je pod utjecaj lokalnih četničkih snaga koje su, pod vodstvom predratnih političkih stranka, iskoristile slabu prisutnost komunista i ispregovarali primirje s talijanskim zapovjedni-cima nedugo nakon ustanka. Puno su veći problem za među-etničke odnose bili naknadni zločini koje su počinili nad hrvatskim i muslimanskim stanovništvom i uništenje naselja poput Boričevca i Kulen Vakufa.9 Povjesničar Max Bergholz pokazao je kako nedužne žrtve iz Kulen Vakufa 1941. godine nikada nisu komemorirane jer su ih ubili srpski pobunjenici koji su se kasnije pridružili partizanima i nakon rata preuzeli

9 Za hrvatsku nacionalističku perspektivu ovih događaja vidi Josip Pavičić, ur. Josip Pavičić, ed. Dossier Boričevac (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2012). U nekim publikacijama i memoarima partizanski sudionici ustanka priznaju da su se zločini činili i nad Hrvatima. Na primjer, u knjizi iz 1963. godine, jedan od vođa pobune 27. 7., Doko Jovanić, ne samo da priznaje da su pročetnički elementi među pobunjenicima ubijali hrvatske civile i palili sela, nego da je i kontrola KPJ nad ustankom bila minimalna. Đoko Jovanić, “Ustanak u južnoj Lici 1941. godine”, u: Lika u NOB 1941. (Beograd: Vojno delo, 1963.) str. 123-124. Ipak, u kasnijim tekstovima, a posebno u komemorativnim govorima, Jovanić i drugi autori zaboravljaju spomenuti da su sami pobunjenici bili počinitelji zločina nad civilima. Đoko Jovanić, “Razvoj oružane borbe u Lici od početka oružanoga ustanka do formiranja 6. ličke divizije”, u: Lika u prošlosti i sadašnjosti, (Karlovac: Historijski arhiv u Karlovcu, 1973.), str. 269-271. U ovoj verziji Jovanić naglašava da je “komunistička partija organizirala pobunu i da ju je kontrolirala od prvoga dana” Ibid., str. 271.

važne političke položaje.10 Ipak, upravo su događaji 27. 7. i interpretacija tih događaja od strane KPJ bili okosnica cen-tralnoga komemoracijskog događaja u Hrvatskoj kojim se promoviralo bratstvo i jedinstvo.

Lika je ostala područje oštrih borbi tijekom cijeloga rata. Iako je partizanski pokret s vremenom jačao i privlačio više Hrvata u svoje redove, Gospić je ostao ustaško uporište do zadnjih mjeseci NDH.11

Partizanske su snage 4. 4. 1945. godine konačno raz-bile preostalu gospićku obranu. I dok je taj datum upisan u komemoracijski kalendar kao vrijeme oslobođenja, pobjed-ničke partizanske snage oštro su kaznile prave i osumnjičene kolaboracioniste, većinom Hrvate, čija će sudbina ostati tabu tema tijekom narednih četrdeset i pet godina. Titove su snage 8. 5. ušle u većinom napušteni Zagreb iako su borbe s ustaškim snagama koje su se povlačile trajale do konačne predaje u blajburškome polju u Austriji tjedan dana kasnije. Rat je završio, ali je socijalistička revolucija tek počinjala, a svi tragovi demokracije odbačeni su kao klasni neprija-telji, a osumnjičeni kolaboracionisti doživjeli su brutalnu represiju. Dok se broj poginulih partizana u Lici procjenjuje na 9000, s još 6000 ljudi navedenih kao žrtve fašističkoga terora, broj stradalih u borbi na strani NDH ili u poslijeratnm

10 Max Bergholz, “The Strange Silence: Explaining the Absence of Monuments for Muslim Civilians Killed in Bosnia during the Second World War”, East European Politics and Societies 24, no. 3 (2010)

11 Todor Radošević, ur., Kotar Gospić i Kotar Perušić u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu 1941. – 1945. (Karlovac: Historijski arhiv u Karlovcu, 1989.); i Davor Kovačić, Drugi svjetski rat na području Gospića, u: Željko Holjevac, ur., Gospić: grad, ljudi, identitet, (Zagreb, Ivo Pilar, 2013.) str. 201-214.

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partizanskim likvidacijama ostaje nepoznat12

Izgradnja bratstva i jedinstva: Lika u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji

Poslijeratni socijalistički režim je strogo kontrolirao sve komemoracije i ostale političke rituale. Već su 25. 7. 1945. godine revolucionarne vlasti u Zagrebu proglasile 27. 7. narodnim praznikom kojim se slavio ustanak iz 1941. godine. To je bio jedan od središnjih komemorativnih doga-đaja Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske. Svaka je jugosla-venska republika slavila svoj dan ustanka, a u hijerarhiji sjećanja onaj u Srbiji bio je prvi (7. 7.), onda je crnogorski (13. 7.), slovenski (22. 7.), hrvatski i bosanskohercegovački (27. 7. kada se obilježavaju ustanci u Srbu i Drvaru) te na kraju makedonski (11. 10.). Renata Jambrešić-Kirin, pišući o politici sjećanja u odnosu na Drugi svjetski rat, zaključuje da “su jugoslavenski animatori kulturne memorije” bili važni u “afirmaciji političkoga sustava, ideologije bratstva i jedinstva i legitimnosti vladajuće stranke dok su potiskivali problem međuetničkih sukoba.”13

12 Juraj Hrženjak, ur. Rušenje antifašističkih spomenika u Hrvatskoj, 1990. – 2000. (Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca Hrvatske, 2002.), str. 98. Ivan Vukić u svojoj knjizi, Lika i Podgorje: Na braniku doma i naroda, tvrdi da je “četničko-komunistička vojska ubila 1000 lokalnih ustaša i antikomunistički nastrojenih Hrvata u samo četrdeset i osam sati”, iako drugi izvori upućuju na mnogo niže brojke. www.likaplus.hr/gospic/vremeplov/lika_i_podgorje_na_braniku_doma_i_naroda/default.aspx.

13 Renata Jambrešić-Kirin, “Politička sjećanja na Drugi svjetski rat u doba medijske reprodukcije socijalističke kulture”, u Lada Čale Feldman i Ines Prica, ur., Devijacije i promašaji: Etnografija domaćeg socijalizma (Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 2006.), str. 166.

Akteri nisu bili samo politički vođe socijalističkoga režima koji su bili uključeni u “konstrukciju” dominantnoga komemorativnog diskursa kako bi legitimizirali svoju poli-tičku moć, nego i pripadnici središnjih veteranskih udruga, SUBNOR (Savez udruženja boraca narodnooslobodilačkoga rata).14 Sintagma “kolektivno sjećanje” preciznije opisuje komemorativne procese od “kolektivne memorije” jer posre-dovanje, odnosno “djela skupina i pojedinaca” igraju presudnu ulogu.15 Činjenica je da je međuetničko nasilje u Lici bilo izraženije od borbe između okupatora i patriota ili komunista i fašista, što je utjecalo na poslijeratnu politiku sjećanja. Stoga je zaboravljanje prošlosti bilo jednako važno kao i sjećanje. Sudjelovanje velikoga broja Srba u pokretu otpora imalo je za rezultat njihovu preveliku zastupljenost u lokalnoj samou-pravi, policiji, jugoslavenskoj vojsci i Partiji. Od 8292 člana KPJ iz Like samo ih je 1877 bilo hrvatske nacionalnosti (tj. 23 %), a 5610 ih je bilo Srba, 703 Jugoslavena i 102 ostalih.16

Kao povjesničar Prvoga svjetskog rata, Jay Winter je zabilježio da sjećanja nisu samo isječci prošlosti, nego su to

14 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

15 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), str. 17; Jay Winter i Emmanuel Sivan, ur., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), str. 6.

16 Lički vjesnik (12. srpnja. 1989.), str. 3. Neproporcionalan broj Srba u vojnim, političkim i policijskim strukturama u Hrvatskoj u odnosu na njihov udio u hrvatskom stanovništvu bio je jedan od argumenata hrvatskih nacionalista za dokaz o srpskoj dominaciji čak i nakon 1945. godine. Za detaljnije rasprave i statistike, vidi Zdenko Radelić, Stvaranje hrvatske države i domovinski rat (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006.), str. 75-82.

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rekonstrukcije i ponovne tvorbe prožete osjećajima, vjerova-njima, znanjem steknutim iz danoga iskustva i interpretaci-jama koje su društveno uokvirene.17

Iako su politički rituali koji se odvijaju na ključnim lokacijama sjećanja i njihov prijenos široj publici putem tiska i elektroničkih medija važan dio kolektivnoga procesa sje-ćanja, ovaj se članak bavi lokacijama kao takvima i posebno njihovim transformacijama u doba političke tranzicije. Gotovo tristo spomenika, kipova, bista, obeliska, spomen ploča i drugih objekata sjećanja posvećenih Drugomu svjet-skom ratu podignuto je diljem Like u desetljećima nakon rata. Gotovo je svako selo i grad imalo neku vrstu znaka za sjećanje na NOB. Spomenici su često smješteni na cen-tralne lokacije u naseljima, ali moglo ih se naći i na zgra-dama povezanim s lokalnim herojima, poprištima bitaka ili drugih važnih događaja i grobljima. Neke od tih spomenika izgradile su lokalne vlasti ili udruge veterana, dok su drugi financirani inicijativama na razini republike. Iako su spome-nici dokumentirali razne događaje iz NOB, gotovo su uvijek otkrivani na datume povezane s centralnim partizanskim narativom, poput 4. 7. (Dan borca) ili 27. 7. (Dan ustanka).

Iscrpna istraživanja Heike Karge o spomenicima u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji otkrivaju da je, unatoč percepciji monolitične politike sjećanja odozgo prema dolje, stalno pri-sutna “medijacija sjećanja” tako što su lokalni akteri moderi-rali svoje komemoracijske prakse unutar parametara postav-

17 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), str. 3.

ljenih od strane Partije i federalnih vlasti.18 Ona primjećuje da su fraze poput “socijalistička revolucija” ili “bratstvo i jedinstvo” sveprisutne u političkim govorima, udžbenicima i medijima koje kontrolira država, ali da su bili iznenađujuće odsutni na mnogim spomenicima izgrađenim od kamena i bronce da bi se očuvali lokalni ratni narativi. Kao što se vidi iz uvoda, u svezak u kojemu se katalogiziraju spomenici Banije, često je manjkalo koordinacije s vlastima:

Mnogi spomenici podignuti su bez prethodnih kon-zultacija sa stručnim institucijama pa je razumljivo da je bilo povremenih previda u njihovoj izgradnji. Klimatske se uvjete ignoriralo kada se birao građevni materijal, planiranje i konstrukcija spomenika prepušteni su nedovoljno vještim pojedincima, a tekstovi na spomenicima često su nejasni i gramatički netočni.19

Slična neslaganja prisutna su i diljem ličkoga pejzaža sjećanja. Spomenici oko Srba označavaju važnost te lokacije sjećanja unatoč kontroverzama koje se vežu uz događaje iz ljeta 1941. godine kao što je ranije opisano.20 Posjetitelji na putu prema Srbu u izoliranoj dolini rijeke Une, možda da bi prisustvovali godišnjoj komemoraciji Dana ustanka, prvo

18 Heike Karge, “Mediated Remembrance: Local Practices of Remembering the Second World War in Tito’s Yugoslavia”, u European Review of History, vol. 16, no. 1 (2009), str. 50.

19 Ivica Šuštić, Spomenici revolucionarnog radničkog pokreta, NOB-a i socijalističke revolucije na području općine Sisak (Sisak: Muzej Sisak, 1982), str. 5

20 Iako se smatra dijelom Like, Srb je administrativno izdvojen iz Ličko-senjske županije i dodan Zadarskoj županiji 1997., za što lokalno stanovništvo smatra da je povod bilo smanjivanje udjela Srba u Lici.

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trebaju proći skromno spomen-obilježje nekoliko kilometara nakon što skrenu s ceste Gračac – Knin. Smješten na pri-jevoju (Srbski klanac) odmah prije nego što cesta zaokreće natrag u dolinu, tekst koji je sada izbušen rupama metaka glasi: “prvi pucnjevi pušaka u ustanku na koji je pozvala Komunistička partija Jugoslavije dogodili su se na ovom mjestu”, referirajući se na borbu između pobunjenika i ustaš-kih pojačanja koja su se kretala prema Srbu. Spomenik koji se sastoji od pedeset i sedam pušaka za svakoga stanovnika Srba koji je poginuo u partizanskim redovima stoji na ulazu u grad [slika 6]. Potpuni popis svih žrtava rata, podijeljenih na pale borce (partizane) i žrtve fašističkoga terora (civile) urezan je na mramorne ploče u osnovnoj školi koja je dje-lovala kao i spomen-dom. Drugi obližnji gradovi imali su skromnije spomenike ustanku (Mazin, Dobroselo), a u Donjemu Lapcu stajao je veliki brončani kip Stojana Matića, jednoga od lokalnih zapovjednika koji je ubijen u borbi 1942. godine.

Spomenik ustanku naroda Hrvatske bio je glavni spomenik u Srbu. Obelisk visok 15.5 metara, ukrašen bron-čanim likovima, bio je djelo Vanje Radauša [slika 5]. Lik na vrhu obeliska nosio je zastavu Komunističke partije Jugoslavije, dok su druga dva lika predstavljala pobunjenika s puškom i seljaka naoružanoga vilama. Ispred spome-nika bio je lik majke u tradicionalnoj nošnji, a podnožje je bilo ukrašeno reljefima koji su prikazivali prizore iz rata. Spomenik je dovršen 1950. godine na brežuljku nedaleko od centra grada, a formalno je otkriven na desetu obljetnicu ustanka 1951. godine. Odluka da se upotrebljava brački kamen nije bila pametna jer su oštre ličke zime brzo ero-dirale građevni materijal i spomenik je u 1960-ima trebalo

obnoviti. Dok je spomenik u Srbu bio središnje mjesto kome-moracije i uspostavio je narativ onoga čega se moralo sjećati, dva susjedna sela svjedočila su o onome za što je režim htio da se zaboravi. Prema Nikoli Čanku, spomenik nikada nije građen u Suvaji, jednomu od sela koja su uništile Luburićeve ustaše 2. 7. 1941. godine.21 Čanak je pretpostavljao da bi spomenik takvu zločinu zakomplicirao napore pomirenja s Hrvatima nakon rata. Drugo “mjesto amnezije” bio je Boričevac, hrvatski grad koji su spalili pobunjenici u ranim danima ustanka. Ljudima koji su tamo živjeli bilo je zabra-njeno da se vrate nakon rata, a spomen obilježje nije posto-jalo do 2011. godine kada je udruga prognanika postavila spomen ploču na ruševine lokalne katoličke crkve.22

Spomenička topografija oko Srba opisivana je ovako detaljno da bi se pokazalo do koje razine pejzaž mogu obli-kovati politike i sjećanja i zaborava kojima se balansiralo između interesa lokalnih vlasti i najviših krugova vladajuće Partije. Nadalje, različita naselja imala su različite odgovore na službeni narativ i javno primjenjivanje toga narativa ili tako što bi ga u potpunosti prigrlila ili tako što bi očuvala kontranarative u privatnim sferama koji su bili potiskivani do pada komunizma u devedesetima. Srb pokazuje koliko je problematično prenijeti kompleksnost događaja iz ljeta 1941. godine kroz spomenike čija je namjena bila vječno zabilježiti

21 Goldstein, S., 1941., str. 125; i intervju s Nikolom Čankom u Srbu 25. 11. 2009. godine. S obzirom da se većina muškaraca već skrivala u šumi, glavnina žrtava bile su žene i djeca. Čanak je tvrdio da su ustaše došle iz Boričevca i Kulen Vakufa, navodno da bi se nekako opravdalo naknadno osvetničko ubijanje u tim gradovima.

22 Novi list, 28. srpanj 2011., str. 21.

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verziju događaja koju su odabrali pobjednici partizani. Ustanak je sadržavao elemente komunističke revolucije, tra-dicionalnoga srpskog seljačkog ustanka, spontane reakcije na masovna ubojstva koja su počinile ustaške snage, veli-kosrpske i četničke ideologije koju se perpetuirali predratni političari i osvetničkih napada na druge vjerske zajednice, ali u kulturi sjećanja socijalističke Jugoslavije to je sve preo-bličeno u početak herojskoga otpora pod Titovim genijalnim vodstvom.

Gospić je dobio svoj dio spomenika iako je bio pod kontrolom ustaških snaga do posljednjih ratnih mjeseci. Središnji spomenik posvećen palim partizanima i žrtvama fašizma bio je smješten u park pokraj Općinskoga suda. Podignuti 4. 7. 1958. godine, brončani kipovi kipara Pavla Perića prikazivali su partizana i partizanku u herojskim pozama, zatočene civile u agoniji i seljake koji drže vile.23 Spomenik koji se sastojao od tri kamena vješala i kipa upla-kane majke, koji je izradio Radauš, otkriven je 27. 7. 1961. godine u Jasikovačkoj ulici u čast “tisuća nedužnih žrtava Like i drugih dijelova naše domovine koje su ubile ustaše u logoru Jadovno i drugim lokacijama na Velebitu”. Natpis ne imenuje narodnost žrtava niti počinitelja, ali naglašava da je prolivena krv “dala ljudima iz toga kraja još više snage i odlučnosti, pod vodstvom Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i druga Tita, da izdrže u borbi za slobodu, bratstvo i jedin-

23 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948.-1963.), kutija 3, Gospić.

stvo i pobjedu revolucije.”24 Kosturnica u obliku čamca, izgrađena 1964. godine na pravoslavnome groblju sadržavala je ostatke četrdeset i dvaju prvoboraca (partizana iz 1941. godine) koji “su poginuli boreći se protiv okupatora i domaćih izdajnika”25. Svi su ti spomenici bili u potpunosti uništeni u devedesetima od strane nepoznatih počinitelja.

I dok je Gospić držao veliki ustaški garnizon tijekom cijeloga rata, pokret otpora nicao je u okolnim selima. Lokalni komunisti organizirali su prve partizanske odrede u Vrebcu, Mogoriću i Barletama. Dok spomenik u Vrebcu živopisno prikazuje seljake kako vilama napadaju njemačke vojnike, obelisk u Barletama poziva na “čuvanje bratstva i jedinstva” i “sjećanje na one koji su dali živote za novu socijalističku Jugoslaviju”. S obzirom da su četnici uz potporu talijanskih snaga djelovali iz Medaka, Divoselo je postalo žarište parti-zanskoga djelovanja i meta brojnih napada ustaša stacionira-nih u Gospiću. Uz brojne spomen-ploče i biste, spomen dom bio je izgrađen u seoskome središtu s imenima 1300 palih partizana i civilnih žrtava. Spomenik na ulazu u Divoselo podignut je na Dan veterana 1964. godine, a slavio je partizan-sku obranu sela u studenome 1941. godine od “izdajnika”, što je opisano kao “najglasnija himna slobode, himna bratstva i jedinstva Srba i Hrvata”26. Još jedan spomenik otvoren istoga dana u Smiljanu sadržavao je sljedeći poetski napis:

24 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948. – 1963.), kutija 3, Gospić.

25 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948. – 1963.), kutija 3, Gospić.

26 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948. – 1963.), kutija 3, Divoselo.

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Jedna živa iskraPretvara sve u plamen, bratstvo i jedinstvoOtvara sunčani put naprijedJedna živa iskraIspreplela je bratska srcaHrvata i Srba, Srba i HrvataI odvela ih prema slobodi.27 Središnji spomenik u Perušiću [slika 8], većinski

hrvatskome gradu, nije prikazivao gomile seljaka, već rad-nike koje su mobilizirali lokalni komunisti. Popisu palih partizana prethodi popis imena dvanaest lokalnih stanovnika koji su se borili u Španjolskome građanskom ratu (1936. – 1939.), što je još više pridonijelo ideološkomu, a ne naci-onalnomu simbolizmu spomenika. Otočac, također gradić s hrvatskom većinom, imao je velik spomen doma posve-ćen utemeljiteljskoj sjednici ZAVNOH-a (vladajućega tijela hrvatskih partizana osnovanoga 1943.) kojom je, uz neke druge važne proglase, uspostavljena jednakost Hrvata i Srba u budućoj socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji.

Gore spomenuti spomenici bili su posvećeni i partiza-nima palima u borbi i žrtvama fašističkoga terora, što je bilo u skladu s narativom bratstva i jedinstva, ali postojali su i spo-menici posvećeni samo pokoljima. Spomenik u Kruškovcu (izgrađen 1956.), gdje su ustaške jedinice pobile nekoliko sto-tina civila koji su bježali iz Divosela i drugih sela, opisivao je kako su žrtve “umirale u neprirodnim mukama” na rukama

27 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948. – 1963.), kutija 3, Smiljan.

“ustaških zločinaca”.28 U Mlakvi, još jednome selu kraj Gospića, lokalno je stanovništvo organiziralo podizanje spo-menika godinu dana ranije koji je sadržavao još slikovitije prikaze nasilja: “4. 8. 1941. godine ustaški su zločinci masa-krirali i spalili 270 nedužnih domoljuba i žrtava u ovome selu”29. Iako su počinitelji identificirani, žrtve nisu. Ali znalo se, naravno, da su žrtve ubijene samo zato što su bile Srbi: prema istraživanjima koja nisu uključivala poginule s “druge strane”, 91.45 % žrtava fašističkoga terora bili su Srbu, a 68.02 % tih smrti dogodilo se tijekom 1941. godine.30

Najsustavnija ubijanja koja su ustaše počinile u Lici nisu bila u napadima na srpska sela, već tijekom prvih mje-seci NDH kada su se u logorskome sustavu kratkoga vijeka Gospić – Jadovno – Pag ubijali neprijatelji režima. Lokacija Jadovno ipak je bila marginalizirana u hijerarhiji sjećanja. Samo jednostavan spomenik, podignut 1961. godine, ozna-čavao je mjesto logora, a na rijetkim komemoracijama više

28 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948. – 1963.), kutija 3, “Kruškovac”. U natpisu na spomeniku stoji da je “907 muškaraca, žena i djece ubijeno”, dok u detaljnome članku o događaju objavljenome 1989. godine stoji da je “nakon trodnevne koljačke orgije ustaških zlikovaca” ukupno 426 civila izgubilo živote. Dane Rajčević “Dane Rajčević, “Zločini ustaša nad stanovnicima Divosela, Čitluka i Ornica u prvoj polovici augusta 1941. godine”, u Todor Radošević, ur., Kotar Gospić i kotar Perušić u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu, 1941. – 1945. (Karlovac: Historijski arhiv u Karlovcu, 1989.), str. 227.

29 Državni arhiv u Gospiću, HR-DAGS, fond 206 (Spomenici NOB-a 1948. – 1963.), kutija 3, “Mlakva”.

30 Zdenka Krivokuća, Pali borci i žrtve fašizma s područja kotara Gospić i kotara Perušić tokom NOR-a 1941. – 1945., u: Radošević, ur., Kotar Gospić i Kotar Perušić, str. 978.

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se pozornosti pridavalo natjecanjima omladine i vojnim vježbama. Identiteti žrtava i počinitelja nikada nisu jasno određeni u komemorativnim govorima na toj lokaciji. Primjerice, 1973. godine se nekoliko tisuća pionira i drugih građana okupilo na mjestu gdje je nekada bio logor i slušalo je govor Milana Rukavine, potpredsjednika Izvršnoga vijeća Hrvatskoga sabora, koji se prisjećao logora i njegovih žrtava:

Ovdje ste da bi se sjetili i odali počast desetcima tisuća muškaraca, žena i djece koji su bačeni u jame i bezdane diljem Velebita zbog jednoga jedinog razloga: jer su mrzili fašizam i ustali su protiv neprijatelja i kvislinga. U Jadovnu su svi koji su ustali protiv fašizma i odbili priznati okupaciju ubijeni, sve su to bili domoljubi svih naroda i narodnosti...31

Službeni narativ definirao je ustaške zločine u okviru borbe protiv fašizma iako su žrtve velikom većinom bile civili i nisu imale nikakve veze s pokretom otpora.

Tijekom osamdesetih, kako se komemorativni diskurs diljem Jugoslavije sve više orijentirao na žrtve, lokalne su se udruge otvoreno žalile da je Jadovno marginalizirano i da memorijalno područje treba proširiti. U članku u gospićkome dvotjedniku Lički vjesnik iz 1985. godine autor poziva na osnivanje komiteta za uvođenje novoga pristupa sjećanju na žrtve koji se poprilično razlikovao od službenoga narativa:

Četrdeset godina mira i slobode prošlo je od kraja Drugoga svjetskog rata u kojemu smo bili svjedoci naj-mračnijim klaonicama u povijesti ljudskoga roda i dotad neviđenomu genocidu, barbarstvu i zvjerstvu mračnih snaga

31 Ličke novine (15. lipanj 1973.), str. 2.

fašizma i njihovih krvavih suradnika, ustaša i četnika. Od kraja rata do danas postojali su napori da se ovo spomen-područje primjereno obilježi, ali, nažalost, sve bi stalo na sla-bašnim simboličkim akcijama (postavljanje nekoliko spomen-ploča, povremeni posjet i neke druge minorne aktivnosti).32

Rezultat ove inicijative bili su brojni članci i memoari preživjelih logoraša u narednim godinama, kao i djelomična rekonstrukcija spomenika u blizini jedne od krških jama (Šaranova jama) 1988. godine. Središnji spomenik bio je obelisk od leševa, naslaganih jedan na drugi u stravičnome prikazu patnje i smrti [slika 3]. Bio je to upečatljiv odmak od dotadašnjih prikaza ili herojskoga otpora ili smrti u borbi s obzirom da su sada leševi žrtava jasno prikazani, kao potresni prethodnik novomu krugu nasilja koji će nastupiti u devedesetima.

James Young u svojoj knjizi o spomenicima holoka-ustu tvrdi da “stvaranjem zajedničkih mjesta za sjećanje spomenici održavaju iluziju zajedničkoga sjećanja.”33 Ono što je očito iz spomeničke prakse u Lici jest da su spomenici bili tek iluzija pravoga kolektivnog sjećanja koje je postojalo ispod površine službenoga diskursa. Dok su se Srbi mogli identificirati sa spomenicima koji su bilježili njihove patnje i doprinose ratnim naporima, pun opseg njihove traume bio je prešućen za dobrobit bratstva i jedinstva. Za Hrvate koji su bili na krivoj strani, njihova su sjećanja bila apsolutni tabu, a za mnoge je bratstvo i jedinstvo predstavljalo povratak

32 Lički vjesnik (15. studenog 1985.), str. 1.

33 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), str. 6.

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velikosrpske dominacije iz međuratnoga razdoblja.Najveći jugoslavenski spomenički eksperiment,

eksplozija socijalističkoga realizma u arhitekturi i gradnja velebnih spomenika od 1960-ih nadalje, načelno je mimoišao Liku. Većina središnjih mjesta sjećanja već je bila obilježena do ranih šezdesetih, a to se sastojalo od kipova u socreali-stičkome stilu ili spomen-pločama, kao što je ranije opisano. Dok je Lika i dalje gradila realistične prikaze partizanskih heroja i patnji civilnoga stanovništva, nova generacija umjet-nika i arhitekata dizajnirala je radikalne i moćne spomenike diljem države. Gal Kirn, vodeći stručnjak za jugoslavenske modernističke spomenike, objašnjava da su apstraktne forme predstavljale univerzalne vrijednosti, bezvremenost i antifa-šizam koji nije bio vezan uz pojedini nacionalizam.34 Ti su spomenici, čak i kada su smješteni na poprišta najozlogla-šenijih logora smrti poput Jasenovca, dijelili viziju moder-nizacije i obrazovanja kojima je Jugoslavija stremila, ali u konačnici nije ostvarila zbog nedostatka unutarnje kohezije. Turističke karte Jugoslavije iz 1988. godine uključuju mnoge od tih spomenika bok uz bok s drugim primjerima kulturne baštine poput katedrala, antičkih ruševina, palača, samo-stana i dvoraca ukazujući na to da je režim smatrao da su antifašistički spomenici njegov doprinos kulturnomu moza-

34 Gal Kirn, A Few Critical Notes on the Destiny of the Yugoslav Partisan Memorial Sites in the Contemporary, Post-Yugoslav (Croatian) Context, u: Nataša Ivančević, ur., Vojin Bakić: Lightbearing Forms – A Retrospective (Zagreb: Muzej suvremene umjetnosti, 2013.), str. 288. Vidi i Gal Kirn i Robert Burghardt, Jugoslovenski partizanski spomenici: Između revolucionarne politike i apstraktnog modernizma, u: Jugolink, vol. 2, no. 1 (2012.), str. 7. – 20.

iku Jugoslavije.35 Pomak prema memorijalnim parkovima nije bio namijenjen samo da se strancima predstave jugosla-venski umjetnici, već i da se probudi zanimanje domaćega stanovništva za partizansku ostavštinu s lokacijama koje nisu bile samo za polaganje vijenaca, nego su bile prikladne za razonodu i brojne aktivnosti poput kampiranja, piknika, koncerata i događanja za mlade.

Poput mnogih drugih aspekata jugoslavenskoga pro-jekta modernizacije, promjene u spomeničkome stilu mimo-išle su Liku. Cestogradnja i elektrifikacija unijele su pro-mjene u siromašnu regiju, ali pad stanovništva nastavio se i za vrijeme mira kako su mladi odlazili, a privreda stagnirala. U sedamdesetima je SUBNOR u Lici pokrenuo kampanju da se Bijeli potoci – Kamensko namijene u spomen-područje, što bi ne samo obilježilo preko 42 povijesna lokaliteta važna za organizaciju nekih od prvih partizanskih odreda u regiji, nego bi i privuklo turiste na piknike, planinarenje i druge aktivnosti u prirodi. Prema odboru za uređenje, spomen-područje bi pružilo “prvenstveno mladim generacijama novo i dublje razumijevanje NOB-a i njezina naslijeđa”.36 Kompleks je dovršen u osamdesetima i uključivao je velike piramidalne građevine i niz Radauševih brončanih kipova. U nacionalnome parku Plitvička jezera su partizanski veterani inicirali projekt izgradnje hotelskoga i konferencijskoga kom-pleksa nazvanoga po legendarnoj VI. ličkoj diviziji, što je još

35 Turistička karta Jugoslavije (Beograd: Turistički savez Jugoslavije, 1988.).

36 Spomen područje Bijeli potoci – Kamensko (Gospić: Odbor za uređenje Spomen područja Bijeli potoci – Kamensko, 1974.), str. 17.

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jedan primjer spajanja rastućega turističkog gospodarstva s politikama sjećanja na Drugi svjetski rat.

Dizanje bratstva i jedinstva u zrakKako je Jugoslavija klizila prema etničkome ratu u kasnim osamdesetima, duhovi potisnutih trauma iz Drugoga svjet-skog rata isplivali su na površinu i pridonijeli novomu ciklusu osvetničkoga nasilja. Politički diskurs, širen putem medija priklonjenih novim nacionalističkim političarima, mobili-zirao je i Srbe i Hrvate domoljubnim ponosom i strahom od čudovišta među Drugima: četnici i ustaše isplivali su iz mraka, iz zaboravljenih kutaka države i zauzeli su prve redove za nadolazeći rat. Paradoksalno, umjesto prožimanja jugoslavenske mladeži vjerovanjem da je suradnja preko etničkih linija ključ za rješenje svih ekonomskih i političkih kriza s kojima je njihova generacija suočena, politike sjećanja stvorile su okvir za demonizaciju političkih protivnika i stra-šenje onih generacija koje su se još sjećale prethodnoga rata.

Kada je postalo očito da će kontroverzni povjesničar Franjo Tuđman predvoditi hrvatski odgovor projektu srp-skoga nacionalizma Slobodana Miloševića na najavljenim višestranačkim izborima, tisak pod beogradskom kontrolom napuhao je histeriju nadolazećega ustaškog preuzimanja Hrvatske. Srpski nacionalisti su u Hrvatskoj organizirali velike skupove na mjestima sjećanja poput Petrove Gore i spomenika u Jasenovcu kako bi povukle paralele s tragedi-jom iz 1941. godine, što je kulminiralo u ljeto 1990. u Srbu. Procijenjeno je da se 120.000 ljudi okupilo na Srpskome saboru u Srbu 25. 7. na kojemu su organizatori predstavili

Deklaraciju o suverenitetu i autonomiji srpskoga naroda.37 Autori deklaracije inzistirali su da samo narodi Jugoslavije, a ne republike mogu odlučivati o odcjepljenju od socijali-stičke Jugoslavije i proveli su referendum o srpskoj autono-miji unutar Hrvatske u kolovozu i rujnu 1990. godine. Iako je masovni skup u Srbu održan na jednom od najvažnijih partizanskih spomen-područja samo dva dana prije službene komemoracije, nije više bilo govora o bratstvu i jedinstvu.

Rat koji je uslijedio rijetko se vodio između vojski, već se pretežno sastojao od naoružanih skupina koje su etnički čistile područja na kojima su živjeli civili. Tijekom početne faze rata u Hrvatskoj (1991. i 1992.) pobunjeni hrvatski Srbi su uz podršku JNA i niza paravojnih snaga okupirale preko 30 % teritorija i prognale većinu nesrpskoga stanovništva. Nakon što je HV oslobodila većinu okupiranoga područja nizom operacija 1995. godine srpsko je civilno stanovništvo otišlo u progonstvo. Osim ljudskih gubitaka veliki dijelovi Hrvatske teško su oštećeni u borbama: kuće, štale, crkve, zgrade, tvornice i infrastruktura izgrađena za vrijeme raši-renoga jugoslavenskog projekta modernizacije. Pejzaž sje-ćanja bratstva i jedinstva, koji je bio i te kako zastupljen u gradovima i selima, također je bio žrtva rata. Za razliku od velikoga broja civilnih žrtava uhvaćenih u unakrsnoj vatri, partizanski spomenici u regijama poput Like nisu bili tek kolateralna šteta, već su ih zaraćene strane posebno ciljale

Prema podatcima dobivenim od Hrvatske antifa-šističke organizacije, 2964 spomenika i spomen-ploča

37 Davor Pauković (ur.), Uspon i pad Republike Srpske Krajine (Zagreb: Centar za politološka istraživanja, 2005.), str. 70. – 71.

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uništeno je između 1990. i 2000. godine.38 Njihova analiza podataka upućuje na to da su većinom ciljani spomenici u čast srpskim i židovskim žrtvama fašizma, oni koji su naglašavali ulogu Komunističke partije Jugoslavije u pokretu otpora, koji su imali istaknute crvene zvijezde ili ćirilićno pismo te oni koji su naglašavali bratstvo i jedinstvo. Nadalje, uništavanje spomenika bilo je rašireno u većinski srpskim područjima koje je HV oslobodila u proljeće i ljeto 1995. godine. Milorad Pupovac, saborski zastupnik i predsjednik Srpskoga narodnog vijeća, primijetio je da je sudjelovanje u partizanskome pokretu otpora bio ključan element identiteta hrvatskih Srba i njihove kulturne baštine i da je sustavno uništavanje spomenika antifašizmu u devedesetima služilo brisanju toga dijela hrvatskoga kulturnog sjećanja.39 Zato je SNV uključilo obnovu antifašističkih spomenika kao ključnu točku svojega programa.40

Uništavanje spomenika ni u kojemu slučaju nije feno-men samo bivše Jugoslavije ili modernoga doba. Rimljani su prakticirali damnatio memorae (osuđivanje sjećanja) kako bi izbrisali sve materijalne tragove svojih protivnika ili bivših careva čiji su nasljednici svoje naslijeđe htjeli gra-diti ispočetka. Osvajačke vojske su kroz cijelu povijest bile poprilično naklonjene pretvarati kulturnu baštinu pobijeđe-nih naroda u hrpe prašine. Desetci spomenika podignutih za vrijeme Treće Francuske Republike, koja se upustila u vrstu

38 Hrženjak, Rušenje antifašističkih spomenika, str. XII

39 Intervju s Miloradom Pupovcem u Zagrebu, Hrvatska 1. 10. 2009.

40 Saša Milošević, ur. Srbi u Hrvatskoj 2007. (Zagreb: Vijeće srpske nacionalne manjine grada Zagreba, 2007.), str. 20. – 21.

“kipomanije” na prijelazu u 20. stoljeće, pretvoreni su u staro željezo za vrijeme njemačke okupacije u četrdesetima, posebno u Parizu.41

Zanimljivo, ta je njemačka politika imala podršku značajnoga dijela francuske birokracije i pripadnika inte-ligencije koji su uklanjanje tih republikanskih spomenika doživljavali kao izravnanje starih računa. Komunističke vlasti u Jugoslaviji poticale su vlastitu statutomaniju nakon preuzimanja vlasti 1945. godine, ali su prvo uklonili simbole prethodnih režima i okupacijskih sila. U Zagrebu je, primje-rice, režim srušio minarete novouspostavljene džamije (koja je prethodno bila umjetnički paviljon koji je projektirao Ivan Meštrović), uklonio kip bana Josipa Jelačića (kojega je Marx smatrao kontrarevolucionarom zbog uloge u gušenju ustanka u Mađarskoj 1848.), preorao grobove ustaša i njemačkih voj-nika na mirogojskome groblju te uništio sve ratne spomenike izgrađene za kratkoga trajanja NDH.

Pad komunizma u istočnoj Europi pratilo je rašireno uklanjanje mnogih socrealističkih spomenika na koje se gledalo kao na simbole utjecaja Sovjetskoga Saveza. Neke države, poput Mađarske, uklonile su sve spomenike koje se smatralo “neželjenim naslijeđem”, ali umjesto da su ih uništili, smjestili su ih u divovski muzej na otvorenome (Memento Park). Ali uništavanje spomenika u Hrvatskoj (i u mnogo manjoj mjeri u ostalim državama nastalim raspa-dom Jugoslavije) bilo je nasilnije i brutalnije, ako je uopće moguće upotrijebiti takvu riječ za opisivanje napada na

41 Sergiusz Michalski, Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage, 1870-1997 (London: Reaktion Books, 1998.), str. 49. – 55.

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kamen i broncu. Dok su se lokalne vlasti ponekad koristile administrativnim metodama kako bi uklonile spomenike s javnih prostora, bilo je na stotine primjera kada su nepoznati (ili možda poznati, ali nikad optuženi) počinitelji digli u zrak ili teško oštetili spomenike i skulpture koje su stvorili neki od najslavnijih hrvatskih umjetnika 20. stoljeća, poput Vojina Bakića, Antuna Augustinčića, Dušana Džamonje, Vanje Radauša i Ede Murtića. Stupanj uništenja razlikovao se od regije do regije i često se poklapao s ratnim zonama iako su rijetki spomenici oštećivani tijekom borbi, već su većinom namjerno ciljani. Tako je u Istri i obalnim područjima oko Rijeke bilo malo napada na partizansku kulturnu baštinu, dok su Lika i dijelovi Dalmacije potpuno očišćeni od gotovo svih spomenika povezanih sa socijalističkom Jugoslavijom.

U Lici je intenzitet nasilja nad kulturnom baštinom povezanom sa Srbima, komunizmom i Jugoslavijom ostavio tek nekoliko spomenika nakon što je HV razbila pobunjene Srbe i hrvatska država uspostavila kontrolu nad cijelom regijom 1995. godine [slika 7]. Službenici i zapovjednici u Gospiću, koji je bio poprište žestokih borbi na početku rata i niza nasilja nad civilima s obiju strana, temeljito su oči-stili urbani pejzaž od svih partizanskih spomenika. Vlasti su uklonile središnji spomenik ispred Općinskoga suda sa seljacima koji su držali vile i na njegovo su mjesto stavile stilizirani križ posvećen palim braniteljima iz Domovinskoga rata [slika 2]. Sa strana križa nalaze se biste Franje Tuđmana i hrvatskoga nadbiskupa iz Drugoga svjetskog rata, Alojzija Stepinca. Vlasti su srušile Radaušev kip u Jasikovačkoj ulici, spomenik u logoru Jadovno uništili su nepoznati počinitelji, a spomenik u obliku obeliska kraj mosta preko rijeke Like u tragikomičnome je obratu pretvoren u reklamu za restoran

[slika 1]. Činjenica da su 1992. godine nepoznati počinitelji digli u zrak kip izumitelja Nikole Tesle koji je bio hrvatski Srbin, u centru Gospića upućuje na zaključak da uništeni spomenici nisu birani zbog svoje ideološke neprihvatljivosti, nego zato što ih se povezivalo sa srpskom kulturnom bašti-nom. Dok je hrvatska vlada obnovila spomenik u Jadovnu 2011. godine, lokalne vlasti odupiru se vraćanju kipa Nikole Tesle u centar grada.42

Hrvatske su oružane snage sravnile spomenike u Divoselu [slika 9], Čitluku i Počitelju sa zemljom, kao i sta-novnike tih sela tijekom i nakon operacije Medački Džep u rujnu 1993. godine. Tijekom operacije Oluja 1995. godine tenkovi hrvatske vojske raznijeli su impozantan spomenik u Srbu, središte osporavane povijesti iz 1941. godine [slika 4]. Hrvatske snage opljačkale su grad nakon što je stanovništvo pobjeglo. Čak je i praznik, 27. 7., maknut s komemorativ-noga kalendara, a na njegovo je mjesto stavljen 22. 6. (Dan antifašističke borbe), kada se obilježava osnivanje prvo par-tizanskoga odreda, većinski popunjen Hrvatima, kraj Siska. Spomenik je obnovljen 2010. godine u sklopu koalicijskoga sporazuma Pupovčeva SNV-a i HDZ-a koji je tada bio na vlasti iako su godišnje komemoracije privlačile protuskupove koje su organizirale desničarske političke stranke koje su pro-svjedovale protiv onoga što smatraju “četničkim slavljem”.43

42 Novi list, 29. lipnja 2010., str. 2; Novosti, 15. srpnja. 2011., str. 16. – 17.

43 Vidi Vjeran Pavlaković, “Contested Pasts, Contested Red-Letter Days: Antifascist Commemorations and Ethnic Identities in Post-Communist Croatia”, u: Ljiljana Šarić, Karen Gammelgaard, i Kjetil Ra Hauge, ur., Transforming National Holidays: Identity Discourse in

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Spomenik je palim partizanima i civilima u Perušiću očuvan. Vjerojatno zato što su sve žrtve bile Hrvati.

Hrvatski ekstremisti i pripadnici hrvatske vojske odgovorni su za velik dio uništenja spomeničke baštine Drugoga svjetskog rata, ali su i srpske jedinice Republike Srpske Krajine također uništavale spomenike posvećene bratstvu i jedinstvu. Primjerice, srpski ekstremisti srušili su kip hrvatskoga partizana Marka Oreškovića u Korenici, devastirali Bijele Potoke – Kamensko memorijalno područje, ali su sačuvali mnogo drugih spomenika koji opisuju Srbe kao žrtve ustaških zločina. U političkome i kulturnome vakuumu, nastalom nakon raspada socijalističke Jugoslavije, krajinski Srbi koji su se pobunili protiv hrvatske države stvo-rili su novu kulturu sjećanja koja se temelji na odabranim traumatičnim trenutcima nedavne prošlosti koji isključuju suživot s drugim etničkim skupinama.

Zaključak

Unatoč retorici da je raspad socijalističke Jugoslavije konačno omogućio da se dozna puna istina o Drugome svjetskom ratu, nedavna prošlost ostala je predmet žustre rasprave u hrvatskome društvu, posebno u političkoj areni. Dok je istina da je partijski monopol nad prošlosti omogu-ćio da neke od potisnutih trauma isplivaju na površinu u demokratskoj Hrvatskoj, revizionistički proces je u mnogim slučajevima za rezultat imao demonizaciju cjelokupnoga antifašističkog pokreta, a u isto je vrijeme rehabilitirao i do

the West and South Slavic Countries, 1985 – 2010 (London: John Benjamins Publishing, 2012.).

neke mjere glorificirao ustaše kao hrvatske patriote. U nekim regijama, poput Like, sustavno uništenje partizanskoga spo-meničkog pejzaža, unatoč svim njegovim ideološkim i estet-skim nedostatcima, bilo je jednako deranju stranica iz udž-benika povijesti umjesto pozornoga uređivanja i revidiranja komunističkoga narativa koji je legitimizirao politički sustav. I dok su neki spomenici sravnjivani sa zemljom, udruge veterana NDH podizale su nove spomenike prethodno poti-skivanim kategorijama ratnih stradanja – pripadnicima oru-žanih snaga NDH i civilima koje su partizani ubili na kraju rata. I dok ti pojedinci svakako zaslužuju dostojanstvo da ih se obilježi na spomeniku ili nadgrobnoj ploči, činjenica da to dolazi uz cijenu brisanja drugih žrtava i povijenoga pejzaža upućuje na to da uistinu otvoren dijalog o povijesti još nije ostvariv u Lici.

Statutomanija socijalističkoga režima se, čini se, ponavlja kako braniteljske organizacije Domovinskoga rata podižu novi sloj sjećanja urezanih u kamen diljem Hrvatske. Iako nisu ni približno toliko monumentalni kao njihovi soci-jalistički prethodnici, lokacije poput nedavno izgrađenoga memorijalnog parka u Otočcu posvećenoga palim hrvatskim vojnicima imaju mnogo paralela s partizanskim spome-nicima, doduše uz drugačije simbole i napise.44 Nažalost, praksa odbijanja poraženoj strani da obilježi svoje gubitke također je naslijeđena iz socijalističkoga razdoblja, pa tako

44 Pri otkrivanju spomenika u Otočcu, okupljeni uglednici naglasili su da će spomenici poput ovoga omogućiti mladim generacijama da razumiju povijest Domovinskoga rata, kao što su partizanska spomen-područja trrebala prenositi službeni narativ NOB-a. Novi list, 9. 11. 2011., str. 43.

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čak i Srbi koji su bili civilne žrtve iz rata devedesetih imaju tek nekoliko spomenika – prvi službeni spomenik podignut je u Varivodama 2010. godine, a ostali su u Gospiću, Golubiću i Borovu – dok su hrvatske veteranske udruge žustro zabranile bilo kakva spomen-obilježja za pripadnike oružanih snaga Srba, bez obzira na to kako su ubijeni i jesu li ili nisu bili osumnjičeni za ratni zločin. Čak je i tih nekoliko skromnih spomenika koji su izgrađeni bilo oštećeno ili oskvrnuto upu-ćujući na to da određeni segmenti hrvatskoga društva odbi-jaju dopustiti prepoznavanje žrtava s druge strane.

Kako se 2013. godina primakla kraju, Lika je opet privukla pozornost cijele države zbog politike sjećanja. Predrag Fred Matić, ministar branitelj, je 30. 12. nazočio ceremoniji izgradnje prvoga vladina spomenika žrtvama komunističke represije u selu Sinac. I dok je službena izgrad-nja spomenika za pojedince koje je ubila Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, politički prethodnik vladajuće Socijaldemokratske partije, bio važan korak u suočavanju s vlastitom prošlosti, događaj se pretvorio u neku vrstu deba-kla jer su Crkva i obitelji nekih žrtava bojkotirali ceremoniju. Službeno je razlog bojkota bila tvrdnja da je vlada oskvrnula ostatke žrtava koristeći buldožer prilikom ekshumacije s namjerom da zataška komunističke zločine, ali čini se da je osnovni motiv bio trajno nastojanje desnice da diskreditira vladajuću stranku s pomoću simboličkih i emocionalnih makinacija politikom sjećanja45. U Lici pejzaž sjećanja na Drugi svjetski rat ostaje bojišnica dugo nakon što su parti-zani, ustaše i četnici ispalili svoje posljednje metke.

45 Novi list, 31. 12. 2013., str. 34.; Novi list, 2.1. 2014., str. 34.

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Places of Suffering in Belgrade during World War 2 and Their Post-War Commemoration

Milan Radanović1

1 Independent researcher; lives and works in Belgrade, Serbia.

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Belgrade had the largest loss of human life in of all the popu-lated places in Yugoslavia during World War II, taking into account the entire number of the victims of fascist terror. Unfortunately, a scientific paper stating at least the approxi-mate number of the killed citizens of Belgrade, and the wider area of Serbia and Yugoslavia, killed within the territory of the capital of occupied Yugoslavia still does not exist. Between 16,000 and 18,000 inhabitants of the city and surro-unding villages are estimated to have been killed during the war, making it the place with the largest loss of human life in Yugoslavia along with Bosanska Dubica County, Bosanska Gradiška County and the cities of Zagreb and Sarajevo.

The first victims of the war in Yugoslavia were the citizens of Belgrade who died during the bombing of the city by the Germans on April 6, 1941. Around 2,300 citizens of Belgrade are usually estimated to have been killed during the April 6 – 12 bombings, most of them during the first day.2

Likewise, Belgrade is a place where numerous people from other areas of Yugoslavia and Balkans were killed, making Belgrade, after Jasenovac, the place with the most plight in Yugoslavia. What brought about this fact? Belgrade is, as pointed out in scientific literature, the only capital in occupied Europe that had concentration camps within its city limits. It is precisely in this fact that one must look for the reason for such a high number of casualties. In addition to that, a large number of the People’s Liberation Army of

2 A. Dragojević, Č. Janjić, S. Nedić, Bombardovanje Beograda u Drugom svetskom ratu, Beograd, 1975, pp. 14-15.

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Yugoslavia (PLAY) and the Red Army died during the fight to liberate the city.

If we were to discuss the total number of those arre-sted and imprisoned (4 prisons and 6 camps), we would be facing tens of thousands (probably just short of 90,000) of people who had the experience of being locked away in fas-cist prisons and camps in Belgrade, many of them citizens of Belgrade, but there were also people from other parts of Serbia and Yugoslavia, as well as a certain number of citizens of other Balkan and central European countries (Greece, Albania, Austria etc..).

Belgrade is a place where the Holocaust happened. Of the 11,000 Belgrade Jews, 9,000 were killed during the war, mostly as victims of the Nazi genocide. Belgrade was also the site of genocide of the Roma people. The occupying German forces are responsible for the deaths of around 1,500 Roma from Belgrade and surrounding villages. The respon-sibility for the plight of the Roma is shared by the quisling government, since it was its gendarmerie that participated in arresting the Roma in Belgrade and its vicinity. The respon-sibility of the quisling government is also implied regarding the measures which enabled the occupying German forces to record and arrest the members of the local Jewish population.

The responsibility of the quisling government is espe-cially apparent when the plight of the members and sym-pathizers of the People’s Liberation Movement (PLM) and members of their families is discussed. Thousands of mem-bers and sympathizers of the Movement from Belgrade were isolated in the jails of the quisling Special police and Banjica camp. Many of them were killed.

Likewise, Belgrade is a place in which many members

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of the armed forces of the Third Reich lost their lives, along with a certain number of members of quisling formations during the fights to liberate the city. Members of the quisling apparatus and their sympathizers were killed after the libera-tion. A number of those deemed by the winning side to have been responsible for real or alleged collaboration were also killed.

We will try to outline in short the post-war commemo-ration of locations of extermination in Belgrade during the fascist occupation (mostly the places people were routinely killed in, and, to a lesser extent, places where people were imprisoned, since not all locations where incarcerations took place are commemorated and marked appropriately). We will also attempt to point out the possible reasons for the lack of commemoration and adequate marking of certain places where people were imprisoned (most of all the Staro Sajmište and Topovske Šupe concentration camps).

Belgrade is a city which had a very developed resi-stance movement, organized by the Communist party of Yugoslavia (CPY). It must be noted that the locations linked to resistance to the fascist occupation and its domicile colla-borators are more likely to be commemorated than those where civilians were killed.

Concentration Camps

BanjicaThe first concentration camp opened in Belgrade was the Banjica Camp. The camp was under the joint jurisdiction of quisling and occupying authorities, although most prisoners were caught and isolated by the members of the quisling

repressive apparatus. This is an important distinction, beca-use the other concentration camps in Belgrade were under the jurisdiction of the German occupying forces.

Banjica Camp was opened on July 5th, 1941 in the building of the XVIII infantry brigade of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The first prisoners were impriso-ned on July 9th, 1941. They were communists arrested in Belgrade after June 22nd, 1941. 24,000 prisoners were impri-soned in the camp, mostly ethnic Serbs, but also members of all Balkan and Yugoslav nations, especially Jews. The largest number of prisoners hailed from Serbia and Belgrade, but there were also people from other parts of Yugoslavia as well as Albania, Greece and some other European countries. Police documents that were recovered mention the names of 23,697 prisoners, but this is not the final number as entire groups of people whose incarceration has been confirmed from other sources are not mentioned in those files. 4,200 murdered inmates have been identified (most were shot at the Janjica killing location near Belgrade). Thousands of those deported to other camps all over occupied Europe need to be added to that list, as most of them died in those camps.

Banjica Camp is the only Belgrade camp appropriately commemorated for now. The first museum exhibition dedica-ted to the camp was opened in 1969, in a small part of what used to be the army barracks where inmates were isolated. A new concept for the permanent exhibit was realized in 1983, on around 450 m², and a new, somewhat supplemented exhibition was presented in 2001. 400 exhibits are presented as part of the museum exhibition, with a special place for the objects made by the camp’s inmates.

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Topovske šupeChronologically, the second concentration camp opened in Belgrade was the camp colloquially known as Topovske šupe, which the occupying German forces, that formed the camp, called Judenlager Belgrad. It was one of the first Nazi camps for Jews and Roma formed in Europe under German domination. It was opened in August 1941, in the army base of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Army in a neighborhood called Autokomanda, near the centre of Belgrade. The camp was opened to imprison adult Jewish and Roma men from Belgrade, northern parts of central Serbia and Banat. 6,000 Jewish and 1,000 – 1,500 Roma men were imprisoned in the camp. The Jewish prisoners were from Belgrade, Banat (previously forcibly relocated to Belgrade in August 1941), and, to a lesser extent, from several other towns in northern Serbia, as well as from some other central European coun-tries from which they had fled in 1939-1940. The Roma pri-soners were from Belgrade and the surrounding villages.

A vast majority of the inmates were shot during terror campaigns in autumn 1941 at several killing locati-ons in Belgrade’s surroundings, as part of the measures of German occupying forces to crush the Partisan uprising in Serbia (within the context of mass executions performed by German occupying forces in Šabac, Kraljevo, Kragujevac, Jadro, Užice, etc.) and as part of the start of the Jewish and Roma genocide in Serbia. Most of the inmates were shot during October and November 1941 at several killing loca-tions around Belgrade: the former military shooting range in Jajinci, near the village of Jabuka in southern Banat, Trostruki Surduk near Surčin, a location near the train stop in Rakovica and a location in Deliblato Sands. Only a

handful of executions were performed inside the camp itself, the victims being inmates who tried to flee. The camp was open until December 1941 when the small group of remai-ning inmates was transferred to Staro Sajmište to prepare the faire grounds for the reception of incoming Jewish women and children, whose imprisonment started on December 14th, 1941.

After World War II, the land where the Topovske Šupe camp operated was given to the Yugoslav National Army (YNA), as it had had a military purpose before the war and military workshops were reinstated within the buildings of the former camp. However, the first memorial at this location was placed as late as 2006, as part of a humble and inconspi-cuous memorial park (which, it is important to note, does not include the existing structures which were part of the former camp, except for a single dilapidated wall). The first profe-ssional discussion on how to commemorate the location was held in 1979, when the question arose on whether to preserve the authentic (and already dilapidated) camp structure, or to erect an adequate memorial in their place. The location has held the status of “cultural heritage under previous protec-tion”, with a tendency to define the legal status and means of commemorating the suffering, which is an initiative of the Department for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the City of Belgrade.

However, the location of the former camp was sold by city authorities to a private company, Delta Holding, in 2005. The company has announced several years ago that it plans to build the largest shopping mall in the Balkans at this location. Thus, we have the firm intentions of the investor to build a place for shopping, recreation and pastime at the

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site where several thousand inmates suffered. This intent is not only in collision with a responsible relationship with the plight of numerous victims of Nazi genocide, but is also in collision with legal procedures, as the Department for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the City of Belgrade has suggested the revitalization of this location and the pla-cement of the Belgrade Museum of the Victims of Genocide in this location. The Department’s suggestion is to expropri-ate these structures.

Staro SajmišteThe concentration camp at the Belgrade faire, or Sajmište Camp, was, along with Banjica, the largest concentration camp in Belgrade. During the almost three years and two phases of the camp’s existence, 40,000 men, women and children were imprisoned in the camp. Staro Sajmište was under the jurisdiction of Gestapo and SS. The concentration camp was opened at the location of the Belgrade faire, built in 1937 on the left bank of the Sava River.

During its first phase (December 8th, 1941 – May 10th, 1942), the camp functioned as the Jewish concentration camp Zemun (Judenlager Semlin). Around 6,400 Jewish women and children were imprisoned in the camp during those five months and around 500 Roma women and chil-dren. Almost all Jewish prisoners were killed in the spring of 1942 or died inside the camp as a consequence of the brutal camp regime. The Roma women and children were allowed to leave for the most part, but there were recorded deaths among them due to starvation, hypothermia and disease. The largest proportion of Jewish prisoners was from Belgrade and Banat, while the largest proportion of Roma prisoners

was from Belgrade’s surrounding villages. Jewish prisoners were executed in the spring of 1942 in a mobile gas chamber (“dušegupka”) on the route from Sajmište to Jajinci, where their bodies were buried.

After killing the Jewish prisoners, the new function of Sajmište camp, now called Zemun Collection Camp, was to collect slave labor for the Third Reich’s economy. The new prisoners were captured Partisans, i.e. members of the PLAY, as well as men captured in resurgent areas of Bosanska Krajina, western Serbia and all over Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia, all sympathizers or members of the PLAY. A certain number of members of the Chetnik movement were also imprisoned later on, as well as some Bulgarian and Greek Partisans. A change in the approach to the captured Partisans, who would earlier be summarily executed, was the result of the Reich’s war industry’s need for free labor. The Zemun Collection Camp was linked to the system of the Ustashi concentration camp Jasenovac – the old, weak and infirm would be transferred to Jasenovac and executed there. Those capable of work were transferred via Sajmište from Ustashi camps to camps in the Reich and Serbia (e.g. Borski Camp), and to the agricultural fields of Tot Organization in Banat. The conditions in the Collection camp were extremely bad with the administration and capos being very brutal. The high death rate was additi-onally increased due to hunger and disease. An approximate number of victims (died and executed) of Zemun Collection Camp has been estimated at 12,884, which includes those who died in nearby Tot Organization Camp at Ušće and Ostrovska Ada on the Danube.

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During the allied bombing in April 1944, about half of the pavilions at the faire were severely damaged, resulting in the displacement of the remaining prisoners. After the liberation, most of the damaged pavilions have been leveled, with new buildings erected in their place. Those buildings housed the headquarters of the youth work brigades during the construction of New Belgrade. A part of Sajmište was relinquished to artists for their studios since 1950s. An attempt was made to overcome the tragic history of the place by giving it a new purpose through the art colony. However, it resulted in Sajmište becoming a place of oblivion instead of a place of memories.

Although the SFRY, formed as a country of recon-ciliation after a tragic war experience, attempted to bring together the tragic memories and ensure a perspective of a common future, Sajmište was not subject to those practices.

The first memorial for the victims of Sajmište was erected on July 7, 1951 at the Bežanijska Kosa killing loca-tion, a former village and today a part of New Belgrade. Around 3,600 corpses of Sajmište prisoners were exhumed at this location immediately after the city was liberated. At the same time, a small memorial was erected at the Jewish cemetery in Zemun in the same year for the prisoners of Zemun Collection Camp. Around 6,500 corpses of killed and deceased prisoners were exhumed there.

The first memorial plaque was placed at the location of the camp itself in 1974 for the first time. A decade later, a new memorial plaque was placed in the same location. It showed inaccurate and inflated data about the number of vic-tims of the two camps at Staro Sajmište (40,000).

The last intervention in the Sajmište area, or, more precisely, on an adequate location outside the former concen-tration camp, was the erection of a monument to the victims of genocide in 1995. This monument, a work by the sculptor Miodrag Popović, was erected on the bank of the Sava river, near the complex which housed the former concentration camp, to mark the 50th anniversary of the victory over fas-cism, on the day of the revolt in the Jasenovac concentration camp (April 22nd). This last bit is indicative if compared to the name of the monument.

The writing at the base of the monument explains that the monument was erected to commemorate the victims of the two concentration camps on Staro Sajmište, but also to commemorate the victims of “the infamous Ustashi concen-tration camp Jasenovac and the victims of Hungarian occu-pying forces which were brought to Belgrade by the waves of Sava and Danube, to the brave resistance against Nazi terror and to all Yugoslavians who were victims of genocide. “In the previous sentence of that text it is stated that the lar-gest casualties at Sajmište were “Serbs, Jews and Roma”. The reason why the monument is not dedicated to the vic-tims of the Sajmište camps exclusively becomes clear within the context of the culture of memory of 1990s and the wars waged in that decade. An inflated number is listed in the wri-ting: “one hundred thousand.”

Discussions on the necessity of commemorating the Staro Sajmište area have been plentiful during the last ten years. Different methods of commemorating were propo-sed. The representatives of the Jewish community in Serbia expressed hope that some sort of Holocaust museum would be built as part of commemorating the area. Ideas of building

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museums of genocide over Roma and genocide over Serbs at the location of former concentration camps at Sajmište lean in on this idea. The question remains on how suitable that location really is to be a potential museum of genocide over Serb people in World War II, if we are aware that the majority of prisoners of the Zemun Collection Camp of Serb nationality were not imprisoned there for reasons of ethnic cleansing, but rather to exact brutal revenge for participating and supporting the resistance, although a part of the Serb prisoners had in fact been previously interned on account of their ethnicity only. The ethnic profiling of the victims has clouded the fact that most prisoners and victims of Zemun Collection Camp and the nearby Tot (Todh) Organization Camp were made up of people participating in or supporting the resistance, i.e. the international and multiethnic Yugoslav resistance movement led by the communists (CPY).

Other Concentration CampsIn addition to the four concentration camps previously men-tioned, two more fascist camps existed in Belgrade: the Tot (Todt) Organization Camp at Ušće, near Staro Sajmište, also on the left bank of Sava, very near the confluence with Danube and a concentration camp known as Milišića Ciglana located at Zvezdara. These two camps were smaller than the other camps, and existed for shorter periods of time. There are no monuments marking them.

The Monument to the Jewish Victims of Fascism and the Fallen Fighters from the People’s Republic of Serbia 1941-1945

A monument was erected to commemorate the plight of the Jews of Serbia during World War 2 at the Jewish (Sephardic, to be precise) cemetery in Belgrade in 1952. With the help of the state of Yugoslavia, the Jewish community organized the erection of monuments in other cities during the same year – Zagreb, Đakovo, Sarajevo and Novi Sad. This commemora-tion of Jewish victims was a rare example in Europe in those first post-war years.

The author of the monument is the architect Bogdan Bogdanović. It was his first work. It represents a step forward, or, better yet, a change of direction from the Yugoslav monumental sculpture from socialist realism towards socialist modernism. The form of the central part of the monument is a clear allusion to the tablets of Moses, and sacral symbols are present among the monument’s details. Parts of demolished Jewish houses were built into the walls along the approach to the monument, as well as fragments of gravestones of the old Sephardic cemetery on Palilula. The urn with Bogdan Bogdanović’s remains was placed at the foot of the monument in 2010.

Jajinci Memorial ParkFrequent executions of hostages from two concentration camps and several prisons in Belgrade were the main reason for the German occupying forces to designate a central loca-tion for the execution of hostages and prisoners in autumn 1941. The former military shooting range near the village of Jajinci, at the foot of Alala, was chosen as the most

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convenient location for mass shooting, and later for mass burial of Jewish prisoners who were gassed in a mobile gas chamber en route from the Sajmište Concentration Camp to the killing location in Jajinci (225 prisoners of Banjica camp were also executed in this manner).

Tens of thousands of hostages and prisoners were shot at Jajinci from autumn 1941 to autumn 1943 (according to official, imprecise and probably inflated data, 80,000 were killed in Jajinci). The number of people killed and buried at this location is impossible to determine due to lack of histo-ric sources which would completely reveal the number, and primarily due to the fact that the German occupying forces organized the exhumation and incineration of corpses buried there to cover up their crimes during winter 1943/1944.

During the first years of the war Jajinci already became synonymous with the biggest mass crimes location in Serbia.

The first memorial to commemorate the victims killed and buried at this location was placed on July 7, 1951, on the tenth anniversary of the antifascist uprising of the people of Serbia. The memorial is humble, consisting of a relief made by the sculptor Stevan Bodnarov, the busiest sculptor in Belgrade during the first post-war decade where commemo-rating the war’s events was concerned (he was also a member of the revolution and antifascist uprising.) The memorial park was designed in 1964, on the 20th anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade, after which it became the central loca-tion for the commemoration of the victims of fascist terror in Belgrade. The park was redesigned in 1988, when a monu-ment by Vojin Stojić was placed in its central area.

The Serbian Orthodox Church has started the con-struction of a church and parish in 2004 in the immediate

vicinity of the Jajinci memorial park (local authorities gave it the land as a gift in 1993). As pointed out in literature, this idea was not met with approval by the relevant insti-tutions in charge of preserving cultural monuments, but it was obviously in the interest of politics to accommodate the Church’s demand. The church is still unfinished, with reli-gious ceremonies being performed there since 2008. One of the main reasons the construction still is not over, according to what can be deduced from the media, is the fact that the building plan for the church “is not planned to support the traditional Serbian style of religious buildings”. The church was conceived as a place of commemoration for the victims of Jajinci, but also as a religious object for the churchgoers of the nearby Jajinci neighborhood.

A similar attempt of subsequent sacralization, i.e. an attempt to redefine a memorial location occurred in Ostra near Čačak, where a new church is being built right next to the monument constructed by the sculptor Miodrag Živković, installed in 1969 and dedicated to the members of the Čačak division of the People’s Liberation Movement who died in combat in 1943. The church was built without a permit obtained from relevant authorities and with in spite of the opposition of the local SUBNOR.

Jabuka Location (5 km on the road from Pančevo towards Jabuka)

The location near the village Jabuka in southern Banat, not far from Pančevo, started being used as an execution site during October 1941, during the most massive campaigns of execution by firing squads of hostages and prisoners from concentration camps and prisons in the area of Belgrade.

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This period (October – November 1941) was also the period of the largest scale executions that the German occupying forces conducted on the territory of Serbia. The first people to be shot there were some of the prisoners of the Topovske Šupe concentration camp in Belgrade. They were executed at Jabuka during October and November 1941. The rest of the prisoners from Topovske Šupe were executed at Jajinci and Rakovica. Smaller groups of hostages were executed at Jabuka in the following period, and victims shot or hanged on other locations (mostly in Pančevo) were buried there). The usual estimate in scientific literature is an imprecise number – 10,000 victims, but that number could not be proven by method of individual identification and seems inflated. Physical remains of the victims shot and buried at this location were destroyed by German occupying forces in the spring of 1944 in an attempt to cover up their crimes.

A memorial was constructed in 1981 according to the idea of the architect Nebojša Delja. This memorial became the central location for the commemoration of victims of fas-cist terror in southern Banat. The memorial has been resto-red recently, after years of neglect.

Memorial Cemetery for the Combatants Who Diedin Occupied Belgrade 1941 – 1944.

The New Cemetery in Belgrade is the city’s main cemetery. In 1959, a memorial cemetery was opened for the comba-tants who had died in occupied Belgrade in 1941 – 1944 (known also as the Alley of Shot Patriots 1941 – 1944). The project was conducted by the architects Bogdan Bogdanović and Svetislav Ličina. The idea was to collect the remains of those from the National Liberation Movement who were

killed in Belgrade during occupation. The remains of the pri-soners of the Gestapo and Special police and a small part of the Banjica prisoners’ remains (considering that the majority of Banjica prisoners’ remains were destroyed by the occu-pying forces several months prior to Belgrade’s liberation) were gathered. The area was designed as a park. There is a tomb in its centre with the remains of 1,057 people. Above it is a grassy mound with a copper torch on top. Several hun-dred marble plates are distributed throughout the cemetery’s area with the names of the victims buried in the tomb. The remains belong to the members of the National Liberation Movement who were not killed in Jajinci, but at other places throughout Belgrade, where the occupying authorities did not perform excavations and/or cremation of the corpses.

Belgrade Liberators’ Cemetery 2,944 soldiers of the PLAY and 961 soldiers of the Red Army died in the fights to liberate Belgrade. Their remains were placed in tens of common and several hundred indivi-dual tombs all over Belgrade and its surroundings, usually at the site of their death.

The Belgrade Liberators’ Cemetery was opened on the tenth anniversary of liberation, on October 20th, 1954. The remains of the biggest number of members of the PLAY and Red Army lie there. (1,386 PLAY members’ remains and 711 Red Army members’ remains are buried here). The aut-hors of the cemetery project are the architects Branko Bon and horticulture engineer Aleksandar Krstić. The entrance to the cemetery is a monumental gate at the eastern side of the memorial. The gate is part of the wall which has reliefs on its outer side depicting battles, the work of the sculptor

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Radeta Stanković (who will later create the partisan-liberator sculpture which would be added to the memorial’s approach path in 1988.) The walls interior is inscribed with the names of units which participated in liberating the city and the num-bers of deceased and buried soldiers. Antun Augustinčić’s (the famous Yugoslav and Croatian sculptor) Red Army soldier is also placed at the cemetery.

The realization of this memorial has a certain political connotation. It represents a sort of correction in the attitude towards the memory of the fallen Soviet soldiers, in light of the downturn of the relationship between Belgrade and Moscow in 1948 and the resulting removal of numerous memorials dedicated to Soviet soldiers, including the central monument on Trg Republike. The realization of this memorial also strongly signified the thawing of the official Yugoslavia – Soviet Union relationship after Stalin’s death.

Memorial for the Hanged Patriots at Terazije Five antifascists and communists were hanged at Terazije, Belgrade’s central artery. The hanging of the members of the People’s Resistance Movement at Terazije was performed with the aim to intimidate the population and manifest the occupying forces’ and their collaborators’ omnipotence. It was also done to boost the morale of the Nazis and domestic fasci-sts due to the increasing number of assassinations, diversions and sabotage conducted by communists in occupied Belgrade. The five hanged antifascists had previously been shot in Gestapo’s nearby prison. This was the only example of public hanging in Belgrade during the occupation.

Two memorials for the Terazije hanging exist in Belgrade. One is at the New Cemetery in Belgrade, as part

of the Memorial cemetery for the combatants who had died in occupied Belgrade, opened in 1959. (Authors: Bogdan Bogdanović and Svetislav Ličina), five stylized gallows are installed with the names of those hanged at Terazije. The other memorial, the work of the sculptor Nikola Janković, was erected in 1983 at Terazije, in front of the building known as Iguman’s Palace. This is one of the so-called invisible monuments brought on by an inadequate conceptual design, although it is located on one of the busiest roads in the city.

Literature:

Jovan Bajford, Staro sajmište. Mesto sećanja, zaborava i sporenja, Beograd, 2011.

Beograd u ratu i revoluciji, I-II, Beograd, 1984.Beograd se seća: spomenici i spomen obeležja Narodno-

oslobodilačkog rata, (pr. Danica Basta), Beograd, 1964.Beogradska operacija, (pr. D.A. Volkogonov, S. Joksimović),

Beograd, 1989.Simo Begović, Logor Banjica 1941-1944, I-II, Beograd, 1989.Milan Koljanin, Nemački logor na beogradskom Sajmištu 1941-1944,

Beograd, 1992.Olga Manojlović Pintar, “Široka strana moja rodnaja” - Spomenici

sovjetskim vojnicima podizani u Srbiji 1944-1954, Tokovi istorije, 1-2/2005, Beograd, 2005.

Olga Manojlović Pintar, (Ne)vidljiva mesta sećanja: spomenici crve-noarmejcima u Srbiji, Oslobođenje Beograda 1944, Zbornik radova, (ur. Aleksandar Životić), Beograd, 2010.

Olga Manojlović Pintar, Alksandar Ignjatović, Prostori selektovanih memorija: Staro sajmište u Beogradu i sećanje na Drugi svetski rat, Kultura sjećanja, 1941: Povijesni lomovi i svladavanje prošlosti, (ur. S. Bosto, T. Cipek, O. Manojlović), Zagreb, 2008.

Memorijali oslobodilačkih ratova u Srbiji, II, Beograd, 2005.Mesta stradanja i antifašističke borbe u Beogradu 1941-1944.

Priručnik za čitanje grada, (ur. Rena Rädle i Milovan Pisarri), Beograd, 2013.

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Mesta stradanja u Beogradu iz vremena Drugog svetskog rata i njihova posleratna memorijalizacija

Milan Radanović 1

1 Milan Radanović je samostalni istraživač; živi i radi u Beogradu.

Beograd je imao najveće gubitke stanovništva na tlu Jugoslavije tokom Drugog svetskog rata, kada govorimo o ljudskim gubicima jednog naseljenog mesta, što podrazu-meva i ukupan broj žrtava fašističkog terora. Nažalost, još uvek ne postoji naučni rad u kome bi bila izvršena makar približna kvantifikacija stradalih stanovnika Beograda, ali i šireg područja Srbije i Jugoslavije, koji su usmrćeni na terito-riji glavnog grada okupirane Jugoslavije. Prema procenama, tokom okupacije u Beogradu je stradalo između 16.000 i 18.000 stanovnika grada i okolnih seoskih naselja, što Beograd, uz opštine Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiška, uz gradove Zagreb i Sarajevo, čini mestom sa najvećim gubi-cima stanovništva tokom Drugog svetskog rata na jugoslo-venskom tlu.

Prve žrtve rata u Jugoslaviji bili su stanovnici Beograda poginuli u nemačkom bombardovanju 6. aprila 1941. Od 6. do 12. aprila stradalo je, prema najčešće pomi-njanim procenama, oko 2.300 stanovnika Beograda, uglav-nom u prvom danu bombardovanja.2

Takođe, Beograd je mesto u kome je stradao velik broj lica sa drugih područja Jugoslavije i Balkana, na osnovu čega je Beograd, nakon Jasenovca, mesto u kome su zabe-ležena najbrojnija stradanja na jugoslovenskom tlu. Šta je doprinelo ovoj činjenici? Naime, kako se ističe u litera-turi, Beograd je jedini glavni grad u okupiranoj Evropi na čijem tlu su egzistirali koncentracioni logori. Upravo u ovoj činjenici treba tražiti razloge za visoke brojke stradalih.

2 A. Dragojević, Č. Janjić, S. Nedić, Bombardovanje Beograda u Drugom svetskom ratu, Beograd, 1975., str. 14-15.

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Takođe, u Beogardu je stradao i velik broj pripadnika Narodnooslobodilačke vojske Jugoslavije (NOVJ) i Crvene armije tokom borbi za oslobođenje grada.

Ako govorimo o ukupnom broju onih koji su hapšeni i represirani u mestima za izolaciju (4 zatvora i 6 logora), onda se suočavamo sa desetinama hiljada (verovatno ne mnogo manje od 90.000) onih koji su imali iskustvo izolacije u faši-stičkim zatvorima i logorima u Beogradu, pri čemu je reč kako o stanovnicima Beograda, ali takođe i o velikom broju stanovnika drugih delova Srbije i Jugoslavije, ali i o određe-nom broju stanovnika drugih balkanskih i srednjoevropskih zemalja (Grčka, Albanija, Austrija, itd).

Beograd je mesto holokausta. Od oko 11.000 beo-gradskih Jevreja u ratu je stradalo oko 9.000, pri čemu su većina žrtve nacističkog genocida. Takođe, Beograd je mesto genocida nad Romima. Nemački okupator je odgovoran za smrt oko 1.500 Roma iz Beograda i okolnih seoskih naselja. Odgovornost za stradanje Roma snosi i kvislinška vlada s obzirom da je kvislinška žandarmerija učestvovala u hap-šenjima Roma u Beogradu i okolini. Takođe, odgovornost kvislinških vlasti podrazumeva se kada je reč i o sprovođe-nju mera koje su omogućile nemačkom okupatoru da lakše evidentira i pohapsi lokalne Jevreje.

Odgovornost kvislinške vlade naročito dolazi do izra-žaja kada govorimo o stradanju pripadnika i simpatizera Narodnooslobodilačkog pokerta (NOP) i članova njiho-vih porodica. Na hiljade pripadnika i simpatizera pokreta otpora iz Beograda bilo je izolovano u zatvorima kvislinške Specijalne policije i u Banjičkom logoru, od kojih su mnogi ubijeni.

Isto tako, Beograd je mesto u kome je tokom borbi za oslobođenje grada život izgubio i velik broj pripadnika oružanih snaga Trećeg Reicha i određen broj pripadnika kvislinških formacija, a nakon oslobođenja usmrćen je određen broj pripadnika kvislinškog aparata i njihovih sim-patizera, kao i određen broj onih koje je pobednička strana smatrala nenaklonjenim i odgovornim za stvarnu ili navodnu kolaboraciju.

Pokušaćemo da ukratko prikažemo posleratnu memo-rijalizaciju mesta stradanja u Beogradu tokom fašističke oku-pacije (pre svega kada je reč o stratištima i, u manjem obimu, kada je reč o mestima za izolaciju, s obzirom da nisu sva mesta za izolaciju memorijalizovana i obeležena na zadovo-ljavajući način). Takođe, pokušaćemo da ukažemo na moguće razloge izostanka memorijalizovanja i neadekvatnog obele-žavanja pojedinih mesta za izolaciju (pre svega kada je reč o logorima na Starom Sajmištu i o logoru Topovske šupe).

Beograd je grad koji je imao vrlo razvijen pokret otpora (NOP) u organizaciji Komunističke partije Jugoslavije (KPJ). Odmah treba napomenuti da su lokacije koje se vezuju za otpor fašističkom okupatoru i njegovim domaćim saradnicima, intenzivnije i doslednije obeležavane u odnosu na mesta stradanja civilnog stanovništva.

Logori

BanjicaPrvi logor koji je formiran u Beogradu bio je Logor na Banjici (ili Banjički logor). Logor je bio pod zajedničkom ingerencijom kvislinških i okupacionih struktura, iako je većina zatočenika Banjičkog logora uhvaćena i izolovana

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od strane pripadnika kvislinškog represivnog aparata. Ovo je važna napomena s obzirom da su ostali logori u Beogradu bili pod ingerencijom nemačkog okupatora.

Logor na Banjici osnovan je 5. jula 1941. u zgradi XVIII pešadijskog puka Vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije. Prvi zatočenici izolovani su u logoru 9. jula 1941. Reč je o komu-nistima uhapšenim u Beogradu nakon 22. juna 1941. U ovom koncentracionom logoru boravilo je oko 24.000 zatočenika, uglavnom lica srpskog etničkog porekla, ali i pripadnika svih balkanskih i jugoslovenskih naroda, osobito Jevreja. Najveći broj zatočenika poticao je iz Srbije i Beograda, a među logorašima bilo je i lica iz drugih delova Jugoslavije kao i iz Albanije i Grčke i nekih drugih evropskih zemalja. Sačuvana policijska evidencija pominje imena 23.697 zatočenika, ali ovo nije konačna brojka jer u spiskovima nisu navedene čitave grupe čije je zatočenje u logoru utvrđeno na osnovu drugih izvora. Do danas je identifikovano oko 4.200 ubije-nih logoraša (većina ih je usmrćena streljanjem na stratištu Jajinci pokraj Beograda). Ovom broju stradalih treba dodati i hiljade banjičkih logoraša koji su deportovani u logore širom okupirane Evrope, gde su mnogi od njih stradali.

Banjički logor je jedini beogradski logor koji je, za sada, memorijalizovan na odgovarajući način. Prva muzej-ska postavka posvećena logoru u ograničenom prostoru otvorena je 1969., u manjem delu nekadašnje kasarne koja je služila kao zgrada za izolaciju logoraša. Nova koncepcija stalne postavke realizovana je 1983. na oko 450 m², a 2001. je predstavljena postavka koja je donekle dopunjena. U okviru muzejske postavke predstavljeno je oko 400 eksponata, među kojima se izdvajaju predmeti koje su izradili zatočenici i zatočenice logora.

Topovske šupeHronološki gledano, drugi logor formiran u Beogradu bio je logor kolokvijalno poznat pod nazivom: Topovske šupe, a koji je od strane nemačkog okupatora, koji je formirao ovaj logor, bio nazivan Judenlager Belgrad. Reč je o jednom od prvih nacističkih logora za Jevreje i Rome koji su formirani u Evropi pod nemačkom dominacijom. Logor je zasnovan avgusta 1941. u kasarni VKJ u kvartu koji je poznat pod nazivom Autokomanda, a nalazi se u širem centru grada. Logor je bio namenjen izolaciji odraslih jevrejskih i rom-skih muškaraca iz Beograda, severnih delova centralne Srbije i Banata. U logoru je ukupno bilo zatočeno oko 6.000 jevrejskih i od 1.000 do 1.500 romskih muškaraca. Jevrejski zatočenici bili su poreklom iz Beograda, Banata (prethodno, avgusta 1941., prisilno preseljeni u Beograd) i, u manjem broju, iz nekoliko drugih gradova u severnoj Srbiji, a takođe iz nekih zemalja srednje Evrope odakle su izbegli 1939. – 1940. Romski zatočenici bili su poreklom iz Beograda i okolnih seoskih naselja.

Ogromna većina logoraša streljana je u kampanjama terora tokom jeseni 1941. na nekoliko stratišta u okolini Beograda, u sklopu mera nemačkog okupatora za gušenje partizanskog ustanka u Srbiji (u kontekstu drugih masov-nih streljanja koje je nemački okupator izvršio u Šapcu, Kraljevu, Kragujevcu, Jadru, Užicu itd.) i u sklopu otpoči-njanja genocida nad Jevrejima i Romima u Srbiji. Većina logoraša streljana je oktobra i novembra 1941. Na nekoliko stratišta u okolini Beograda: nekadašnje vojno strelište Jajinci, lokacija u blizini sela Jabuka u južnom Banatu, Trostruki surduk pokraj Surčina, lokacija u blizini žele-zničke stanice u Rakovici i lokacija u Deliblatskoj peščari.

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U samom logoru izvršeno je svega nekoliko egzekucija nad uhvaćenim odbeglim logorašima. Logor je postojao do početka decembra 1941. kada je manja grupa preostalih logoraša premeštena na Staro sajmište kako bi pripremila sajamske prostorije za prihvat Jevrejki i njihove dece, čija je izolacija započela 14. decembra 1941.

Nakon Drugog svetskog rata prostor logora Topovske šupe prešao je u vlasništvo Jugoslovenske narodne armije (JNA) jer je i pre rata imao vojnu namenu i u zgradama nekadašnjeg logora ponovo su oformljene vojne radionice. Međutim, prvo spomen obeležje na ovoj lokaciji podignuto je tek 2006. u okviru skromnog i tek naznačenog spomen parka (koji, što je vrlo važno napomenuti, ne uključuje postojeće objekte nekadašnjeg logora, sem jednog ruševnog manjeg zida). Ipak, prva stručna diskusija o načinu memorijalizacije ovog prostora otvorena je 1979. kada je postavljeno pitanje da li treba sačuvati autentične (već tada – oronule) objekte logora ili na njihovom mestu podići adekvatno spomen obeležje. Od pre nekoliko godina ovaj prostor ima status “kulturnog dobra pod prethodnom zaštitom”, sa tendencijom definisanja pravnog statusa i načina obeležavanja sećanja, što je inicijativa Zavoda za zaštitu spomenika kulture grada Beograda.

Međutim, lokacija nekadašnjeg logora prodata je od strane gradskih vlasti privatnoj kompaniji Delta Holding 2005. Ova kompanija pre nekoliko godina obznanila je da namerava izvršiti izgradnju najvećeg tržnog centra na Balkanu na ovoj lokaciji. Dakle, najavljena je čvrsta namera investitora da na mestu nacističkog logora, odnosno strada-nja više hiljada zatočenika, bude podignuto mesto za šoping rekreaciju i razbibrigu. Ova namera je ne samo u koliziji

sa odgovornim odnosom prema činjenici stradanja velikog broja žrtava nacističkog genocida, već i u odnosu na pravnu proceduru s obzirom da Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture grada Beograda predlaže revitalizaciju ovog prostora i sme-štaj beogradskog Muzeja žrtava genocida u okviru ovog pro-stora. Zavod predlaže eksproprijaciju ovih objekata.

Staro sajmišteLogor na Beogradskom sajmištu ili Logor Staro sajmište bio je, pored Banjičkog logora, najveći logor na teritoriji Beograda. U toku nepune tri godine, u dve etape postojanja logora, u logoru na Sajmištu bilo je zatočeno gotovo 40.000 muškaraca, žena i dece. Logor na Sajmištu bio je pod upra-vom nemačke Policije bezbednosti i Službe bezbednosti. Logor je formiran na lokaciji Beogradskog sajmišta izgrađe-nog 1937., na levoj obali reke Save.

U prvoj fazi postojanja (8. decembar 1941. – 10. maj 1942.) funkcionisao je kao Jevrejski logor Zemun (Judenlager Semlin). Tokom tih pet meseci u logoru je bilo zatočeno oko 6.400 jevrejskih žena i dece i izvestan broj jevrejskih muškaraca i oko 500 romskih žena i dece. Gotovo svi jevrejski zatočenici ubijeni su u proleće 1942. ili su, jednim delom, ubijeni ili umrli u logoru kao posledica brutalnog logorskog režima. Romske žene i deca najvećim delom su pušteni iz logora, ali je i među njima zabeležena smrtnost usled gladi, hladnoće i zaraznih bolesti. Najveći broj zatočenica i zatočenika jevrejskog porekla poticao je iz Beograda i Banata, dok je najveći broj romskih zatočenica i zatočenika poticao iz beogradskih prigradskih naselja. Jevrejske zatočenice i zatočenici likvidirani su u proleće 1942. u pokretnoj gasnoj komori (“dušegupka”) na putu od

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Sajmišta ka Jajincima, gde su pokopani njihovi leševi.Nakon ubijanja jevrejskih zatočenika, nova funkcija

logora na Sajmištu, sada Prihvatnog logora Zemun, bila je sabiranje robovske radne snage za privredu Trećeg Reicha. Novi zatočenici postaju zarobljeni partizani, odnosno pri-padnici NOVJ, kao i muškarci zarobljeni na ustaničkim područjima Bosanske krajine i zapadne Srbije, ali i širom Bosne i Hercegovine, Srbije i Hrvatske, kada je reč o pripad-nicima i simpatizerima NOP-a. Kasnije je u logoru bio zato-čen i jedan broj pripadnika četničkog pokreta, kao i izvestan broj albanskih i grčkih partizana. Izmena okupatorskog odnosa prema zarobljenim partizanima, koji su u prethod-nom razdoblju po pravilu streljani ubrzo nakon zarobljava-nja, rezultat je potrebe ratne industrije Reicha za besplatnom radnom snagom. Prihvatni logor Zemun bio je povezan sa sistemom ustaškog logora Jasenovac na taj način što je KL Jasenovac preuzimao radno nesposobne, stare i iznemo-gle robijaše i likvidirao ih u okviru jasenovačkog logora. Istovremeno su radno sposobni logoraši iz ustaških logora preko Sajmišta prebacivani u logore u Reichu i samoj Srbiji (npr. Borski logor) i na poljoprivredna dobra Organizacije Tot u Banatu. Uslovi boravka u Prihvatnom logoru bili su izuzetno teški i dodatno su bili otežani brutalnošću logorske uprave i kapoa, a visoka smrtnost dodatno je povećavana usled gladi i zaraznih bolesti. Utvrđen je približan broj žrtava Prihvatnog logora Zemun u koji su uključeni i umrli i ubijeni u obližnjem logoru Organizacije Tot na Ušću i na Ostrovskoj adi na Dunavu i ovaj broj iznosi 12.884 umrlih i ubijenih logoraša.

Tokom savezničkog bombardovanja, aprila 1944, teško je oštećeno oko polovine sajamskih paviljona, zbog čega su

preostali logoraši izmešteni. Nakon oslobođenja većina ošte-ćenih paviljona je srušena, a na njihovom mestu su podignute nove zgrade koje će u vreme izgradnje Novog Beograda slu-žiti kao sedište štaba omladinskih radnih brigada. Od 1950. deo Sajmišta je ustupljen umetnicima za ateljea. U nekadaš-njim logorskim zgradama učinjen je pokušaj da se vezivanjem tog prostora za umetnost prevaziđe njegova tragična prošlost. Umetnička kolonija trebala je da donese novi smisao trauma-tičnom istorijskom nasleđu. Ipak, to je doprinelo da Sajmište postane mesto zaborava, umesto da postane mesto sećanja.

Iako je SFRJ, koja je formirana kao država pomirenja nakon tragičnog ratnog iskustva, pokušavala da kroz kome-morativnu praksu usaglasi tragična sećanja i osigura perspek-tivu zajedničke budućnosti, na Sajmištu je izostao rezultat ovakve prakse.

Prvo spomen obeležje žrtvama logora na Sajmištu podi-gnuto je 7. jula 1951. na stratištu na Bežanijskoj kosi, neka-dašnjem seoskom naselju, a danas delu Novog Beograda. Na ovom stratištu neposredno nakon oslobođenja ekshumirano je oko 3.600 leševa logoraša logora na Sajmištu. Isto tako, na Jevrejskom groblju u Zemunu, iste godine je podignuto takođe skromno spomen obeležje logorašima Prihvatnog logora Zemun. Na ovom groblju ekshumirano je oko 6.500 leševa ubijenih i umrlih logoraša.

Na samom mestu logora prva spomen ploča postav-ljena je tek 1974. Deceniju kasnije na istom mestu postav-ljena je nova spomen ploča. Ploča sadrži neprecizne i uveli-čane podatke o broju žrtava dva logora na Starom sajmištu (40.000).

Poslednja intervencija na prostoru Sajmišta, zapravo van prostora nekadašnjeg logora, dakle, na neadekvatnoj

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lokaciji, bilo je podizanje Spomenika žrtvama genocida 1995.Ovaj spomenik, rad vajara Miodraga Popovića, podi-

gnut je na obali reke Save, u blizini kompleksa nekadašnjeg logora na Sajmištu, povodom proslave 50-godišnjice oslobo-đenja od fašizma, na dan proboja logoraša logora Jasenovac (22. april). Ovaj poslednji podatak je vrlo indikativan ako ga uporedimo sa nazivom spomenika.

U natpisu u podnožju spomenika ističe se da je spo-menik podignut žrtvama dva logora na Starom sajmištu, ali i “žrtvama zloglasnog ustaškog logora Jasenovac i žrtvama mađarskih okupatora koje su do Beograda doneli talasi Save i Dunava, hrabrom otporu nacističkom teroru i svim Jugoslovenima žrtvama genocida”. U prethodnoj rečenici u natpisu ističe se da je na Sajmištu “najviše stradalo Srba, Jevreja i Roma”. U kontekstu kulture sećanja 1990-ih i ratova vođenih u ovoj deceniji postaje jasnije zbog čega spomenik nije isključivo posvećen žrtvama dva logora na Sajmištu.

U natpisu u ponožju spomenika navodi se preuveličana brojka stradalih na Starom sajmištu: “sto hiljada”.

Poslednjih desetak godina učestale su diskusije o nužnoj memorijalizaciji prostora Starog sajmišta. U opticaju su različiti predlozi memorijalizacije. Predstavnici jevrej-ske zajednice u Srbiji iskazali su nadanje da će u okviru memorijlizovanog prostora biti izgrađen svojevrsni muzej holokausta. Na ovaj predlog naslanja se ideja izgradnje muzeja genocida nad Romima i muzeja genocida nad Srbima na lokalitetu nekadašnjih logora na Sajmištu. Ostaje upitno koliko je ova lokacija podesna za potencijalni muzej geno-cida nad pripadnicima srpskog naroda u Drugom svetskom ratu ako uzmemo u obzir da većina logoraša Prihvatnog logora Zemun srpske nacionalnosti nije izolovana u ovom

logoru u cilju sprovođenja genocidnih radnji, već u cilju bru-talnih odmazdi zarad participacije i podrške pokretu otpora, iako je jedan deo srpskih logoraša prethodno uhapšen isklju-čivo zbog etničkog porekla. Nacionalizovanje žrtava logorâ na Starom sajmištu potisnulo je činjenicu da su većina zato-čenika i žrtava Prihvatnog logora Zemun i obližnjeg logora Organizacije Tot (Todh) činili pripadnici i simpatizeri NOVJ i NOP-a, odnosno internacionalnog i multietničkog jugoslo-venskog pokreta otpora pod rukovodstvom komunista (KPJ).

Drugi logoriPored četiri navedena logora, u Beogradu su egzistirala još dva fašistička logora: logor organizacije Tot (Todt) na Ušću, nedaleko od Starog sajmišta, takođe na levoj obali Save, neposredno u blizini ušća ove reke u Dunav i logor poznat pod nazivom Milišića ciglana na beogradskoj Zvezdari. Ova dva logora su po kapacitetu bila manja od ostalih logora, sem što su kraće postojali. Ovi logori nisu obeleženi nikakvim spomen obeležjima.

Spomenik Jevrejskim žrtvama fašizma i palim borcima iz Narodne republike Srbije 1941. – 1945.

U okviru Jevrejskog (zapravo, sefardskog) groblja u Beogradu 1952. podignut je spomenik Jevrejima Srbije stradalim tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Sem u Beogradu, jevrejska zajednica je 1952., uz finansijsku pomoć jugoslo-venske države, organizovala podizanje spomenika Jevrejima žrtvama fašističkog terora i genocida i u Zagrebu, Đakovu, Sarajevu i Novom Sadu. Ovo je u prvim posleratnim godi-nama bio redak primer memorijalizacije jevrejskih žrtava genocida u Evropi.

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Autor spomenika je arhitekta Bogdan Bogdanović. Reč je o prvom ostvarenju ovog poznatog jugoslovenskog autora. Ovaj spomenik predstavlja iskorak ili, bolje rečeno, zaokret jugoslovenske monumentalne skulpture od socre-alizma ka socijalističkom modernizmu. Forma centralnog dela spomenika neposredno asocira na Mojsijeve tablice, a među detaljima spomenika prisutni su sakralni simboli. U pristupne zidove spomenika ugrađeni su delovi porušenih jevrejskih kuća na Dorćolu i fragmenti nadgrobnih ploča starog sefardskog groblja na Paliluli. U podnožju spomenika 2010. položena je urna Bogdana Bogdanovića.

Stratište u Jajincima (Spomen park Jajinci)Učestale egzekucije talaca iz dva logora i nekoliko zatvora u Beogradu bili su osnovni razlog da je nemačka okupaciona komanda u jesen 1941. odlučila da odredi centralno mesto za pogubljenje talaca i zatočenika. Bivše vojno strelište u blizini sela Jajinci, u podnožju Alale, izabrano je kao najpodesniji prostor za masovna streljanja, a kasnije i za pokapanja jevrej-skih zatočenika koji su ugušeni u pokretnoj gasnoj komori, na putu od logora na Starom sajmištu do stratišta u Jajincima (ovakva vrsta pogubljenja izvršena je i nad 225 zatočenika logora Banjica).

Od jeseni 1941. do jeseni 1943. na stratištu u Jajincima streljano je više desetina hiljada talaca i zatočenika (prema zvaničnim i nepreciznim, verovatno preteranim podacima, na stratištu u Jajincima stradalo je oko 80.000 ljudi). Broj usmr-ćenih i pokopanih lica na ovom stratištu nije moguće ustano-viti zbog nepostojanja istorijskih izvora koji bi do kraja rasve-tlili približan broj stradalih, ali prvenstveno zbog činjenice da je nemački okupator u cilju prikrivanja tragova zločina i

brisanja materijalnih dokaza o zločinu, u zimu 1943./1944. organizovao iskopavanja i spaljivanja leševa žrtava.

Stratište u Jajincima je već tokom prvih ratnih godina postalo sinonim za mesto najmasovnijeg zločina na tlu Srbije.

Prvo spomen obležje kojim su komemorisane žrtve ubijene i sahranjene na ovom stratištu postavljeno je 7. jula 1941., na desetogodišnjicu antifašističkog ustanka naroda Srbije. Obeležje je skromno i sastoji se iz reljefa vajara Stevana Bodnarova, u prvoj dekadi nakon rata, svakako najuposlenijeg beogradskog vajara kada je reč o obeležava-nju događaja iz razdoblja minulog rata (ujedno i umetnika koji je bio učesnik revolucije i antifašističke borbe). Spomen park je konačno uređen 1964. na 20-godišnjicu oslobođenja Beograda nakon čega je postao centralno mesto komemora-cija žrtava fašističkog terora na području grada Beograda. Spomen park je preuređen 1988. kada je u njegovom central-nom delu postavljen spomenik Vojina Stojića.

Srpska pravoslavna crkva započela je 2004. izgradnju hrama i parohijskog doma neposredno pokraj Spomen-parka Jajinci (gradske vlasti su još 1993. darovale crkvi zemljište za izgradnju). Kako se ističe u literaturi, ideja nije naišla na odo-bravanje nadležnih institucija za zaštitu spomenika kulture, ali su, očigledno, političke strukture imale interes da izađu u susret crkvenom zahtevu. Ovaj hram do danas je nedovršen, a verski obredi u nedovršenom hramu obavljaju se od 2008. Kako se može zaključiti iz medijskih napisa jedan od glavnih razloga što hram nije dovršen treba tražiti u činjenici da, kako se ističe, hram “nije projektovan tako da podražava tradicio-nalni srpski stil gradnje bogomolja”. Hram je osmišljen kao mesto odavanja pošte stradalima na stratištu u Jajincima, ali i kao crkva namenjena vernicima u obližnjem naselju Jajinci.

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Sličan primer naknadnog sakralizovanja, odnosno pokušaja redefinisanja memorijalnog prostora uočljiv je u Ostri pokraj Čačka gde niče novi hram tik uz spomenik vajara Miodraga Živkovića, otkriven 1969., posvećen bor-cima Čačanskog NOP odreda, izginulim u borbi 1943. Crkva je podignuta bez dozvole nadležnih organa i uz protivljenje lokalnog SUBNOR-a.

Stratište kod sela Jabuka (5 km na putu od Pančeva prema Jabuci)

Stratište kod sela Jabuka u južnom Banatu nedaleko od Pančeva aktivirano je oktobra 1941. tokom najmasovnijih akcija streljanja talaca i zatočenika iz logora i zatvora sa područja Beograda. Ujedno ovo razdoblje (oktobar – novem-bar 1941.) period je najmasovnijih streljanja zatočenika i talaca koje je nemački okupator sprovodio na tlu Srbije. Na ovom stratištu najpre su streljani zatočenici logora Topovske šupe u Beogradu. Reč je o delu zatočenika ovog logora koji su umoreni tokom oktobra i novembra 1941. Drugi deo zato-čenika ovog logora streljan je na stratištu kod sela Jajinci i u Rakovici. Tokom narednog razdoblja na ovom stratištu vršena su streljanja manjih grupa talaca kao i sahranjivanja talaca i zatočenika streljanih ili obešenih na drugim lokaci-jama (uglavnom u Pančevu). U literaturi se najčešće pomi-nje neprecizna brojka od 10.000 stradalih, ali ovaj broj nije dokazan metodom poimenične identifikacije i čini se većim od realnog.

Zemni ostaci žrtava streljanih i sahranjenih na ovom stratištu uništeni su od strane nemačkog okupatora u proleće 1944. u cilju prikrivanja tragova zločina.

Na stratištu je 1981. uređen memorijal prema zamisli

arhitekte Nebojše Delje. Ovaj memorijal postao je potom centralno mesto komemorisanja žrtava fašističkog terora u južnom Banatu. Spomenik je poslednjih godina obnovljen nakon višegodišnje zapuštenosti.

Spomen groblje boraca poginulih u okupiranomBeogradu 1941. – 1944.

Na beogradskom Novom groblju, koje je centralno gradsko groblje, 1959. uređeno je Spomen groblje boraca poginulih u okupiranom Beogradu 1941. – 1944. (poznato i pod nazivom Aleja streljanih rodoljuba 1941. – 1944). Projekat su uradili arhitekte Bogdan Bogdanović i Svetislav Ličina. Zamisao je bila da se na jednom mestu nađu posmrtni ostaci pripadnika NOP-a ubijenih u Beogradu za vreme okupacije. Sakupljeni su posmrtni ostaci stradalih zatočenika zatvora Gestapoa i Specijalne policije i manjeg dela logoraša logora Banjica (s obzirom da je većina posmrtnih ostataka logoraša Banjičkog logora uništena od strane okupatora nekoliko meseci pred oslobođenje Beograda). Prostor je uređen parkovski. U cen-tralnom delu nalazi se masovna grobnica u kojoj su smešteni posmrtni ostaci 1.057 osoba. Nad njom je travnata humka, na čijem vrhu se nalazi bakarna buktinja. Na celom prostoru groblja razasuto je nekoliko stotina mermernih ploča sa ime-nima pripadnika pokreta otpora koji su sahranjeni u masov-noj grobnici. Reč je o pripadnicima NOP-a koji nisu ubijeni na Jajincima, odnosno koji su ubijeni na drugim, manjim stratištima u Beogradu, na kojima okupator nije izvršio isko-pavanja i spaljivanja leševa.

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Groblje oslobodilaca BeogradaU borbama za oslobođenje Beograda poginulo je 2.944 boraca i borkinja NOVJ i 961 borac i borkinja Crvene armije. Poginuli borci i borkinje prvobitno su sahranjeni u nekoliko desetina zajedničkih i nekoliko stotina pojedinačnih grob-nica, širom Beograda i u okolini grada, najčešće na mestu pogibije ili u blizini mesta pogibije.

Na desetogodišnjicu oslobođenja Beograda, 20. okto-bra 1954., otvoreno je Groblje oslobodilaca Beograda. U okviru ovog memorijala sahranjen je najveći broj poginu-lih pripanika NOVJ i CA. (Na groblju je sahranjeno 1.386 boraca NOVJ i 711 boraca Crvene armije). Autori projekta groblja su arhitekta Branko Bon i inženjer hortikulture Aleksandar Krstić. U groblje se ulazi kroz monumentalnu kapiju na istočnoj strani memorijala. Kapije su deo zida koji sa spoljne strane sadrži reljefe sa scenama borbi, čiji je autor vajar Radeta Stanković (on će kasnije izraditi i skulpturu partizana-oslobodioca koja je 1988. postavljena u pristupnom delu memorijala). Sa unutrašnje strane zida nalaze se ispi-sani nazivi jedinica koje su učestvovale u oslobođenju grada i brojevi poginulih i sahranjenih boraca/kinja. U okviru groblja postavljena je i figura crvenoarmejca koju je izradio poznati hrvatski i jugoslovenski vajar Antun Augustinčić.

Realizacija ovog memorijala ima i određenu političku konotaciju. Naime, realizacia ovog memorijala predstavlja izvesnu korekciju u odnosu prema uspomeni na poginule sovjetske vojnike s obzirom da su nakon 1948., odno-sno nakon značajnog pogoršanja u odnosima zvaničnog Beograda i zvanične Moskve uklonjena mnoga spomen obe-ležja sovjetskim vojnicima, uključujući i centralni spomenik na Trgu Republike. Takođe, realizacija ovog memorijala

predstavljala je snažan signal u otopljavanju službenih jugo-slovensko-sovjetskih odnosa nedugo nakon Staljinove smrti.

Spomenik obešenim rodoljubima na TerazijamaNa Terazijama, centralnoj beogradskoj saobraćajnici, 17. avgu-sta 1941. obešena su petorica antifašista i komunista. Vešanje pripadnika NOP-a na Terazijama sprovedeno je u cilju zastra-šivanja stanovništva i zarad manifestovanja svemoći okupatora i njihovih pomagača, ali i zbog međusobnog ohrabrivanja nacističkog okupatora i domaćih fašista usled sve većeg broja atentata, diverzija i sabotaža koje su preduzimali komunisti u okupiranom Beogradu. Petorica obešenih antifašista prethodno su ubijeni vatrenim oružjem u obližnjem zatvoru Gestapoa. Ovo je bio jedini primer javnog vešanja u Beogradu tokom fašističke okupacije.

U Beogradu postoje dva spomenika koji memorijali-zuju vešanje na Terazijama. Na Novom groblju u Beogradu, u okviru Spomen groblja palih boraca u okupiranom Beogradu, koje je oformljeno 1959. (autori: Bogdan Bogdanović i Svetislav Ličina), postavljeno je pet stilizovanih vešala sa plo-čicama sa imenima obešenih na Terazijama. Drugi spomenik, delo vajara Nikole Jankovića, podignut je 1983. na Terazijama, ispred zgrade koja je poznata pod nazivom Igumanova palata. Ovaj spomenik je jedan od tzv. nevidljivih spomenika, iako se nalazi u jednoj od najprometnijih gradskih ulica, čemu je doprinelo neadekvatno idejno rešenje spomenika.

M. Radanović

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Literatura:

Jovan Bajford, Staro sajmište. Mesto sećanja, zaborava i sporenja, Beograd, 2011.

Beograd u ratu i revoluciji, I-II, Beograd, 1984.Beograd se seća: spomenici i spomen obeležja Narodno-

oslobodilačkog rata, (pr. Danica Basta), Beograd, 1964.Beogradska operacija, (pr. D.A. Volkogonov, S. Joksimović),

Beograd, 1989.Simo Begović, Logor Banjica 1941. – 1944., I-II, Beograd, 1989.Milan Koljanin, Nemački logor na beogradskom Sajmištu 1941. –

1944., Beograd, 1992.Olga Manojlović Pintar, “Široka strana rodnaja” - Spomenici sov-

jetskim vojnicima podizani u Srbiji 1944. – 1954., Tokovi istorije, 1-2/2005., Beograd, 2005.

Olga Manojlović Pintar, (Ne)vidljiva mesta sećanja: spomenici crve-noarmejcima u Srbiji, Oslobođenje Beograda 1944., Zbornik radova, (ur. Aleksandar Životić), Beograd, 2010.

Olga Manojlović Pintar, Aleksandar Ignjatović, Prostori selektovanih memorija: Staro sajmište u Beogradu i sećanje na Drugi svetski rat, Kultura sjećanja, 1941.: Povijesni lomovi i svladavanje prošlosti, (ur. S. Bosto, T. Cipek, O. Manojlović), Zagreb, 2008.

Memorijali oslobodilačkih ratova u Srbiji, II, Beograd, 2005.Mesta stradanja i antifašističke borbe u Beogradu 1941. – 1944.

Priručnik za čitanje grada, (ur. Rena Rädle i Milovan Pisarri), Beograd, 2013.

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Kulturna baština i politike sjećanja/ The Politics of Heritage and MemoryZadar, 9. – 10. listopada 2013./ October 9 – 10, 2013

Publikacija je jedna od aktivnosti projekta “Kula Jankovića: spomenik kulture, pokretač održivog razvoja Ravnih kotara”. This publication is one of the activities of the project Jankovic Castle: historic site, generating sustainable development of the Ravni kotari region.http://kula-jankovica.unizg.hr/

Izdavač: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Trg maršala Tita 14, 10 000 Zagreb, Tel./ Phone: ++385 1 4698 175, www.unizg.hr

Publisher: University of Zagreb, Trg maršala Tita 14, 10 000 Zagreb, Croatia, Tel./ Phone: ++385 1 4698175, Fax: ++385 1 4698136, www.unizg.hr

Suizdavač: Centar za mirovne studije, Selska 112 A, 10 000 Zagreb, Tel./ Phone / Fax: ++385 1 4820 094, www.cms.hrCo-publisher: Centre for Peace Studies, www.cms.hr

Publikacija objavljena u Zagrebu, kolovoz 2014./ Published in Zagreb, August, 2014

Urednica/ Editor: Petra Jurlina, Centar za mirovne studije/ Centre for Peace Studies, Zagreb

Lektorica/ Proofreading of the Croatian and Serbian texts: Mirjana Gašperov

Lektor engleskog dijela/ Proofreading (English): Joel Cox

Prevoditelj(i)/ Translator(s): Marwan Zeitoun i Julia Mikić (Gelbman)

Dizajn/ Designer: Maša Poljanec ([email protected])

ISBN (Sveučilište u Zagrebu) 978-953-6002-81-8

ISBN (Centar za mirovne studije) 978-953-7729-24-0

CIP zapis dostupan u računalnome katalogu Nacionalne i sveučilišne knjižnice u Zagrebu pod brojem 883987. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available in the Online Catalogue of the National and University Library in Zagreb as 883987.

This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of University of Zagreb and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Ova publikacija izrađena je uz pomoć Europske unije. Sadržaj ove publikacije isključiva je odgovornost Sveučilišta u Zagrebu i ni na koji se način ne može smatrati da odražava gledišta Europske unije.

Europsku uniju čini 28 država članica koje su odlučile postupno povezivati svoja znanja, resurse i sudbine. Zajednički su tijekom razdoblja proširenja u 50 godina izgradile zonu stabilnosti, demokracije i održivog razvoja, održavajući pritom kulturalnu raznolikost, toleranciju i osobne slobode. Europska unija svoja postignuća i svoje vrijednosti također dijeli i sa zemljama i ljudima izvan njezinih granica.

Ova publikacija nastala je u sklopu projekta Kula Jankovića - spomenik kulture, pokretač održivog razvoja Ravnih kotara uz financijsku podršku Europske unije. This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union through the project Janković Castle: historic site, generating sustainable development of the Ravni kotari region.

the politics of heritage - cms · might seem of bad taste, funny or just sad. but we believe that...

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