1

«The Portuguese semi-presidential system in times of crises, 2011-2016:

A president caught between international responsibility and responsiveness to the

electorate»,

paper prepared to be delivered at Panel P429: The Relationship between Heads of State and

Prime Ministers (Section Presidential Politics. Powers and Constraints in Comparative Perspective),

Chair: Thomas Sedelius, ECPR General Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, 7-10/9/2016.

André Freire1

and

José Santana-Pereira2

Introduction

While there are different interpretations in the literature, not all of which agree, it has been

said Portugal has a semi-presidential system of government in which a directly-elected

president exists alongside a prime minister who is politically responsible to parliament. In

terms of the president’s constitutional powers and its exercise (formal and material

constitution), the existing literature suggests Portuguese semi-presidentialism is neither one of

the weaker (e.g. Slovenia, Ireland, Austria) (Elgie 1999; Metcalf 2000; Shugart & Carey 1997;

Siaroff 2003; Novais 2007; 2014; Freire & Pinto 2011) nor one of the stronger regimes (e.g. the

Weimar Republic, Finland before 2000, France, Poland at various times, Cape Verde, São Tomé

e Príncipe), but that rather for most of the time since 1974 – and especially since the 1982

constitutional revision – it has been somewhere in between (Canotilho & Moreira 1991; Sartori

1994; Novais 2014).

The Portuguese constitution states: ‘The president of the republic represents the Portuguese

Republic, ensures national independence, the unity of the state and the normal functioning of

the democratic institutions, and is, in effect, the supreme commander of the armed forces’

(República Portuguesa 2005, Art. 120).3 The first article of the constitution also states:

‘Portugal is a sovereign republic based on human dignity and the will of the people and is

1Associate professor with Aggregation / Habilitation at ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, and researcher at CIES-IUL. Director of the political science doctoral programme, specialising also in international relations, at ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. 2Post-doctoral researcher at ICS, University of Lisbon, and invited assistant professor at ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. 3 Emphasis added.

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committed to the creation of a free, just and supportive society’.4 The president’s

constitutionals duty, therefore, is to protect the sovereignty of the nation (responsiveness) and

its democratic order (constitutional responsibility). Furthermore, Article 134 states the

president’s duties include ensuring all laws made by parliament and by the executive (decree-

laws) strictly observe the letter and spirit of the constitution. The president also has some

‘legislative powers’, which include a veto (República Portuguesa 2005, Art. 138). While the

presidential veto can only delay parliamentary legislation it can stop decree-laws, although this

can be overcome quite easily when the government enjoys a disciplined and cohesive

parliamentary majority in the parliament.

One of the duties that became significant towards the end of a presidential term, and which is

the focus of this article, is the presidential authority to appoint the prime minister (República

Portuguesa 2005, Art. 113). This power is also limited, however, as the prime minister can only

be appointed after the leaders of all parties represented in parliament are heard, and any

decision must take the results of the election into consideration. It is the prime minister who

chooses the government ministers who are then formally appointed by the president. Since

1982 government has been the political responsibility of parliament (Freire & Pinto 2011;

Novais 2014), with the president’s responsibility being purely institutional (concerning the

normal operation of democratic institutions – which is the only acceptable reason the

president can have for dismissing a government). Neither the dismissal nor formation of a

government depend on enjoying the confidence of the president (Sartori 1994; Canotilho &

Moreira 1991; Freire & Pinto 2011; Novais 2014; Pinto 2016). The 1982 revision of the

constitution and the change of political conditions in relation to government and parliament

between 1987 and 2002 has resulted in a significant increase in the political power of the

prime minister, which has turned the office into something that can be described as being a

kind of ‘prime ministerial presidentialism’ (Freire 2010; Moreira 1989; Freire & Pinto 2011).

Research into the Portuguese case shows there has been a significant change in the role of the

president: a change that depends on political conditions (especially the type of parliamentary

majority and political congruence with the president) and on the timing of the presidential

terms (Duverger 1980; Cruz 1994; Lobo & Neto 2009; Freire & Pinto 2011). Here we will

explore to what extent short-term economic conditions, as well as the Troika’s foreign

4 Emphasis added.

3

intervention (2011-2014) currently known as ‘the bailout’ on Portugal /by the CE, ECB and the

IMF), enhance or mitigate these two political factors.

Between 2011 and 2014 – and in the context of a serious economic crisis – Portugal required a

bailout from the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International

Monetary Fund (the Troika) that resulted in the country being placed under its supervision.

During this period, Portugal was an illustration of the dilemma noted by Mair (2011), which

states that the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation – particularly in the context of

the sovereign debt crisis and external intervention – have made the country’s political parties

responsible to two different types of actor: the electorate and international partners (other EU

member state governments and the Troika institutions). This has brought the dilemma

between responsiveness to the demands of the electorate (the source of sovereignty for

nationally-elected political bodies) and responsibility into sharp relief.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the role of the president role during his second term in

office (2011-16) and to assess on what side of the scale his attitudes and activities fell –

whether on the side of meeting the nation’s international commitments (international

responsibility), or its national commitments to uphold the constitution (domestic responsibility)

and responding to the demands of the electorate (responsiveness) or if he achieved a balance

between both obligations.

The article is divided into three parts. In the following section, we analyse some of the

important theoretical contributions, with a special focus on the important dilemma facing

semi-presidentialism at times of crises (the balance between international responsibility and

responsiveness and national responsibility) and provide a number of contextual details about

how Portuguese democracy operated from 2011 to 2015. We go on to examine the president’s

discourse outlining his understanding of his role during the bailout, about the crises and

austerity, the exercise of his legislative powers during his second term in a longitudinal

perspective (and the factors explaining the differences between Cavaco Silva’s first and second

terms), the occasions he used (and refused to use) his power to veto laws and request rulings

by the Constitutional Court and his role in the formation of the 21st constitutional

government. The paper ends by outlining the main findings.

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Semi-presidentialism at a time of crisis: International responsibility versus responsiveness

(and domestic responsibility)

The great liberal revolutions of the 18th century brought about important innovations to the

art of government (Freire 2014). Underlying these innovations, beyond the aim of eradicating

tyranny (through the separation of powers) and the arbitrariness of power (through Bills of

rights), there was one guiding principle – government based on consent – and free, fair and

frequent elections were introduced as the basic mechanism for ensuring this (Schedler 1998;

Manin et al. 1999; Freire 2014). In democratic representative regimes, it is those who are

elected who govern by taking into account the basic choices of the electorate. The political

parties present the electorate with a package of policies and are then selected on the basis of

these proposals, which then serve as the goals of government (Schedler 1998). Once their

allotted time in office is over, the electorate will decide if they were governed in accordance

with their previously expressed preferences.

As a result of the Troika bailout programme, from May 2011 to May 2014 Portugal was

effectively controlled by external agents who severely restricted Portuguese sovereignty while

limiting the actions of both the government and the president. The Memorandum of

Understanding (MoU) signed with the Troika in 2011 contained a large privatisation

programme, called for an extensive and profound programme to deregulate the labour market

and reduce the size of the state through the implementation of pay freezes and the phased

reduction in the number of state employees, while also calling for the rationalisation of the

state and reductions to the cost of doing business. The programme also called for the

recapitalisation of the banks as a means of both ensuring compliance with the new capital

ratios demanded by the EU and of providing credit to businesses (Moury & Freire 2013).

The MoU also established a framework within which the political parties could make proposals

and which restricted the choices open to the electorate in the June 2011 general election

(Freire & Santana-Pereira 2011). During the campaign, the Socialist Party (PS – Partido

Socialista) said it would honour the agreement, although it did not share the radicalism of the

Social Democratic Party (PSD – Partido Social Democrático), which saw the agreement as a way

for Portugal to make amends for its recent excesses, confirming it would go much further than

the Troika. It should be noted that, in terms of state reform, the PSD claimed it wanted to trim

the fat (intermediary costs, duplication of functions, cuts to public-private partnership charges)

and not cut the welfare, and it openly assumed a number of commitments to this end. The

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manifesto of the CDS-PP was more moderate, occupying a position midway between the PS

and the PSD. The Left Bloc (BE – Bloco de Esquerda) and Portuguese Communist Party/Green

Party (PCP/PEV – Partido Comunista Português/Partido Ecologista ‘Os Verdes’) remained

bitterly opposed to the MoU and called instead for debt renegotiation. With no single party

winning a parliamentary majority, the PSD and CDS-PP formed a majority coalition.

Throughout the 2011-15 legislature, the concept of government based on consent was

constantly threatened. In fact, many of the right-wing government’s flagship measures –

including public sector pay cuts, reductions in pension and benefit payments and the harsh tax

increases – had been in the manifestoes of neither of the coalition parties and nor were they

contained in the 2011 MoU, which formed the basis of the choices facing the electorate in

June 2011 (Freire 2016a; Freire 2016b; Gouveia & Piçarro 2013). There is an abundance of

empirical evidence supporting the idea that the government had implemented an ideological

programme on which it was not elected and which would have been very difficult for it to

impose (either socially or politically) on the Portuguese political system but for the context of

the bailout (Moury & Freire 2013; Freire et al. 2015). While a failure to deliver on manifesto

promises is not new to Portuguese democracy, the failures during the 2011-15 legislature were

unprecedented in their breadth, depth and severity, undermining the electorate’s trust in

politicians and, ultimately, their faith in democracy itself.

Elections cannot give the winning party free rein to do what they wish (Schedler 1998). In 2012

the Portuguese were asked if they thought the emergency economic and financial situation in

which the country found itself justified the violation of the commitments made by the

governing parties (Freire et al. 2012), with 68.1% of those surveyed saying it did not (including

60.3% of supporters of the right-wing parties). Voters were also asked if the government was

sharing the sacrifices fairly in applying the Troika programme, with the majority again saying

they did not think this was the case (90.6% of all respondents and 77% of supporters of the

right-wing parties). It should be noted that the position of those who voted for parties of the

right contrast quite strongly with the views expressed by PSD and CDS-PP deputies, resulting in

a strong incongruence between the electorate and those they elect – the opposite was true for

those on the left (Moury & Freire 2013).

The coalition government also operated at the very limits of the constitution. No fewer than 22

of their proposals were declared unconstitutional (Gouveia & Piçarro 2013; Novais 2014;

Ribeiro & Coutinho 2014) – but only 12 following the President’s requests: see Table 2 below -,

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while the sacrifices they demanded of capital and labour were significantly unbalanced – an

‘asymmetrical austerity’ (Freire 2016a; Freire 2016b) – that in and of itself demonstrated the

significant degree of discretion available to national politicians at a time of external

intervention: that is to say, the national government was not just a puppet hanging on strings

being controlled by the Troika (Moury & Freire 2013; Freire 2016a). The result of this

asymmetrical austerity can be seen quite clearly in the Eurostat data showing the declining

relative weight of wages in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2015 Portugal had the sixth-

worst wage to GDP ratio, having reached its lowest level since 1960 (Aníbal 2016). There was a

small reduction in inequalities measured by the Gini index between 2011 and 2013 (resulting

from the compression of middle-class salaries and pensions); however, the gap between the

rich and the poor grew, as did poverty levels and severe material deprivation (Bancaleiro &

Aníbal 2014). Portugal experienced the largest number of cuts to social programmes of any EU

country during this period (Suspiro 2014), while macroeconomic results (in terms of the public

debt to GDP ratio, the public debt, unemployment and economic growth) remained very poor

(Freire 2016a; 2016b).

However, there were some positive results: the reduction in the external trade deficit (2011-

14) and the country’s alleged improved credibility with international partners and investors.

Interest rates on Portuguese debt have fallen sharply since 2012; however, while there are

those who claim this is due more to the increasingly assertive intervention of the European

Central Bank (ECB) in purchasing national debt than to the specific merits of these countries

(Sánchez-Cuenca 2014), it has to be said additionally (on the side of general factors) that

interest rates have been very low across the EU and United States since 2013 (Aníbal 2014).

Furthermore, between 2013 and 2014 there have been signs of a slight recovery in GDP

growth and a fall in unemployment; however, these developments have been too weak to

make any real difference. In any event, the fall in unemployment must be put in the context of

the large wave of emigration (Albuquerque 2013), and the poor quality, instability and low pay

of the newly-created jobs. In fact, much of the fall in unemployment is due to a large number

(of temporary) public sector internships, which have been responsible for the (artificial)

reduction in the rate of unemployment (SIC Notícias 2014). Nevertheless, a second bailout was

avoided, which was an incredibly important result, particularly given Greece is already on its

third rescue plan (Freire & Lisi 2016a).

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Insert Table 1 about here

This all appears to have led to a decline in the confidence Portuguese have in their political

institutions, which in 2012 was much lower than in other institution (except the banks and

financial system, see Table 1). Apart from the president, the ranking situation was the same in

2008 in relation to all political institutions; however, from 2008-12 the situation got much

worse. In the context of an erosion of social and working rights, it is interesting to note that

only the trade unions were trusted more 2012 than in 2008. It is also interesting to note the

fall in trust in the EU. It is not difficult to understand the reason for this given the EU’s

responsibility for the difficulties many European countries are experiencing – particularly those

countries that have accepted financial assistance programmes.

Data for 2014 shows there has been a slight economic recovery from the depth of the crisis in

2012-13, but that it remains below the levels of 2008 – a clear indication of the effects of the

crisis. The situation in other countries subject to austerity programmes is identical (Sánchez-

Cuenca 2014, pp.59–77; Freire & Lisi 2016a). In Portugal, it is difficult not to see in the

extraordinary betrayal of election promises one of the factors accounting for the decline in

trust in political institutions.

Insert Figure 1 about here

The situation in terms of the public’s satisfaction with how democracy in Portugal functions is

equally problematic (Figure 1). The decline dates back to 1999-2000 when the country joined

the single currency; however, the 2008-14 crisis made this situation much worse, while the

recovery of 2012-14 was limited and weak. Again, this trend is particularly pronounced in

those countries that were worst affected by the crisis, especially those in the southern

periphery, while it is much less evident across the rest of Europe (Sánchez-Cuenca 2014; Freire

& Lisi 2016a), suggesting the crisis is at the root of these developments.

How do we understand the role of the president in this context? An eminent German

sociologist informs us that the indebted Western capitalist states of today operate as if there

are two types of constituents: ‘State’s people’ (Staatsvolk) and ‘financial markets’ people’

(Marktsvolk) (Streeck 2013, pp.129–130). This idea was first developed by Mair (2011) as the

conflict between responsiveness towards the sovereign power at the national level (the

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electorate, or Staatsvolk) and the international responsibility (of governments and national

parliaments towards other governments, parliaments and international institutions, as well as

towards the Marktsvolk) developed – a situation that is particularly pronounced with

globalisation, multi-level democratic systems and external interventions, such as financial

bailouts. By favouring responsiveness governments and presidents are more responsible and

responsive to their electorate, but this can lead them to fail to meet the state’s international

commitments while favouring international responsibility can undermine the democratic

legitimacy of the nationally-elected political bodies. Clearly, this is not an easy dilemma to

resolve; however, the responsibility noted by Mair points to the external dimension.

Nevertheless, when looking at this dilemma we must also include responsibility to the

constitution that the president, prime minister and the government swear to uphold when

taking office.

Cavaco Silva’s second term

The presidency in times of financial bailout, according to Cavaco Silva.

The bailout was both the president’s biggest worry and the greatest on political activity during

these years. In March 2013 President Cavaco Silva wrote that ‘the commitments to the

international institutions, which were supported by a large party political consensus ... define

the framework that since May 2011 has been a standard for the actions of the public

authorities, including the president, in both domestic and external matters’ (Silva 2013, p.15).

He then outlined what he considered to be his role in foreign policy, which was to: reassure

international partners the national authorities are determined to meet their commitments to

external bodies in full; keep them informed of the progress made; emphasise the political and

social consensus in terms of carrying out the adjustment programme while highlighting the

sacrifices imposed on the Portuguese people; outline the negative effects of the adjustment

programme on the Portuguese economy; and remind Portugal’s European partners that the

success of the bailout is of interest to the countries being bailed out and to the EU as a whole.

On the domestic scene, the president saw it as his duty to use his office to exert influence in a

way that would preserve the political and social consensus. His appeal to the traditional parties

of government (PS, PSD, CDS-PP) to come to an agreement was a common thread in his

discourse (Silva 2012; 2013; 2014), particularly during the crisis of the summer of 2013 and in

the aftermath of the October 2015 general election – which were also the moments in which

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his popularity ratings reached new lows (De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016; Fernandes & Jalali

2016). Disagreements within the coalition in 2013 created the potential for a political crisis

that Cavaco Silva attempted to resolve by encouraging the coalition government to reach out

to the PS to reach an agreement for national salvation. While no agreement was reached (Silva

2014; Pinto 2016) the government survived, with the PSD and CDS-PP quickly coming to an

understanding. Again, in the wake of the October 2015 election, the president strongly

encouraged the three parties to come to an understanding, again without any success (De

Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016).

Just why did the president seek an agreement? He said that failure to do so meant it was

certain that during a serious political crisis, during the critical phase in the execution of the

financial assistance programme, it would leave the country in an even worse situation and that

it was his ‘duty to prevent this from happening’ (Silva 2013, p.29). In March 2014, he said it

was ‘essential that there be a medium-term agreement between the political forces

committed to the financial assistance programme’ (Silva 2014) that must focus on the goals of

political stability, governability and the implementation of measures consistent with the

country’s commitments to the end of the next legislature (2019), given that they concerned

goals independent of the electoral cycle. Such an understanding ‘would in no way prevent

political alternation, nor would it put an end to political diversity or the plurality of ideas within

the political parties. Focusing on structural and consensual aspects of the parties of

government, seeking to adhere to the rules Portugal signed up to within the framework of its

involvement in the European project, an agreement of this nature ... would serve the interests

of all Portuguese’ (Silva 2014, p.24).

The president believed Portugal had to honour its commitments to the international

community, both because the release of further tranches of the loan depended on it and

because the idea of restructuring the public debt would, in his opinion, have seriously negative

effects (Silva 2013). Nevertheless, he often mentioned his belief that the sacrifices being

demanded as a consequence of the adjustment programme should be shared more fairly, for

the solidarity between generations to be preserved, for the uneven regional development to

be addressed and of the need for austerity to be accompanied with stimulus and growth

programmes.

In October 2011, he spoke about the lack of fairness in some of the measures announced by

the government, including the planned abolition of the holiday and Christmas payments for

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public sector employees. At the time, some of his detractors believed his statement to be

more one of concern for his own position as a state pensioner rather for any citizens who may

be affected (Pinto 2016). His January 2012 gaffe, when he stated publicly that his pensions

were not enough to meet his expenses (Pinto 2016) only strengthened the criticism of him and

led to a sharp fall in his popularity (Fernandes & Jalali 2016). In his 2013 New Year message,

Cavaco Silva emphasised the need to prevent a recessionary spiral caused by the commitment

to austerity not being accompanied by an economic development plan (Silva 2013). In his

speech to parliament on the 39th anniversary of the Carnation Revolution, he stressed this

point, saying the austerity measures that had been implemented had a much greater

recessionary effect than originally anticipated, and that this was due to failures in the

government’s estimates that had led to austerity fatigue and a lack of concern for the situation

(Silva 2013).

In his understanding of the president’s relationship with the government at times of crisis,

Cavaco Silva preferred to intervene discretely in a manner that respected his influence on the

government’s legislative output. His contacts were designed to help make clear the content of

some of the Bills while persuading the government to introduce formal or substantive changes

to them being an important part of his involvement behind the scenes. He also rejected

adopting «a populist posture» and intervention that would gain him momentary popularity: he

believed adopting such a posture would be damaging to the country:

In times of crisis such as we are experiencing today, it would be easy to take advantage

of a presidency with no direct executive responsibilities and, through inflammatory

public statements, satisfy the instincts of a certain branch of the media, of some

political analysts and of those who wish to challenge the institutions. It would be easy,

for example, to encourage feelings against the political classes or even against the

actions of the government; however, this is not my understanding of responsible

action by a president of the republic, much less during times of grave crisis (Silva 2013,

pp.32–33).

This position has been criticised by analysts and specialists who believe the president should

be an actor and not a spectator, and that his apparent inability to act was the cause of his

popularity ratings falling to their lowest level (Cordeiro 2013).

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The exercise of legal powers during the crisis: A longitudinal view

The president is an important actor in Portuguese politics, enjoying legal powers with which to

limit the activities of government and the parliamentary majority supporting it, including a

right of veto and to request judicial review (both prior and subsequent) by the Constitutional

Court. Thus, the Portuguese President is a fundamental veto player (Tsebelis 1995). The

question facing us here, though, is has the president exercised his powers effectively, and if so

to what extent? This is particularly important given the gravity of the situation in which

Portuguese democracy finds itself and the restrictions on the national sovereignty as a result

of the external bailout. We know the Constitutional Court has been particularly active and its

many important and – for some – controversial rulings of incompatibility with the constitution

during the legislature were a demonstration of both the separation of powers and horizontal

responsibility. They were also an indication of the seriousness of the crisis and of it being seen

as an opportunity by an executive that has often governed at the extreme limits of Portuguese

constitutional order (for a contrasting view of this, see the condescending face of the

government and its parliamentary majority in Ribeiro & Coutinho 2014; for a more

sympathetic view of the Constitutional Court see Novais 2014 and Gouveia & Piçarro 2013).

Insert Table 2 about here

In order to analyse this situation, we must take into account the president’s constitutional

powers and the differences in political conditions that were responsible for increased or

decreased levels of presidential activism. The existence of a solid and cohesive parliamentary

majority (which can more easily overcome presidential vetoes), the ideological and political

congruity between the president and the parliamentary (and governmental) majority, suggests

there would be fewer differences between the president and the government, and the first

term of any president (as a result of their need for re-election) tends to be a time of limited

presidential activity (Lobo & Neto 2009; Freire & Pinto 2011). Theoretically at least, the first

two elements should have resulted in less presidential activism by Cavaco Silva, while the third

should have resulted the opposite.

It was expected that Cavaco Silva would become more active during his second term, not least

because this was a promise he made to the electorate during his re-election campaign

(Fernandes & Jalali 2016; Silva 2012; 2013). Considering the three indicators of presidential

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intervention presented in Table 2 as a whole (requests for prior and successive constitutional

review and vetoes), however, we see Cavaco Silva was the only civilian president to use his

legal powers on fewer occasions during his second term than his first (22 and 26,

respectively).5 This is more remarkable because of all civilian presidents, he was the most

active during his first term (in their first terms, Mário Soares and Jorge Sampaio used these

powers 24 and 19 times, respectively). With Soares and Sampaio, their reason for making

greater use of their powers during their second terms was the fact they were cohabiting with

governments led by their political opponents (in Sampaio’s case for just some of his second

term), while in the case of Cavaco Silva, the cohabitation took place during his first term and at

the very beginning of his second term, meaning his initial expectation of another term of

cohabitation was overtaken by events and the result of the 2011 election that produced a

government with of the president’s political hue.

Given the notorious difference between the frequency of his use of the president’s legal

powers during his second term and that of Soares and Sampaio (who used the powers 2.5 and

3.2 times more frequently, respectively, than Cavaco Silva), we would be well advised to

consider other explanatory factors that go beyond the institutional and questions of timing.

The gravity of the economic and financial crisis and limitations to national sovereignty resulting

from the external intervention acted to limit presidential activity during Cavaco Silva’s second

term. Fernandes and Jalali (2016) claim Cavaco Silva’s reduced intervention was due to the

bailout, and that for most of his second term he was caught between a rock and a hard place.

If he was seen to be encouraging popular dissatisfaction with the austerity caused by the

bailout and to use his powers in mitigation, he could have created additional problems in the

already difficult task of implementing the adjustment programme. This, in turn, could have had

undesirable consequences in the Troika’s quarterly assessments. On the other hand, were he

to take ownership of the austerity agenda, he would risk being seen to replace the elected

government (which had taken on the adjustment programme as its own) with the possibility of

it making him unpopular in political circles, thereby limiting his ability to persuade other

political actors. The fact the coalition government was going further than either demanded by

the Troika or proposed in its election manifesto, alongside the asymmetrical austerity (which

the president said it had to seek to avoid) and a government that often acted at the very

boundaries of constitutionality, were factors demanding he act with discretion in order to

retain some margin for manoeuvre for national political actors before the Troika, which,

5 We exclude President General Ramalho Eanes, the first to be elected after the transition to democracy.

13

according to our standpoint, could create conditions for more presidential involvement –

particularly since the president is the guardian of the constitution and of democratic political

order.

The other reasons for Cavaco Silva not using his legal powers are of a party political nature.

During the January 2011 presidential election campaign, Cavaco Silva expected he would need

to deal with the Socialist prime minister, José Sócrates, for another two-and-a-half years – he

expected to spend at least half of his term in cohabitation. Shortly after his second term

began, however, the economic crisis collapsed into a political crisis that resulted in the

resignation of Sócrates, the dissolution of parliament and the calling of an early general

election in June, which in turn led to the formation of a coalition government involving the PSD

(which Cavaco Silva had led for almost a decade) and the CDS-PP. Consequently, for most of his

second term, there was marked by a solid and cohesive ideological congruity between the

president and the parliamentary majority supporting the government.

There is no agreement on this explanation, however, and Fernandes and Jalali (2016) list a set

of counter arguments. Cavaco Silva sometimes proposed initiatives that did not please the

government (such as the request for review and veto on the unconstitutionality of austerity

measures in the 2013 Budget; the 2013 New Year speech in which he spoke of the

recessionary spiral; the exertion of pressure for an agreement between the incumbents and

the PS, particularly in 2013 and 2015; and his veto of a law that had been passed unchanged by

parliament. See tables 5 and 6). Despite being from the same ideological family (or, in the case

of the president and prime minister, linked to the same party), the relationship between

Cavaco Silva, Passos Coelho and Paulo Portas had never been particularly close or friendly.

Despite all this, from our standpoint the undeniable congruence between the president and

the government/parliamentary majority, both on the political-ideological direction and the

scale of the conflict between national responsiveness and international responsibility and their

understanding of the crisis, the bailout or austerity discussed above, this seems to us to have

been a factor that has had much more weight than Fernandes and Jalali attribute it.

Insert Table 3 about here

Insert Table 4 about here

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There are even more factors that can help explain Cavaco Silva’s limited activism during his

second term compared to those of Soares and Sampaio. One of these was the huge loss of

popular support for Cavaco Silva between his first and second terms (Fernandes & Jalali 2016),

which was in sharp contrast to the previous presidencies (Veiga 1998). Clearly this could have

been a result of the crisis and its socio-economic effects (an argument corroborated in the

individual-level data analysis, based on mass surveys, presented in Freire 2016a); however, it is

also associated with the political management of the crisis and the association between the

president and the governing majority, an accusation the left-wing opposition parties (PS, BE

and PCP/PEV) repeatedly threw at Cavaco Silva (Fernandes & Jalali 2016; Freire et al. 2015;

Freire 2016a; 2016b). There was also the question of Cavaco Silva’s weakness, given he was re-

elected with the fewest and the lowest percentage of votes in the history of Portuguese

democracy – even if we only consider presidential elections (Table 3). Cavaco Silva was also the

only president in the history of Portuguese democracy in which the absolute number of votes

cast for the president was lower than the total number of votes cast for the parliamentary

majority (Table 4). While this is partially due to the extraordinarily low levels of electoral

participation in 2011, even if we only count the percentage of votes, Cavaco Silva received the

lowest number in the election for his second term compared to the votes cast for the majority

party in parliament.

Vetoes and non-vetoes, requests and non-requests for rulings on the constitutionality of

economic matters.

Concerns over the distribution of sacrifices seem to have troubled the president during the

analysis of the budgets in the bailout years. Nevertheless, he did not always decide to ask the

Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the austerity measures being

implemented (particularly in respect of cuts to public sector wages and pensions). He

expressed some concerns about the scale and fairness of some measures contained in the

2012 Budget (Correia 2011), yet he did not ask for a ruling. Instead, it was a group of

opposition deputies who called for a decision, with the Constitutional Court ruling a number of

the measures proposed were unconstitutional (Fernandes & Jalali 2016). Some journalists

asked Cavaco Silva if he regretted not asking for a ruling, to which he responded: ‘it could

undermine the entire budget were a president to seek a prior ruling from the Constitutional

Court on the constitutionality of a simple clause. There would be no budget’ (Jornal de Notícias

2012a). This standpoint is clearly contested by the (left leaning) high profile constitutionalist

15

Jorge Reis Novais from both the standpoint of constitutional theory and political stances (see

Novais 2014).

When it came to the 2013 Budget, which contained similar measures, he decided to act and

ask for a ruling,6 due to concerns he had regarding the extent to which the sacrifices were

being fairly shared (Pinto 2016). Cavaco Silva spoke of the ‘different treatment being meted

out to public sector workers’, ‘class taxes’ and, in respect of measures affecting pensioners,

the violation of their ‘legitimate expectations’ and their ‘real acquired rights’ (Público 2013).

Cavaco Silva took action two weeks after the budget was published, when it became clear the

PS, BE and PCP appeared ready to approach the Constitutional Court for a ruling (Público

2012). This strategy meant the year would start with a budget in place, while the president

was able to beat the opposition to the punch in requesting a ruling. The request to the

Constitutional Court for a ruling on three articles in the 2013 Budget law rather unsurprisingly

resulted, in April 2013, with them being ruled unconstitutional: 7 a decision Fernandes and

Jalali (2016) claim was popular with the public.

The 2014 Budget, which yet again included measures similar to those that had been ruled

unconstitutional, prompted a presidential request for a ruling from the Constitutional Court.

This may have been because he did not want to create instability during the final years of the

adjustment programme (Fernandes & Jalali 2016). In October 2013, he confirmed his decisions

in respect of requests for prior or subsequent rulings on the constitution nature of state

budgets were based on careful assessments of the costs involved, which is what happened

that year (Fonseca 2013; Visão 2013a; the used of subsequent rullings in clearly contested by

Novais 2014, for both constitutional and political reasons). At the beginning of 2014, a

presidential source said that ‘opinions on the 2014 Budget the president had requested,

bearing in mind the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, do not suggest there are any

unconstitutional articles in the budget’ (Lusa 2014). However, the advice the opposition

received was somewhat different, leading it to request a ruling on four of the clauses

contained in the budget, three of which (public sector pay cuts, cuts to basic pensions and

6 ‘Cavaco Silva revealed this Wednesday that the articles of the State Budget over which he had concerns regarding their constitutionality ... are those calling for the suspension this year of the holiday subsidy to public employees (29), the suspension of 90% or equivalent of the holiday subsidy to pensioners (77) and the introduction of an extraordinary solidarity tax to be paid by pensioners with pensions above 1,350 euros (78).’ Measures worth almost two billion euros (Aníbal 2013). 7 In particular, the cut to the holiday subsidy for public sector employees, pensioners and teaching and research contracts, and a tax on health and unemployment benefits.

16

taxes on health and unemployment benefits) were ruled in breach of the constitution by the

Constitutional Court (Crisóstomo et al. 2014).

Austerity was not just a product of the budgets. Other measures were designed to cut

spending and/or increase receipts via changes to the legislative framework on workers’ rights,

and particularly on the rights of public sector workers. The president did not appreciate the

call from Jerónimo de Sousa, leader of the PCP, and the leader of the General Confederation of

Portuguese Workers (CGTP – Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses) union

confederation, for him to veto changes to the Labour Code that they claimed would lead to a

serious deterioration in the rights of Portuguese workers (Sol 2012; Lusa 2012). Cavaco Silva

was strongly criticised by those on the left who believed his drive for changes to the Labour

Code was ‘still more proof of [Cavaco Silva’s] commitment to the interests of big capital and a

rejection of his sworn duty to defend, uphold and enforce the constitution’.8

The position he adopted in 2013 was slightly different. Requests were made for a ruling on Bills

on workers’ rights, including the public sector regrading and the convergence of public sector

pensions with those of the private sector (Visão 2013b; Jornal de Negócios 2013). Both Bills

were ruled unconstitutional (Table 6), with a safeguard later incorporated into the regrading

Bill to protect the majority of public sector workers from redundancy. The president passed

the new General Public Sector Labour Law with this clause in place (Público 2014). In 2014, the

only requests for prior rulings on financial matters (Table 6) occurred as the result of a request

by the prime minister, Pedro Passos Coelho – after several measures in the 2014 Budget had

been defeated – as a way of anticipating future defeats in the Constitutional Court during the

critical post-bailout period (Dinis 2014). The Bills were declared unconstitutional.

Insert Table 5 about here

Insert Table 6 about here

The only government Bill vetoed, in March 2014, sought to block measures destined to

increase the percentage of their pay packet public sector workers paid for services such as the

public administration health subsystem (ADSE), among others (Table 5). Pinto (2016) reminds

us that this veto would have cost the government €33 million, but that it was easily

8 See Jornal de Notícias 2012b. During a visit to Madeira three years later, Cavaco Silva was on the receiving end of similar criticisms from a trade unionist (Lusa 2015).

17

circumvented by publishing it again shortly afterwards, after having being approved by the

majority of deputies in parliament.

Cavaco Silva and the appointment of the 21st constitutional government

In 1994, Giovanni Sartori made a distinction between the formal (the letter and spirit of the

basic law) and the material (effective operation of the political system within a particular

constitutional framework) constitution (1994). While Portugal’s 21st constitutional

government, which did not take office until the end of November 2015 and was formed

following the 4 October general election, complied fully with the formal constitution, the

democratic parliamentary political practice and semi-presidentialism, it is a fact that the

solution agreed upon was in contrast with how the material constitution has been applied

since 1975. First, because a minority PS government has parliamentary support from the BE,

PCP and PEV, the first time in 40 years of the democratic constitution that the radical left has

been involved in government. It also represents a move towards greater inclusiveness in the

political system and the increased responsibility of all party political forces represented in

parliament (De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016; Freire 2016a; 2016b; Freire & Lisi 2016b).

The first question arising around this new government solution is: why only now? On several

occasions in the past, when the PS had fallen short of an absolute parliamentary majority while

left-wing parties were in the majority (1975, 1976, 1983, 1995, 1999 and 2009), the party

preferred to either seek formal (coalition) or informal (supply and demand) support from the

right in order to govern (Freire & Lisi 2016b). In our opinion, there are at least eight

explanations for this situation.

Insert Figure 2 about here

The significant ideological shift of the right-wing parties, especially the PSD, further to the right

during the previous parliament, made it much more difficult for the PS and PSD to come to an

agreement (Figure 2) (Freire et al. 2016), is one explanation enabling an agreement between

the parties of the left becoming a reality.9 However, it is important to note the limitations to

the president’s powers in such situations, especially in relation to dissolving parliament. Doing

so will help understand the situation and the solution that was hit upon, and which was far

9 For a discussion of several factors, see Freire & Lisi (2016b).

18

from being the president’s preferred outcome. Because he was in the final six months of his

term and it was the first months of a parliamentary term, Cavaco Silva did not have the

authority to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections, and nor could he refuse to appoint a

government on ground of political trust, because this was not in accordance with either the

letter or the spirit of the constitution – and had not been since 1982. The only alternative open

to him was to appoint a caretaker government that would take office from October 2015 to

June 2016, which would be very costly to the country. He was therefore ‘obliged’ to appoint a

PS minority government supported by political forces he believed to be anti-European and

which were opposed to the country’s military and political alignments (particularly

membership of NATO) – his only other solution was to keep the caretaker government in office

until his successor could call fresh elections (De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016). Also, before

being obliged by circumstances to appoint the 21st constitutional government, the president

tilted towards his international responsibility and view (ideological and other) of what was in

the national interest, to the detriment of his responsibility to the Portuguese voters who had

elected a parliament containing a majority of left-wing deputies.

Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to analyse whether Cavaco Silva’s actions and attitudes during his

second term (2011-16), which coincided with a serious economic and financial crisis and the

intervention of the Troika (EC, ECB and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) were more

concerned with the country meeting its international commitments (international

responsibility), first, or fulfilling its national commitments (domestic responsibility: complying

with the constitution) and responding to the demands of the electorate (responsiveness),

second – or if there was a balance between these two aspects.

While the assistance programme was in force, Cavaco Silva often spoke of the importance of

complying with international agreements in order to maintain the confidence of investors and

international partners. It is clear that the government’s responsibility was to honour the state’s

international commitments; however, it is significant that the president – the supreme

guardian of the constitution – was able to neglect the equally important need for substantial

levels of trust between representatives and those they represent: that is, to give equal weight

to the government’s commitments to the electorate (Silva 2013, pp.4–5). The president’s

successive declarations and actions in this respect, as well as those of the government and its

19

parliamentary supporters, clearly show their lack of concern for their electorate as they

focused almost entirely on the Marktsvolk.

Despite the dominant trend in this direction, however, we must also recognise Cavaco Silva

continued to express – at least here and there – some concern for the Portuguese and the

need for market and Troika diktats to show some respect for them. Here, however, we can

emphasise the following: at the level of his discourse, and despite his mixed nature, there is a

clear tendency for greater emphasis on international responsibility over responsiveness to the

electorate and national responsibility to the constitution; however, this relative imbalance is

perhaps even more apparent in his limited presidential activity – for example, by comparing his

use of legal powers (vetoes and requests for constitutional rulings) to the use made of them by

past presidents in their second terms. In other words, if the preferences expressed by Cavaco

Silva during his second term in office seem to show him inclining more towards international

responsibility than towards the wishes of the Portuguese electorate (responsiveness) and his

national responsibilities (to the constitution), his use of his legal powers while in office show

him to be clearly in favour of the former over the latter.

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26

TABLES & FIGURES

27

Table 1: Trust in institutions in Portugal: 2008, 2012 and 2014 (proportion of surveyed and that said they had ‘some’ or ‘much’ trust; percentage of each sample)

Institutions (2008). (2012). Difference 2012-2008.

(2014).

Difference 2014-2008.

Church 67.3 66.1 -1.2 n.d. -

Armed forces 74.4 72.9 -1.5 n.d. -

Media 62.1 55.2 -6.9 53.4 -8.7

Employers’ associations n.d. 38.6 - 51.8 13.2*

Large companies 48.6 35.1 -13.5 47.5 -1.1

Banks/financial system n.d. 22.8 - 29 6.2*

Unions 53.2 57.9 4.7 49.6 -3.6

President of the Republic 73.4 35.2 -38.2 36.3 -37.1

Political parties 30.5 19.2 -11.3 n.d. -

Parliament 48.5 22.3 -26.2 33.9 -14.6

Government 44.5 13.6 -30.9 31.6 -12.9

Courts 50.2 36.3 -13.9 39.9 -10.3

Public administration 48.9 41.3 -7.6 n.d. -

European Union 64.7 42.6 -22.1 52.4 -12.3

N 1350 1209 - 1205 -

Sources: Surveys and representative samples of the adult Portuguese population of mainland Portugal as part of the

CIES-IUL research projects: Freire & Viegas (2008); Freire, Viegas & Lisi (2012); Belchior, Silva e Queiroga (2014).

Notes: n.d. = no data; * = no data for 2008, comparison made with 2012.

28

Figure 1: Satisfaction with how democracy functions in Portugal, 1985-2014

(proportion of surveyed who are “satisfied” or “very satisfied”)

Sources: Data elaborated by authors from the Manheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-1999 (Schmitt and Scholtz, 2001), in Eurobarometer 54.1 from ICPSR (Hartnung, 2008), in Estudos Eleitorais Portugueses de 2002 (Freire et al 2003) and 2005 (Freire, Lobo and Magalhães 2005), in the CIES-IUL Participação e Deliberação Democrática survey (Viegas 2006) and the 2011 Barómetro da Qualidade (BDQ 2011) survey. For 2008, 2012 and 2014 data, see the surveys cited in Table 1.

51

64,3 65,2

46 47,7 41

33

10,2 16,3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1985-1986 1987-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2005 2006-2008 2011 2012 2014

29

Table 2: Requests for ruling on constitutionality and political vetoes used during the

presidencies of Mário Soares (1986-96), Jorge Sampaio (1996-2006) and Cavaco Silva (2006-

16)

Terms Requests for prior

rulings on

constitutionality

Requests for

subsequent rulings on

constitutionality

Political vetoes

L DL T1 L DL T2 L DL T3 Total:

T1+T2+T3

Soares I:

1986-91

12

(8)

5

(5)

17

(13)

0 0 0 5 2 7 24

Soares II:

1991-96

14

(11)

9

(3)

23

(14)

2

(2)

1 * 3 7 23 30 56

Sampaio I:

1996-2001

3

(2)

4

(1)

7

(3)

0 0 0 4 8 12 19

Sampaio II:

2001-06

7

(7)

0 7

(7)

1

(1)

0 1

(1)

8 55 63 71

Cavaco I:

2006-11

10

(6)

0

10

(6)

1

(0)

0

1

14

1 15 26

Cavaco II:

2011-16

10

(10)

0 10

(10)

2

(2)

0 2

(2)

7 3 10 22

Sources: Freire e Pinto (2010); Fernandes e Jalali (2016); Serviços da Presidência da República. Notes: L - Parliamentary laws; DL – Decree-Laws; T – Total; * ‘The Constitutional Court did not take note of the request’. Between parenthesis, (...) are all the laws considered unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.

30

Table 3: Participation and abstention in presidential and legislative elections in Portugal, 1975-2016

Presidential Elections 1976 1980 1986 (1st)

1986 (2nd)

1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016

Participation (%) 75.4 84.2 75.6 78.2 62.0 66.4 50.9 61.5 46.5 48.7 Abstention (%) 24.6 15.8 24.4 21.8 38.0 33.6 49.1 38.5 53.5 51.3 Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Votes (millions) 4.885 5.831 5.739 5.935 5.097 5.779 4.324 5.590 4.214 4.638 Registered voters (millions)

6.477 6.921 7.593 7.593 8.222 8.707 8.746 9.085 9.657 9.741

Legislative Elections 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 2015

Participation (%) 91.7 83.3 87.5 85.4 78.6 75.4 72.6 68.2 67.1 61.8 62.3 65.0 60.5 58.9 57 Abstention (%) 8.3 16.7 12.5 14.6 21.4 24.6 27.4 31.8 32.9 38.2 37.7 35.0 39.5 41.1 43 Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Votes (millions) 5.666 5.393 5.915 5.917 5.629 5.744 5.623 5.674 5.854 5.363 5.433 5.713 5.485 5.332 5.181 Registered voters (millions)

6.177 6.477 6.757 6.925 7.159 7.621 7.741 8.322 8.719 8.673 8.716 8.785 9.347 9.429 9.440

Sources: Official statistics cited in Freire and Pinto 2005 (1976-2001: PR; 197-2005: AR); for the more recent elections (AR 2009 and PR 2006): National Election Commission (www.cne.pt) and the Interior Ministry (www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt). Notes: the results of elections to parliament only cover votes cast for national constituencies; Voters = valid votes; RE = Electoral Rol l (STAPE); the presidential elections from 2001-2016 also include residents outside national territory and able to vote.

31

Table 4: Presidential and parliamentary majorities in Portugal, 1975-2016

Presidential Elections 1976 1980 1986 (1st)

1986 (2nd)

1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016

Winning candidate (%) 61.5 56.5 46.3 51.3 70.4 53.8 55.8 50.7 53.0 52.0 Winning candidate (millions of votes) 2.967 3.258 2.628 3.015 3.460 3.038 2.411 2.773 2.232 2.412 Second-placed candidate (%) 16.5 40.2 25.4 48.7 14.1 46.2 34.5 20.7 19.8 22.9 Second-placed candidate (millions of votes) 0.796 2.319 1.443 2.864 0.692 2.606 1.493 1.138 0.833 1.061

Legislative Elections 1976 1980 1985 vs

1st 86

1985 vs

2nd 82

1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 2015

Parliamentary majority (% votes)

35.0 (50.9)

47.1 29.8 29.8 50.2 50.4 43.8 44.0 48.9 45.0 36.6 50.4 32.3 (50.8)

Parliamentary majority (% votes)

1.886 (2.744)

2.841 1.711 1.711 2.851 2.861 2.567 2.359 2.657 2.588 2.077 2.814 1.748 (2.750)

Votes for the party that supported the winning presidential candidate (%)

76.2 44.9 39.5 54.4 39.4 79.7 52.4 44.0 37.8 36.0 39.5 50.4 38.6

Votes for the party that supported the winning presidential candidate (millions)

4.108 2.659 2.270 3.125 2.230 4.521 3.071 2.359 2.056 2.588 2.246 2.814 2.086

Votes for the party that supported the second-placed presidential candidate (%)

3.1 47.1 20.8 39.5 54.4 4.4 34.0 32.3 40.2 45.0 47.3 34.3 1.84

Votes for the party that supported the second-placed presidential candidate (millions)

0.164 2.788 1.195 2.270 3.103 0.248 1.990 1.733 2.182 1.653 2.707 1.918 0.099

Sources: Data elaborated from STAPE (www.stape.pt), National Election Commission (www.cne.pt) and the Interior Ministry (www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt). Notes:

1. Parliamentary majorities supporting the government: 1976-1978, PS; 1978-1979, PS and CDS; 1979-1980 and 1980-1983, AD (PSD, CDS, PPM); 1983-1985, PS and PSD; 1985-1987, 1987-1991 and 1991-1995, PSD; 1995-1999, PS; 1999-2001, PS; 2002-2005, PSD and CDS-PP; 2005-2011, PS; 2011-2015, PSD and CDS-PP; 2015-, PS.

2. The political parties that supported the winning candidate (Ramalho Eanes) were: PS, PPD/PSD, CDS, MRPP, AOC and PCP-ML; the political parties that supported the second-most voter candidate (Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho) were: UDP, MES and FSP;

32

3. In 1980, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Ramalho Eanes) were: PS (FRS) and PCP (APU); the political parties supporting the second-placed candidate, Soares Carneiro, were: PSD, CDS and PPM (AD).

4. In 1986, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Freitas do Amaral) were: PSD and CDS; the political party that supported the second-most voted candidate (Mário Soares) wasi: PS. In 1986, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Mário Soares) were: PS, PCP (APU) and PRD; the political parties that supported the second-placed candidate (Freitas do Amaral) were: PSD and CDS.

5. In 1991, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Mário Soares) were: PS and PSD; the political party that supported the second-most voted candidate (Basílio Horta) was: CDS.

6. In 1996, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Jorge Sampaio) were: PS and PCP (CDU); the political party that supported the second-most voted candidate (Cavaco Silva) was: PSD.

7. In 2001, the political party that supported the winning candidate (Jorge Sampaio) was the PS; the political party that supported the second-placed candidate (Freitas do Amaral) was the PSD.

8. In 2006, the second-most voted candidate (Manuel Alegre), while a member of the PS, was not supported by any party and ran against the PS’s offic ial candidate (Mário Soares); Cavaco Silva, the winning candidate, was strongly supported by the PSD and the CDS-PP; the BE, with Francisco Louçã, the PCP with Jerónimo de Sousa, and the PCPT-MRPP with Garcia Pereira, were the other candidates clearly supported by political parties.

9. In 2011, the winning candidate (Cavaco Silva) was supported by the PSD, the CDS-PP and the MEP. The runner-up (Manuel Alegre) was supported by the PS, the BE and the PCTP-MRPP

10. In 2016, the winning candidate (Cavaco Silva) was supported by the PSD and the CDS-PP. The runner-up (Sampaio da Nóvoa) was an independent who was seeking the support of the PS but who only received the endorsement of Livre/Tempo de Avançar and the PCTP-MRPP.

33

Table 5: Cavaco Silva’s 10 vetoes (2011-2016)

Date Subject Origin Motivation

May 2011 Committee on Access to

Administrative

Documents

Parliament Definition of a special unsubstantiated

remuneration regime and doubts about

the Bill receiving sufficient scrutiny

June 2011 EPAL Government Transition veto during the dissolution of

parliament.

June 2011 Zero rate tax for

innovation

Government Transition veto during the dissolution of

parliament.

June 2011 State support for private

education

Parliament A ministerial order on this already exists

July 2012 Administrative reform of

Lisbon

Parliament Errors identified in the definition of parish

and municipal boundaries

August 2012 Rules for the use of LPG

and natural gas as fuel

Parliament The president had his doubts about the

juridical and constitutional nature of the

Bill.

March 2014 Changes to the value of

discounts for health sub-

systems (ADSE, ADM,

SAD)

Government The president was unconvinced of the

need for and the impact of increasing

contributions. Parliament passed a Bill that

contained this same measure.

March 2015 Private copies Parliament The president called on parliament to

reconsider this Bill to provide more

suitable protection for author and

consumer rights.

January 2016 Adoption by same-sex

couples

Parliament The president thought the change was

very radical and profound.

January 2016 Changes to abortion

laws

Parliament The president did not thing parliament had

spent enough time discussion the topic.

Sources: Serviços da Presidência da República; Pinto (2016). Note: AR - Parliament.

34

Table 6: Cavaco Silva’s 12 requests for ruling on constitutionality (2011-16)

Type of

ruling

Date of

request

Subject Origin Court ruling

Prior April 2011 Suspension of the performance

evaluation model for primary and

secondary school teachers

Parliament Ruling 214/2011

(29 Abril):

Unconstitutional

Prior March

2012

Criminal enrichment Parliament Ruling 179/2012

(5 Abril):

Unconstitutional

Prior April 2013 Establishment of the Court of

Sport Arbitration

Parliament Ruling 230/2013

(24 Abril):

Unconstitutional

Prior May 2013 Intermunicipal bodies Parliament Ruling 296/2013

(28 May):

Unconstitutional

Prior August

2013

Regrading of public sector workers Parliament Ruling 474/2013

(29 August):

Unconstitutional

Prior November

2013

Convergence of public sector

social protection with the general

social security regime (pension

cuts)

Parliament Ruling 862/2013

(19 December):

Unconstitutional

Prior July 2014 Pay cuts and the conditions for

their restoration

Parliament Ruling 574/2014

(14 August):

Unconstitutional

Prior July 2014 Sustainability contribution Parliament Ruling 575/2014

(14 August):

Unconstitutional

Prior July 2015 Crime of unjustified enrichment of

political office holders

Parliament Ruling 377/2015

(27 July):

Unconstitutional

Prior August

2015

Access of officials to information

systems and metadata

Parliament Ruling 403/2015

(27 August):

Unconstitutional

Subsequent January

2013

Items in the 2013 Budget Parliament Ruling 187/2013

(5 April):

Unconstitutional

Subsequent September

2013

Creation of the Court of Sport

Arbitration

Parliament Ruling 781/2013

(20 November):

Unconstitutional

Sources: Constitutional Court; Serviços da Presidência da República; Pinto (2016). Note: AR - Parliament.

35

Figure 2: Position of Portuguese political parties on the left-right scale (1 = left, 10 = right)

according to citizens, 1978-2015

PCP: 2.3PCP: 2.1

CDU: 1.7PCP: 2.0

PCP: 2.7PCP: 2.9

PCP: 29

CDU: 2.8

PCP: 2.5

PCP/CDU: 2.8

PCP/CDU: 2.2

BE: 2.6 BE: 2.6

BE: 3.0

BE: 2.6

BE: 2.6

BE: 2.7

BE: 2.3

PS: 4,6

PS: 5.0PS: 4.8 PS: 4.7

PS: 5.2 PS: 5.3PS: 5.0

PS: 4.7PS: 5.0

PS: 4.8PS: 4.5

PSD: 6.9 PSD: 6.8

PSD: 7.2PSD: 6.9

PSD: 7.6PSD: 7.3

PSD: 7.5 PSD: 7.6

PSD: 8.0

PSD: 7.9PSD: 8.2

CDS: 7.9 CDS: 8.0

CDS: 8.7

CDS: 8.2CDS: 8.0

CDS: 7.4

CDS: 8.0CDS: 8.2

CDS: 7.6

CDS: 7.9CDS: 8.2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1978 1985 1989 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2012 2014 2015

Sources: 1978-2008, data elaborated by Freire and Lisi (2016a) from several sources; 2011 and 2015, Estudos Eleitorais Portugueses (Lobo and Magalhães 2011; Lobo and Magalhães 2015); 2012, Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2012); 2009 and 2014, European Election Studies (Egmond et al. 2013; Schmitt, Popa and Devinger 2015).