The

PRESIDENTIAL

RECORDINGS

JOHN F. KENNEDY

The

PRESIDENTIALRECORDINGS

JOHN F. KENNEDY

�� THE GREAT CRISES, VOLUME TWO ��

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 21, 1962

Timothy Naftali and Philip ZelikowEditors, Volume Two

David Coleman

George Eliades

Francis Gavin

Jill Colley Kastner

Erin Mahan

Ernest May

Jonathan Rosenberg

David Shreve

Associate Editors, Volume Two

Patricia Dunn

Assistant Editor

Philip Zelikow and Ernest May

General Editors

B

W. W. NORTON & COMPANY • NEW YORK • LONDON

Copyright © 2001 by The Miller Center of Public Affairs

Portions of this three-volume set were previously published by Harvard University Press in TheKennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisisby Philip D. Zelikow and Ernest R. May.Copyright © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

All rights reservedPrinted in the United States of AmericaFirst Edition

For information about permission to reproduce selections from this book, write to Permissions, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110

The text of this book is composed in Bell, with the display set in Bell and Bell Semi-BoldComposition by Tom ErnstManufacturing by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing GroupBook design by Dana SloanProduction manager: Andrew Marasia

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

John F. Kennedy : the great crises.p. cm. (The presidential recordings)

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.Contents: v. 1. July 30–August 1962 / Timothy Naftali, editor—v. 2. September 4–October 20,1962 / Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, editors—v. 3. October 22–28, 1962 / Philip Zelikowand Ernest May, editors.ISBN 0-393-04954-X

1. United States—Politics and government—1961–1963—Sources. 2. United States—Foreign relations—1961–1963—Sources. 3. Crisis management—United States—History—20th century—Sources. 4. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963—Archives. I. Naftali,Timothy J. II. Zelikow, Philip, 1954– III. May, Ernest R. IV. Series.

E841.J58 2001973.922—dc21 2001030053

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110www.wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

The Presidential Recordings Project

Philip ZelikowDirector of the Center

Timothy NaftaliDirector of the Project

Editorial Advisory BoardMichael Beschloss

Taylor BranchRobert Dallek

Walter IsaacsonAllen Matusow

Richard NeustadtArthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Robert Schulzinger

vii

Contents

The Presidential Recordings ProjectBy Philip Zelikow and Ernest May xi

Preface to John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3By Philip Zelikow and Ernest May xvii

Editors’ Acknowledgments xxv

Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars xxvii

A Note on Sources xxix

Meeting Participants and Other Frequently Mentioned Persons xxxi

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1962 3

11:30–11:50 A.M. Meeting on U-2 Incident 412:35–1:00 P.M. Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 194:00–4:50 P.M. Drafting Meeting on the

Cuba Press Statement 335:00–5:55 P.M. Meeting with Congressional Leadership

on Cuba 525:55–6:10 P.M. Meeting on the Congressional Resolution

about Cuba 73

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1962 81

5:00–6:15 P.M. Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 82

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1962 110

TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with Douglas Dillon 11212:35–12:40 P.M. Meeting with Billy Graham and

Dwight Eisenhower 115

C O N T E N T Sviii

12:40–1:02 P.M. Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 1186:45–7:15 P.M. Meeting on Berlin 135

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1962 149

4:55 P.M. Conversation with John McCormack, Thomas Morgan, and Carl Vinson 150

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1962 154

5:00–5:56 P.M. Meeting with Maxwell Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 156

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1962 178

11:30 A.M.–12:03 P.M. Meeting on Laos 178

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1962 181

11:00 A.M.–12:27 P.M. Meeting on the Soviet Union 1821:18–1:30 P.M. Meeting on the Crisis at the

University of Mississippi 222APPROXIMATELY 1:30–1:35 P.M. Meeting with

Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case 2302:00 P.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 2332:25 P.M. Conversation with Theodore Sorensen 2372:30 P.M. Conversation with LeMoyne Billings 2382:50 P.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 2397:36 P.M. Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 247

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 30–MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962 250

APPROXIMATELY 10:40 P.M.–1:00 A.M. Meeting on Civil Rights 25112:14 A.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 288Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued 290APPROXIMATELY 12:40 A.M. Conversation from the

Oval Office between Robert Kennedy and Cyrus Vance 299Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued 2991:45 A.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 3061:50 A.M. Continuation of Conversation with

Ross Barnett 3082:00 A.M. Conversation between Robert Kennedy and

Creighton Abrams 3104:20 A.M. Conversation with Creighton Abrams 312

C O N T E N T S ix

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962 314

8:46 A.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 3149:31 A.M. Conversation with Archibald Cox 31611:12 A.M. Conversation with Cyrus Vance and

Robert McNamara 317

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1962 319

4:20–5:20 P.M. Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 321

5:25 P.M. Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and Cyrus Vance 352

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1962 355

9:20 A.M. Conversation with Cyrus Vance 35610:05 A.M. Conversation with John McCormack 357SOMETIME THAT MORNING. Conversation with

Lawrence F. O’Brien 359

MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1962 361

10:30 A.M. Conversation with Mike Mansfield 36212:00 P.M. Conversation with Albert Gore 3654:48–5:10 P.M. Meeting on the Budget 369

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1962 378

9:54 A.M. Conversation with Mike Mansfield and Mike Kirwan 379

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1962 381

TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with George Smathers 382TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with Eugene Keogh 388TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation about James Meredith 389

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1962 391

11:50 A.M.–1:00 P.M. Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 397

6:30–8:00 P.M. Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 427

WEDNESDAY, October 17, 1962 46810:00–11:30 A.M. Meeting with West German

Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 469

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1962 49910:00–10:38 A.M. Cabinet Meeting on

the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 49911:10 A.M.–1:15 P.M. Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 512NEAR MIDNIGHT. Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting

on the Cuban Missile Crisis 572

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1962 5789:45–10:30 A.M. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs

of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 578

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1962 5992:30–5:10 P.M. National Security Council Meeting

on the Cuban Missile Crisis 601

Index 615

T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C Tx

xi

The Presidential Recordings Project

BY PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY

Between 1940 and 1973, presidents of the United States secretlyrecorded hundreds of their meetings and conversations in theWhite House. Though some recorded a lot and others just a little,

they created a unique and irreplaceable source for understanding notonly their presidencies and times but the presidency as an institutionand, indeed, the essential process of high-level decision making.

These recordings of course do not displace more traditional sourcessuch as official documents, private diaries and letters, memoirs, and con-temporaneous journalism. They augment these sources much as photo-graphs, films, and recordings augment printed records of presidents’public appearances. But they do much more than that.

Because the recordings capture an entire meeting or conversation,not just highlights caught by a minute-taker or recalled afterward in amemorandum or memoir, they have or can have two distinctive qualities.In the first place, they can catch the whole complex of considerationsthat weigh on a president’s action choice. Most of those present at ameeting with a president know chiefly the subject of that meeting. Evenkey staff advisers have compartmented responsibilities. Tapes or tran-scripts of successive meetings or conversations can reveal interlockedconcerns of which only the president was aware. They can provide hardevidence, not just bases for inference, about presidential motivations.

Desk diaries, public and private papers of presidents, and memoirsand oral histories by aides, family, and friends all show how varied anddifficult were the presidents’ responsibilities and how little time they hadfor meeting those responsibilities. But only the tapes provide a clear pic-ture of how these responsibilities constantly converged—how a presi-dent could be simultaneously, not consecutively, a commander in chiefworrying about war, a policymaker conscious that his missteps in eco-nomic policy could bring on a market collapse, a chief mediator amonginterest groups, a chief administrator for a myriad of public programs, aspokesperson for the interests and aspirations of the nation, a head of asprawling political party, and more.

The tapes reveal not only what presidents said but what they heard.For everyone, there is some difference between learning by ear and by

eye. Action-focused individuals ordinarily take in more of what is said tothem than of what they read, especially when they can directly questiona speaker. A document read aloud to a president had a much betterchance of registering than the same document simply placed in the in-box. Though hearing and reading can both be selective, tapes probablyshow, better than any other records, the information and advice guidingpresidential choices.

Perhaps most usefully, the secret tapes record, as do no other sources,the processes that produce decisions. Presidential advisers can be hearddebating with one another. They adapt to the arguments of the others.They sometimes change their minds. The common positions at the endof a meeting are not necessarily those taken by any person at the outset.The president’s own views have often been reshaped. Sometimes therehas been a basic shift in definition of an issue or of the stakes involved.Hardly anyone ever has a clear memory of such changes. Yet, with thetape, a listener now can hear those changes taking place—can follow, asnowhere else, the logic of high-stakes decision making.

Casting about for analogies, we have thought often of Pompeii. As theruins uncovered there have given students of Greco-Roman civilizationknowledge not to be found anywhere else, in any form, so the presidentialrecordings give students of the presidency, of U.S. and world history, andof decision making knowledge simply without parallel or counterpart.They are a kind of time machine, allowing us to go back and be in theroom as history was being made. And, unlike even the finest archaeologi-cal site, what we uncover are the words and deliberations of the peoplethemselves in the moment of action, not just the accounts, summarynotes, or after-the-fact reconstructions they left behind.

Of the six presidents who used secret recording devices, three did soextensively. Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhowerrecorded to a limited extent. John Kennedy, however, after installing anelaborate taping system in July 1962, used it frequently during the 16months before his murder in November 1963. Using a different system,Lyndon Johnson made recordings throughout his presidency, especially in1968, his last, tumultuous year in office. Richard Nixon, after two yearswithout using any recording devices, installed a system which, becausevoice activated, captured every conversation in a room with a microphone.

The existence of Nixon’s system came to light in July 1973 duringcongressional hearings on administration involvement in the 1972Watergate burglary. Segments of tape obtained by Congress provided amajor basis for the impeachment proceedings that led to Nixon’s laterresignation.

T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C Txii

The Watergate hearings brought an end to secret taping. Afterward,it became unlawful to record conversations without knowledge and con-sent. As the ruins of Pompeii reveal details of Greco-Roman life only upto August of 79 A.D., when lava from Vesuvius buried the city, so secretrecordings reveal the inner workings of the U.S. presidency only from1940—and especially 1962—down to mid-1973.

On the premise that these recordings will remain important histori-cal sources for centuries to come, the University of Virginia’s MillerCenter of Public Affairs plans to produce transcripts and aids for usingall accessible recordings for all six presidencies. We started with themethods and style we used in 1996–97 to produce a then-unprecedentedvolume of its kind, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during theCuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).Though that volume improved on the then-available transcripts of a fewKennedy administration meetings, we kept trying to find ways to makethe transcripts still better. This was a process of trial and error.

Our initial hope was that professional transcribers, like court reporters,could do much of the primary transcription. That did not work out well.For those untrained in the history of the period, transcribing presiden-tial tapes can be a bit like assembling a jigsaw puzzle without being ableto see the picture on the puzzle box, and this is especially true when theaudio quality is bad. Tapes of telephone conversations tend to be mucheasier, both because the speakers are using a machine that was linked tothe original recording system (usually a Dictaphone in this case) andbecause there are generally only two participants in the telephone con-versation. Recordings of meetings are much harder to transcribe. MostKennedy recordings are of meetings; most Johnson recordings (and allthose publicly released so far) are of telephone conversations.

Originally short of funds and audio expertise, we initially workedalmost entirely with ordinary cassette copies of the tapes. We later beganrelying on more expensive Digital Audio Tape (DAT) technology. We triedout other technical fixes, starting in 1996 with a standard noise reductiontechnique (called NONOISE in the trade). The results were disappointing.We have since tried out other, much more sophisticated techniques sug-gested by some sound studios. Though we have learned these techniquescan sometimes be vital for especially murky material suffering from unusualinterference, there is an offsetting risk of additional distortion and loss ofdata, including the subtle changes in tone that can affect accurate speakeridentification. Two of our scholars, Timothy Naftali and George Eliades,were especially critical experimenters in this learning process.

The same two scholars helped the growing team stumble on a more

T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T xiii

useful bit of hardware. Looking for a way for two scholars to listensimultaneously to the same DAT copies, Eliades suggested use of a mul-tiple outlet headphone amplifier (Rane’s Mojo amplifier). Eliades andNaftali also discovered that this hardware dramatically improved ourability to boost the audio signal from the tapes. We are continuing to tin-ker with the hardware, including more use of CD-ROM technology. Wewelcome suggestions for further improvement.

The most fundamental improvements in transcription so far, though,have not come from machines. They came from people. Introduction of ateam method for reviewing transcripts, an innovation developed andmanaged mainly by Naftali, has helped reduce the most intractable sourceof error—the cognitive expectations and limitations of an individual lis-tener. For instance, when you expect to hear a word in an ambiguous bitof sound, you often hear it. Even without particular expectations, differ-ent listeners hear different things. So we have utilized a special kind of“peer review” in this new realm of basic historical research.

The talents required from our scholars are demanding. They must beexcellent historians, knowledgeable about the events and people of theperiod. They must also have a particular temperament. Anthropologistsand archaeologists used to taking infinite pains at a dig, teaspoon ortoothbrush in hand, might call this a talent for “field work.” So we areespecially grateful to the historians, listed on the title page of the vol-umes, who have displayed the knowledge, the patience, and the disciplinethis work requires, rewarded by a constant sense of discovery.

In consultation with our editorial advisory board and our scholars,we developed a number of methodological principles for the MillerCenter’s work. Among the most important are:

First, the work is done by trained professional historians who havedone deep research on the period covered by the tapes and on some ofthe central themes of the meetings and conversations. They are listed onthe title page as associate and volume editors. The historians not onlydelve into documentary sources but sometimes interview living partici-pants who can help us comprehend the taped discussions. Our voiceidentifications are based on sample clips we have compiled and on ourresearch. On occasion our list of participants in a meeting differs fromthe log of President Kennedy’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln. We list onlythe names of participants whose voices we can identify. Our research hasalso turned up a few minor cataloguing errors made at the time or later.

Second, each volume uses the team method. Since few people alwaysspeak in complete grammatical sentences, the transcriber has to inferand create paragraphs, commas, semicolons, periods, and such. Usually

T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C Txiv

one or two scholars painstakingly produce a primary draft, including theintroductory scene setters and explanatory annotations. Two or morescholars then carefully go over that transcript, individually or sometimestwo listening at the same time, with their suggestions usually goingback to the primary transcriber. In the case of often-difficult meetingtapes, like the Kennedy recordings, every transcript has benefited from atleast four listeners. The volume editors remain accountable for checkingthe quality and accuracy of all the work in their volume, knittingtogether the whole. All of this work is then reviewed by the general edi-tors, with the regular advice of members of the project’s editorial advi-sory board.

Third, we use the best technology that the project can afford. As of2001, we work from DAT copies of the recordings (not the less expensiveanalog cassettes ordinarily sold to the public by presidential libraries).Our transcribers are now moving toward transferring this digital dataonto CD-ROMs. Each transcriber at least uses a professional qualityDAT machine and AKG K240 headphones with the signal boosted by aheadphone amplifier. Each listens to a DAT copy of the library master,checking with a DAT from which sound engineers have attempted toremove extraneous background noise.

Fourth, we aim at completeness. Over time, others using the tran-scripts and listening to the tapes may be able to fill in passages marked[unclear]. Although the Miller Center volumes are intended to be author-itative reference works, they will always be subject to minor amendments.Editors of these volumes will endeavor to issue periodic updates. We useellipses in our transcripts in order to indicate that the speaker paused ortrailed off, not to indicate that material has been omitted.

Fifth, we strive to make the transcripts accessible to and readable byanyone interested in history, including students. As the U.S. govern-ment’s National Archives has pointed out, the actual records are thetapes themselves and all transcripts are subjective interpretations. Forinstance, our team omits verbal debris such as the “uh”s that dot almostanyone’s speech. Listeners unconsciously filter out such debris as theyunderstand what someone is saying. Judgments must be made. Someonesays, for example, “sixteen . . . uh, sixty. . . . ” The transcriber has todecide whether the slip was significant or not. But the judgment calls areusually no more difficult than those involved in deciding where to insertpunctuation or paragraphing. In the effort to be exhaustive, sometimesthere is a temptation to overtranscribe, catching every fragmentaryutterance, however unclear or peripheral. But the result on the page canadd too much intrusive static, making the substance less understandable

T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T xv

now than it was to listeners at the time. Obviously, what to include andomit, balancing coherence and comprehension against the completenessof the record, also requires subjective judgment. The object is to give thereader or user the truest possible sense of the actual dialogue as the par-ticipants themselves could have understood it (had they been payingattention).

Sixth, we go one step further by including in each volume explana-tions and annotations intended to enable readers or users to understandthe background and circumstances of a particular conversation or meet-ing. With rare exceptions, we do not add information that participantswould not have known. Nor do we comment often on the significance ofitems of information, except as it might have been recognized by the par-ticipants. As with other great historical sources, interpretations willhave to accumulate over future decades and centuries.

T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C Txvi

Preface to John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3

BY PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY

These three volumes in the Miller Center Presidential Recordingsseries cover the three months after Kennedy first began to tape-record meetings.

Before and after becoming president, Kennedy had made use of arecording device called a Dictaphone, mostly for dictating letters or notes.In the summer of 1962 he asked Secret Service Agent Robert Bouck toconceal recording devices in the Cabinet Room, the Oval Office, and astudy/library in the Mansion. Without explaining why, Bouck obtainedTandberg reel-to-reel tape recorders, high-quality machines for theperiod, from the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He placed two of these machinesin the basement of the West Wing of the White House in a roomreserved for storing private presidential files. He placed another in thebasement of the Executive Mansion.

The West Wing machines were connected by wire to two micro-phones in the Cabinet Room and two in the Oval Office. Those in theCabinet Room were on the outside wall, placed in two spots covered bydrapes where once there had been wall fixtures. They were activated bya switch at the President’s place at the Cabinet table, easily mistaken fora buzzer press. Of the microphones in the Oval Office, one was in thekneehole of the President’s desk, the other concealed in a coffee tableacross the room. Each could be turned on or off with a single push on aninconspicuous button.

We do not know where the microphone in the study of the Mansionwas located. In any case, Bouck, who had chief responsibility for the sys-tem, said in 1976, in an oral history interview, that President Kennedy“did almost no recording in the Mansion.” Of the machine in the base-ment of the Mansion, he said: “Except for one or two short recordings, Idon’t think it was ever used.” So far, except possibly for one shortrecording included in these volumes, no tape from the Mansion machinehas turned up.

President Kennedy also had a Dictaphone hooked up to a telephonein the Oval Office and possibly also to a telephone in his bedroom. He

xvii

could activate it, and so could his private secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, whoknew of the secret microphones, often made sure that they were turnedoff if the President had forgotten to do so, and took charge of finishedreels of tape when they were brought to her by Bouck or Bouck’s assis-tant, Agent Chester Miller.

Though Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, andRobert Kennedy’s secretary, Angie Novello, certainly knew of the tapes anddictabelts by some point in 1963, it is not clear that they had this knowl-edge earlier. Anecdotes suggest that the President’s close aide and sched-uler, Kenneth O’Donnell, might have known about the system and mighthave told another aide, Dave Powers, but the anecdotes are unsupported.Most White House insiders, including counsel Theodore Sorensen, whohad been Kennedy’s closest aide in the Senate, were astonished when theylearned later that their words had been secretly captured on tape.

After Kennedy’s assassination, Evelyn Lincoln was quickly displacedby President Johnson’s secretaries. She arranged, however, for the SecretService agents to pull out all the microphones, wires, and recorders andtook the tapes and dictabelts to her newly assigned offices in theExecutive Office Building, adjacent to the White House. Though RobertKennedy had charge of these and all other records from the KennedyWhite House, Lincoln retained physical custody.

During Kennedy’s presidency, only a small number of conversationswere transcribed. Though Lincoln attempted to make some other tran-scripts, she never had much time for doing so. George Dalton, a formerNavy Petty Officer and general chore man for the Kennedy family, tookon the job. “Dalton transcripts” have not been released, but everyonewho has seen them uses terms like fragmentary, terrible to unreliable, awful,or garbage.

The tapes and dictabelts migrated with President Kennedy’s papers.First they moved to the main National Archives building in downtownWashington, D.C. Herman Kahn (an archivist, not the strategic analyst)was responsible for them within the National Archives system; RobertKennedy was the custodian for materials belonging to the family, includ-ing all the tapes. Robert Kennedy disclosed the existence of the tapes in1965 to Burke Marshall, a legal scholar and former Justice Departmentcolleague. Lincoln and Dalton were looking after the materials, andDalton was attempting some transcripts. The papers and the tapes thenwere moved to a federal records depository in Waltham, Massachusetts.In the summer and fall of 1967, when Robert Kennedy drafted hisfamous memoir of the Cuban missile crisis, Thirteen Days, he used what-

P R E FAC Exviii

ever transcripts existed and almost certainly listened to tapes. Passagesin the book which refer to “diaries” seem nearly all to be based on thesecret recordings.1

After Robert Kennedy was assassinated in 1968, custody of PresidentKennedy’s private papers became the primary responsibility of SenatorEdward Kennedy (Burke Marshall represented Jacqueline Kennedy’sinterests). Dalton was employed by Senator Kennedy, and either sometapes or some of Dalton’s transcripts or both may have been moved intoSenator Kennedy’s own files. Despite occasional rumors, none of the cus-todians publicly acknowledged that the tapes existed.

When Nixon’s taping system was revealed in 1973 and Congress wasseeking access to those tapes, Senator Kennedy was a member of theinquiring Judiciary Committee. With rumors by then rife, he and the fam-ily quickly confirmed that President Kennedy had, indeed, also secretlytaped meetings and conversations in the White House. They publiclypromised to turn the tapes over to the National Archives. During the nexttwo years they negotiated a deed of gift that put in the hands of archivistsat the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts, alltapes except those dealing with private family affairs.

According to Richard Burke, a longtime member of Senator Kennedy’sstaff, Dalton was instructed by the late Steven Smith, Senator Kennedy’sbrother-in-law, to remove sensitive documents from the Kennedy papersand to cull the tapes in order to protect the family’s reputation. Burkealso claims that he read transcripts by Dalton from Oval Office dictabeltsof conversations with Marilyn Monroe and Judith Exner and thatDalton had erased potentially embarrassing passages.2 But Burke is anundependable source. A book he wrote about his years with the senatoris full not only of errors but of outright inventions. Yet there are others,including at least one Kennedy Library archivist who received thetapes, who suspected that between 1973 and 1975, Dalton—possiblyassisted by Kennedy aide Dave Powers and retired archivist andKennedy family employee Frank Harrington—looked at the tapes to seewhat should be removed without leaving any record or documentation

P R E FAC E xix

1. See Timothy Naftali, “The Origins of ‘Thirteen Days,’”Miller Center Report 15, no. 2 (sum-mer 1999): 23–24.2. Philip Bennett, “Mystery Surrounds Role of JFK Tapes Transcriber,” Boston Globe, 31March 1993, p. 1; Seymour M. Hersh, The Dark Side of Camelot (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997),pp. 454–55.

of their work. Dalton has refused to discuss what he did. SenatorKennedy’s then–chief of staff, when interviewed in 1993 by the BostonGlobe reporter Philip Bennett, denied that Dalton had worked on thetapes at the direction of Senator Kennedy, but Burke Marshall toldPhilip Zelikow in February 2000 that he thought Dalton had beenworking on the tapes for the Senator, at least in general.

In 1975, tapes recording about 248 hours of meetings and 12 hoursof telephone conversations became part of the President’s Office Files atthe library. While a treasure trove for history, this handover did notinclude all the recordings that President Kennedy had made, nor were allthe recordings complete.

Fortunately perhaps, the Secret Service agents had originally num-bered and catalogued the reels of meeting tapes in a simple way, soremovals and anomalies are easily noticed. There are a few. Three tapeswere received by the library with reels containing “separate tape seg-ments.” It is possible that they had been cut and spliced, for two of thesetapes, including the one made on August 22, 1962, concerned intelli-gence issues and may have involved discussion of covert efforts to assas-sinate Castro. The Kennedy Library archivist Alan Goodrich says,however, that the “separate tape segments” may exist simply because theSecret Service agents were winding some partial reels of tape togetherto fill out the reels of blank tape being fed into the machine.

Another tape from August 1962 is simply blank. Several more num-bered tape boxes, for tapes made in June 1963, had no tapes inside,though the library has “Dalton transcripts” for at least four of thesemissing tapes. The fact that still other tapes received by the library hadbeen miswound suggests at least that they had been clumsily handled.Since the library has not yet issued its own forensic reports about the“separate tape fragments” or blank tape or made the original tape reelsavailable for outside examination or released the existing “Dalton tran-scripts” for missing tapes, we cannot draw conclusive judgments aboutjust what happened.

The dictabelt recordings never had any order. Lincoln seems to havefiled them randomly. Some seem to have been partially overwritten. TheKennedy Library’s numbers merely distinguish one item from another.They provide no guidance to chronological sequence or content. As withthe meeting tapes, the Kennedy Library has attempted to date and iden-tify the tapes, and the editors of these volumes have confirmed and, invarious cases, amended this information as a result of further research. Anumber of dictabelts were taken by Lincoln without authorization for aprivate collection of Kennedy memorabilia. Some of these went to the

P R E FAC Exx

Kennedy Library after her death in 1995; others turned up in the handsof a collector who had befriended her. In 1998 the Kennedy Library wasable to recover these dictabelts too, but there is no way of knowingwhether there were others and, if so, what their fate was.

Once in the jurisdiction of the Archivist of the United States, therecordings were handled with thoroughgoing professionalism. The libraryremastered the tapes on a Magnecord 1022 for preservation. The dicta-belts were copied onto new masters. All copies of the tapes, includingthose used for these books, derive from these new preservation masters.

Some minor anomalies were introduced as a result of the remastering.Listeners will occasionally hear a tape stop and the recording start up,replaying a sentence or two. That is an artifact of the remastering process,not the original White House taping. The original tapes were also recordedat relatively high density (1 inches per second). The remastered tapesnecessarily have different running speeds that produce subtle audio distor-tion. The new masters, for example, seem to have people talking slightlyfaster than they did at the time.

The library was initially at a loss as to how to make tapes available tothe public. Many contain material still covered by security classification.Because of the poor sound quality of most of the tapes, it was not easy toidentify sensitive passages. The library initially attempted to prepare itsown transcripts and submit these for classification review. But the taskwas hard, the library staff was small, and funds were meager. Moreover,some archivists believed as a matter of principle that the library shouldnot give official standing to transcripts that might contain transcribers’errors. In the view of the National Archives and Records Administration,only the tapes themselves are archival records. All transcripts are works ofsubjective interpretation. The effort at transcription came to an end in1983, and almost all the tapes remained under lock and key.

In 1993 the library acquired new equipment and began putting therecordings onto Digital Audio Tape (DAT). These could be reviewed inWashington and digitally marked without transcripts. Changes in proce-dures, along with determined efforts by two archivists, StephanieFawcett and Mary Kennefick, accelerated the pace of declassification.Between 1996 and 2000 about half of the recordings in the KennedyLibrary became available for public release; the rest await declassifica-tion review.

While the Kennedy Library has been careful to make no deletions orerasures from tapes and dictabelts in its possession, the copies publiclyreleased, and used for these volumes, do have carefully annotated exci-sions of passages still security classified. These passages were excised

78

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digitally, not literally, and remain intact on the library’s preservationmasters. It is to be hoped that future, more tolerant declassificationreviews may someday release some of the material that currently isexcised. But even for the sanitized tapes, the library issues no transcripts.

Our work on these tapes commenced in 1995. We obtained analogcassettes of tapes relating to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as soon as theywere released. Painstakingly, we listened to and transcribed those tapes.Each of us spent many hours listening to each hour of tape. Even so, ourtranscripts contained large numbers of notations for words or passagesthat were unclear or speakers that could not be identified. The resultanttranscripts were published by Harvard University Press in 1997 as TheKennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Because of support from the Governing Council of the University ofVirginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs, and W. W. Norton, the tran-scripts of meetings on the missile crisis in volumes 2 and 3 of this seriesare more complete and accurate than were our original products. Wewere able to decipher in those tapes large numbers of words and pas-sages previously incomprehensible and to identify speakers with greatercertainty. We were also able to draw on the assistance of other historiansemployed in the Miller Center’s Presidential Recordings Project,employing and benefiting from the team method we describe in our gen-eral preface on the project.

Some questions nevertheless linger because of uncertainties, alreadydescribed, concerning the completeness and integrity of the tapes nowavailable. Why were they made? Did Kennedy use the on/off switch with aview to controlling, even distorting the historical record? Did others, afterhis murder, tamper with the tapes in order artificially to shape the recordof events? In view of the possibility that a small fraction of the meetingtapes were removed or mangled after the fact, can they really be regardedas better sources than self-serving memoirs or oral histories? To theextent that they are valid, undoctored records of conversations and meet-ings, do they tell us much that could not be learned from other sources?

Our judgment is that any tampering with the tapes was so crude andham handed that it extended only to removals. The extent of suchremovals may have been constrained by the original Secret Service cata-loguing system. Since missing tapes would be noticed, too many missingtapes might cause an outcry and lead to unwelcome inquiries. So theremovals of meeting tapes, if that is the explanation for the anomalies,were relatively limited. The situation of the dictabelts is different. Sincethey were not catalogued at the time they were made, we cannot knowhow many—if any—are missing.

P R E FAC Exxii

The most plausible explanation for Kennedy’s making secret taperecordings is that he wanted material to be used later in writing a mem-oir. Since he seems neither to have had transcripts made (with two minorexceptions in 1963) nor to have listened to any of the tapes, it is unlikelythat he wanted them for current business. He had himself written histo-ries and was by most accounts prone to asking historians’ questions:How did this situation develop? What had previous administrationsdone? He knew how hard it was to answer such questions from surviv-ing documentary records. And he faced the apparent likelihood that,even if reelected in 1964, he would be an out-of-work ex-president whennot quite 51 years old.

Did Kennedy tape just to have material putting himself in a favorablelight? On some occasions, he must have refrained from pushing an “on”button because he wanted no record of a meeting or conversation.Especially on early tapes, there are pauses at moments when the Presidentwas speaking of tactics for dealing with legislative leaders. Almost cer-tainly, he made recordings only when he thought the occasions important.As a result, the tapes record relatively little humdrum White House busi-ness such as meetings with citizen delegations or conferences with con-gressmen and others about patronage.

Those who have spent much time with the tapes and those who havecompared the tapes to their own experience working with Kennedy findno evidence that he taped only self-flattering moments. He often madestatements or discussed ideas that would have greatly damaged him hadthey become public. Early in the missile crisis, for example, he musedabout his own possible responsibility for having brought it on. “Lastmonth I said we weren’t going to [allow it],” he said. “Last month Ishould have said that we don’t care.” He never seemed to make speechesduring a meeting for the benefit of future listeners. His occasional tapedmonologues were private dictation about something that had happenedor what he was thinking, obviously for his own later reference.

Two other points apply. First, he had no reason to suppose that thetapes would ever be heard by anyone other than himself unless he choseto make them available. They were completely secret. Second, he couldhardly have known just what statements or positions would look good toposterity, for neither he nor his colleagues could know how the storieswould turn out.

The tapes of missile crisis debates establish far more clearly than anyother records the reasons why Kennedy thought Soviet missiles in Cubaso dangerous and important. They make abundantly clear that his preoc-cupation was not with Cuba or the immediate threat to the United

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States. He feared that, if he did not insist on removal of the missiles,Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would be emboldened to try to takeover West Berlin, in which case he—Kennedy—would have only twochoices. He would either have to abandon the two and a half millionWest Berliners theretofore protected by the United States, or he wouldhave to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, for there was noimaginable way of defending West Berlin with conventional militaryforces. The Soviet missiles in Cuba would then be a “knife in our guts”constraining the U.S. nuclear threats to save Berlin.

The tapes also explain as do no other sources Kennedy’s approach tothe Mississippi civil rights crisis. They show him worrying about inter-national economics, specifically the drain on U.S. gold reserves, to suchan extent that he questions whether the United States can or shouldcontinue to keep troops in Europe. The tapes in some instances disclosefacts still hidden by walls of security classification, as, for example, thatthe Kennedy administration had plans to create an illegal CIA unit toinvestigate U.S. journalists and officials.

But the greatest value of these recordings does not reside in specificrevelations. It comes, as is said in the general preface to the project, fromgiving a listener or reader unique insight into the presidency and presi-dential decision making. We are proud to be able to put this extraordi-nary source into the hands of students of history and politics.

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Editors’ Acknowledgments

These initial volumes of the John F. Kennedy Presidential RecordingsSeries represent the work of a team of dedicated people. Besides thescholars listed on the title page, the editors are grateful to LorraineSettimo, the executive assistant of the Miller Center’s PresidentialRecordings Project, and to Andrew P. N. Erdmann, the scholar whoassisted with the Eisenhower conversations. At the John F. KennedyLibrary, Jim Cedrone, Alan Goodrich, William Johnson, and MaryKennefick were especially helpful. And at the National Archives, NancyKeegan Smith was of special assistance. Lastly, we are deeply grateful toour editors at Norton, Drake McFeely and Sarah Stewart, who exhibitsuch a rare combination of qualities: attention to detail, patience, andvision.

Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars

RESEARCH SCHOLARS

David ColemanCuba, Nuclear Test Ban

George EliadesVietnam, Laos, Nuclear Test Ban

Francis GavinBerlin Crisis, International Monetary Policy

Max HollandDomestic Politics

Jill Colley KastnerU. S.-German Relations

Erin MahanBerlin Crisis, U.S.-European Relations, Congo, Middle East,

United Nations, China

Timothy NaftaliU.S.-Soviet Relations, Cuba, General Latin America,

Intelligence Policy, Nuclear Test Ban

Paul PitmanU.S.-European Relations

Jonathan RosenbergCivil Rights

David ShreveCongressional Relations, Tax and Budgetary Policy,

International Monetary Policy

CD-ROM DEVELOPER AND MULTIMEDIA COORDINATOR

Kristin Gavin

RESEARCH ASSISTANTS

Brett Avery BushW. Taylor Fain

Laura Moranchek

A Note on Sources

In addition to the various memoirs and other writings cited as sources inour footnotes, we have relied upon the relevant archival holdings for theWhite House and the various agencies of the U.S. government, heldmainly in the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston and the NationalArchives, Washington, D.C. We have also relied on the less formal hold-ings of that useful private institute, the National Security Archive,Washington, D.C.

Each footnote appearing for the first time in a chapter is fully citedon first reference. The one exception made was for the many footnotesciting the U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States1961–63 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). Footnotesthat include references to Foreign Relations of the United States are abbre-viated as FRUS and include the volume number and page numbers. ForFRUS references other than those from 1961 to 1963, the appropriateyears are included.

Meeting Participants and OtherFrequently Mentioned Persons

The following is a concise guide to individuals who participated intaped conversations. We have supplemented these brief descrip-tions, when possible, with the thumbnail sketches made by for-

mer presidential special consultant Richard E. Neustadt in his bookReport to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1999). Neustadt met the people he has written about.We feel that his vivid brush strokes add some additional color that we, atthis distant remove, do not feel qualified to provide. We also include fig-ures mentioned frequently in the conversations, such as foreign heads ofgovernment, who were not present at the meetings.

Abrams, Creighton W., Colonel, U.S. Army; Assistant Deputy Chief ofStaff and Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Stafffor Operations, 1962–1963

Ackley, H. Gardner, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968(Chairman, 1964–1968)

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,1949–1963

Alexander, Henry, Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust in 1962Allen, Ward P., Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political

Affairs, Department of StateAnderson, George W., Admiral, U.S. Navy; U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,

1961–1963Ausland, John C., State Department Representative to the Berlin Task

Force, 1961–1964Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State, 1961–1966

A Washington lawyer with an international practice, wartime associate ofJean Monnet (the advocate of European Union), adviser to Adlai Stevensonin 1952, ’56 and ’60, Ball had come into the Kennedy Administration as

xxxi

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; his focused energy, intelligence, andapplication already had won him a promotion.

Barbour, Walworth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, 1961–1973Barnett, Ross R., Democratic Governor of Mississippi, 1960–1964Bell, David E., Director of the Budget, 1961–1962; Director, U.S.

Agency for International Development after December 1962An economist, former Secretary of Harvard’s Graduate School of PublicAdministration, as it then was, and before that Administrative Assistant toPresident Truman, Bell was personable, thoughtful, analytic, and experienced.

Billings, LeMoyne, Personal friend of President Kennedy; a roommate ofthe young JFK at Choate and, briefly, Princeton

Blough, Roger, Chairman, U.S. Steel Corporation, 1955–1969Boeschenstein, Harold, Senior Executive, Owens-Corning Fiberglass

Corporation in 1962Boggs, Thomas Hale, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Louisiana,

1941–1943, 1947–1972; House Majority Whip, 1961–1971Bohlen, Charles E., Special Adviser to the President, 1961–1962; U.S.

Ambassador to France, October 1962–1968One of the two top Russian specialists in the State Department, recentlyappointed Ambassador to France. More a thoroughly skilled operator than adeep analyst, Bohlen was bored in Paris, feeling out of things.

Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for NationalSecurity Affairs, 1961–1966Formerly Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard at a young age, co-author ofHenry Stimson’s memoirs, “Mac” was bright, quick, confident, determined,striving to be the perfect staff man, juggling many balls at once.

Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant of Defense for InternationalSecurity Affairs, 1961–1963

Carter, Marshall S., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; Deputy Director ofCentral Intelligence, 1962–1965

Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba, 1959–Celebrezze, Anthony J., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,

1962–1965Charyk, Joseph V., Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1960–1963Clark, Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General of the United States,

1961–1965Clay, Lucius D., President’s Special Representative in Berlin, 1961–1962;

Special Consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1963Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International

Organization Affairs, 1961–1965Clifford, Clark, Personal Attorney to the President; Member, President’s

M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T Sxxxii

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 (Chairman from May1963)

Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central IntelligenceAgency, 1962–1966

Cox, Archibald, Solicitor General of the United States, 1961–1965Day, J. Edward, Postmaster General of the United States, 1961–1963Dean, Arthur H., Chairman, U.S. delegation, Conference on the Discon-

tinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Geneva, 1961–1962; Chairman, U.S.delegation, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962

de Gaulle, Charles, President of France, 1958–1969Dennison, Robert S., Admiral, U.S. Navy; Commander-in-Chief, U.S.

Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 1960–1963Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1965

Dillon was engagingly direct, practical, experienced, disinclined to reach beyondhis own (broad) departmental boundaries, except on Kennedy’s invitation.

Dirksen, Everett M., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Illinois, 1950–1969;Senate Minority Leader, 1959–1969

Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1962–1985Dowling, Walter C., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of

Germany, 1959–1963Duncan, John P., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1963Duvalier, François, President of Haiti, 1957–1971Eastland, James O., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Mississippi, 1943–1978Eisenhower, Dwight D., 34th President of the United States, 1953–1961Feldman, Myer, Deputy Special Counsel to the President, 1961–1964Fisher, Adrian, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, 1961–1969FitzGerald, Desmond, Chief, Far Eastern Division, Deputy Directorate

for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, 1958–1963Forrestal, Michael V., Senior Staff Member, National Security Council,

1962–1965Foster, William, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

1961–1969Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1964Fowler, James R., Deputy Administrator, Far East, U.S. Agency for

International DevelopmentFreeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1969Fulbright, J. William, U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Arkansas, 1945–1974;

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959–1974Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1961–1964

Wall Street lawyer, skilled, sophisticated, broad-gauged, loyal to McNamara.

M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S xxxiii

Goldberg, Arthur J., Secretary of Labor, 1961–1962; Associate Justice,U.S. Supreme Court, 1962–1965

Goodwin, Richard N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1961–1963

Gordon, A. Lincoln, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 1961–1966Gordon, Kermit, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962;

Director, Bureau of the Budget after December 1962Gore, Albert, Sr., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Tennessee, 1959–1971Goulart, João, President of Brazil,1961–1964Graham, William Franklin (Billy), Baptist minister and evangelistGraybeal, Sydney N., Division Chief, Foreign Missile and Space

Activities, Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1964Greenewalt, Crawford H., Chairman, E. I. DuPont de Nemours and

Company, 1962–1967Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister, 1957–1985Halaby, Najeeb E., Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,

1961–1965Halleck, Charles A., U.S. Representative, Republican, from Indiana,

1935–1969; House Minority Leader, 1959–1965Harriman, W. Averell, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern and

Pacific Affairs, 1961–1963Hart, Philip A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Michigan, 1959–1976Haworth, Leland, Member, Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 Heller, Walter W., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1964Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence

Agency, 1962–1965Hickenlooper, Bourke B., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Iowa,

1945–1969; Chairman, Republican Policy Committee, 1961–1969Hillenbrand, Martin J., Director, Berlin Task Force and the Office of

German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State,1961–1963

Hilsman, Roger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence andResearch, 1961–1963

Hodges, Luther H., Secretary of Commerce, 1961–1965Hoover, Herbert H., 31st President of the United States, 1929–1933Humphrey, Hubert H., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Minnesota,

1948–1964; Senate Majority Whip, 1961–1964Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States, 1961–1963Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political

Affairs, 1961–1964

M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T Sxxxiv

A senior career Foreign Service officer, most recently Ambassador to Thailand;successful in the Service in all senses of the phrase.

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General of the UnitedStates, 1962–1966

Kaysen, Carl, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for NationalSecurity Affairs, 1961–1963A professor of economics on leave from Harvard, Kaysen worked up expert-ise in defense policy and weaponry, among other things; brilliant, subtle,confident, analytic but also a looker-around-corners.

Keeny, Spurgeon, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for Scienceand TechnologyA physicist with training in international relations, associated from thestart with the President’s Science Adviser’s Office, Keeny was personable,sophisticated, discreet, and a great gatherer of bureaucratic intelligence.

Kennedy, John F., 35th President of the United States, 1961–1963Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States, 1961–1964Keogh, Eugene J., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from New York,

1937–1967Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the

Soviet Communist Party and Soviet Premier, 1953–1964Killian, James R., Special Assistant to the President for Science and

Technology, 1957–1959King, J. C., Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans,

Central Intelligence AgencyKirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., Executive Director, Central Intelligence

Agency, 1962–1965Kirwan, Michael, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Ohio, 1937–1970;

Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, HouseAppropriations Committee in 1962; Chairman, Democratic Congres-sional Campaign Committee

Kohler, Foy, Assistant Secretary of State for European and CanadianAffairs, 1959–September 1962; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union,September 1962–1966

Kreer, Robert G., Director of the Diplomatic Communication Services,Department of State

Kuchel, Thomas H., U.S. Senator, Republican, from California,1953–1969; Senate Minority Whip, 1959–1969

Land, Edwin, physicist and inventor; member, President’s ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board in 1962

Leddy, John M., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until

M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S xxxv

April 1961; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, April 1961–June1962; U.S. Representative to the Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development after October 1962

LeMay, Curtis E., General, U.S. Air Force; U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff,1961–1965

Lemnitzer, Lyman, General, U.S. Army; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, 1960–1962; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command,1962–1969

Lincoln, Evelyn, Personal Secretary to President Kennedy, 1952–1963Loeb, James, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, 1961–1962Long, Franklin, Assistant Director for Science and Technology, U.S.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962–1963Lovett, Robert A., Special Counselor to the President, 1961–1963; member,

Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 1962Lundahl, Arthur C., Assistant Director of Photographic Interpretation,

Central Intelligence Agency, from 1953MacArthur, Douglas, General of the Army, 1944–1964McDonald, David, President, United Steel Workers of America,

1952–1965MacDonald, Torbert, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,

1955–1976Macmillan, M. Harold, Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1957–1963

A one-nation Tory in Parliament from the 1930s, close to Eisenhower sinceNorth Africa in the ’40s, complex, shrewd, detached and tough behind abland, Edwardian exterior. Macmillan’s private humor and wry outlook onlife endeared him to Kennedy, despite their age difference.

Mansfield, Michael J., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Montana; SenateMajority Leader, 1961–1977

Marshall, Burke, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, 1961–1965Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs, 1962–1964Martin, William McChesney, Chairman, Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System, 1951–1970McCloy, John J., Special Adviser to the President on Disarmament

Matters, 1961–1963McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965McCormack, John, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,

1928–1971; Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1961–1971McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968

Recruited from the presidency of the Ford Motor Company, a driving, man-

M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T Sxxxvi

aging, no-nonsense—and also no-pomposity—rationalist; his adherence toreason and duty was so passionate as to hint at emotion hidden beneath.

Meany, George, President of the AFL-CIO, 1955–1979Meredith, James H., First African American student admitted to the

University of Mississippi, 1962–1963Mills, Wilbur D., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Arkansas,

1939–1976; Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee, 1957–1976Morgan, Thomas E., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Pennsylvania,

1945–1977; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1962;member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1962

Moscoso, Teodoro, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment; U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress

Murrow, Edward R., Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1964Nasser, Gamal Abdul, Prime Minister of Egypt, 1954–1956; President of

Egypt, 1956–1958; President of the United Arab Republic, 1958–1970Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs, 1961–1963Experienced in defense and diplomacy since 1940, sophisticated, competent,cool, public cold warrior and private philanthropist, Nitze had all the skillsand some of the limitations of the driving young banker he had once been.

Norstad, Lauris, General, U.S. Air Force; NATO Supreme AlliedCommander, Europe, 1956–1963

O’Brien, Lawrence F., Special Assistant to the President forCongressional Affairs, 1961–1963

O’Donnell, Kenneth, Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1963Okun, Arthur, Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers,

1961–1964Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, British Ambassador to the United States,

1961–1965Former Tory MP, intelligent, sensitive, quick on the uptake and well con-nected: related both to Macmillan’s wife and to Kennedy’s late lamentedbrother-in-law, the Marquis of Hartington, killed in World War II.

Pérez Godoy, General Ricardo Pío, leader of Peruvian military coup ofJuly 1962; leader of the military junta, 1962–1963

Pittman, Steuart, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense,1961–1964

Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, President of Peru, 1956–1962Reuther, Walter, President of the United Auto Workers,1946–1970Roosa, Robert V., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary

Affairs, 1961–1964

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Rosenthal, Jacob, Executive Assistant to the U.S. Under Secretary ofState, 1961–1966

Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairmanof the Policy Planning Council, 1961–1966MIT economist, a driving enthusiast and conceptualizer with a tendency tolisten to himself.

Rusk, Dean, U.S. Secretary of State, 1961–1969Experienced, thoughtful, conventional, perhaps essentially shy, temperamen-tally at odds with his presumed model and undoubted mentor, GeneralMarshall, Rusk may never have felt at ease with JFK, to say nothing ofarticulate aides like Kaysen.

Russell, Richard B., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Georgia, 1933–1971;Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

Salinger, Pierre E. G., White House Press Secretary 1961–1964Saltonstall, Leverett, U.S. Senator, Republican, from Massachusetts,

1945–1967; ranking minority member, Senate Armed ServicesCommittee, in 1962

Samuelson, Paul A., Economist; member, Council of Economic Advisers,1960–1968

Schaetzel, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State forEconomic Affairs, February 1961–March 1962; Special Assistant tothe Under Secretary of State, March 1962–September 1962; DeputyAssistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after September 1962

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1964Schroeder, Gerhard, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of

Germany, 1961–1966Schultze, Charles L., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1961–1965Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961–1971Shoup, David M., General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commandant of the U.S.

Marine Corps, 1960–1963Sloan, Frank K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs in 1962Smathers, George A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Florida, 1951–1969Solow, Robert M., Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1964Sproul, Alan, President of the New York Reserve Bank, 1941–1956;

Chairman, Task Force on the International Balance of Payments,November 1960–January 1961

Staats, Elmer B., Deputy Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1958–1966Stevenson, Adlai E., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United

Nations, 1961–1964

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Strong, Robert C., Director, Office of Near East Affairs, Department ofState, 1961–1963

Sullivan, William H., U.N. Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,Department of State until April 1963

Sweeney, Walter C., General, U.S. Air Force; Commanding General,Tactical Air Command, 1961–1965

Taber, John, U.S. Representative, Republican, from New York, 1923–1963;ranking minority member, House Appropriations Committee in 1962

Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern andSouth Asian Affairs, 1961–1965

Taylor, Maxwell D., General, U.S. Army; Military Representative of thePresident, 1961–1962, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,1962–1964[H]e had come out of retirement after a distinguished career to support JFKin 1960: one person at the Pentagon the President knew well enough to trust.

Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1961–1971Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., Ambassador-at-Large, U.S. Department of

State, 1962–1966Tobin, James, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962Tretick, Stanley, Staff photographer for Look magazine in Washington,

1961–1971Troutman, Robert, Member, President’s Committee on Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity, 1961–1962Tshombe, Moise Kapenda, Leader of the secessionist Katanga Province,

the Congo, 1960–1963Turner, Robert C., Assistant Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget,

1961–1962Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,

September 1962–1965 Vance, Cyrus R., U.S. Secretary of the Army, 1962–1963Vinson, Carl, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Georgia, 1914–1966;

Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, in 1962Wagner, Aubrey, Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, 1962–1978Webb, James E., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, 1961–1968Wehrley, Roy, Director, U.S. Agency for International Development

mission in Vientiane, LaosWheeler, Earle G., General, U.S. Army; Army Chief of Staff, 1962–1964White, Lincoln, Spokesman, U. S. Department of State, 1961–1963Wiesner, Jerome B., Special Assistant to the President for Science and

Technology, 1961–1964

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Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,1961–1966

Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1965Wirtz, W. Willard, Secretary of Labor, 1962–1969Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation

Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962–1964Zuckert, Eugene M., Secretary of the Air Force, 1961–1965

M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T Sxl

The

PRESIDENTIAL

RECORDINGS

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Tuesday, September 4, 1962

The President’s Labor Day holiday in Newport, Rhode Island, endedabruptly. A U.S. spy plane had just accidentally strayed over Soviet terri-tory in violation of international law and the President’s 1961 pledge tomaintain a moratorium on reconnaissance flights in Soviet airspace.Briefed first thing that morning in Newport, Kennedy sent instructionsfor his chief Kremlin-watchers to meet him at the White House once hereturned. The stray plane had spent only a few minutes in Soviet air-space, and fortunately Moscow’s response was a note and not a salvo ofantiaircraft missiles. Nevertheless, with tensions high in U.S.-Soviet rela-tions, President Kennedy wanted to minimize the effect of this incident.He wished to waste no time in responding to the Soviet protest. InWashington, the State Department was drafting that response for thePresident’s approval.

Even before this news arrived from Russia, President Kennedy hadplanned to devote considerable time on this Tuesday to discussing theCold War. The week before Labor Day, two Republican congressmenhad launched a searing attack on Kennedy’s Cuba policy, suggestingthat the Soviet military buildup in the Caribbean was designed to makea missile base out of Fidel Castro’s island. Senators Kenneth Keatingand Bourke Hickenlooper were alleging that the Kennedy administra-tion knew this and was hiding the truth about Soviet activities from theAmerican people. Indeed the administration did know a little bit moreabout the situation in Cuba than it had announced publicly. On August29, a CIA U-2 had flown over most of Cuba. The photographs from thatflight had revealed eight Soviet surface-to-air missile sites on the west-ern half of the island. These were not the nuclear missiles alleged bythe Republican senators. Nonetheless, this was the first time Soviet mis-siles of any kind had been seen in Cuba. Kennedy had to be concernedthat it was only a matter of time before this significant developmentwould be leaked to his opponents.

President Kennedy felt it was time to reassert control of the situa-tion, to take the lead in informing the public of what his experts believedwas happening in Cuba. Over the weekend the head of policy planning atthe State Department, Walt Rostow, had chaired a team to draft a majorpress statement for the President. Even before Kennedy’s plane arrivedat Andrews Air Force Base, word was already going out to the congres-

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962 3

sional leadership to be prepared for an afternoon White House briefingon the Cuban situation.1

11:30 –11:50 A.M.

[W]e don’t owe him the whole truth . . .

Meeting on U-2 Incident2

Since the May 1960 shoot-down of a CIA U-2 spy plane piloted byFrancis Gary Powers, use of the U-2 had become a problem for theUnited States in international politics. In the words of the CIA, therewas “universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme uneasinessregarding overflights.”3 Hope for a short-term solution of the Berlinproblem before Dwight D. Eisenhower left office crashed with Powers’splane. In the United States, candidate John F. Kennedy had joined thechorus of disapproval of Eisenhower’s decision to send a U-2 over Sovietterritory so close to a planned summit. As a result of the failure of thePowers mission, the White House would never again send a U-2 to flyover the Soviet bloc.4

Two years later at a moment of even greater international tension,President John Kennedy faced his own U-2 problem. A U.S. Air Force U-2 had strayed into Soviet territory on Thursday, August 30, but Kennedyapparently only heard about it when the Soviet protest arrived early onSeptember 4.5 In response, the President gathered his top aides fromState and Defense to consider how to mollify the Soviets and to guard

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 19624

1. Date Diary, 4 September 1962, Richard Russell Papers, Richard B. Russell Library forPolitical Research and Studies, University of Georgia, Athens.2. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, McGeorge Bundy, Martin Hillenbrand,Robert Kennedy, Foy Kohler, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk. Tape 18, John F. KennedyLibrary, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.3. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, in CIADocuments on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary McAuliffe (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),document 45.4. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), p. 197.5. After 1958, the U.S. Air Force assumed the responsibility for U-2 reconnaissance flightsalong the Soviet periphery. This particular flight was under the control of the Strategic AirCommand. Like the CIA, the U.S. Air Force was not permitted to send U-2s over Soviet terri-tory after May 1960. Although a resumption of U-2 overflights of Soviet territory was consid-

against yet another U-2 incident. But the U.S. government still neededthe intelligence that U-2s could provide. Although satellite reconnais-sance was still in its infancy, the successful launch of the SAMOS satel-lite in the summer of 1961 had taken some but not all of the pressure offthe U-2 for information on Soviet military developments. Evidently, theU-2 involved in the 30 August incident had meant to fly parallel to theSoviet borders to pick up electronic intelligence but had lost its way.

Kennedy began taping as Dean Rusk gives his assessment of thesituation.

Dean Rusk: It’s very clear indeed that the Soviets have got us righton the hip on this one.

President Kennedy: Right.Rusk: Therefore the [unclear] and—President Kennedy: [Unclear] which I [unclear]. I saw your wife the

other day at the airport.Charles Bohlen: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: And I saw Avis’s sister, wasn’t that . . .?6 Avis’s

sister was there right at the airport to welcome me, along with a fewothers.

Bohlen: Evidently.President Kennedy: She said she was Avis’s sister and three boys,

and two boys.Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: She must . . . she couldn’t have too much to do

up there if she went to the airport [unclear]. [A chuckle.]Rusk: [Unclear] have you been briefed on what actually happened on

this?President Kennedy: Yeah. I wonder how the pilot made the mistake?Rusk: Well . . . very heavy winds blowing to the west and they just

blew him off course. It was at night. Obviously, it could not have been—there—a reconnaissance photographic plane of the sort that the U-2over a Soviet—

President Kennedy: Oh, it was at night.

Meeting on U-2 Incident 5

ered by the Kennedy administration during the 1961 Berlin crisis, no intentional overflights ofSoviet territory took place in the Kennedy years (ibid., pp. 189–97, 201).6. Charles Bohlen had two daughters, Avis and Celestine. Here the President is referring toCelestine Bohlen, who later became a foreign correspondent for the New York Times.

Rusk: It was at night.President Kennedy: Right.Rusk: But I think the key element here is the basis of candor between

you and Mr. Khrushchev on a matter of this sort. Because if he developsall sorts of wide-ranging suspicions of your own credibility then all sortsof other tight things like Berlin, Cuba could be directly affected and, Ithink, in a very adverse way. So, I would suggest for your considerationthat we send a note and make a short statement, consistent with it, say-ing that it was investigated immediately upon receipt of the Soviet note.The investigation revealed that an unintentional violation may, in fact,have taken place.

“A weather reconnaissance and air-sampling aircraft operated byUnited States Air Forces in the Northern Pacific was in the area east ofSakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note.7 The pilot of theaircraft has reported that he was flying a directed course well outsideSoviet territorial limits, but encountered severe winds during this night-time flight and may therefore have unintentionally overflown the south-ern tip of Sakhalin. My government has instructed me,” this will be thenote, “that the policy of the United States government with respect tooverflights of Soviet territory has in no way been altered and remains asstated by the President on January 25, 1961. If the pilot of the aircraft inquestion did, in fact, violate Soviet territory this act was entirely unin-tentional and due solely to a navigational error under extremely difficultflying conditions.”

Bohlen: May I make [unclear interjection] I think you ought to say,“expresses the regret of the United States government.”

President Kennedy: The regret thing might bring it back . . . thewhole business of ’60, where I said that we should have regretted and[former vice president Richard] Nixon always said I apologize[d].8 I’djust as soon . . . I tried—I’d rather use a phrase here—

Rusk: Well, if you, see if the pil—President Kennedy: —that suggested . . . which would not put us

back in the regretting business.Rusk: If the pilot of the aircraft in question did, in fact, violate

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 19626

7. Sakhalin Island was divided between Japan and Russia until 1945, when the Soviets occu-pied the southern half of this long island.8. Kennedy is referring to the politics surrounding the Soviet shoot-down of Gary Powers’sU-2 in May 1960. The Eisenhower administration’s handling of the crisis became an issue inthat year’s presidential election.

[Soviet] territory . . . You see it’s, leave that open. He may have, you see.But [if he] did in fact violate, this act was entirely unintentional and duesolely to a navigational error under extremely difficult flying conditions.That’s enough of a regret, I should think, at this point.

Martin Hillenbrand: Sir, may I bring up one point that I think—President Kennedy: Yeah.Hillenbrand: —is important to your credibility problem?Thirty-four seconds excised as classified information.Robert Kennedy: Can I make that point also that it’s almost the

direct wording of the note that was issued after the U-2 . . . that firstparagraph—

Hillenbrand: My point is that I just wouldn’t specify what they’recollecting—I would leave it unspecified, but the nighttime will make itclear that it’s not a photographic one.

President Kennedy: Well, the other thing, I, you’d have to maybeeven explain that . . .

Hillenbrand: I think you could say, “a routine.”Bohlen: Well, but the cause of the violation was the weather, the

wind . . .Unidentified: Right.Hillenbrand: No doubt—President Kennedy: The purpose of the flight—Bohlen: The purpose of the flight was not going to—Rusk: “A weather reconnaissance and air-sampling aircraft” . . . It

undoubtedly did some air sampling, didn’t it? Don’t all of our flights dosome of this?

Unidentified: I’m, you know . . .Robert McNamara: I don’t [unclear], the U-2 did.Unidentified: No, I don’t think so.Rusk: An aircraft on a routine mission—President Kennedy: Well, I don’t know . . . it’s . . . I think the . . . we

owe him . . . we don’t owe him the whole truth [unclear]—McGeorge Bundy: Why don’t you just say an aircraft in interna-

tional waters may have been blown over?Hillenbrand: That’s right. All I’m suggesting is we not say while on

an air-sampling mission.Rusk: Knock out that sentence.Hillenbrand: I think that this would clearly affect the credibility of

[unclear].President Kennedy: Yeah.Hillenbrand: It is very likely that he would know that it’s not.

Meeting on U-2 Incident 7

President Kennedy: Well, would he?Bundy: Is their charge as I understood it, the first take? [President

Kennedy can be indistinctly heard.] They have charged a rather higherdegree of violation than we believe to have occurred in this matter.They’ve talked about—

Unidentified: Nine minutes.Rusk: They’ve only talked about nine minutes. But that may—President Kennedy: The point is there’s no photography. That’s the

key to this U-2. Now, if we just say “nighttime,” we leave everybody toconclude that it’s not. Unless we want to at the time, to put out back-ground that it wasn’t a U-2, it was obviously at night, so no photographywas involved. That seems to me—that gets away from the U-2 idea.

Bundy: It is a U-2.President Kennedy: The plane is U-2 but it gets away from—Bundy: The mission is not to spy in the sky.President Kennedy: Yeah.Bundy: Spies, yeah.President Kennedy: Does he charge it was photography?Rusk: No, they didn’t, sir . . . they didn’t say that.Kohler: Just say, “a U-2 reconnaissance, an American U-2 reconnais-

sance plane.”President Kennedy: Well, there wasn’t reconnaissance in this.

Reconnaissance is photographic. How do we get that over?Is that for you?Rusk: Well, you get, then—“a weather reconnaissance aircraft oper-

ated by the United States Air Force.”President Kennedy: Why don’t we call it “a weather reconnaissance

plane?”Kohler: That would be perfectly all right. As long you just don’t say,

“[unclear] on a air-sampling mission,” I just . . .President Kennedy: Right.Bundy: In international waters.Rusk: In the Northern Pacific.Kohler: Yes.Rusk: It was in the vicinity, it was in the area east of Sakhalin at

about the time specified by the Soviet note. It was not on a photographicmission, period. The pilot of the aircraft—

President Kennedy: It was at night. It was at night and not on a pho-tographic mission. You want to say that. We want to just have that back-grounded when we put it out, when we release this note.

Hillenbrand: You just say a weather plane—

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 19628

President Kennedy: Are we planning to release this note . . . ?Rusk: We’d convert that part of it into a short statement. Just the

part that I . . . the . . .President Kennedy: But I think [unclear interjection] we could in a short

statement that we put out, say it wasn’t photographic, it took place at night.Hillenbrand: If you just said “a weather reconnaissance airplane

operating at night.”Bohlen: I think that takes . . .Hillenbrand: That would take care of it.President Kennedy: OK, but then I think we can—whoever puts

this, if State puts it out, the thing to say is it’s obviously not U-2 becauseit was . . . at night. Weather . . .

Bohlen: The only real problem we have in regard to the public state-ment is where this plane came from. It came from South Korea.

Hillenbrand: This is, this kind of gets us too involved—Bohlen: And, this is one that we’ve decided . . . the best thing to do is

just say we don’t say where it came from—Hillenbrand: You should deny it came from Japan.Bohlen: Except [unclear] background [unclear] on background to

say that it’s been announced that there’s no U-2 operations from Japan.You might have a little trouble with South Korea [unclear].

President Kennedy: Can we see, read that again to us now, Mr.Secretary?

Rusk: “A weather reconnaissance aircraft operated by—”President Kennedy: This should be to Khrushchev? Or who would

this be to ?Rusk: This would be to—Bohlen: No, this would be a reply to the note. This statement would

then [unclear] in an oral reply . . .Rusk: [mumbling in the background] This [unclear] no question who

was [unclear] and who was—President Kennedy: . . . does contain that the United States [unclear] . . .

[mumbles as he reads the draft note] the investigation will be a [unclear] to—Rusk: Right.President Kennedy: The investigation.Rusk: [reading] “An investigation revealed that an unintentional vio-

lation may in fact have taken place. A weather reconnaissance aircraftoperated by the United States Air Force in the Northern Pacific, was inthe area east of Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note.”

The question [is] whether we specifically say no photography wasinvolved.

Meeting on U-2 Incident 9

Hillenbrand: All right, well, if you put in that phrase there, “operat-ing at night.”

President Kennedy: Well, then we’re going to background, aren’twe? And say that . . . We’re going to say that here. We don’t say it to theSoviets [unclear].

Rusk: [reading] “The pilot of the aircraft has reported that he wasflying a directed course well outside Soviet territorial limits but encoun-tered severe winds during the nighttime flight and may therefore haveunintentionally overflown the southern tip of Sakhalin. My governmenthas instructed me to state that the policy of the United States govern-ment with reference to overflights of Soviet territory has in no way beenaltered and remains as stated by the President on January 25, 1961. [If ]the pilot of the aircraft in question did in fact violate Soviet territory,this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational errorunder extremely difficult flying conditions.”

President Kennedy: Do we want to say “every precaution will betaken to prevent a recurrence”?

Unidentified: Sounds good.President Kennedy: See that gets in, the regret, then after that . . .Bohlen: This implies as though you haven’t taken [them] before.

And, of course, the course of this plane was well outside the—Bundy: I don’t understand how this damn thing happened, I must say.President Kennedy: I see that every—We are just restating it that

every precaution be taken to prevent a recurrence.Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”President Kennedy: “Every step will be taken.”Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”Bohlen: “The existing precautions will be . . .”Rusk: “Precautions are . . . earlier—”President Kennedy: “Reexamined in [unclear] terms.”Rusk: “—directed earlier—”Unidentified: “Reconfirmed.”Rusk: “Precautions directed earlier by the President to avoid such

incidents remain in full effect.”President Kennedy: But, except, we’ve had the incident. So, I think

we ought to just say, if we are going to say anything, we ought to justsay that we’re taking every step to prevent a recurrence.

Bundy: Will be reviewed. You could say it will be reviewed. Thatwould suggest that you—

President Kennedy: Prevent a recurrence.Well, then . . . and then what would we release?

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196210

Rusk: I think we might make a statement that in effect is this note,even though we make the statement before the Soviets get the reply.

Bundy: Why do we . . . Why do we—?Rusk: Make a statement entirely harmonious with—Bundy: Isn’t it better to have the Soviet government get the answer

before we make it public that we think there may have been . . .Bohlen: Well, that means a certain number of hours, almost till

tomorrow that we have to wait for the . . .Bundy: Why are we in such a tremendous hurry?Rusk: I think we ought to handle the press today.Bundy: I think maybe we could stonewall today, saying that the mat-

ter . . . that the President’s instructions are in force and the question willbe, the case is being looked into.

President Kennedy: What would be—you know, we can say the mat-ter is being looked into—but what would be the matter of our makingthis as a public statement now before the Soviets have gotten it?

Bundy: No. I was thinking that the same argument that the Secretaryand Chip were making is . . . the critical issue here for the long haul isthat we should do nothing that makes Khrushchev think he can’t trustyou.9 It seems to me that the more seriously you respond [unclear] theresponse is more seriously from the U.S. government to the Soviet gov-ernment if they get it first on a private line.

President Kennedy: Did they release theirs before we got it?Bundy: They [unclear].Bohlen: Yes, they gave Reuters [unclear] what we got this morning.Bundy: Well, they gave it to our man before they gave it, before they

released it. But we didn’t get it until after they had . . . is that right?Bohlen: [Unclear] afternoon but [unclear].Bundy: Thompson, presum—, had this, you see, as of yesterday. No,

as of one P.M. today.President Kennedy: Well, then we’ve got two alternatives: one is to

put it out now and then put it out an hour after we—Rusk: Well, you can give it to [Anatoly] Dobrynin and then put it out.10

Bundy: Hmm, hmm. That’s true, [unclear]. Right.Rusk: You can just send it over to him, send it to him, and then put it

out. If it is in their hands at the time we put it out, it’s all right.President Kennedy: Then what would we put out?

Meeting on U-2 Incident 11

9. Chip is Charles Bohlen.10. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States since mid-March 1962.

Rusk: We would put out the text of the note.Bohlen: Do you want to do it in an oral statement or do you want to

make it a formal note?Bundy: [to Robert Kennedy] Well, the question is whether we want to

add anything that says, when you see him, you’re seeing him . . .Rusk: Make an oral statement but make the, but make the . . .Bundy: Bobby happens to be speaking to him at 2:15, is that right? 11

Rusk: I think we ought to get this to him before you see him, so thatyou can underline it, reaffirm it in whatever way is necessary.

President Kennedy: OK. We ought to . . . It seems to me that weought to . . . When Bobby is seeing him . . . we ought to give Bobby someinstructions as to what his attitude ought to be on various matters.Dobrynin called you what day?

Robert Kennedy: Saturday.President Kennedy: And he wanted to see you, he’d like to see you?Bohlen: You’ve had a response from [unclear]?Robert Kennedy: No, he wants to see me at 2:15. He said anytime

and anyplace. He wants to talk just . . . I don’t know what it’s about.Bohlen: Berlin?President Kennedy: What is it that we ought to have—What is it,

Bobby ought to, does anybody have any suggestions about what line heshould take?

Rusk: Well, I think that the principal positive thing is this questionof the nontransfer of nuclear weapons and I’d [unclear] a few minuteswith you about that.12 They have come back to it, so we’re moving tokind of pull this together with our allies so that we can go ahead on thenontransfer of nuclear weapons agreement with them. We’ve said thatMr. [Andrei] Gromyko’s reply to mine was constructive and open.13 Ithink you ought to take up the nuclear testing with him and point outthat—

President Kennedy: We ought to get this atmospheric . . .

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196212

11. Robert Kennedy’s 2:15 P.M. meeting with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is con-firmed by a note in the Attorney General’s appointments diary, John F. Kennedy Library.12. At the Geneva foreign ministers’ meeting in July, the United States had proposed anagreement on the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons from nuclear states to nonnuclear states asa way to assuage Soviet concerns that the United States would permit the Federal Republic ofGermany to acquire nuclear weapons. The Soviets did not find the U.S. proposal satisfactorybecause it left the door open to West Germany receiving nuclear weapons as part of a multi-lateral NATO nuclear sharing agreement.13. Andrei Gromyko was Soviet foreign minister since 1957.

Rusk: We really ought to get going on this and that we just reallycan’t understand why they make such a [unclear] deal about on-siteinspections, which can’t possibly involve espionage. That this must besomething else in their minds. But if he has any idea . . . he could giveyou more about what is really in their minds about this, do they reallywant to continue the testing? [Unclear]—

President Kennedy: Well, yeah, that. And then the other thing is:what he ought [to] say about Berlin, what he ought to say about Cuba?He ought to indicate what [unclear] are not in Cuba.

Rusk: Well, we have that proposed statement coming in on Cuba.President Kennedy: [to Robert Kennedy]You come into that meeting

on Cuba and Berlin.Rusk: And then Berlin, I should think that, again, we hammer the

business of the necessity of avoiding incidents, that the movement of thetraffic from Friedrichstrasse to Brandenburg Gate or to the BrandenburgBridge is intended to avoid incidents. And we hope their people will coop-erate on that and that this is a matter that ought not to be allowed to[unclear] because [unclear]. But you’ve been fully briefed on that earlierreport on this.

President Kennedy: Yes. Well, why don’t we see whether we get—McNamara: [Unclear] the Attorney General add to this note also, to

repeat again that it’s the President’s personal instruction to theSecretary of Defense that there will be no U-2 overflights . . . wish hecould.

Hillenbrand: Right. And also about photography.McNamara: Yes, and also about the photography.Hillenbrand: Yeah. I think coming from him—McNamara: I believe it is extremely important that [unclear].President Kennedy: And before you . . . Chip will have gotten this

over to them? As soon as it’s . . .Bohlen: Yeah, we can get—President Kennedy: But you go right now. You won’t be at this,

involved in this Cuba thing, so you can go ahead with it.Bohlen: Well, [unclear].President Kennedy: Then, there, when the press goes out, Manning

ought to be told that he can reiterate to the press but—14

Bohlen: OK.

Meeting on U-2 Incident 13

14. Robert J. Manning was the State Department’s press officer.

Bundy: Manning is right here and—President Kennedy: Can he get this message [unclear]?Bundy: Yeah.President Kennedy: Well, we just reiterate that it was a U-2 flight.

[Bohlen can be heard indistinctly in the background.]Rusk: Do we put that in the actual statement?President Kennedy: No, but the press, because—Bundy: It was obviously not engaged in photography by the Soviets’

own times? Did they give times?Unidentified: Yes.Bundy: 19:21 hours Moscow time.President Kennedy: That’ll just be a part of the story.Robert Kennedy: What if he says to me [unclear]?Bundy: You can say it again that you don’t know but you have the

impression that flights, the planes of both sides have flown near eachothers’ borders. This has happened.

Hillenbrand: I would suggest that when you say to this one . . . thisflight, you know that we have to do air sampling, we have all sorts ofroutine missions with these aircraft, just as yours do.

Unidentified: And the ships, too.Hillenbrand: We have just—Rusk: We have all sorts of aircraft flying from Alaska down

towards—Unidentified: Excuse me.President Kennedy: The whole problem, you see, is I don’t know

what that particular mission was, the plane was on.Robert Kennedy: I know. We talked about it with [Director of

Central Intelligence John] McCone.President Kennedy: Well, it wasn’t intended to be over your coast.Rusk: And since it was at night, it obviously wasn’t photographic or—Robert Kennedy: Yeah.Rusk: I think—President Kennedy: Chip, can you—Unidentified: The Attorney General—President Kennedy: Chip, you’ve covered the [unclear]?Bohlen: Do you want me to . . .Hillenbrand: Chip, do you want [unclear] to a State Department—?Bundy: Yes, and the instruction will—Rusk: Now what about—Bundy: Will you tell Manning and Pierre [Salinger] that we say

nothing [unclear].

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196214

Rusk: [Unclear.]Bohlen: Well [unclear] it will automatically get to [unclear].Rusk: Well, that’s right. We don’t send anything over tomorrow.Bundy: Let’s not [unclear] Pierre’s article.Bohlen: Do you want me to call and see him?President Kennedy: Why doesn’t Chip take—what?Rusk: I wouldn’t go over to see him.President Kennedy: Why not?Rusk: Why doesn’t he come to see me?President Kennedy: He doesn’t have to—what time?—Chip, just

talk to him on the phone briefing him [on] the message [unclear]—Rusk: Or I could send him the thing. . . . I wouldn’t talk to him on the

phone. Just a phone call telling him to . . .Bohlen: Well, then I think we’d better do this. We’d better give this

to him and then have it repeated in Moscow by McSweeney to theRussian [unclear].15

President Kennedy: Fine. That’s the best way.Rusk: Give him a copy of the statement we make here and then send

this to Moscow.Bohlen: Yeah, well, we won’t get it . . . How do I get it to him? Send

it to him?President Kennedy: Have Chip call him up and read to him and say,

“This is the message we’re sending to McSween[ey], I’ll send you over acopy of it but I wanted you to have it ’cause we’re going to put out astatement—”

Rusk: Yeah. We’re making a statement on it [unclear].Meeting breaks up.President Kennedy: McSween[ey] ought to be told, it seems to me,

in the note that we send to him that you . . . this is what’s been given toDobrynin at whatever time it was and also about the public statementput out. So—

Rusk: Yeah. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: As long as [unclear] have this by the time

McSween[ey] gets this. McSween[ey] ought to know [unclear] willhave it. Because, you know [unclear].

Bohlen: Yeah, we’ll put this right on the wires . . .Rusk: That’s right. Let McSweeney know that it has been made public.Bohlen: You have to make it public.

Meeting on U-2 Incident 15

15. John M. McSweeney was the U.S. minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Rusk: [Unclear.] [Pause.]Unidentified: You took my estimate? [Door closes.]

The incident over Sakhalin introduced a new note of caution in U.S.intelligence gathering. At the next meeting of the Special Group, whichoversaw covert action by the U.S. government, the Air Force successfullypushed through a policy of standing down for the time being all U-2flights manned by the Air Force.16 The CIA, which was the only otheragency with a U-2 fleet, continued in the business. However, the loss of aU-2 leased to the Taiwanese government only a few days later wouldalso put operational use of U-2s by the CIA under severe scrutiny.17 BySeptember 10, Kennedy officials, especially McGeorge Bundy and DeanRusk, were asking the CIA to shape its plans for U-2 surveillance ofCuba so as to minimize the risk of an international incident. This wouldhave an effect on the timeliness of warnings to President Kennedy of theSoviet buildup on the island.

Those events were still days away. In the meantime, after a little dis-jointed conversation, Kennedy’s advisers walked out of the Oval Office.The President accompanied them and left the recorder running. Twelveminutes of hall chatter follow amidst general sounds of secretarial work.The President’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, is heard answering two tele-phone calls.

At approximately noon, members of an Arkansas delegation led bySenator William Fulbright entered the West Wing of the White House.The group included the University of Arkansas’s Schola Cantorumchoir, which had just won first prize at a choir competition in Italy, andthe ambassador of Italy, Sergio Fenoaltea. Two White House guards areoverheard discussing the group.

White House Guard #1: Did you bring over the Italian guy[Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea]?

White House Guard #2: Yeah. I got him.A few minutes later the group approaches the empty Oval Office.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196216

16. From Marshall Carter to John McCone, 8 September 1962, in CIA Documents, McAuliffe,pp. 55–56.17. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, ibid.,pp. 127–37.

White House Greeter: Mr. Ambassador, how do you do?Ambassador Fenoaltea: Very well.

Ten minutes after the Arkansas group had entered the private secretarialand staff office adjacent to the Oval Office to await the President, Kennedyreentered the Oval Office. He clearly had little idea who these people wereor why they had been allowed to wait for him in an office usually closed topublic visitors. No White House staffer had informed him that SenatorWilliam Fulbright and the Italian ambassador were waiting outside hisoffice. Apparently preoccupied with the two difficult foreign policy mattersof the day, Kennedy had forgotten that at his August 29 press conferencehe had hailed this Arkansan choir and promised the press corps that thechoir would be visiting him at the White House within the new few days.

Staffer: It’s all set up, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Are you going to inform me now on what I

ought to say?Staffer: Angie’s probably got it.18

President Kennedy: Well, ask Angie—Staffer: Pierre [Salinger] set this thing up.19

Staffer: Schola Cantorum at the University of Arkansas.President Kennedy: Are they?Staffer: Who’ll get Pierre?Staffer: Pierre.Staffer: [Unclear] to Pierre.Staffer: Pierre!Staffer: Are they there?Unclear exchange. Angie Duke enters the Oval Office to clarify the situ-ation for the President.President Kennedy: You getting in on this Angie?Angie Duke: Pierre’s got it now.President Kennedy: Where’s Pierre?Duke: He’s down in his office—President Kennedy: Listen, from now on, Mrs. Lincoln, whenever

we’ve got a group, I want all the information right here.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962 17

18. Angie Biddle Duke was the White House chief of protocol.19. Pierre Salinger was the President’s press secretary.

Amidst a babble of voices, the President asks McGeorge Bundy, whomay have been with the President in the Oval Office throughout thismomentary confusion, to find his secretary, Evelyn Lincoln.President Kennedy: Whose [unclear] is this?Bundy (?): [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Tell her to come in here.Bundy: Evelyn! [The telephone rings.]President Kennedy: Who are those people standing there?Evelyn Lincoln: I have no idea.President Kennedy: Well, now don’t let people come into your office

to be listening to everything that goes on. Who are these people?Lincoln: Who brought them in? Who brought them?Staffer: They [unclear] take a picture. Mr. [unclear].President Kennedy: Just keep them out until I’m ready for

Christssake.Lincoln: Who brought them here? [Unclear.]Staffer: Ralph Tucker?Lincoln: Ralph Tucker?President Kennedy: Keep them out, Mrs. Lincoln.Lincoln: I can’t [unclear].President Kennedy: I don’t want people standing around.The President and Bundy are intent on having a conversation aboutsomething that has just come to their attention. Amidst the babble in hisoffice, Kennedy grabs a sheet of paper.President Kennedy: This isn’t coming in right. The United States

government would like to give you a reminder [of its present course].Bundy: Just an argument on how they couldn’t [unclear] helpful to

the effort. Particularly about the United States. How in the world . . . thefact of the matter is, three . . . background. Our people produced the req-uisition, everything.

President Kennedy: Yeah. I think we’d better have this thing organ-ized. This is a shitty organization.

I never know what the hell I’m supposed to say . . . [what I coulduse] is any suggestions.

Bundy: [Unclear] but I think not.

The choir members were successfully ushered out to the Rose Garden.The President then joined them and the choir began to sing. The per-formance lasted nearly five minutes, after which the President spoke tothe audience. Laughter can be heard faintly in the Oval Office in reaction

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196218

to the President’s remarks outside, as well as some indistinct play-by-playfrom White House staffers chatting as the performance took place. Atabout 12:25 P.M., the President reentered the Oval Office. In a bettermood, he asked that the Arkansans be given a White House tour.

President Kennedy: Let’s see, can you get somebody to take themthrough the White House?

Can you [unclear] people remind everybody that whenever I have agroup, give me a little history with suggested points and [unclear]?

Unidentified Staffer: Right. I will, sir.Staffer: [Unclear.]Staffer: But announce that you [unclear] out on the other side. We’ve

worked that out. The sergeant’s going to take them through.Staffer: Yes.Staffer: The sergeant . . .The door opens. Someone says, “Gee, are you going to perform methat Boogie?” Someone answers, “Oh, yes, [this] afternoon.” Thegroup passes through the corridor. There is a little chitchat.Unidentified: Oh, isn’t that gorgeous.

The group from Arkansas has left and a few staffers were chatting.Telephones continued to ring, and Evelyn Lincoln’s voice can be heard inthe background. Forgotten, the machine in the Oval Office kept running.

12:35–1:00 P.M.

I think it’s a question about Cuba in the future.

Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba20

The public event effectively broke Kennedy’s meeting with his nationalsecurity experts in two. While Chip Bohlen left to draft a response to the

Meeting on Sovie t Arms Shipments to Cuba 19

20. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Robert Kennedy, RobertMcNamara, Dean Rusk, and Theodore Sorensen. Tape 18, John F. Kennedy Library,President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

Soviet note on the U-2 incident, the rest of them moved to the CabinetRoom to discuss Soviet activities in Cuba. At issue was what form of pub-lic statement was required to reassure the American people that Kennedyhad matters under control. Congressmen, especially Senator KennethKeating of New York, had begun to question the White House’s handlingof the obvious buildup of Soviet weapons on the island. There wererumors of the installation of Russian missiles, certainly conventionallyarmed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but possibly even surface-to-surfacenuclear rockets. Indeed, photography from a secret U-2 flight flown overthe island on August 29 had just confirmed for Kennedy the existence ofeight SAM sites.

Although there was as yet no firm evidence of nuclear missiles, somein Kennedy’s inner circle think that it is only a matter of time beforeKhrushchev decides to install that kind of force in Cuba. This group, ledby Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, viewed the impending publicstatement as a golden opportunity to send a clear warning to Khrushchevthat the United States would never countenance a Soviet nuclear base inCastro’s Cuba. In any case, the President wanted a public statement onthis new Soviet defensive missile system found in Cuba. On August 31, hehad told General Marshall Carter, who was running the CIA in JohnMcCone’s absence, to put the readout from the August 29 flight “in thebox and nail it shut.”21 A freeze on sharing this information with anyonebut the top foreign policymakers and analysts remained in effect.However, it was not going to last forever with interest so high on CapitolHill and in the media.

President Kennedy remembered to turn the machine on as theSecretary of State, a skeptic about the possiblility of any Soviet nuclearadventure in Cuba, read aloud from a draft statement prepared by theState Department.

Tape machines were now running connected to microphones in boththe empty Oval Office, where distant secretarial sounds could still beheard, and in the Cabinet Room, where the President’s Cuba team hadassembled.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196220

21. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, “Action Generated by DCI CablesConcerning Cuban Low-Level Photography and Offensive Weapons,” CIA Documents,McAuliffe, document 12.

Dean Rusk: [reading from State draft press statement 22] “. . . in LatinAmerica. Whatever armed strength the Cuban regime may develop will berestricted by whatever means—”

McGeorge Bundy: Agreed.Rusk: “—may be necessary to that island. The U.S. will join with

other hemisphere countries to insure that Cuba’s increased militarystrength will amount to nothing more than an increased burden on thepeople of Cuba themselves.”

Robert McNamara: I think that’s excellent.Bundy: I think that general sentiment—I wouldn’t call it “increased

military expen—increased expenditure on military gadgets.” I really thinkwe don’t want to get into the position of being frightened by this group.

Rusk: But this sense that Bob McNamara has about any placing bythe Soviets of a significant offensive capability in the hands of this self-announced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and major chal-lenge to this hemisphere and would warrant immediate and appropriateaction.

McNamara: I worry about that because they already have 16 MiGswhich—23

Rusk: Do you feel that the MiGs are [a] significantly aggressive[addition]?

McNamara: I do. And I further feel that they’ll be adding to whatcould be interpreted as offensive strength in the months ahead.

President Kennedy: The missiles really are what are significant?Bundy: Surface-to-surface missiles are the turning point.Unidentified: SAMs.Bundy: Unless they were to put jerry-built nuclear weapons on MiGs

which is—McNamara: Yeah.Bundy: —not a likely configuration.

Meeting on Sovie t Arms Shipments to Cuba 21

22. The President’s copy of this draft is in the “Cuba, Security, 1962” folder, President’s OfficeFiles, Box 115, John F. Kennedy Library. The document bears Kennedy’s notations and under-lining.23. The MiGs are Soviet fighter and ground attack aircraft. By the summer of 1962, theSoviets were to have delivered at least 41 jets and reconnaissance aircraft (MiG-19s and MiG-15s) to the Cubans. See the 4 May 1961 report by Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovskyas quoted in “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964, by AleksandrFursenko and Timothy Naftali (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 99. The U.S. government haddetected these older model aircraft. It had not yet, however, detected the ongoing delivery ofthe most-advanced Soviet fighter/ground attack aircraft, the MiG-21.

President Kennedy: No.McNamara: They can, they may well put surface-to-surface missiles

or missile launchers, artillery or missile launchers in there. They havethat equipment in their own force. In the first place, it will be a question:Do they have it or don’t they have it? We won’t be sure. Is it equippedwith a nuclear warhead or isn’t it equipped with a nuclear warhead? Is itsubstantial or isn’t it substantial? I just worry about the President hav-ing made a statement which can be used as a lever by elements of theCongress and of the public, unless we know exactly what we’re going todo under those circumstances. If we have a plan, we know what it is andwe’re are all agreed on it, then I think a firm statement is excellent. Butunless we have . . . it seems to me we could cause great [unclear].

Bundy: Our preliminary analysis of the consequences for us, Bob, ofthe establishment of a surface-to-surface nuclear capability gives me atleast the feeling that we wouldn’t have to act.

Rusk: I think we’d have to act, Bob, exactly how and by what stageswe’d . . . for example, I would suppose that if you’re going to take on abloodbath in Cuba, you’d precede it by a systematic blockade to weakenCuba before you actually go to put anybody ashore.

McNamara: See I wonder why we . . . if we do it then, why wouldn’twe do it today? This is one of the actions that we can consider today as amatter of fact. There’s no question the Soviets are shipping arms toCuba; that’s clear. They’ve said so. Now, we can—

President Kennedy: The reason we don’t is that, is because we figurethat they may try to blockade Berlin and we would then try to blockadeCuba. But I think that the reason we don’t today is the [unclear] is that itwouldn’t do them that much harm for quite a while—

Rusk: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: —and then Berlin would be the obvious

response—Rusk: [Unclear.] The configuration in Cuba still is defensive. Now

we’ve gone to great effort to try to find serious, significant Cuban pene-tration into the other countries around the Caribbean. The defense min-ister of Venezuela said they had captured only one Czech Bren gun.They just haven’t found anything. And, we’ve been having great diffi-culty in finding . . . except through money, Mexico [unclear] excuse.

Bundy: The Jordan report on this subject would be very clear andthat’s the principal argument . . .

Rusk: But we’ve, but we really have . . . If we have to go to the U.N.to prove Cuban indirect aggression against the other members of thehemisphere, we’d have a heck of a job proving it.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196222

Bundy: What we find is a lot of energetic students being taught“truth,” which is unfortunately not actionable.

Rusk: You see, at Punta del Este, we told Venezuela to capture a bigarms cache from Cuba and [unclear] helicopter pad [unclear].24 Well, therewas nothing there according to the Venezuelan minister of defense.

I am just saying, Mr. President, that we, that there is very little evi-dence, hard evidence, that the Cubans are really directly engaged in sub-versive activities in other countries around the Caribbean and LatinAmerica. We haven’t even been catching arms. We haven’t been able topin down hard evidence of the kinds of actions that would lay the basisfor any direct action in Cuba. The principal posture of Cuba at the pres-ent time is defensive as far as the policy is concerned.

President Kennedy: I think we ought to get two things. First, whatstatement I put out; and second, whether we ought to get the leadershipdown here, the Republican, key gasbags and others. This is . . . it’s sort of[unclear] which they have, [then] they can put it out in a way that lookslike we’re not putting anything out, probably give them everything wedo have. At least, it’s on the, it’s on the record.

As I say, one of the problems is that a lot of stuff has been out, but itseeps out in a way that [will] convince these fellows . . . to look likethey’re putting stuff out that we won’t put out. So, I think, that maybe,particularly this surface-to-air missile thing we ought to give them.Does everybody agree to that? We’re going to have to put that out any-way because that’s going to leak out—

Bundy: I think so.President Kennedy: —in two or three days.Bundy: I think [unclear] it would be better.Rusk: Bob McNamara and [unclear] I are now scheduled to go before

the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee of the Senatetomorrow morning for a briefing on the Soviet situation that’s bound toget into this. 25 And I think we’d better have the leadership down hereand—

President Kennedy: Today.Rusk: —and cancel that meeting.Bundy: You have the leadership, I think, at breakfast tomorrow, Mr.

President.

Meeting on Sovie t Arms Shipments to Cuba 23

24. The Organization of American States foreign ministers’ meeting was at Punta del Este,Uruguay, 22 to 31 January 1962.25. On Wednesday, 5 September 1962.

President Kennedy: No, I have the leader—I meant the Republicansand Democrats.

Bundy: Oh, the regular, bipartisan body.McNamara: There is a related point: You have asked, Mr. President,

on two or three occasions whether we believe it would be wise to ask forauthority from Congress to call up reserve and guard forces whilethey’re out of session, if international events make that desirable. I per-sonally believe it would be wise to ask for that authority, assuming thatwe could achieve it without controversy. It relates to Cuba, in onerespect, that the forces that we would require could be required forBerlin, Southeast Asia, or Cuba.

Rusk: Mr. President, I think I would agree with the Secretary ofDefense on that. I think we . . . it would be very helpful for us to have itbut I think it would more effective if we could do it quickly and quietly.The Soviets would get the message.

McNamara: Yes. Yes—Rusk: But, if we’re going to have a great turmoil—McNamara: Yes.Rusk: —and hullaballoo about it, then it would be better to have that

in connection with a specific action taken—McNamara: Exactly—Rusk: —[unclear] call the Congress back in special session.McNamara: Exactly; but I mention it now because if the leadership

wants to act in relation to Cuba, one of the best actions I can think of isexactly this.

President Kennedy: Well, now—if we, let’s say we get them downhere at five this afternoon, on an off-the-record basis we give them moreor less what we know about these things and tell them when this infor-mation is to become available and the number of people that are there . . .and any other question they want. In the meanwhile we’re going to goover this statement. At least we’re going to have something to say aboutthis. It’s going to get out . . . so that I can say to Pierre to put it out atsix. Whatever he’s going to put out, he’s going to put out the informa-tion about these sites and any other statement we’ve got [unclear]worked out.

Bundy: I would suggest that we be very careful, Mr. President, aboutgoing with that full statement today simply because the issues involvedare very grave and—

President Kennedy: That’s right but I think what we’ve got to do is . . .we can’t permit somebody to break this story before we do.

Bundy: The SAM site business can be broken promptly. That doesn’t—

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196224

Bundy and the President start talking over each other.President Kennedy: But everyone’s going to want to know what

we’re going to do about it.Bundy: We don’t have to put all these statements out at once. They

don’t—Robert Kennedy: Can I raise a—President Kennedy: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: I think that [unclear] that while you were out that I

don’t think that this is just a question about what we are going to doabout this. I think it’s a question about Cuba in the future. And then Ithink that it’s the judgment of everybody around this table that this isonly one step—we’ve seen it being built up for the last six months oreight months, whatever it might be—that this is going [to] continue.There’s going to be . . . three months from now, there’s going to besomething else going on, six months from now . . . That eventually it’svery likely that they’ll establish a naval base there for submarines per-haps, or that they’ll put surface-to-surface missiles in.

And what steps, we—what position will we be in at that time, if weconsider that surface-to-surface missiles, and I think maybe we shouldreach a determination on that, that surface-to-surface missiles in Cubawould be so harmful that we would have to undertake an invasion ofCuba, or a blockade which eventually would lead to an invasion and theMarines going in, and the airborne, et cetera. Then, whether . . . Or evena naval base or some of these other things. That in this kind of a state-ment, that you traced the history of Cuba and even mention the MonroeDoctrine and say, point out that this was captured in a different way andthe Monroe Doctrine doesn’t apply as it did in the past; but we still haveour responsibilities to national security, that, making some of thesepoints that were made in Secretary Rusk’s statement, and then also saythat there’re certain things that would violate our national security. Andwe would then have to take appropriate action and such things would bethe establishment of surface-to-surface missiles or the putting of, of, of anuclear weapons base.

Now, my point is, I think that it’s much more difficult for them totake steps like that after you’ve made that statement. That if they putthem in and then you take offensive action, then I think that the SovietUnion is almost committed to support them. Number two, we’re goingto be in a much tougher position in the future if the Soviet Union doessign a treaty with Cuba because then if you invade Cuba, or do . . . takeany steps like that, you know that you’re going to have a world war. Atthe present time, [if] you invaded Cuba, you’re not, you’re not, certain of

Meeting on Sovie t Arms Shipments to Cuba 25

that. In fact, I should think that they probably wouldn’t support . . . a lotof screams around the world.

But I think that this statement . . . this gives us a reason to put out astatement as to what really is going to be our policy, not just on the sur-face-to-air missiles, but what is our . . . going to be our policy as far asCuba in the future is concerned. I think that’s—

Rusk: The great problem, the great difficulty, of course, as we allknow [unclear] . . . I think that, looking at Cuba, I think that it would befairly easy to come to answers to the questions that are posed at thepresent time. But the United States has such a worldwide confrontationwith the Soviet Union that when the time comes to act, the Presidentwill have to take into account how that action relates to the worldwideconfrontation and what the situation is everywhere else at the same timebecause his problems are total and comprehensive. I mean, if we wererelatively isolated in the world, which we were before World War II, wecould concentrate on Cuba and say, “If this in Cuba, then that follows.”But we’ve got a million men overseas in confrontation with the Sovietbloc and this is a part of that confrontation. This is the thing that makesit so agonizingly difficult.

Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I understand that. So, therefore, I think that youreally have to reach a determination of whether putting surface-to-surfacemissiles in Cuba would be where you’d really have to face up to it, and fig-ure that you are going to have to take your chances on something like that.Everything you do, whether you do it in Southeast Asia, or Berlin or Cubaor wherever is going to have some effect on the Soviet Union elsewhere.And whether there are certain things that they do that—

President Kennedy: But isn’t this what we’re saying? As I under-stood, that statement was that when they’ve got a—

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but [unclear] saying—President Kennedy: —upset the general balance in—Robert Kennedy: The point of that, the Secretary makes, Secretary

McNamara says they’ve got that at the present time.President Kennedy: Yes.Robert Kennedy: Under that definition of a “substantial offensive

capability,” quote unquote, that at the present time that the Cubans andthe Russians have that in Cuba and that the . . .

Bundy: Would our [unclear], air-defense posture against those MiGsbe [unclear], Bob?

Robert Kennedy: Some congressman or senator can come in and say,“Prove that they haven’t at the present time 16 MiGs,” and, then you’d

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196226

be in trouble. . . . “Why aren’t you doing something [unidentified mum-bling] right at this moment?” Now maybe that—

Bundy: Respond how?Robert Kennedy: Maybe you don’t have to say surface-to-surface

missiles but I think that this is an opportunity where we really face up towhat’s going to happen a year from today. Because they are going to gettougher [unclear]. [Bundy is whispering to the President.]

Rusk: [Unclear.] I wouldn’t suppose, and of course this is . . . Bob to . . .[the President is heard whispering, “has to study now.”]. But I would notsuppose that the mere fact that a, for example, that a motor-torpedo boatcan come roar up along the Florida coast and throw a few shots ashorewould mean that that was an offensive capability. I’m not sure that MiGsunarmed with nuclear weapons would provide any offensive capability ofthe significance that we’re talking about here.

McNamara: No, I don’t mean to overemphasize the offensive capabil-ity of them. But they’re going to continue to increase whatever offensivecapability they have—

Bundy: I think that really is a question, Bob. It seems to me that every-thing they have put in so far, really is, insofar as you can make these distinc-tions, a defensive weapon. Fighters are defensive aircraft for use againstbombers and photographic reconnaissance. The SAMs are the same thing,surface-to-air missiles don’t go . . . are a stupid way of reaching Florida.

Robert Kennedy: Well, Mac, that’s what you do, I mean, at the pres-ent juncture, if you were them—

Bundy: No, I’m only saying that the other step seems to me a muchlarger step than the development of the kind of thing we’ve seen over thelast year and a half which is fully consistent with their behavior in a lotof other countries.

Robert Kennedy: I just . . . I think we can all assume that they aregoing to take those steps eventually.

Rusk: No, I think, Bob, even there that if we were imposing a block-ade, for example, we could make it very clear that any firing on theAmerican mainland by MiGs or anything else would lead immediately tothe destruction of Cuba.

Bundy: That’s right.McNamara: Oh I think that’s completely clear. What they’re going

to try to do is build up a deterrent power. The first, and most obvioussteps, are air defense. But those are not likely to be enough becausereally their air defense isn’t worth a damn. We can—

Bundy: If it were a war, I agree with you.

Meeting on Sovie t Arms Shipments to Cuba 27

McNamara: All right. And therefore—President Kennedy: If we were attacking the Soviet Union, it would-

n’t be worth much?McNamara: No. Against . . . in Cuba it isn’t worth—President Kennedy: Yeah.McNamara: —much and even in the Soviet Union, it isn’t worth

very much, Mr. President, because we can go underneath it. So that isn’tgoing to be sufficient for the Cubans. They are going to say, “Well, thatreally didn’t help us much. We have to have more of a deterrent power.”And this, this—

President Kennedy: The only real deterrent against a country oursize is two things: First, the fact the Soviet[s] can act against us.

McNamara: Yes.President Kennedy: [Unclear] in Iran, Turkey or anyplace else. And

secondly, if that they can get a ground-to-ground—McNamara: Yes.President Kennedy: —with a nuclear weapon. That’s the real deterrent.McNamara: Yes.President Kennedy: Otherwise we can always move against Cuba. It

just takes two more divisions than it took . . .McNamara: Exactly, exactly or a few more suppressive aircraft.Rusk: Mr. President, I think there is one thing that we can be—Unidentified: Yes.Rusk: —as certain about is . . . it can be a given that they have no . . .

the Soviet Union would never in the world permit a nuclear weapon tobe used against us from Cuba, except as part of a general nuclear war.

President Kennedy: That’s why I agree. I don’t think . . . why they givethe, and why do they give the . . . Then why don’t we give them the . . . ?

Rusk: Now, they could—If they should announce some morning thatthey were placing nuclear weapons in Cuba—

President Kennedy: Under Soviet control.Rusk: Whether they did or not; they just announced it, that could

cause some real problems.President Kennedy: What is it you suggest that we announce today,

aside from this statement, which is rather long? What is it, in short, youthink we ought to announce as far as what our future action should betowards Cuba? Aside from consultations, or aside from Guantánamo?26

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196228

26. The U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Cuban government granted the UnitedStates a lease for the base in 1903 and extended it in an agreement signed in 1934.

What Bobby, I guess, is saying is that we should announce today thatif they put in ground-to-ground missiles, we will—

Robert Kennedy: They take certain [unclear]—I think, no I thinksome study should go on—

Rusk: Well, if we designated ground-to-ground missiles or we speci-fied the nuclear weapon, I think we would create a kind of panic that thefacts themselves don’t now justify.

Bundy: That’s correct.Rusk: And that this could heat the matter up much faster than if we

could get some general language, then, take account of the point thatBob McNamara made. . . . It would be better to get a warning to theSoviets in more general terms so that we do not create for them a majorprestige problem in not moving down that trail and then make it veryclear to our friends in the hemisphere—

President Kennedy: This is . . . the key sentence is, “Any placing bythe Soviets of a significant offensive capability in the hands of this self-announced . . . would be a direct and major challenge . . . would warrantimmediate—”

Rusk: “appropriate action.”Robert Kennedy: Of course they’ve challenged us, though, repeat-

edly. We’ve got the Monroe Doctrine and they’ve spit in our eye on it. 27

The idea we’re going to challenge again or then. . . .McNamara: The next sentence is excellent.28 Very strong.Bundy: Yeah. It’s a very important sentence.McNamara: I agree. I think it can stand without the preceding sen-

tence.29

Rusk: I think we ought to be careful, too, about supposing that theMonroe Doctrine has somehow disappeared or receded into the back-ground. What has happened to the Monroe Doctrine is that it, in the

Meeting on Sovie t Arms Shipments to Cuba 29

27. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823, constituted awarning to European powers not to intervene in the Western Hemisphere. In the twentiethcentury, it provided a rationale for U.S. intervention in the Caribbean region. PresidentTheodore Roosevelt declared as a “corollary” to the doctrine that the United States shouldmaintain stable conditions and not give outside powers any cause to intervene in the region.28. The next in the draft, with underlining as found on the President’s own copy, reads,“Further I say to our friends in Latin America that whatever armed strength the Cubanregime may develop will be restricted by whatever means may be necessary to that island.”29. The previous sentence was “Any placing by the Soviets of a significant offensive capabilityin the hands of this self-announced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and majorchallenge to all this hemisphere stands for and would warrant immediate and appropriate(forceful) action.” In Kennedy’s copy, forceful is underscored.

first instance, is a hemisphere problem. The Rio Pact.30 Implementationof the Monroe Doctrine would be attempted primarily through hemi-sphere action. But it still remains there as an element of American policyand our own national self-defense. If we ever needed to move and we’dmove on the basis of the historic, special regime in this hemisphere. Ithink your press conference—

President Kennedy: Of course, the point is that the hemisphere—they are being invited in, not forcing their way in. And the MonroeDoctrine was for another situation, which was that the country came andinvaded Latin America. This is where they are not invading it; they arebeing asked in by the government, which is its de facto government.

Rusk: We also [unclear] Mr. President. We never did, so far as I canrecall at the moment, we never used the Monroe Doctrine as a flash-panreaction to a particular situation. It was a basis for diplomatic action, forgnawing at it, for insisting to other governments that they respect it andtake it. And it took a lot of time in most instances to apply the MonroeDoctrine.

Door opens and closes. There is a short pause.I think, Mr. President, it would be a little difficult to talk about this

additional information, or to say anything sort of—we have here on thefourth page—without some general reference and some background.I’m not sure that this would be too sharp to say [unclear] look at it andsee that we should say [unclear] now.

President Kennedy: I don’t know about number “D. Informal consul-tation.” 31

Rusk: Of course that is not a—President Kennedy: Why don’t we just say . . . take . . . consult with

foreign ministers, other members—let’s just put it that way.Rusk: Why we can combine C and D.32 Yeah. Sure.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196230

30. The Rio Treaty of 1947 (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), better knownas the Rio Pact, was a collective security agreement. Under its provisions, an attack againstone American state would be considered an attack against all.31. The draft ends with a list of six measures to be initiated by the President, lettered Athrough G. Letter D reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to take full advantage of theforthcoming meeting of the U.N. General Assembly to arrange for informal consultationswith the Foreign Ministers of the other members of the Organization of American States onrecent developments in Cuba as they may affect the security of the hemisphere; this is inaccord with suggestions which have come from several of our Latin American friends.”32. C reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to consult with our friends in the Caribbeanarea about ways in which they can assist in the above programs further to insure their protec-tion against the threat of Cuban military strength.”

President Kennedy: Good. Now, this . . . what about G?33 This is say-ing we are going to recognize the government-in-exile, is it?

Rusk: No, this does not go quite that far. It’s a move in that direction.But our great problem there is that the refugees are in complete disorderso far as leadership.

Bundy: I would question whether we want to—if we do this—thenthe one that is formed will look like our puppet. It will be the Cubangovernment-in-exile formed by the President on his instructions. Thereis some disadvantage in that.

Rusk: I think we might be able to shorten this in various respects.President Kennedy: Well, I think, that we can shorten this thing, boil

it down. The key thing you need right now are these missiles, also putthem into proportion: We are in much more danger from the SovietUnion than we are from Cuba.

McNamara: Sure.President Kennedy: So that this thing again, the fixation on Cuba as

opposed to someplace else, is really, if they’re to recognize that the mis-siles have changed . . . There are dangers in them. But other than that . . .we don’t want them to fall into that . . . we want to kind of make it clearto the country that [unclear as Bundy begins to speak] get our informationas quickly as possible.

Bundy: In that context—It seems to me, Mr. President, I would sug-gest that we get the information out of the White House because theinformation, the question has been raised as to whether you had all thedope, were getting the thing straight. And that needs to be got straight.Then I, I at least would suggest at least that the major points might bet-ter be made by the Secretary of State precisely because we are not doinganything very enormous at the moment there.

President Kennedy: Now, the only key thing would be this, all of this . . .Bundy: You could reinforce it at a press conference.President Kennedy: Would be . . . whatever armed strength they

develop . . . I mean, they seem to put a lot into this thing about . . . whythey . . . so, this is going to be used against other Caribbean, so that sen-tence is rather important.

Bundy: Very important. I agree.

Meeting on Sovie t Arms Shipments to Cuba 31

33. G reads, “I feel sure as more and more Russians arrive in Cuba, more and more Cubans will bethinking and saying: ‘Cuba sí, Russia no.’ To take full advantage of this fact I hereby invite and urgeCuban exiles everywhere to unite within a single organization in which opportunities are left foreventual major participation at top levels by those resisting Communist domination within Cuba.”

Rusk: I think that’s the kind of statement that has to be made by thePresident. The declaration of a security, in effect, a security guarantee toall—

Bundy: To the Caribbean statesRusk: —all of Cuba’s neighbors [unclear].President Kennedy: I think what we ought to do is . . . why don’t you

get . . . working.Bundy: Yes, we can shorten it up.President Kennedy: With Ted [Sorensen], to shorten it up, tighten

it up. Then let’s have a—Bobby’s going to see this fellow at 2:15—thenlet’s have a meeting at, let’s get the leadership down here at five; allwe’re going to do really is to tell them about these surface—

Bundy: Bring them up—That will be essentially for briefing byGeneral [Marshall] Carter then?

President Kennedy: That’s right. Now, how much do we tell them[about] how we got it?

Marshall Carter: We can give them a briefing, sir, that would givethem all without telling them exactly how we got it.

President Kennedy: I think you’ve got to say, you would say that—when we did get it—because, you see, at the press conference I said thatwe had no evidence.

Bundy: No confirmation. Fully confirmed conclusions were possibleonly when, Thursday—

President Kennedy: Friday.Bundy: —or Friday.Robert Kennedy: Not till Saturday.Bundy: It was Thursday night and Friday morning, wasn’t it?Unidentified: That’s right. It was Thursday night.President Kennedy: OK. Now you can work on this. So that part’s all

right. I don’t—there’s nothing particularly . . . I think you can just say yougot it and describe what it is to them. By then we will have this statementin order and then I think at that time the Secretary can say we want to keepsome proportion. We’ve got Berlin and the big danger’s it would—Theydon’t have offensive capability against us and they also, they don’t have anability to, in the final analysis, to prevent us from doing what we thinkneeds to be done. But the big problem is the fact of these other obligations.So, if we lock them in, that takes care of really the big [unclear] physically.

Bundy: I think you can, do you have a judgment, is today the time toreach that other larger question of whether we want to indicate thatsome such phrase “the significant offensive capability or further develop-ment which might create a direct hazard” or something of this sort?Whether you want to make that [unclear]?

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196232

President Kennedy: Well, Bobby are you suggesting that we say aspecific thing rather than [unclear] “significant offensive”—?

Robert Kennedy: Well I might be—could I work on it—President Kennedy: OK.Robert Kennedy: —for a little while?President Kennedy: We’ll need it in—Robert Kennedy: That’s my feeling. I think that we should take this

opportunity.President Kennedy: Well, now, do we want to meet at four here and

[put an] end to this thing, in a new . . . form, with everybody havinggiven it some thought—?

Bundy: Right.President Kennedy: And then we’ll have the leadership at five.Bundy: You . . . And your current thought is that we, you would then

issue a statement through Pierre at the end of the afternoon?President Kennedy: That is correct. Even if it’s confined—Bundy: To a very limited—President Kennedy: —to a statement of what the facts are plus this

key sentence from page 4. [to someone else] That’s all right [unclear]. Buteven if—

The meeting ended and Kennedy left to shake hands in the Oval Officewith a congressional candidate from Missouri. After that, he went to theMansion for lunch and a swim.

4:00 –4:50 P.M.

The difficulty here is that the intervention is being invited.That’s what’s causing all our difficulties . . .

Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement34

In the three hours since this group last met, Robert Kennedy has beenvery busy. Besides drafting a new version of the statement on Cuba forthe President, the Attorney General met with Soviet ambassador

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 33

34. President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Ray S. Cline, C. Douglas Dillon,Carl Kaysen, Robert Kennedy, Curtis LeMay, Edwin Martin, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze,

Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy. The Russians requested thismeeting to hand over a private letter from Khrushchev in response tothe new Anglo-American proposals on the test ban matter. Kennedycame back from that meeting with little that was positive. Khrushchevwas unwilling to countenance a partial test ban without some form ofrestraint on future nuclear tests underground. The Attorney Generalhad made use of the meeting to mention Cuba, but the Soviet ambassa-dor said nothing to deter Kennedy from his belief that it was only a mat-ter of time before Moscow put nuclear missiles on the island.35

The group was larger for this second Cuban meeting of the day.Among the new participants were the Treasury secretary, DouglasDillon; the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, EdwinMartin; and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay.Kennedy was widening the circle to confirm the instincts of his keyadvisers and to tighten the statement before it went out. Discussion nowcentered on the new Robert Kennedy draft. In the struggle over whetherto use the evening’s statement to send a warning to the Soviets, RobertKennedy had scored a victory.

The President started recording as he and his key advisers were con-sidering how much of the intelligence data at hand on the Soviet buildupshould be revealed in this statement.

Dean Rusk : [Unclear] ships [unclear] instead of actions, suggestinghe wants [unclear].

President Kennedy: I think in this one, we ought to say . . . and toavoid having the exact number of days ago—

McGeorge Bundy: I think so.President Kennedy: Because otherwise it looks like it’s only been the

last minute.Bundy: Well, I would say if it’s going to go, “It has become clear that

the suspected landing craft [unclear].Rusk: I would not put [unclear] in terms . . . They would say yes.

And we can’t be sure of that fact.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196234

Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Others attending the meeting but not identified ashaving spoken include Charles Bohlen and Martin Hillenbrand. Tape 19, John F. KennedyLibrary, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.35. What Robert Kennedy did not know was that indeed his suspicions were correct andSoviet missiles were on their way to Cuba, though they had not arrived there. However,Ambassador Dobrynin was as much in the dark about these missile deployments as the U.S.government.

Bundy: Here is the foreign intelligence [unclear] because this[unclear] clear if we can get the substantive [unclear] on the side of[unclear]. [Pages are flipped.]

President Kennedy: I think probably, in here somewhere, we proba-bly ought to say is how many [unclear] technicians there are, militarytechnicians there are [unclear]. [Ongoing unintelligible background conver-sation.]

Bundy: What level of force can be stated, numbers of technicians? Onthe order of 5,000, or don’t you know?

Marshall Carter: Three thousand would be closer.36

Unidentified: Three thousand.Unidentified: We’re talking about military personnel.President Kennedy: Technicians?Carter: Technicians, yes sir. Military technicians.Unidentified: Military technicians.Carter: This is within the last month, sir.Rusk: Military training and tactical personnel [unclear].President Kennedy: Well, I think . . . let’s put that sentence here:

“That consistent with . . . there are . . .”Unidentified: There appear to be about 3,000 in there, we have

[unclear].President Kennedy: That’s about right.Bundy: About 3,000.Unidentified: Three thousand.President Kennedy: What’s this statement for?Bundy: This is to get the facts. The factual paragraph will go before

this. This is a slightly shortened version of the paragraph on page 1. [Apage is flipped.]

President Kennedy: What about saying, “There are approximately3,000 technicians this side [unclear] there are . . . however . . .”

Carter: You could add this up. [Unclear] presence. That might work.Unidentified: You just take that one [unclear] should probably have

another one.Carter: Now on a substantive issue, Mr. President—President Kennedy: Why don’t I just [say], “As I have said before,”

Bobby, “As we have said before.” [Unclear] just so it doesn’t look like thisis a new fact coming out, this one on the technicians.

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 35

36. Ultimately, the White House would put out that there were approximately 3,500 Sovietmilitary personnel in Cuba. The Attorney General’s draft statement has not been found.

Ray Cline: Sir, you asked me a question this morning about our firstevidence, we traced it back to mid-1960, to at least by July 1960 therewere some military technical advisers—

President Kennedy: Right.Cline: —sent to Cuba from the [Soviet] bloc.Bundy: Was that more than three years ago?Cline: No, [unclear].Carter: We were carrying 500 up until this most recent influx, and

there were 1,700 actually in, and 1,300 more within the last four or fivedays, so that it’s about 3,500 military technicians, but we’ve been carry-ing approximately 2,000 agricultural and economic assistants, Soviettypes, since they first started coming in in mid-’60.

Rusk: So that number has increased since they . . . [Rusk keeps talkingunder Kennedy—unintelligible.]

President Kennedy: OK, well we have to rewrite that section, I think.I’d rather see, “As we have said before.”

Bundy: Yeah. Right.Carter: We carry about 5,000, altogether: agricultural, economic, and

military at this time. [Pause.]Bundy: What this statement in this form admits . . . This paragraph

here, that’s the one on which we were having a discussion this morning.Rusk: The Attorney General redrafted it, as we said this morning . . .Robert Kennedy (?): We’ll look at that.Rusk: There is a paragraph here that I believe might . . . we might

just want to make two or three small changes. I think [unclear]. [Lot ofpaper rustling. Short, unclear exchanges.]

Robert Kennedy: The Secretary thinks that you should . . .Rusk: It’s page 4, I believe [unclear].Unidentified: Have you seen this piece of paper?Unidentified: [Unclear.]Carter: [Unclear] I was more concerned about the first page with the

facts [unclear]. That one there that you [unclear].Unidentified: Coordination.Rusk: This last paragraph on page 4.President Kennedy: Why don’t we just start at the top of page 4:

“Clearly the recent acceleration of Soviet military aid to Cuba is comingdangerously close to a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.” I think that’s a. . . it’s an ambivalent, ambiguous position. What [unclear] would be thesubject of endless conversation about what does constitute a violationand what does not. [Bundy can be heard indistinctly in the background.]

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196236

Edwin Martin: Well Mr. President, the “however” clause whichimmediately followed that sort of impliedly says—

President Kennedy: —But what is the “violation?”Martin: What is the “vio—”? They have not yet done the following

things and the implication is that that would be—President Kennedy: I think we ought to leave this out, this

Monroe—Douglas Dillon: We could get into a terrible fight about the Monroe

Doctrine, because—President Kennedy: It’s so vague.Dillon: —others would say it has already been clearly violated.President Kennedy: I think we ought to leave the Monroe Doctrine

out of that paragraph. I don’t think it’s necessary anyway.37

Bundy: I think if we do leave it out, if we leave out of any statementwe make, there is no point in calling attention to it in the statement at allbecause it has the difficulty Douglas [Dillon] described.

Rusk: The . . . Then what about calling attention to the inter-American security arrangement [unclear] connection?

President Kennedy: Well, I think we can just leave out the words“since the Monroe [Doctrine] was first announced.” Just say “for over acentury and a half ” or something. Or it would just say, “For many yearsthe United—the American states,” that would be the bottom of page 2.“For many years, the American states have consistently maintained theirright to prevent the use of their ter—”

Is this the principle of our agreements to prevent the use of theterritory by nonmilitary [nonhemispheric] powers or is it to preventthe seizure of territory, or—What exactly is the Rio Treaty? Whatdoes it provide? Is that the key document, the Rio Treaty that willoverturn it?

Bundy: The collective security arrangement.Rusk: Well, I think it’s a general collective security phrase to ensure

the safety and territorial integrity of the defense of the WesternHemisphere [unclear.] [Two other voices—unclear.]

Cline: How about the Declaration on Solidarity for the Preservationof the Political Integrity of the American States, 1954, says—under the

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 37

37. The final statement did not contain any reference to the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. posi-tion was that it had a right to react to anything that posed a threat to U.S. security or to thesecurity of other members of the inter-American system.

Rio Treaty—said it [reading] “declares that the domination or control ofpolitical institutions of any American State by the international commu-nist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of anextra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereigntyand political independence of the American States, endangering thepeace of America—”38 I think—

Rusk: There were sweeping reservations that were read into that atthe time that [unclear].

Cline: That’s right. This is the most clear statement that we haveunder the Rio Treaty on Communist intervention. It was called, “AgainstInternational Communist Intervention at Caracas, Venezuela.”

Martin: That figured an inaccurate use of force [unclear] it alltogether.

Rusk: Yes, I think the wording at the bottom of page 2 will have tobe revised to bring in the actual language of the Rio Pact.

Robert Kennedy: Can you get me—What is the language here of theRio Treaty?39

President Kennedy: The key point is that the Monroe Doctrine—and all these things—is talking about the forcible seizure of the terri-tory of one country, of a country in the Western Hemisphere, by aforeign power. The difficulty here is that the intervention is beinginvited. That’s what’s causing all our difficulties, but we therefore haveto . . .

Robert Kennedy: The Article 5 of the Rio Treaty says that “the terri-tory or sovereignty or political independence of any American State isaffected by an aggression which is not an armed attack.”40

Rusk: That’s right.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196238

38. “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the AmericanStates Against International Communist Intervention,” accepted on 13 March 1954 at theconclusion of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas, Venezuela. For the fulltext of the declaration, see Department of State Bulletin 30, no. 769 (22 March 1954): 420. Thepassage continues: “. . . and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoptionof measures in accordance with existing treaties.”39. The Attorney General is trying to rework his draft to incorporate these new ideas.Ultimately his draft would be completely revised and cut.40. He is presumably referring to Article 6, which reads: “If the inviolability or the integrity ofthe territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should beaffected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-conti-nental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, theOrgan of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must betaken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures

Robert Kennedy: “Or by any other type of situation that mightendanger the peace.”

President Kennedy: The whole name “aggression” is the point.These people are being invited in, that’s why—

Robert Kennedy: It’s just whether the Soviet Union establishingbases here or putting missiles here, whether that is in fact an aggressionwhich doesn’t constitute an armed attack [unclear].

Dillon: It depends a lot on the—President Kennedy: Well, we don’t have to settle that question today,

though. I mean, this is really leading up to our main points. So that I don’tthink we have to . . . I think the first sentence, [reading] “Considering U.S.policy is necessary [unclear], the special relationship among the countriesof the Western Hemisphere, a relationship which has existed for manyyears and which has been the subject of many hemispheric treaties.”

Rusk: Inter-American treaties.President Kennedy: Inter-American treaties. [reading] “This special

relationship has been acknowledged throughout the world, and is recog-nized by Article 52 which provides for regional security arrange-ments.”41 Then we go on to January of this year . . .

[Pause.]Robert Kennedy: You better get that changed.Unidentified: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: All right. Then I would say at the top of [page]

4, I’d leave that paragraph out.Rusk: Then first, [page] 4. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: First, take it out and say, “There is . . .” Yeah.Rusk: At the bottom of page—Robert Kennedy: Now what does that—President Kennedy: [testily] You have to understand, we’re going to

have to redo this.Robert Kennedy: Yeah.President Kennedy: I just want to get the key . . . you have to lead up

to explaining that.Robert Kennedy: Yeah.

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 39

which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and securityof the Continent.” For the full text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947,see Department of State Bulletin 17, no. 429 (21 September 1947): 565–67.41. Of the Charter of the United Nations.

Rusk: [Unclear.] “Soviet assistance” at the bottom of page 4, “limitedto weapons normally associated with defense.”

President Kennedy: Yeah.Rusk: And knock out the next sentence, and then say, “[Unclear] say

to our friends in Latin America [unclear].”Unidentified: Well, you really want to say that there is nothing in the

Soviet announcement which foreshadows such an eventuality; there is noth-ing there which precludes it either. And you just wanted [unclear] our way.

Carl Kaysen: The reason for that sentence was really to put them . . .to read our interpretation into it, and to force them into [unclear].

Bundy: That puts us in a position of depending on their words.President Kennedy: Well, maybe it wouldn’t be if you keep in that sen-

tence, “It will continue to be so confined.” I would say, that if it was goingto happen, then we would take action against it. So I would think that . . .

Rusk: I think rather than say “it will continue to be so confined,” “itmust be so confined.”

President Kennedy: We say “bloc assistance” [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]Dillon: If you say, “It must be so confined,” does that mean you’re

going to confine it?Rusk: Well, that’s what “it will continue to be so confined” means, in

this context. Not negotiable.Dillon: [Unclear] statement . . .Unidentified: What’s this about [unclear]? [Pause. Mumbling.]Rusk: “Should it be otherwise, the greatest questions would arise . . .

but otherwise the greatest questions would arise for our friends in LatinAmerica.”

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: With all this information, it’s a little less red flaggish.Carter: [Unclear.]Dillon: The only thing I think you want to be careful of is . . . making

a threat to do something if they get some particular weapon in Cuba. Ifyou make your threat that you’ll never let it come out of Cuba, which isstill the key; but the other thing means that you’re—

President Kennedy: Well, I would say ground-to-ground missiles,you’d—42

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196240

42. Presumably, Robert Kennedy’s draft only ruled out the placement of offensive weapon sys-tems on Cuba. Here the President is making clear what he thinks would be unacceptable:ground-to-ground missiles.

Dillon: Well, that’s . . . if you want to put it on that maybe—President Kennedy: Yeah.Dillon: —that’s a strong enough one to put it on, but just saying

“offensive weapons,” I don’t know what an offensive weapon is. They’dargue. Might say tanks are but I don’t know.

Bundy: That’s a substantive question. I mean how far—it’s clear thatwe want to make a statement that makes it plain that they will be confinedand not make a . . . head for the rest of the hemisphere with this stuff.43

Rusk: Well, what about this then? “To date, bloc assistance has beenlimited to weapons normally associated with defense. Were it to be oth-erwise the greatest questions would arise.”44 [Unclear] “Our friends inLatin America and throughout the world [unclear] Cuban regime[unclear] restricted by whatever means make it necessary to that island.”Nothing more . . .

Dillon: That’s right, but you don’t say you’re going to go in there . . .Bundy: I think that “to that island” is technically not a . . . Ed [Martin]

and I have figured out [Martin makes an unclear interjection] that you can’tkeep them out of international waters with their patrol boats. So we’regoing to have to say, “kept away from any part of the hemisphere.”

Rusk: “By whatever means necessary to Cuba.”Martin: We have [had] an alternative plan.Bundy: [Unclear] take that “free passage of the high seas” unless

you’re going to make a special order.President Kennedy: Let’s see which way that we are in the draft.

Now, this first—Bundy: I think the factual part can be done very well from that first

paragraph with the corrections you’ve made. It doesn’t need to be long.Then the question is really whether you want an extensive development,or any development of the Rio Treaty obligations or whether you wantto go straight to some form of pledge, either as stated in the Justice draftor anywhere else.

President Kennedy: There’s no difference between them.Robert Kennedy: Do you have another copy of that first factual?Bundy: No I don’t; it’s just the one.Rusk: I think there is some mistake [unclear] in the Attorney

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 41

43. Bundy consistently doubts the Soviets would ever use Cuba as a military base from whichto threaten the United States.44. Rusk has hit on a new formulation of the warning to the Soviets. This phrasing wouldprevail.

General’s draft in the middle of page 4 indicating what there is not evi-dence of . . .

Martin: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: I think we ought to have that and then we ought

to—Bundy: That could follow on—Rusk: And then the statement on—that reassures our Latin

American allies at the end.Dillon: Well, I think the way you’ve redrafted it [unclear] objection.President Kennedy: What we are doing is, first we’re going to give

the details of what assistance they’ve sent to Cuba.Bundy: That’s right . . . what they have not.President Kennedy: Secondly, we have . . . And what they have not.

Then secondly we are going to give a unilateral guarantee against theuse of any of these forces against anyone in the hemisphere.

Bundy: Against anybody else.President Kennedy: Third, we’re going to say that the [unclear] indi-

rect methods of taking steps against them [unclear] direct. Then I thinkwe ought to say something about, at the end, that we have to keep in mindfor those who are . . . This is a dangerous world and we have to keep inmind . . . don’t want to use the word totality again, but all of the dangers welive with. The fact of the matter is the major danger is the Soviet Unionwith missiles and nuclear warheads, not Cuba. We don’t want to geteverybody so fixed on Cuba that they regard . . . So in some way or otherwe want to suggest that at the end. This is a matter of [unclear] danger, asis Berlin as is Southeast Asia as are a great many areas which are—

Bundy: I think there is a question, Mr. President, whether you wantto do that in this statement or whether that’s something we make clearas we go along.

President Kennedy: Well, I know, I think we’ve got to say somethingabout that otherwise you don’t want everybody to blow on this, you geteverybody so mesmerized here that all these other places which arealso—

Rusk: I think, perhaps [unclear]—President Kennedy: This is not an aggressive danger to us except

indirectly.Bundy: As it now stands.President Kennedy: Compared with these other places. Now some-

where we’ve got to get that in, it seems to me, right from the beginning.Give some guidance.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196242

Dillon: How far do these surface-to-air missiles shoot if they want touse them to hit the ground?

Bundy: Thirty miles.Dillon: [Unclear.]Pause. Some flipping of pages.Bundy: Would you like us to go and work on it?President Kennedy: Haven’t similar missiles been given to Iraq and

what, the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria]?Bundy: Similar missiles are on order for Iraq and the U.A.R. and

[unclear]—President Kennedy: Indonesia?Paul Nitze: Indonesia has them, yes sir.Cline: [Unclear] the equipment has been delivered to Indonesia and

they are proceeding at a very leisurely pace there and this is the onlyplace that they’ve set up such a program.

President Kennedy: Do you think it might—Bundy: This is a quick, smart, secret operation.Unidentified: That’s right.Bundy: They were put in fast here in Cuba. It is in that sense quite

different from their ordinary military assistance. [Voices of agreement.]Rusk: The problem with stating these points you mentioned at the

very end, Mr. President is to put [it] in terms of general tensions andthe need for making progress on all fronts, to not put it in such a waythat it appears that we are timorous about Cuba, because we are scaredto death of [unclear]—

President Kennedy: No, but what I just want to get everybody tokeep in mind, what is really—

Rusk: Right.President Kennedy: —dangerous, and what’s really annoying—Nitze: At some stage wouldn’t it be wise, Mr. President, to lay the

background as to why this isn’t symmetrical, why that it’s the Russianswho are really threatening people all over the world? Our measures aredefensive mainly. We feel differently. Whereas the Russians have come inwith a real aggressive phase. [Unclear.] Because otherwise you get onthis tit-for-tat kind of a thing, justification where you have to understandtime lines.

Bundy: Have you got [unclear] language Mr. Secretary as to what wefigure will be the consequences? Because that’s— [Unclear response.]

President Kennedy: Yeah, well I think we ought to . . . do we charac-terize this as an announcement [unclear] aggressive regime?

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 43

Papers rustling. Dillon is speaking to someone in the background.President Kennedy: All right. Now let’s see. We’ve got this first page

[unclear].Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]Bundy: The first paragraph, it’s on—there it is, Bobby.President Kennedy: Now, the question, I don’t [unclear]—Bundy: Then we would add the paragraph from page 4—Rusk: [Unclear.]Bundy: Of Bobby’s draft, the middle paragraph, “no evidence of,”

except I would suggest that we omit the last sentence. That seems tome—

President Kennedy: I’ve taken that out.Bundy: —entirely a question of their faith.President Kennedy: All right, now what do we say after this?Bundy: And after that we would move toward . . .Rusk: I would say what comes below, we’re going to have to revise.

The use of [unclear].Bundy: “I say to our friends in Latin America and throughout the

world.”President Kennedy: [Unclear] grandiloquent thing, that’s an oratori-

cal phrase?Rusk: Well, “Our friends in—”Bundy: “I can assure our friends in Latin America”?President Kennedy: Let’s just say, “The armed strength [unclear] in

Latin America.”Bundy: Or “whatever armed strength.” All right. And say not “to that

island,” I would think . . .President Kennedy: Well, I think that gets over the idea we have

[unclear].Martin: [Unclear] precious distinction.Kennedy and Unidentified: What?Martin: The high seas is a precious distinction in [unclear] state-

ment.Bundy: Well, it’s an important one because the question will come up

when they begin using the high seas with MTBs [motor-torpedo boats]as to whether the President has committed himself to prevent that. Iwould be sorry to see him in that bind.

Brief, unclear exchange. President Kennedy at one point says, “What?”Inaudible.President Kennedy: Bobby, you rewrite that sentence.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196244

Bundy: I would say . . .Rusk: Maybe you rewrite that sentence and let’s take the last sen-

tence that [unclear]—Bundy: Well, I think it’s important to say. Look, we put in another

draft—I admit that it’s not as eloquent language—“will be prevented bywhatever means might be necessary from threatening any part of thehemisphere.”45

President Kennedy: OK.Martin: Seems to me that gets the point across.President Kennedy: All right. “Threatening militarily . . .” They’re

threatening every part of the hemisphere now in the indirect sense, sothat we’re talking now about the military—

Bundy: “Prevented from action against any part of the hemisphere.”Unidentified: “Any action against—”President Kennedy and several others: “Military action.”Unidentified: “Military action against.”President Kennedy: Yeah.Rusk: And in the final sentence where . . . here we will have to write a

sentence to relate this to other problems [unclear].Bundy: You have one other sentence though about grave damage,

which danger, which we need a decision either for or against.Rusk: Start the paragraph: “To date, bloc assistance has been limited to

weapons normally associated with defense. Were it to be otherwise, thegreatest questions would arise. The armed strength which the Cubanregime may develop will be restricted by whatever means.” For sure.

President Kennedy: See, the reason we’ve got to put in something atthe end, otherwise you’re going to get a suggestion of blockade right nowand blockade these shipments and . . . so that I think we better just—46

Bundy: Well, we could say simply, “Against the real dangers whichconfront the world, the current threat of, the current hazards in Cubaare not—”

Unidentified: “Kept in pers—”Bundy: “Must be kept in perspective.”

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 45

45. This less than eloquent phrase makes its way into the final version of the statement.46. The President is seeking more policy flexibility than would have been allowed by a stri-dent statement. The sentence about restricting or confining Cuban power never makes it intothe final version. Instead the Cuban problem is set within the complex of concerns definingthe worldwide struggle against Communism.

Unidentified: “Perspective.”President Kennedy: “The dangers which confront the world in . . .”Unidentified: [Unclear.]Bundy: Well, I would . . . I don’t know that I’d localize it, at all.

“Which Soviet—”President Kennedy: “Communist.” “Communist.”Bundy: “With which Communist aggression threatens the wor—

Communist aggressiveness,” I would say, “threatens the world.”President Kennedy: “And the peace.”Long pause, with the sounds of writing and page turning. Severalunclear, whispered exchanges. Someone says “statement of the generalthreat.”Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] Read that [unclear].Rusk: [reading] “The Cuban ques—”[unclear] “The Cuban question

must be considered as part of a worldwide challenge posed by Communistthreats to the peace and must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue inwhich all free men have a prominent stake.” It gets the idea without—47

Bundy: Without [unclear] either way. It’s very clear.Robert Kennedy: We might put that at the beginning, I think, of the

first paragraph, rather than at the end where we say [unclear] happen[unclear]. Might be well to have this right under . . . when we get into adiscussion of this whole problem.

Unidentified: After the factual statement.Bundy: That’s probably going to be the second paragraph.Unidentified: After the factual statement.Bundy: But before we . . . the defense [unclear] . . .Unidentified: [Unclear.] All right, [unclear].Bundy: But before we say there is no defensive [unclear] I would

think . . . Let’s put this together in detachable fragments [unclear].[Unclear exchange. Someone says, “Time is running out.”]

President Kennedy: Five, yeah.Robert Kennedy: Can we head up there before that? [Unclear] take it

up now?Bundy: Well, we’ll do our best.President Kennedy: Here’s . . I don’t know what—You’ve got

Bobby’s haven’t you?

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196246

47. Here Rusk was expressing President Kennedy’s point that Cuba must be kept in perspective,since the real concern was the Soviet Union and the most acute dangers were in other parts of theworld. This language would also be part of the final version.

Bundy: Yeah.President Kennedy: What about this business of Guantánamo?

[Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: Here at the end.Bundy: I swiped it out.48

Unidentified: Yeah. I think that . . .Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Yeah, we ought to have a sentence in there “as

any further . . . as further information is received and verified—”Bundy: “It will be promptly made available.”President Kennedy: “In accordance with the President’s statement a

week ago.”49

Robert Kennedy: That’s almost covered in that first page.Bundy: It’s in one of the papers. I think we did get this.Robert Kennedy: Mac, you might look at the first page.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Bundy: Well . . . the [Central Intelligence] agency has a brief of what

they plan to do, Mr. President, which you may want to review before the . . .Rusk: “As further information is developed and confirmed.”50

Carter: Would you prefer to look at it or . . .President Kennedy: What’s this on?Carter: This is substantially what we gained in this morning, Mr.

President, except—President Kennedy: Oh about the . . . I’d like to ask General [Curtis]

LeMay a little about what these SAM sites could mean if we were going tocarry out an attack on Cuba. What hazard would this present to you?51

Curtis LeMay: Well, it would mean you’d have to get, of course, yourforce in there to knock them out so that the rest of the attacking forceswould be free to take on the other targets. That’d be the first thing we’ddo. We’d have to go in low level and get them.

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 47

48. Guantánamo would be mentioned in the final text.49. Presumably referring to his news conference on 29 August 1962 where he addressed the issue.50. This becomes the language of the final draft; but just before Salinger reads the statement,the President has this rewritten so that it is clear that he has consistently promised to provideinformation as “it is obtained and properly verified.” Understandably, the President is con-cerned about his personal credibility. Compare the news conference version to the “last draft,”4 September 1962, “Cuba” folder, National Security Files, Box 36, John F. Kennedy Library.Besides this change, Salinger provided additional information at the press conference on therange of the SAMs. Otherwise, the statement as read and this so-called last draft found inMcGeorge Bundy’s Cuba file are identical.51. On 7 September, Kennedy would order military planning for assaults on SAM sites.

President Kennedy: OK.LeMay: These missiles have no low-level capability so you go in low

and take them out.President Kennedy: You’d have to go hit the radar?LeMay: And the missiles, too.Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Would that be a difficult operation?LeMay: No, sir.Rusk: They would probably have low-level, smaller antiaircraft guns.LeMay: Lose our tactical fighters going in low, uh, huh.Rusk: Yeah.President Kennedy: You mean they would use antiaircraft [guns]?Rusk: They would use 20 mm [unclear]—LeMay: Well, they would probably not see us until we got within a

few miles of the coastline.Rusk: Yeah.LeMay: And you’d put part of your force on those missiles to knock

them out.Rusk: Right.LeMay: Of course, you’ve got to get the airfields very quick too.Rusk: Sure.LeMay: But this complicates any assault plans you might have. It’s

another target you’ve got to worry about.President Kennedy: Yeah. How about . . . let’s see . . . how are we now

. . . are we going to continue our observation of the island?Unidentified: [Unclear.]Carter: We have not yet faced that problem, sir. We have a bird ready

to go tomorrow morning and we would like to send it to cover that por-tion which was obstructed by clouds on the [August] 29th mission. Wecould go in across the Isle of Pines—hit the two—[pointing to a map]hit right there on the first of the green sites and then cover the islanddown and back, avoiding the present area. We don’t need any more cov-erage of that area now.52

President Kennedy: This would be about 75,000 feet, would it,depending?

LeMay: Sixty-five [thousand], 70,000 feet, yes sir.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196248

52. A U-2 photographed the central and eastern portions of Cuba on September 5. The mis-sion detected three additional SAM sites in the central portion of the island. Heavy cloudcover prevented the U-2 from seeing much along the eastern side of the island. “U-2

Carter: I think that’s a safe operation. But I think also it’s safe for theentire island now, but next week it may not be and it might not be now.

President Kennedy: He has to go over land doesn’t he, to get thisthing, these [unclear]?

Carter: Yes sir, these are verticals.53

LeMay: Well, once these things become operational they have thecapability of shooting a U-2 down, of course. We can go to the low alti-tude 101s, but [unclear].54

President Kennedy: You can’t get much, can you?LeMay: You can’t hide them very well.President Kennedy: You don’t get much I suppose either, do you?LeMay: Well, you’d get the definite targets you’re looking for. You’d

have to cover a big wide area. You need more sorties to do that. The spe-cific areas you’re interested in, you could [unclear].

President Kennedy: So the question really is the hazards to thisflight tomorrow.

LeMay: Yes, sir.Carter: I think the hazard would be very, very slight and we would

like to go ahead with it, sir.President Kennedy: It’s fine with me. Do you have any?Robert McNamara: I think we definitely should go ahead, Mr.

President.Bundy: I would agree.President Kennedy: Fine.Now, that would be about—after that it would probably get more dif-

ficult. So what are we going to do then? We ought to go, at least—Iknow it’d seem abrupt so let’s be thinking about what [unclear]. There’sno way we can do this . . .

Thirty-three seconds excised as classified information.Cline: This flight tomorrow, ought to give us complete coverage of the

island and I think we would assess that and perhaps suggest we do an openflight or a . . . that it is safe for another major flight based on [unclear].

Carter: Of course, you’ll get noise from the 101s [if President

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 49

Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, in CIADocuments, McAuliffe, pp. 127–37.53. Vertical photography was taken from directly overhead, rather than at an angle, pointedinland from a flight along Cuba’s periphery.54. The McDonnell RF-101 Voodoo was the world’s first supersonic photoreconnaissance air-craft. Originally built as a fighter-interceptor, it was a highly maneuverable, low-altitudereconnaissance plane.

Kennedy adds low-level surveillance flights] but you’re going to getnoise no matter what happens anywhere.

President Kennedy: OK, why don’t we stand down for a meeting atfive. Now, on this meeting at five certainly one of the questions that isgoing to come up is this question of our ability or inability to get ourNATO allies to do anything about their ships carrying this stuff. Thatwould be addressed to you, Mr. Secretary [unclear].

Rusk: Yes, and I will comment briefly on that, that it’s not verypromising at this point. We’ve taken it up with them again. But . . . toexplain some of the difficulties, but that’s not very helpful.

Carter: Does the opening sentence adequately take care of yourinjunction [unclear] Mr. President?

President Kennedy: This is what you might read?Carter: Yes, sir, this is what we’ll give them.President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s fine. I think that’s right. I think the . . .

just what the facts are which is just that . . . [Loud paper rustling.]President Kennedy: At the meeting then, I think I’ll ask that you,

General [Carter], to just brief on . . . go over that part of the materialwhich has been made available previously and then this recent material . . .if you want to comment . . . and then [turn to] the Secretary of Defenseand General LeMay will then be asked about the military significance ofthis. Also they’ll talk about Guantánamo. Now, if they want to talk aboutthis question of Guantánamo, you should respond—

McNamara: Yes, I talked to Admiral [George W.] Anderson thisafternoon, Mr. President, and he recommended that we maintain thepresent forces at the present levels, unless we observe, by various means,reinforcements of Cuban military personnel in the area.55

President Kennedy: Now, this statement of Bundy’s is—I wonder ifat this meeting the personnel we’ll want here will be Secretary of . . .the CIA, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, General LeMay, andMr. Nitze. I wonder if the other gentlemen could perhaps go into myoffice and take a look at this statement [unclear] as soon as Bundy hasit ready and then see if you fellows could come to a conclusion on itand then if we get it all straightened out, then I will have theSecretary of State and Defense take a look at it and we’ll put it outright about six.

President Kennedy: Why don’t we all wait in . . .The meeting breaks up. Only fragments of conversation can be made out.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196250

55. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., was Chief of Naval Operations.

Bundy: Mr. President walk into [unclear]. [Bundy keeps mumbling.][Papers shuffling.]

McNamara: [Unclear.] I don’t have [unclear]. Yes, I think so. Itseems to me [unclear]. I’m not sure we [unclear].

Bundy: How much do we want?56

Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]McNamara: All right.President Kennedy: [Unclear.] How much do we want?McNamara: I would recommend . . . Last time you had 250,000 for

11 months. I’d recommend 150,000 for say 5 months, up to the first ofMarch, end of February. [Unclear.] Worked out fine [unclear] in effectwhile they’re out of session. [Unclear.]

President Kennedy: Fine.Unidentified: And I think we did a good job [unclear].Nitze: I appreciate your help. [He laughs.]Unclear exchanges. Meeting has broken up.McNamara: Could I just ask, Mr. President, whether you want to

raise [unclear] question with the [congressional] leadership [unclear]. Iagree with [unclear], the surface-to-air missiles should not represent thestage at which our traditional strength [unclear] putting nuclear weaponsthere as a deterrent actually makes Cuba more [unclear] recognizabledeterrent.

Unidentified: They could put some more strength there [unclear]concentration of artillery [unclear].

Unidentified: We’ve got [unclear].Nitze: You have an appointment to see Foy Kohler at five? 57

McNamara: Yeah, would you call him? Thank you very much. It maybe too late but at least. But she may have already done it.

Dean Rusk had a barely audible conversation with someone before thecongressmen arrive. The Secretary of State then, it seems, left the room,but Robert McNamara stayed behind to greet the congressmen.

Draft ing Meet ing on the Cuba Press Statement 51

56. The discussion has shifted to the call-up of reserves that Kennedy believes is necessary toprepare the U.S. armed forces for any contingency in the rough patch ahead.57. Foy D. Kohler would replace Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., as U.S. ambassador to the SovietUnion on 27 September 1962.

5:00 –5:55 P.M.

. . . I think Berlin is coming to some kind of a climax this fall,one way or another, before Christmas. And I think that today Iwould think it would be a mistake for us to talk about militaryaction or a blockade [against Cuba].

Meeting with Congressional Leadership on Cuba58

The Attorney General and McGeorge Bundy moved to the Oval Officeto complete work on the President’s Cuba statement, as the congres-sional leadership filed into the Cabinet Room. Earlier in the day, theWhite House invited 20 people to attend, including Speaker of theHouse John McCormack of Massachusetts, Senate Majority Leader MikeMansfield of Montana, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson.59

Robert McNamara was in the Cabinet Room as the congressmenarrived. At the tail end of the drafting meeting he had mentioned to thePresident that a call-up of reserves might be needed during the forth-coming congressional recess. As the congressmen took their seatsaround the Cabinet table, McNamara isolated a key congressional playerto put in a word about the administration’s pressing military need.

Robert McNamara: [quietly as an aside to an unidentified congressman,perhaps Senator Russell] Well, I think the President wants to tell youwhat he knew of it. While you’re standing here, may I mention that[unclear] possibility of obtaining authority [to] call up reserve [unclear]personnel while Congress is out of session.60 He can’t do it. The old

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196252

58. Including President Kennedy, Senators Everett Dirksen, J. W. Fulbright, BourkeHickenlooper, Mike Mansfield, Richard B. Russell, and Alexander Wiley; Congressmen CharlesA. Halleck, John McCormack, and Carl Vinson; Marshall Carter, Curtis LeMay, RobertMcNamara, and Dean Rusk, all identified in the discussion. Senators Thomas H. Kuchel and JohnSparkman and Congressmen Carl Albert, Leslie C. Arends, Robert B. Chiperfield, and ArmisteadSelden are listed on the President’s appointments diary but not identified as speakers. Tape 19,John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.59. Sometime later, Senator John Sparkman of Alabama was added to the list of invitees.According to a note to the President’s appointments secretary Kenneth O’Donnell, VicePresident Lyndon Johnson, Senators Hubert Humphrey, George Smathers, and LeverettSaltonstall and Congressmen Hale Boggs and Thomas Morgan could not attend.60. The 87th Congress adjourned on 14 October 1962 and the 88th Congress convened on 10January 1963.

[unclear] expired on the first of August [unclear] the resolution . . . orrather on May—yeah, the first of August the resolution was passed. Intheory . . . that authority . . . again, unless he declares a national emer-gency which is [unclear] impossible to ask Congress. Now this, however,is likely to cause controversy because of this [unclear]. It certainly wouldbe the wrong thing to ask for. We are united as a nation at this time.[Unclear] I don’t think so [unclear]. Well, it’s Cuba, Berlin, andSoutheast Asia, all the [unclear]. No. No sir, I do not. [Unclear.] I wouldn’tanticipate [unclear] requirement. [Unclear.] The authority shows, ourpurpose and firmness of will. You know, we’ve asked for it only for aperiod while Congress is out of session until the end of February, fromthe 1st of October to the end of February. We could have it [unclear].This bill was passed [unclear].

While McNamara has this private conversation, the number of con-gressmen and the voice level in the Cabinet Room rises significantly.John McCormack: [Unclear] resolution on the holidays. Is that

right, Ev?Everett Dirksen: Yeah.McCormack: Constitution Day.Dirksen: How many more of these [unclear] are going to come?

[Unclear exchanges and greetings.]Unidentified: They’re not all here, Mr President. They’re not all

here yet. [Unclear exchange.]President Kennedy: General, why don’t you come in and sit over

there. [Whispered exchanges.]Dirksen: Oh, we are having fun—President Kennedy: I know you’re having fun, but—Dirksen: I invited you to come up to the battleground if you run out

of [unclear]. [Laughter.]Richard Russell: It’s at the country’s expense Mr. President. I can

assure you of that.President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Dirksen: The last thing was [Senator Paul] Douglas trying to knock

the lobbying sections out of the bill. John Cooper came along and got itall bitched up, then they had 15 parliamentary inquiries and as of thismoment, nobody knows what he voted on.61 But he voted on something.

Alexander Wiley: Mike, you come over here. Come on. [Whisperedexchanges.]

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 53

61. John Sherman Cooper was a Republican senator from Kentucky.

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: All the big shots should be at the table, not the little

shots today. [Unclear exchanges.]Unidentified: Pull up a chair.Unidentified: You sit back there thinking that you’ll have people think-

ing that pipe as far away from everybody as possible. [Unclear exchanges.]President Kennedy: Just wait just a minute. Alex. [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear] California.Unidentified: He’s in California.Unidentified: Oh, he’s in California?Unidentified: Back tonight. I saw Fulbright was in town.President Kennedy: That singing group from Arkansas here this

morning was fantastic . . . [unclear] group from the University ofArkansas [unclear] won that prize with forty other countries at singingmedieval church music.

Charles Halleck: Is that the group that all the singing experts saidwas no good? [Several voices agree. Laughter.] [Unclear.]

President Kennedy: [That] shows you you can’t believe everything[unclear].

Unidentified: It just proves . . .Russell: In my opinion I thought the . . .Unidentified: Huh?Russell: In my opinion the Italians loved it. [Unclear exchange.]President Kennedy: I think we’re . . . I think we’re starting anyway.This meeting is to give the leadership the latest information we have

on Cuba. Perhaps General Carter, who is executive director of theCentral Intelligence Agency, who is representing the intelligence com-munity today in Mr. McCone’s absence, will lead off with first what wehad up till Friday, then the information we got this weekend.62

Marshall Carter: Up until Friday of last week we’ve had considerableindications—in fact, firm indications—of Soviet shipping up to as manyas forty ships having come into Cuba since mid-July. Spasmodic reports,many from refugees and from some defectors indicating the type ofequipment, but nothing on which we could really pin a confirmation.

New sources, highly reliable, new information that has just come inover this last weekend now gives us clear confirmation of exactly what

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196254

62. McCone was on his honeymoon at Cap Ferrat, on the French Riviera.

the Soviets have been putting in, in recent weeks. We have surface-to-airmissiles, some artillery, and some motor torpedo boats with missilelaunchers.

I’d like to go into the details of exactly what this equipment is that wehave been able to confirm. They are now building, on the island of Cuba,eight surface-to-air missile sites, one probable assembly area just south ofHavana and two additional sites, one on the far eastern side of Cuba.

I’d like to show you these on the map here. There has been very littlepermanent construction at these sites, indicating that they are going inon a crash basis and yet they could be operational, some of them, withina week. It takes a minimum of 125 technically trained personnel to oper-ate one of these sites and to the best of our knowledge, no Cubans havebeen receiving this technical training. This excludes the security person-nel and administrative personnel required to operate a site. The sites onthe western slope of Cuba, eight of them, cover the entire third of theisland. Just below Havana is what appears to be an assembly area fromthe information we are getting, and in the far right, we have here anindication of an additional site. Each of these sites has a central radarand normally six launchers, each normally having a missile. They areexactly the type of equipment that the Soviets utilize in Russia and isknown as their [NATO designation] SA-2. It has characteristics some-what better than the Nike Ajax, not as good as the Nike Hercules. Itshorizontal range is 25 to 30 miles, its altitude capability 60[,000] to80,000 feet with one system, 80,000 to 100,000 feet with an improvedsystem. We have not received information as to which of the systemsthey are putting in. Low altitude capability is about 2,500 feet and themaximum operational area for these missiles; the best capabilities arebetween 10,000 and 60,000 feet. It appears that there will be additionalsurface-to-air missile sites put in subsequently.

Now further defector and clandestine reports from the centralprovince indicate that at least two sites will be located there—I’ve putthem in in green—but we have not received any confirming informationon those. The pattern now is emerging that would indicate approxi-mately 24 sites in total would cover the entire island of Cuba.

In addition to the surface-to-air missile sites that are being put in, wehave confirmed reports on eight Komar-type missile-launching motortorpedo boats. These have an operational radius of about 300 miles at aspeed of 45 knots. Each of the boats has two missile launchers, but theselaunchers are not reloadable, so that they must go back to shore or to amother ship to get new loads. They are radar-guided missiles and they

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 55

have an effective range of between 15 and 17 miles. It carries a 2,000-pound high-explosive warhead. This is a conventional type of missile-launching motor-torpedo boat such as the Soviets utilize in their waters.Some Cuban naval personnel have received training in the Soviet Unionbut we do not know whether or not they were trained on the Komar-type boat. These are in addition to the 13 motor-torpedo boats and thesix submarine chasers that we had reported earlier this year.

These same highly reliable sources indicate that current shipments alsoinclude some additional army-type armaments such as tanks and armoredpersonnel carriers, possibly also some combat aircraft. We now credit theCubans with having 60 MiG fighters operational including at least a dozenMiG 19s. There is no report on any MiG 21s or of any bombers.

Soviet shipments of military equipment continue to show no signs ofletting up. There are about 16 Soviet dry cargo ships now en route toCuba and we estimate at least ten of them are probably carrying militaryequipment. Total numbers of military and military-related shipments toCuba since mid-July approximate 65 vessels. The routine shipments ofSoviet goods continue mainly in Western bottoms.63 At least 1,700Soviet military technicians have arrived in Cuba in late July and earlyAugust. Bloc military personnel, as you know, first began arriving inCuba in mid-1960 and up until this most recent influx, we have been car-rying about 500 military-type technicians, several thousand agriculturaland economic type. Thirteen hundred military-type technicians have justrecently arrived and we estimate now from 3,000 to 3,500 military tech-nicians on the island of Cuba. We would anticipate that additional Soviettechnicians, both military and economic, would be coming in these sub-sequent shipments.

That concludes the present situation as we were able to confirm itjust this past weekend from, what I say, are very reliable sources, Mr.President.

President Kennedy: Questions, gentlemen?Russell: How many of these missile torpedo boats did you say they

had?Carter: There are eight of them there, sir, now.Hickenlooper: Are they water to water, water to air?Carter: Water to water, short range, highly accurate, however, or rea-

sonably accurate. The . . .Hickenlooper: Not subject to water to air?

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196256

63. Ships registered in non-Communist countries.

Carter: No sir. We give them an estimated probable error [in accu-racy] of about 100 feet.

President Kennedy: At how many miles? At 15 miles?Carter: At 15 miles, yes, sir.President Kennedy: We would hope to have the rest of the informa-

tion in a very short while about other sites on the rest of this island[unclear].

Carter: Yes sir, we are seeking out information from the eastern por-tion of the island. And as it comes in through various sources we willcollate it and I would hope by next week or within the next ten days wewould have any new developments in that area.

Halleck: Mr. President, I wonder if I could ask something?President Kennedy: Yeah, shoot.Halleck: Do you consider this a defensive operation or force, or an

offensive [operation]?Carter: Well, there are no indications of any offensive weapons right

now, sir. These weapons are defensive.At least, the surface-to-air missiles are. The interpretation as to

tanks or armored personnel carriers—since they are on the island . . . Ithink we’d better revert to the Department of Defense to make thatanalysis. The motor-torpedo boats, well they are . . . I think I’m not com-petent to comment on that, sir. General LeMay [would be] better. Iwould say they are either defensive or offensive depending upon howthey are used.

Curtis LeMay: I don’t think these torpedo boats have offensive capa-bility. I think [unclear] defensive buildup.

President Kennedy: [whispering] Did he just say “defensive”?Unidentified: Yes, sir.Russell: Doesn’t matter what you say, Mr. General, if they would

decide to kick us out of Guantánamo, every bit of this stuff could beoffensive. They could bring their artillery and then put them in thosehills back of Guantánamo and run us out. Then we do what?

Unidentified: I would think they’d be [used] mainly against otherLatin American countries.

Russell: Oh, against it, yes.Hickenlooper: Mr. President, is there any buildup or threat against

Guantánamo at the moment? I mean indication of movement or concen-tration?

Carter: No sir. Normal harassment that takes place all the time, sir,but nothing . . . no real indication.

President Kennedy: Might just say something about Guantánamo.

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 57

Dean Rusk: Well, they seem to be staying very much at arm’s lengthfrom Guantánamo, with any significant forces, [unclear] moving someforces.

President Kennedy: The Secretary of Defense wants to say some-thing about Guantánamo, what we got there?

McNamara: Yes, Mr. President. We have relatively light forces thereat the present time, approximately 1,500 men including about 400 sailorswho have been trained for ground combat.

An attack on Guantánamo would have to be met with forces from theUnited States, forces which are available, which are on alert, fighter air-craft and airborne troops. [Unclear background conversation.]

Hickenlooper: Mr. President, may I ask if—is there any stepped-upactivity on the part of Soviet submarines in the Caribbean waters, theGulf [of Mexico], around that area, the shipping lanes?

Carter: No, sir. At least we have no indication of it, sir.Hickenlooper: Well, I said stepped-up activity. There probably is

some activity around in there.Carter: Very, very slight, in that area, sir. And very spasmodic.Hickenlooper: Thank you.Rusk: There’s been a surprisingly small amount of submarine activ-

ity in the Atlantic area by the Soviets.Russell: Mr. Secretary, you remember how many dollars they get

each year out of Guantánamo, their employees there?Rusk: They have 3,200 Cuban employees, of whom 1,000 live on the

base. So that means about 2,200 go back and forth every day.McNamara: They might get something on the order of seven million

dollars a year perhaps. There are roughly 3,500 employees involved.Russell: They’re requiring these people to turn in their dollars too,

aren’t they?McNamara: Yes.Rusk: So far as we know, there’s been no systematic attempt to

harass the workers on the base, nor has there been any interference withthe water supply there. They run a regular check on the water supply.

Halleck: Are the Cuban workers permitted to buy at the PX on thebase at Guantánamo and then go off base with their purchases, back intoCuba, such as medicines, luxuries, this that and the other thing?

McNamara: I don’t believe so, but I can’t answer for certain. [Pause.]Russell: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: [to Rusk] Do you want to say anything?Rusk: Mr. President, I might just comment on two points on the

political side. One, the attitude of the other American states and the effect

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196258

of this on them. We do believe that this will give much further impetus tothe motion that started in the hemisphere about a year ago. We detect adeeper concern in what’s happening in Cuba. You will recall that at thelast Punta del Este Conference in January, this hemisphere showed con-siderable movement in rejecting Castro as a solution to the hemisphericproblems and unanimously condemned this regime in Cuba as a Marxist-Leninist government and—with not in all of the cases unanimity—took anumber of actions that moved toward hemispheric solidarity.

Since that time, the Argentine government was in fact overthrownover this issue, the Frondizi government, and this attitude toward Castrois one of the key sources of present tensions in Brazil where the reactionto Castro has been getting stronger.64

In the case of Mexico, if I can make this very much on an off-the-record basis, we do get more help from Mexico, privately, underneath thescenes, than they are willing to confess publicly or make any noise about.They’ve got a political problem there.

But I think we can count on growing, rather than diminishing soli-darity in the hemisphere, in response or in the face of this continuedbuildup of arms in Cuba.

Now, on the other side of that, it seems that it’s necessary for us—wehave done this in a number of ways privately and the President hasthought about the public aspect of it—we’ve got to make it very clear toall of our friends in the hemisphere that these Cuban armed forces aren’tgoing anywhere. They’re not a threat by force of arms to the other coun-tries of the hemisphere.

Now, you’ll be interested that we’ve—actually the special securitymeasures established at the Punta del Este Conference as an instrumentof the OAS . . .65 We’ve gone to extraordinary effort to try to catch theCubans actually smuggling arms or putting in bands in countries aroundthe Caribbean, and thus far we haven’t been able to turn up very much.The principal effort that the Communists are making in Latin Americaseems now to be money, and the training of young people as potentialagents, training these Cubans. But we haven’t been able to catch any ofthis illicit traffic in arms that we were hoping to intercept [unclear] thePunta del Este Conference. They seem to be playing a cautious game onthings of that sort.

Now, in the NATO framework, we have been trying to get our

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 59

64. The Argentine government under Arturo Frondizi was overthrown on 29 March 1962.65. Organization of American States.

NATO allies to take a harder look at this Cuban problem than they havethus far been willing to do. We’ve made some progress, but not nearlyenough in our estimate.

In the case of Canada, their trade with Cuba in 1961, [was] on theorder of 35 or 40 million dollars. This year it will be on the order of sixor seven million dollars. Part of that is because Canada is forbidding anyreexport of anything from the United States to Cuba. They are applyingthe COCOM list to Cuba and it cuts off quite a number of things andalso, our own embargo on Cuba has deprived Cuba of dollars that theymight use to buy large quantities of foodstuffs and things of that sortfrom Canada. So it’s partly action by Canada, partly because the Cubanshaven’t got any dollars.

We are very much concerned about the use of free world shipping inthe Cuba trade.66 But this is a very, very difficult problem to deal with,because there is such a vast supply of shipping and a surplus of shippingfor normal trade these days, that the customary arrangements with theSoviet bloc [are] bare-bones charters, without specifically identifyingthem for the Cuba trade. A very small percentage of the tonnage avail-able in fact goes into the Cuba trade, something like 1 percent, 2 percent,in that order of magnitude. A number of the NATO countries claim thatthey do not have the legal authority to move without having parliamen-tary action similar to our Trading with the Enemy Act. But, in anyevent, since their problem would be to break trading relations with theSoviet bloc as a whole, as far as shipping is concerned . . . Countries likeNorway, U.K., Greece, that have a heavy reliance upon their shippingservices for foreign exchange for their own necessities, would find itvery difficult to do that in specific relation to Cuba. Nevertheless, we aretalking about this development with our NATO allies and hope verymuch that they can find some way to put pressures on those shipperswho are in fact taking an active part in the Cuba trade. But it is a difficultone because of the vast surpluses of shipping and the nature of the char-ters that are normally used in the trade that get diverted or turned awayinto the actual Cuban part of it.

Dirksen: What flag is predominant would you say?Rusk: It varies: U.K., Norway, Greece.Unidentified: Portugal.Rusk: Portugal slightly, Italy slightly. And—

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196260

66. Referring to recent press reports that the demand for shipping between the Soviet Unionand Cuba was so high that vessels registered in NATO member countries were being used.

President Kennedy: West Germany.Rusk: Yugoslavia and West Germany, all of them are involved with it.Russell: Mr. Secretary, you . . . speaking of the Mexican cooperation,

I was very much concerned last year when I was down there talking tosome of our people, particularly [three seconds excised as classified informa-tion] telling me about these dummy corporations that were shippingparts and replacements to the Cubans to keep their industry going. Iunderstood that practically all of them were American in origin. Theywere transshipping, the dummy corporations in Mexico to Cuba. Andthe Canadians are pretty bad about that too. They bought a great deal ofparts and replacements [unclear] few get rich, the big boys over there.Has that matter been [unclear]?

Rusk: We’ve seen some reduction of that, again partly because ofCuban foreign exchange, which—

Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.Russell: The Russians would never let that happen you see. It’s got

too much nuisance value to . . . They’ve kept them going.Rusk: There’s practically no trade as such now between Cuba and

Latin America, very limited now. The foreign minister of Chile, for exam-ple, told me the only thing they sell to Cuba is garlic. And we thoughtthat was probably something we wouldn’t worry too much about. [Somechuckling.]

Alexander Wiley: Mr. President, may I ask a question? How do youdefine the question of missile sites? I understood you to say that theywere defensive instead of offensive, is that right?

Carter: Yes, sir. These are designed for shooting down aircraft andthat’s all.

Wiley: Well, now then, the next question is, what is our policy inrelation to Cuba? I’m just back from the hinterland and everybody isinquiring about it and I said I’ll have to talk to the executive who spear-heads foreign policy or the Secretary of State. What is to be our policy?Just to sit still and let Cuba carry on?

President Kennedy: [Unclear statement.] On this matter we are goingto make an announcement in regard to the existence of these sites today.

We’re also going to state that the United States would prevent the useof any of these military weapons, any of this force against any neighboringcountry, but that this . . . which I have never thought a very likely prospectbut at least it has been discussed. Any concern that this buildup, militarybuildup would be used against another country, another neighbor wouldbe . . . We will indicate that if that were done, the United States wouldintervene under its Rio Treaty and the Monroe Doctrine and all the rest.

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 61

As to whether the United States would intervene in Cuba in order to. . . at this point, I would think it would be a mistake. We’re talkingabout—we have to keep some proportion—we’re talking about 60MiGs, we’re talking about some ground-to-air missiles which from theisland, which do not threaten the United States. We are not talkingabout nuclear warheads. We’ve got a very difficult situation in Berlin.We’ve got a difficult situation in Southeast Asia and a lot of other places.So that if I were asked, I would say that I could not see, under presentconditions, the United States intervening. It would be a major militaryoperation. General LeMay can describe it in more detail. It would be amajor military operation.

Wiley: Blockading [unclear].67

President Kennedy: Well, a blockade is a major military operation, too.It’s an act of war. We could blockade . . . there’s no evidence that thatwould bring down Castro for many, many months. You’d have a food situa-tion in which you’d have people starving and all the rest. In addition,Berlin obviously would be blockaded also. And if Berlin were blockadedone of our reprisals obviously could be the actions of various kinds againstCuba. But I would say today . . . listen I think Berlin is coming to somekind of a climax this fall, one way or another, before Christmas. And Ithink that today I would think it would be a mistake for us to talk aboutmilitary action or a blockade [against Cuba]. Blockades are very difficult.It’s a big island and you have to stop ships of the Soviet Union and otherships. And it would be regarded as a belligerent act; and it would beregarded as a warlike act. I would think we would have to assume thatthere would be actions taken against countries. . . . I think that we there-fore should not do that. I don’t see that the Soviet . . .

This is annoying and it’s a danger. I think the dangers to this hemi-sphere [unclear] by Cuba is by subversion and example. There’s obviouslyno military threat, as yet, to the United States. The military threat quiteobviously is still the Soviet Union which has missiles and hydrogen bombs.

So that, in answer to your question, I would . . . even though I know alot of people want to invade Cuba, I would be opposed to it today. So I thinkwe ought to keep very close surveillance on Cuba which we are doing andkeep well informed and make it very clear that the placing in Cuba of mis-siles which could reach the United States would change the nature of the. . . buildup and therefore would change the nature of our response.

Rusk: Mr. President, I think it might be worth commenting that the

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196262

67. Over previous weeks, Wiley had called publicly for a blockade of Cuba.

Soviets have been reluctant to make a flat all-out commitment to Cuba.There is a good deal of information that Castro’s famous statement lastDecember that he was an all-out Marxist-Leninist was a statementwhich seriously annoyed the people in Moscow for two reasons: one wasthat it exposed him to other people in Latin America. Senator [Bourke]Hickenlooper and Congressman [Armistead] Selden will rememberhow much of an impression that made at the Punta del Este Conference,for example, and therefore it made him less effective in Latin America.

But secondly, the impression is that he made that statement in orderto try to force the hand of the Soviet[s] to make commitments to Cubathat the Soviets weren’t ready to make. They have stayed—it’s not surenow they’re making a flat all-out security commitment to Cuba in thissituation and . . . either publicly or privately.

President Kennedy: After all, the United States put missiles inTurkey, which are ground to ground with nuclear warheads. We have tokeep some . . . it seems to me we have to weigh our dangers. I would saythe biggest danger right now is for Berlin.

Perhaps you want to comment on what happened in Berlin today and . . .Rusk: Yes, I’d say—Wiley: May I say, Mr. President, that I think that the majority of the

people agree with the conclusions that you’ve made, that the world is ahot spot and we’d better not make it hotter by any of our own acts.

I got your statement to mean that we’ll be ready and willing and ableto carry on but we will not, to the slightest degree precipitate, well, athird world war. [Pause.]

Hickenlooper: Mr. President.President Kennedy: Yes.Hickenlooper: I can see how the present extent of the buildup as

reported here poses no military threat of any great significance at this par-ticular moment, physically to the United States. But, the thing that both-ers me is the psychological impact on the Latin American countries.Whether or not the continued, reported and established buildups in Cubaof bloc country arms, technicians, people, with inaction here, I’m not sug-gesting action one way or the other, that isn’t part of my discussion. Theeffect that it has on the Latins, and the argument that we’re a paper tigerand the fomenting groups in Latin America say, “See look what’s happen-ing 100 miles from the United States. They do nothing about it. TheUnited States is . . . we have nothing to fear, we can spit in their face, wecan do this, that, and the other thing.” That is, the dissident groups inLatin America which are not diminishing in strength so far as I can find.And it’s the psychological impact that bothers me, at least as much if not

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 63

more than some of the physical threats, or potential threats that might beinvolved at the moment. I think it’s quite a serious psychological situationin Latin America. Every time it’s announced that more Russian troops,people, more Russian technicians, whether they are troops in civilianclothes or whether they are agricultural technicians or whatnot, predomi-nantly it comes out that the more of those that come in . . . more missiles,more weapons, and so on, I’m afraid it gives stimulus to those dissidentgroups down there which pose an increasing difficulty for us in thosecountries. I may be wrong but . . .

President Kennedy: I will say that the Soviet Union exercises somerestraint in some areas. They haven’t after all talked about a peace treatysince 1958 and they haven’t raised it.68 We did as I say put missiles inTurkey with nuclear warheads and they didn’t take action. We haveengaged in assistance of various kinds to Iran, Pakistan, and other areas.So that I think that we both proceed with some caution because we both[Hickenlooper tries to interrupt] realize where the real danger to the coun-tries lies finally, but I quite agree that Cuba is . . .

On the other hand, Senator, I’m not so sure looking at it over the last12 months whether you’d say that what’s happened in Cuba has particu-larly helped the Communist cause. I would say that there’s a lot of thingsthat helped the Communist cause but I think they are more internal ineach country and not what’s happened to Cuba. I would say that everysurvey I’ve seen in the last 12 months shows the sharpest drop in thesupport of Castro, which was, perhaps since ’59.

Hickenlooper: Mr. President, I have noticed in whatever meager andperhaps inaccurate information I get, I think I have noticed a sharp dropover the last year, year and a quarter, in Castro, the popularity of Castro,or the respect for Castro as an individual, or as a leader. But Castroism isa thing that I believe they separate from Castro in their thinking. Thatis, the idea that you can take from the big fellow, that you can go take anddo it with immunity. That you can confiscate, that you can have this, that,and the other thing, which they ally with Castro’s movement in Cuba.They know Castro is a Commie, they know he’s under Communist domi-nation, but I don’t know whether the Spanish say Castroísimo or, what is

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196264

68. President Kennedy is playing down his Khrushchev problem. Khrushchev’s 1958 threat tosign a peace treaty with the East German government triggered the 1958 to 1962 Berlin cri-sis. Although Khrushchev had backed down from following through on this threat in 1959, hehad not stopped talking about his readiness to sign a peace treaty. Khrushchev reiterated thisthreat at the Vienna Summit of June 1961 and again, most recently, in July 1962.

it? Whatever. Anyway, the Castroism in Spanish is a thing that they dif-ferentiate as compared to Castro as the individual. I may be wrong aboutthat but that is the impression I get.

Rusk: Mr. President, I think there is no question that the extreme leftdown there will tend to make some noise about this kind of buildup. I thinkthere is a compensating factor on the other side, Senator. I think that moreand more people of the responsible sort are becoming much more soberabout Cuba than a year ago. A year ago at Punta del Este, as you know, cer-tain of these countries down there didn’t really think about Cuba; they werethinking about their own internal problems and those at a distance fromCuba—Argentina, Brazil, Chile—weren’t very helpful at Punta del Este.

Now, there are growing concerns about it. I think there is a moresober approach. And I would have to report [unclear] that some of thereactions have been not what ought to be done about Cuba, but to usethe Cuban situation as a pretext for saying to us: “Well, now that means,of course, the opportunity presents itself to have more destroyers andmore cruisers and things of that sort.” And that’s as a matter for theirown military establishments. It is not really called for at this point[unclear] in relation to Cuba. But, I think on balance the developmentdown there has been wholesome, in response to this. [Unclear.]

The President asked me to comment for just a moment on what hap-pened in Berlin today. Over the weekend the three allies insisted to theSoviet Union that their guard coming in from Friedrichstrasse to theWar Memorial would have to be moved to gates down near the WarMemorial to avoid incidents, traffic hazards, provocations that wereresulting from their use of the Friedrichstrasse Gate for their armoredpersonnel carriers, carriers that they adopted after the stoning incidentsten days ago. We gave them until this morning to reply because they hadto turn around with Moscow.69

Hickenlooper: That’s the War Memorial at Brandenburg Gate?

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 65

69. An imposing Soviet War Memorial in Berlin had been erected just inside West Berlin, nearthe Brandenburg Gate. Each day, Soviet soldiers charged with guarding the memorial wouldtravel down Unter den Linden, through the Brandenburg Gate, from East Berlin to WestBerlin. Disturbances and instances of harassment from West Berliners, particularly students,had intensified with the recent one-year anniversary of the sealing of West Berlin (13 August)and the killing of an East German, Peter Fechter, as he was trying to cross the Wall andescape to West Berlin. This led the Soviets to transport their soldiers in Armored PersonnelCarriers (APCs), creating a difficult issue for the Western powers striving to keep to a mini-mum the Soviet military presence in West Berlin. By changing the crossing point from theBrandenburg Gate to the Sandkrug Bridge, the Western powers shortened the distance thatthe Soviet APCs would have to travel through West Berlin.

Rusk: That’s correct. So we’ve just had information from Berlin thatthe Soviets did accept the Sandkrug Bridge which is just beyond theBrandenburg Gate and is very near the War Memorial. And we wereinterested and pleased that they responded in that way because theywere beginning to build up a position there and we cut that back to theoriginal [unclear].

Russell: That’s good news.Short unclear exchange between Rusk and President Kennedy.Russell: That’s good, but one question, Mr. Secretary. You hear all

kind of rumors that Castro is becoming more and more of a figurehead,that two of the old-time Communists are running Cuba and he’s more orless a front. Is there anything to that?

Rusk: My own reading of our information on that, Senator Russell, isthat this is not the case, that it would have, it might have been true per-haps four or five months ago but that Castro, whatever his faults, has beenmore or less accepted by the Soviet Union as the person who has to bebacked even though there is friction between himself and the hard-core,old-time Communist apparatus.70 Now, I think you do get reports abouthis heavy drinking and his administrative hopelessness and things of thatsort. But we’re inclined to believe that the Soviets have agreed to toleratehis “un-Communist” kinds of weaknesses, if you like, because they needhis hold on the Cuban people. I suspect, myself, that they’d have muchgreater difficulty with the Cuban people if Castro were removed and youhad the old-line apparatus trying to take over completely.

Dirksen: General Carter, assuming that those sites you pointed outare essentially for defensive purposes, how long would it take to convertthem to an offensive facility?

Carter: They’re not convertible, sir. You’d have an entirely newinstallation. The only thing you could use would be the administrativefacilities, the buildings and roadways.

Dirksen: What else would they require?Carter: You’d require launching pads, and an entirely new missile

delivery system and missile guidance system, if you are going into astatic operation. Now, of course, we do have mobile surface-to-surfacemissiles in our own inventory and in the Soviet inventory. We have seenno sign of those at all in Cuba.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196266

70. In March 1962, Castro removed the powerful longtime Cuban Communist leader, AnibalEscalante. On the shake-up in the Cuban leadership see Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of aGamble,” pp. 163–65.

Russell: Is it contemplated that there’d be any change in the flightinstructions to any of our planes as a result of the construction of thesebases?

Carter: No, sir. This is—Russell: Or would you know about that? General LeMay, do you

know about that? [A voice is heard indistinctly in the background.]Carter: It should not be required.Russell: Well, we’ve been getting such information by flying along

the shores and all of Cuba and not just by [unclear]. I didn’t knowwhether we were going to continue to get that information or whetherit’d prevent us from knowing if they did put in an intermediate-rangemissile base.71

Carter: Well, these—President Kennedy: General, let me just say, this is going to present

us with some difficulties of securing information of the type youdescribe. So that we are now considering what should be the action wewould take in order to keep informed about what additional . . .

Russell: [Unclear.]Rusk: I think there is one point the Senator mentioned—President Kennedy: But there is no doubt that we can’t fly low.Rusk: As far as international waters are concerned, I’ve already

announced this week that we would insist upon our right to use interna-tional waters or international airspace for at least the planes.

President Kennedy: What are the—Russell: Well, we won’t go into that.72

Carl Vinson: Mr. President, is there any possibility of any more dras-tic action through the OAS as a result of this arms buildup?

Rusk: I will be talking with the foreign ministers of the OAS and theU.N. assembly in the next—in about ten days’ time.73 We have talkedwith several of them separately on this general subject. We would like tostep up, if we can, the activities of that special security committee.

But thus far, I must say, we’ve had very little luck in getting hard infor-mation about action directed against the other countries in the hemi-sphere. They tend to think those are the kind of ordinary Communist

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 67

71. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is asking about the possible consequencesof the SAM deployments on U-2 flights over the island.72. Senator Russell was a member of the smaller group of congressmen who were regularlyinformed about CIA operations.73. Rusk met with the Latin American ambassadors the following afternoon, where he pro-posed an informal meeting of foreign ministers.

techniques of money and training [unclear] and things of that sort. Arms,we think they haven’t been able to buy. We’d love to catch them.

Russell: The President referred to our responsibilities there to theseother countries. Just what would we do if they had an upheaval say in[the] Dominican Republic and the Communists took over there? Ahandful of Castroites there, perhaps not many. But are we under anymore responsibility there to restore some democratic form of govern-ment than we are in Cuba?

President Kennedy: Well, I’d say that that is our problem, quite obvi-ously not the military problem, but Haiti is now a [unclear] and I wouldthink that the United States should intervene if it appeared that therewere going to be a revolt or a coup d’etat in the Dominican Republic thatwould put Communists in control, then I would think the United Stateswould intervene at that point.

Russell: We moved up, I know, when it looked as if the fallen dicta-tor’s family might—

President Kennedy: That’s right.Russell: —move back in. I didn’t know whether that . . . of course

you’ve got about as much of a dictator on the other end of the island asthere was in Santo Domingo. Duvalier, I think, is [unclear].

Unidentified: [Unclear, but someone mentions Castro.]President Kennedy: Yes, I think that obviously Duvalier . . . and we

don’t know where he’s going, but we have to . . . but I would think that ifwe ever had any others that Castro is taking over, then the United Stateswould with as many other countries as we could, would try to intervene.We have, in the case of [the] Dominican Republic, we had Colombia andVenezuela with us. And I think that we ought to attempt to strengthenour inner OAS arrangements in the Caribbean so that if there is a situa-tion, we can intervene with the support of at least one or two otherCaribbean countries at the critical moment.

Hickenlooper: Well, Mr. President, isn’t there some evidence thatalmost all of the Caribbean countries are willing to join in whateverintervention the United States should determine—

President Kennedy: I’m sure with the exception perhaps of Haiti, I’msure they would.

Hickenlooper: Well, with the exception of Haiti, yes, yes, yes.President Kennedy: And Mexico, I’m sure they would if they see—Hickenlooper: Indeed.President Kennedy: Whether they would join in Guatemala would

depend really on the conditions in Guatemala. But I would think if the . . .

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196268

There might be a difference of opinion as to the personnel. And wemight say someone is Communist which the Venezuelans or someoneelse might not say. But, I think, if the provocation were clear, I don’tthink there is a doubt—I don’t see anyone who would not support us atthis time with the exception of Haiti.

Unidentified: And Mexico.President Kennedy: I think the problem always is, as it was with

Castro, is they come into power as something else, and our informationis not complete and therefore we assume that they may be all right. Ithink that would be our problem with Guatemala. But I—

William Fulbright: Do you—The President and Senator Fulbright try to speak at the same time.President Kennedy: No, you go ahead; I’m finished.Fulbright: Do you feel that this might be a sort of a testing out of

our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, in part?Rusk: May I comment on that very briefly, Mr. Chairman—Mr.

President? I’m inclined to believe that the Cuban development came as asurprise to the Soviets two years ago. They saw in this an opportunity tocause us some difficulty in this hemisphere. They had not planned itquite this way all the way through and that they came aboard with largeassistance when it became necessary to support the Castro regime. Idon’t believe it started out as a probing of the Monroe Doctrine, but I dobelieve that the attitude we take about the effect of Cuba in the hemi-sphere is very important in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, in terms of,more importantly at this point, the inter-American defense treaties. Tobe sure that the Soviets realize that there is suspicion beyond Cuba, thatthey are in for trouble here . . . and then the Cuban situation has to belooked at in this total context as a threat and so in a given circumstanceto see what has to be done at the time.

Russell: Mr. President, this statement to which you refer, you notonly refer to these missile sites, but you give all the facts as to the techni-cians, and . . .

President Kennedy: Yes, but the technician information has been—Russell: The whole story is being released . . . I think that’s a very

wise—President Kennedy: The technician material has been put out before—Russell: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: —but the missile sites we did not get until

Friday and that is being put out to . . . so it’s the missile sites— [Unclearbackground whispering.]

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 69

Carter: Not in the same degree, Mr. President, as it appears.Russell: No, it’s much later. As I understand from what General

Carter says, it’s larger than we thought it was when we made this otherstatement.

President Kennedy: Well, I think we’ve known for at least two weeks.In the State Department briefing, it seems to me the figure of 3,500 wasused, wasn’t it?

Rusk: Yes, sir.Unidentified: [Unclear]—Carter: Three to five thousand, I think.President Kennedy: Right.Carter: It’s a pretty good fix now at about 5,000 total.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: That includes [unclear].Carter: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: That’s correct. That’s right. But, of the 5,000,

how many are military?Carter: At the most, 3,500.President Kennedy: So there’s 3,500, and the others are other kinds

of technicians.Carter: Yes, sir.Russell: I think it’s an [unclear] just to give the whole thing out.

Let’s say MiGs, and armored torpedo boats and old kit and bother noth-ing. Just throw it out and let the people have it . . . hearsay . . . You haveso many rumors, if you don’t do it this way . . .

The tape quality deteriorates intermittently over the next few exchanges.Russell: . . . it’s worse than it actually is . . .President Kennedy: Right. Well, I think we’re setting a number—I

don’t know if we got the torpedo boats in this one. Have we put out thetorpedo boats before?

Carter: No, sir.[Pause.]President Kennedy: Perhaps General LeMay, before we conclude,

might just want to say what the military problem is of these sites in casethere is ever a military action against Cuba. What it would take—

LeMay: This complicates the military circumstances [unclear].These missiles are not good at altitude [unclear] go in underneath theireffective altitude and knock them out.

Unidentified: [Unclear.]LeMay: I would [unclear] use our strategic force [unclear].Unidentified: No.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196270

LeMay: I see no complications regarding the general operation[unclear].

Rusk: [Unclear.]McNamara: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: [Unclear.] General, go see if the statement we’re

going to put out is ready. I might read it to . . .Background conversation while Rusk is talking is unintelligible.Rusk: Mr. President, although the forces actually in Guantánamo

may appear to be rather light, the capability of these forces on the oneside is very heavy. And further, the other side, the Cubans have gone toconsiderable lengths to make it clear that they don’t have intentions ofattacking Guantánamo. One of the current jokes around the UnitedNations is the Cubans [say] “Don’t the Americans hope we would attackGuantánamo?” That kind of thing. So, I think, the lightness of the forcesin Guantánamo is not necessarily a measure of the situation.

Mansfield: Well, Mr. President, I’d hate for you to lie down, but Ithink it ought it to be understood that when you issue a statement, andgive these facts and figures, that the reaction may well be a call foraction of some kind or another. I would hope that this would not beused for the purpose of creating a situation which would tend to under-mine your authority and your responsibility. I would hope that wewould move with caution and we will not be carried away by these fig-ures and facts that you have given us this afternoon. I think we wouldhave to expect that there will be a certain reaction which may not bevery satisfactory.

President Kennedy: Oh, I expect that, but as I say, [short, unclear asideto someone else]. All right, as I say we’re talking about 58 MiGs, we’retalking about some ground-to-air missiles. That really isn’t comparableto the threats we face all around. So that I think that’s just the perspec-tive we have to keep it in, even though no one would desire more to seeCastro thrown out of there; but throwing Castro out of there is a majormilitary operation. It’s just a question of when we decide that that’s theproper action for us to take. It is an operation which has to be mountedover a period of time and we could anticipate that there would be reac-tions in other parts of the world, by the Communist bloc against othervulnerable areas as we carve out Cuba. So I think we just have to try tokeep all that in perspective.

Mansfield: Well, that’s the point—President Kennedy: There’s no easy aspect to throwing Castro out.

If we had it, we’d do it. Except an outright military action whichinvolves a great many divisions—a number of divisions—and a great

Meeting with Congress ional Leadership on Cuba 71

deal of our military power and I think we’ve got Berlin, we’ve gotTurkey and Iran . . . We’ve got southeast Asia, so I—

Unidentified: Formosa also.Fulbright: Do you think?President Kennedy: And Formosa.Fulbright: Do you think, Mr. President, if we did decide to take some

firm action about Cuba, that this would turn the pancake over, that thiswould start Russia off here, there, somewhere else?

Rusk: I think this will lead to a very very severe crisis indeed. Icouldn’t predict exactly what the Soviets would do but I would thinkthat they would almost certainly make a major move on Berlin of somesort. You remember, the unfortunate combination of Hungary and Suezin 1955 and ’6. Now, if on the other side, as the President indicated, theSoviets made a move on Berlin, this opens up some possibilities withCuba with world support, that we would not have if we at the momenttook initiative against Cuba because of circumstances.

Fulbright: This is the other side of the pancake.Rusk: See, that’s the other side of the pancake. Because this is a part

of the worldwide confrontation of the free world and the Soviet Union.We have a million men outside the United States as part of this con-frontation. All right, this has to be thought of in relation to the wholebecause you can’t deal with these simply as little isolated [unclear]instances but the total situation.

Russell: That’s undoubtedly true, but Senator Mansfield is right about. . . it may cause a great deal of reaction because this Cuban thing—

President Kennedy: That’s right.Russell: —is in the nature of an offense to the national pride, [chuck-

ling] and there’s something personal about it too. It’s so close downthere that . . . a man wouldn’t get ruffled about something that happenedin Berlin, much less Hungary or some other part of the world, but hewould get upset about Cuba.

Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Short pause.]President Kennedy: Well, this statement will be out and it won’t

have any reference to our meeting here but it will be a statement of factand you’ve heard the facts as they come along, we’ll make available toyou. And I would think that if we ever get any information aboutground-to-ground missiles then the situation would then be quitechanged and we would have to [unclear].

Unidentified: Well, thank you, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Meanwhile we will . . .Unidentified: Thank you [unclear] Senator Russell.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196272

Meeting breaks up.Unidentified: Mr. Secretary.Unidentified: Hello, Alex. [Unclear.]Wiley: [Unclear.]McNamara: Yes, I wanted to speak to Senator Russell also [unclear].Unidentified: My greatest friend.The tape spools out.

At the end of the meeting with the congressional leadership, RobertMcNamara, it seems, gathered a few of the congressmen for a short sep-arate meeting with the President to discuss the need for a special grantof standby authority to permit the administration to call-up 150,000reservists. Kennedy had been considering a call up in August as aresponse to the increasingly tense situation in West Berlin. His advisershad discouraged him. Now, it seemed that recent events in Cuba couldprovide another argument for the reserve call-up that Kennedy wanted.

5:55–6:10 P.M.

. . . [D]efinitely say “in view of the developments in Cuba” . . .people understand that . . .

Meeting on the Congressional Resolution about Cuba74

For the second time in twenty months, President Kennedy intended toseek congressional authority for special reserve mobilization powers. Inmid-1961, following the dramatic Kennedy-Khrushchev summit inVienna, where the mercurial Soviet leader had vowed to solve once andfor all the Berlin problem, Congress approved a call-up as part of a pro-gram of expanding defense spending. Now it was the specter of twincrises, in and around Cuba and Berlin, combined with the fact thatCongress was about to recess for the midterm elections, that promptedthe administration’s request.

Meeting on the Congress ional Reso lut ion about Cuba 73

74. Including President Kennedy, Everett Dirksen, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara,Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, Richard Russell, and Carl Vinson. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library,President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

Getting authorization in 1962 was going to be more difficult. In ret-rospect, the 1961 call-up seemed to have been a mistake. National news-papers and congressional offices received complaints from some of the150,000 men who had been pulled away from civilian jobs and their fam-ilies in 1961. Yet despite the unpopularity of the 1961 call-up, thePentagon had since late July been kicking around drafts of a new con-gressional reserve authorization. The immediate cause was a new cam-paign of threats from Moscow, which Khrushchev had launched in thesummer by insisting on some kind of resolution of the Berlin tangleafter the U.S. midterm elections. For over a month, these drafts had notbecome policy. Although he shared his advisers’ concerns about theimplications of Khrushchev’s threats to Berlin, President Kennedy wasnot prepared to push for this authorization until the political climate hadimproved.

Now, with the Soviets’ hurriedly and mysteriously building up Cubandefenses, Kennedy sensed Congress might be prepared to call upreserves to meet an anticipated superpower conflict. A threat from Cubaresonated more than one from Berlin with the American people. Withthe administration about to make public its statement on the discovery ofSoviet defensive surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba, it was time tosee whether public concerns over Cuba could translate into congres-sional support for authorization to call up 150,000 reservists in 1962.

As McNamara corralled key congressional leaders, he knew howimportant it was that this request not meet any significant political oppo-sition. Khrushchev was now in the habit of telling American visitors thatdemocracies would not fight. It was this notion that the administrationneeded to dispel. For a message of unity and determination to be sent tothe Kremlin, any administration request for reserve authorization wouldhave to proceed smoothly and without controversy through Congress.

The time and place of this meeting remain unclear, though all inter-nal evidence points to its having taken place on September 4 after thelarger congressional briefing on the Cuba statement. With this smallergroup convened, possibly in the Oval Office, the recording began withMcNamara’s reporting on the results of the 1961 U.S. military buildupand the reasons why more was needed now.

Robert McNamara: The authority that was granted last summer hasexpired. As you know it covered authority to call up 250,000 men duringa period of 11 months and that authority expired with the 1st of July.

Since that authority was granted, we have added about 300,000 men

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196274

to the regular forces: roughly 40[,000] to 50,000 men to the Navy, aboutthe same number to the Air Force, and 110[,000] to 120,000 men to theArmy. All of the forces are in substantially better shape today than theywere on June 30th of last year.

The Army has been expanded in terms of combat-ready divisions byabout 45 percent. There were then 11 combat-ready divisions. There aretoday 16 combat-ready divisions.

The Air Force has had a very substantial expansion in its tactical airstrength. A portion of that tactical air strength that has been added,however, is not yet combat ready and won’t be combat ready for six tonine months.

The Navy has been expanded by the addition of a large number ofamphibious craft as well as logistical support ships.

So, we are much stronger today than we were 13 or 14 months agowhen we asked for authority to call up Reserve and Guard personnel.

On the other hand, there are both military and political and psycho-logical reasons why it would be desirable, we believe, to have authorityto call up between 150[,000] and 250,000 personnel during the periodthat Congress is out of session, say roughly from the 1st of October tothe end of February. We’ve been considering that. I just mentioned itbriefly, a moment ago, to Chairman [Carl] Vinson and Chairman[Richard] Russell.75 They mentioned that the House would meet onFriday—

Unidentified: On Thursday.McNamara: Rather Thursday. We have a draft resolution, essentially

the same as the resolution passed a year ago. I think we’re all agreed, allof us who have considered this problem, that if there is to be any contro-versy, any debate, any argument over whether this is a wise move or not,it would be undesirable to submit it to—[Tape cuts off briefly.]

President Kennedy: Then [unclear] the numbers revised [by]General [Burgess]?

McNamara: Yes, sir. We would.President Kennedy: But it seems to me quite possible that you would

have to call up some air units before the end of the year, if not earlier.Because I think they would be the most likely units we’d call.

We don’t have any plans to call up any [National] Guard divisions?McNamara: No, sir. They . . . If—President Kennedy: That’s why I think the 150 is enough. When it

Meeting on the Congress ional Reso lut ion about Cuba 75

75. Respectively, chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

gets beyond that, then we’re [unclear] crisis more, and after that wedraft a [unclear].

McNamara: It seems almost certain that any units that were calledup during this intervening period between now and, let’s say, the end ofFebruary could be composed of men who had not been called up withinthe last year and a half.

President Kennedy: With the exception of the air.McNamara: Well, even in the air, Mr. President. We have located

seven squadrons of fighter aircraft and personnel who were not called toactive duty and who would therefore be the squadrons we’d call to rein-force either the U.S. reserve or to move to Western Europe.

And similarly in the Navy we think that, except under most unusualcircumstances, we could call the 8[,000] or 10,000 naval reservists thatmight possibly be needed in the event of blockade and antisubmarine war-fare from personnel who had not served within the past year and a half.

In the case of the Army, because of the very substantial increase inarmed strength, as I mentioned, a 45 percent increase in the number ofcombat ready divisions, we see no real requirement for a call-up duringthis period. But with the possibility that such might be necessary, wewould like to have authority to call up a total of at least 150,000 men.Were it necessary to call Army personnel, again personnel could becalled who had not served within the past year and a half.

Dean Rusk: Mr. President, if I might just make a very brief commenton the one aspect of this. If the Soviets have been cautious this past yearabout Berlin in key times, a lot of it was due to the speed and the calmwith which the Congress moved last autumn in response to thePresident’s request for additional strength in the military field. If thiscould go through with relative quiet and speed, it would be a very usefulsignal in Moscow, but if it were to create a grave controversy, then thatwould be—create another problem.

Everett Dirksen: Mr. Secretary, how are we going to avoid acri-monies today in view of the gripes that obtained in the last call-up ofreserves . . . ?

President Kennedy: Sir, that’s why we’re talking to you now.Dirksen: Yeah, [unclear].Now, I think there is probably one way to pour some sugar on that

department and achieve that tactic, if in any kind of a statement youwere going to particularly mention . . . definitely say “in view of thedevelopments in Cuba” . . . people understand that . . . and a few otherthings, put ’em in . . . have no doubt in their minds as to why this isneeded. You [unclear]. Now, Mr. President, I was [unclear] yesterday, I

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196276

was the guest of the Winnebago Labor Day, on Labor Day.76 The onlything they wanted to talk about, those that talked to me, wanted to talkabout Cuba . . . in Cuba. So this is very much in the average person’smind and you’ll have to lay it right on the line in any statement youmake; otherwise they’ll be hell-a-poppin for one and we won’t have anygood answers for them, unless you give us the answers.

McNamara: We can say that it will not be necessary. As a matter offact, we can insert into the resolution, a statement that personnel whohad served within the past year and a half would not be called backinvoluntarily. And we could certainly say that in view of world condi-tions, including Cuba, we believe it necessary to request this authority toact during the period when Congress is out of session.

Richard Russell: Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, [unclear] go back andget the qualified personnel without meeting again with the same group?

McNamara: Yes, we can.Russell: The only other question you had is about the recommenda-

tion to reducing the National Guard reserve force. Is this [unclear] inany way contemplated?

McNamara: No, definitely not.Russell: Because that ought to be explained somewhere.McNamara: Yes, that can be—that’s very very—Unidentified: Yeah.Unidentified: Who would we ask? [Unclear exchange. Then indistinct

discussion among the participants.]Unidentified: Why don’t we lead on this?Russell: I think that we may have some controversy about this now,

Mr. Secretary—Unidentified: [whispers in the background] We will.Russell: —because it’s a political year and you’re on the eve of an elec-

tion. And there have been some legitimate gripes on the part of some ofthese fellows who have been called up . . . [unclear] griping, there’s been alot of questioning, and we can get the bill through all right. But I can’tguarantee you that if we [unclear] controversy . . . that the President’s[unclear] I’ll do it anyhow [unclear] if he wants to do [unclear] to assumemy part of the responsibility to get that through [unclear].

Dirksen: [Unclear.]

Meeting on the Congress ional Reso lut ion about Cuba 77

76. Senator Everett Dirksen spoke at the Winnebago County (Illinois) Labor Day picnic(Rockville Register Star, 4 September 1962). We are grateful for the assistance of the EverettDirksen Center, University of Illinois, in tracking down this reference.

President Kennedy: Even when pointing out that it’s deeper than[unclear] international [unclear].

Dirksen: Deeper [unclear] so damn vulnerable [unclear].President Kennedy: Can we do this in this manner? The Secretary of

Defense can talk to the leadership again and to Senator Russell and toSenator . . . to Chairman Vinson in the next two or three days in moredetail about the kind of language about how no one would be called upwith the exception of [unclear] of say a thousand people because it’s pos-sible we might want to [unclear] Cuba. If we really had an emergency,we could call up an important [unclear]—

Russell: I bet a good many would volunteer.President Kennedy: —go over to talk to the leadership and unless he . . .McNamara: Yes, Mr. President, we can do that. This doesn’t—President Kennedy: You get [unclear] think about in the next day or so.Carl Vinson: I’m working with [unclear] this week. If it does not

have to be done this week, it might be better. [Unclear.]The President, McNamara, and the Congressman speak simultaneously.President Kennedy: [Unclear] through just at the end, which you

suddenly lost the . . .McNamara: Yes, I agree [unclear], Mr President. It’s pertinent to the

subject that we discuss it more. But we will draft a resolution and dis-cuss it further.

The meeting seems to have ended and the President has apparently left.The recorder picks up bits of conversation.Lincoln: Can I come in? McNamara: [Unclear] I don’t think it’s necessary to call any of those

that were called up before. Do you?Lyman Lemnitzer: [Unclear exchange in the background as Lemnitzer

speaks.] I wouldn’t think so and [unclear] all right.McNamara: Yeah and get this [unclear].Lemnitzer: I would like to have the 300 people at that point, in

January for Cuba.McNamara: Well, those could be . . . more of those could be extended

service of people you have.Lemnitzer: No, not exactly because we don’t have any qualified F-84

people available to do that. They would have to come from the NationalGuard, if you wanted for us to move, wanted to do the job properly.

Paul Nitze: Is this a question of manpower ceiling now for you or—McNamara: It’s really the 300 specialists on that [unclear ]—Lemnitzer: What we did, you see, is we formed some new regular

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196278

units. We didn’t have in the regular establishment any qualified F-84people, or practically none.77 We had to start up a school and send thesepeople to school. Now we’ve had a plan for getting National Guard peo-ple, by name, actually to fill these slots. They’ll all be out of school byJanuary so this list has been coming down all the time.

McNamara: What I’d like to avoid, Paul, is sending up a bill that has—Nitze: One [Unclear.]McNamara: Yeah, one for 300 people, because the criticism will be, or

a criticism against the bill, will be that we’re going to call up people thathad just recently served. I’d like to be able to put in a flat statement thatwe won’t call back people who served recently.

Nitze: Of course, if you . . . You know, it might be that if you just havea proviso covering a thousand men, this is so small that you take the heatoff of it.

McNamara: Yeah, but then it points the finger directly and you reallyget a lot of gripes. I think we can—

Lemnitzer: Well, if we had a little more time, I’d imagine we couldget three hundred volunteers.

McNamara: Yeah, I think so, too.Lemnitzer: [Unclear.] Whether it would be the exact people we

request or not [unclear].McNamara: Well, yeah. I agree, too.Lemnitzer: With a little time, I think we can try to find them

[unclear].McNamara: I think so, too. And there isn’t much . . . we’re not talk-

ing about a long period here.Lemnitzer: No.McNamara: We are only talking about 120 days. I think we could

safely have—Lemnitzer: [Unclear] until January it would be a great help if we

could use these men.McNamara: Yeah.Lemnitzer: Because by January you just get the bodies out of school.McNamara: Yeah.Lemnitzer: They would then start the unit training—McNamara: Yeah.

Meeting on the Congress ional Reso lut ion about Cuba 79

77. Manufactured by Republic, the F-84 was a fighter-bomber introduced in 1948. The F-84swept-wing version followed in 1951.

Lincoln: Do you want [unclear]?Tape is shut off, perhaps by Evelyn Lincoln.

After these discussions, the President had a long one-on-one sessionwith Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee. Then he met with Sorensen andPierre Salinger. And finally, he closed the day with a five-minute chatwith McGeorge Bundy. None of these meetings was taped.

Meanwhile Pierre Salinger, the White House press secretary, readthe final text of the President’s statement to reporters:

All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere, havebeen concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolsterthe military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information hasreached this Government in the last four days from a variety ofsources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have providedthe Cuban Government with a number of antiaircraft defense missileswith a slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of ourNike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providingthe extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is requiredfor their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles hav-ing a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military techniciansnow known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is con-sistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equip-ment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make informationavailable as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba fromany Soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to Russia, of aviolation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantánamo, of the presenceof offensive ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offen-sive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction andguidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.

The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwidechallenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealtwith as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the specialrelationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.

It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castroregime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by forceor by the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means maybe necessary from taking action against any part of the Western

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 196280

Hemisphere. The United States, in conjunction with other hemispherecountries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments willbe a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they willbe nothing more.

His official day at an end, the President went for his evening swim at7:35 P.M.

Wednesday, September 5, 1962

The President reached the Oval Office after breakfast with the congres-sional leadership. The international news that morning was not good.The Soviets had decided to flex a little muscle in the air corridors linkingBerlin to the world. On Tuesday, Soviet MiGs had unexpectedly“escorted” three commercial airplanes flying over East Germany on theirway to West Berlin. These actions stood in stark contrast to Moscow’sapparent acceptance of a Western plan to regulate Soviet troop move-ments to the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin.

The news from Moscow would not get any better in the course ofthe day. The Soviets would decide to reiterate their opposition to anyfour-power meeting on Berlin, asserting instead that the best way toeliminate tension in that divided city was to sign peace treaties with bothGermanies and remove all troops from West Berlin. And on this day, theKremlin would also dismiss the Kennedy administration’s explanation ofthe U-2 accident in the Soviet Far East. “Unworthy of responsible politi-cians,” said the authoritative newspaper, Izvestia.1

This morning Kennedy’s chief foreign policy advisers testified beforethe Senate Armed Services Committee about the current crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. Neither Dean Rusk nor Robert McNamara mentionedthe administration’s intention to ask for standby authorization to call upreserves. This was still closely held among the few congressional leaderswho had been briefed on Tuesday. But they did talk about Cuba, Berlin,and the fact that the United States still had more nuclear weapons thanthe Soviet Union.2

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962 81

1. “Russians Scorn U-2 Note; Call the Flight Aggressive,” New York Times, 6 September 1962.2. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions

The President, on the other hand, had a largely ceremonial morning.He signed into law a bill designating Frederick Douglass’s home as anational historical site. Then, after a brief meeting with the U.S. ambas-sador to Portugal, the President spent some time with participants in theExperiment in International Living program.

Kennedy returned to the White House after lunch at 3:50 P.M. Heswitched the tape recorder on and off rapidly, catching what appear to be thewords, “Ambassador Steven[son].” Then silence. The President went into a13-minute meeting with the Democratic governor of Wisconsin, JohnReynolds, before turning to the next big issue on his agenda, nuclear testing.

5:00 –6:15 P.M.

I get the impression with all this material [that] this is a case ofgo out and see what happens. Because you know, nobody knows.

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series3

President Kennedy was uneasy about the remaining tests in the DOMINICseries. Following the start of the Soviet test series that summer, Defenseand the AEC had pushed for an increase in the number of U.S. nuclear tests.The Soviet tests seemed to have revealed a much greater antimissile capa-bility than had been expected, and there was concern that the United Statesneeded more information for its own ABM development. The answer forthe United States seemed to be more high-altitude tests, which could simu-late the effect of nuclear war on satellites and missile communications, tokeep in step with the Soviets. For some time, Kennedy had expressed con-cern over high-altitude tests. There was a body of evidence that these testsadded radiation—electron particles—to the Earth’s magnetic field, apotential hazard to satellites and, worse, to astronauts who happened to bein Earth orbit. Over the objections of the British and some U.S. scientists,Kennedy had approved high-altitude tests in the original DOMINIC plan.

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196282

with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), 5 September 1962, Volume 14,87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).3. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Leland Haworth, Carl Kaysen, RobertMcNamara, Dean Rusk, Glenn Seaborg, Theodore Sorensen, Robert Seamans, JeromeWiesner, Adrian Fisher, and James Webb. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library, President’sOffice Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

Now, however, just as he fielded requests for more of these tests, Kennedyhad additional reasons to doubt his original grant of approval. OnSeptember 1, the Atomic Energy Commission had admitted that the high-altitude STARFISH test, conducted on July 8, had unexpectedly added sig-nificant amounts of radiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, causing damageto the fuel cells on three satellites. Of great embarrassment to the U.S. gov-ernment was the fact that one of the damaged satellites, which lost its abil-ity to communicate with Earth, was British.

Kennedy could not abandon high-altitude tests easily. At Geneva, theU.S. and British governments had proposed a draft of a partial test banthat would have outlawed all atmospheric and high-altitude testing as ofJanuary 1, 1963. Although the initial Soviet reaction to this proposal hadbeen negative, Kennedy wished to have all high-altitude testing out of theway quickly just in case a change in Soviet disarmament policy made atreaty possible before the new year. Canceling the remaining tests, how-ever, would be a direct challenge to what his military experts were tellinghim about the new Soviet antiballistic missile program. They wanted himto swallow a few, last-minute, high-altitude tests as part of DOMINIC, sothat the U.S. missile defense program could keep up with what theRussians were doing. And, if these contradictory pressures were notenough to keep in mind, Kennedy knew that NASA had another Mercuryspace mission scheduled for September. Kennedy did not want the astro-naut, Walter M. Schirra, to be endangered by a high-altitude test.4 So, ifKennedy approved more high-altitude tests in 1962, they would have to bescheduled with Schirra’s mission in mind. The President did not want ahigh-profile postponement of that Mercury mission to draw attention toany decision to press on with a few last high-altitude shots.

Before the nuclear test meeting began, President Kennedy and a fewof his national security advisers discussed Cuban policy. Press speculationfollowing the President’s September 4 statement centered on the possibil-ity of early military action against the island. The recording picked up anelliptical discussion of the possibilities of imposing a blockade.

Dean Rusk: I think you were starting to say something about this.Unidentified: I think—President Kennedy: The blockade thing is really [dead].

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 83

4. Born 12 March 1923, in Hackensack, New Jersey, Captain Walter “Wally” M. Schirra flewon Mercury 8, Gemini 6, and Apollo 7.

Unidentified: [Unclear.]McGeorge Bundy: A newsman?President Kennedy: You know what I think we ought to do, would be

to get a good analysis of what the problems are of blockade—of howlong it would take to have [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] There are a fewsteps we can have ready [unclear]—

Robert McNamara: Well, things we can do now: We could even checkthe [unclear]. But I am very reticent that the blockade would be very effec-tive on that.5 [Unclear interjection.] And it would certainly lead to retalia-tion, then, almost certainly, I would assume, by the Soviets.6

Dean Rusk: It might in broad terms be very [unclear].President Kennedy: Let’s deal with that unless [unclear]. My atti-

tude on [unclear interjection by McGeorge Bundy] off by the weather.Bundy: [Unclear.] What we could do, what could we do . . .Unidentified: Building up an independent—McNamara: In addition to the deterrent we [unclear].Unidentified: —[a] target zone. When we put it out. [Unclear dis-

cussion.]Bundy: Third paragraph. I have all the latest substantial [unclear].McNamara: The problem is that there is still substantial doubt

whether the [unclear] Soviets retaliate with their forces in Berlin or else-where . . . but put that kind of a blockade in [Cuba] and it will be effec-tive immediately with the quantities [unclear].

President Kennedy: That’s obvious.McNamara: And we didn’t discuss [unclear].Rusk: [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]McNamara: He said it wouldn’t take any U.S. soldiers.Unidentified: I didn’t know you said seven.McNamara: I didn’t tell him how many. [Unclear] U.S. soldiers.Unidentified: Sorry.McNamara: I think—Rusk: They believe they can hold on.McNamara: Substantial casualties [unclear] in Cuba.Unidentified: In any event, we got a call from your office [unclear].Unidentified: Well, this isn’t going to be worse in the future.

[Laughter.]

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196284

5. The Soviet military buildup on Cuba.6. In the 4 September drafting meeting the President had worried that the Soviets wouldrespond to any blockade of Cuba with a blockade of West Berlin.

President Kennedy: All right.McGeorge Bundy calls the nuclear test meeting to order. The chairmanof the Atomic Energy Commission, Glenn Seaborg, is to lead off with abriefing on the latest Soviet test series. Announced on July 21, this testseries started on August 5 with a gigantic atmospheric test estimated at30 megatons. In the days that followed, the Soviets tested many nucleardevices with much smaller yields.Bundy: Mr. President, this is a preliminary meeting for a meeting of

the NSC [National Security Council] tomorrow. [Tape cut off briefly.]And then look at the draft letter which essentially states the direct andappropriate amount of defense commission.

Glenn Seaborg: Well, very briefly there have been 18 airburst tests,and then there was this one underground test, where we really just got apicture of the crater of.7 Since the start there have . . . we only have a lit-tle bit of the radiochemistry at the moment.

Twenty-nine seconds excised as classified information.Seaborg: The other thing I think that’s interesting about the series is

there’s been a tremendous concentration on relatively small-yield tests;we’ve gotten several in the less than 5 kt [kiloton] and some that wereprobably less than 1 kt are the ones which we don’t really have a good yield[unclear.]8 This is much more so than we’ve ever seen before when they’vetested.

Jerome Wiesner: That’s not surprising given the last series, whichconcentrated on hard wood—

Unidentified: That’s right.President Kennedy: But it indicates . . . what does that indicate?Unidentified: Well, the thing it might indicate [is] that they’re aim-

ing at the small tactical—President Kennedy: Tactical.Unidentified: —type of devices; that would be my guess.Twelve seconds excised as classified information.Seaborg: These are still pretty tenuous but there are a number of con-

nections between Tyuratam and the other testing areas and also withNovaya Zemlya. And there is a certain, at least, possibility that they will fire

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 85

7. An airburst is the explosion of a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere, but below 100,000 feetand at such an altitude that the expanding fireball does not touch the Earth’s surface. Testdevices detonated above 100,000 feet are known as high-altitude tests.8. Yield is the energy released in nuclear explosions, usually expressed in terms of the equiva-lent tonnage of TNT required to produce the same energy release.

something from Novaya Zemlya, coming from Tyuratam up to NovayaZemlya or perhaps from some other inland site. But [unclear] likely to beTyuratam.9

Eleven seconds excised as classified information.Seaborg: Which were similar to those tests which occurred off in the

Novaya Zemlya area, which gives us some thought that perhaps if theyare going to do a high-altitude test, they will do it up there.

President Kennedy: This gives [unclear], all right. What problemsmight that present—similar to the problem of, that we—

Seaborg: We don’t—I gather you’d have to ask Jerry [Wiesner] onthis but my feeling is that this is less likely to cause trouble than at thosehigher latitudes.10 But as of last week those scientists—[unclear interjec-tion]. No, you’re thinking of the shot . . . no those radiation effects—butwe really don’t know enough about it to be sure one way or the other—it probably would depend on what the yield is.

President Kennedy: How much? By what factor would you have toincrease the number of—11

Unidentified: Electrons.Unidentified: Electrons.President Kennedy: —to make a lunar journey prohibitive?Wiesner: It would make it difficult if you wind up with [unclear] . . .President Kennedy: A moral [unclear].Wiesner: More advanced . . . Would you say a factor of 50 would

really push it . . . serious trouble?Unidentified: Well, as of right now, we feel that we probably can get

through; however, it is already a matter of concern and it is an additiveeffect. And so we would really be concerned if the electronic powerincreased by a factor of say ten times. I think that would almost rule outthe flight.

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9. The Tyuratam Missile Test Range was east of the Aral Sea in the Soviet republic ofKazakhstan. Referred to as Baikonur in official Soviet press releases, it was the location of thefirst Soviet launch of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile in August 1957.10. Jerome B. Wiesner was the President’s special assistant for science and technology anddirector of the White House Office of Science and Technology.11. The President has in mind the controversy about the effects of high-altitude testing on theupper atmosphere. On 11 August the Soviets had asked the United States not to conduct anytests that endangered their cosmonaut Major Andrian Nikolayev. Here Kennedy wonderswhether the more recent Soviet high-altitude tests had added additional charged particles—electrons—to the upper atmosphere, which could interfere with radio communications or evenpose a threat to the lives of astronauts who orbited through this space.

Unidentified: There are actually two things that—there are a num-ber of things you could do, I might point out. First of all, you couldlaunch. You see your present difficulties occur at one hot spot in theAtlantic. If you could carry out your launchings in a way that avoidedthat—handicapping your launching time. You could get it back to a verysubstantial reduction by doing that. Secondly—

President Kennedy: I’d have to move the whole space program up toNew England then. [Laughter.]

Unidentified: Yeah.Unidentified: What did we move it for then [unclear]?Unidentified:12 [Unclear] I think you could fire from any of our bases

and avoid that. It just depends on the nature of your launch as a matterof fact and the nature of your mission mostly.

Secondly—whereas I think NASA is justifiably worried about thepresent 8R estimates of dosage, a human being could take 10 [to] 20times that dosage of electrons, and medical people tell us, and still sur-vive and not be sick, not be hurt. I think the [unclear]—

President Kennedy: In any case, I was thinking just because of this . . .We haven’t gotten any response from the Soviets—

Unidentified: I think a factor of 50 would really get you in serioustrouble. I think Bob is right that at a factor of 10 you’d begin to worry—I think you could manage, if you found yourself in this embarrassment,but I don’t—

President Kennedy: OK, right, in any case.Unidentified: It also causes heaps of trouble, if you start—James Webb: Well, I think we can shield, but it might cause us some

trouble. 13

Rusk: Would any [unclear]? Has anything happened in the recentSoviet series that is any surprise at all?

Unidentified: No.Seaborg: I think the only thing surprising is that they haven’t really

been—so far at this stage in the analysis—nothing surprising has showedup. But [unclear]. I think it was a little bit of a surprise that this first onewas clean; I think one rather expected it not to be.14

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 87

12. Probably Robert Seamans of NASA.13. Shield the astronaut from this radiation.14. A weapon that produces less residual radiation relative to other weapons of the sameenergy yield is said to be cleaner.

President Kennedy: What about our tests? How would you summa-rize our tests, as far as . . . so, how would they? If they were talkingabout our tests would they dismiss them quite as you dismiss theirs?

Seaborg: I think that they would not be able to understand thesophistication of some of the biggest advances we have. Well, one otherpoint I might mention: we have electromagnetic timing measurementson the . . . pulse measurements on a number of these high-yield shotsand so far all of them have been two-stage as far—

Unidentified: Well, we’ve missed the 25 megaton, we’ve—Seaborg: No.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Seaborg: No, no. We got it but not with the airplane; we got it.15

[Unclear.]Unidentified: That’s a two-stage one, too?Seaborg: And that’s two-stage . . . Now this data—I think, at this

stage one must always remember one is still relatively looking . . . takinga first look at the data.

Unidentified: I think—Seaborg: Last year things changed several times in the process . . .Unidentified: I think one observation that might be made here. And

I don’t want to put a lot of weight on it; but that is: this 25-megaton shotbeing clean can be inter[preted] . . . I mean, it has significance in variousways. But our most advanced ideas, namely the ripple concept, leads toan inherently clean system and maximum efficiency.16

Unidentified: You don’t know whether it is a clean weapon oranother weapon that is—

Unidentified: Right. Or [unclear interjection] whether it’s clean to beclean or whether it’s clean [unclear interjection].

Seaborg: I’m sorry, I believe it has lead in it. And I think that’s quitea different process. I’ll check, and I don’t have it here, but that’s myunderstanding [unclear and unclear interjection] in lead so that it’s not anamazing development.

Webb: Well, perhaps it isn’t—Seaborg: It wouldn’t show up in lead.Webb: With reference to your earlier question, Mr. President, I think

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196288

15. The U.S. Air Force and the CIA cooperated in using reconnaissance planes to collect elec-tronic signals from Soviet test ranges. The U-2 that strayed over Soviet territory in lateAugust was likely on one of these missions (see “Meeting on U-2 Incident,” 4 September 1962).16. A ripple device permits the firing or releasing of two or more munitions, in this contextnuclear weapons, in close succession.

probably the single most-advanced thing they wouldn’t be able to makemuch sense out of, namely the ripple, which is of course a very reducedyield and a very complicated device. So, I doubt that they could reallymake any sense of it.

Unidentified: So, they would have the same troubles we have withtheir efficient weapon last time. [Chuckles.]

Webb: Yes, I think so.Unidentified: Not being able to decipher what it was.Seaborg: I don’t think also that they have anything like the sophisti-

cated system that we have for [unclear].Twenty-two seconds excised as classified information.Kaysen: . . . I think, leads to the very low weight, high-yield weapons.

Are the two most—Unidentified: Why in other words, yes—Unidentified: The two most important.Kaysen: Yes. And with some real [unclear] advances in the primary,

the primary—Unidentified: Well, those came from underground.Bundy: [Unclear] and did them underground. That’s correct.Kaysen: I was speaking of—Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.President Kennedy: All right, well, let’s . . . Can you?Bundy: That’s essentially all—President Kennedy: [Unclear] now? [flipping through chart] Where

do you want us to look?Bundy: Well, at their yield. At the back of graph 3, Mr. President,

that you will see the series of tests which [unclear]—Unidentified: We brought a chart that indicates that . . .Bundy: The next to last page, page 17, following the schedule, what

it amounts to is a series of values, you get 6 of one, 5 of the other.17

Unidentified: That’s right. A total of 11.Bundy: Of high-altitude tests primarily for determining these effects,

which we still so imperfectly understand from 50 kilometers on up, 25kilometers on up.18

And a series of five new atmospheric tests primarily designed to

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 89

17. In reaction to the new Soviet test series, President Kennedy had indicated in August thathe would authorize an additional 11 tests in the DOMINIC series, some of which would behigh-altitude tests.18. For details on the scope, character, and purposes of the DOMINIC test series, see ChuckHansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion Books, 1988), pp. 81–89.

explore further the problem of very high yield weapons with probablylow weights. The most important being the Ripple II and Ripple IIIexperiments, I believe.

President Kennedy: Where are those?Bundy: On the right-hand side.President Kennedy: OK.Bundy: It may be worth just a moment to explain what that is. I

should think Lee [Haworth] or Glenn [Seaborg] . . .19 Because that isprobably the most important technical development in our own Dominicseries.

Kaysen: That’s the sort of breakthrough of the Livermore laboratory.One minute, 29 seconds excised as classified information.During the portion of this conversation excised for reasons of nationalsecurity, the President evidently asked Glenn Seaborg a question that ledto the following discussion of the role of underground testing in the U.S.program of nuclear trials.Rusk: . . . you might Glenn Seaborg, before you get to the President’s

question, looking ahead at your own program underground, do you see,[unclear] strictly from your own point of view, a period of six monthssay in which you would not yourself expect to conduct undergroundtests for reasons of your own? Do you . . . Are there going to be anyrecesses?

Seaborg: You mean if there were . . . If the possibility existed of car-rying on tests in the future on a—

Rusk: Yes.Seaborg: Optimum time schedule?Rusk: If there were no, if you like, interference from the outside. Are

there periods of time in which you would not be doing anything any-how—if you were just running your own . . .

Seaborg: I think our present view is that from the standpoint of thebest rate of advance by testing, that the Atomic Energy Commissionwould prefer the—

Rusk: Steady course.Seaborg: The steady course at an optimum rate, where the tests

would be [unclear]—President Kennedy: Let’s see—how many underground tests have

we carried on now, since last September?Seaborg: About 15.

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196290

19. Leland J. Haworth was a commissioner of the AEC.

President Kennedy: We had 15 underground tests and 15 atmos-pheric tests.

Seaborg: No about 25 are—President Kennedy: So, we’ve had 25 atmospheric.Seaborg: About, yes.President Kennedy: Twenty-five atmospheric tests. We’ve had 75

tests in the last 11, 10 months now.20 I can’t see what there is above . . .ahead of us in the next nine months or a year that make it so necessaryfor us to continue to test beyond what you have talked about here. So, Imean, we are starting to talk about what, 75 times or 60, aren’t we? Imean that’s what we’re—

Unidentified: Mr. President could I make a comment on that?President Kennedy: Yes.Unidentified: There is something that is in the underground pro-

gram that’s of great interest to us. And that’s about mainly our cleanweapons in the low-yield range.21

Fifty-one seconds excised as classified information.Bundy: Broadly speaking, the underground testing program can now

provide for continuous and rapid weapons development and effects testswhen we get calibration for everything up to 50 or even 100 kt.22

And I think if we were to put it this way, Mr. President, so that youcould see the choices: I don’t believe that there will be any significant,really heavy pressure from the laboratories for continued atmospherictests for a period of a year to 18 months after this series is completed inthe higher yields. And I think if we were to continue without atmos-pheric testing in 1963, you would have high morale with a high rate ofprogress.

Underground testing, simply because it is the outlet, has a kind ofpsychological impact on the vitality and the energy of the laboratoriesand there is, therefore, a certain cost of cutting that off. On the otherhand, the fact that we have had these 50 tests makes it perfectly plain

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 91

20. The President was only off by one test. Since the Soviets broke the moratorium inSeptember 1961 and by the time of this meeting, the United States had tested 27 times in theatmosphere as part of the DOMINIC series, 44 times underground as part of the NOUGATseries, and 5 times underground or on the surface as part of Operation STORAX—a total of76 tests. (Gallery of U.S. Nuclear Tests, Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org).21. These were for tactical use.22. The first U.S. underground test (RAINIER) occurred in 1957. By 1962, most U.S. nucleartesting was done underground at the National Testing Site in Nevada. In fact, two-thirds ofall U.S. tests since the resumption of testing in September 1961 took place underground.

that in the underground area we are, not only more experienced, but bet-ter informed and better prepared than any other country.

Kaysen: Of course, somebody has [unclear]—but we are also learninghow to test higher and higher yields underground. This probably couldnow be used to test weapons up to about 100 kilotons and possibly couldgo up as high as a megaton. The point that Mr. Bundy makes about thegeneral effect on the laboratories and the state of readiness that it keepsthe laboratories in and the state of higher morale that it provides for thelaboratories is, of course, a point [that] we have made many times.23

Seaborg: I think it is just about happenstance perhaps; there has tobe a time at which the things that one, the advances one would hope tomake—the most significant advances that are down in the ground areones which require a series of experiments rather than a —you build upto a point and have a sudden go/no-go test. The all-fusion weapon, isone example.

Wiesner: But the all-fusion weapon, Mr. President, shouldn’t weighvery heavily in your mind, in my opinion. [Seaborg is mumbling in thebackground.] Because, the fact of the matter is today the all-fusionweapon, as the result of some of the tests, looks more dismal than it did ayear ago. Keep in mind that people [unclear] make it. And it’s got to beregarded as a long-term development program. I don’t think it should bea major factor in seeing whatever your thinking is . . .

President Kennedy: Well, let’s go to work on these other matters[unclear]—were you going to say something about that?

Seaborg: No, that’s all right but—Wiesner: Wouldn’t you agree with the—Seaborg: Well yeah, the high cleanliness . . . whether it’s all-fusion or

the other is the same general— [Unclear exchange.]Wiesner: Which is the one that people hold out as a very cheap, and

therefore very attractive weapon. It’s still a gleam. And it is probably adimmer gleam now than it was a year ago.

Unidentified: Well, this is of course part of the go/no-go [unclear].Wiesner: Yes.Unidentified: It doesn’t make it, for us, in a year, either.Unidentified: That’s right.Unidentified: From a military standpoint, some of these small,

cleaner systems can be very useful. [Some agreement in the background.]

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196292

23. See Leland Haworth’s and Glenn Seaborg’s comments at the test ban meeting of 1 August1962.

Unidentified: Yeah, I’m sure that’s right.President Kennedy: Let’s take a look down this—how many tests are

we talking about?Unidentified: Eleven until [unclear].President Kennedy: And they would be run from what date to what

date?Bundy: I would say from the third week in September to the first week

in November. But this illustrated schedule which is on page 17 probablyshould be slipped and this is as good point as any to indicate the reallygrave complexity of this, which is the reason we’ve asked Mr. Webb and Dr.Seamans to be here . . . is that we have a Mercury shot scheduled now forthe 25th of September. While we do not believe that test Fluvio or testNike/Hercules currently scheduled for the 17th to the 22nd will do morethan very temporary damage to this orbiting area, we don’t know that.24

And it would certainly be necessary to measure the atmosphere beforesending up Mr. [Walter] Schirra.25 And our preliminary thought in a staffdiscussion of this yesterday, was that we might do better, assuming that thisin principle, in the main, were it acceptable to you, Mr. President, to slip thewhole thing a couple of weeks.26 And to put this initial shot safely behind—the Mercury shot—rather than to have any question of this kind arise.

The way the diplomatic situation has developed there is a kind of aninformal image of a January 1 point at which there may be pressure notto do atmospheric testing in light of what you and the Russians have saidto each other; I don’t know whether Butch would agree on this.27

Adrian Fisher: Yes I would. I think January 1 is sort of a point—President Kennedy: What? About atmospheric testing or all of

them?Fisher: Well, January 1 is the date which we said we would—President Kennedy: Stop the testing.Fisher: —would like to have an effective treaty. If you put it in terms

of an effective treaty . . . But still if saying that, if you start up on January1 with a series of large bangs, I think that gives you a little bit of a trum-pet blowing an uncertain note.

President Kennedy: Of course, this Schirra may be a week or twoweeks delayed . . . might be so?

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 93

24. These high-altitude tests were subsequently postponed, scaled back, and renamed.25. Astronaut Schirra was originally scheduled to blast off aboard Mercury 8 on September 23.26. The remainder of the DOMINIC test series.27. Butch was Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Webb: It could be. But we are certainly making every effort to go offby the 25th.

Bundy: The alternative would be if, let’s say for the moment—thatwe were to say that we gave NASA ten days or two weeks from the 25thto try to get him up. If that, for various technical reasons, did not hap-pen, it might be well to put the Mercury shot over to December, wherethere’s another one scheduled. Then get the series out of the way, and goforward.

McNamara: Could we not carry on some of the airdrop tests?28

Bundy: We could do that. The airdrop tests are really not a problem.[McNamara is mumbling in the background.] But they are very easy any-way, Bob. They can be done at any point.

McNamara: I agree. I am just suggesting that instead of pushing thewhole schedule forward two weeks—

Bundy: The tight part of the schedule is the high-altitude testingpart. That’s where there are uncertainties.

McNamara: I think there is some merit in starting the testing . . .Bundy and McNamara speak at the same time.Bundy: I agree, [unclear] with the current tests. I would only [unclear]

started, if the Soviets stop.McNamara: However, in that case we could start airdrops.Wiesner: Well, there is a problem though, that the ripple weapons

have to be fabricated.Unidentified: That’s right.Wiesner: So that you can’t drop them tomorrow. They are still in the

laboratory, in development.Unidentified: These were actually the earliest dates at which they

could be made ready.President Kennedy: You mean and each weapon, in other words—Unidentified: They are being run through the laboratory right now.President Kennedy: This is a schedule which is based on when these

weapons will be ready?Unidentified: Yes. I’d speak [unclear] now. [Unclear.]Bundy: [Unclear] two ranges, Mr. President. In the high-altitude test

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196294

28. Most of the tests in the DOMINIC series (25 April 1962 to 4 November 1962)—29 outof the 36 tests—were airdrop tests. They involved dropping the nuclear device from anaircraft, detonating it in the air, and measuring its yield. Unlike high-altitude tests, whichwere designed primarily to measure weapons effects, airdrop tests were used for weaponsdevelopment.

cases, it is based on pad availability, essentially the BLUEGILL test,29

the URRACA test,30 and the KINGFISH test31 [unclear].President Kennedy: [Unclear]?Seaborg: Wouldn’t this help you some, Jerry, with respect to this air-

plane question?Wiesner: In what?Seaborg: The BLUEGILL. . . . Isn’t there a problem of outfitting an

aircraft by September 17th anyway?Unidentified: Well, there is. There is the question of whether it’s a

critical . . . a critical air [unclear] or not. [Unidentified person agreeing inthe background.] We could be ready to fire sometime in that period, butthere might be some degradation of the experiment. Of course this issomething that can happen any time in the course of an operation. But Ithink at this stage it would help. However, what about HAYMAKERprime risk two, you would [unclear] perhaps?32

Unidentified: Well, I don’t believe Ripple II, I am quite sure RippleII cannot. I believe that the HAYMAKER can; but I have to check it—

Unidentified: That’s right, HAYMAKER [unclear].McNamara: In any case, HAYMAKER doesn’t have to be postponed.

That’s the point I’m trying to make here.Unidentified: Yes.Bundy: [Unclear] That problem doesn’t arise yet, so I think we can

start—Unidentified: On the 23rd—Bundy: —the third week of September . . . [Unidentified person says,

“That’s right.”]Rusk: Does the BLUEGILL shot get into the space problem at all? 33

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 95

29. The BLUEGILL test was aborted on 3 June 1962 when the Johnston Island missile track-ing system failed. The BLUEGILL Prime [the second BLUEGILL test] was the test thatblew up the launch pad and contaminated the launch site at Johnston Island on 25 July 1962.The Thor missile engine failed after ignition, and the missile control officer hit the destructbutton while the missile was still on the ground. BLUEGILL was a high-altitude test to eval-uate a W-50 warhead in a Mk 4 reentry vehicle. (Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 86–87.)30. The highest nuclear test (1,300 kilometers) ever planned by the United States, URRACAwas controversial from the moment DOD official Harold Brown announced the schedule forhigh-altitude testing 29 April 1962. It was considered the most likely test to add additionalradiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, and it was subsequently canceled.31. The KINGFISH test was a test similar to BLUEGILL in intention and design.32. A HAYMAKER underground test, in the NOUGAT series, took place 27 June 1962.33. BLUEGILL Double Prime was intended to be the lowest of the high-altitude tests. Likethe earlier BLUEGILLs, it too failed.

Kaysen: They are predicted not to.Bundy: We think not but we would have to make a check, Mr.

Secretary, before we set up an announcement—Rusk: It would be better for the BLUEGILL shots, if the altitude

permits it in honesty . . . to consider those ordinary atmospheric testsrather than high-altitude outer space tests.

Unidentified: [Snickering.]Unidentified: If you don’t, well let’s try. [Unclear interjection.] There

is some concern about the possibility of BLUEGILL getting somethingup to levels that will have some effect on the man in space . . . [unclear]far up that—

Unidentified: We don’t believe this—but we believe it enough thatwe’d have to make measurements after the shot to be sure.

President Kennedy: Well, I don’t think we want it around that weblew off something a week before that made us postpone the thing forthree months.34 I think we shouldn’t take that chance. I would rathertake it on the other end. [Unclear] telling me [unclear] had some slip-page [unclear] by November 1st, well, let’s say that as we . . . then let’snot have it then. Let them go ahead and let’s . . . then go till November20th, [unclear] not [unclear].

Bundy: What we would actually do Mr. President, I think, is to movethe BLUEGILL-URRACA-KINGFISH series back two weeks. There’s aparticular problem about KINGFISH which is worth attention, too. Andthat’s the one now scheduled next to last on the 14th of October.

President Kennedy: Well, let’s just set it as our policy that we willnot put off any tests that raises any reasonable prospect of interferinguntil Schirra goes. And then let’s try to decide which of these tests wecan throw out. We don’t want to do them all, if we can help it.

Seaborg: You mean which of these we’d terminate?President Kennedy: Yeah.Seaborg: Well, our candidate among the developmental tests would

be the fourth, THUMBELINA.35

President Kennedy: What about URRACA?President Kennedy had been uneasy about this planned test since the British

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196296

34. Schirra’s Mercury mission.35. Thumbelina was the name of a nuclear device. Although there was no test called THUM-BELINA in the DOMINIC series, a Thumbelina device was ultimately tested in an airdrop testcalled CHAMA on 18 October 1962. The Thumbelina nuclear device was lightweight with asmall diameter.

raised an objection to it in May. Kennedy created a special panel, includingscientists Wolfgang Panofsky and James A. Van Allen, to study the radiationeffect of URRACA on the natural radiation belt—the so-called Van Allenradiation belt—in the Earth’s magnetic field. Although this distinguishedpanel assured the President that URRACA would not contribute signifi-cantly to the number of electrons, the President was biased against the test.For months his AEC chief Seaborg and McNamara had been fighting arearguard action to save it. With evidence that the July STARFISH testhad added so much radiation to the magnetic field that one British and twoU.S. satellites had been severely damaged, the President was even moredetermined not to take any chances with URRACA.Seaborg: No, that’s [laughter].Unidentified: That’s our only [unclear].Unidentified: That’s our only [unclear].President Kennedy: What?Seaborg: That’s the AEC’s only high-altitude shot.President Kennedy: I know. But we . . . I know, it’s one of the saddest

things I’ve ever . . . I mean, it needs 1,500 kilometers. [Laughter.]Seaborg: Oh, well, no, we should have made the point that that has

been reduced, Mr. President.President Kennedy: To what?Seaborg: From 165 kilotons to 10 kilotons to make the contribution

to the artificial radiation belt negligible.President Kennedy: All right. So, now it is down to 10 kt?Seaborg: It is down to 10 kt.President Kennedy: At 1,500 kilometers?Seaborg: It is—Bundy: Mr. President, if you wanted to look at the problem of the

contribution to the electrons, the test to concentrate on is KINGFISH.Seaborg: Yes, and we should get to that, I think, because that’s—Bundy: That’s the—Rusk: [Unclear] the URRACA. I would like to ask an irreverent

question, if I can [unclear]?Seaborg: Yes.Rusk: I get the impression with all this material [that] this is a case

of go out and see what happens. Because you know, nobody knows.36 Isthat [unclear]—

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 97

36. Rusk is raising a sore subject. Only days earlier the AEC had to admit that the STARFISHtest at 400 kilometers had unexpectedly added large amounts of radiation to the Earth’s mag-

Seaborg: Well that’s [unclear].Wiesner: If it’s worse than that, you know. [Laughter.]Seaborg: No, I don’t agree with that and I wouldn’t describe it that

way.Rusk: [Unclear] saying the knowledge of the existence of unpre-

dicted phenomena could be very important.Seaborg: Yes, and we’ve found unpredicted things, for example, in

KINGFISH—Unidentified: We sure did.Wiesner: This is the place where Glenn’s loyalty to his organization,

I think—37

President Kennedy: Now tell me why it is that this is the AEC’s onlytest?

Seaborg: Well, because they are effects shots and the other—38

President Kennedy: But, I mean, Livermore—Los Alamos. This is aLos Alamos [Scientific Laboratory] test?

Seaborg: Yes.Unidentified: This is their only high-altitude—Seaborg: The only high-altitude test.Unidentified: The rest are Defense Department tests.Seaborg: That was primarily AEC’s; of course they are all at

Livermore [unclear].39 [Unclear] sort of joint.President Kennedy: Yeah, but I don’t know . . . And that really is.

What are you going to try to find from this test?Seaborg: How to . . . ourselves . . . test if it becomes desirable in

space. And to make the diagnosis from those tests that would be neces-sary for weapons development and how to ascertain whether the otherfellow is testing [unclear]—

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 196298

netic field, causing damage to the fuel cells on three satellites. According to Seaborg’s latermemoir, Dean Rusk would rib him for years about AEC’s erroneous prediction about theeffects of this high-altitude test [Glenn Seaborg, with the assistance of Benjamin S. Loeb,Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley; University of California Press 1981), p.156].37. Seaborg is probably referring to the ill-fated STARFISH test. In his memoir, Seaborgadmits that the AEC had tried to hide the fact that it had been so wrong on STARFISH. Inits first assessment of the test results on 20 August, the AEC wrote that the increase in radi-ation had been “generally anticipated.” Yes, it had been anticipated, but for the higher-alti-tude URACCA test not for STARFISH; and the AEC believed these changes would beinsignificant for the Van Allen belt, in any case (see Seaborg, Kennedy, p. 157).38. Effects shots are tests designed to test the effect of a nuclear blast on communications,electromagnetic pulses, and so on, in outer space.39. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, initially the University of California RadiationLaboratory.

President Kennedy: Well, I think what we ought to do is go aroundthe room and everybody throw in what test they would give up, if theyhad to. And then we can . . . I say we’re going to cut this list down. Whatdo we want now?

Seaborg: All right. Well, I have given you the Thumbelina [devicetest], yes, sir.

President Kennedy: All right. Now, Jerry [Wiesner]. What onewould you give?

Wiesner: Oh, dear.President Kennedy: Let’s get . . . the problem is which is the least

useful scientifically?Wiesner: I would rather go the other way and say which ones I think

are most valuable.President Kennedy: Let’s do it my way. Let’s just . . .Wiesner: All right, your way, well . . . [chuckling].President Kennedy: Which one would you throw off the list?Wiesner: My list will be longer this way. I’d agree with THUMBE-

LINA. I would say that HAYMAKER Prime is probably useful, but notnecessary. I would—

President Kennedy: What’s the least useful?Wiesner: Least useful: probably THUMBELINA or URRACA.President Kennedy: URRACA. We’ve already got THUMBELINA;

so we get URRACA.Wiesner: URRACA.President Kennedy: All right.Wiesner: I think Ripple III could be dispensed with, wouldn’t you

agree, [unclear]?Kaysen: I’d give up Ripple III, before I’d give up URRACA, yes.Unidentified: Yes.Wiesner: Now, not all of the 10-kiloton tests in the high-altitude

series are necessary. You’ll get interesting and useful information—President Kennedy: Yes, but, OK. Who are we going . . .Wiesner: But, you could drop all three if you wanted to.President Kennedy: Do you . . . one? What one do you [unclear]?

[Laughter.]Unidentified: Well, if I were . . . I think of the high-altitude things, I

think that I would throw out first number 6. I’d just have 33c.President Kennedy: That’s called? [Bundy whispers.]Unidentified: Then I would throw out, I think, next the low-yield

BLUEGILL. The 25 kilometer 10 kt.President Kennedy: Number 1?

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 99

Unidentified: Four.Unidentified: Four. No, 4. See, 4 is a two-stage package actually—President Kennedy: Yes.Unidentified: It’s 165 kilotons at 50 kilometers as a backup for

BLUEGILL. And if BLUEGILL is successful, then it’s 10 kilotons at 25kilometers.

President Kennedy: [Unclear] questions. Do you have any, Mac?Bundy: I am sure that I would agree on throwing out THUMBE-

LINA and I think the test that you need to pay most attention to, Mr.President, is KINGFISH number 2, in the high-altitude series.

President Kennedy: That’s right. [Four seconds excised as classifiedinformation.] What about Nike/Hercules?40

Seventeen seconds excised as classified information.Seaborg: I think that’s the test you’ve read, Mr. President.Wiesner: No, no. It’s number 5.Seaborg: Oh.McNamara: The Nike/Hercules tests bear on KINGFISH—Unidentified: That’s right.McNamara: And I think today we should simply agree that we don’t

know whether KINGFISH can be carried out.41

Bundy: Right.Five seconds excised as classified information.McNamara: Information can be gained from the, particularly the first

Nike/Hercules, possibly from the second Nike/Hercules also, that willbear on the potential effects of KINGFISH, and we should certainly notcarry out KINGFISH or decide to carry it out until one or both of thoseNike/Hercules tests have been carried out, Mr. President.

Unidentified: Mr. President—Wiesner: Ah, excuse me . . . The trouble with that Bob is that the best

estimates that we have now is you drop KINGFISH much below 40 or 50kilotons, you won’t get any of the blackout effects we are trying to study.42

McNamara: I agree fully.

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962100

40. The President is asking about tests using a Nike/Hercules missile to launch the test deviceto a somewhat lower altitude, about 25 kilometers, which might accomplish the goals of someof the high-altitude tests, like KINGFISH.41. The Secretary of Defense is referring to the new uncertainty concerning the radiationeffects of this particular high-altitude nuclear test.42. KINGFISH is also designed to test the effect of a very high altitude (circa 95 kilometers)nuclear blast on command and control systems. Bringing the test lower or reducing its yieldto avoid the harmful effects on the Van Allen belt would make it less useful for this purpose.

Wiesner: [Unclear.]McNamara: As I say, I think that the Nike/Hercules tests will how-

ever bear on whether you should carry it out at all.Unidentified: Uh, huh. But, Mr. President, I think—McNamara: I don’t think we can decide today, for sure—Unidentified: No.McNamara: —whether we should carry it out.Carl Kaysen: I think there is a new dimension or element of the prob-

lem, which perhaps we didn’t have to worry about so much before.Before, we looked at total yield and we looked at what’s important andwhat’s not. We now have a number of 10-kt shots at different altitudes,which hasn’t you know—Bob McNamara has just said the purpose offinding out what we know about certain phenomena.

I think if we look at the political side of the business of putting elec-trons up into space, it’s not only how many electrons we actually put up,but the total number of high-altitude shots that has some . . . That is aproblem, that is something we ought to look at, so that—

President Kennedy: Well, now, let me ask you, point out these shotswhich present the electron possibility.

Forty-six seconds excised as classified information.President Kennedy: There’s not much use our going to the Russians

and telling them about the problem of electrons and then going aheadand doing it ourselves and adding more electrons.

Unidentified: Well, I was thinking in estimating, however, if theRussians do put one up, in the 30- or 40-megaton amount [unclear],which is not likely . . . But if they shot a very high yield one up to the, atthe most vulnerable altitude and increased by a factor of five or ten theradiation that’s already up there, then we’re beginning to get into therange where [unclear] it’s becoming not, maybe not impossible but[unclear] which is complicated and difficult. I don’t regard it as likelythat the Russians [unclear] . . . additional.

President Kennedy: [Unclear] too; but we haven’t heard unless I ask[unclear] that we try again with [unclear] the Russian ambassador [unclear]not much available, not much to draw on over there.

Wiesner: I think that Carl’s point is very important in that the totalnumber is [unclear].

President Kennedy: Well, let’s . . . on this matter of KINGFISH, itseems to me the Defense Department ought to come forward with addi-tional reasons for [unclear] tests [unclear] and they can propose, so thatwe maybe can cut down the electrons and can give us . . . which weregard as . . . based on this information. What happened before [unclear]

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 101

whether they suggest that we ought to do it or not or whether we canstrip it down to . . . enough to make [unclear] useful but not hazardous.We can’t very well make any less [unclear] that the Russians as far as . . .[unclear] ourselves.

Eight seconds excised as classified information.McNamara: But we are not certain that even with that reduction by a

factor of ten that we have a safe test. We don’t know of any way to findout other than to carry out the Nike/Hercules tests.

Wiesner: On the other hand we [unclear] number of what will hap-pen in [unclear].

President Kennedy: The upper limit we deem . . .Wiesner: The worst possible thing that we think could happen is,

and this we think is unlikely, it could double what’s already up there.Unidentified: If all the electrons are ours.Unidentified: If all the electrons that their bomb would generate—Unidentified: If they’re all going in the wrong place would [unclear]

increase 50 percent.Wiesner: You see. Right now we think we’ve got 25 percent of the

electrons.[Unclear.] If you got them all, you’d get 50 [unclear].Unidentified: Of course that could be a different distribution.Rusk: We know that some of these shots are creating a problem for

us in space [unclear]. I would suppose that our criteria have not changedfrom what is necessary for national security into it would be good to door good to know. There is a rigorous test: What is required by nationalsecurity? [Unclear.]

Bundy: Mr. President, you asked the question what tests do we takenow. I do not find that it’s an unacceptably long list in the context of thevarious ideas and possibilities and knowledge probably that we have. Iagree with the Secretary [of State] that that’s the proper test. I thinkthis may be our last clear chance to do this, and I think that there’s agreat deal to be said for getting in a posture in which we have clearlyfound out the things we need to find out. Because we may have a year ora year and a half when it’s not easy to find out.43

President Kennedy: You think—Rusk: In fact, a major change in the weight-yield ratio, for example,

is very important from a security point of view that [unclear].Wiesner: I think you have to be careful about that because it is my

understanding that this test, the Ripple II, will not put you in that posi-

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962102

43. When the pace of diplomatic negotiation would make testing politically infeasible.

tion. This will put you in a position to design a weapon, which willrequire further testing, so that—

Unidentified: No, it will put you in pretty good position.Wiesner: Except you’ll have this one. You’ll have this one, which will

not be the 30 to 40 megaton.Unidentified: No, that’s right.Unidentified: It might be 15.Unidentified: Yeah.Wiesner: I understand that. So that I think that should be clear.Unidentified: But it will be a big gain.Wiesner: On the other hand, Mr. President, you want to recall the

KINGFISH-type experiment was one of the basic reasons that we feltwe had to resume testing.44 Which was to get [these] effects [unclear].Because of the bad luck we’ve had in the Pacific we’ve not carried outthis test. Many of the others, I think, would be cut if you took seriouslythe criteria we started applying initially, which the Secretary has talkedabout.

McNamara: I would speak to that point, Jerry. I think Ripple IIIshould not be cut.

Forty-four seconds excised as classified information.McNamara: We may have to burst higher than we previously antici-

pated to avoid anti-ballistic missile systems. Therefore I think Ripple IIIis an important test as I think Ripple II is an important test. So, I would-n’t cut out either Ripple II or Ripple III. There are others that might becut; but not those two.

President Kennedy: Where are we with BLUEGILL?Well, in any case we are agreed that we will not start these tests

until after this . . . Schirra has gone ahead, we’ll give the order, then.McNamara: Except, Mr. President, for some air-drop tests.President Kennedy: Air-drop tests?McNamara: Yes.President Kennedy: If we can. If we can do that.Bundy: How long would you like that, figure that period would be,

Mr. President? Do you want to make it indefinite?President Kennedy: [to the NASA representatives] Well, we ought to

be able to know within two weeks if you are ever going—we hope youare going to go within two weeks of the time you’ve said.

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 103

44. Soviet high-altitude tests in 1961 had been at higher altitudes than had been anticipated byU.S. analysts.

Webb: I would certainly say that. Of course, worldwide weather isthe problem here. [President Kennedy agrees.] [Unclear] recovered. But Ithink it is feasible to set the [unclear]. If we don’t get off within twoweeks of the time, we do have another [Mercury] flight scheduled inDecember. We’d simply cancel that and go on with December at whichtime we can have a chance to make it [unclear].

President Kennedy: It seems to me we probably won’t want to dothat. With all the . . . you don’t want to build up the Schirra flight, thenyou cancel it till December. That will look like a setback. So, I wouldthink we’d probably have to go with this flight, if you are ready to goSeptember 25th . . . want to . . . waiting on the weather then, I think, weought to wait until you go and just do whatever else we can do which willnot affect this.

Webb: We’ll do everything we can to go at the earliest possible—President Kennedy: Then the other problem is that these tests will

be taking place probably after the Soviets have announced that they havedesisted their tests. 45 We assume—

Unidentified: They have closed the area until the 15th of October—46

President Kennedy: So we have to assume—Unidentified: But that doesn’t mean that they won’t continue with

any [unclear].Rusk: No, they told us that they are going to be finished by Novem-

ber 1st.President Kennedy: So we ought to be shooting for November 1st

ourselves. We don’t to want to sort of string them out at the lastmoment if we can help it, obviously. That may mean therefore if we haveto . . . if we are not able to put a couple of these airdrops into that periodfrom September 25th that’s going to put our schedule up till November12th and 15th, won’t it?

Bundy: The tightness in the schedule, Mr. President, is much morelikely to come not in the airdrop tests but in the high-altitude tests. Thethree that are interlocked because of the launch pad problem—

Unidentified: And the airdrop won’t present much of a problem.Bundy: —are BLUEGILL, URRACA, and KINGFISH.President Kennedy: URRACA, KINGFISH, and what?Bundy: And BLUEGILL on 17 September, URRACA 29 September,

and KINGFISH on 14 November.

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962104

45. The President means ended.46. The area is the Soviet testing zone.

President Kennedy: Well, we’re all agreed that we’ve got to go withBLUEGILL and we have to go with KINGFISH though we’re going tohave another discussion on KINGFISH, aren’t we? [Unclear exchange.]

Unidentified: Mr. President, I’d like to make one consideration thatyou should have in mind, and that’ll get to the background to the testban negotiations, background to the discussions of outer space generally.And there is under consideration before you the idea of heading off thismilitary use of space, which is the Soviet concept to get our reconnais-sance satellite, with our counter position, which is no weapons of massdestruction in outer space. Now, there’s not a general resolution on thatyet; but that’s the way the thinking tends . . . is shaping up. Now[unclear] is [unclear] to many ones in outer space, at the same time youmake your proposal. And that’s [unclear] URRACA, and . . . [unclearinterjection] which you hold your position on KINGFISH is—

President Kennedy: Well, URRACA is in trouble . . . anyway. But theother . . . KINGFISH is the—

Unidentified: It’s our most important test.President Kennedy: . . . most important test. Unless we have a great

October, I [unclear].Bundy: [Unclear] is the most important test.President Kennedy: What?Bundy: [Unclear] ranks after BLUEGILL, STARFISH, and URRACA,

in the earlier recommendations, I thinkUnidentified: That is right.Unidentified: One part of the reason for that I believe was DOD

wasn’t ready to go ahead with it. I think they always felt it was animportant test.

Seaborg: KINGFISH was always in the forefront of these. We didn’tthink we could do it this year.

Wiesner: Mr. President, one other thing is that [unclear] responsi-bility for the fallout [unclear] getting rid of Thumbelina [unclear]—

President Kennedy: Yeah.Wiesner: Because that’ll [unclear].President Kennedy: I see.Bundy: I might mention, Mr. President, although it is not a part of

this specific presentation that there is also a possibility, that there is arecommendation on it, there is a request for authority to make a fourthlattice shot. And this would also create fall-out and those problems andthe Defense Department yesterday was apparently pulling very hard[unclear] all this attention [unclear] the [boron?].

Seaborg: [Unclear] to trigger a shot to see about X rays up and

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 105

down. And you [unclear] experiment. You look like you get the data, butwe certainly are not interested in pushing that problem.

Wiesner: It’s a test that’s not unlike, it’s a test not unlike the one wehad [unclear] trouble [unclear] accidentally.

Seaborg: It’s about the same magnitude. There are in effect twoshots: There’s one at one-and-a-half or 1.7 megaton, kilotons each butright on the surface.

McNamara: Mr. President, in view of the problem of the Russianscompleting their tests on November 1st and ours which slipped, as we dis-cussed it, and extending substantially beyond that point, I’d like to suggestwe take this schedule, and at least as far as the Nike/Hercules and theKINGFISH shots are concerned, reschedule this to be completed by the1st of November. I don’t know exactly how we’ll do that; but if you couldgive us that objective, I think we can work it out. But I don’t think weought to have a schedule extending beyond November 1st.

Unidentified: This poses a problem with regard to Mercury.McNamara: It does, well, but I am going to assume for the minute

that we will accept a delay in Mercury and reschedule in such a way as tocomplete it by the 1st of November.

President Kennedy: How long do you think you’ll need? It’s possibleto give you five weeks; but it might only give you three.

McNamara: It might only give us three weeks; but we have con-structed another pad, fortunately.

Unidentified: It doesn’t come in till the 15th—McNamara: I know it doesn’t come in until the 15th of October; but

it is available for two weeks. And for two weeks, we will have two pads.For the period before that, we will only have one pad.

I think we ought to simply take it as our objective to finish this off bythe 1st of November, at least on schedule.

Bundy: Mr. Secretary, I think we ought to be awfully careful aboutthis high-altitude test, just out of the experience we have had in tryingto cram it into a tight schedule. I would hate to see us come down to aperiod in which we were missing certain things in October [unclear] forthe one that I would myself think in the light of the whole pattern of ourrelations with the Soviet Union, it is essential for us to [unclear][McNamara begins to interject]. Pressure for [unclear].

McNamara: I don’t think it’s essential, Mac. But I think we can gaina lot by preparing to complete it by the 1st of November. As a matter offact, we will begin to anticipate problems and find solutions to them.Mac, my concern about what may happen, if we have to defer our tests

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962106

until after Mercury starts [is] Mercury may not take off until the end ofNovember, or the end of October. We’ve got to have some action here totry to compress our schedule. The best way to get it is simply say,assume you don’t start until the third . . . or three weeks after the 15th ofSeptember and finish the 1st of November.

Rusk: But on the political side, if we were quite clear that we hadgiven them [unclear] their two shots go off after they had stopped, wedidn’t say that.

President Kennedy: [Unclear] finish.Rusk: [Unclear.] Well, we wouldn’t want to do that, then the

[unclear] got to be larger [unclear].President Kennedy: What about BLUEGILL? Now, what is

BLUEGILL doing in the way of electrons?Wiesner: Very little. [Unclear exchange.]President Kennedy: Can you get it at 95 [unclear]? Is that the dif-

ference?Unidentified: Yes, the pressure goes up very greatly.President Kennedy: You can’t [unclear] . . . dropping KINGFISH?Unidentified: Well, the trouble is dropping KINGFISH—President Kennedy: Now what is KINGFISH going to tell us that

BLUEGILL doesn’t?Fifty-one seconds excised as classified information.President Kennedy: . . . Let’s do this.Wiesner: [Unclear] you call URRACA because we don’t know about

that very high altitude—President Kennedy: Let’s take to . . . we’re going to be back here tomor-

row. I think overnight let’s be thinking—I think we ought to . . . I think 11[tests] is too many given our time problem. So we’ve got to try to drop—take it down to 8. And we just have to see where we, and then let’s see whatour—given the problem of—let’s do two schedules: One in which they gooff on time—give them two days; and the other is two weeks. When . . .

And how would we organize it in order to get it done as close to theNovember 1st date as Bob McNamara has suggested in recognition thatthat’s not a final decision right now?

Then let’s . . . What other matter do we have to consider in regard[to this]? There’s nothing more we can do about KINGFISH. You gotthat down about as fine as you can.

Unidentified: Have to learn more, sir. It is conceivable that we willhave to wait for the yields [unclear] times and the exact height of the[unclear]?

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 107

Unidentified: Learn as much as we can up until . . . for the time thatyou need, the advance time that you need, learn as much as you can fromit [unclear].

President Kennedy: Now is there anything . . . you got three, as Iunderstand it, there are three Nike/Hercules?

Seaborg: Three, yes. Well, one is a scout.Unidentified: Two are Nike/Hercules and one is a scout, XM 33c.President Kennedy: They’re all . . .Unidentified: The BLUEGILL one.President Kennedy: XM 33c was put in somebody’s list. Which one

is that? What do you call it?Unidentified: That’s six, seven, and eight [unclear].Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.President Kennedy: The fact of the matter is, if the Soviet Union

ever really gets this space ship which presented us with a real militarymatter, couldn’t you stop it?

Unidentified: If there are people . . . Yes, if they—President Kennedy: Have people on it.Wiesner: Well, if it were up above 500 kilometers or so.Unidentified: [two people talking at the same time] Even at a low altitude,

you could do it for quite a while because quite high levels for a day—Wiesner: For a few days this stuff could be made very intense.Unidentified: Oh, yes we could stop it, yes.President Kennedy: If it were manned?Unidentified: If it were manned and we wanted to.Wiesner: You could probably even stop electronic equipment, if you

wanted to—President Kennedy: Yeah.Wiesner: But it would take the [unclear].McNamara: Well, the probability is we could shoot it down with

Nike/Zeus from Kwajalein.47

Wiesner: You could probably even stop solar cells from there.McNamara: We will have by next May, Mr. President, [unidentified

interjection] the capacity at Kwajalein to shoot down satellites in theorder of 150- to 200-mile altitude and we can probably increase that to800 miles of altitude, say 1,300 kilometers, within a year or two.

W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962108

47. The U.S. Army’s first antiballistic missile [ABM] system was designed in the mid-1950s,and then redesigned as the Nike-X.

President Kennedy: We assume they will have the ABM?McNamara: And we assume they will have the same, yes.Wiesner: You see we’re doing it with the Nike/Zeus. McNamara: Yes.Wiesner: And they have a comparable system.McNamara: Yes.Wiesner: In fact, we could do it with our regular missiles, if we

wanted to.McNamara: There is a great probability that Leningrad system will

have some capability of this kind.48

Wiesner: See, if we really wanted to attack a satellite now, we thinkwe can do it relatively quickly with a Minuteman, or even with a smallermissile.

President Kennedy: Well, in any case, we are going to be back againtomorrow morning and we are going to see if we can get this thing down toeight and then what the schedule ought to be in view of priorities [unclear].

Unidentified: Right.Seaborg: Mr. President, there is one thing: Cutting the weapons

development tests won’t help much on the schedule.Unidentified: No.Seaborg: We have to do it on the left-hand column.President Kennedy: Now, we are also concerned, which we haven’t

talked about much, about radiation.Wiesner: Well, this is why I feel strongly about THUMBELINA.Unidentified: That’s where THUMBELINA helps.Wiesner: THUMBELINA helps a great deal; but the Ripple II and

III [tests of ripple nuclear devices] will also make a substantial differ-ence. I understand the Secretary’s—

President Kennedy shuts off the machine.

The National Security Council, at its meeting on Friday, decided to reducethe 11 remaining tests to 8, dropping the AEC’s HAYMAKER Prime,URRACA, and a DOD high-altitude test. The President saved THUM-BELINA because it had been designed by Los Alamos and would providean important development base for that laboratory. There were twoalternative sets of dates for these eight tests, depending on the date of

Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Tes t Serie s 109

48. The Soviets were thought to be building an ABM system around Leningrad.

Walter Schirra’s Mercury mission. Under no circumstances would thehigh-altitude BLUEGILL shot go up until after Schirra had come down.49

Kennedy had one more meeting before the end of Thursday withArthur Goldberg and Walter Reuther, the head of the United AutoWorkers [UAW]. This was apparently the meeting Reuther had requestedthe previous week to talk about the recent problems between the UAWand the AFL-CIO. This was not taped.

The President left the Oval Office at 7:40 P.M.

Monday, September 10, 1962

The twin pots of Cuba and Berlin continued to simmer. Cuban policyseemed to be increasingly a difficult domestic matter for Kennedy. Theadministration had managed to keep the congressional resolution for thereserve call-up under wraps until Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfieldintroduced it on September 7. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksenhad kept the secret, but just as soon as Mansfield made his statement, theRepublican leadership began a campaign in favor of much tougher actionagainst Cuba. At the same time, an incident half a world away was alsocomplicating Kennedy’s Cuba policy. On September 8 a U-2 reconnais-sance aircraft on a joint U.S.-Taiwanese mission had disappeared over thePeople’s Republic of China and was presumed shot down. Given theadministration’s existing concerns about the consequences of a U-2 inci-dent over Cuba, the event in Asia reopened the debate over what riskswere acceptable to maintain surveillance over the island.

The most disturbing news to reach Kennedy was about Khrushchevand Berlin. In his second meeting that year with a high-level U.S. visitor(the first in May, with Salinger and Sorenson), Khrushchev had broughtSecretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to his Black Sea resort at

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962110

49. Diary of Glenn Seaborg, Entry, 6 September 1962, John F. Kennedy Library. In the end,there would be nine remaining tests in the DOMINIC series. Five of the nine were airdrop tests,of which ANDROSCOGGIN (2 October 1962) and HOUSATONIC (30 October 1962) testedthe Ripple II device, and CHAMA (18 October) the Thumbellina device. The ANDROSCOG-GIN failed, which may be the reason why there was an extra test in this last group. The fourhigh-altitude tests were CHECKMATE (20 October 1962), BLUEGILL Triple Prime (26October 1962), KINGFISH (1 November 1962), and TIGHTROPE (4 November 1962). All ofthe high-altitude tests took place after Walter Schirra’s nine-hour Mercury mission on 3October 1962.

Pitsunda. The Soviet press was about to announce that Berlin negotia-tions were deadlocked and there would be a pause. Khrushchev now toldUdall, who told Kennedy, just what would happen after that pause. Hesaid, “We will give [President Kennedy] a choice—go to war, or sign apeace treaty [ending occupation rights in Berlin]. We will not allow yourtroops to be in Berlin.” Khrushchev added, “if any lunatics in your coun-try want war, Western Europe will hold them back.” If that were notenough, “It’s been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy—now we can swat your ass. So let’s not talk about force. We’re equallystrong,” Khrushchev blustered. “You want Berlin. Access to it goes throughEast Germany. We have the advantage. If you want to do anything, youhave to start a war.” But Khrushchev promised a lull before he broughtthe crisis to a conclusion. “Out of resepct for your President we won’t doanything until November [after the midterm elections].” None of thiswas public. What was public was bad enough. Khrushchev had also metwith visiting U.S. poet Robert Frost, who then recounted to reporters (ina cleaned up version of what Khrushchev actually said) how Khrushchevhad told him that “we were too liberal to fight.”1

In Congress, when the talk wasn’t on Cuba, there was discussion of aplan to allow the self-employed to build retirement accounts of their own,what would become the Self-Employed Pension–Individual RetirementAccount (SEP-IRA), and the President’s foreign aid bill.

The President had spent the weekend at Hammersmith Farm inNewport, Rhode Island, catching some of the excitement of the upcom-ing America’s Cup Challenge. Ahead of him this Monday were a series ofimportant meetings, only half of which he would choose to tape.

A sense of history and, of course, politics apparently influenced thePresident’s choice of what to tape this day. Former president Dwight D.Eisenhower remained a special challenge for Kennedy. Enormouslyrespected throughout the world, Eisenhower retained the affection ofmillions of Americans. Journalist and sometime Kennedy adviser JosephAlsop once described the difference in the hold that the youngerPresident and Eisenhower had on the American people. Kennedy com-manded their minds, but only Eisenhower had been given a place inAmerican hearts. The former president had just returned from a lengthy

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962 111

1. Memorandum of Conversation between Khrushchev and Udall, 6 September 1962, in FRUS,15: 309. Kennedy apparently read this document, since he alluded to its contents at least once, ontape, later in the day. On Frost, see Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (NewYork: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 351.

European tour, which had included a long conversation with the pricklyGerman chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Kennedy needed Eisenhower’sblessing, or at least a political nonaggression pact, to keep control of thedomestic debate on measures appropriate to the current tensions inEurope. Later in the day, Kennedy would meet with his Berlin team todiscuss the latest developments and to hammer out the responses thatthe Western alliance would make if Khrushchev seized West Berlin.

Possibly just before turning to Eisenhower and these foreign mat-ters, Kennedy called his Secretary of the Treasury to discuss whether toveto the Self-employed Pension Bill.

Time Unknown

Now, what I’ve got to indicate, therefore, is that I’ll veto it ifit’s hung on this bill and that they’ve got a better chance tooverride my veto if it’s separate than they have with this bill.

Conversation with Douglas Dillon2

Despite overwhelming congressional support for H.R. 10, the Self-employed Pension Bill, President Kennedy felt compelled to oppose themeasure. A similar bill had passed the House on three previous occasionsbut had always been rejected by the Senate. Three days before this conver-sation, on September 7, the measure gained the approval of the Senate forthe first time, and though it emerged in a much diluted form compared tothe original House proposal, it appeared headed for only a modest rework-ing in the House-Senate conference committee. The precursor of the manytax deductible private pension plans of later years, Keogh-Smathers—as itwas often called—provided for the partial deductibility of contributions toprivate pension plans made by owner managers and the self-employed.3

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962112

2. Dictabelt 3A.6, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection. C. Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury. See also transcripts forthe President’s conversations on H.R. 10 with Albert Gore on 8 October 1962, and withGeorge Smathers on 10 October 1962.3. The principal sponsors of the original bill were Eugene J. Keogh, Democratic U.S. represen-tative from New York, 1937 to 1967, and George A. Smathers, Democratic U.S. senator fromFlorida, 1951 to 1969. Under its final provisions, eligible self-employed individuals coulddeduct 50 percent of their contributions up to an annual maximum of $2,500 or 10 percent of

Having received estimates that it would produce a revenue loss of$100 to $125 million, Kennedy expressed a private desire, soon madepublic, that he would prefer to veto the legislation.4 The Treasury hadalso weighed in against the bill and had recommended a veto on the basisof the expected revenue drain and on the realization that the lion’s shareof benefits under the measure would go to wealthy physicians and attor-neys. Only the likelihood of near unanimous congressional support and apotential veto override gave the President any reason to consider sign-ing H.R. 10.5 And though Kennedy believed that the bill was, indeed,based on a principle of taxpayer equity (since it provided some privatepension plans with tax benefits comparable to those enjoyed by publicpension plans) and that it might be worthy of consideration in a largerpackage of tax reform, the estimated revenue loss and the status of itsexpected beneficiaries convinced him to issue a veto threat.

While it eventually would be passed as a separate bill, some of itschampions in the Senate launched a preemptive, and ultimately abortive,search for the appropriate “veto-proof ” legislation on which to add, byamendment, the provisions of H.R. 10. In the following conversationwith Treasury secretary Douglas Dillon, Kennedy ponders a strategy bywhich the administration could convince supporters of the bill not tohang it on other more favored legislation.

Douglas Dillon: [Unclear] allow me to say that . . . even if he’s retir-ing in due course—6

President Kennedy: Yeah.Dillon: [Unclear] will be chosen shortly—President Kennedy: Right.Dillon: [Unclear] wait until after Congress has gone home.President Kennedy: Right. OK . . . fine. Good.

Conversat ion with Douglas Dil lon 113

their annual income, whichever was less. In addition, the tax benefits would not be granted toan employer if he did not offer the same partially deductible retirement contributions to allemployees. The original House version allowed for 100 percent deductibility up to the$2,500/10 percent limits. A Senate floor amendment by Senators Russell Long (D-Louisiana)and Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minnesota) changed this to 50 percent.4. The estimated revenue loss in the original House version was $365 million.5. It passed the House unanimously and garnered only four no votes in the Senate: Paul Douglas(D-Illinois), Albert Gore (D-Tennessee), Pat McNamara (D-Michigan), and Wayne Morse (D-Oregon). The final version of the bill that emerged out of the Senate-House conference commit-tee also passed unanimously in the House and received only eight no votes in the Senate.6. “He” is unidentified.

Douglas Dillon: You don’t have to worry about that.President Kennedy: OK, good. Now, let’s see . . . this problem of

H.R. 10. They . . . see, [Everett] Dirksen and everything, they’re argu-ing that unless they hang it on this bill, that I’ll veto it.7 Now, what I’vegot to indicate, therefore, is that I’ll veto it if it’s hung on this bill andthat they’ve got a better chance to override my veto if it’s separate thanthey have with this bill. It’s rather . . . it may not be right, but that’s theonly way. Because, otherwise, they’re going to hang it on this bill.

Dillon: Yeah, although . . . you think they . . . you don’t think theyhave the votes?

President Kennedy: Well, I . . . they won’t unless they think I’mgoing to veto it.

Dillon: I see.President Kennedy: So, I’m giving the impression that we’re going to

veto it, and I thought the Treasury people ought to at least have that line—Dillon: Yeah, fine.President Kennedy: —that this would be too much of a revenue loss,

it doesn’t belong in this bill, and we just have to veto it.Dillon: Yeah, the same sort of thing we said about the Cannon

amendment.President Kennedy: Yeah, right.Dillon: That [unclear].President Kennedy: OK, good.Dillon: OK.President Kennedy: All right. Thank you.

At 12:30 P.M. the former President arrived at the White House through aside door. Minutes after Eisenhower’s arrival, the Reverend Billy Grahampaid a call on both Presidents in the Oval Office. Graham was just return-ing from a visit to Latin America and had some news to bring thePresident about the strength of Fidel Castro’s supporters in SouthAmerica. President Kennedy tapes the meeting through the receiver ofhis telephone. He rarely used this method of taping.8

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962114

7. Everett M. Dirksen was a Republican senator from Illinois, 1951 to 1969, and Senate MinorityLeader, 1959 to 1969.8. It is possible that the conversation on Dictabelt 3A.7, which has not been found, was theobject of President Kennedy’s effort to tape. Ending that conversation, the President mighthave forgotten to switch off the dictabelt machine and thus this room conversation was pickedup by either an open receiver or the telephone speaker.

12:35–12:40 P.M.

And the anti-Communist forces are getting hysterical becausethey feel that we’re not defending them like we ought to, rightor wrong.

Meeting with Billy Graham and Dwight Eisenhower9

The Reverend William Franklin Graham, Jr.—more popularly known asBilly Graham—paid a brief courtesy call on the President before depart-ing for the second half of his 1962 Latin America tour. Relations betweenPresident Kennedy and Graham, the most popular Protestant evangelistof the era, had never been close, in part because of the minister’s friendlyrelations with both Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Eisenhower’sarrival for his luncheon with President Kennedy allowed the brief exchangeof greetings. Graham took the opportunity to reiterate the importance ofLatin America’s problems. Although Latin America was an overwhelm-ingly Catholic region, Graham was deeply concerned that Communistinroads posed a general threat to religious freedom in the area. This shortconversation begins with Graham discussing his experiences during thefirst portion of his Latin American tour in early 1962, when his proselytiz-ing campaign encountered resistance by local authorities and violentdemonstrations. It was recorded on the Dictaphone connected to thePresident’s telephone and, therefore, is of poor quality.10

Billy Graham: There are these guerrillas up in the mountains inColombia. I was there. They killed 32 in the town I was in the night I

Meeting with Bi l l y Graham and Dwight Eisenhower 115

9. Including President Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, Billy Graham, and Evelyn Lincoln.Dictabelt 3A.8, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.10. In January and February 1962, Graham toured Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, andChile. Then beginning in São Paulo, Brazil, on 25 September 1962, he toured Brazil, Paraguay,Argentina, and Uruguay. “Billy in Catholic Country: He Collides with Clergy,” Time, 23February 1962, pp. 77–78; Current Biography Yearbook, 1973 (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1974),pp. 151–54; Marshall Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness (Boston: Little,Brown, 1979), pp. 441–46; Billy Graham, Just As I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham (SanFrancisco: Harper San Francisco, 1997), pp. 188–92, 199–206, 356–57, 360–68, 389–402;Carroll Kilpatrick, “President Confers With Ike 2 Hours,” Washington Post, 11 September1962, pp. A1, A6; New York Times, 24 January 1962, p. 3; Wallace Terry, “Billy GrahamCondemns Sterilization,” Washington Post, 11 September 1962, p. A6.

was there.11 And they swooped down. They’ve killed over 300,000 in thelast 14 years.12 And they claim now that Castro is in control of theseguerrillas.

Unidentified: In what? In Colombia?Graham: In Colombia.And he says the way to the United States is through the Colombian

Andes. And hoped [unclear] get organized and give weapons to [unclear].And so, the infiltration is tremendous. And the anti-Communist forces aregetting hysterical because they feel that we’re not defending them like weought to, right or wrong. And I know it’s a very delicate problem.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: But it isn’t easy. [Unclear.] But these ones, the20[,000], the 25,000 . . . but a . . . but, the main thing . . . that they charge. . . American policy is that [we support] an oppressive regime . . . thesupporters, that is . . . [we’re] keeping them down, and . . . And, there-fore, America is wrong. “America ought to give us the weapons and not toour bosses.” And [unclear] . . .

Graham: And how to get it to them—Eisenhower: And [unclear]. . . . [Unclear] we were discussing, how-

ever, on the telephone today [unclear] pushing, pushing for them and I’dlike to take them on the ears: What do you mean by it?

President Kennedy: As matter of fact from Bogotá [unclear]. The, a,there’s no a . . . the a . . . Colombia actually has, you know, [Alberto]Lleras Camargo, he’s a first-class [unclear] government—13

Eisenhower: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. They [unclear]. The tape skips.Unidentified: —The [unclear] president [unclear] the same thing.

The person was asked if he had been asked to help finance the [unclear]to help them to get out of the [unclear].

Graham: Right. [Unclear exchange.] If you can do the same thingsomehow in Brazil.

Unidentified: We’ve diversified the problems down in there [unclear].

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962116

11. Graham refers to his visit to Cali, Colombia, during his Latin American tour earlier in1962. In his autobiography published in 1997, Graham records the incident slightly differ-ently, reporting that the guerillas killed “fourteen people not far from where we were staying”in Cali (Graham, Just As I Am, pp. 364–65).12. From 1948 to 1962, Colombia endured La Violencia, a period of intense violence betweenLiberal and Conservative political factions that left over 200,000 Colombians dead.13. Alberto Lleras Camargo, who had just stepped down after his second term as president ofColombia (1945–46, 7 August 1958 to 7 August 1962), was a strong supporter of Kennedy’sAlliance for Progress.

Graham: Well, I was sure delighted to see you. Please give myregards to the Mister Vice President.

Graham starts to leave, causing a number of people to speak at the sametime. Someone says “Nice to see you.”Graham: Thank you very much. Nice to see you. [Multiple voices

continue.]Unidentified: . . . in Georgia.Graham: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Oh, I see.Graham: He’s playing golf—Unidentified: Oh. Oh.Graham: —in North Carolina right now. Good-bye. Thank you.Unidentified: All right, Mister Graham. All right.Graham: Fine. Thank you.Evelyn Lincoln: Have a good evening.Graham: Thank you. I’m so glad to see you.Again the sounds of a number of people saying good-bye to Graham.Someone says “Thank you very much,” and another says to Graham“Well, we’ll wish you [unclear] Vice President.”Graham: Yes. [Unclear.] [Laughter.] Bye. Thank you. Bye.Unidentified: May I, Mrs. Lincoln?Evelyn Lincoln: Sure, sure.Unidentified: The Attorney General won’t be here until about one. And

he’ll stand by and then he’ll [unclear] unless of course the [AttorneyGeneral] judge. He’ll go over the canal about 20 minutes to seven. Thenwe’re bringing him back for a short tour [unclear] Billy Graham laterthat [unclear].

President Kennedy: All right.Unidentified: . . . and for his pictures [unclear].President Kennedy: Are you gentlemen all set? [Two voices agree

simultaneously.]Unidentified: Thank you, General Schulz from the rest of us.14 [Pause.]Unidentified: We’ll need a ride. [Unclear.]Unidentified: No. Leave that right there. [Unclear.]After Billy Graham left the White House, Kennedy and Eisenhower

met in the Oval Office to discuss Eisenhower’s trip to West Germany.

Meeting with Bi l l y Graham and Dwight Eisenhower 117

14. Brigadier General Robert L. Schulz, retired, longtime aide to General Eisenhower.

12:40 –1:02 P.M.

You can’t go up the autobahn waving an atom bomb. . . .[T]he first time . . . a bridge is blown out in front of you, youcan’t begin a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union overgetting to Berlin.

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower15

In late July, President Kennedy’s predecessor, Dwight David Eisenhower,made a six-week trip to Western Europe. On his return, PresidentKennedy wrote him and requested a meeting. The two Presidents werenot only from different generations but also from different political par-ties. President Kennedy felt that Eisenhower found him young and inex-perienced even though Kennedy himself thought the older man woefullyuninformed. In explaining why his brother often conferred withEisenhower, Attorney General Robert Kennedy recalled that “feelingEisenhower was important and his election was so close—he always wentout of his way to make sure that Eisenhower was brought in on all mat-ters and that Eisenhower couldn’t hurt the administration by going offand attacking.”16

On September 10, the two Presidents met at the White House.Eisenhower brought Kennedy a copy of a memorandum about his conver-sation with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer on August 2.17 Inthe discussions before lunch, the two U.S. Presidents dealt with the topicsfrom that memorandum, which covered primarily NATO issues. Kennedywas interested to discover whether Eisenhower might cause him politicaltrouble by criticizing his European defense policies. He need not havebeen worried. There was a large degree of continuity between the twoadministrations’ West European policies.

The heavy financial load that the United States carried for the mili-

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962118

15. Tape 21, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential RecordingsCollection.16. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: TheUnpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 55.17. “Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer,” 2 August 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower PresidentialLibrary.

tary defense of Western Europe, which had so vexed Kennedy duringAugust, remained on his mind. Kennedy was interested in hearingEisenhower’s thoughts on pressing for greater allied contribution to aconventional ground force buildup in Europe.

For President Kennedy, the ongoing Berlin crisis necessitated aNATO strategy based on graduated military responses in order to limit awar before it escalated to nuclear conflagration. President Eisenhowerhad also grappled with the crisis over Berlin.

West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer questioned PresidentKennedy’s commitment to Berlin and resisted the U.S. insistence on aconventional force buildup in Central Europe. Adenauer feared that aNATO strategy that stressed conventional defense below the nuclearthreshold might make war more likely and thus expose West Germanyas the probable chief theater of war.

President Kennedy and Eisenhower believed that French presidentCharles de Gaulle was capitalizing on Adenauer’s anxiety and disen-chantment with the United States. The two American Presidents fearedthat de Gaulle’s vision of Europe was anti–Anglo-Saxon in outlook andthreatened the integrity of NATO. They speculated about the variousimplications of the Franco-German rapprochement, ceremoniously sig-naled on September 14, 1958, at Colombey-des-Deux-Églises, where thetwo European statesmen met. Periodic meetings between the WestGerman chancellor and the French president had continued. Mostrecently, in July 1962, Adenauer had spent three days in France. Then inSeptember, de Gaulle had visited Bonn.

Another problem that had carried over from the President’s Augustmeetings on Berlin and Europe was a change in the U.S. military com-mand. Adenauer worried that it signaled a shift in U.S. nuclear strategytoward greater reliance on conventional weapons. In late July, the SupremeAllied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris Norstad, hadannounced his resignation, effective November 1, 1962.18 His intendedreplacement was the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GeneralLyman Lemnitzer. Kennedy had nominated General Maxwell D. Taylor asGeneral Lemnitzer’s successor. Norstad had enjoyed a special relationshipwith the Europeans because he had conceived SACEUR’s role as increas-ingly independent of Washington and had envisioned NATO as a fourth

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 119

18. Norstad’s resignation was eventually postponed to 1 January 1963 because of the Cubanmissile crisis.

nuclear power. His departure, amidst a controversy over the deploymentof a land-based medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force underSACEUR’s direct command, fueled West German and French resentmentof U.S. hegemony.

The tape recording begins as Eisenhower commiserates with Kennedyabout the European allies.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: For now, as I mentioned in my note, I thinkthat events have sort of overtaken—

President Kennedy: Well, I wrote him a letter, and he wrote back avery nice letter. I talked to Globke here the other day, and evidently he[Adenauer] goes into these fits of depression.19 Whether it’s their sortof overdependence upon us, which makes them particularly sensitive towhat we do, but . . . I find that—I’m sure you did—somewhat harassingbecause here we do these things . . . we keep our forces there. TheFrench have only a division and a half in West Germany instead offour.20 The Germans just cut their defense budget from 17 billion downto 15.8, which means they aren’t going to reach the figures that theyoriginally said they would.21

Eisenhower: I know. They told me they wouldn’t.President Kennedy: Yeah, well, they just cut it within a two- or

three-week period. I think, since your visit there. The finance minister[Ludwig Erhard] made [West German minister of defense Franz Josef]Strauss cut it so that this has dropped—so now we’re going to appeal tothem. Well, with all that, and the fact that the British, the Army of theRhine is not to NATO standards—

Eisenhower: Yes, yes.President Kennedy: I feel that sometimes that they place more bur-

dens on us than they’re entitled to do.Eisenhower: That’s correct and, I’m going to tell you, Mr. President,

when I went through in 1951—January—I went around to all these,every one of these places. I said, “Now as far as I understand the policy ofmy government”—that was Truman’s plan. I said, “This is an emergencyeffort to get you people a chance to get on your feet. You’ve got 225 mil-

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19. Dr. Hans Globke was state secretary in the office of Chancellor Adenauer.20. As set forth by NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4 in the summer of 1961.21. The West German Ministry of Defense had requested 18.2 billion deutsche marks. TheWest German Bundestag approved a defense budget of 14.97 billion deutsche marks.

lion people. We know you’ve got a collective labor force about twice thesize, in skilled labor, twice the size of ours. There’s no reason why youpeople can’t keep the ground forces. Now in the meantime, the UnitedStates has got to keep the deterrent—all the big bombs and all the rest ofit. We’ve got to keep the big thing and an enormous air force. Yourexpenditures in those things don’t need to be very heavy, but you’ve gotto begin to produce these conventional and land forces.”

“Well,” which they said, “Well, you want us just to be the ol’ landman and you come in and be the . . . you know, the glamour boys.”

I said, “To the hell with that, we’re trying to find the . . . how can weput together our assets to have the best defense.” Now I tried to sell—Isold this idea. I mean, they said they accepted it.

But as time has gone on, and for eight years, I desperately triedbehind the scenes to get these people to admit we ought to begin to getout; they wouldn’t do it. And I’m afraid that just through custom theyhave thought of the—begin to think of the thing as their right, that thisis just their . . . And if you say, “Well, you now ought to do a little more,that you ought to pay for this or that [or anything].” Oh, they get veryemotional.

But Mr. Adenauer started off to tell me about relations betweenFrance and Germany. These he said were improving markedly and rap-idly, and that both he and General de Gaulle were committed to a com-plete rapprochement, and that his own trip through—about six or sevendays through France—had been almost a triumphal tour. He was verypleased.22 And he said he thought that this was going on to . . . so thatvery soon, they would be allowing all people to go back and forth overtheir borders without even, without cards, like we demand up in . . .cards you carry between Mexico and so on. He says it’s all just free cir-culation.

I said, “Well, if you start the intermarrying, then you’ll have union,and be all right.”

He is very keen on this and, really, I think, is now looking uponFrench-German friendship, and a sort of an entente, as a new type of,almost an axis of influence in that area. This was what he said was theencouraging part about the European thing and he thought this also ofthe Common Market.23

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 121

22. Adenauer made a state visit to France in early July 1962.23. Signed in 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC),also referred to as the Common Market, and the European Atomic Energy Commission

And I—we—had a long talk about the Common Market, whichseemed to have no—nothing—no application to defense.

Then he came . . . the next thing that bothered him though very verymuch was the relief of Norstad.24 And he told the long story of the—about this being a surprise and everything else. And he was veryunhappy—first, that he was leaving. He said, “Norstad has gotten to bean influence that we think is almost necessary—backup.” I told him thenof my friendship with Lemnitzer, and I said, “I don’t see how you can geta better man. Now, he hasn’t had quite as much experience in this kind ofthing [as] Norstad.”25

But he was. . . . I sent Lemnitzer over to [British field marshal SirHarold] Alexander as his operation officer in a big army group, and, Isaid, “He does know something about allied work together.”26

Now, he said, then, but he [Adenauer] said, “By and large, we seethis as two things. You’re putting in . . . you’re sending Lemnitzer outand Norstad out because they apparently have not understood the poli-cies, or not have followed the policies that America is now adopting. Andyou’re putting in General [Maxwell] Taylor.”27 Then he reached overand got a book, and this book was [laughs] General Taylor’s book.28

And he said, “Now I must tell you, General,” he said, “I tell you asyour friend, if this book—if the philosophy of this book—is going to beadopted in Europe,” he said, “I am afraid there will be disastrous conse-quences in Western Europe.”

And I said, “Well, you better go ahead, Mr. Chancellor.”“Well,” he said, “well, the philosophy of this book is that we should

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962122

(EURATOM). The original six signatories were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.24. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 20 November1956 to 1 January 1963.25. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Norstad’s successor as SACEUR, 1 January 1963 to 1 July1969.26. Then Brigadier General Lemnitzer was Alexander’s U.S. deputy, his deputy chief of staff,for the 15th Army Group during World War I.27. Reference to General Maxwell Taylor, Lemnitzer’s successor as Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. Taylor served as U.S. Army chief of staff under President Eisenhower from1955 to 1959 and emerged as a leading critic of the Eisenhower administration’s policies.28. Reference to Taylor’s The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), a landmark study ofU.S. military security needs, which indicted Eisenhower’s national security policy, generatedconsiderable controversy around the 1960 election, and popularized the term flexible response todescribe the need for limited military options short of nuclear war. See “Meeting about Berlin,”6 August 1962, for a discussion of West German anxiety.

not depend on atomic bombs.” And he said, “we’re going to—we should-n’t fight and strive to fight our wars by conventional weapons.” He said,“If we do this, and if we adopt this kind of philosophy, this means thatAmerica is again ready to see Europe overrun. Then we will start—starting way back to where we were in 1942—to go back and plan [toretake a Soviet-occupied Europe] and after all of this destruction andoccupation.” And he said, “This time it won’t be as easy as it was underHitler.” And this should, by and large, he said, he saw this as a verystrong evidence of an enormous and revolutionary change in Americanpolicy, defense policy in Western Europe.

And I said, “Well, now, I’m not going, I can’t quarrel about that. Imean I can’t argue the case because I am not privy to exactly to theinner circles of portions of what you’re saying. But I do know this.They’ve [the Kennedy administration] said they’re spending a goodmany billions to keep our deterrent in a very top shape, and the missilework as far as I can see is not only going ahead but, from all that my G-2friends tell me from time to time, our strength is growing up even morerapidly than what we thought, first calculated, and to greater value.29

Therefore, I can’t see that any of our, any government—any Americangovernment—is discounting the effect of the deterrent or its need to useit in the face of overwhelming strength.

Now, shortly after that, that was the gist of his talk, although hebrought in all sorts of details and, you might say, auxiliary sort of rea-sons to support this. But then I got a word. It came out from one of hisfriends, one of his people, that reached me, oh, a week later. Said thatGeneral Taylor had given some testimony that greatly reassuredhim.30 Now, I didn’t read this testimony; I didn’t want to . . . But appar-ently . . . The German said, that spoke to me said, that apparentlyGeneral Taylor no longer believes exactly what he said in his bookbecause he had changed his mind. So, the big, real thing, was when Isaw this in the paper and then this German came to see me and told methis. I said, “Well, I think maybe there’s no need for telling you because

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 123

29. The abbreviation G-2 is used in the Army to refer to staff intelligence personnel.30. On 9 August, while Eisenhower was touring Europe, the U.S. Senate by unanimous voteconfirmed Taylor’s nomination as Chairman of the JCS. The action followed a hearing by theSenate Armed Services Committee. At one point, Taylor assured the committee that “I am notreturning, if you gentlemen confirm me, as a crusader for change but rather one to make thepresent system as effective as possible” (see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 August1962, p. 1421).

it’s probably something you’d write about a friend with and knew aboutthe change.”

President Kennedy: Well, I think that . . . Of course, I think they mis-stated Taylor’s position. As you know, Taylor’s been very strong on tac-tical atomic weapons.

Eisenhower: Yes. Oh, yes . . . Oh, yes . . .President Kennedy: And I, so I . . . there’s in fact . . . Norstad . . . I

think it’s a great loss—Norstad. For example, last spring . . . As youknow, [General Lucius] Clay and Norstad had a rather difficult time.31

Eisenhower: Oh did they? No, I didn’t know that.President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, there was a good deal of tension

there.Eisenhower: Hmm.President Kennedy: For example, last spring, General Clay wanted to

have the civilian—at the time buzzing was taking place take place in thecorridor—he wanted a fighter escort at that time.32 General Norstad dis-agreed. And we went with General Norstad. And I think it was the rightthing, as [a] matter of fact. They, as you know, they called the buzzing off.But there was a good deal of . . . I don’t know whether it’s wanting to goback to other times—but there was a good deal of friction.

Eisenhower: I didn’t know that.President Kennedy: But I think that Norstad is first class, but when

he came back last winter, he said . . . I guess he’s had what—two heartattacks—or one?

Eisenhower: Yes, that’s right.President Kennedy: So he said he wanted to resign at the end of this

year. So, then when General Lemnitzer’s time ended [as JCS Chairman],I was either faced with having him reappointed again or putting himback, so this seemed to be the best arrangement.

But it was unfortunate that General [James] Gavin left in September,who had been identified with support for the French nuclear effort.33 AndGeneral Norstad left. General Lemnitzer went in. And these things areregarded, I think, as quite significant. And the chancellor is 86. But as Isay, I find—I think that the criticisms, which are traditionally leveled at

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31. General Lucius D. Clay was the President’s special representative in Berlin until May1962, thereafter special consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clay was chosen for his sym-bolic role as the hero of the 1948 Berlin airlift while he was the U.S. military governor foroccupied Germany.32. Reference to Soviet harassment of Western aircraft.33. General James Gavin was the U.S. ambassador to France until mid-September 1962.

the United States, when you think that the amount of ground divisionswe have there, the amount of effort we’re putting in various places.

Again the French—a division and a half in West Germany. I talkedto Ambassador [Hervé] Alphand this morning, and I said, “I don’tunderstand.”34 I said, “This French-German rapprochement is wonder-ful, but here the Germans, who have been quite critical of us this sum-mer, as I say, have cut their defense budget in the last month even thoughthey’ve got a very strong economy. And the French have a division and ahalf even though your minimum goal is four under NATO, and you reallyshould have six.”35

He said, “Well, we’ve got them for the defense of France.”But I said, “Well, look, you can’t have two divisions here [in Western

Europe] and two others . . .” The British are—Eisenhower: That’s right.President Kennedy: [Unclear] on us. So I think that the press, partic-

ularly some feed this, these European criticisms of our efforts—I thinkthat considering the load we carry compared to the load they carry . . .

Eisenhower: That’s right.President Kennedy: It’s incredible.Eisenhower: I would agree, and, a matter of fact, I would . . . I tried

my best, although every time I did the diplomats always said, “Now youdo it, you’re going to lose Europe now; that’s all there is to it becausetheir temper and this and that and the other thing and the psychologicalreaction.”

But I tried every possible way. I said, “Well, now let’s make thesesmaller divisions. Let’s begin to show them that we are concerned aboutthis big spending.” After all, we built almost unaided that great infra-structure that starts right at the ports and goes all the way through theplace. We’ve got airfields. We’ve got everything and, of course, deGaulle did not . . . De Gaulle didn’t talk to me substantively at all. Hejust proved very nice, very hospitable, and all that, very kind, but wedidn’t talk about it. And he wouldn’t, you know. He’s a very very[unclear] man.

But, on the other hand, the German gave me the understanding thatnot only were they going to go right up to their target. But I said, “Ofcourse, your target is too small. You are a people of still only 60 million.

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 125

34. Hervé Alphand was French ambassador to the United States. President Kennedy and hemet between 11:05 and 11:34 A.M.35. Four divisions were specified under NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4.

You’re right there on the firing line. Our country, which is, I say, threetimes the size, is doing much more than three times what you’re doing,and you people ought to be waking up to this.” But I’m astonished thatthey cut their—

President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, Bob McNamara is coming over togive you the figures on it.36

Eisenhower: Well, I think when I write to Adenauer I’m going to tellhim that I’m astonished.

President Kennedy: That would be very helpful. I think we’ll getSecretary McNamara to give you the figures. I think that . . . Your talkwas very helpful, too. Of course, he has great regard for you and JohnFoster Dulles—37

Eisenhower: We’ve always been very friendly.President Kennedy: Yeah. So I think the fact that you . . . That helped

reassure him very much, especially when you spoke about Lemnitzer andTaylor.

Eisenhower: Oh yes. Oh, oh, Lemnitzer . . . to hell with it.President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s right.Eisenhower: And I said, “I just can’t believe that you’ll have anything

but satisfaction.” Now, he did bring out that . . . before he gave me all thecircumstantial evidence that showed that what’s his name, Norstad,knew nothing about his immediate relief. Because he . . . Norstad, onlyby happenstance had been there about five days earlier. And was talkingwith him, the plans that they were going to do together, and so I saidwell maybe he was under a . . .

President Kennedy: Well. . . . No . . . That’s right. We gave him . . . Itwas only five days before his relief because he came back here about amonth in July. He came back in July, and we talked about this. He had ear-lier said that he would like to resign between August and September andthe next January—he gave a four- or five- month period. Well, we pickedOctober—the first of November because of the Lemnitzer, Joint Chiefs . . .

So when he came back here in July, we talked about whether we oughtto go to January, and he said no. And he also said he’d like to come outright away because otherwise it would be rumored and his influence would

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36. McNamara joined Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk for lunch andthen met in the Cabinet Room with General Marshall Carter, deputy director of the CIA, andthe two presidents.37. Dulles was secretary of state under Dwight Eisenhower until his death from cancer in1959.

be nonexistent. So that we moved it, at Norstad’s own suggestion, with agood deal of speed. Now they may have felt that that indicated that wewere . . . Quite the reverse, I’d give anything to have Norstad therebecause I think we’re going to have a terribly difficult time with Berlin andI think Norstad has so much experience and they have so much confidencein him. It’s a very tough job for Lemnitzer to go in after him.

Eisenhower: That’s right. And not only that, but, at this stage, I’llsay this: Norstad is a very tough fellow, when he [makes a] commit-ment. He’s a very great supporter of his own convictions, and normally, Imust say, I think [unclear]. Well, now, I can disabuse you of Laurie[Norstad] . . . Of his mind on that particular thing because he thinksthat we were—that is our country—was trying to put them in sort of asecondary position—take it and like it. See we started . . . It happenedwhen Mr. Truman called me and asked me to go over there. He . . . Thegreat argument, he was . . . “unanimously these 12 countries,” Mr.President, “12 countries have asked for you.”

And I said, “Well as long as they’ve asked for me in person, Mr.President, I mean duty is you will have to send me over.” But God, howI’d hate to leave home. [Laughs.] I did.

So then we . . . when I was leaving. I was going out . . . and I finallyagreed to come over here and stand for this Republican nomination. AndI said to him I would be . . . “It must be done unanimously; it must bedone correctly.”

So I gave plenty of warning, and they worked and they so . . . and, Iwanted, what’s his name—

President Kennedy: [General Alfred] Gruenther.38

Eisenhower: Gruenther.They decided to take Ridgway because Ridgway was coming out of

Korea, and I think they wanted to send him over.39 I don’t think thatRidgway was the temperament for that kind of a job. But anyway, hedidn’t . . . He came back and became the chief of staff about a year later.But both saw . . . all we did was done unanimously [unclear] by request-ing the President to do this. He knew all this past history, and that both-ered him because he said it looked like their opinions weren’t very

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 127

38. General Alfred Gruenther was a close personal friend of Eisenhower and served as hischief of staff while Eisenhower was SACEUR, 1951 to 1952. Gruenther was then SACEURhimself, 11 July 1953 to 20 November 1956.39. General Matthew Ridgway was commander of the U.N. Command in the Far East, 11April 1951 to 30 May 1952. He was SACEUR, 30 May 1952 to 11 July 1953, and served asU.S. Army chief of staff, 1953 to 1955.

important. But I told him that just had to be something that was mechan-ical . . . No one would do that deliberately. He seemed to take that—

President Kennedy: Well, Norstad wanted us to move because hethought there would be rumors about . . . As I say, Norstad asked—toldme—that he couldn’t, that this was what his desire was when he wasover in the winter.

Then when he came in July, and he talked to me about what our tim-ing was, he said he’d like it to come as quickly as possible. So what we didwas announce Norstad and then say that if we were asked to submitsomebody, we would submit the name of General Lemnitzer and put itup to the North Atlantic Treaty Council.

Well, of course, the French are attempting always to justify the needfor their own atomic [force], independent of us.40 So, I think, they raisedsome difficulty about it but . . . I don’t know what—where these—whenyou think, as I say, what the United States has done for 17 years inGermany, I think that—

Eisenhower: There’s one point that I do think we’ve got to remem-ber. These people have . . . They were in an awful shape; then theMarshall Plan of course got them back, and they recognize that. I’ll tellyou the nation that speaks more publicly and openly about the help ofAmerica, American help, is Germany. You never hear of this brought upin France or Britain—sometimes in Britain. But up in Germany, it’salmost a religion. Everybody that comes to you says, “Well, now, ofcourse, we realize what we owe to America.”

But the effort to get these people to doing their own part—I justdon’t know beyond this very argument. If it were the six divisionsthere—with the little bit that, the 12 that Germany will have, the onethat France, so on. You’re bound to be back to the Rhine before you cancollect yourself.

President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah . . . yeah . . .Eisenhower: You see. Unless you go into this atomic business. And if

that’s going to be true, you’ve got to have greater strength that can bedeployed rapidly. Well, if they’re going to cut down . . . There’s just . . .

President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.Eisenhower: There’s something wrong here. I don’t know just what

it is. I hadn’t heard this. I was hopeful . . . I knew that when de Gaullebrought back his Algerian army, he was going to put most of his

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40. Since assuming power in 1958, de Gaulle had declared unequivocally and repeatedly thatFrance would achieve independent national nuclear capability.

Algerian army in France. But I never dreamed that he wouldn’t go andfulfill his commitments—41

President Kennedy: Well, I agree. That’s what I said. I said to[French ambassador Hervé] Alphand, “This great Franco-German . . .We are always subject to very sharp criticism by the Germans for notdoing one thing or another.” I said, “But we are doing everything wecommitted to under NATO and in addition carrying SAC, and in addi-tion the navy, and in addition Southeast Asia.” I said, “Now, France isn’teven fulfilling its NATO commitment.”

But, of course, the reason is that they know that they don’t dependon the French and they depend on us. So, therefore, they’re always con-cerned about our intentions because they realize that without the UnitedStates, they would be exposed. The fact is that he would be perfectlyright about in talking about our immediate use of nuclear weapons, itseems to me, if we didn’t have the Berlin problem, because then obvi-ously any Soviet intrusion across the line would be a deliberate one andwould be a signal for war.

When we have this problem of maintaining our position in Berlin,where you may be using sort of gradually escalating force to maintainyourself in Berlin, you can’t suddenly begin to drop nuclear weapons thefirst time you have a difficulty. That would really be the only—and it’s avery valid reason for our emphasizing the necessity of their building upconventional forces. When I saw Clay, he said, “You can’t go up the auto-bahn waving an atom bomb. And say, the first time you put a . . . a bridgeis blown out in front of you, you can’t begin a nuclear exchange with theSoviet Union over getting to Berlin.”

Eisenhower: Well of course, on that one, Mr. President, I’ve personally,I’ve always long thought this from the beginning. If they believe there isno amount of strength you can put in Berlin, they can say that. I wouldthink that you could . . . What’s his name—Khrushchev—said to me atCamp David.42 He was talking about [The United States’s] needing some

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41. In 1958, de Gaulle returned to power to end the French-Algerian war. Peace talks beganin March 1961, but bloodshed continued until Algeria gained independence on 1 July 1962. InSeptember 1961, de Gaulle had begun withdrawing French forces from Algeria. Under NATOpolicy directives MC 70 and 26/4, France was committed to contribute four divisions but hadproduced only two and one-third divisions to that point.42. Rural retreat of U.S. presidents in northern Maryland, 70 miles northwest of Washington,D.C. Established in 1942 as “Shangri-La” by Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower renamed it forhis grandson in 1953. When Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959, he andEisenhower had several discussions at Camp David.

more troops [in West Germany]—there was somewhat at that time in thepublic about more, a couple more divisions, and so . . . He [Krushchev]says, “What are they talking about?” He says, “For every division they canput in Germany, I can put ten, without any trouble whatsoever.”

And I said, “We know that.” And I said, “But we’re not worryingabout that.” And I said, “I’ll tell you. I don’t propose to fight a conven-tional war. If you declare . . . if you bring out war, bring on war of globalcharacter . . . There are going to be no conventional, nothing conven-tional about it.” And I told him flatly.

And he said, “Well.” He said, “That’s a relief. Neither one of us canafford it.” “Yes,” I said that, and I said, “OK, so I agree to that, too.”[Laughing.]

President Kennedy: Right. Right.Eisenhower: But, you see, what these people are afraid of . . . I mean

the essence of his argument was, if you try to fight this thing convention-ally from the beginning, when do you start to go nuclear? And this willnever be until you yourselves in other words become in danger and hesaid, “That means all of Europe is again gone.” And that—

President Kennedy: But, of course, we’ve got all these nuclear weapons,as you know, stored in West Berlin. All we are . . . What they are really con-cerned about is that the Russians will seize Hamburg, which is only a fewmiles from the border, and some other towns, and then they’ll say, “We’llnegotiate.” So then Norstad has come up with this whole strategy. I thinkthe only difficulty is that no one will . . . That if we did not have the prob-lem, I say, of Berlin and maintaining access through that autobahn author-ity, then you would say that any attempt to seize any part of WestGermany, we would go to nuclear weapons. But, of course, they never will!

But it’s this difficulty of maintaining a position 120 miles behindtheir lines—

Eisenhower: Mr. President, I’ll tell you . . . Here’s something, I can’tdocument everything . . . but Clay was there. Poor, poor old Smith isgone.43 We begged our governments not to go into Berlin.

We . . . I asked that they build a cantonment capital, a cantonment cap-ital at the junction of the British, American, and Russian zones. I said, “Wejust don’t, we can’t do this. . . . ” Well, it had been a political thing that hadbeen done first in the Advisory Council, European Advisory Council, inLondon. And later confirmed and . . . But Mr. Roosevelt said to me this

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43. Eisenhower was probably referring to Joseph Smith, who as an Army brigadier general,had been headquarters commander for the Berlin airlift of 1948–49.

twice—I’m talking about my concern. And he said, “Ike”—and he wasalways very, you know, informal—he said, “Ike,” he said, “quit worryingabout Uncle Joe. I’ll take care of Uncle Joe.”

That’s exactly what he told [me]. Once in Tunis and once when Icame over here about the first or second or third of January of ’44.That’s the last time I ever saw him. Now he just wouldn’t believe thatthese guys were these tough and really ruthless so-and-sos they were.44

There’s one other thing that Adenauer brought in that you mighthave interest—more than I would—under the security standpoint. Hewas talking about the French problem and about bringing the Britishinto the Common Market.45 And he got into, you might say, into thesame nest. Now he said, “You know, just a few years, when you werehere, General, France wanted Britain in this whole—you might call it‘association’—in order to balance off Germany.46 Now what they’refrightened of, is that Britain comes in and Britain will have greater influ-ence in the association than will France.”

Now he said, “This is a . . .” He cited plenty of evidence there. But hesaid, “One of the reasons they’re making it so difficult for you to comeinto the Common Market . . .” And he said, more or less, as a suspicion ofhis, that they were going to be able to prevent [British entry into the

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 131

44. Eisenhower did travel with Franklin Roosevelt in Tunis on 21 November 1943. He alsomet privately with Roosevelt at the White House on 5 and 12 January 1944. There are norecords of those conversations.

In March and April 1945 Eisenhower had refused to divert his forces to a race to captureBerlin before the Russians, partly because he knew the postwar occupation zones had alreadybeen decided. Later criticized for this judgment, he tended to be defensive about it [seeStephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 1 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 391–404]. Innow recalling how those zones, and Berlin’s place in them, were originally determined,Eisenhower mixes memories of general conversations with Franklin Roosevelt about futurerelations with Russia in November 1943 and January 1944, when there was probably little orno specific discussion of Berlin, with the memory of his own subsequent early-1944 proposalfor a “cantonment capital.” Eisenhower made that proposal at a time when Roosevelt stilltoyed with the idea of connecting Berlin to the edge of a sketchily imagined U.S. occupationzone. Under pressure from the British, the Soviets, and his diplomats, Roosevelt gave waylater in 1944 to the scheme which neither he nor Eisenhower had originally supported butwhich was finally adopted [see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 360-65; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: TheWhite House Years, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), p. 335 and note 5].45. On 31 July 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced Great Britain’s bid foraccession for the EEC. De Gaulle rarely disguised his reluctance to accept Britain’s entrance.46. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC in 1957, deGaulle supported Britain’s entrance. The United Kingdom, however, decided against joiningthe Common Market and formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with Austria,Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Common Market] because they would make it impossible really forBritain to come in, except at the price of complete desertion of theCommonwealth.

“And you know,” he said, very . . . very wisely, he said, “You knowtoday, if I were prime minister of Britain, I would not know what is theanswer here.” He says, “For immediate, economic advantage, they shouldcome into the Common Market. But when you think of all the traditionand all of the connections they would have to sever and the bad will thatwould be engendered throughout the [unclear],” he said, “Oh, this is atough problem for them.”

President Kennedy: He doesn’t really want them in? He thinksbecause it will weaken the [unclear] the British and just us.

Eisenhower: No, I think . . . I think he would like them in. But hedoesn’t think France wants them in. Because the French . . . He saidFrance is finally getting into a position they’ve been wanting . . . to getsome kind of a lever on all of Western Europe—where they’re reallybigger . . . big shots.

President Kennedy: And once the British come in they’ll have a—Eisenhower: That’s right. They become sort of a [unclear].An unidentified speaker interrupts the conversation to tell Kennedy thathis lunch companions have arrived.Unidentified: Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara are over at

the House.President Kennedy: OK. We’ll walk over.Unidentified: And General Carter had to come from CIA, as you

know . . . and he . . . Mac Bundy said that he could—President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what we’ll do—we’ll get right after

lunch.[speaking to Eisenhower] I just had General Carter . . .47 I just wanted

him to show you the Cuban SAM sites. . . .48

Eisenhower: I’d like to see them.President Kennedy: [speaking to an aide] So right after lunch if he

could just . . . We’ll meet him in this office.Unidentified: You’ll meet him here?President Kennedy: Right. In this office. Yeah. [Conversation begins to

fade as they depart.] Why doesn’t he come because I’d like to have

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962132

47. Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter was deputy director of the CIA.48. Surface-to-air missiles.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara . . . We’ll all meet here rightafter lunch.

Unidentified: Fine.President Kennedy: It’ll be about 2:15.49

Unidentified: Fine. [Door shuts.]

Tape recording continues for several minutes until someone enters theroom and turns off the switch. Following lunch in the Mansion, Kennedy,Eisenhower, Rusk, and McNamara joined Marshall Carter in the CabinetRoom. Kennedy did not tape that meeting.

On September 12, 1962, Eisenhower drafted a letter to ChancellorAdenauer about the points discussed between the two U.S. presidents.Eisenhower ended his letter with a passage meant to calm the agingchancellor’s anxiety about the U.S. commitment to the defense of WestGermany: “Please do not bother to reply to this document. As a friend ofyours and your countrymen and as a loyal citizen of my own I have triedonly to act as a messenger of thoughts expressed to me personally (byeach of our two nations’ respective leaders) on subjects to which I haveadverted.”50 On September 14, Kennedy and Rusk approved this letterbefore it was sent to Adenauer.

After Dwight Eisenhower left the White House, at about 3:00 P.M.,Kennedy returned to the family quarters for a hour. He had a series ofmeetings before him that afternoon, none of which he taped. For an hourhe spoke with the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Harry F.Byrd of Virginia, a staunch opponent of anything that smacked of deficitspending. Next there came a group led by the outgoing secretary oflabor, Arthur Goldberg; the secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth; the secre-tary of commerce, Luther Hodges; the solicitor general, Archibald Cox;and the attorney general, Robert Kennedy. Hodges stayed on after thismeeting and was joined by Senator Robert Kerr, Theodore Sorensen, andthe White House domestic team. At 6:00, Kennedy huddled with ClarkClifford, the Washington lawyer and intelligence community wise man,

Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 133

49. Kennedy is referring to the time of the intelligence briefing set up for PresidentEisenhower in the Cabinet Room after lunch.50. Personal letter, Eisenhower to Adenauer, 12 September 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. EisenhowerPresidential Library.

who in early August had pushed for the establishment of a CIA unit tohelp investigate press leaks.

Finally, from 6:28 to 6:45, the President met with Rusk, McGeorgeBundy, and Robert Kennedy. Although no memorandum of conversationexists for this meeting, its subject was almost certainly sending U-2sover Cuba. A week earlier the Soviets had protested the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin Island, and just the day before a U-2 piloted by theNationalist Chinese under arrangement with the U.S. government hadbeen shot down over Communist China. Nevertheless the CIA wasrequesting two extended flights over portions of the island not coveredby the flights of August 29 or September 5. Fearing another U-2 diplo-matic incident, Secretary Rusk had concerns about flying over a countrythat now had Soviet surface-to-air missile batteries. There was reason tobelieve that the recently discovered SAM sites, which were in the easternand central portions of Cuba, might be operational. Bundy had called fora 5:45 meeting of CIA representatives with Rusk; Lansdale; James Reber,the head of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR); andthe Attorney General in his office to discuss the Secretary’s concerns.Rusk, Bundy, and Robert Kennedy came directly from that meeting tosee the President.

The President agreed with Rusk. The White House apparentlyordered a worldwide stand-down for all U-2 flights until September 16.When U-2 flights resumed over Cuba, they were to be quick missions,termed in-and-out flights, that photographed small parts of the island ofparticular interest to the agency without coming near known SAM sites.Due to unexpectedly bad weather the in-and-out flights would be furtherdelayed until September 26 and 29. As for the central and eastern partsof Cuba, the areas with known SAM sites, there was, as yet, no agree-ment to take the risk to photograph them.51

A gathering of the administration’s Berlin team followed. Kennedy

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962134

51. The story of Bundy’s 10 September meeting was reconstructed after the fact by two CIAofficers during congressional investigations in 1963 into the intelligence background to theCuban missile crisis [see Ernest deM. Berkaw, Jr., to the Executive Director, CIA, 28February 1963, FRUS, 10: 1054–55 (The FRUS version indicates this memorandum was pre-pared in 1963 but carries the date of 10 September 1962, giving the impression this documentwas backdated for the CIA’s records.); Lyman Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director,“White House Meeting on 10 September 1962 on Cuban Overflights,” 1 March 1963, in CIADocuments on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, Mary McAuliffe, ed. (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),document 21]. The results of the later Oval Office meeting can be inferred from Gregory W.Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, eds., The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), pp. 199–211.

decided to tape his advisers explaining this particular national securityheadache.

6:45–7:15 P.M.

[T]he planning that goes into this preferred sequence will beextremely valuable to governments when we have to make thedecisions nearer to the time.

Meeting on Berlin52

Since President Kennedy’s meetings about Berlin in August, the adminis-tration’s contingency planning had progressed. His chief advisers nowencouraged him to approve a proposal on “Preferred Sequence of MilitaryActions in the Berlin Conflict,” which largely drew on the Berlin and mar-itime contingency (BERCON/MARCON) plans discussed in August.53

Now President Kennedy needed to approve the sequence of military actionsbefore the Washington Ambassadorial Group and the NATO Council con-vened later in the month.

Earlier that day, McGeorge Bundy had sent Kennedy a draft of thepaper and a cover memorandum that explained disagreements about theuse of nuclear weapons and the wisdom of specifying in advance asequence of actions.54

The President began recording as his advisers outlined the differingviews among the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Dean Rusk: [voice fades in] . . . as simply a part of a catalog of plans. Ayear ago the North Atlantic Council asked me and [SACEUR GeneralLauris] Norstad to undertake such planning with regard to Berlin, and

Meeting on Berl in 135

52. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Martin Hillenbrand,Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, and Dean Rusk. Tape 22, John F. KennedyLibrary, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.53. Draft not found. For the revised military subgroup proposal for the WashingtonAmbassadorial Group on the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict, seeFRUS, 15: 315–20.54. FRUS, 15: 313–15.

these BERCON/MARCON plans on which you agreed—long ago—area result of that.55 Norstad feels that he needs a general planning type ofapproval from the North Atlantic Council, and [the] Council ought toknow what’s going on. I do think that it is important for the NorthAtlantic Council to . . . members of NATO to . . . know what may in factlie ahead if this Berlin matter gets, you know, more difficult because theymay be living in a kind of a dream world, and some of them may not befacing up to the fact that this could get very tough indeed if the situationdevelops further.

Now, on the interallied discussions there are two points on whichthere may be some disagreement among the four principal powers. Thefirst would be the timing in the application of maritime sanctions. TheBritish are inclined to hold that off longer than we think we ought to.We, the Germans, and the French have pretty well agreed to move onthose fairly early. But the British will want to delay for long-standingattitudes toward maritime matters.

Secondly, there is some, there may be some difference in the stage atwhich some type of nuclear weapon would be involved. I think Mr.[Paul] Nitze could indicate the views of the different national delega-tions on that. Otherwise, I think the general approach is agreed amongthe Four, and it would be a very sobering thing for the North AtlanticCouncil to get into. The actual BERCON/MARCON plans themselveshave been already discussed with the North Atlantic Council, I believe.Isn’t that correct?

Paul Nitze: The views of the standing group . . . the standing grouphas sent its comments to the North Atlantic Council.

Rusk: Oh. Well, the governments though . . . have had means ofbecoming familiar with that, with the nature—

Nitze: That’s right.Rusk: I think it ought to be pointed out to you, Mr. President, that

Norstad is concerned about the North Atlantic Council seeming to . . .putting too much emphasis on what we refer to as the preferredsequence of those reactions. He does not feel that the circumstances ofthe time, or the action of the enemy, would make it clear enough that thisis the way the scenario’s going to unfold. Now, we think it must beunderlined to the North Atlantic Council that we can’t guarantee ourpreferred sequence, but that the planning that goes into this preferred

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962136

55. For the BERCON/MARCON contingency planning discussions, see “Meeting on Berlin,”3 August 1962 and 9 August 1962.

sequence will be extremely valuable to governments when we have tomake the decisions nearer to the time. Of course, all these matters aresubject to later decisions by government in light of the circumstances.

President Kennedy: What is the obligation of the other NATO pow-ers in case any of these . . . What are we asking of them? They’ve got aBerlin commitment too, haven’t they?

Rusk: Well there’s, there’s for example, there would be . . . For exam-ple in Phase I, there would be mobilization, alert and mobilization activi-ties which would . . .

President Kennedy: By all of the NATO powers?Nitze: Phase II.Rusk: I’m sorry, I thought that was certain mobilization mentioned

in Phase I, Paul, is that not right?Nitze: [Unclear.]Rusk: I beg your pardon . . .Nitze: [That] supposes it to have already taken place as a result of

our [unclear].McGeorge Bundy: We’re in Phase I.Nitze: Yes.Rusk: Yes, I’m sorry. It’s Phase II, isn’t it . . . [flips through pages].

Paragraph 2 at the bottom of page 3 . . .President Kennedy: Under [unclear] and then to instruct. Now, do

we know what it is we want each one of these countries to do? For exam-ple, Belgium, what kind of mobilization, a gradual military buildup ofnaval measures and air measures including repressive measures? Do weknow sort of what we’d want each of the . . . program to be?

Nitze: Long term is we want them to meet their force goals, we knowwhat divisions we want them to call up, and what we want them to do, inbroad terms, but in specific terms we have not . . .

President Kennedy: Let me say force goals—Lyman Lemnitzer: Within NATO there are specific measures, what

he calls an alert, steps which they should take to move forces, to call up[unclear] character.

Nitze: But, for instance in Phase II we would expect the British tocall up their territorials, and then to move over the top the forces thatare necessary to bring them up to the three divisions to which they arecommitted by the NATO MC 26/4 force goals.

President Kennedy: Of course, isn’t that a peacetime goal? Or is thatthe alert goal?

Lemnitzer: No, it is a peacetime goal, but they are not up to it.Nitze: They are not up to it.

Meeting on Berl in 137

President Kennedy: What country in NATO is up to its goals, exceptfor the United States?

Nitze: Canada.President Kennedy: Canada?Lemnitzer: Canada and the United States.Unidentified: Well, Belgium is pretty well up to its commitment. So,

there are varying degrees . . .Rusk: And the Netherlands are not too far away . . .Robert McNamara: Well, none of them are up to it in terms of proper

logistical support. None of them are ready to fight, Mr. President, andeach of them would have to call men to active duty in Phase II in order toprepare for the action in Phase III, and as a matter of fact, it would be thecalling of reserves to duty in Phase II that we would hope would deterPhase III. But I think it’s fair to say none of the NATO forces are properlyequipped with combat support and logistical support forces.

President Kennedy: All of ours? Ours are?McNamara: [Unclear] ours.Nitze: And we would contract; perhaps reinforcing the forces we’ve

got there now. We’ve got the two division sets of equipment and wemight want to fly over . . .

McNamara: Yes, and almost certainly in Phase II we would call upadditional air squadrons.

Rusk: We nonetheless suddenly we have . . . We have column one andcolumn two. Column one was the Third Division force.

McNamara: Yes.Rusk: And column two showed the additions we would hope that the

different countries would make to that. Presumably we would presspretty early for the column two.

McNamara: Yes, but we would first press to move to column one,which they have not moved to as yet.

President Kennedy: Well, the only thing is, do we want to say this,on page 4, where it said, “Should the risk of loss be too great, extendedflights would be suspended.” Do we want that on any record?

Nitze: Well, there’s an important point involved here. . . . If theSoviet Union were to use their ground-to-air missiles in the corridor, wecouldn’t continue flights in the corridor without going after thoseground installations. And, if you go after the ground installations, youalso go after the airfields from which the Soviet planes come up, wouldbe an expansion of the activity beyond what we contemplated in Phase Iand would really involve very serious risks of the conflict becoming a big

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962138

one. And the thought was that you’d better take these mobilizationmeasures which are contemplated in Phase II before you go that far.

President Kennedy: This Phase II, though, we’re talking now reallyabout Phase II, aren’t we?

Lemnitzer: Yes.Nitze: Yes, during Phase II, you would continue the flights as long as

you could, but if they started using these ground-to-air missiles, or putin a—

President Kennedy: It seems to me we ought to maybe considerrewording that sentence because I think it sounds like maybe they willtry and then they’ll knock us down and then we’ll stop and then it willbe up to NATO when we start again. Don’t you think we ought to put ita little more . . . we will cease and mobilize and then—

Bundy: And [many] steps will be taken.President Kennedy: Prepare to commence again rather than sort of

leaving it more questionable.Nitze: I think that the British are going to come in with some sug-

gested amended language for that particular sentence. And I think theirgovernment has approved the whole document except for that sentenceand I think they’re going to come in into our next meeting with a slightchange in it. I think they’ll make the same point that you have in mind,Mr. President.

President Kennedy: Could you keep that in mind . . . the NATO deci-sion? Couldn’t we say NATO would have to face the necessity, in light ofstated military preparedness for air action, beyond the scope of Live Oakoperations, in order to reestablish air access after suitable concentration offorces has taken place?56 This other thing, they get it all, in the end.

Garbled exchange between Bundy and an unidentified speaker. Sound ofpages being turned.President Kennedy: Now, when we say the three powers would, if

necessary . . . what are we . . . What do we want to call in the . . . Haveyou got that? When do we call on NATO to make its forces, air forcesavailable?

Nitze: The concept is that as long as the effort is purely on the aircorridors along the autobahn, that this is a tripartite responsibility. The

Meeting on Berl in 139

56. Live Oak was the planning group created by SACEUR Lauris Norstad to deal with themilitary aspects of the Berlin problem. Headed by a British major general, it also included U.S.and French officers and a West German observer.

moment it spreads beyond the air corridors or autobahn, then it becomesa NATO responsibility.

President Kennedy: I wonder if there’s something we could impressupon the other NATO [countries] about what their obligations willbegin to become; or do you think they’ll be impressed enough with theprospect that it might escalate into nuclear, to be willing to participatefully in any support they can give us short of nuclear action? In otherwords, this doesn’t seem to ask very much of NATO except for this,really, almost information sheet. Isn’t it for them, for the other membersof NATO aside from the British and the French and Germans?

Nitze: They would have to participate fully in the buildup to PhaseII. All the actions in Phase III and in Phase IV would be NATO action.

Rusk: I think we might knock out that four, the last line on page 3,for example naval measures, national, tripartite and NATO, becausenaval measures would be themselves outside of the corridor—

Nitze: Well, we’d wanted really to have some degree of flexibility sothat the three powers could do naval harassment and even some forms ofencroaching blockade without the possibility of being vetoed by NATO.But I think you should still . . . could take out the or without. [Unclear] Ithink.

Rusk: I don’t think the . . . that the veto . . . that unanimity is goingto deal with these in places in time and it’s necessary [unclear].

McNamara: The paragraph requiring the action by the other membersof NATO, Mr. President, is the second paragraph on page 4. . . . Perhaps itis sufficiently self explanatory, and can certainly be enlarged—

President Kennedy: [Unclear] mean “to mobilize and deploy jointlyadditional military forces”?

McNamara: It means . . .President Kennedy: [reading] “Achieving the force levels and state of

readiness necessary to the defense of NATO and the launching ofBERCON/MARCON operations.” It doesn’t say what—

McNamara: Yeah.President Kennedy: Of all M-day forces.57

Bundy: Theoretically, the M-day forces go well above the 30 divisionlevels or any current levels.

Nitze: Yeah.President Kennedy: We wouldn’t want to state what those additional

military forces would be?

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57. The abbreviation M-day forces stands for Reserve Forces.

Bundy: Well, they know what they are, Mr. President. Under theexisting NATO planning, they would total, if they all were produced,something like 47 divisions, if I remember the figure correctly. GeneralLemnitzer will have it in mind.

Lemnitzer: I am not sure of the total. We will check it.Bundy: But it implies a NATO-wide mobilization, and they will all

know that that is what is implied under existing contingency plans on aNATO-wide basis. This document, it is important to say, relates to anexisting NATO strategy. This is simply the Berlin strategy within exist-ing NATO strategy.

Martin Hillenbrand: We have another paper which will be consid-ered by the NAC [North Atlantic Council] at the same time, and thatrelates to the specific question of tripartite-NATO relationship, and whatparts of these operations will be under necessarily under tripartite con-trol, and where the obligation is for NATO as a whole.58

McNamara: Which we could declare by saying a major element ofmilitary action will be for each of the Western European members ofNATO to mobilize and deploy. . . . Make it more specific.

Bundy: Under NATO M-day plans.McNamara: Yes.Bundy: Yeah.McNamara: [whispering] We also hope each of the NATO nations

contemplate through the use of [unclear].President Kennedy: Do the words on page 5, “the initiation of some

form of nuclear action” . . . has the word initiation got anything to do[with] [unclear] [sounds of flipping pages] at the bottom? If our continuedimpression would be observed, it would be the realization of the imminenceof nuclear war?59 Or is initiation satisfactory? [Unclear exchange.]

Nitze: The point we were trying to get across here was that theother NAC members would have to realize that we might be faced with asituation where we would have to initiate. If we could take out the words

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58. The tripartite powers were the three Western powers with treaty rights and obligations inWest Germany—Great Britain, France, and the United States. The defense of the Westernposition in Berlin would start as a tripartite responsibility and then expand to involve all ofNATO. The involvement of the entire NATO alliance would occur if the Soviet challengeexceeded a certain threshold.59. Kennedy is hinting at the possibility that the Western powers might have to be the first touse nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact over Berlin. They would preempt theSoviet use of nuclear weapons because of the “realization of the imminence” of total war.

initiation of, and it would still be implied when you say “will be someform of nuclear action.”

Bundy: I think that’s better.Nitze: “Resort to.”President Kennedy: Yeah.Nitze: We can just take out the initiation.Bundy: I think “resort to” is pretty good.President Kennedy: Yeah.Nitze: “Resort to.”60

President Kennedy seems to take a phone call, not related to the discus-sion at hand.President Kennedy: Right, OK, . . . Huntsville [Alabama]? Yeah, which

day can you do it? Next week? Why don’t you check that out and . . . Letme see, I’ll be in Huntsville Tuesday, this week. Because it looks like I’ll bedown there this Sunday. What about the [unclear] burning of those things[unclear]? Yeah . . . have you announced how many FBI you’ve got; or arethey putting in helicopters. Yeah, OK, fine. Right. OK. Good. Bye.61 [Hangsup phone.]

President Kennedy: You are going [to] change that to make it . . .Bundy: We’re going to say “resort to,” simply—President Kennedy: “Resort to.”Nitze: It would be “to resort to.”President Kennedy flips his copy of the document, searching for theoffending phrase.President Kennedy: All right, then.Rusk: Mr. President, it’s the very last paragraph, on page 6, [unclear]

language [unclear] because it would be too much of a row to NATO, theNorth Atlantic Council. Paul, I don’t see any particular point, from ourpoint of view, in hanging on to it. We might as well drop it.

Nitze: Apparently, the Germans have also said they wanted to dropit. I’m not quite sure why they want to drop it.

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60. The critical sentence in this planning document thus read: “If the course chosen [byNATO] were conventional action and this fails to make the Soviet Union back down and hasnot precipitated general war, the last remaining pressure to be exerted will be to resort tosome form of nuclear action” (FRUS, 15:320).61. On 11 September 1962, President Kennedy planned to visit defense facilities at RedstoneLaboratories in Huntsville, Alabama. He would be accompanied by British defense ministerPeter Thorneycroft, who was visiting the United States 9 to 17 September. On Sunday, 16September, Kennedy was expected to be in Newport, Rhode Island, with Thorneycroft as hisand Mrs. Kennedy’s guest.

Rusk: Well, apparently, there is [unclear] some of these big powerdecisions here, this in effect, the Council is going to have to arrive atrapid decisions at the time of execution. I think that’s really what . . .

Bundy: In realistic terms, it’s not accurate, that paragraph.Unidentified: Yeah.Bundy: You ought to know, Mr. President, that General Norstad

himself is worried about the restrictiveness of this paper in terms of theuse of nuclear weapons. The reason this is important is that he will bemaking a presentation on his views, at a certain stage. I don’t know justwhen this will, how this will work. But the Council has asked for hisviews on the general issue of the future of nuclear weapons in NATO,and this connects closely to this general question of when they will beused in the minds of Europeans who are hesitant about what they per-ceive to be changes in our policy.

President Kennedy: Well, you know that President Eisenhower’sconversation with Adenauer [unclear] some confusion, and all the rest.

Bundy: Yeah.President Kennedy: He’s going to give . . . is General Norstad going

to give the . . . policy?Bundy: The presentation of his paper will be handled, as I under-

stand it, by Paul Nitze, isn’t that right?Nitze: No, Tom Finletter.62

Bundy: Tom Finletter.Nitze: [I’ll] bring Tom up to date on the . . .Bundy: What will Norstad’s relation to this paper be?Nitze: I don’t think he will have a relationship to it. He’s already

expressed his views to the Joint Chiefs on the paper. His views have beentaken account of by the Joint Chiefs [of Staff].

Lemnitzer: Yes, he’s also . . . That’s right, and we’ve recommended,concerned with most of them and a good many of his views have beenincorporated into this paper. Not all of them, but . . .

Nitze: I think the most important one is the . . . is the second sen-tence, in the second paragraph on page 1.

Lemnitzer: The Joint Chiefs are most concerned [unclear] get theidea that we were going through step by step by step.

President Kennedy: Have you tried ever [unclear] avoid the subject?Is that the one?

Meeting on Berl in 143

62. Thomas Finletter was the permanent representative to the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization.

Bundy: Yeah. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: [reading] “Nations may render [unclear] of

nuclear weapons. . . .”Rusk: Point out the standard [unclear].Nitze: This we thought met his major point. . . .President Kennedy: Will he at some time talk about the failure of the

NATO people to come up with their, let’s say, with General Eisenhower[unclear] . . . Adenauer complaining about us?63 Well, I think it would bewell to have these other points made.64 Did somebody make these? Orwill General Lemnitzer do that?

Lemnitzer: Well, he makes them continually, to most of the nationsparticularly the British. He’s been after them for several years.

President Kennedy: What’s your impression of them?Nitze: At the moment the French have won the most in their conver-

sations [unclear].Lemnitzer: [Unclear.] I think he’s already given up on the French for

the time being, for more divisions, but as they come back from Algeria, Ithink that we would have to continue to press the French.

President Kennedy: Is he going to talk about medium-range ballisticmissiles?65

Bundy: At a certain point, he’s under obligation, really, to talk toNATO. He put that off earlier on so as not to have any confusion abouthis views and his retirement. But this is a separate issue. The only reasonI mentioned it is slightly cognate in the minds of many of the Europeans,because our instinct of holding off this decision till the latest possiblemoment is related in their minds to what they take to be our lack ofenthusiasm to General Norstad’s modernization program.66 He willdefend his point of view on modernization in medium-range ballisticmissiles at some point before the council. I don’t know the date of that.

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63. “He” is General Norstad.64. Kennedy is referring to the inability of NATO allies to meet the conventional force goalsset in the fall of 1957 by MC 70 and again in the summer of 1961 by MC 26/4.65. For Norstad’s views on the deployment of MRBMs in Europe, see the “Meeting withDwight Eisenhower,” 10 September 1962.66. Bundy is referring to the Kennedy administration’s foot-dragging in establishing a Europeanland-based MRBM nuclear force. Many administration officials, especially in the Department ofState, opposed a land-based force because the allies would demand control over the missiles intheir territory. State preferred a sea-based multilateral force (MLF), which would avoid the issueof national control entirely by employing mixed NATO crews. Kennedy held a dim view of theMLF. Although the President shared State’s concerns about allied pressures for their ownnational nuclear forces, he doubted the MLF was a viable alternative.

President Kennedy: I think it would be helpful if he put in the, whyhe regards conventional forces, and their buildup, to be completely con-sistent with his view on . . . because he knows I want to make an exclu-sive . . . I’d like to have it, so that their . . . Also it affects—

Rusk: They’re going to jump on his bandwagon as an excuse for notgoing ahead with a conventional buildup.

Bundy: Yeah. Well, they do this in their own minds . . .Unidentified: Right.President Kennedy: Well, I think if he says that, he’s regarded as

very pure on the subject, we’re not, if he would say it, and explain it.Could we suggest that he make that part of his presentation?

McNamara: I hope to avoid that presentation as long as possible,Mr. President, and to the best of my knowledge it isn’t scheduled at thepresent time.

Lemnitzer: Well, there’s one on the 25th of September; that was sortof a tentative date. I don’t know whether it’s been firmed up. I don’t[know] what the status of that one is, Mr. President.

President Kennedy: OK, [unclear] now we’ve got to go to . . . [toMcNamara] You’re coming tomorrow?

McNamara: Yes, I think so. I’m worried about [British defense min-ister Peter] Thorneycroft . . .

President Kennedy: Is he not—Bundy: Isn’t Mike coming, too?McNamara: Yes I believe so, Mac, but we have a problem that Dave

Ormsby-Gore is having a dinner for him tomorrow night.67 I don’t knowif that gets us back there in time for—

President Kennedy: You’ve got to get back in time for that.McNamara: Yes, I’m taking him out for dinner tonight in lieu of—President Kennedy: We’ll just send you to Huntsville—McNamara: We could have limited [unclear]—President Kennedy: —dinner Wednesday or is that Albert?Bundy: Don’t know myself how high—McNamara: The surgeon general sent me [unclear]. [Laughter.] I

don’t know.Bundy: I think they would relax to just have this dinner without

Thorneycroft or even give up the dinner; that would be great!Mixed exchange amidst continued laughter. Someone says, “Thorneycroftcan come late.”

Meeting on Berl in 145

67. David Ormsby-Gore was the British ambassador to the United States.

McNamara: I said we would talk to him tonight. Just say we can beback here by nine tomorrow night, and leave with you [unclear] an hour . . .

President Kennedy: An hour isn’t . . . it seems to me you can cut it anhour short, we’ve been through that so much.

McNamara: I haven’t—President Kennedy: But he—McNamara: And he hasn’t either.President Kennedy: So it would be . . .McNamara: It’s probably desirable to do it. I’ll talk to him and see

what his preferences are . . .Bundy: I do think the dinner is a trivial matter.President Kennedy: Who did you get, some congressmen and senators?Bundy: No, just Thorneycroft and his party.President Kennedy: Is his party all coming with us?McNamara: No, only two or three.President Kennedy: These are—Is [unclear] coming with us?Bundy: I don’t know, Mr. President. You’ve got a lot of problems.

[chuckling] I wouldn’t try to manage that dinner. Nobody else can.President Kennedy: [Unclear] give my speech . . . Is Chip [Charles]

Bohlen [unclear] is much more familiar with our whole scene than TomFinletter would be but perhaps Tom would—68

McNamara: Finletter, . . . I think it is a forum where he’d do it and hehas asked if Paul can come over to acquaint him with it so that he had[unclear]. [Garbled exchange.]

Nitze: Well, we’ve considered it to be the natural thing that the U.S.would put this forward.

President Kennedy: I mean, aren’t the British and the French[unclear]?

Hillenbrand: We’ll put it forward as our view, and then the British,French, and Germans would all support that.

President Kennedy: [shuffles papers while talking] . . . after the presen-tation of the four-power military set group proposal.

Nitze: NATO cost us a little jealousy in the Four Power, in theAmbassadorial Group. [Laughter.]

President Kennedy: All right.McNamara: Mr. President, Lem[nitzer] and I met with the Senate

committee this morning and this afternoon. I don’t believe we’ll have any

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962146

68. In October Bohlen is expected to leave for Europe to replace General James Gavin as U.S.ambassador to France.

problem in putting a resolution through the Senate. Senator [Richard]Russell has planned to do that very promptly. His [unclear], as a matter offact, was talking this afternoon and I believe it was unanimous.69

Rusk: I’ll [unclear].McNamara: We’re scheduled to go before the House . . .President Kennedy: So would they get that, including particularly

Khrushchev’s conversation with [Secretary of the Interior Stewart]Udall about America [unclear] divided.70

McNamara: I think it’d be extremely helpful. We’d go before the Houseon Thursday; we’ll have more trouble there. The process is becoming a realcontroversy.

Lemnitzer: The more individual opinions in the House, with 37members, everyone has got some particular angle to follow. . . .

President Kennedy: They can all vote for it.McNamara: I’m sure they will. I’m sure they will.Nitze: I think so.President Kennedy: I would like to get, you know, this statement

[unclear] passed to them about the backlog in foreign aid; I’d like to getwhat they at the Defense Department . . . if you did the comparable statis-tics, you know . . . he’s got this thing where he just would [unclear].

McNamara: Yes there is roughly 2 billion dollars of other than fiscal’63 [unclear]. Now he adds fiscal ’63, whatever he’s thinking of a billion-two, perhaps, to the two billion, so he probably comes up with three bil-lion two or three billion four.

President Kennedy: But, I mean, if you took your total, I’m talkingabout the total Defense Department . . . what is your budget?

McNamara: Oh, I can’t tell you that . . .President Kennedy: Seventy or 80 billion?McNamara: Oh, I can’t answer the question, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Mac, [unclear]?Bundy: Can I [unclear] the problem?

Meeting on Berl in 147

69. President Kennedy had asked Congress for standby authority to call up 150,000 reservistsfor one year and to extend active duty tours without declaring a state of emergency. On 24September, the House of Representatives granted him that power.70. On 29 August, Secretary Udall arrived in the Soviet Union for an 11-day visit to seehydroelectric projects. On 6 September, Udall met for two hours with Khrushchev. Duringtheir conversation, Khrushchev raised the subject of Berlin and informed Udall bluntly thatthe Soviets would not allow Western troops to remain in Berlin and that the United Statesand its allies would not dare to go to war over this. At one point, Khrushchev told Udall thatKennedy was not in a position to reach an agreement over Berlin because he lacked support inCongress (see FRUS, 15: 308–10).

President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah. But in other words . . . [Garbledexchange.]

McNamara: . . . in the Defense Department. We have it for so manyyears back [unclear].

Bundy: We might get Charlie Hitch to do something.71

McNamara: Oh, yes, it’s all available, and we’ll get out a quarterlyreport on it.

Meeting breaks up. Voices, milling around, slamming doors, laughter.Multiple conversations taking place. The following statements can be heard.Bundy: Lifetime obligation to [unclear].Lemnitzer: [Unclear] back here, but I’d like to set it up under you.President Kennedy: Would you set it up and send me a cable?Lemnitzer: [Unclear] all I can get, I will. I’ll get it to you on

[unclear] 11th.President Kennedy: That’s fine.Lemnitzer: Right.Unidentified: [Unclear] unless he’s coming back here. The President . . .Nitze: Are you going back to the building or not?Lemnitzer: Yes, I am, Paul.Nitze: Could you take my . . . this with you?Lemnitzer: Well, I don’t want to lose it.Nitze: Well, look, I see [unclear]. I’ll . . . let me take it home and put

it in my safe.Unidentified: So you’re going right to your office [unclear].Nitze: Yeah, but probably not to the Pentagon.Lemnitzer: I’ve decided to be there [unclear].Nitze: I can just put it in my safe.Lemnitzer: OK. All right. [Unclear.] See you later.Nitze: Yeah.Bundy: Mr. President, have you got a minute?The President goes out, leaving the machine on.

On 13 September, the Ambassadorial Group met to discuss the paperfurther. The group made only minor revisions, as Rusk persuaded the

M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962148

71. Charles Hitch was assistant secretary of defense for budgetary affairs. McNamara admiredHitch, the former head of the economics division at RAND, for his efficiency and innovation. Hitchdevised the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), which centralized planning in theOffice of the Secretary of Defense and reduced the independence of the service secretaries.

allies that NATO acceptance of the preferred sequence would demon-strate to the Soviets that any threatening move in Berlin would meetwith unified Western resistance.

Following the Berlin meeting, the President went for his eveningswim. Then it was time to return to the Executive Mansion.

Thursday, September 13, 1962

The President arrived in the Oval Office at 9:40 A.M., after breakfast withthe Democratic legislative leadership. It was his first full day in theWhite House since Monday, September 10. Early Tuesday Kennedy hadflown to Huntsville, Alabama, for an intensive two-day tour of the heart-land of the U.S. space program, where he received a series of briefings onthe status of his goal to put a man on the moon. By the time of his returnon Wednesday night, he had visited the Marshall Space Flight Center inHuntsville; Cape Canaveral in Florida; the NASA facility in Houston,Texas; and the McDonnell Douglas plant in St. Louis, which had built theMercury capsules and was now working on the Gemini program.

Kennedy had a press conference scheduled for Thursday evening, andmost of the morning was spent preparing. After signing a bill extendingfederal protection to the Point Reyes seashore in northern California,Kennedy met for a few minutes alone with Secretary of State Dean Ruskbefore heading into a longer meeting with Rusk and a group of keyadvisers to review what might be discussed at the press conference.While Kennedy was on tour, the Soviets had issued a strong response tothe President’s September 4 statement on Cuba and the administration’sannounced intention to call up 150,000 Reserves. The Soviet Unionraised the alert status of its forces and warned that it would protectCuban sovereignty. President Kennedy had every reason to expect ques-tions about this in the evening.

Walter Heller then came into the Oval Office for about half an hour,presumably to help with any domestic economic questions. Finally, beforegoing to a luncheon in honor of U Thant, the acting secretary-general ofthe United Nations, the President welcomed the members of the U.S. del-egation to the 17th U.N. General Assembly. Senator Albert Gore ofTennessee, who had been named to the delegation, brought along hisdaughter, Nancy, and his son Al, a future vice president.

After lunch, just before dropping in on a group of Jewish leaders meet-

T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 13, 1962 149

ing in the Fish Room, the President called Speaker McCormack, whom hehad seen at the leadership breakfast, to discuss the congressional resolu-tion on standby authority for calling up the Reserves. In McCormack’soffice were Congressmen Carl Vinson of Georgia and Thomas Morgan ofPennsylvania.

4:55 P.M.

[T]he quicker we dispose of it, probably the better.

Conversation with John McCormack, Thomas Morgan, and Carl Vinson1

The President talked with Carl Vinson, a Democratic representative fromGeorgia and chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John McCormack,a Democratic representative from Massachusetts and the Speaker of theHouse; and Thomas “Doc” Morgan, a Democratic representative fromPennsylvania and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The four discussed strategies for winning support of a House resolutionto grant the President special limited power to call up to 150,000 reservistsfor one year and to extend active duty tours without declaring a state ofemergency. The House passed the resolution on September 24, 1962.

President Kennedy: Mr. Speaker.John McCormack: Hello, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Hi.McCormack: I have Carl Vinson with me and Tom Morgan was here

a little while ago and coming back.President Kennedy: Right.McCormack: On this resolution on Cuba.President Kennedy: Right.McCormack: Tom Morgan’s going to introduce it today and Carl

Vinson’s going to introduce, both of them are going to introduce, thesame resolution.

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1. Dictabelt 3B.1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

President Kennedy: Right, fine.McCormack: Now you have seen it?President Kennedy: Yes, that’s correct.McCormack: That starts our, “Where, whereas President James

Monroe,” and so forth.President Kennedy: Right.McCormack: That right? Then down there, “Now therefore be it

resolved.”President Kennedy: Right.McCormack: We’re trying to see if we can get it up to suspension on

Monday. How would that hit you?President Kennedy: That’s fine. I think the quicker we dispose of it,

probably the better.McCormack: Yes, because the Senate isn’t going to . . . they’re going

to refer to the Joint Committee on Armed Services and ForeignRelations and report back next Thursday.

President Kennedy: Right, right.McCormack: Now if we can work it out. Ah, that is . . .[off the phone to someone else] Will you get Chairman Morgan, will you?[back to President Kennedy] Oh, here’s Chairman Morgan. I’ll have

you talk with Tom Morgan, if I may, and also Carl Vinson.President Kennedy: Right, right.McCormack: [to Morgan] I’ve got the President, Tom, and the

President said if we can get it up to suspension Monday that would be fine.[back to President Kennedy] Now here’s Tom Morgan, Mr. President.Thomas Morgan: Yes, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Yes, Doc, why I think the quicker, the better and

I think the closer we get to that language the better off we are. It’s theonly way to head off their giving us something much worse.

Morgan: Do you think this language is OK then?President Kennedy: Yes, that’s the language that . . . we sent up, I

think, to the Senate—Morgan: Yeah.President Kennedy: Isn’t that the same language that Mike had?Morgan: It’s the same language that Chairman Vinson had.President Kennedy: Is that 1958? It mentions 1958?2

Morgan: Pardon?

Conversat ion with McCormack , Morgan, and Vinson 151

2. President Kennedy wants to be sure this resolution mentions the congressional resolutionthat helped a Republican president, Dwight Eisenhower, deal with foreign crises in 1958.

President Kennedy: Does it mention the year 1958?Morgan: Just a minute, Mr. President.[to someone in the room with him] Is it here? 1958?[back to the President] Yes.President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s the one. Right. Good. That’s fine.

Well, that’s good because that puts it back on them.Morgan: Yeah.President Kennedy: Good, Doc.Morgan: OK.President Kennedy: Thank you.Morgan: Wait a minute, Mr. President. Mr. Vinson wants to talk to

you.Carl Vinson: Mr. President?President Kennedy: Yes, sir, Mr.—Vinson: This is the resolution that was just sent me up from your

office down there—President Kennedy: That’s correct.Vinson: That I used when the Secretary of Defense was before the

committee to tell the committee that this was what we would consider,and we do not have jurisdiction and so Mr. Morgan’s committee hasjurisdiction.

President Kennedy: Right.Vinson: But I am going to get the sense of my committee, “do they

endorse it.” And then I’ll bring out the . . . authorization for 150,000reservists under suspension, past that Monday—

President Kennedy: Oh, terrific.Vinson: And then, Mr. Morgan will call up . . . on the recommenda-

tion by the Speaker for suspension of the rule and bring up the concur-rent resolution.

President Kennedy: Very good.Vinson: Now it’s all right to introduce them?President Kennedy: That’s fine, Mr. Chairman. Yes, because I think

that’s the only way to head off their introducing a much more objection-able amendment—3

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3. The New York Times that morning reported attempts by three Republican senators to addinflammatory language to the administration’s reserve mobilization bill. One of them, SenatorPrescott Bush of Connecticut, proposed that it “put the Soviet Union on notice that theMonroe Doctrine was not dead.” However, by the end of the day the Senate had passed theresolution unanimously, without any amendments. The failed Republican amendments were

Vinson: Uh-huh.President Kennedy: —language.Vinson: That’s right, because I’ve got to keep down some very objec-

tionable amendments—President Kennedy: That’s correct.Vinson: . . . in my committee and this is the only way I can do it.President Kennedy: That’s fine, Mr. Chairman.Vinson: Thank you, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Thanks a lot. Right.

At the President’s 6:00 P.M. press conference, Kennedy reiterated a desirefor calm regarding Soviet activities in the Caribbean. He stressed that hebelieved that “these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat toany other part of this hemisphere.” And he called for a stop to “loosetalk” about invading Cuba for it gave “a thin color of legitimacy to theCommunist pretense that such a threat exists.” Kennedy, however, didnot deny his administration’s concerns about what the future mighthold. On September 11, the Soviets had responded to his September 4statement with a stiff public pledge of their own to defend Cuba. But theSoviets had added that they had no intention of sending any nuclear mis-siles to Cuba. Thus both provoked and encouraged, Kennedy reinforcedhis earlier warning to the Soviets. If Cuba, he said, “should become anoffensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, thenthis country will do whatever must be done to protect its own securityand that of its allies.”4

Returning to the White House at 6:34 P.M., the President had anotherwarning to present. On the advice of Clark Clifford and the other mem-bers of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), thePresident had invited Orvil Dryfoos, the publisher of the New York Times,to a meeting to discuss Hanson Baldwin and the problem of leaks of clas-sified information.5

Kennedy and Dryfoos met for nearly an hour. To dramatize the valueof the information Baldwin had described in the Times, Kennedy handed

Conversat ion with McCormack , Morgan, and Vinson 153

referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for possible incorporation in another res-olution (New York Times, 13 and 14 September 1962).4. The President’s News Conference of 13 September 1962, in The Kennedy Presidential PressConferences (New York: Coleman, 1978).5. On the Baldwin case, see Volume 1, “Meeting with PFIAB,” 1 August 1962; Introduction to16 August 1962; and “Meeting on Intelligence Matters,” 22 August 1962.

Dryfoos a top secret report, codeword Keyhole, that identified Sovietmissile launch sites on the basis of satellite information. Then he brieflyleft the Oval Office while Dryfoos read.

Having returned to his office, President Kennedy explained to Dryfoosthat he intended to implement a new system to guard against harmfulleaks once the director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, returnedfrom his honeymoon. He wanted to work out a system with McConeand Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara so that the CIA wouldreceive reports on any conversations that Pentagon officials had withjournalists.

Dryfoos was impressed by the Keyhole document and said thatHanson Baldwin would not have submitted his story had he understoodthe sensitivity of his information. Nevertheless he argued strongly againstthe President’s idea of using the CIA as a watchdog, citing the FirstAmendment and the importance of an informed electorate in a democracy.President Kennedy, however, kept coming back to the importance of hisCIA plan. Finally, Dryfoos asked whether the President planned toannounce this plan publicly. When Kennedy said no, Dryfoos cautionedhim that this was the type of plan that Hanson Baldwin would be the firstto find out about and it would make great front-page material.6

Following this meeting, the President went to the pool.

Tuesday, September 25, 1962

President Kennedy took some time off in mid-September 1962 despite thecrush of events in the Caribbean and Central Europe and his active partici-pation in the midterm elections. An avid sailor, Kennedy spent as muchtime watching the America’s Cup Challenge off Newport, Rhode Island, aspossible. Leaving the Oval Office on Friday afternoon, September 14, theKennedys spent until Wednesday afternoon, September 19, in Newport.President Kennedy invited his good friend British ambassador David

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6. “Meeting of Orvil E. Dryfoos with John F. Kennedy, September 13, 1962,” 14 September1962, Dryfoos Papers, New York Times Archives, New York, NY. Kennedy started the meetingby saying that he was much less worried about Cuba than he was about the situation in Berlin.He thought people exaggerated the threat posed by Cuba. He expected the situation to getvery bad in Berlin in December. The editors are grateful to the New York Times for the use ofits archives.

Ormsby-Gore and Mrs. Ormsby-Gore to join his family on board theUSS destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. to watch the races. The Australiansloop Gretel was challenging the American sloop Weatherly.

President Kennedy returned to the White House for meetings onWednesday evening and Thursday. Thursday evening, September 20, heleft for a quick visit to a Democratic fund-raiser in Harrisburg, Penn-sylvania, before flying back to Newport that night for the next round ofraces. The Kennedys did not leave Newport again until Monday evening,September 24. The President and Mrs. Kennedy hosted a lunch forMohammed Ayub Khan and his delegation at Hammersmith Farm inNewport before leaving for Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, September 25, was President Kennedy’s first full day in theOval Office since Thursday, September 13, the date of the previous tapedconversation. Much of the President’s schedule this day involved Asiaand the Pacific. In the morning the President met with the coordinatingsecretary of state for security of South Vietnam, Nguyen Dinh Thuan.Then he was reunited with Benjamin Kevu, the man from the SolomonIslands who had saved his life during World War II by delivering acoconut with information about the location of Kennedy and the othersurvivors of his destroyed PT boat. Next to enter the Oval Office wasthe prime minister of Australia, Robert G. Menzies. A non-Asian event,the swearing in of Willard Wirtz as secretary of labor, also happenedjust before lunch. So, too, did a meeting with George Ball, GeorgeMcGhee, and Carl Kaysen, perhaps on the progress of negotiations withthe Europeans on a modified gold standstill agreement.1

Following his midday break, the President returned to his office fortwo meetings with his brother. At the first meeting, the AttorneyGeneral was joined by John McCone of the CIA and Carl Kaysen. In thesecond meeting Robert Kennedy was alone with the President. None ofthese meetings was taped.

The only meeting the President taped came at the end of the day andinvolved a discussion of incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffMaxwell Taylor’s fact-finding trip to East Asia.

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1. For the development of this policy see Volume 1, “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,”10 August 1962; “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,” 16 August 1962; and “Meeting onGold and Dollar Policy,” 20 August 1962.

5:00 –5:56 P.M.

I would think the more likely thing would be . . . is they wouldmove there [South Korea] having moved against Quemoy andMatsu and our having trouble in Berlin; it would be part of aworldwide expansion rather than just a single action there.

Meeting with Maxwell Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip2

President Kennedy announced on July 19, 1962, that General MaxwellTaylor would replace Lyman Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, effective October 1. Before assuming his post, Taylor decided heneeded a refresher trip to the Far East. He left the country amid disturb-ing reports of Soviet military aid arriving in Cuba. Taylor departed onAugust 31, stopping first in Japan and following an arc down toIndonesia. The newly appointed Chairman focused on U.S. policy in theregion, especially as it concerned Communist China. He also examinedthe status of U.S. military assistance programs in the Far East, lookingfor ways to use U.S. aid more effectively, including substituting nuclearfor conventional forces.

The short period of time did not allow for much more than a whistle-stop tour, but Taylor did meet with heads of state in many countries,including Thanarat Sarit in Thailand, Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia,and Achmed Sukarno in Indonesia.

Taylor’s visit to Indonesia came soon after the United States had helpednegotiate an end to a Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Irian, also

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962156

2. Including President Kennedy, William Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Averell Harriman, U. AlexisJohnson, Carl Kaysen, Robert Komer, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, WilliamSullivan, and Maxwell Taylor. President Kennedy’s daily appointment’s diary lists GeorgeBall and a Commander Bagley as also having attended the meeting, but they were not identi-fied on the tape. Tape 23, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection. Initially, the Kennedy Library dated this conversation as 28 September1962; however, internal evidence and the existence of an Asian foreign policy meeting onTape 25, which could not have occurred any other day but 28 September, argues for this beingthe Taylor briefing meeting of 25 September 1962.

This tape begins with a few minutes of a fragmented conversation. The quality of therecording is so poor that only a few words can be heard. Civil rights and the President’s inten-tion to initiate a housing bill for the District of Columbia are mentioned. A “Ken,” possiblyKenneth O’Donnell, and a “Tom” greet each other. Given that Tape 22 contained a conversa-tion on September 10 and the next conversation on Tape 23 occurred in the late afternoon of25 September, it is impossible to provide an exact date for this fragment.

known as West New Guinea. The Dutch, who had colonized Indonesia andcontrolled it until 1948, refused to turn over West New Guinea to theIndonesians in 1949. The colony comprised 150,000 square miles of themost primitive territory left in the world.

The United States maintained a hands-off policy until 1960, whenthe Eisenhower administration proposed to create a U.N. trusteeship forthe territory. The negotiations quickly failed. The Dutch sent an aircraftcarrier and troops to the region, to which Sukarno responded by infil-trating troops, contracting for $500 million of Soviet military aid, andissuing belligerent statements. The Kennedy administration pursuedEisenhower’s policy, but little progress was made until mid-1962, whenKennedy’s negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, worked to bringthe two sides together. He proposed a two-year transition plan, withWest Irian remaining a U.N. trustee for the transitional period.

President Kennedy had to intervene to save the negotiations, but hedid save them and a compromise agreement was reached in early August1962. The Dutch agreed to turn over the region to a U.N. TemporaryExecutive Authority, which could begin the transfer of authority to theIndonesians as early as May 1963.

Taylor returned on September 21. At this meeting, Taylor providedessentially a long briefing of his trip. Kennedy did not tape the entiremeeting. He turned on the tape recorder after Taylor began speaking.

Maxwell Taylor: . . . my first orientation, and also updating of myknowledge of some of these countries. However, one can’t go through anarea like this even though it’s sometimes reasonably familiar withoutbeing hit by certain things which seem worth reporting. I might saythat, in general, that one reflects in going to the Far East . . . seeing theanalogies and the lack of analogies between our military problem thereand the problem in Europe. There is an analogy in the sense that wehave the problem of deterrence of war out there just as we have a prob-lem of deterrence in the NATO area. The enemy, however, is different.It’s Red China in one form or another. And the assets of Red China andthe weaknesses of Red China are quite different from the assets andweaknesses of the Soviet Union.

And in military terms, and I looked at this primarily in a military way,and I realize the one-eyed aspect of that, but the military threat from RedChina of course is manpower on the ground. They have the largest armyin the world. But secondly, and perhaps more critically from our point ofview, they also have the fourth-largest air force, and a pretty good air

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 157

force. We don’t think they fly as well as our Chinat [Chinese Nationalist]friends, but if you look at the inventory of aircraft that have been built upin recent years, it ends up in [being] quite a formidable threat. So muchso that our air people in each one of the areas, say, in Korea, or in Taiwan,or in Southeast Asia, can build a picture which is quite graphic and quiterealistic, I think, of a 1,000-plane attack say against every important tar-get in South Korea in a very short period of time.

Now what we’ve done over the years is that we have built up in Koreaparticularly and Taiwan very sizable ground forces, but we have laggedin the air defense aspect. So that now we’re being hit almost at one time,in a short period of time, at least, with the requirements for more-advanced interceptors and also for a modernized air control and warn-ing circuits. So we’re having this in South Korean, Taiwan, and also—

President Kennedy: OK. Now, do we have Hawk missiles in—Taylor: —and in Korea.President Kennedy: Do we have them on Formosa?Taylor: We have them planned in Formosa.Lyman Lemnitzer: None of them have Hawks yet but we have a

Nike-Hercules Battery there.President Kennedy: Is that a pretty good missile?Lemnitzer: Yes sir, it’s the best up to about 80,000 feet. It’s a very,

very accurate—President Kennedy: As good as a SAM 2?Taylor: It’s also a surface-to-air missile, Mr. President, something we

don’t give her credit for, a surface-to-surface missile. A credit we don’tgive to ourselves, but it has a very good accuracy up to about 90 miles.

Lemnitzer: It was moved in there at the time of the bombardment ofthe offshore islands of 1958, and it’s the best missile in the world of itskind.

President Kennedy: Can this pick up? This . . . it could be against anocean target. The Nike—

Unidentified: Yes, sir.Taylor: If you could locate the target with binoculars—President Kennedy: Radar? Do you have a firing? Do you have a

radar apparatus?Lemnitzer: Indeed, that’s how it . . . President Kennedy: We don’t have any Nike-Zeus on Quemoy and

Matsu, do we?Lemnitzer: No missiles, no surface-to-air missiles on Matsu.President Kennedy: Now, is our, [is] the number of our missiles on

Formosa inadequate?

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962158

Taylor: I would say it is inadequate. That is really the point, sir, thatthe air defense aspect has lagged in terms of other kinds of forces. Andunfortunately, when you look at the MAP program, as I told the senatorsthis morning, that’s where the money is going.3 We’re planning now toclose this gap, but most of the money in the military aid programs aresimply for the maintenance of current forces plus this additional moneyfor the modernization of air defense. That’s not entirely true, but it’sgenerally so. So that’s one of the unfortunate things about any seriouscut in the aid program at this time is that it does hold back an area inwhich we are critically weak.4

Another very interesting and I think important point militarily, Mr.President, as you go down each country. Take Korea, which is a bigmoney user in that area. I looked that program over, hoping as I have inprevious years to find some way, from a military point of view, to reduce,to recommend a reduction. This is a burden which we don’t like. It’sbeen looked at year after year. But I would have to report that as long aswe keep the present assumptions in Korea, I don’t think, from a militarypoint of view, we’re justified in reducing our forces. In fact, we should beputting more money, as I’ve said, into air defense.

Now, one of the reasons however, for that is that the assumptionnow . . . the objective given to our forces . . . the indigenous forces inKorea . . . is to be able, with South Korean forces, to check and hold off amassive attack mounted not only by the North Koreans but also by theRed Chinese. In other words, we’re setting a very high level of effort asthe goal for our, for the indigenous forces. And we’re assuming thatatomic weapons would not be used.

Now, I’ve discussed this with the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs. Ithink that we should really come to you and get with a study of . . . ananalyzing of pros and cons of the use of atomic weapons in the Far East.Those pros and cons are quite different from the situation in Europe.Sometimes the advantages are greater; sometimes perhaps less. But Ithink that if we could assume that in case of [a] massive Chinese attackat any point in Asia, whether in Korea or in Southeast Asia, we couldcertainly recast then some of our military requirements, and I wouldthink reorient some of our programs. So I think that’s a capital point,and we should bring you a recommendation.

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 159

3. The acronym MAP stands for the Military Assistance Program.4. The Kennedy administration was in the midst of a struggle with Congress over the size ofthe following year’s foreign aid budget.

President Kennedy: On whether we ought to agree to the use of tac-tical nuclear weapons in case the Chinese should join the NorthKoreans?

Taylor: That is correct, sir. Take in Korea: If they came across theYalu [River], we’d use them in North Korea at once. We would not, we’dreserve judgment on whether we’d attack targets elsewhere. But if yourmilitary people could have that assumption, I would think there’s apretty good chance of recasting some of our deployments.

William Bundy: May I just comment on that, if I may General? Thisessentially . . . such a study was made on a political-military basis by agroup headed by General Cary of the Air Force, retired Air Force officerunder our auspices—5

Lemnitzer: That’s right.Bundy: —with very close joint staff cooperation, and it came up with

exactly the same conclusion: that if you made this strategic assumption,then you could safely reduce; but pointed out the pros and cons of mak-ing that assumption. In other words if you decide to use nukes sooner, ineffect you’re moving your strategy in Asia in the opposite direction ofwhat you are in Europe, and so on. And we can see all the pros and consof that. I merely say I think the studies exist for this kind of examinationnow. The Joint Chiefs went into it at the same time.

Lemnitzer: We went into it in great detail. If you are in fact loweringthe threshold to the Chinese crossing the river, you’re going to usenuclear weapons. Now that’s quite inconsistent with a policy which we’veexpressed on, certainly in the European area, and generally throughoutthe world. [Five seconds excised as classified information] and apply thesame terms that you would apply in NATO, the strength that you havethere on the ground is going to determine the threshold at which youemploy nuclear weapons. Well, I think, [the] lower the forces, the sooneryou’re going to be required to use nuclear weapons.

Taylor: I think the only thing required now would be to tell us thatyou would like to have a study, that . . . assuming that we’re allowed toplan on the use of nuclear weapons whenever the Chinese come in forceinto North Korea. Then what effect would it have on force structure,then see what came out of it.

Robert McNamara: Mr. President, may I say that that kind of astudy has been made in connection with the fiscal ’64 budget. The Chiefs

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5. General Cary is unidentified.

haven’t had a chance to review it. A General Cary, who’s a retired AirForce General.

President Kennedy mumbles something, probably related to the fact thatBill Bundy has already made the same point while McNamara was outof the room.McNamara: But this ought to be reviewed formally by the Chiefs and

reported to you, and I asked the Chiefs yesterday to—President Kennedy: The point he was making, Mr. Secretary, while

you were absent, [was] that this would in a sense be a reverse of whatwe were attempting to do in Europe.

McNamara: But I think the conditions are reversed. In Europe thereason our strategy [is] as it is, [is] because we’re faced with a nuclearforce and a very strong one. In China we have no nuclear force opposingus. And it seems to me this is enough of a difference to warrant at leastconsideration of a different strategy. And I think—

President Kennedy: Whether you’d say that you would use nuclearweapons . . . on crossing, coming into North Korea, which would not bevery overt, because they could be coming in and out of there in peacetimeconditions or whether you’d wait until they cross the cease-fire line?6

Taylor: Well the intent would be a massive invasion. If it’s not mas-sive, it has no great military significance.

President Kennedy: I would think that if they came en masse, theChinese down, then of course it would be a . . . I would think the morelikely thing would be . . . is they would move there [South Korea] havingmoved against Quemoy and Matsu and our having trouble in Berlin; itwould be part of a worldwide expansion rather than just a single actionthere. That’s the least likely kind of military action for them to take.

Taylor: Well, I think that’s true, that there’s no great feeling that thatis a likely contingency now, but the whole situation in Red China canchange drastically. If, for example, the situation would break in SoutheastAsia, we ourselves might want to put pressure on that part of world.

McNamara: Well, we’re right in an untenable position, I think, at thepresent time. We’re supplying forces which are more than enough tosupport a strategy based on nuclear weapons, but less than enough tocounter a large-scale conventional onslaught. So we don’t have any—

Taylor: We’re not bound by that position.McNamara: And this is why we started these studies, Mr. President.

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 161

6. President Kennedy is referring to a military offensive by the People’s Republic of China.

President Kennedy: I would think that the nuclear, you changed tousing nuclear, I don’t know whether it’s the Yalu River or whether yousay it’s once they cross the cease-fire line in any force. The reason thatwe’re so slow about using nuclear weapons in Europe is, first, becausewe’re against a nuclear force, and second, because of Berlin. Well, yousee, if you didn’t have the Berlin problem, you just had a clean line, youwould use nuclear weapons almost from the beginning if they cameacross in force. That would be a signal [without] [unclear].

Well, we know it isn’t going to come that way; it’s going to comewith difficulty in Berlin, but we might have to take the first action. So Iwould think that we could say that you would use nuclear weapons . . . Idon’t think you could say if they came across the Yalu River, but youcould say that we certainly [would] use it if they attack in force acrossthe [Korean] cease-fire line. That’s—

Taylor: I think that’s the point sir, that we would not be prepared tohold them back by conventional methods if they came en masse. Howthey got there wouldn’t particularly matter.

President Kennedy: What would that free? That might free, whatone or two [divisions] . . . we’ve got two divisions there?

Taylor: Well, we—[unclear].Lemnitzer: I don’t think it would free very much because the divi-

sions we’ve got in Korea are not the new U.S. divisions. They are thedivisions General Taylor, when he was commander of the Eighth Army,organized specifically for the requirements of Korea. They aren’t veryheavy in artillery and transportation, and they aren’t very heavy instrength. They’re smaller than our divisions.

President Kennedy: But we have two divisions there? Do we?Taylor: We have two forward . . . two divisions.President Kennedy: The question is whether they really, is that the

place for them to be, is it?Lemntizer: Well I think it’s the greatest deterrent to the resumption

of hostilities in Korea.President Kennedy: Our two divisions?Lemnitzer: That’s right, and I also think that that representation of

our image in the United Nations command also gives us control of thatsituation, which might otherwise . . . it would pass to some other nation-ality.

McNamara: I think it would free this, Mr. President: In the long runit would free substantial Korean forces. I say [in] the long run becausein the short run they have such a serious unemployment problem; youcouldn’t reduce the military force in Korea today without adverse effects

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962162

in the civilian economy. But in the long run it would free substantialforces, maybe a couple hundred thousand men. In the long run it wouldgreatly reduce our military assistance program because we’re supplyingair power to Korea and to Taiwan, and we will have to supply it toThailand if we continue the present policy, which wouldn’t be required ifwe understood that we could use nuclear weapons, particularly nuclearweapons delivered by U.S. aircraft. So I think both of those effects wouldtake place.

Taylor: That’s correct. The present strength of the armed forces ofSouth Korea [is] about 600,000 as opposed to about 380,000, I think, inNorth Korea. So if you really were setting up your military structure inSouth Korea simply to offset North Korea, manpower-wise, you wouldcertainly think [that] you could make a reduction. But it would have togo with some arrangement that you wouldn’t fear a sudden rush fromthe Chinese across the Yalu. And that would be the response by nuclearweapons.

President Kennedy: The next place was Japan. As a result of yourwire, I sent a memorandum to the secretary of defense about our capitalexpenditures in Japan, our dollar expenditures, which I seem to recallare 350 million?

McNamara: Over 300 [million]; 330, something like that.President Kennedy: Yeah. The limitations which are described . . .

you can’t use it, we certainly couldn’t even use Japan if you really wantedto use it. . . . Doesn’t seem to me they’d probably let you use it, wouldthey?7

Taylor: I think it is a question, sir. I’m afraid [in] my cable . . . Inoticed in the State summary which I didn’t think quite did [unclear]really to my thoughts. [It] is not that the bases aren’t useful—they’revery useful. In fact the Navy and the Air Force would say they’re virtu-ally indispensable, at this time, in time of peace. But if you get into timeof war, then it becomes more and more unfit. And when you look at the,we have some 680 combat aircraft in the Far East to face the Chinese2,800 [planes]. About two-thirds of those are on Japanese bases. Now ifwe start to have war with Red China, it’s very likely, as we’ve indicatedhere, it would be a nuclear war, and whether we could use those . . . theconcerns of the air forces being neutralized, so to speak, by the Japaneselimitations, I don’t know. But it’s certainly a possibility. But I wouldn’t

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 163

7. Kennedy is referring to the Japanese government’s prohibition on the storage of nuclearweapons in Japan.

suggest for a moment that we should close up these bases. But they arenecessary now, but they are not so important that they should really bethe controlling factor in all our foreign policy toward Japan.

William Sullivan:8 Under the present rules, Japan is committed topermit us the use of bases in Japan for the use of our forces against anyresumption of hostilities in Korea. This is a United Nations commitmentwhich the Japanese made. They have made efforts to evade that commit-ment when they entered the United Nations, and we were going to moveour Far East command out of there, but when it was put up on the basisthat their first action would be to deny the U.N. the use of Japanese basesas their first act upon joining the United Nations, it looked a little bitoff-key. They withdrew their proposal.

Now the principal objection, the principal handicap at the presenttime is the question of nuclear weapons in Japan. Japan is emotionally,well they’re fanatical about nuclear weapons for understandable reasons.

Forty-two seconds excised as classified information.Taylor: One other broad question, Mr. President, is the proper mix or

the proper balance between indigenous forces and our own forces whenwe consider them packages for military purposes. Years ago, when themilitary aid program started in the Far East, the thought was that prima-rily we’d be supporting ground forces. We were going to always have asmall army. We would need the training of oriental manpower to help ushold the line in any given sensitive area. Meanwhile our Navy and ourAir Force would utilize their mobility and their striking power and theirsophisticated weapons to back up the ground forces, largely indigenous.In the course of the years, that’s changed, rather surprisingly. At least Iwas surprised at the extent now we are planning to give sophisticatedweapons, advanced interceptors, some naval craft of some sophisticationto these indigenous forces. And I think it’s very timely for us to reexam-ine this whole question of what is the proper mix, what should be theobjective of these forces. Now really, it’s saying in Pentagon language, toreexamine the MAP objectives which we have country by country.

In countries such as Korea and Taiwan, for example, we use suchbroad language as to say these forces are to assist U.S. forces extensivelyin the event of general war. Well, that is so broad it could mean almostanything. And I personally have the feeling that we should reallysharpen our objectives so that they state more specifically what are the

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962164

8. A sample of William Sullivan’s voice was not available. This identification is based on ananalysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.

common-sense reasonable objectives at this time. That’s something forDOD, for the JCS and State to work out.

In Southeast Asia, Mr. President, of course the threat is quite differ-ent. You’re impressed always that the diversity of insurgency is really theopen enemy in the four countries that we’re most concerned with. I had avery interesting stop in South Vietnam. It was only one of these shortones, two and a half days, and I saw many people and did a certainamount of traveling. One of my most interesting experiences was callingin eight junior officers, who were attached to . . . American officersattached to the South Vietnamese units, to try to get a grassroots feelingof how these young officers felt about their job, how they were gettingalong with the local officials, and so on. I’m sure you would get a greatdeal of encouragement out of hearing these young officers. They’re keenas they can be. They like what they’re doing. They realize the importanceof their mission, and none of them would say they [have] had any realdifficulties in their personal relationships with the South Vietnamese offi-cers. I asked that question because the press, just shortly before myarrival, carried some such statement, and I would say based upon myobservations and many discussions it just isn’t so.

How are we doing there? Of course I’ve read the reports as all of ushave over the last 10 or 11 months, but really you have to be on the groundto sense a lift in the national morale. It was right on the ground lastOctober when I was there. The hamlet program is indicative I would thinkof the greater public popular support. They have either fortified or [are] in[the] course of fortification [of] some 5,000 hamlets out of the total16,000. This is done very largely by voluntary work on the part of the localpeople with very little government guidance. They’re getting some, but theprogrammer, they ran away from the government plan. Also, it’s some-thing to see, the over 100,000 mountaineers, the Montagnards, who’vecome out of the mountains, left their fields, left the areas in which theywant to live in order to escape communism. [Seven seconds excised as classi-fied information.] Cleaning up the villages, getting adequate defenses forthem, and also bringing in new and improved agricultural methods, so thatthe whole life of the Montagnards for the first time is showing some signsof promise.

President Kennedy: We saw the minister this morning.9 He dis-

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 165

9. A reference to Nguyen Dinh Thuan, the coordinating secretary of state for security ofSouth Vietnam. He met with President Kennedy that morning to discuss, among other mat-ters, the crop destruction program.

cussed with us this question of using pesticides against their food, and Itold him we’d give them an answer one way or another by the end of theweek. They wanted to try some test runs up in areas which are clearlyVietcong.

Taylor: They are very anxious to do that.President Kennedy: [Unclear.] All the pluses and minuses about it.

What’s our judgment about it? I thought we ought to answer him oneway or the other.

Taylor: Well, this has been talked back and forth between State andDefense for some time. And most people are unanimous in saying thatthis rather modest initial effort should be tried.

President Kennedy: What about [Lieutenant General Paul D.]Harkins? What does he think?

Taylor: He’s all for it. Also, Diem is for it.President Kennedy: Can they tell, do you think, which are which—Robert Komer:10 This has been the problem in our mind, Mr. President,

as to whether or not you can identify the Vietcong–held fields from theMontagnard fields. And—

President Kennedy: They say [unclear] rice is planted in a straighterline. Is there any other way? They say that in the areas which they aretalking about, they say they can. I don’t know whether—

Taylor: Well they know areas that are denied to the governmentforces [where] you have to fight your way in. And the assumption is thatany rice in there is going to be used by the enemy, regardless of what thepolitical coloration of the man who actually planted the rice.

Unidentified: Yes.McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t think any of us here can say for

sure whether they can tell. But what we can say is that the ambassador iswholeheartedly in support of it, our military planners are wholeheart-edly in support of it, and I believe that the risk of a trial is low. And Iwould strongly urge therefore we try it.

President Kennedy: What can we do about keeping it from becomingan American enterprise which would be surfaced with poisoning food?11

McNamara: I think we’ll be charged with that.Taylor: We can’t avoid it.McNamara: We can do quite a bit to avoid it.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962166

10. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Robert Komer’s voice was not available. Thisidentification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.11. The President is using surfaced to mean “revealed to be involved.”

President Kennedy: Should we have Vietnamese—Taylor: They will put it down.McNamara: They will put it down. It would be done in their aircraft.Komer: How about the season? Is it?President Kennedy: Yes, [can we do it] now?Unidentified: Is it the time in the season? [Unclear exchange.]McNamara: There’s about eight weeks left.Unidentified: There are.Unidentified: Well, let’s try it then.Taylor: There is some experience with this in Malaya, isn’t that

right? One of those two groups there.Komer: I don’t know that they used—President Kennedy: I think that’d be worth having if the British did

it. That would be pretty . . . Lemnitzer: The British did do it in Malaya, Mr. President, yes.Unidentified: They used . . .Komer: Well, I think psychologically, Mr. President, there’s some-

thing different between a man going in with it and spraying it on theground and doing it from a plane or from a helicopter. I’m not arguingagainst it on this ground but I do point out that there is this—

President Kennedy: The British did it on the ground?Komer: No, they did it both, and of course we’re now doing it, we’re

now using napalm. The British used napalm. In many ways napalm ismuch nastier than the—

Unidentified: Nastier . . .President Kennedy: To burn up food, we’re doing that?Komer: Yes. Yes, and napalm destroys the use of the soil also. Very

simple, whereas the insecticides, or these—what do you call them?—herbicides do not.

Bundy: I think the British also did this at the very end of, towards theend, at any rate, of their campaign in Malaya when they had the ChineseCommunists boxed in small jungle areas fairly well identified.

Unidentified: Well identified. There was no question—Bundy: There was no question that there was any mixture of friendly

people in those areas.President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we send out the word, and let’s

take a look at what the instructions are so they understand all the . . .Averell Harriman: It’s too late. [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear.] No, they say—McNamara: No, it’s definitely not too late. There are about eight

weeks left.

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 167

Harriman: No, I don’t know, our people think that basically the peas-ant, whoever he is, is the one who eats the food. Two, 3 percent, or 5 per-cent, or 6 percent or 8 percent of Vietcong get around and that food istaken away from whoever the peasant may be. That’s the argument thatour people make very strongly. There’s no such thing as fields, that weknow of, fields that have been grown for Vietcong. They are grown forthe villagers themselves, and that’s the argument against it, and that thiswould not be depriving the Vietcong of a grain of food.

President Kennedy: Well, couldn’t we have some . . . ? It seems to methere would have to be some proposal made that food would be suppliedto these areas by the government. Then the government would be ableto distribute—

Taylor: Once they get in, sir. But at this time these are closed areas,no one—

Komer: Part of the problem is, if you destroy the crops, theMontagnards come out. . . . Then being prepared to take care of themwhen they do come out.

Well, now this is fairly well along [unclear], as I understand it.Unidentified: That’s right.McNamara: This, we have a program to do.Komer: Yes, that’s . . .Harriman: Our people have been through it, in China and elsewhere.

The loss will far, the losses among the peasants will far outweigh such arelatively small gain in taking away the food from the Vietcong. Butthat’s the amount of judgment which our people [feel] very strong, for[whatever it’s worth].

President Kennedy: Who’s that? Who would that be, Governor?Harriman: Huh?President Kennedy: Who are those people?Harriman: Well, Rice, who has been through it in China and seen

what happened when you prejudice the peasants against you, and hethinks the whole thing is going to be won on the basis of whether thepeasants are with you or not.12 Come in and destroy their crops. . . . Whyit builds up an antagonism which is very hard to break.

Bundy: I think that Roger Hilsman’s theory on this is somewhat sim-ilar, for what it’s worth. It’s mainly that if you can identify the enemyvery precisely and be sure that you’re not getting possibly friendly peas-ants hurt too, then . . . it’s good to do it if it can be done in a rather large

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962168

12. E. E. Rice was a Foreign Service officer assigned to the Policy Planning Staff.

scale because then you really want to get real military advantage com-mensurate with the political risk. There’s some worry that doing it justin a few very small areas, we might take an awful political whacking andnot really get—

President Kennedy: The job done.Bundy: The big military job done.Harriman: And then it makes the local population ready to join the

Vietcong and changes the whole atmosphere. [Unclear.]Taylor: Well this is another form of bombing. I think it’s the same

problem. We have the . . . Harriman: It’s a very strong political argument against it from those

people who have had experience in this.President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we . . . without putting an impos-

sible burden on them, why don’t we say that we are now leaning, or inclin-ing towards permitting this program, and that we would like to . . .

First, is there sufficient time to make it effective? Number two, can itbe done on a wide enough scale and yet with accuracy to make it worth-while? And three, what is the technique they’re going to use to detectwhat areas they are going to do and what is the system they are going touse to determine what is Vietcong and what isn’t? And then what proce-dure would they make to take care adequately of the people who are notVietcong, but who are damaged or find themselves short of food? Andthen if we get an answer back, in 48 hours or so, then we can make a finaljudgment on it. Try to tell them we’ll give them a final answer when weget back. There may be some other questions we ought to ask them.

Komer: Those are the principal ones.Taylor: Those are the principal ones, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Well, then, we ought to try to tell them we’ll

give them a final answer by the weekend. I’m sure they don’t want toscrew around any longer.

Taylor: One of the things, Mr. President, we need to look at with alittle more, greater attention, is the best method of reporting ourprogress. In other words, how are we doing? We’re always asking our-selves that. We have never had a very good way to answer except by feel.I found that General Harkins has anticipated this to a certain degree,and now puts out a questionnaire, a rather heavy questionnaire, to all themilitary people in the field, so that once a month they report back indica-tors such as ability to go in certain villages where they hadn’t beenbefore, and so on.

My comment to the ambassador was that I thought that this shouldbe a country team affair so that all the questions, the political questions,

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 169

[would] get injected into the same kind of questionnaire, and that oncea month we get a complete poll across the board in those areas thatwe’re interested in.

Komer: As you know we suggested to the ambassador, and I thinkhe’s accepted this, that we send a group of Vietnamese-speaking foreignservice officers out. To station one in each of these important areas tomaintain contact with the [unclear] people to maintain contact with thelocal officials and the people and try to be [the] eyes and ears of theambassador and the country team to help answer this question. Thiswould be supplementary to—

Taylor: All these things should be done. But now we have literallyhundreds of Americans all through Vietnam who are qualified observersand they should be passing in—

Komer: That’s great. And it’s a problem of getting the informationfrom them really. They’re all busy people.

Unidentified: Three are being established outside of Saigon, andthey will serve as sort of vacuum cleaners to pick this stuff [out] . . .

Komer: Yes.Taylor: Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Mr. President, I stopped in

Cambodia and had the first insight into the [Prince Norodom] Sihanoukpersonality.13 [Laughter.]. He couldn’t have been nicer, and I told him Idon’t know why you have troubles with this man. [Laughter.] In bothThailand and Cambodia we have a real problem of emotionalism on thequestion of who to support.

President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.Taylor: Sir?President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.Taylor: Yes, and perhaps even more so right now. Sihanouk is a wild

man, as you know, and he really believes that both of his neighbors onthe right and the left are his enemies, mortal enemies, historicalenemies.14 These invasions are just feeling him out, that someday they’dlike to come over and stay. He believes that. I don’t think there’s any-thing phony about it.

Then you get over and talk to [Marshal Thanarat] Sarit, and he is ofcourse a wise old pro and a tough old cookie, but he gives us a prettygood beating now.15 Oh, I think he really doesn’t mean it. He smiles when

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962170

13. Sihanouk was the Cambodian chief of state.14. Sihanouk viewed both South Vietnam, on the right, and Thailand, to his left, as enemies.15. Sarit was the Thai prime minister.

he calls us these names, but he has behind him his people worried aboutCambodia because of the very modest military aid. They are painting thepicture of attacks by Cambodia. I said I had more confidence in the Thaiarmed forces than Sarit did, and he really thought that was a possibility.

President Kennedy: How much are we giving them in our aid pro-gram? To Cambodia?

McNamara: Eleven million.Taylor: Eleven million and change to Cambodia. Yeah.President Kennedy: [Unclear.] And what are we giving Thailand?A group of voices says, “Eighty million,” then, “About eighty million.”Taylor: The real issue now is not the basic Cambodia program, but a

little increment which represented the equipment for three infantry bat-talions and one so-called frontier battalion which Sihanouk wouldundertake to put in the northeast frontier to help stop the infiltration:Something we’re all for. It makes all the sense in the world. And nowthat we’ve had to pay this price in Thai relations, I would say we oughtto go ahead and do it. It’s about 1.7 million as I recall some [unclear].

Unidentified: That’s rightU. Alexis Johnson (?): Part of this problem, Mr. President, is also a

problem of diplomacy here, if you will. The problem of the Thais readingthis in the newspapers first—of course, anything that comes out inPhnom Penh leaks, and it leaks to the Thais through the newspapers—instead of our being able to tell them directly. To the degree that we cantell the Thai about these things before they read them in the newspapers,of course we can help. But then there’s the problem of the Thai thentalking and Sihanouk reading it. [Some laughter.]

Komer: Well, the Cambodians deliberately did this once so the Thais . . .Johnson: They deliberately did this. The Cambodians deliberately

did this to—Unidentified: Yes.Johnson: We couldn’t stop it.Unidentified: We couldn’t stop it.Lemnitzer: This has an impact on the Vietnamese situation because

the only way that that border is going to be properly policed is for thesebattalions or other Cambodian battalions to get up there and prevent theVietcong from circulating back and forth.

Taylor: Well they’re trying to get us also to have some of the U.N.presence that’s been talked about, or some device like that. Perhaps ajoint military commission with the Vietnamese. Because these borderincidents are going to continue by the very nature of that frontier, andthey’re going to be a source of constant disturbance in our relations.

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 171

Unidentified: That’s right.Johnson: The problem here is that it’s very difficult to establish a

U.N. presence between Cambodia and South Vietnam because [of]South Vietnam not being a member of the U.N. You can establish a U.N.presence, if both sides have agreed in principle, between Thailand andCambodia. Again here, Mr. President, the problem is one of diplomacy.The lack of any effective real communication between the Cambodiansand the Thai. And if you can put a U.N. man in there to act as a go-between and a communicator, then this will . . .

President Kennedy: What is the status of that?Johnson: The status of that is now that U Thant is going to talk to

both the Thai and the Cambodians at New York; now is my under-standing.

Harriman: Yes. And they were going to select, they hoped to select aBurmese.

Johnson: I’m very . . . I question the selection of a Burmese, anyway.Let them work that out.

Harriman: They want to do it, but they’ve both agreed to this.Johnson: They have agreed to a Burmese?Harriman: Yes.Johnson: All right, fine.Taylor: I would like to pick up the comment by Mr. Johnson with

regard to the partition nature of Southeast Asia. To us it’s one strategicarea. We have a common problem there, and we are succeeding reason-ably well in unifying our efforts. It’s been a real step forward, I think, onthe military side to have General Harkins. That ties together the twoprincipal programs.

I must say we’re still partitioned, though, in other ways. Our coun-tries are partitioned. I think our people stationed in these countries get“localitis.” I found that the people over in South Vietnam were fighting[President Ngo dinh] Diem’s battle versus the Cambodians. But inCambodia they are fighting Sihanouk’s battle versus Diem. Now, thethought may not be worth much, but I would think that to have ourambassadors and our heads of MAAG get together once a quarter, justto break down these barriers and frontiers which have certain psycho-logical disadvantages to our own operations, would be good.16 Whetheryou’d ever get Sarit, and Sihanouk and some of those people in a summit,southeast summit, I don’t know.

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962172

16. The acronym MAAG stands for Military Assistance Advisory Group.

Johnson: Now, that would blow up.Taylor: Well it might.Johnson: But I entirely agree, Max, on our ambassadors. I think it’s

very important. When I was out there, we used to meet once every fourto five months. Laos, our own people, we always used to get together inVientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon. And we’ve encouragedthat again. It’s a problem of finding the time for them to do it. That wasa most useful device. In the MAAG case, too, we used to get together.

Taylor: Well, they all have common problems now.President Kennedy: Why don’t we get a report of when they last all

met, [can we] get the report when they last met?Unidentified: They last all met in Baguio, I think.Kennedy asks a question apparently about the date of that meeting andan unclear exchange follows.McNamara: Well the last three were there with us in Honolulu. We

had the MAAG chiefs and the three ambassadors there on July 24th.Unidentified: Yes, we did in Honolulu, that’s right. [Unclear] stayed

over a day.Taylor: But moving from capital to capital within the area I would

think would have some symbolic effect of stressing the neighborhoodquality of this whole problem.

Unidentified: Very much so.Taylor: Just a couple of other questions, Mr. President . . . comments

rather. One is Thailand. I would say that Ambassador [Kenneth T.]Young has a very tough problem there, a very complex problem, inpulling together all the resources in the way that you’ve been stressingacross the board: military, economic, and so on.17 He’s had trouble in get-ting his plans in because they are complex. I think he may be short ofpeople. I’m not sure. I know he personally feels he ought to have[unclear] assist him, and I reported this to Johnson.

President Kennedy: Yes.Taylor: But he’s got a real problem. Of all the ambassadors, I think he

has more of a problem perhaps even than [Frederick E.] Nolting, [Jr.]does.18 Because Nolting’s job is pretty well laid out in front of him now.

My final stop was Indonesia where I had a very good—President Kennedy: Did you make a suggestion in your cable about

some internal security system being appointed to Young?

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 173

17. Kenneth Young was U.S. ambassador to Thailand, 29 March 1961 to 19 August 1963.18. Frederick Nolting was U.S. ambassador in South Vietnam, 10 May 1961 to 15 August 1963.

Taylor: Yes, sir, I did.Bundy: We are going ahead with that here.Taylor: In Indonesia I had an inconsequential meeting with Sukarno,19

but a very, very useful contact with the military, particularly with[Lieutenant General Abdul] Nasution and the army chief of staff, Yani.20

Nasution, was very frank, indeed, with describing the internal problems. Ofcourse he knows the military forces are popular with us, and he obviouslywants to keep before us the fact they are the balance wheel or the stabiliz-ing influence vis-à-vis the Communist element in the country.

He has started a civic action program in his armed forces very muchalong the model which we had in Korea, one which I think should havelong-term benefits.

Of course the whole country is burdened and will be burdened for[an] indefinite number of years in the future by the saddle of debt to theSoviet Union. As you know they have received credits and actuallydrawn down credits of almost a billion dollars in military equipment.They have some 500 million in economic credits. How far they’ve beendrawn down, I don’t know. But you really can visualize a country mort-gaged for the indefinite future to the Soviets.

Yet on the military side the military men now [are] regretting it,saying, “Yes of course we thought we were going to war over West Irian.Now we’d like to turn back; we would like to give back some of thisequipment and turn to the West.” But they can’t do it. My own feeling iswe should give some aid to Indonesia, a small amount. In the militaryfield they need very little, LSTs, things of that sort, plus some supportfor this civic action program, which really, I think, holds real promiselargely in the political field.21

President Kennedy: Have we got any Indonesian officers traininghere?

Taylor: Yes, sir, we’ve always had. That program has never stopped.We ought to give them just as many spaces as they can use.

Sullivan: This was reviewed by, you were there Averell, I think, in NewYork with the Secretary and [Indonesian foreign minister] Subandrio?

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962174

19. Taylor notes in his memoirs that Sukarno talked at length “on the charms of his favoritestars of Hollywood.”20. Lieutenant General Abdul Nasution was chief of staff of the Indonesian armed forces andminister of defense.21. The abbreviation LST stands for landing ship, tank.

Harriman: Yes, I met Subandrio for lunch, met three hours with him.He made it very plain that they wanted to get out from under theRussian influence. That’s going to be a tough thing to do, until they getthis loan paid off.

Taylor: Yes, it will be a long time.Harriman: But I think we ought to continue. . . . I told him I thought

we ought to give him preliminary assistance and then study out theirprogram. But they’ll have to work something out with the IMF, andthey’re not very keen to do it, and I think we ought to hold back alonger-range program until they develop a program which the IMFapproves. But in the meantime, given that industry is down 30 percentsome of it, give them little spare parts and raw materials which shouldhelp them off base. Indicate that we are ready to help them when theyput their house in order.

President Kennedy: The main purpose of this buildup was WestIrian, was it?

Taylor: Yes, sir.Unidentified: Have they delivered . . . ?Unidentified: I think.Taylor: Most of it’s either delivered or in the pipeline. Apparently

Sukarno and Khrushchev got together and agreed they’d put all thesteam into this thing they could. And they really, really have accom-plished it. I asked couldn’t they cancel or turn back anything, and theysaid most of the high-money-value articles have been delivered or are onthe way.

President Kennedy: Are they pleased there was a peaceful settlementof West Irian or they’d rather . . . ?

Taylor: Sir?President Kennedy: Are they pleased that there was a peaceful settle-

ment?Taylor: Oh, yes. Very happy about it. Very happy about our activities

in [unclear] that . . .President Kennedy: How much did the . . . Did we ever find out how

much the Dutch put in there as far as troops? Five thousand was it orwhat? I noticed this story Marquis Childs had yesterday about all this . . .22

Unidentified: They were building up to 10,000 but I don’t think theyever got there, sir. It was around 6[,000] or 7,000. [Unclear.]

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 175

22. Childs wrote a syndicated column that the President often read.

President Kennedy: That’s all they put into all of West Irian?Unidentified: I don’t think they ever got higher than that.Unidentified: It was very low.President Kennedy: What do the Indonesians have under arms, do

we know?Unidentified: Maybe 350,000 now under arms, but they got about

1,200 men on the island. That’s all they have.Taylor: They infiltrated about 2,000 into West Irian.Unidentified: I think we’ve got it at around 1,200.Taylor: Well, those are the principal points, Mr. President.President Kennedy: What about . . . we were going to talk about

whether we withdraw, what we do about the withdrawal of the MAAGfrom Laos.23

Michael Forrestal:24 Sir, we’re having a meeting for you on that onFriday if that would be all right with you.25 We haven’t quite gotten that,the program . . .

President Kennedy: Governor, do you think?Carl Kaysen: I think we were waiting on the [Central Intelligence]

agency—President Kennedy: SNIE?26

Kaysen: —[to] get an estimate, round up all the intelligence materialso we had the latest agreed statement on what’s happening, and that’sdue as I understand it, Thursday. We have a meeting then.

President Kennedy: I talked to the minister, I guess you may . . . onthis question of, this morning, [unclear] this question of this. We’ll justhave to wait and see what they do on that.

Kaysen: South Vietnam.Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation [on Laos].Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation, yes.Unidentified: They seem to be drawing back slightly on that, don’t

they?Unidentified: Yes, there’s hope. There appears to be hope in the cable.President Kennedy: OK. All right. Is that all?

T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 25, 1962176

23. The Geneva Declaration on Laos required U.S. military personnel to leave the country by7 October.24. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Michael Forrestal’s voice was not available.This identification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.25. See “Meeting on Laos,” 28 September 1962.26. Special National Intelligence Estimate.

McNamara: Mr. President, I can report to you that we met withPresident Ayub this morning for an hour and a quarter on the MAP pro-gram.27 [Laughter.]

President Kennedy: He said he had a lot to take up with you. [Morelaughter.]

McNamara: More with you than with me, I think. We said yes and noin the appropriate places and gave firm answers. He said he’d rather haveno than maybe. So we gave no in the places where it seemed suitable, andthen we broke up on, I thought, very friendly terms.

President Kennedy: [Unclear.]McNamara: Yes, sir. And [Walter P.] McConaughy has since

reported to me Ayub was pleased with the results.28 We didn’t increasethe military assistance program above the amounts we had previouslydecided upon. [Laughter.]

McNamara: I think it is fair to say we performed poorly last year. Wedidn’t deliver nearly as much as we could have or should have. So we, ineffect, told him that, and that we have a plan for increasing our deliveriesfor next year.

Unidentified: Is John McCone going to see him?President Kennedy: Yes, Thursday.McNamara: Thursday. I talked to McCone after I talked to Ayub this

morning.Papers rustle; people get up and talk over each other. This indistinctchatting continues for over five minutes; then there is silence until thetape runs out.

This was the last formal meeting of the day. Kennedy’s movementsafterward are not clear from the official record. At 10:15 P.M. he departedthe White House for the National Theater to meet up with the FirstLady and his mother, Rose Kennedy, to catch the second act of Mr.President. Afterward, the presidential party attended an after-theatersupper party at the British Embassy.

Meeting with Maxwel l Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip 177

27. Ayub Khan was president of Pakistan.28. Walter P. McConaughy was U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and formerly the assistant secre-tary of state for Far Eastern affairs, 24 April to 3 December 1961.

F R I DAY, S E P T E M B E R 28, 1962178

Friday, September 28, 1962

The President had ahead of him a busy morning of varied engagements.He was due to meet with George Meany of the AFL-CIO and a youngstaffer in the Department of Labor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Then hewould turn to an off-the-record discussion of New York State politicswith the two main Democratic nominees for governor and the U.S.Senate repectively, Robert Morgenthau and James B. Donovan. Donovancarried another hat around the U.S. government these days. In the midstof campaigning for the Senate, he was the central figure in the adminis-tration’s secret negotiations with Fidel Castro over the release of the1,105 men captured during the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961. Finally,after the presentation of the report of the President’s Committee toAppraise Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Kennedy wouldhave a short talk with the prime minister of New Zealand before headinginto a high-level meeting on handling policy in Southeast Asia.

11:30 A.M.–12:03 P.M.

The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as manyof their North Vietnamese forces and military advisers inLaos as they can do with safety.

Meeting on Laos1

President Kennedy had few achievements to show for his efforts toimprove U.S.-Soviet relations. The one exception was an agreement toneutralize tiny Laos. Lying athwart the Mekong River, it bridgedThailand and Cambodia in the east and the two Vietnams in the west.Signed in July 1962, the Geneva Accords provided for the withdrawal of

1. George Ball, William Bundy, Ray Cline, Roswell Gilpatric, Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman,Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, and Maxwell Taylor attended the meeting. Tape 25, JohnF. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

all foreign advisers and troops from this strategic real estate.2 This repre-sented a possible improvement of the situation from the U.S. perspective.The military position of the Royal Lao government had so deteriorated inthe spring that in early June the Kennedy administration seriously consid-ered sending some 40,000 U.S. troops to occupy the southern portion ofthe country. Before a decision had to be made in Washington, the situationstabilized. In mid-June, the Lao elite formed a national coalition govern-ment and the Geneva agreement was reached. With only a week to gobefore the first major test of the uneasy peace, Kennedy gathered his Laosteam to discuss the progress of the Communist compliance. As of October7, all foreign military advisers were to have left the country. In materialsdistributed before the meeting, Kennedy’s advisers made clear theirassumption that the Communists would violate the Geneva agreement.The North Vietnamese, in particular, were expected to maintain a militarypresence in the country, to backstop the Communist Pathet Lao forces.Kennedy faced the decision of whether the United States would adhere tothe letter of the agreement and pull out all U.S. military assistance teams.

Unidentified: [starts in midsentence] . . . later Secretary Ball andGovernor Harriman will run through for you the . . . their planning andthen perhaps after that the Defense Department, Secretary McNamara,[and] Generals [Maxwell] Taylor and [unclear] might wish to com-ment on the military aspects of it.

Ray Cline:3 Sir, the United States Intelligence Board [USIB] approveda paper on Laos on Wednesday.4 I have advance copies of it here, which Iwill distribute to those who are interested.

With respect to the problems that we are primarily concerned with—the implementation of the Geneva accords—some major conclusionswere reached which I’d just like to read.

Conclusion on the Communist intentions is as follows: [reading] “TheCommunists will seek to expand their influence and power in Laos withthe ultimate aim of achieving effective control over all of the country. To

Meeting on Laos 179

2. These were the “Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos” and a 20-article protocol. They areprinted in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (Washington, DC: Department of State,1962), pp. 1075–83.3. Ray Cline was deputy director for intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency.4. The USIB was a interagency organization, under the chairmanship of the CIA, that over-saw the production of national intelligence estimates.

this end they will nominally support the Souvanna-led government pro-ceeding toward their goal mainly through political and subversive means.

“The Communists”—the next conclusion that is relevant to this is—“The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many of theirNorth Vietnamese forces and military advisers in Laos as they can dowith safety. Souvanna [Phouma] will almost certainly be unable to pre-vent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting theVietcong effort into South Vietnam.”

I think the . . . those are the conclusions relevant to the GenevaAccords. In addition, they reached a number of conclusions on the fragilityof the political coalition in Vientiane. Unless there are specific questions, I[unclear] the facts . . . if you want to read them. They are available here.

We have no evidence of an intention to withdraw all of the Vietminhtroops before October the 7th. Our own working estimate is that proba-bly about 7,500, 7,000 to 8,000, Vietminh troops and advisers are still inLaos. And there is very solid evidence of their intention to conceal atleast a considerable part of those troops by disguising them as PathetLao or Lao troops.

I think that’s the general picture. We have a great deal of data onwhat is actually going on in different parts of the country.

President Kennedy: What do we think is their—Did Secretary Ruskhave any success with his conversation with Gromyko in regard toSoviet resupply? [Cline begins to speak but Kennedy cuts him off.] Or arethey blaming him because, they say, we’re doing the Meo business, theSoviet Union—5

Cline: Yes, sir. I would say that the conversation with Gromyko wasnot very satisfactory. That he indicated it was all our fault and said that—

President Kennedy: For what reason? What have we done wrong?Cline: He specifically spoke about the supply of the Meo. But Hanoi—

he also referred to propaganda statements which the Communists arenow making which say that we are not intending to withdraw our troopsat all, either, that we are disguising them in—

Kennedy turns off the machine. The meeting continued for another 25minutes.

At this meeting Kennedy decided to proceed with strict adherence to theterms of the Geneva Accords. However, the United States would make a

F R I DAY, S E P T E M B E R 28, 1962180

5. The Meo were anti-Communist mountain people who were U.S. allies.

substantial payment to the coalition government in Vientiane. Moreover,in order to prepare for the expected Communist violations, Kennedyinstructed his team to develop the necessary intelligence sources so thatthe world, especially the International Control Commission responsiblefor supervising the accord, could be made aware of the violations in goodorder. Finally, as insurance against any further deterioration of the U.S.position in the region, Kennedy ordered the retention of U.S. troops inneighboring Thailand.6

Ironically, the most likely use of U.S. forces in the near future was notin far-off Asia but at home in the Deep South. Two of the men at the Laosmeeting had just come from a meeting at the Pentagon War Room withAttorney General Robert Kennedy. The Governor of Mississippi wasresisting a court order to allow an African American James Meredith—toregister at the main campus of the University of Mississippi system. ThePresident had no meetings scheduled this day to discuss the progress ofnegotiations between Mississippi governor Ross Barnett and theAttorney General. But he was certainly kept informed of his brother’sefforts to avoid a military showdown like that which had happened inLittle Rock, Arkansas, in 1957.

Saturday, September 29, 1962

The President was supposed to be in Newport, Rhode Island, for theweekend. However, he delayed his departure and went into the office at9:55 A.M. His first visitors were the incoming Chairman of the JointChiefs, Maxwell Taylor, who stayed about half an hour, and Michael V.Forrestal, son of legendary Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and akey member of the President’s National Security Council staff, particu-larly on issues dealing with Southeast Asia. Twenty minutes afterForrestal’s departure, the President welcomed his two closest Kremlinwatchers for a seminar on Nikita Khrushchev.

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962 181

6. See National Security Action Memorandum No. 189, 28 September 1962, FRUS, 24: 904.

11:00 A.M.–12:27 P.M.

Generally speaking, I think, Khrushchev has felt, at least upuntil recently, that things are going his way and he needn’ttake any risks, that he is playing for the big stakes and not thesmall.

Meeting on the Soviet Union1

President Kennedy had just received a letter from Soviet leader NikitaKhrushchev by way of their top secret back channel. One of the dangersof the President’s back-channel diplomacy with the Russians throughRobert Kennedy was that a careless remark might lead to serious misun-derstanding. It appeared from the letter that the Soviet leadershipunderstood Robert Kennedy to have said in a private meeting withSoviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that Washington would accept along-term moratorium on underground testing following the signing ofan atmospheric test ban. It was a Soviet objective to halt testing under-ground. Given U.S. insistence on a strict verification system to strengthenany comprehensive test ban, it seemed most likely that the superpowerswould only manage to agree on a partial test ban. Nevertheless, theSoviets hoped to make a moratorium on underground testing a precon-dition to any partial test ban. Kennedy knew what his answer would beto this Soviet misunderstanding.

Kennedy made sporadic use of the administration’s top Sovietexperts.2 Between them, Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen hadnine years’ experience as U.S. ambassador in the Soviet Union and hadwitnessed Khrushchev’s rise to power.3 The President knew Bohlen muchbetter than Thompson but had not even consulted Bohlen before he sentthe Attorney General to see Dobrynin. On this Saturday, he called themin to help shape his response to Khrushchev. The U.S. congressional elec-tions were only five weeks away, after which, Kennedy assumed, the

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962182

1. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, and later JeromeWiesner. President Kennedy also has a telephone conversation with Senator Henry Jacksonduring the latter part of the meeting. Tape 25, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s OfficeFiles, Presidential Recordings Collection.2. Timothy Naftali Interview with McGeorge Bundy, 16 November 1995.3. Charles “Chip” E. Bohlen was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957.Thompson succeeded him and stayed until his return in August.

Soviets would initiate a new, more dangerous challenge to the status quoin West Berlin—a warning Khrushchev repeated in his letter.

Later the President’s science adviser, Jerome Wiesner, would join theconversation. Wiesner would not be told that Khrushchev had writtendirectly to the President. Instead, in another demonstration of how infor-mation could be compartmentalized even among the President’s closestadvisers, President Kennedy would ask Wiesner to suggest responses tocertain Soviet attacks on the U.S. negotiating position at the test bantalks, never letting on where these allegations had come from.

Kennedy started taping as Bohlen was reminiscing about his experi-ences with Khrushchev. Thompson can be heard deferring somewhat toBohlen, a better linguist and more-experienced, though not necessarilybetter, Kremlinologist.

Charles Bohlen: [tape fades in] . . . other than that [unclear] he con-tinues—his wife was the one that’s—but she’s crippled.

Llewellyn Thompson: Yeah.Bohlen: And after the breakup of the Summit in Paris [in 1960], she

rushed down to the airport when Khrushchev was leaving and presentedhim with a big bunch of roses.

Thompson: Yeah, that’s right.President Kennedy: But [unclear] . . . that is assuming he wants to

talk to [unclear] but at least I would [unclear] that part of it. [Unclear.]Thompson: And this letter, Chip says, is—Bohlen: This letter is clearly an appeal [unclear] to a meeting, per-

haps. This letter . . . I don’t know if this . . . [unclear] is worse.President Kennedy: Oh, it’s not worse. It’s just the transparency of it

is less [unclear] are the Russians. Well, I’d like to have him be a little less. . . [reading aloud from the most recent letter from Soviet premier NikitaKhrushchev] “I would like to note with satisfaction that you now seem toagree in principle that along with the conclusion of the treaty with . . . amoratorium.”4

Bohlen: We had never agreed to that, at all.

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 183

4. The exact line runs: “I would like to note with satisfaction that now you seem to agree inprinciple that along with the conclusion of a treaty on the ban of nuclear weapons tests in theatmosphere, in outer space and under water a moratorium with regard to undergroundexplosions be accepted” (Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, 28 September 1962,FRUS, 6: 152–61).

President Kennedy: That’s right. [continuing to read] “If this is so,then it opens certain prospects.”

Bohlen: Do you think that’s anything that Bobby might have toldhim?

President Kennedy: No, but Bobby would. . . . Well, I think Bobbydid—5

Bohlen: Did say something.President Kennedy: Bobby did say maybe for a period of six

months—Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: —but not an indefinite one. It seemed to me there

was nothing wrong with . . . just not quite in that form. In a legal thing . . .that there should be no unlimited moratorium. . . . Yeah, I [unclear] to saysomething. But we never put the question that way. We are not proposing[unclear] unlimited, we [unclear] just for a certain period of time. Ofcourse I always knew they would do that the first time it’s needed for . . .But then it seems to me we could follow that up quickly.

Bohlen: Yes, if it . . . what he’s saying is that after the period of mora-torium, he proposes five years, which is nonsense, of course, but . . . Hesays that if at the end of that time you haven’t reached an agreement on atreaty for [the] underground thing, then you agree to reexamine thewhole thing. In other words, any treaty that you might sign for theatmosphere or something like that, would be conditional.

President Kennedy: Well, I think Bobby used the six-months phrase;obviously five years . . .

What is your judgment as to why they won’t take an atmospherictest?6 Because they can’t underground . . . they can’t test undergroundas well as we can? Is that the reason?

Bohlen: This might be the reason; but I also think there probably issome element of principle in their, in the . . . Tommy, would you? . . .They may fear that we’ve got some tricks or scientific gimmick that’sgoing to increase our . . . He says it, in essence, he’s not going to make a[unclear].

President Kennedy: [reading] “If, however, even during that term . . .then the whole question of a ban will have to be reconsidered anew. Andif . . . insists . . . I want to say this already now and in plain terms—theSoviet Union will consider itself free from . . . ”

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5. Robert Kennedy met with Anatoly Dobrynin on 18 September 1962.6. Atmospheric test ban.

Thompson: I think they’d agree to a three-year moratorium; but notmuch . . . and I doubt if you could get anything less than a two and a halfperiod. [Unclear] The others that could support five, that’s a bargaining—

President Kennedy: But I don’t see much advantage to us. We proposesix months; they propose five years. I don’t see much advantage to us inthat proposition. It would be an unpoliced moratorium for three years.

Thompson: Well, if this included those automatic stations—?Bohlen: Well, he mentioned these automatic stations in here. Tommy,

is this the first time he has ever come forward with—?Thompson: As far as I’m—Bohlen: Yeah. And I don’t know whether—President Kennedy: He says it’s national. Isn’t this in line with his

traditional position? That if he—Thompson: Well, if you had a radio readout out on those stations,

that you are constantly monitoring—if they ceased to work, then you’dobviously have—the whole thing would be up in the air. I don’t knowhow effective they’d be; but I—

President Kennedy: [Unclear] we look at this part of it? I was won-dering what [unclear] at Pugwash—

Thompson: Seems to me this is up to you. But there would be addedassurance because we would get reports from other stations that know ifthey weren’t—if this thing wasn’t working or wasn’t reporting.

Bohlen: Yeah, but the difference between this and the on-site inspec-tion is that I gather that there is absolutely no way no matter what read-ings you get where you can tell the difference between certain kinds ofnatural explosion and a nuclear one. And then the idea was that whenyou got readings of this kind, you would go to the spot to measure.[Pause.]

Well, Mr. President, I think this letter gives you a vehicle to make aresponse, speaking now of the Berlin section of it, which can I say, I feelquite strongly is necessary in some form or other. Now, there are threeor four different ways that you can get this over that the regularity withwhich he [Khrushchev] has been telling everybody that the UnitedStates is too liberal, et cetera, et cetera, to fight.7 And I must say thegeneral feeling, I think is that, among the demonologists, is chances arehe believes this. And now the question is how can you convey—

President Kennedy: Why would he say it? What is the argument forhis saying it?

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 185

7. On Khrushchev’s statement, see the editors’ introduction, 10 September 1962.

Bohlen: Well, he believes—if you take it from his own military pointof view—that the local military situation [that] makes the correlation offorces is all in their favor and he probably thinks that in view of publicopinion and [unclear] of the horrors of a nuclear war that the UnitedStates would not . . . would back away from that point. Therefore he’sgot a situation with all the advantage on his side where he can proceed.And there’ll be a great whooping and yelling around but that nothingwill happen. But the thing he’s interested in, which is the only thing youworry about, is a nuclear war. And this is cockeyed, I think. Although, Idon’t know, if you read some of Joe’s articles, [unclear] old Alsop’s arti-cles about de Gaulle’s view and all this other stuff.

President Kennedy: But de Gaulle . . . that’s why I think de Gaulle . . . Ithink de Gaulle would like to start to get out of Berlin and [unclear] blamethe United States. Because, if they could only get Berlin eliminated, thenthey could really have a . . . Europe which would be in pretty good shape.

Bohlen: Well, I’m not so sure. But I think that de Gaulle’s basic feel-ing, and I’ve talked to Joe about this, and I’ve told him [that] whoeverhis informant was, who I believe was [French foreign minister] Couvede Murville.

President Kennedy: [Unclear question.] Well, he said it was [Frenchdiplomat Jean] Laloy; he talked to Laloy.

Bohlen: Laloy?President Kennedy: Yeah. Apparently de Gaulle asked about contin-

gency planning. Then de Gaulle said, “Why, my dear fellow, don’tworry—the Americans aren’t going to fight anyway. [Unclear.] Don’tworry about it.”

Bohlen: This is de Gaulle’s, sort of, method of presentation. But Ithink de Gaulle’s thought runs differently. I don’t believe that he thinksthere’s going to be a real crisis over Berlin, or what Joe would call acrunch, in other words.

President Kennedy: Hopefully.Bohlen: And he thinks that the thing is going to—the French have

always thought that Berlin was going to die on the vine. Couve deMurville told me that last June.

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: He just said . . .President Kennedy: They don’t really care, do they?Bohlen: “[Unclear] just stay away” and that they don’t give a damn.

No. Because if they don’t . . . they want Germany divided which is essen-tially their whole policy.

And I think that de Gaulle’s chief mistake about the Russian thing is

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962186

that he attributes the present structure of Russian power to be identicalwith the time of Stalin. And he never can forget that he stood up toStalin and said, “Nuts to you,” and Stalin came around. And he doesn’trealize that this guy, and I think Tommy would—I’d like to know whatTommy thinks about this—operates in a very different power circum-stance from Stalin.8 Stalin could change anything like that himself,whereas this guy has pressures and tendencies that he has to take cog-nizance of, if he . . . and this limits his personal sphere of maneuver.

But the question is, Mr. President, and this obviously is a subjectwe’re not supposed to ask you. [He laughs.] But . . . this is your businessand not ours. That it seems to me very important to halt this sort ofprogress that the Russians are doing in Berlin, building up this enor-mous record of saying that the West is not going to do it. You andMacmillan and de Gaulle really agree with him that Adenauer gets thebig picture. And it’s very difficult to know why he’s doing it, unless it’sin preparation for another dialogue which he talks about—

Thompson: That’s what I think is the—Bohlen: But I think this is the likelihood; but on the other hand—Thompson: The other thing it might be is that—Bohlen: —what in God’s name—?Thompson: The other reason why he might make these remarks is

that he wants to, he wants to—Bohlen: To show those to some of the others.Thompson: Yeah, to provoke us into a strong reply, which he can use to

ease [unclear] policy. In either case it would argue for going back at him.President Kennedy: I mean for us to, for us to—do you want some

orange juice?Thompson: No, thanks.President Kennedy: For us to . . . for him to tell Americans and other

people that the Americans aren’t going to fight . . . that doesn’t seem tome to . . . what would be the log[ic] . . . as you say unless he wants us to,[unclear] first [unclear] to fight but I don’t ever—if that’s his opinionyou don’t really announce it, because that’s really rubbing our face in it.Do you think therefore—it could be—He doesn’t have to have a reasonfor everything. If he’s telling what he actually thinks—

Thompson: Yeah.Bohlen: Agreed.Thompson: He’s capable of doing it.

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 187

8. Referring to Khrushchev.

Bohlen: The trouble is, that this circulates, and it’s already circulatingaround Western Europe and you’re getting a sense of panic [unclear]European countries. De Gaulle doesn’t necessarily help it at all, you know.

President Kennedy: [Unclear.] Are you saying this keeps downgrad-ing our changes?

Bohlen: Yeah. Definitely.Thompson: I don’t know, I think—Bohlen: There are three or four different ways in which this particu-

lar aspect of the problem can be [unclear]. One, by you being direct. Ithink you’ve seen that draft of the—

President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw yours and then Bundy did another one.Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: Bundy’s was satisfactory . . . [unclear] be yours

or [unclear].Bohlen: [speaks over the President] Well, it seems to me that this, in a

sense . . . part of this could be tacked on, if you’re proposing to answerthis letter of his. Some of this stuff in this draft could be a [unclear].

That would be one way of doing it, the other way would be by a pub-lic statement, which I think everybody believes would not be either con-vincing or very desirable at this time.

The third way would be to use a diplomatic channel, possibly you to[Anatoly] Dobrynin or Foy [Kohler] right to Khrushchev.9 My feelingabout this is negotiating a substance as serious as this, I really think thatthe direct communication thing would carry more conviction, if you didit to Dobrynin, you had no certainty how he would—

President Kennedy: Yeah. I don’t see these . . . anybody . . . these fel-lows having any more of these conversations for a while. I’ll try to—

Bohlen: And I think that also if you sent your ambassador inMoscow to talk to Khrushchev along these lines, we’re still working onthe same thing.

President Kennedy: Maybe we should get just a . . . get awfully bel-ligerent to Kohler.

Bohlen: And the third way, Mr. President, is one that I must say thatI’ve always been inclining to [unclear] is in the field of action. These fel-lows have been buzzing our planes in the corridors—running these MiGswithin 2[00] or 300 yards of a passenger-loaded Pan Am plane, whichjust contains all the ingredients of an accident. Because these things go sofast, you know, 2[00] or 300 yards is just nothing. And that if you would

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962188

9. Anatoly Dobrynin was the Soviet ambassador to the United States.

consider with your allies the possibility of the next time they do this, ofputting in fighter escorts for these planes and running them until theyseem to be calling it off and then call it off and then be prepared to startagain. I have a feeling that the Russians in situations of this kind pay muchmore attention to action than they do to words.

[to Thompson] So what would you think of that?Thompson: Yeah. As I was saying earlier, I think this may . . .

buzzing may be related to their annoyance at our buzzing their ships.10

It’s the prestige factor [unclear].Bohlen: But you have a decided difference in there, is that the

buzzing of the planes in the corridor could at any point produce a terri-ble accident, whereas the buzzing of a ship has got very little chances tobring about that.

President Kennedy: We . . . How much [of the] buzzing has therebeen? Remember last year there was . . . [in the] spring there was a bigargument with [Lucius] Clay wanting us to put in fighters and [GeneralLauris] Norstad against it. And I thought Norstad’s judgment was right.Because fighting . . . well, it just struck me . . I would think you ought towait on fighters. That is one of the things we can do without [unclear]shooting . . . put fighters in there. And I . . . It seems to me we ought towait until this thing gets a little higher before we do that?

Bohlen: Well—President Kennedy: So they’re doing [unclear] we did say we’d knock

it down, then . . . at least then they’ve taken an action which is . . .Bohlen: Yeah. But then you’ll have an accident which will create an

enormous amount of excitement in this country and you will have theloss of life with the passengers on the plane. And I think this will forceyour hand into action which will be a little beyond what should be pro-posed to do now.

Now the other possibility of action, which perhaps might be put in thisletter as a, sort of, a warning, but one which, I think, many of us in theDepartment of State have been thinking of for a long time. And that is thequestion of making West Berlin a Land of the Federal Republic. Thiswould mean complete recognition that you were through with East Berlin.Well, we are de facto. But you will have a hell of a time, I think, with theFrench in getting any agreement and the British to include that, and it

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 189

10. In his 28 September letter, Khrushchev makes direct reference to a conversation he hadwith Llewellyn Thompson where he had complained to the U.S. ambassador about thebuzzing of Soviet ships on the high seas.

would require that agreement. I don’t know what the West German atti-tude would be.

Thompson: They’d be for it.Bohlen: They’d be for it, I think. And the West Berliners would

surely be for it. It would have the advantage of—you’d have to have awhole series of new agreements. That is to say, you’d have the WestGerman government requesting the presence of the Western troopswith the agreement of the Federal Republic. The only problem would behow this would affect your right of access through their territory.

I just have a very strong feeling that the trend is being manipulatedby Khrushchev very much to our detriment.

Thompson: You’d certainly have to study that one carefully becauseon your access . . . one of our main points now is [that] we hold theSoviets responsible. I mean . . . they haven’t recorded that . . . but onceyou make . . . do it just by agreement, the Soviets say, “Well, we havenothing to do with this agreement; why talk to us?” You get a—

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: Well, you might even do it in a too [unclear] sort of way but

you would leave your occupation rights there completely, but that you’dalso just change the status of the . . . West Berlin as a Land of the Republic.

Thompson: Going back to the buzzing, it seems the one thing youcould do is to put in some rather vague language in the reply, just raisingthis problem instead of [unclear] our planes. [Unclear] could be comingat it rather than just doing it.

Bohlen: A great deal of the language he uses on Cuba could be[unclear] directly to Berlin because he’s talking about disregarding thenormal conventions, [unclear]—assigning to ourselves the right to this,that, and the other, and this is exactly what he’s trying to do in Berlin.

President Kennedy: [reading aloud from Khrushchev’s letter] “[Unclear]this occupation is here to stay . . . [unclear] . . . put it to the U.N.”

Did you get a report on Grewe’s last conversation with me before heleft,11 about how he thinks the Hallstein Doctrine is dated and thatthey’re going to [unclear]?12

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962190

11. Wilheim Grewe was West German ambassador to the United States until September 1962.His resignation came about because the Kennedy administration lost confidence in his effec-tiveness as a liaison after Rusk accused him of leaking to the press in April 1962 a Departmentof State draft of an allied agreement on Berlin.12. This doctrine, named for Adenauer’s foreign policy adviser, Walter Hallstein, held thatBonn would refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with all countries, excluding the SovietUnion, that recognized the German Democratic Republic.

Bohlen: We picked up some [unclear] when we were in Bonn thisJune. . . . But, it hasn’t got . . . a lot of the private interests in Germanyare very keen to have the Hallstein Doctrine eliminated and some of thepeople in the Foreign Office. But I think old Adenauer is clearly hookedon it. He did something recently that . . . well, the reaffirmation of theHallstein Doctrine.

President Kennedy turns to the section in Khrushchev’s letter about U.S.policy toward Cuba.President Kennedy: [reading aloud] “We haven’t done anything to

give you a pretext for that.”[Kennedy jumps ahead in the text.] “I must tellyou straightforward [ly] . . . that your statement with threats againstCuba is just an inconceivable step.” Straightforward? He doesn’t saywhether existing . . .

[Kennedy resumes reading aloud] “Your request for an authority . . . bythe way is a step . . . apt to get red hot . . . pour oil in the flame . . . toextinguish that red-hot glow.”13 His metaphors are a little mixed in that.Why would he blame someone who wants to pour oil on the flames toextinguish that red-hot glow? [Laughter.]

Thompson: [Unclear.]Bohlen: Who writes these damn things for him?Thompson: Does Foy know about this thing?14

Bohlen: I don’t think so. This only came in yesterday, didn’t it?Thompson: I assume Foy will be seeing . . . calling on Khrushchev

[unclear].President Kennedy: [reading from Khrushchev’s letter, sometimes mum-

bling] “to qualify . . . to remind you of the norms . . . naturally . . . wouldnot say anything on West Berlin. . . . For example, what is going on, forexample, in the U.S. [Congress]?”15 [The President is quite amused.]People in the Congress?

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 191

13. Kennedy is paraphrasing as he reads. The sentence goes: “Under present circumstances,when there exist thermonuclear weapons, your request to the Congress for an authority tocall up 150,000 reservists is not only a step making the atmosphere red-hot, it is already adangerous sign that you want to pour oil in the flame, to extinguish that red-hot glow bymobilizing new military contingents.”14. Foy Kohler was the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.15. FRUS, 6: 159. The full quote reads:

That is what made us to come out with the TASS statement and later at the sessionof the UN General Assembly to qualify your act, to remind of the norms of interna-tional law and to say about West Berlin.

If there were no statement by you on Cuba, we, naturally, as Ambassador

Bohlen: These are all such—President Kennedy: What?Bohlen: —stilted translations from the Russian. If you can see what

the Russians said, this [unclear]—President Kennedy: [reading aloud] “How can one, for example, fail

to notice the decision of the House [of Representatives] to stop givingU.S. aid to anybody that trades with Cuba. . . . Isn’t that an act of imper-missible arbitrariness against freedom of, freedom of [movement]?”

They have the resolution. [He continues reading.] “Very serious con-sequences may have the resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate . . . readyto assume responsibility for unleashing [thermo]nuclear war.”

What do you think is the reason that they are going ahead withCuba in this massive way? They must know that it . . . I thought onereason why they [unclear] Berlin because we’d take a reprisal againstCuba . . . they want to make it as difficult as possible. What other reasoncan there be? Because they began this buildup in June. In late June therewas no indication of an invasion by the United States at this time, so[unclear].

Thompson: Well, I would suspect that Castro is nervous about whatmight be going on and the pressure has been pretty—

President Kennedy: Sorry?Thompson: —within the bloc, the Communist bloc, this is a good

step for him; he’s helping this country defend itself against U.S. imperial-ism and . . .

Bohlen: This is the satellite bond that you get. The Poles and stufflike that . . .

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: They think that Castro was planning it. They sent a guy

over there, Che Guevara, you know, to try and persuade the Russians tolet them join the Warsaw Pact, to give them formal coverage and Sovietprotection.16 And the Russians refused to do this. And then this is what

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962192

Thompson and Mr. Udall were told, would not say anything on West Berlin. Yourstatement forced us to do so.

We regret that this dangerous line is being continued in the United States now.What is going on, for example, in the U.S. Congress?

16. One of Fidel Castro’s closest associates, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, visited moscow in Augustto discuss the conclusion of a Soviet-Cuban defense agreement. Khrushchev, however, refusedto sign the proposed agreement.

they did. And also, as Tommy mentioned, he said from the point of viewof the Communist world, it is very important for him to be out in front,showing that he is militant, pushing for the great cause.

President Kennedy: Why do you think they refused to put him in theWarsaw Pact?

Bohlen: Oh, because this is too much for the Russians because thenthey’re not sure what the United States might do—

President Kennedy: Right.Bohlen: —and they don’t want to be committed to go to war over

Cuba, [Kennedy mumbles assent] if there is an American attack. Oh, I thinkthis has been very clear all the way going back to ’60 when he first beganto rattle the rockets about Cuba, then he made a statement before anyonewould call him on that thing, he made a statement saying, “It’s just sym-bolic.” And they haven’t gone beyond that and this latest one, which herefers to here; the September 11th one seems to me to have been primarilyissued in order to tack on the rider about not doing anything about Berlin.

Thompson: I think, in general, he’s, he has very much in mind thatmeeting you and that, I think, if he can settle Berlin, then—

Bohlen: Well this is what bothers me . . . the hell out of me. He’scoming over here in the end of November and this letter is really pitchedto the . . . twice he refers to the resumption of the dialogue . . . and thenin the last paragraph he talks about the: “Of great importance for findingthe ways to solve both this problem . . . are personal contacts of states-men on the highest level.” Well that means between you and him. But,the question is: What in God’s name could be the best solution to theBerlin thing if you did meet?

President Kennedy: [Unclear] I don’t—unless he wants to demon-strate that he’s doing every possible—

Bohlen: Well, I mean, this still leaves the situation as it was. I think,from your point of view, [unclear] don’t see that [there’s] anything verymuch to negotiate about as long as he is insisting on the removal of cer-tain troops.

Thompson: Well, I think, Chip [Bohlen], that if he, I think he’s, firstof all, that he is in a position where he has . . . he feels he has got to goahead and sign this treaty.

Bohlen: Yes, I think everybody—Thompson: And I don’t think he wants to play Russian roulette with

that and just toss a coin and see whether there’s war or not. If he wantsto . . . he could get us to accept the East German . . . Solution Capproach, where we would accept East Germans deployed at the check-

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 193

point.17 Each of us maintain a [unclear] position [unclear] would beacceptable [unclear] his treaty.

President Kennedy: What’s that again? That sounded [unclear].Thompson: Well, each of us would say, we would say, we would still

hold the Russians responsible but in a practical way we will let the . . .accept [the] East Germans on the checkpoints as long as they don’tinterfere with our access. And they would make the statement that theywere treated as was a sovereign country. But, in fact, they are not.

Then he could go ahead and sign his treaty, and you wouldn’t be thengambling on whether there’s war or not. And, I think, that’s about themost that you could hope to come out with. He would hope for more, andtry for more, but in the end might settle for something like that. As longas he can sign his treaty and then maintain the position that EastGermany is sovereign. We say it’s not. They, in the meantime, practicallycontrol the access but don’t interfere.

Bohlen: Wouldn’t that be buying an awful lot of future trouble withthat sort of a solution because of the East Germans’ not being bound byany agreement, anything like that; wouldn’t they go in for the harass-ment that the Russians are now, sort of, semidoing in a much moreintensive [unclear]?

Thompson: [Unclear] would be very dangerous, I think. But if theRussians say then they’re out of it except that they are allies of EastGermany. The East Germans start doing something and we take someforceful action. . . . Then, we’ve always got the sanctions against them, ofcutting off trade and all that sort of thing. So for the immediate period, a fewyears, I should think that it probably would buckle them in pretty quietly.

In the meantime they would be pressuring others to recognize EastGermany and gradually, I think, time would solve the thing, which in away, it might. It might not be too bad. Certainly, it’s going to go alongthe way it is for a long time. There could be no solution—

President Kennedy: Could he claim that he had solved this problemby this means?

Thompson: I think so. I think he’s off the hook then. And once he’ssigned this treaty, that’s the main thing.

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962194

17. Solution C was a term thrown around during the Kennedy administration as it tried todevise a negotiating position on the German and Berlin problems. Solution C was to seeknegotiations aimed toward an informal, interim agreement to preserve the status quo in Berlindespite a G.D.R.-U.S.S.R. peace treaty. It appeared to offer the most likely chance of successwith the least fuss. It was a view favored by State’s old Berlin hands.

President Kennedy: Why don’t you think he signed it before? Onthat basis he could have signed at any time in the last two years. Whydon’t you think he signed it?

Thompson: Well, we’ve never let him know that we’d accept [the] EastGermans on the checkpoints. That’s the thing that would make the issue.

Bohlen: Well, then that international authority just is tantamount tosaying that it would be international, whether the East Germans wouldbe in it. We’ve never presented them a formal draft of that thing. I thinkthat they could . . .

I think it’s a . . . He’s coming over here . . . [Someone sighs.]President Kennedy: He said, didn’t he? I mean, he just writes that

he’s coming, doesn’t he? [Kennedy reads] “After the election, especially inthe second half of November, it would be necessary . . . to continue thedialogue.”

Bohlen: Yeah. He says that twice in there; there’s another. [Unclearinterjection by Kennedy.] That and coupled with the last point makes itperfectly clear that his idea of a dialogue is between you and him.

President Kennedy: Of course that’s not very advantageous to us, isit? Just to have he [and I] . . . And then no matter what happens it lookslike . . . we become even more obvious as the chief defender of Berlin.Which is just what de Gaulle wants to do to us. Because he doesn’t wantto fight a war; he wants to make it all [unclear].

Bohlen: A sellout.Thompson: Yes.Bohlen: And I don’t know what the British attitude would be on this

sort of thing. I think [that] this will cause a great deal of ruckus and furor.President Kennedy: What . . . de Gaulle and [unclear]?Bohlen: A meeting between you and Khrushchev. I mean, I think, the

British and the Germans . . .President Kennedy: Why would the British care? They’ve mucked it

up—[unclear].Bohlen: Well, the British wouldn’t mind, I mean if they thought that

. . . they could be worried that the thing would come to a deadlock and abig impasse and that you would be nearer the danger of war than youwere before. And the West Germans, I think, they’d probably followmore or less the line of the French and be ready to fill the air withdenunciations of duty.

President Kennedy: And the weakness of the . . .Bohlen: Of course this question as to why the Russians are pushing

this thing so hard is one that I have [unclear] almost four years and Idon’t think that anybody [is] clear why. . . . And de Gaulle may not care

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 195

if the United States takes the blame for any sort of a sellout, or whateveryou want to call it, in Berlin.

But on the other hand most of the fellows in the French ForeignOffice particularly feel that Khrushchev is doing this because of thewhole effect on West Germany and on the alliance. In other words, he isseeking larger aims than just Berlin.

I must say, I don’t think that. I think that Berlin is a . . . these are thekind of repercussions and results [on] which he would naturally capital-ize if they happened. But I don’t think he’s playing these moves on Berlinwith this in view. I don’t know what you feel about the alliance.

Thompson: Well, I think he’s hooked personally on . . . He’s alwaysboasted that this was his solution that he dreamed this whole thing up.

Bohlen: Yeah.Thompson: He got way out and he’s gotten further out since.Bohlen: Well, what I mean is that [unclear] Berlin as a thing in itself.

That if he settled this, would he then quiet down? And consider thatEurope is all tidied up? Or would it be just a move to disrupt theAlliance, to stop progress—?

Thompson: I think it’s mainly the former. I think he—Bohlen: I think so, too, myself; but on the other hand you can’t sepa-

rate the fact that these might be the consequences which he would thenimmediately try and exploit.

Thompson: He can exploit any of the—Bohlen: Well, the thing that mystifies me about this thing is that he

himself nearly has a success on his terms which would be an enormoushumiliation and defeat for us, which I don’t think is going to happen, butassuming that it does, still if he knows anything about history, this is theway of bringing war very much sooner—

[Someone agrees indistinctly.]Bohlen: —because you don’t inflict what would be a very humiliating

defeat upon a power like the United States when you don’t affect hispower 1 inch by . . . .Berlin wouldn’t affect our power at all.

President Kennedy: Right.Bohlen: And almost all throughout history a Munich has sort of

been followed by—President Kennedy: YeahBohlen: —the war.President Kennedy: Right.Bohlen: So, I can’t see that if he is thinking straight, and in historical

terms, that he could have very much happiness out of either result of thisthing.

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962196

President Kennedy: Well, why would they build up Cuba? Whywould . . . I mean he must . . . if he calculates correctly, he must realizethat what’s happened in Cuba this summer makes it much more difficultfor us to accept any, to engage ourselves now to have a deal over Berlin. Imean, that’s just not been—

Bohlen: [Unclear.] This is one thing that I’m convinced of, is that theRussian mind does not have the foggiest comprehension of the Americanpolitical process. They really believe that you are sort of the dictator ofthe United States and can do any damn thing you want, and that . . .This just comes through the doctrine. You see, they consider that thecapitalist system, that democracy in a capitalist system is just a part offlimflam and [is] a disguise for the control by Wall Street and all thisother . . . Look at the way he keeps talking about Dean Rusk being a toolof the Rockefellers because he was head of the thing.18 I think he gen-uinely believes in it. So that all this stuff that you—

Thompson: The Pentagon and Wall Street. [Unclear.]Bohlen: Yeah. It’s a very complicated sort of process. But I think the

conclusion that they reach is that public opinion doesn’t—President Kennedy: Really count.Bohlen: —really have any real effect and [unclear] enormous pres-

sure this can put on a presidency.President Kennedy: And I suppose we don’t . . . we over . . . we

underestimate the pressures that go on him, not from public opinion butfrom other [unclear].

Bohlen: Well, I think you can describe public opinion in the SovietUnion the same way that a good general pays great attention to themorale of his troops. In other words, he doesn’t let troop morale dictatehis course of action, because then he wouldn’t be worth a damn as a gen-eral. He is very conscious of the fact that they rely on the morale. I meanthis just . . . but this doesn’t mean any—

President Kennedy: But you don’t think that he would calculate whatthey’re doing in Cuba as a broad sort of traditional position and so onwould [unclear] really intensify the feeling here greatly, and make itmuch more difficult to do anything about Berlin?

Bohlen: No, sir, I think this is probably something that’s just a com-plete blank page in his mind. I think that—what Tommy said—I thinkhe did Berlin because here it was something they had engaged in aboutthis regime, and then the Cubans got very scared and panicky for fear

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 197

18. Dean Rusk was president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

there was going to be another, sort of, Bay of Pigs, something like this.Which they would probably have lost.

President Kennedy: [Comments indistinctly.]Bohlen: And went to the Russians and said, “My goodness, my good-

ness, you’ve got to help us.” Their first idea was to put them in a treaty,and then the Russians put these arms in there; and then also the effect ofhis standing in the Communist world because the Chinese have beenconstantly attacking Khrushchev from the left, which is the first time inBolshevik history that this has ever happened. Heretofore they havealways been the extreme left—denouncing yellow Soviet so-and-so asthe opportunist and everything like it. The Chinese now come and say,“You are scared of the thing.” Now there is one factor that underlies[unclear] that I don’t know anything about. Tommy may have someideas about it.

Thompson: History [unclear] points their way [unclear] move is tokeep the Chinese from doing it—

Bohlen: This is what I mean.Thompson: —[taking] the Chinese with it.Bohlen: Well, the Chinese are not in much shape to give very much

help.Thompson: [Unclear] I think it doesn’t.Bohlen: Yeah, I think it is more in the psychological field, of his lead-

ership in there, [Thompson murmurs assent] the other factor may be inthere. But the one question that perhaps may underlie this is that weknow now that all this flap about the missile gap is just for the birdsbecause they didn’t put their main effort on ICBMs and our estimatenow of the correlation of military forces is heavily in our favor [someonemumbles assent] and not in their[s]. Now, if you go back to the history ofthe Sino-Soviet dispute, you will see the Chinese undoubtedly believe,completely literally, the Soviet claims which they were making in ’57 and’58 of having . . . the balance having shifted in their . . . point. And I justwonder whether or not in the Soviet hierarchy how much real under-standing there is of the actual correlation of military force or whetherthey are not operating on their previous, sort of, at least, announced esti-mate that they had sort of passed us. And their policy would be muchmore intelligible if they believed that; because if they believed that theyhad the nuclear, sort of, equality, or even superiority, then their lines ofaction would be quite continuous, I mean, quite consistent. But it is notconsistent if it’s viewed in the light of what our estimate of the twoforces are.

President Kennedy: We are taking a look at a contingency plan for

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962198

sort of building up a staging area in Florida for . . . in case we ever haveto go into Cuba. This would be impossible, I suppose, to keep this com-pletely—we’ll look at this next week—to keep it completely submerged.But obviously there is no sense in having about a four months’ gapbetween the time we’ve decided to do something about Cuba and have towait. So, we want to begin to build up down there. Now, I suppose thatwill surface. . . . What effect does that have?

Bohlen: Well, they’ll pick it up with all of this stuff, [unclear] callingup this . . . Getting the authorization to call up 150,000 reservists andstate this in Congress. They’ll make a big thing out of it. And I thinkthis inevitably will . . .

President Kennedy: Do you see any reason not to do it?Bohlen: I don’t. Although the question is—I’ll tell you one thing,

Mr. President, that I do think is that if you ever come to do any actionagainst Cuba, it would almost have to be on the basis of a declaration ofwar. I mean serious action, that is—

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: —U.S. forces and all. Because this will give you the legal

basis for a blockade and everything of this kind. If you try a blockadewithout a declaration of war, then I think you get into a mess of compli-cations with your friends and allies, as well as with the Russians. Now, ifthe Cubans would make some move that would establish a reasonablejustification for a declaration of war, I think this is the only way youcould do it, if you are going to use United States forces. I don’t knowwhat’s being done in the sense of infiltration of people into Cuba—

President Kennedy: Well, we’ve warned them that we’ve been tryingto do that. . . . We’ve been doing that for nine months—

Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: —under General [Edward] Lansdale but he

hasn’t had much success. We’ve got these intelligence teams in there.But, I saw the Washington Post suggested that we’d given up on internalrevolt. You [unclear] that editorial this morning?

Bohlen: I saw that. But that’s very curious [unclear]—President Kennedy: It sounds like some guy got in there late at

night, and he wrote . . . [unclear] from the Pentagon staff.Bohlen: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: What?Bohlen: That has not been the Washington Post ’s general line—President Kennedy: Oh, no.Bohlen: —on the Cuban thing at all this year.President Kennedy: Suddenly, a complete [unclear] operation.

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 199

Bohlen: Some guy must have gotten a bright idea and sold it to PhilGraham.19

President Kennedy: Yes, you’re probably [right].Bohlen: But the . . .Thompson: I think . . . I had the impression, that at the start of the

Cuban thing, that the Russians thought it wasn’t going to last and theywere very reluctant to get too committed, to put too much in there.

President Kennedy: Of course, if we had gone in a year ago—and itwas much easier in April after the Bay of Pigs—and you had thatbecome the regular United States invasion . . . I have always thoughtthat they would—of course you can’t tell what they would do, a yearago. Now . . . but it always seemed to me they would just grab WestBerlin, don’t you think?

Bohlen: Well, they might have, Mr. President, and this might haveled to general war. But I think the situation is getting to the point wherethere are so many places, there are many instances where if we take cer-tain kinds of forcible actions, the Russians can retaliate. I think we tend[unclear] to let the Berlin situation dominate our whole action [unclear].But this is what the Russians are clearly trying to do. [Unclear.]

Thompson: I would have thought a move against Iran would havebeen more likely than for Berlin.

President Kennedy: Except they could grab Berlin in two hours.Iran, they would have to really—

Bohlen: Yeah, but any one of these things [unclear]—Thompson: Grabbing would have meant direct fighting with U.S.

troops—President Kennedy: What? What?Thompson: Grabbing Berlin. And that’s, I think, much more danger-

ous than a move in Iran.Bohlen: Their play is . . . the Russian game has always traditionally

been this way with the non-Communist power . . . is to push, pull, to feelaround and then judge, make their next move based upon their estimateof the reaction to what people do. There is a phrase of Lenin in which hesaid there are certain situations which you control with bayonets: if yourun into mush, you go forward; if you run into steel, you withdraw. Andsince anything that Lenin said is enshrined in letters—

President Kennedy: That’s right.Bohlen: —in gold and scarlet, I still think that Khrushchev’s attitude

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962200

19. Philip Graham was the publisher of the Washington Post.

on Berlin is in one sense to test us. Now, I don’t know; but Joe Alsopwrote about this . . . saw him the other day and I think you saw him,didn’t you?

President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw him.Bohlen: Joe has a new theory about the [Berlin] Wall, did he tell you

that?President Kennedy: This was to cover up the . . .Bohlen: This was to . . . The Wall was not to stop the refugees but to

provide the necessary circumstances where they could make a majorbuildup of East German forces. And I said, “Well, I think that theseissues are one of the consequences but not necessarily the cause”—butyou know Joe when he gets on an idea—

President Kennedy: Then he’s got the idea that the solution to thestrategy is that the United States [unclear] our contingency planning, heknows that the allies won’t do anything and therefore—

Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: —it [unclear] the United States to indicate it’s

going ahead.Bohlen: Well, I must say, Mr. President, it depends on how your

analysis of this whole situation is. But, I think, that if we are going to doanything, we’re going to have to do it—

President Kennedy: Quickly.Bohlen: —unilaterally.President Kennedy: Yeah. I just yesterday, or the day before, sent a

memorandum over to the Pentagon to ask them how long it takes tomove in. You remember that time we sent up that battle group into WestBerlin; then it turned out it took 28 hours to reach the autobahn. Well,so now I asked whether they’ve got. . . . They’re still a long way awayfrom the autobahn, so we’ve got a camp there that they can make into abarracks. So I asked them to—

Bohlen: McNamara was very much impressed with the state of train-ing and the morale of the forces that he saw—

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: —in Germany [in] the last two or three days. I don’t think

the strategy is worth a damn; but at least [he chuckles] the troops are ingood shape.

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: But . . . because you might have an awful lot of pulling and

hauling with your allies, you see. For instance, suppose Khrushchevwhen he signs the treaty does the following things: that he just turnsover to the East Germans the access rights to the military on the road

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 201

and the [East] Germans say, “Well, we haven’t got any agreement withyou; they can’t go through,” leaving the air alone, because the air is aplace where we have much more freedom of maneuver. Then what’ll youdo? You will have consultations with your allies. The British, undoubt-edly, will call for a conference, [Thompson or Kennedy laughs] and theFrench will just sort of stay out of it totally. [Bohlen chuckles.] You knowthem. And [unclear]. So you could lose an awful lot of time on this thing.

If they’re foolish enough to announce that the air corridors areclosed, then, I think, you have a very clearly indicated action which is tosend your fighters in. [President Kennedy speaks indistinctly.] But sendthem in, in force. Anything you do on a subject like that, the danger isthat you send in too few forces and that this doesn’t create the impres-sion. You ought to send in double the number of fighters that peoplethink would be adequate for the purpose.

And in the air, I think, this is the place where the thing is going to cometo a real . . . the crunch will happen there. Wouldn’t you think so, Tommy?

Thompson: Generally speaking, I think, Khrushchev has felt, at leastup until recently, that things are going his way and he needn’t take anyrisks, that he is playing for the big stakes and not the small. In places likeIran and others, where he could have done a lot of things, but if he did,he’d [unclear] make it more difficult to spread further later on. And he’sbeen . . . in Laos the same way and there are other complicating factorsthere, but. . . . In general, I don’t think he wants to really run a real riskof war at this time.

Bohlen: I wouldn’t think so.Thompson: [Unclear.]Bohlen: But then you come back to what is their estimate of the gen-

eral correlation of military forces?Thompson: Well, it certainly isn’t something that can be deliberately

calculated in this period. A wise thing to do . . .Bohlen: Whatever happened to this idea that at one point was being

kicked around [unclear] of showing Khrushchev some—President Kennedy: Pictures?Bohlen: Pictures. It was leaked, I mean, it was deliberately let out of

NATO. And I think that [unclear] the probability is that they’ve got it.The only question is do they realize to what extent we cover their instal-lations and therefore we know what ICBM rockets they have and whatwe have, which is growing every month here, I think?

President Kennedy: I think he thinks they’ve got enough to causesuch damage to us, that we wouldn’t want to accept that damage unlessthe provocation was extreme. But, of course, those are all calculations he

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962202

has to make about what we are going to do, and what the French will doand what the British will do. And I suppose it just comes back to whatyou . . . we were originally saying, that it’s just a question of how do weconvince him that the risk is there. And that raises whether we ought togo with this letter or not. Or whether we just choose to ignore this andjust let this thing drop until he comes over here in November. SoMcNamara had some statement this morning about the [unclear]—

Bohlen: Yes, I saw that. In fact, that got the headlines in all thepapers about the fact that we had nuclear weapons there and that in cer-tain circumstances we were prepared to use them.

President Kennedy: Whether we ought to let it drop at that orwhether these words get to be, as you suggested . . . They begin to haveless and less effect. Because I don’t know whether [unclear].

Bohlen: And the one thing about this channel, Mr. President, so far,thank God, is it [has been] kept completely confidential—

President Kennedy: Yes.Bohlen: —thoroughly. One of the few things—President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: —in the United States government operations which there

is not the slightest leak on. And this fact, I think, would lend a littlemore weight to the words which you send back on it. The danger of notanswering this and letting him come over here would be he’d come overwith some positions which had obviously been agreed to in the hierarchyof the Soviet government and that they may be completely based on amiscalculation, on a misjudgment of the whole situation. And then hecomes over here and you meet, and you have just a complete confronta-tion with no formal agreement, or anything like this, and this sets off itsown chain of events. What would you think, Tommy?

Thompson: Oh, I think, if . . . if by chance, he is, he did say thesethings in order to get a positive response from us that he could use withhis colleagues, or with the East Germans . . . then it would be too bad, ifwe didn’t . . .

Bohlen: Well, let’s put it this way. What would you lose by having inthe Berlin part of this letter, something along this line, which you take tobe daring?20 I can’t see that you would lose anything. The only dangerthat it might involve would be that it would bring it to a head; but I

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 203

20. Bohlen seems to be referring to a draft response from President Kennedy. The actualresponse, as sent from Washington on 8 October 1962 did not include any reference to theBerlin question (see Kennedy to Khrushchev, 8 October 1962, FRUS, 6: 163–64).

don’t think the way this is worded it would have very much of this, if it’ssufficiently general. And if he doesn’t believe it, well, you’ve wasted sometime in writing a letter, but I don’t think the consequences would be anyworse than they are. I am very much afraid of his coming over here filledwith these impressions, that our silence in the face of his—there werefour occasions now, one to [Secretary of the Interior Stewart] Udall,one to [poet Robert] Frost—did he say it to you, Tommy, too, thatwe’re not fighting on the . . . ?21

Thompson: No.Bohlen: No. And [to] the Belgian and the Finn. And he has repeated

the same damn thing to them. And he hasn’t had any reaction whatso-ever. Now that—

President Kennedy: It’s another . . . I don’t know whether I ought todo anything about Frost about supposedly this secret Frost [unclear],Macmillan sent these up . . . a civilized remark. But . . . I was just won-dering whether there’s . . . have you talked to Frost?

Thompson: No. And I haven’t been near the [State] department, so Idon’t know . . . for the last two months, so I [unclear] . . . uninformed[unclear].

President Kennedy: I’ll call [unclear] on the phone so he can’t say hewasn’t asked.

What about this? Would you go along with this thought aboutresponding to this letter and in it, including in it . . . ?

Thompson: I agree with Chip. I think, if the letter is to have a . . .President Kennedy: Would you get that letter you [unclear]?Unidentified: Yes.Bohlen: I think it’s in your [unclear].Unidentified: I think it’s [on] the chair.Thompson: I think now . . . You cut it down a bit, Chip.Bohlen: Yeah.Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Rustling of paper, then silence.]Bohlen: You’ve got to change the first [clears his throat]. [Silence

while they read.]President Kennedy: I think when he says that people over here agree

with him, I think he may in that case be meaning just the division ofWestern Germany, which everybody does agree with him on in Europe.Not this question of our rights and troops in West Berlin, because he’s

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962204

21. The Udall and Frost discussions on 6 and 7 September are described in the editors’ intro-duction, 10 September 1962.

been told that so many times. He knows we don’t agree with that. But Ithink he knows that de Gaulle and Macmillan and, possibly, I don’t reallycare about the unification of Germany.

Bohlen: Yeah, well, except that in one of these things, I think it wasto the Belgian, he was more explicit than that, in which he said thatPresident Kennedy and Macmillan and de Gaulle really agree with mysolution to the Berlin thing, and it’s only Adenauer who just wants trou-ble, pulling the spokes from the wheel. I don’t know which is—

President Kennedy: Of course that may be just a way to [unclear] toGermany and . . . but . . . I wish if the Germans were ever going to doanything about the division of Germany or recognition of East Germany. . . what kind of [unclear], they would go ahead and do it and not try todo it when it becomes useless as a . . . when they can’t sell that positionfor anything.

Actually that last conversation that Adenauer had with Norstad and[NATO general secretary Dirk] Stikker, I don’t . . . he didn’t even men-tion Berlin. [Unclear] George Ball, et cetera. But he doesn’t get aroundto Berlin when he talks. I don’t think he wants to see Germany reunified.

Bohlen: Hell, no.President Kennedy: So what are we all doing?Thompson: Khrushchev—Bohlen: [Unclear] with the Germans [unclear] nothing in the

German ethos because one of the things that you always run into is thisdeeply felt thing, blah, blah, blah [unclear] take any action [unclear], isput off, you’ll really disrupt Germany. I must say I never totally believedit because Germany is a [unclear] country. And I think also—

President Kennedy: We don’t want any—Bohlen: —that the French fear of the Germans turning East,

under the present circumstances, is very illusory because Khrushchevcannot give them Eastern Germany. He told me this and I am sure hesaid it to you, but he used to use one expression to me in the last twomonths: “I was there but you must understand that we are not in aposition to make any agreement with you affecting East Germany.”What he meant by that was that they were hooked with this Sovietinvasion of East Germany, and, therefore, the only bait that he couldoffer to the West Germans would be the reunification of the countryin return for their neutrality. Well if you had that possibility, my God,we would have had that out on the table informally years ago. Don’tyou think so, Tommy?

Thompson: Uh, huh. Since we’ve got the bigger half, the bigger part,any unification even in neutrality would eventually be [unclear]—

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 205

Bohlen: Yes, I mean, that is why I think that this would have been if hehad not Sovietized, if the Russians had not Sovietized Eastern Germany,they would have an enormous diplomatic card that they could play towreck NATO, wreck the German involvement in it. But since this is notone that they could play, I don’t really see much real danger of the Germansturning to the East, particularly as this process with France and theCommon Market is going [Kennedy can be heard indistinctly] very far now.

President Kennedy: Well, Chip, what do you think is the . . . howpleased with . . . I suppose anything that the West Germans did aboutEast Germany now would be regarded as indicating that Khrushchevwas right, and we really don’t care about West Berlin. West Berlin seemsto have less and less importance once you, if you give up the idea of uni-fication. And then . . . what are we doing then in West Berlin . . . exceptfor the people that are involved—

Bohlen: Well, you’ve got two and a half million people—President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Thompson: The symbol and [unclear].President Kennedy: What’s the symbol got—?Thompson: They’ll never give up the idea that eventually reunion

will be the case. It’s one thing [unclear].Bohlen: But, of course, one of the, I think, major arguments against

doing anything formally such as recognition of East Germany is that it’sextremely doubtful as to whether that East Germany setup is a viablething. I think that Khrushchev’s attitude may be primarily motivated bya desire to do something which will increase the viability of EastGermany. He may have thought that this Wall was going to do it andthis hasn’t done it. He may think that if you could get his arrangementon Berlin this would fix Ulbricht up. For God’s sake, all of this seems tobe very much founded on wishful thinking.

Thompson: Yeah. Perhaps on the basis that the other solution wouldbe to go in with a lot of money and build up East Germany to where itwould be viable and as [first deputy Soviet foreign minister Vasiliy]Kuznetsov once told somebody, he said, “We can’t do that because thatwould mean that the Germans would live better than we do and—”

Bohlen: Yes, and this is a factor, but another thing is—Thompson: —“and that would be immoral,” he said.Bohlen: Being a divided country, and given the temperament of the

Germans while they haven’t been unified for so damn long historically,they nevertheless, which is a great thing for them, and I just don’t thinkthat even building it up would necessarily make it into a satellite coun-try comparable to say Poland or [unclear interjection by Thompson]

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962206

Czechoslovakia because it’s [unclear]. These other ones that are dividedsuch as North Korea and Vietnam are new countries which haven’t gotany tradition of unity.

President Kennedy: What do you think about this letter of Chip’s?Thompson: I think that the line is sound. I think it could be . . . you

know, this would be a long thing anyway, given the testing, if this couldbe maybe boiled down a little more, not quite so—

Bohlen: And you could add this part onto the thing. Of course you’llwant to discuss this with the Secretary.

President Kennedy: Yes.Thompson: When he is coming back?President Kennedy: He’s coming back this Wednesday, isn’t he?

Coming back Tuesday [unclear]?Bohlen: Mac gets back on Wednesday, doesn’t he?President Kennedy: Yeah. So why don’t we see what, on this

[unclear] come Wednesday?Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: But I have. . . . Why don’t we get somebody

working on a draft response to this?Bohlen: On the Cuban [part]?President Kennedy: To the whole thing.Bohlen: All right, sir. Now the only question is [that] there are very

few people in the Department who know about this correspondence atall [Kennedy is mumbling in the background], and I don’t know if, forexample, that anybody who is knowledgeable on the Cuban thing wouldbe . . . is in on the general knowledge of—

President Kennedy: Actually what we say on Cuba, I think, almostanybody would know more or less the general position on Cuba as to—

Bohlen: What would you want to say on that, then?President Kennedy: Well, I think we ought to say that this decision

of the Soviet Union to so greatly increase the military power of the . . . ofCuba constitutes, I don’t know, an unfriendly act or whatever the diplo-matic term is and that had increased tensions and made . . . reaching anaccord on matters of Berlin far more difficult and that because of themany treaties of the United States in this hemisphere and the specialposition, the historic position of the relationship of the United Stateswith countries surrounding it, this represents a very serious assault onour position—something like that. Without sort of saying that we would[unclear]—

Thompson:[Unclear] get in something about the two things thatconcern us about the buildup in Cuba is: one, our own vital interest; and

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 207

the other is the possible use of Cuba as a threat to other countries in thishemisphere.

Bohlen: And you might point out, if you want to mark a differencebetween let’s say our assistance to Iran, where we have no bases, ofcourse—we just concluded an arrangement—is that Cuba was a memberof the American defense establishment. It is just as though, it would bemore comparable if the United States had acted in the case of Hungary—

President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Bohlen: —to give military support to the Hungarian government

which declared its—to the Soviet Union—its neutrality from the WarsawPact. We can do that and what about—

President Kennedy: What about saying [that] a Cuba friendly to thehemisphere is as significant to [us] . . . that we believe, inasmuch as youhad believed that a Hungary friendly to the Soviet Union is in your vitalinterest? So that he doesn’t get off on Turkey and Iran.

Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: Then on the testing, we’re pretty . . . We know—Bohlen: And our position—President Kennedy: —We just can’t buy . . . on the other hand, it

seems to me, we just ought to say, “Well, in this case there’s just no . . .” Imean he’s offering us five years and then if there is not an agreement bythen, that’s just unpoliced.

I think we ought to, I’ll get Jerry Wiesner. I’ll have to give JerryWiesner these two pages and tell him that this is . . . and see if there isanything he can do about them. Let me tap Wiesner. I think this oughtto be just paraphrased. And I can give this . . . these two pages toWiesner and ask him for comments at least and [unclear] [Sir Edward]Bullard and [Sir William] Penney, et cetera. What it is they did say thatis significant, whether he is accurately restating it.22

Bohlen: Of course a great deal depends on what [unclear].Jerry Wiesner enters the Oval Office.President Kennedy: Oh, hi Jerry.Bohlen: Hello, Jerry.Jerry Wiesner: Hi.Bohlen: What the value of these—

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962208

22. In his letter of 28 September, Khrushchev alleged that Sir William Penney, the chairmanof the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, and Sir Edward Bullard had argued at the tenthPugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held in London 3 to 7 September 1962,that unmanned seismic stations would suffice to verify a comprehensive test ban.

President Kennedy: Could you just take this down? I’ll give you thisnotation, if you have a piece of paper. “The Russian scientists have saidthat according to the British scientists Bullard and Penney, at Pugwashconcerning the use of automatic seismic stations.” [Unclear.]

Wiesner: Actually I have the statement that they issued. I don’tknow whether you want to read it.

President Kennedy: What exactly did they say? Who are Bullard andPenney? Are they very good?

Wiesner: Yeah, they are two top British scientists.President Kennedy: What did they say?Wiesner: Thursday’s statement . . . the group . . . this doesn’t quote

either Bullard or Penney. That’s the group that signed the document butapparently Bullard and Penney and a number of other people worked onit. What they’re proposing are some unmanned seismic stations in unde-fined number, including—

Bohlen: Two or three, he said.Wiesner: Oh, it has to be hundreds. It has to be large numbers.President Kennedy: Would it? Have they [unclear]?Wiesner: They don’t say that. They say “enough.” Actually I have

had a study going since I got this document to try to find out just whatthe right number is without us shooting past—

Bohlen: He mentions two or three in this letter.Wiesner: Oh, that won’t do any good.Bohlen: Right.President Kennedy: Other than that we ought to . . . I’ll tell you what

we ought to do: just take these points down then you could respond tothem like we’re going to write a letter to these scientists.

Wiesner: Oh. Who is this letter from?President Kennedy: Oh, this is from one of their people that came to us.Wiesner: Uh, huh [possibly skeptical].President Kennedy: [reading from the secret letter from Khrushchev] “As

we understood the idea, the suggestion is that automatic seismic stationshelp with their records to determine what is the cause of this or thatunderground tremor—underground nuclear blasts or ordinary earth-quakes. It would be sort of a mechanical control without men. Afterthinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can beaccepted if this would make it easier to reach [an] agreement. In thiscase, it could be provided in a treaty banning all nuclear weapons teststhat automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of thenuclear state and two to three such stations directly on the territory ofthe states possessing nuclear weapons—in the areas most frequently

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 209

subjected to earthquaking. The Soviet government agrees to this . . .agrees to this perhaps only because it seeks a mutually acceptable basisfor an agreement.”

Wiesner: Uh, huh.President Kennedy: Well, I think that that sort of violates the agree-

ment, but we also want to . . . And then it says that [he resumes readingfrom the text] “The American scientists who took part in the PugwashConference . . . approved of the suggestion about the use of automaticseismic stations for the purposes of control. Soviet scientists approvedthe suggestion . . . so, it appears the scientists were already in agreementand there’s a possibility to move ahead . . . ”

I think we ought to move [unclear].Wiesner: What they say is in the document that I have given you, is

that in principle they think this should work and it should be consideredby the governments and—

President Kennedy: [reading] “They need to be sealed in such a waythat they cannot be tampered with; they may be self-contained. Theinstruments would be installed by the host government and periodicallyreturned to the international commission for inspection, replacementand repair, and such.”23 See . . .

Wiesner: My basic reaction is that I would like these things to haveregular communication. I’m not sure it’s necessary, and I don’t want toinsist on it until I can prove it because [unclear].

President Kennedy: [reading further] “All the records would beturned over to the Commission for analysis.”

Could they bug these instruments?Wiesner: It would be pretty hard because you have, see if you have

your external seismic stations, which we still would have, you can getcalibrations on this signal.

President Kennedy: How long do you [unclear]?Wiesner: You could—Bohlen: But Jerry, what would happen if you had an explosion that

was suspicious, you weren’t sure?Wiesner: Well, here’s what you’re hoping for—Bohlen: Are these things are so good that they can detect the differ-

ence between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion?Wiesner: Well, the thing you want, Chip, is a large number of seis-

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962210

23. Once again President Kennedy appears to be reading from a text, although these sentencesdo not appear in the 28 September letter from Khrushchev.

mic stations so that some of them are always close to the events. Ifthey’re close, you can usually tell the difference.

Bohlen: Hmmm.Wiesner: I don’t believe that any such system would get us out of the

necessity for some mandatory inspection of the seismic areas. It wouldreduce . . . Anything of this kind that you do reduces the number. But it’stechnically—

President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what you do. Would you then pre-pare for the . . . by Tuesday or so a response to this argument that itneeds only two or three—

Wiesner: Yeah.President Kennedy: —agreed upon at Pugwash by first going back

to what they really said at Pugwash and the subsequent . . .Wiesner: OK.President Kennedy: . . . and then say what the seismic—Wiesner: Can I get your reaction to one other idea—President Kennedy: Fine.Wiesner: —that I have been playing with . . . that I have actually

been trying to understand this to prepare a memo? As you know, I havebeen impressed for the last year with the fact that the earthquakes—nowI think I have talked to both of you about this—[muttered assent] in theSoviet Union occur in a very few remote places.

Unidentified: Yes.Wiesner: And here are some maps that I’ve had made [unclear].[Wiesner flips maps. Kennedy leaves the room?]Wiesner: This is 1957. They’re in there. They’re in here and they’re

down here, an occasional one out there. They’re in the same place downhere. In fact, I’ve drawn an area in which I can’t find any record of seis-mic—

Bohlen: [Unclear.]Wiesner: Maybe one a year in here. So, I’ve been wondering whether

if we went into this direction we would be willing to do another trick; andthat is to say, we’d accept [unclear], we would accept invitational inspec-tions in a defined a seismic area [Bohlen mumbling in the background] andmandatory in the seismic areas and this would probably be mandatory ina quarter—

Bohlen: The only trouble is that these areas of where they are, theyhave the big complexes.

Wiesner: I know [unclear] but one. But they’re not where your mis-sile bases are. These are [unclear] complexes [unclear].

Bohlen: Yeah but your [unclear] bases are all in here.

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 211

Now where is this . . . Where is . . . this place, Semipalatinsk in all ofthis?

Wiesner: Semipalatinsk is in here. It’s [unclear].Bohlen: [Unclear] for all that testing area—Wiesner: All their testing and all their missile bases, with the excep-

tion of their Kamchatka—Bohlen: Yeah.Wiesner: —Terminal. Now I’ve talked to a Russian about this in

Geneva and he said, “Well, the only trouble is that these are on the bor-ders where our intelligence complexes are.” And I said—

Bohlen: Yeah.Wiesner: —“Sure but who cares about that anyway.” You see. Hey, 60

percent of them are out here underwater on these damn Kuril Isles. Sowhen you finally find out about these things, I’m ready to concede thatthey probably have some basis for their suspicions of what we are trying todo, but two or three stations would make no difference. There was a verythorough study that was made of this a couple of years ago: if they werewilling to put in 100 or 200 of them, or maybe 50 I am not sure what thenumber is, it would make a very substantial difference because what wouldhappen—I think you’d then go in the following way, Chip: you’d first . . .Your external system would say there was something in here that can’t beresolved. The next thing you’d do is call for these unmanned stations.Either that or look at your radio records. I would suspect in a large frac-tion of the cases, the unmanned stations would then give you enough dataso you could resolve it and say, “This was probably an earthquake.” Thereis no question that there would always be a residue—

Bohlen: Well, the only things you’re really interested in are preciselythe ones which would not be resolved by mechanical [unclear] . . . Inother words—

Wiesner: Yeah. But suppose you start with the assumption that theyare not going to cheat.

Bohlen: Yeah.Wiesner: You just . . . and then what you are looking for in both cases

is a system of assurance. Because if they’re going to cheat, I think theycan always cheat. I could always cheat on one or two [unclear] explo-sions and get away with it. I don’t think they could cheat on a large testseries. . . . In fact, at present, they’ve never gotten away with it now. Weknow when they’re testing—

Bohlen: Listen Jerry, tell me one thing: how valuable are under-ground explosions?

Wiesner: I don’t think they are terribly valuable. And I think this is

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962212

the boss’s impression.24 But the fact is that we’ve got a political problemhere at home—

Bohlen: Yeah.Wiesner: —but I think the Russians have got one, too, now, because . . .

What I’d like to see is whether you could invent a system in which [Doorcloses. Kennedy comes back in the room?] we made a compromise, in which weaccepted invitation in the aseismic area and mandatory inspection in theseismic area.

Bohlen: Yeah.Wiesner: Do you think we would get in trouble politically, Mr.

President, with a—President Kennedy: What?Wiesner: —proposal that said that we would accept invitational

inspection in that part of the Soviet Union where there normally aren’tearthquakes if they would accept mandatory inspection in the seismicarea? Here’s a map, a series of maps that show what’s going on. This isyear by year and you see it. Most of—

President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Wiesner: —that great big bulk of the Soviet Union probably doesn’t

have an earthquake a year.Thompson: [Unclear] that?Wiesner: And [unclear] here [pointing to map] 60 percent are over

here in the Kuril Islands. So, we have been asking, you see, for the rightto—of course if they were smart, they would say, “Well, if there are noearthquakes, you can’t go there, because there’s no record.” But they say,“We’ll fake them.”

President Kennedy: What?Wiesner: But they . . . when we say, “Well if there’s no earthquake, we

won’t go because we won’t have a basis for going.” They say, “Well, youcan fake the record.” So that they worry about the other side of . . . [pointsout places on the map]. You see, all of their factories and missile bases, andso on, are in this part of the country there. There is a little bit over here:at Kamchatka the terminal guidance for their ballistic missile tests isthere. But I think—

President Kennedy: Well, I think if there was a chance that they[unclear], we might try—

Wiesner: You see, I think they’ve got . . . Khrushchev’s got [unclear

Meet ing on the Sovie t Union 213

24. President Kennedy.

interjection by Kennedy] the clear advantage of your political problem bynow. People are saying you don’t want it, if you [unclear] . . .

Bohlen: I think this is one of the things . . . that Khrushchev has themost distorted picture of the way American democracy or any democracyoperates. I think this is one of the great inefficiencies in his whole complex.

President Kennedy: Do you think that Khrushchev says all this busi-ness about him finding inexplicable congressional action and the de jurepower and all the rest because he really does . . . astonished at that or isit because this is this . . . What?

Bohlen: He probably thinks in the bottom of his heart that you putthem up to it.

President Kennedy: Put the Congress . . . ? [Laughter.]Bohlen: Well, I’m kidding—actually, I’ve always . . . Well, you see, up

to very recently, I don’t know whether it’s changed so much now, noSoviet Embassy in this town even bothered to read the Constitution of theUnited States. I’ve talked to some of them, and they said, “We don’t want[unclear] to read that.” And they literally didn’t understand anything aboutthe operation of our own system and any democratic system because of themain thesis that this is just a flimflam to delude the people.

Thompson: Or they’ll say a different thing. I’ve argued with a lot ofthem and they’ll say, “Well, the President can’t help with these pressureson him; they’ll force him to do things, even if he doesn’t want to.” So thatyou get both these images [unclear]—

Bohlen: Yeah, I have simplified it a lot in there. [Thompson agrees.]And it may be with a man like Dobrynin, that they are getting a littlemore understanding of how the thing works because some of his . . .except for . . . on the basis of the fundamental Bolshevik thought, someof this stuff, you see, that he says in public speeches and all this sort ofstuff is just a lot of nonsense.

President Kennedy shifts the discussion to the issue of providing nuclearaid to France. Bohlen has recently been named to replace General JamesGavin as ambassador to France. Gavin announced his resignation in earlyAugust and left Paris the week of September 20, ostensibly for personalfinancial reasons but actually amidst controversy over his ongoing propos-als to provide nuclear aid to France. Gavin had encouraged the sale of mis-sile technology, enriched uranium, and compressors for gaseous diffusionplants that separated radioactive isotopes. President Kennedy’s openingstatement to Bohlen is a sarcastic reference to Gavin’s downfall.

Gavin had not been a lone voice in the wilderness. In March 1962,

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962214

Kennedy had opened debate within the administration over the questionby asking for a “new appraisal of our atomic policy in regard to France.”25

Broadly speaking, the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Stafffavored nuclear sharing while the Department of State adamantlyopposed it.

President Kennedy entertained the idea of providing some form ofnuclear assistance because of U.S. balance of payments worries and fearof Franco-German nuclear collaboration. By selling missile technologyand other information up to the level of fission weapons, he hoped to off-set U.S. military outlays. He also thought it would prevent de Gaullefrom pressuring West Germany to cooperate in a nuclear program.

Throughout the spring and summer, the Department of State hadgotten the upper hand, and the administration maintained its officialunequivocal opposition to nuclear sharing with France. Behind thescenes, however, Department of Defense officials continued to discussthe issue with French officials. On September 5, Deputy Secretary ofDefense Roswell Gilpatric left for Europe to discuss allied contributionsto help redress U.S. balance of payments deficits arising from militaryexpenditures on the continent. From September 7 to 9, he met withFrench defense minister Pierre Messmer and used their talks to exploreU.S.-French cooperation in research and development, procurement andproduction, and logistic support.

When this meeting of September 29 occurs, the administration is seek-ing congressional authorization for the sale to the French government ofthe Skipjack nuclear submarine, which was the Nautilus rather than thePolaris missile-firing type. The McMahon Act of 1958, of course, prohib-ited assistance relating to nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear sharingwithin the administration argued, however, that the McMahon Act hadbeen extrapolated into other technical areas such as missile technology.During the meeting, Kennedy takes an important call from Senator Henry“Scoop” Jackson, head of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

President Kennedy: How long do you think it will be before we getour first cable from you suggesting we give atomic weapons to France?[Laughter.]

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 215

25. C. V. Clifton, “Memorandum of Conference with the President,” 7 March 1962, “Conferencewith President and JCS, 10/61–11/62” folder, Chester Clifton Files, National Security Files,Box 345, John F. Kennedy Library.

Bohlen: Mr. President, I think it will probably take at least—Thompson: Two weeks. [More laughter.]Bohlen: Two years. Three years. [Unclear] two years.26

Thompson: That’s all it takes?Bohlen: Now I have been through all that drill, and I think the argu-

ments are very solid on this. [Unclear exchange.]President Kennedy: [Gilpatric] was told by [unclear] that this Brosio

has just bought the French position completely and that he’s followed—27

Bohlen: It seems to have a . . . Paris is a very seductive town—President Kennedy: Is it?Bohlen: —Mr. President. [Chuckles.]28

Wiesner: I often thought that we may be of a lot of help to them withnuclear submarines because—

Bohlen: Well, my God. [Chuckles again.]29

Wiesner: But [unclear].Bohlen: Listen, we could [unclear].Unidentified: Come in [unclear] construction. As we—Thompson: The only thing they’d settle for—our technology.Wiesner: I understand that.Bohlen: The technology.Wiesner: After two years of being sore at us because we wouldn’t

help them build one. Now you’re going to sell them one! [Laughs.]President Kennedy: [Unclear] sell you one, don’t you think?Bohlen: Oh yeah. I think so. The French . . . to hell with the . . . the

French strategy with its . . . is not exactly the most generous [unclear].30

Thompson: Well, look, I don’t know how much this—

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962216

26. Bohlen is being flippant because he had received stern written and oral instructions fromthe Secretary of State to pursue the official administration line of opposing nuclear sharing.27. Manlio Brosio was the Italian ambassador to France. From 17 to 19 September, Gilpatricmet with Italian defense minister Giulio Andreotti in Rome to discuss defense cooperation andItalian contributions for offsetting U.S. military expenditures. Brosio had apparently reported tohis government that de Gaulle sought greater Franco-Italian defense collaboration.28. The Kennedy administration had adopted what former secretary-general of NATO Paul-Henri Spaak said was a running joke among the West Europeans: “Italy is always looking for acompromise. Italy’s position is to say yes to France, no to the U.K., and do what the U.S. tellsher to do.”29. He is laughing at Wiesner’s heretical suggestion to provide some form of nuclear aid toFrance. There had been acrimonious debate throughout the spring and summer over the issue.30. Reference to their perception that both France’s force de frappe and conventional forceswere for the defense of France. De Gaulle had declared that a force de frappe would not be inte-grated with NATO’s nuclear forces.

Bohlen: This nuclear submarine thing, I hope to God that this goesthrough.31

President Kennedy: Where is it now?Bohlen: Well, I don’t know. Gilpatric told me yesterday that he talked

to Scoop Jackson and he talked to [Admiral George W.] Anderson.President Kennedy: And they bullied?Bohlen: Thought that there would be a considerable amount of con-

cern at the Department of State. Gilpatric went over there and sort ofmade a conditional offer and this has produced a great sort of feeling inthe French: “Oh, boy, here the logjam is broken and this is wonderful”and they’ve all expressed great pleasure and delight. But the only thingis, if there’s a hitch in the congressional thing and we have to call it off,then . . . [Unclear exchange.]

President Kennedy: Oh no, I thought Anderson had that?Bohlen: Did you see that letter from Jim Gavin to the Secretary [of

State]?President Kennedy: A letter, no.32

Bohlen: On this subject?President Kennedy: No. Maybe you can send it over to me? But I

think that, as I recall Anderson was in favor, or maybe Jackson, I think,was in favor of our doing something with the French.

Bohlen: I don’t think so.President Kennedy: What? You know giving them some—Bohlen: Yeah.President Kennedy: —nuclear assistance—some of them were . . .Wiesner: I always thought we were making a mistake in not helping

them with things that weren’t bombs. Because this made them particu-larly bitter. They’d say, well this is not nuclear explosives, and confrontus on . . .

President Kennedy: Well, I think it is possible that we’ll just have to. . . The fact is the Soviet Union in all these things recognizes France asa nuclear power, so that it wouldn’t be a question of diffusing any-more.33

Bohlen: Now, this is one of the things in this diffusion angle that hasreally bothered me.

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 217

31. Reference to its going through the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.32. No record of this letter has been found.33. This was a concern because of President Kennedy’s hope for a test ban treaty.

Wiesner: But at the bottom of this is the faster you . . . the more youhelp the French, the more incentive you give other people to get to thatstage, too, you see. So, I think you have to be very careful on the bomb.

Bohlen: As I’ve always understood, Mr. President, your thought onthe things you told Malraux,34 was that this is surely, but in particularwhen Adenauer leaves, is going to produce a comparable German effortto get one.

President Kennedy: Uh, huh.Bohlen: And I would say that this is one of the places where I think

de Gaulle shuts his mind and is focusing on his needs, ready to bringGermany into the European Community. He doesn’t seem to be payingvery much attention to the old talk about the WEU treaties.35

And you recall what Adenauer said to Rusk when we were there inJune; he talked about the atomic [unclear]. He said, “Well, of course[unclear] when we signed the WEU agreement because it is based onthe doctrine of rebus sic standibus.36

President Kennedy: Yeah. Yeah.Bohlen: —which gives the impression which was [unclear] rebus sic

standibus is a hell of a lot and that the situation is quite different than it wasthen. I think the main thing on this thing is whether or not the French—de Gaulle—really believes that this independent nuclear capability . . .

President Kennedy: [to Evelyn Lincoln] Is he calling me? Jackson’scalling?

[to gentlemen in room] Jackson’s calling me. So [unclear].[to Evelyn Lincoln] Can I get Senator Jackson please?[to gentlemen] Yeah, let’s put that away for a little . . . [unclear] and

then let’s come back to it.Unidentified: Uh, huh.President Kennedy: [to Wiesner] Well, would you see if you can get

me a response [to Khrushchev’s test ban letter]?Wiesner: Well, who’s this to? Can’t you . . .President Kennedy: I just want a paper.Wiesner: You want a paper?

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962218

34. André Malraux, French minister of state for cultural affairs, visited the United States from10 to 16 May 1962 at President Kennedy’s personal invitation.35. Western European Union.36. Rebus sic standibus is the legal doctrine that treaties can be terminated on the ground of achange in circumstances that defeats the treaty’s purpose. Bohlen is telling the President thatAdenauer admits to relying on this document as a possible escape hatch from the WEU agree-ment that bars West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons.

President Kennedy: —a paper with an explanation of it.Wiesner: All right.President Kennedy: I just want to know what the Pugwash scientists

did say and what, particularly about this question, of their being quoted—Wiesner: Right.President Kennedy: —as having only said two or three.Hello. Can you get Senator Jackson?Door closes. Kennedy speaks on the telephone to Senator Jackson.President Kennedy: Hello, Scoop, how are you? Good.Henry Jackson: I’ll see if I can’t find out about [unclear].President Kennedy: Yeah, fine, then why don’t you come and see—

why don’t you come down next week, Monday or Tuesday?Jackson: All right.President Kennedy: Can I . . . I’ll call your office Monday morning

and then—Jackson: I’ll be in a meeting [unclear].President Kennedy: Good. Did Ros Gilpatric talk to you about—

Yeah, what is the feeling up there?Jackson: On the [unclear], I think [unclear] used to be [unclear]. In

the meantime, [unclear].President Kennedy: Oh. It seems to me that he accepted.Jackson: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Yeah . . . right. I think. Go on. Yeah but that; but

do they think there is some stuff there that the other people don’t have?Oh, I see. Good. OK.

Jackson: [Unclear.]Bohlen and Thompson begin to talk while President Kennedy is on thetelephone to Jackson.Thompson: I would say, West Berlin. I’m not sure we’re done.Bohlen: [Unclear] consider very carefully. This is the . . . sort of an

amendment to the original resolution [unclear] much more. But it is, asyou notice, he speaks of the continued exercise of their rights in Berlinwhich means, in effect, West Berlin.

President Kennedy: Oh, I see, I see. I understand what you mean.Well, I’ll talk to you about it next, the first part of the week. Have youtold all this to Gilpatric? Right, to Gilpatric. Look, I’ll see you Mondayor Tuesday.37

Meeting on the Sovie t Union 219

37. On Wednesday, 3 October, Senator Jackson met with the President at the White Housefrom 11:10 to 11:30 A.M.

Jackson: I’ll brief him.President Kennedy: Thank you.Telephone conversation ends. President Kennedy turns to Bohlen.President Kennedy: He says [unclear] the Soviets—evidently there’s

some material there, information there, [which] could be valuable to theSoviets.38

Bohlen: This is Rickover’s position. 39

President Kennedy: That’s Rickover. And he says the suggestion,therefore, is that the training program might be adjusted so that thisinformation could be available at the very end. By that time the informa-tion would not be useful—evidently they assume the Russians will haveit by then.

Bohlen: The main thing I’ll be interested in, and Gavin in this lettersaid to me, if this is called off after Gilpatric’s thing. He said this wouldmake it very difficult for Ambassador Bohlen. In other words, this is thekind of thing the French would consider we did.

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Bohlen: —double-crossed them.President Kennedy: Oh, I think we can—we’ll just indicate that we’ll

stay at it. I think we might as well . . .Bohlen: Again, I see no objection to the thing, this resort, to the ques-

tion of this leakage of secrecy that it be handled that way. That’s all right. Ithink the feeling is that in the French scientific community there are somepeople who are very doubtful as to their former connection to the SovietUnion, apart from their actual connections. But I think that if this could doit, then . . . But first, there’s one thing, you know this business of thenuclear diffusion that the Secretary has been talking to [Soviet foreignminister Andrei] Gromyko about, that . . . If you put France in the cate-gory, as the agreement does, as a nuclear possessing power—

President Kennedy: I am very reluctant [unclear].Bohlen: —then you really—President Kennedy: That’s right.Bohlen: —just knock the ground out from under your feet about help-

ing them, except on the grounds of unfriendliness to France. Now, I’ve toldthis to the Secretary, and I think he is well aware of it. And it’ll be worth it

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962220

38. Summarizing his telephone conversation with Jackson, Kennedy tells them that there isfear of compromising U.S. nuclear reactor technology by allowing the possibility of secretspassing to the Soviets by sharing the Skipjack submarine with the French.39. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.

if you really have a good tight nuclear diffusion agreement; but if you don’t. . . That’s why I was worried about sending it on to the allies to considerand you ought to have a lot more clarity with the Russians as to whetherthey’d really need—[reference to conflict between a nuclear nonproliferation ornondiffusion agreement and any U.S. nuclear assistance to France].

President Kennedy: That’s what I thought. We don’t want to gothrough one of these terrible allied [unclear]—

Bohlen: —allied performances on a hypothetical situation.President Kennedy: Right.Bohlen: And, Mr. President, one more thing, you know this resolu-

tion on Berlin?President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: —that Zablocki has sponsored.40

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bohlen: Well, I’m going up there on Monday at ten—President Kennedy: OK.Bohlen: —to talk to him. And you’ve seen this draft?President Kennedy: And I asked him to take out this question of

German . . . The government . . . the conclusion, the final. Secondly—Bohlen: And that isn’t accurate either because the agreements don’t

provide for that.President Kennedy: That’s right.Bohlen: I mean, the agreements are not based on until—President Kennedy: I think that I see no particular disadvantage.

[reading text] I don’t see any advantage of it, I don’t see it’s a great dis-advantage.

Bohlen: No, it’s just that we’ve been trying to get Zablocki to lay offit, but he’s just hot on it. You know, he feels that since we’ve asked[unclear] reservists, he asked that you mention Cuba and Berlin that . . .

President Kennedy: Yeah, but I think . . . I just think—Bohlen: If you have one on Cuba, you ought to have one on Berlin.

He really wants to pick up some political capital for being the—President Kennedy: With the Germans?Bohlen: No, with his election cam—41

President Kennedy: What [unclear] is German?Tape spools out.

Meet ing on the Sovie t Union 221

40. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wisconsin) was on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.41. Zablocki was up for reelection in November 1962.

The secretary of the army, Cyrus Vance; the U.S. Army chief of staff,General Earl Wheeler; and the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General Maxwell Taylor, entered the Oval Office next to discussthe possible use of the Army in Mississippi. Kennedy may have wished totape this conversation; but he only successfully pulls the switch at theend of the conversation, leaving the machine on to catch the strategysession with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Assistant AttorneyGeneral Burke Marshall.

1:18–1:30 P.M.

The question still will remain . . . as to whether we call out theguard today, federalize the guard today, put it on an alert . . .

Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi42

The struggle to integrate the University of Mississippi (“Ole Miss”) beganquietly in January 1961, just after the inauguration of John Kennedy.Inspired by the words of Kennedy’s inaugural address, James H. Meredith,a 28-year-old Air Force veteran, decided to apply to the leading institutionof higher learning in Mississippi. Requesting an application, Meredithdescribed himself as an “American-Mississippi-Negro citizen,” who hadbeen moved by all the changes “in our educational system taking place inthe country in this new age.” He noted that the application would probablynot come as a surprise to the university and hoped the matter would be“handled in a manner that [would] be complimentary to the Universityand to the State of Mississippi. Of course, I am the one that will, no doubt,suffer the greatest consequences of this event.” Convinced that his goal ofending segregation at the university was but one part of the great strugglefor racial justice, Meredith would later write of his “Divine Responsibility”for ending “White Supremacy” in Mississippi, observing that desegregat-ing Ole Miss was “only the start.”

Over the next two years, as Meredith’s case moved through thecourts and finally exploded on the grounds of the Mississippi campus, itreceived national and even international attention, and Kennedy admin-

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962222

42. Including President Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Burke Marshall. Tape 24, John F.Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

istration officials, including the President and the Attorney General,devoted a great deal of time to managing the crisis. Before the episodeended with the registration and matriculation of Meredith at Ole Miss inthe fall of 1962, tense standoffs, rioting, and death would come to theuniversity, and President Kennedy would order thousands of U.S. Armytroops to the campus in order to protect Meredith and enforce the ruleof law. Meredith’s determination to attend Ole Miss, Mississippi’s stead-fast efforts to prevent him from doing so, and the conviction of thePresident and his aides that it was essential to allow Meredith to enterthe university combined to make the episode one of the most celebratedin the history of the civil rights movement.

Having decided to transfer from all-black Jackson State to all-whiteOle Miss, Meredith recognized that he would need legal assistance, whichled him to contact Medgar Evers, Mississippi field secretary of theNational Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).Evers put him in touch with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, where hiscase would be handled by Constance Baker Motley, one of the defensefund’s talented young attorneys. With the nation’s leading civil rightsorganization behind him, Meredith embarked on what would become atortuous legal battle to enter the segregated institution. After Ole Misshad denied him admission on clearly specious grounds, the strugglemoved to the courts, and over the next several months, Meredith contin-ued to seek admission to the university. In September 1962, the federalcourts established Meredith’s legal right to attend the institution. But thestruggle was far from over, as white Mississippians—politicians, OleMiss students, local journalists, and ordinary citizens—united to blockthe young black man from entering their beloved university.

Spearheading the movement against the integration of the universitywas Governor Ross Barnett, who combined the soft-spoken demeanor of thesouthern planter with the overheated rhetoric of the southern populist.Barnett’s performance during the crisis is not easy to characterize: in speak-ing to the Kennedys, he was generally conciliatory, searching, or so itseemed, for a way out of the legal and political morass. But the governor wasequally capable of appealing to the basest instincts of those who would standin Meredith’s path. In one of the most highly charged moments of the crisis,Barnett declared to a crowd of 46,000 football fans attending an Ole Missgame: “I love Mississippi. I love our people. I love our customs.” The thronglaughed, cried, and roared its approval; the moment, a spectator recalled,resembled “a big Nazi rally.” In showdowns that saw Barnett and his col-leagues confront U.S. marshals and Justice Department officials, manyMississippians came to perceive the crisis as pitting the federal Goliath

Meeting on the Cris i s a t the Univers i ty o f Miss i s s ippi 223

against the southern David—or perhaps more aptly, as providing a secondchance to fight for the honor of the south against the northern invader.

The U.S. Department of Justice was interested in the case from thestart, with Burke Marshall, assistant attorney general for civil rights,telling Meredith that the Civil Rights Division was following his effortsand was prepared to do everything it could to assist him. In August1962, one month before the federal courts had established Meredith’sright to enter the University, the Justice Department had become offi-cially involved in the case, filing an amicus curiae brief, which arguedthat several delays issued by Judge Ben Cameron of the Fifth Circuitwere improper. On September 10 Justice Hugo Black of the U.S.Supreme Court concurred, thus paving the way for the federal order thatMeredith be admitted to Ole Miss.

While by August 1962 the Justice Department had become an activeparticipant in the case, its role in the person of the Attorney Generaland others would increase markedly in the days ahead. During the latterpart of September, Robert Kennedy would engage in some twenty con-versations with Governor Barnett in an effort to work out a plan to reg-ister Meredith at Ole Miss, an eventuality the Mississippi politicianseemed determined to prevent.

Meredith was scheduled to start classes at the university, after regis-tering on September 25. But Governor Ross Barnett prevented Meredithfrom registering, blocking his entry into the trustee’s room in a state officebuilding in Jackson, where the registration was scheduled to take place.Accompanied by John Doar of the U.S. Justice Department and JamesMcShane, chief U.S. marshal, Meredith was forced to leave after Barnettwillfully refused a court order to admit him, declaring he did “herebyfinally deny you admission to the University of Mississippi.” The largecrowd roared its approval, an onlooker cried “Three cheers for the gover-nor,” and Meredith departed, along with his federal escorts.

The following day, September 26, Meredith, again accompanied byDoar and McShane, headed to the Ole Miss campus in Oxford to regis-ter for classes. The car carrying the three men, escorted by the highwaypatrol, was forced to stop a few blocks from the entrance to the campus.Backed up by state troopers, county sheriffs, and a line of patrol cars,Lieutenant Governor Paul Johnson approached Meredith, Doar, andMcShane. Filling in for Governor Barnett (low clouds had preventedhim from flying up from Jackson to Oxford), Johnson said, “I would liketo read this proclamation,” which stated that Mississippi was “interpos-ing” its powers and would deny Meredith admission to the university.

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962224

After some gentle pushing between McShane and Johnson, it was appar-ent the Mississippian would not yield. After they exchanged somewords, McShane turned in retreat, and Meredith, Doar, and a retinue offederal marshals departed the scene, prevented once more from fulfillingtheir court-ordered task.

On September 27, the group again tried to register Meredith. This timean elaborate plan had been worked out in discussions between AttorneyGeneral Robert Kennedy and Governor Barnett and his friend TomWatkins, by which the U.S. marshals would draw their guns on Barnett andPaul Johnson in a “show of force.” Once this symbolic act had been com-pleted, the Mississippi politicians would stand aside and allow Meredith topass (with his escorts) and register for classes. But the plan was thwarted, assome 2,000 people, including students, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes,converged that day on Oxford from all over Mississippi, determined to stopMeredith from registering at the university. A worried Barnett telephonedthe Attorney General late in the day to report that he was uncertain if hecould maintain order and claimed he had been unable to disperse the crowd.The Attorney General, never comfortable with the planned “show of force,”ordered Meredith’s convoy, which was heading from Memphis to Oxford, toturn back. Less than 50 miles from Oxford, the group turned around,recrossed the Tennessee border, and returned to Memphis.

On Friday September 28, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals foundGovernor Barnett guilty of contempt. Barnett, who did not appear incourt, was found guilty in absentia and given until the followingTuesday to clear himself by retracting his proclamation and allowingMeredith to register. In the event he failed to do so, the Court declaredBarnett would face arrest and a fine of $10,000 a day for each day heremained in Meredith’s path.

On September 29, President Kennedy would become more directlyinvolved in the crisis, having previously allowed the Attorney General toassume primary responsibility in the affair. That morning Robert Kennedyhad been on the telephone with Ross Barnett and his chosen intermediary,Thomas Watkins, an attorney from Jackson, Mississippi. The deal reachedthe day before had fallen through. Now the Mississippians wanted an evenlarger show of federal force before giving in and letting Meredith registerat Ole Miss.

The President had to decide whether the U.S. Army or a federalizedMississippi National Guard would be needed to cope with the increas-ingly tense situation.

Meeting on the Cris i s a t the Univers i ty o f Miss i s s ippi 225

Unidentified: . . . the witness is on the telephone, so you know thathe says, “I can’t do it any longer.” Second point of it is that even if youhave the problem of, on Sunday if you call the guard on Sunday, this isthe quietest time in those towns, and you will look like you’re calling theguard when there’s nothing happening. Sunday is the psychologicallyquiet time, unless they incite somebody to meet. And so it ought, even inLittle Rock, there’s no doubt we read about Sunday always looks likeeverybody was going to church, and the Life magazine pictures will looklike the very devil. 43

On the other hand, it’s the easiest time to mobilize, when there’snobody around. And that’s an advantage. A third critical point, I guess, is,what if the governor chooses, in effect, to call out the guard before you doand again, if he says you’re challenging him on keeping law and order.And he said, “All right, I’ll keep law and order.” For one thing, he’ll tellyou if you’d call off Meredith, why there won’t be any disturbance.

President Kennedy: But I can’t call off Meredith for that.Unidentified: No. No. I agree with you.President Kennedy: I don’t have the power to call off Meredith.Unidentified: But he’ll put it in the conversation that you’re the one

inciting the trouble.President Kennedy: I understand that.Unidentified: But the other point is, do you want him to call the

guard? If he says, “Well I could keep law and order, I guess, if I call outthe guard,” you have to think of whether he might preempt you on that.

President Kennedy: Well, let him do it. Let him do it. I don’t mindthat. That’d be all right.

Unidentified: You can always federalize the guard [unclear] or evenget the chance to.

President Kennedy: So now the question really is . . . I think we oughtto go ahead [with] my contacts, and your conversation and telegram, withBarnett, number one. Now the question therefore, we know what theresult of that’s going to be. The question still will remain with us today asto whether we call out the guard today, federalize the guard today, put it

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962226

43. The reference is to the autumn 1957 Little Rock crisis in which the governor of Arkansas,Orval Faubus, defied a federal court order to desegregate Little Rock’s Central High School.Faubus used the National Guard, ostensibly to prevent violence but in reality to block nineAfrican American students from enrolling in the all-white high school. After scenes of hate-filled mobs harassing the students appeared on national television, President Eisenhowercalled in 1,000 federal troops and 10,000 federalized National Guardsmen in order to protectthe young African Americans.

on an alert, start an intermediate step in the guard, or do we wait tillMonday and do it? Or do we wait till Barnett sent me an answer? I thinkI’ll . . . Well, in any case, I’ll wait for Barnett’s answer, I guess. Then Iwould think unless he sends me such a vague . . . I don’t know what kind ofwire he’ll send me. What’ll he say to me, or send me?

Robert Kennedy: Maybe he’ll attack Meredith, I suppose.President Kennedy: But he won’t say whether he can keep order,

will he?Robert Kennedy: No, I think he’s . . .President Kennedy: He’ll give me an answer saying, “If you will just

call off that thing, we can keep order.” So it won’t be a clean answer tome. So we still have to . . .

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but you can of course, you can phrase thetelegram in such a way that’s going to make it look difficult.

President Kennedy: All right, let’s get this wire written. Let’s getsomething, Burke [Marshall], as to what I’m supposed to ask him in twoor three questions.

Burke Marshall: All right.President Kennedy: Now, what about the guard? In other words, if

we decide in the next hour or so, after I’ve talked to Barnett, et cetera,getting them there, how would a proclamation be handled . . . [trails offas the President walks away] . . . It will take . . . It will require a federalproclamation to that effect.

Unidentified: Right.President Kennedy: I don’t know whether this requires a television

speech or not [unclear].Unidentified: That’s what I hoped [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] the purpose and then [unclear].Unclear exchanges. The voices get distant. Kennedy is heard saying,“The one tomorrow night to the country.”President Kennedy: Evelyn? Burke, do you want to dictate a memo-

randum for this conversation, guidance, what is it I want to say toBarnett?

Robert Kennedy: Well, why don’t we, just the three of us go and . . .President Kennedy: And a telegram? To follow?Unidentified: If we do that [unclear], yes.President Kennedy: OK, then I’ll call . . . If we’ve got to go with the

guard, it seems to me we ought to call out [unclear] regiment should go.Unidentified: What’s the word, sir? If you call [unclear].President Kennedy: Yeah.Unidentified: . . . federalizing the guard . . .

Meeting on the Cris i s a t the Univers i ty o f Miss i s s ippi 227

Unidentified: . . . put them in the armories, just about, I’d say that’dbe [unclear] use, and I would say the first battle group of the [unclear]the Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Martin. Now, I would suggest thatwe go ahead and move General Billingslea of the Second InfantryDivision Headquarters in there and put him in command . . .44

Unidentified: Under Vance?45

Unidentified: Right, under Vance.Unidentified: None of the others . . .President Kennedy: To do what? To do what?Unidentified: Well, Billingslea would be the Army officer in overall

charge. Put him into Memphis right now.President Kennedy: Where is he now?Unidentified: He’s down at Benning now. 46

President Kennedy: I see.Several unclear exchanges follow.Unidentified: No, I agree. We were going to use, first, two M.P. bat-

talions . . .President Kennedy: How many would there be in one?Unidentified: Well, there would be 800 men, all told. And we’d also

bring in the battle group from the Second Infantry Division at FortBenning to give [unclear].

President Kennedy: How about the map of the town and so on? Isthere somebody around who knows which way and can direct the guardto go . . . ?

Unidentified: Oh, yes. [Unclear] military [unclear] set of maps[unclear].

President Kennedy: Will you have a regular Army fellow with themor will it be Billingslea?

Unidentified: You have regular Army. [Several speakers at once.]President Kennedy: Has Billingslea [unclear] made an analysis of

what he would do with the various forces?Unidentified: People have been working on . . .Unidentified: Right. And Creighton Abrams will be down . . .47

Unidentified: Maybe he should talk to [unclear].

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962228

44. Colonel Martin is not further identified. General Billingslea is Brigadier General CharlesBillingslea.45. Cyrus R. Vance, secretary of the Army.46. Fort Benning, Georgia.47. Major General W. Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for militaryoperations.

Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]Unidentified: I can talk to Senator Stennis, if you like, Mr. President,

on this thing, but I do think it would be wise to at least bring it up.48

President Kennedy: You or [unclear]?Unidentified: I’d be very happy to do it . . .President Kennedy: I could see him. He’s in Washington, is he?Unidentified: Yes, he’s in Washington.President Kennedy: Well, I’ll see him about five or six. He’s talked to

me personally about [unclear] our problem. So [unclear] by that time,I’ll have had my conversation with Barnett, and we’ll send Barnett awire and hopefully, I’ll get a hold of him. [Unclear.]

Unidentified: Maybe you’d better go through an ambassador, insteadof yourself. [Lengthy unclear discussion about Barnett follows.]

Leaving the machine running, the President walks over to the familyquarters at approximately 1:25 P.M.Evelyn Lincoln: Did he go over to the Mansion?Unidentified: He’s in the pool with [unclear].Lincoln: Oh. [Then about five minutes of distant conversation during

which someone says, “Is he coming back?”]President Kennedy apparently decides against a swim. Instead he returnsto the Oval Office with the Attorney General.

President Kennedy has still not decided whether he will stay inWashington overnight. Slated to meet his friends Lem Billings andCongressman Torbert MacDonald in Newport, Rhode Island, Kennedy isstill holding out the option of flying out after he speaks to Ross Barnett.Robert Kennedy: Jack?President Kennedy: I think I’m going to go up there after we give

[unclear] depending on when we . . . [Unclear] don’t want some Micksin Newport, Rhode Island [unclear]. [Unclear] going to make a speechtomorrow night.

What about getting Sorensen to work? 49 Does he say Arthur’s beenworking on it?50

Robert Kennedy: Yeah.Can I talk . . . can I get Arthur? Do you want to get Arthur?

Meeting on the Cris i s a t the Univers i ty o f Miss i s s ippi 229

48. Senator John Stennis of Mississippi.49. For the past week, White House counsel Sorensen had been hospitalized with an ulcer. OnFriday, Sorensen had sent a memorandum to the White House with his suggestions for han-dling the crisis. Evidently the President hadn’t yet seen it. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 484.50. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was a presidential special assistant.

Unclear discussion. The President walks over to Evelyn Lincoln’s officeand has an unclear discussion with her.President Kennedy: Yes, you just have to get him. I just want to

speak to him at home. Where is he? At home?Lincoln: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Mr. President?President Kennedy: Yeah.

A brief unclear discussion follows. Then the Attorney Generallaunches into a discussion of a new spy case.

Approximately 1:30 –1:35 P.M.

If you’re caught spying as a diplomat . . . [y]ou can’t try them?

Meeting with Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case51

On September 28, the FBI arrested Yeoman First Class Nelson CorneliusDrummond of the U.S. Navy and charged him with conspiring to passdefense secrets to the Soviet Union. Drummond was apprehended whilesitting in a car in Larchmont, New York, with two officials from theSoviet delegation to the United Nations. The FBI agents found eightclassified naval documents on the car seat between Drummond and theSoviet officials.

Drummond had been under surveillance for some time and hadapparently shown unusual signs of wealth for an enlisted man whosemonthly salary was $318. Given their diplomatic status, the Soviet offi-cials were not liable to arrest, although they were detained briefly beforetheir identity was established. Shortly after the Russians were appre-hended, the U.S. government demanded their expulsion.

Robert Kennedy: They called [unclear] give those guys as much timeas he can. Tell him, you can’t believe the Russians would do this. You

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962230

51. Tape 24, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential RecordingsCollection.

can’t, you must be . . . You know they brought out the card thing, theRussians are diplomats . . .

Unidentified: The Russians would do that. Ughhhh!!!Unidentified: [Unclear] that they’ve misunderstood. They . . .Robert Kennedy: It’s all about getting those two men.President Kennedy: What?Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: What were they doing?Robert Kennedy: We got the chief petty officer [unclear] who gave

them a lot of valuable information. [Unclear] since 1958.President Kennedy: Why, was he stationed in Moscow, was he for

awhile?Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] And he’s been living way above his

means. [Unclear.] So they got on him.President Kennedy: How did they catch him?Robert Kennedy: They started following him. He spent a lot of

money and then he [unclear] couldn’t get any good stuff on the docu-ments. So when he was short of money, they would watch him [unclear].And they followed . . . thought he was going to go last week, so they fol-lowed all the way out [unclear]. Sometimes he’d drive at [unclear] milesan hour. But they had cars stationed all the way. And then they wentfinally chasing him to Westchester. [Unclear] he was with the third sec-retary of the delegation of the Soviet Union.

President Kennedy: At the U.N. or here?Robert Kennedy: The U.N.President Kennedy: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: They were sitting in the car, with the documents,

with the dough.President Kennedy: They just arrested them?Robert Kennedy: So, they called me at once because they thought that

[unclear] speak Russian [unclear]. They asked for diplomatic immunity. President Kennedy: Yes.Robert Kennedy: Said [unclear] could not believe that the Soviet Union

would be involved. You would think you must be personally [unclear] theRussians. We can’t let you go. So they took him down. [Unclear] had towait until someone came down.

President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] United Nations delegation about 4:30

this morning.President Kennedy: Did what?Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] and then they just let them go.

Meeting with Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case 231

President Kennedy: They let them go? Why?Robert Kennedy: Because they got diplomatic immunity.President Kennedy: If you’re caught spying as a diplomat, all you do

is expel them? You can’t try them?Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] cause the guy confessed.President Kennedy: There isn’t anything you can do under law to a

guy at an embassy who is caught spying? Have any of our people beenimprisoned?

Robert Kennedy: No. They only get expelled. [Unclear] at the UnitedNations. That’s the way we do it all [unclear] now. Being stationed herein the United States. You know, those other two fellows have been com-plaining. [Unclear.]

President Kennedy: What about . . . what’s Kenny O’Donnell [say]about this?

The President turned off the machine at about 1:35. He then called Mrs.Kennedy, perhaps to discuss the prospects of his joining her in Newport,Rhode Island, at the end of the day.

A few minutes later, Arthur Schlesinger reached the White House. Hewas just in time to witness the President’s next telephone conversationwith the Governor of Mississippi. An air of unreal humor pervaded theOval Office. When he was told that Ross Barnett was on the phoneKennedy affected the manner of a ring announcer: “And now—GovernorRoss Barnett.” “Go get him, Johnny Boy,” replied the Attorney General.52

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962232

52. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recounted this scene in Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 344. Soon afterward the U.S. government demanded the expul-sion of the two Russians.

On July 19, 1963, Drummond was convicted of conspiring to commit espionage for theSoviet Union, and on August 15, 1963, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The judge, whospoke of Drummond’s “heinous” crime, could have imposed the death penalty, but said hedecided on a life sentence out of compassion for the ex-sailor’s wife and parents.

2:00 P.M.

[T]he problem is, Governor, that I got my responsibility, justlike you have yours . . .

Conversation with Ross Barnett53

President Kennedy: . . . Mississippi.Unidentified: Yes, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Thank you.Unidentified: Hello. Hello.President Kennedy: . . . calling, if they want to know who’s calling.Unidentified: All right. Fine, Mr. President. [Long pause.]President Kennedy: Hello.Unidentified: All right.President Kennedy: Hello? Hello, Governor?Ross Barnett: All right. Yes.President Kennedy: How are you?Barnett: Is this . . .President Kennedy: This is the President, uh . . .Barnett: Oh. Well, Mr. President [unclear].President Kennedy: Well, I’m glad to talk to you, Governor. I am

concerned about this situation down there, as I know . . .Barnett: Oh, I should say I am concerned about it, Mr. President. It’s

a horrible situation.President Kennedy: Well, now, here’s my problem, Governor.Barnett: [Unclear.] Yes.President Kennedy: Listen, I didn’t put him in the university, but on

the other hand, under the Constitution . . . I have to carry out the orders,carry that order out, and I don’t, I don’t want to do it in any way thatcauses difficulty to you or to anyone else. But I’ve go to do it. Now, I’dlike to get your help in doing that.

Barnett: Yes. Well, uh, have you talked with Attorney General thismorning?

President Kennedy: Yeah. I talked to him and in fact, I just met withhim for about an hour, and we went over the situation.

Conversation with Ross Barnett 233

53. Dictabelt 4A1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

Barnett: Did he and Mr. Watkins have a talk this morning, TomWatkins, the lawyer from Jackson, or not?54

President Kennedy: Yes, he talked to Tom Watkins, he told me.Barnett: Yes, sir. Well, I don’t know what . . . I haven’t had a chance

to talk with him . . .President Kennedy: Now just wait . . . just one minute because I got

the Attorney General in the outer office, and I’ll just speak to him.Barnett: All right. [Long pause.]President Kennedy: Hello, Governor?Barnett: Yes. Hold on.President Kennedy: I just talked to the Attorney General. Now, he

said that he talked to Mr. Watkins . . .Barnett: Yes.President Kennedy: . . . and the problem is as to whether we can get

some help in getting this fellow in this week.Barnett: Yes.President Kennedy: Now, evidently we couldn’t, the Attorney General

didn’t feel that he and Mr. Watkins had reached any final agreement on that.Barnett: Well, Mr. President, Mr. Watkins is going to fly up there

early tomorrow morning.President Kennedy: Right.Barnett: And could you gentlemen talk with him tomorrow? You . . .President Kennedy: Yes, I will have the Attorney General talk to

him and then . . .Barnett: Yes.President Kennedy: . . . after they’ve finished talking I’ll talk to the

Attorney General . . .Barnett: All right.President Kennedy: . . . on the phone and then if he feels it’s useful

for me to meet with him . . .Barnett: I thought . . .President Kennedy: . . . I’ll do that.Barnett: I thought they were making some progress. I didn’t know.President Kennedy: Well, now . . .Barnett: I couldn’t say, you know.President Kennedy: . . . he and Mr. Watkins, they can meet tomor-

row. Now, the difficulty is, we got two or three problems. In the first

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962234

54. Thomas H. Watkins was the Mississippi lawyer and Barnett aide who served as an inter-mediary in the crisis.

place, what can we do to . . . First place is the court’s order to you, whichI guess is, you’re given until Tuesday. What is your feeling on that?

Barnett: Well, I want . . .President Kennedy: What’s your position on that?Barnett: . . . to think it over, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Right.Barnett: It’s a serious matter, now that I want to think it over a few

days. Until Tuesday, anyway.President Kennedy: All right. Well, now let me say this . . .Barnett: You know what I am up against, Mr. President. I took an

oath, you know, to abide by the laws of this state—President Kennedy: That’s right.Barnett: —and our constitution here and the Constitution of the

United States. I’m, I’m on the spot here, you know.President Kennedy: Well, now you’ve got . . .Barnett: I, I’ve taken an oath to do that, and you know what our laws

are with reference to . . .President Kennedy: Yes, I understand that. Well, now we’ve got the . . .Barnett: . . . and we have a statute that was enacted a couple of weeks

ago stating positively that no one who had been convicted of a crime or,uh, whether the criminal action pending against them would not be eli-gible for any of the institutions of higher learning. And that’s our law,and it seemed like the Court of Appeal didn’t pay any attention to that.55

President Kennedy: Right. Well, of course . . .Barnett: And . . .President Kennedy: . . . the problem is, Governor, that I got my

responsibility, just like you have yours . . .Barnett: Well, that’s true. I . . .President Kennedy: . . . and my responsibility, of course, is to the . . .Barnett: . . . I realize that, and I appreciate that so much.President Kennedy: Well, now here’s the thing, Governor. I will, the

Attorney General can talk to Mr. Watkins tomorrow. What I want,would like to do is to try to work this out in an amicable way. We don’twant a lot of people down there getting hurt . . .

Conversation with Ross Barnett 235

55. On September 20, Meredith was found guilty in absentia of false voter registration andwas fined $100 and costs and sentenced to one year in the Hinds County jail. The convictionon this clearly specious charge occurred the same day that Mississippi Senate Bill 1501 passedthe legislature. The bill barred persons guilty of a criminal offense from attending state insti-tutions of higher learning. In addition, on 20 September, Governor Barnett was appointedregistrar of the university. Five days later, the Board of Trustees rescinded the appointment.

Barnett: Oh, that’s right . . .President Kennedy: . . . and we don’t want to have a . . . You know it’s

very easy to . . .Barnett: Mr. President, let me say this. They’re calling, calling me

and others from all over the state, wanting to bring a thousand, wantingto bring 500, and 200, and all such as that, you know. We don’t wantsuch as that.

President Kennedy: I know. Well, we don’t want to have a, we don’twant to have a lot of people getting hurt or killed down there.

Barnett: Why, that’s, that’s correct. Mr. President, let me say this.Mr. Watkins is really an A-1 lawyer, an honorable man, has the respectand the confidence of every lawyer in America who knows him. He’s ofthe law firm of Watkins and Eager. They’ve had an “A” rating for many,many years, and I believe this, that he can help solve this problem.

President Kennedy: Well, I will, the Attorney General will see Mr.Watkins tomorrow, and then I, after the Attorney General and Mr.Watkins are finished then, I will be back in touch with you.

Barnett: All right. All right. I’ll appreciate it so much, now, and there. . . Watkins’ll leave here in the morning, and I’ll have him to get intotouch with the Attorney General as to when he can see him tomorrow.

President Kennedy: Yeah, he’ll see him and . . .Barnett: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: . . . .we will, then you and I’ll be back and talk

again.Barnett: All right.President Kennedy: Thank you.Barnett: All right.President Kennedy: OK.Barnett: I appreciate your interest in our poultry program and all

those things.President Kennedy: Well, we’re . . . [laughs softly].Barnett: Thank you so much.President Kennedy: OK, Governor. Thank you.Barnett: Yes, sir. All right now.President Kennedy: Bye now.Barnett: Thank you. Bye.

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962236

2:25 P.M.

[G]ive me some thoughts . . . the speech, is that right?

Conversation with Theodore Sorensen56

Theodore Sorensen had been hospitalized with an ulcer earlier in theweek. Kennedy telephoned him at the hospital, requesting that he providesome suggestions for a televised speech on the Mississippi crisis thatKennedy thought he might have to deliver Sunday night. Sorensen notedthat Republicans were taking a segregationist line, which would help thePresident avoid a partisan attack. (He would be criticized by both sides.)With some irony, Kennedy himself remarked that this strict Republicanline was not one Eisenhower had followed in the Little Rock crisis (whenthe Republican President intervened with federal troops). Sorensen clari-fied his point, noting that he meant the Republicans in Alabama.

President Kennedy: . . . sort of a South Caro—Theodore Sorensen: . . . [word unintelligible] campaign going on in

Alabama, and the Republicans are taking the straight Ross Barnett lineand so forth.

President Kennedy: Well, except Eisenhower, they . . . [laughs].Eisenhower’s taking a little away from them.

Sorensen: No, I mean the Republicans in Alabama.President Kennedy: Yeah, but I mean, well I, you, and Burke can talk,

because the legal . . . our legal obligations on Tuesday affect when we gowith this guard; that’s the point.57

Sorensen: Yeah.President Kennedy: OK, and you’re thinking about, give me some

thoughts . . . the speech, is that right?Sorensen: Right.

With the Mississippi situation very much unresolved, the President’shopes to salvage what was left of his Newport weekend were dimming.

Conversat ion with Theodore Sorensen 237

56. Dictabelt 4A2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.57. Burke Marshall was assistant attorney general for the Civil Rights Division.

LeMoyne Billings, Kennedy’s roommate at Choate and a Kennedy familyintimate since 1934, called during the afternoon Mississippi discussionsto learn that he probably wouldn’t be seeing his friend up in Newport.58

Billings was having his own difficulties getting there.

2:30 P.M.

I guess it’s not going too well . . . [f]or you because of theMississippi deal.

Conversation with LeMoyne Billings59

Unidentified: Mrs. Lincoln?Lincoln: Um-hm.Unidentified: Mr. Lem Billings.Lincoln: Could you hold just one minute?Unidentified: Sure. [Short pause.]President Kennedy: Lem? Hello.Unidentified: There you are.President Kennedy: Lem?LeMoyne Billings: Hello.President Kennedy: Where are you?Billings: Oh. Hi. I’m a . . . I’ve missed my damn plane, so I’m going to

have to shoot up to Boston and back to Providence.President Kennedy: Oh, I see. Well, I’m still . . . doesn’t look like I

may be able to go there.Billings: Oh, go at all?President Kennedy: That’s right.Billings: Oh, I better not go until . . . until you know.President Kennedy: OK. You’re in a . . . Just leave your message

where we can—Billings: I’m at LaGuardia now. When do you think you’d know? Or

you don’t know?

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962238

58. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and his Times, p. 13.59. Dictabelt 4B1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

President Kennedy: Well, it looks like it will be sometime . . . Whydon’t you go back into New York?

Billings: All right.President Kennedy: And then I will be in touch with you.Billings: OK. Good.President Kennedy: Because I . . . because you can always come up

later.Billings: OK. As I said, I guess it’s not going too well, huh?President Kennedy: Where?Billings: For you, because of the Mississippi deal.President Kennedy: Yeah.Billings: OK. I’ll see you later.President Kennedy: OK. Bye.

2:50 P.M.

Well . . . as I understand it, Governor, you would do every-thing you can to maintain law and order.

Conversation with Ross Barnett60

The President and the Attorney General speak to Governor Barnett,making clear that their primary objective is to maintain order and thatthey expect the governor to work to that end. Barnett hopes his friend,Tom Watkins, will be able to help hammer out a solution to the prob-lem caused by Meredith’s determination to register. The AttorneyGeneral tells Barnett that his conversations with Watkins (they hadspoken twice that day) have been unhelpful, noting Watkins’s sugges-tion that Meredith register secretly at Jackson on Monday, instead ofat the Oxford campus. As Barnett had actually initiated the planthrough Watkins, he finds it attractive, noting an earlier ruling hadordered it. In addition, the plan would permit him to demonstrate hisunyielding opposition to desegregation (he almost certainly planned a

Conversation with Ross Barnett 239

60. President Kennedy and Governor Barnett were later joined by Robert Kennedy. Dictabelt4C, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential RecordingsCollection.

public stand to prevent Meredith’s registration), and also because hecould claim the federal government had decided by stealth to enrollMeredith anyway.

President Kennedy: Hello.Ross Barnett: All right.President Kennedy: Governor.Barnett: Mr. President. Yes, sir.President Kennedy: Oh, will you talk to Mr. Watkins? The Attorney

General did.Barnett: No, I haven’t talked with him now in a couple of hours . . .President Kennedy: Oh. Well, now . . .Barnett: . . . I talked with him though about two hours ago, Mr.

President, and he said he was going to talk with the Attorney Generaland go see him tomorrow morning.

President Kennedy: Oh. Well, in the meanwhile, then, the AttorneyGeneral talked to Mr. Watkins to see whether there was some . . . Waitjust a second. The Attorney General’s right here. He’ll tell you what hetalked to Watkins and Watkins was going to talk to you. Wait a minute.

Barnett: All right. All right.President Kennedy: He’ll come right on the other phone.Barnett: Yeah, sure.President Kennedy: Wait just a [unclear].Barnett: All right. All right.Robert Kennedy: Hello?Barnett: Yes, sir, General. How are you?Robert Kennedy: Fine, Governor. How are you?Barnett: Fine, fine.Robert Kennedy: I talked to Mr. Watkins, you know, earlier this

morning.Barnett: Oh, yes?Robert Kennedy: And he really did not have much of a suggestion.

He had mentioned yesterday the possibility of our coming in tomorrowMonday with marshals, and . . .

Barnett: Yes.Robert Kennedy: . . . that under our understanding for Thursday

that the marshals would show up and that you and the others wouldstep aside and Mr. Meredith would come into the university. Well, hefelt that when he mentioned he talked to me today, he said that hethought that would create some problems, which they could not over-

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962240

come. And he suggested at that time, some alternatives which were notvery satisfactory.

Barnett: Well . . .Robert Kennedy: And then he mentioned the fact that he might come

up early tomorrow morning.Barnett: Well . . .Robert Kennedy: I called him back after I heard the President’s con-

versation with you . . .Barnett: Yes.Robert Kennedy: . . . and said that I thought I’d be glad to see him,

but I thought that unless we had some real basis for some understandingand working out this very very difficult problem that really he was wast-ing his time; and that one of the basic requirements, in my judgment,was the maintenance of law and order, and that would require some verystrong and vocal action by you, yourself. . . .

Barnett: Well, I’m certainly going to try to maintain law and order,Mr . . .

Robert Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: . . . General, just the very best way that I can.Robert Kennedy: But in the . . .Barnett: I, I talked with the student body the other day and told

them to really, to have control of the physical and mental faculties. But itdidn’t do much good it seemed like.

Robert Kennedy: Well . . .Barnett: They cheered and carried on, but then they just started rav-

ing and carrying on, you know.Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I think, Governor, that if we . . . as a very

minimum and as a start, an order by you and the state that people couldnot congregate in Oxford now in groups of three or five, larger thangroups of three or five; the second, to get the school authorities to issueinstructions to the students that if they congregate in groups that theyare liable for expulsion. If that was done this afternoon, I think thatwould be a big step forward. And that anybody carrying an arm or a,arms or a club, or anything like that would be liable to punishment.

Barnett: Well . . .Robert Kennedy: Those kind of steps by you . . .Barnett: Yes.Robert Kennedy: . . . would indicate an interest in maintaining law

and order.Barnett: Well, General, I certainly, I’ll tell the chancellor to

announce to all the students to keep law and order and to keep cool

Conversation with Ross Barnett 241

heads. But the trouble is not only the students, but it’s so many thou-sands of outsiders will be there.

Robert Kennedy: Yes, but I think, if you said, Governor, not just to . . .Barnett: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: . . . keep cool heads, but that they couldn’t congregate.Barnett: How many do you figure on sending down?Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s a . . . I think that the President had

some questions for you that he thought that maybe if we could get someanswers to them that . . .

Barnett: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: . . . that would be what [it would] depend [on].[speaking to President Kennedy in the room] Mr. President . . .Barnett: Mr. General, why don’t you . . . I believe that if you and Tom

Watkins could get together it would help a lot. He’s a very reasonableman, and, and he’s, he knows, he knows the situation down here as wellas anybody living. If you all could get together tomorrow morning, Ireally think that it would pay. I think it would help.

Robert Kennedy: Well, he doesn’t have any suggestions, he just toldme, Mr. Governor.

Barnett: Yes. Well, I . . .Robert Kennedy: So I don’t know what . . .Barnett: . . . I thought he did have.Robert Kennedy: Well, he didn’t. I mean he said something about

sending Meredith, sneaking him into Jackson and getting him registeredwhile all of you were up at . . .

Barnett: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: . . . at Oxford. But that doesn’t make much sense,

does it?Barnett: Well, I don’t know. Why? Why doesn’t it? That’s where

they’d ordered him to go at first, you know.Robert Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: You see, there’s an order on the minutes, Mr. General, for

him to register . . .Robert Kennedy: Well, would you . . .Barnett: . . . [unclear].Robert Kennedy: . . . you’d get . . . As I understand it, you’d get

everybody up at Oxford, and then we’d, and then . . .Barnett: Oh, well, that’s exactly what Tom Watkins must have had in

mind, you know.Robert Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: Let me talk with Tom and call you back in a little while.

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962242

He’s not but a block from me. That’s what he had in mind, I think. And,of course, you know how it is in Jackson. Monday they, no school’s goingon here, you know, and . . . Uh, of course nobody would be anticipatinganyone coming here, you know.

Robert Kennedy: Are you going up to Oxford on Monday? Is thatyour plan?

Barnett: Well, that’s what I planned to do, yes, sir. The lieutenant gov-ernor and I, both, I guess, we’ll have to be up there to try to keep order,you know. And, we’re to be up there pretty early Monday morning.

Robert Kennedy: Will you?Barnett: We’ll be up there, unless you ask us not to.Robert Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: Well, like, you see, we’ll be up there and that’s where all the

people will be. Yeah. I thought you and Watkins were going to talkabout that kind of a situation, then what’d be the best thing to do underthose conditions, you know.

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I think, Governor, that the President hassome, uh, questions that he wanted some answers to . . .

Barnett: Well . . .Robert Kennedy: . . . make his own determination.Barnett: . . . that’s right. He wanted to know if I would obey the

orders of the court, and I told him I, I’d have to do some . . . study thatover. That’s a serious thing. I’ve taken an oath to abide by the laws ofthis state and our state constitution and the Constitution of the UnitedStates. And, General, how can I violate my oath of office? How can I dothat and live with the people of Mississippi? You know, they’re expectingme to keep my word. That’s what I’m up against, and I don’t understandwhy the court, why the court wouldn’t understand that.

President Kennedy: Oh, Governor, this is the President speaking.Barnett: Yes, sir, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Now it’s, I know that . . . your feeling about the

law of Mississippi and the fact that you don’t want to carry out thatcourt order. What we really want to have from you, though, is someunderstanding about whether the state police will maintain law andorder. We understand your feeling about the court order . . .

Barnett: Yes.President Kennedy: . . . and your disagreement with it. But what

we’re concerned about is how much violence [there] is going to be andwhat kind of action we’ll have to take to prevent it. And I’d like to getassurances from you that the state police down there will take positiveaction to maintain law and order.

Conversation with Ross Barnett 243

Barnett: Oh, they’ll do that.President Kennedy: Then we’ll know what we have to do.Barnett: They’ll, they’ll take positive action, Mr. President, to main-

tain law and order as best we can.President Kennedy: And now, how good is . . .Barnett: We’ll have 220 highway patrolmen . . .President Kennedy: Right.Barnett: . . . and they’ll absolutely be unarmed.President Kennedy: I understa—Barnett: Not a one of them’ll be armed.President Kennedy: Well, no, but the problem is, well, what can they

do to maintain law and order and prevent the gathering of a mob andaction taken by the mob? What can they do? Can they stop that?

Barnett: Well, they’ll do their best to. They’ll do everything in theirpower to stop it.

President Kennedy: Now, what about the suggestions made by theAttorney General in regard to not permitting people to congregate andstart a mob?

Barnett: Well, we’ll do our best to, to keep them from congregating,but that’s hard to do, you know.

President Kennedy: Well, they just tell them to move along.Barnett: When they start moving up on the sidewalks and different

sides of the streets, what are you going to do about it?President Kennedy: Well, now, as I understand it, Governor, you

would do everything you can to maintain law and order.Barnett: I, I, I’ll do everything in my power to maintain order . . .President Kennedy: Right. Now . . .Barnett: . . . and peace. We don’t want any shooting down here.President Kennedy: I understand. Now, Governor, what about, can

you maintain this order?Barnett: Well, I don’t know.President Kennedy: Yes.Barnett: That’s what I’m worried about, you see. I don’t know

whether I can or not.President Kennedy: Right.Barnett: I couldn’t have the other afternoon.61

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962244

61. Barnett is undoubtedly referring to 27 September, when some 2,000 people, including stu-dents, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes, converged on Oxford from all over Mississippi,intent on stopping Meredith from registering. A worried Barnett telephoned the Attorney

President Kennedy: You couldn’t have?Barnett: There was such a mob there, it would have been impossible.President Kennedy: I see.Barnett: There were men in there with trucks and shotguns, and all

such as that. Not a lot of them, but some, we saw, and certain peoplewere just, they were just enraged.

President Kennedy: Well, now, will you talk . . .Barnett: You just don’t understand the situation down here.President Kennedy: Well, the only thing is I got my responsibility.Barnett: I know you do.President Kennedy: This is not my order; I just have to carry it out.

So I want to get together and try to do it with you in a way which is themost satisfactory and causes the least chance of damage to people inMississippi. That’s my interest.

Barnett: That’s right. Would you be willing to wait awhile and letthe people cool off on the whole thing?

President Kennedy: Till how long?Barnett: Couldn’t you make a statement to the effect, Mr. President,

Mr. General, that under the circumstances existing in Mississippi, that,uh, there’ll be bloodshed; you want to protect the life of, of, of JamesMeredith and all other people? And under the circumstances at thistime, it just wouldn’t be fair to him or others to try to register him atthis time.

President Kennedy: Well, then at what time would it be fair?Barnett: Well, we, we could wait a, I don’t know.President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: It might be in, uh, two or three weeks, it might cool off a little.President Kennedy: Well, would you undertake to register him in

two weeks?Barnett: Well, I, you know I can’t undertake to register him myself . . .President Kennedy: I see.Barnett: . . . but you all might make some progress that way, you

know.President Kennedy: [Laughs.] Yeah. Well, we’d be faced with, unless

we had your support . . .Barnett: You see . . .President Kennedy: . . . and assurance, we’d be . . .

Conversation with Ross Barnett 245

General that day to report that he was uncertain if he could maintain order, claiming he couldnot disperse the crowd.

Barnett: . . . I say I’m going to, I’m going to cooperate. I might notknow when you’re going to register him, you know.

President Kennedy: I see. Well, now, Governor, why don’t, do youwant to talk to Mr. Watkins?

Barnett: I might not know that, what your plans were, you see.President Kennedy: Do you want to, do you want to talk to Mr.

Watkins then . . .Barnett: I’ll be delighted to talk to him, we’ll call you back.President Kennedy: OK, good.Barnett: Call the General back.President Kennedy: Yeah, call the General, and then I’ll be around.Barnett: All right. I appreciate it so much . . .President Kennedy: Thanks, Governor.Barnett: . . . and I thank you for this call.President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.Barnett: All right.President Kennedy: Right.Barnett: Bye.

President Kennedy finally goes to the swimming pool. Burke Marshalland the Attorney General returned to the Justice Department, wherethey put finishing touches to two important telegrams, one to LouisOberdorfer and the Justice Department’s team in Oxford and the otheron behalf of the President to Governor Barnett. The Justice Departmentordered 300 deputy marshals to move to the campus at Oxford at 3:00P.M., September 30, by helicopter.62 The plan was to lay the groundworkso that Meredith could peacefully register at the Lyceum administrationbuilding on Monday. The gist of the President’s wire was quite different.The White House was prepared to accept the plan for Meredith’s sneakregistration at the university’s Jackson, Mississippi, campus on Mondaywhile the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor made their publicstand in Oxford.

A little after 7:12 P.M. on September 29, Barnett and the Presidentspoke again, their third conversation of the day.63 Beyond discussing the

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962246

62. Angie Novello to Evelyn Lincoln, 29 September 1962, with attachment, Robert F.Kennedy, Personal Correspondence, Civil Rights, Mississippi, Box 11.63. Due to a technical error with the recording system, this third conversation was notrecorded. An approximate time for this conversation comes from a memo written by Robert

Monday plan for Meredith’s sneak registration, Barnett assured Kennedythat the highway patrol would maintain law and order and guaranteeMeredith’s safety. The Kennedy administration, it seemed, had workedout a deal. Robert Kennedy was with his brother in the White House atthe time of the call and then left for the night.

Although a political solution now seemed likely, Kennedy knew hewouldn’t be going to Newport this weekend. He called an old friend,Congressman Torbert MacDonald of Massachusetts, who he hopedwould substitute for him at a political event there.

7:36 P.M.

[Y]ou have to make a judgment about whether these trips areworthwhile or those speeches are worthwhile.

Conversation with Torbert MacDonald64

Evelyn Lincoln: Hello?Unidentified: I have Congressman MacDonald for the President, in

Malden. [Pause.]President Kennedy: Hello. Hello?Torbert MacDonald: Hello, Mr. President.President Kennedy: How are you doing?MacDonald: Oh, all right. How are you?President Kennedy: Where are you? Up at York?MacDonald: Oh, no. No, I’m in Malden, Jack.President Kennedy: Oh, I see.MacDonald: Yeah.President Kennedy: Listen. Bill was down here this weekend. I didn’t

know whether you’d be able to come down.

Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 247

Kennedy’s secretary Angela Novello in February 1963 (see Novello to Burke Marshall, 19February 1963, Robert Kennedy, Mississippi File). At 7:12 Barnett called the JusticeDepartment to alert Robert Kennedy that he would be in his office for the next 10 to 15 min-utes. Burke Marshall relayed this message to the Attorney General, who was with his brotherat the White House. Robert Kennedy responded that Barnett should be told that “he was outof the office for a few minutes and to find out if this call was in answer to the wire sent by thePresident.”64. Dictabelt 4D2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

MacDonald: Oh.President Kennedy: And get Sam Atkinson.MacDonald: Well, not until the first of the week.President Kennedy: Oh, you can’t?MacDonald: No.President Kennedy: You can’t get away there tomorrow?MacDonald: No.President Kennedy: Oh. OK.MacDonald: How long is he going—President Kennedy: Well, he’s got to go back to . . . work tomorrow

night, late. What do you got tomorrow?MacDonald: Well, you know, it’s been a full week.President Kennedy: I know. Oh, I know you’ve had . . . I agree with that.MacDonald: And, uh—President Kennedy: You have to speak tomorrow?MacDonald: Yeah.President Kennedy: Oh.MacDonald: And . . . they’ve sent some stuff up for me that has been

postponed during the week, you know.President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah.MacDonald: And so . . . I’d love to . . . not until . . . What time is . . .

he going back?President Kennedy: Well, he’d probably go back . . . I don’t know. You

know, in time to get there at class Monday morning. But I didn’t knowwhether you could sort of arrange your schedule, because it seems to methis is going to be one of those things that you wouldn’t want to miss.

MacDonald: I’d certainly . . . I’d certainly try to do it—President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you check on it and then give

me a call in the morning?MacDonald: All right. I will.President Kennedy: Will you be home in the morning?MacDonald: Yes.President Kennedy: Well, I . . . My judgment would be . . . based on

long years of . . . Bill’s been down here today. I’ve just talked to him. Andmy judgment would be that it . . . it’s worth the trip.

MacDonald: Well, it’s worth the trip if I can do the trip.President Kennedy: Yeah, but, well, you have to make a judgment

about whether these trips are worthwhile or those speeches are worth-while.

MacDonald: Well, it’s—President Kennedy: [laughing] OK.

S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962248

MacDonald: It isn’t just that, Mr. President.President Kennedy: I understand. Oh, I understand. But I just

wanted to be sure that you knew about it.MacDonald: The spirit is willing—President Kennedy: OK.MacDonald: —and of course—President Kennedy: Yeah, I know.MacDonald: I think this will be nice.President Kennedy: OK. Well, in any case—MacDonald: You really want me to call you tomorrow?President Kennedy: Well, no. But I think it would be worth doing.MacDonald: Well, how about in the afternoon or night tomorrow?President Kennedy: Yeah. Can you come down tomorrow?MacDonald: Well, late afternoon, maybe. Yes.President Kennedy: You mean when you get finished?MacDonald: Well, I figure that I could get out of here by about four,

five o’clock in the afternoon—President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s fine. Good.MacDonald: All right.President Kennedy: OK. I’ll call you. I’ll give you a call in the morn-

ing. You can get a hold of [unclear] Atkinson.MacDonald: All right.President Kennedy: OK. Bye now.

The President went to the Mansion and had some ice cream sent up. Hewas settling into his evening’s activities when his brother called with badnews. The deal with Barnett was off. For the next two hours, he was on thetelephone with Robert Kennedy and deputy press secretary, AndrewHatcher. At one point the President even roused Theodore Sorensen fromhis hospital bed to draft a speech he could use if he decided to call in troops.

Ultimately, the President decided to federalize the National Guard, aneventuality already under consideration. At 11:50 P.M., he sent word to theSecret Service that he wanted to be notified when the Justice Departmenthad sent over the proclamation, which he intended to sign that night. At11:58 P.M., Kennedy sat down with Norbert Schlei, head of the Office ofLegal Counsel, in the Oval Room of the family quarters and signedProclamation 3497, which ordered those who were obstructing justice inMississippi “to cease and desist therefrom and to retire peaceably forth-with.” He then signed an executive order placing the Mississippi NationalGuard units under federal control. Kennedy inquired whether these docu-

Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 249

ments were the same as those Eisenhower had signed in 1957 in the LittleRock case. Schlei said they were, noting the wording had been improved.As Schlei prepared to leave, Kennedy tapped the table, pointing out that ithad belonged to General Ulysses S. Grant. Not wanting to antagonize theSouth, Kennedy advised Schlei not to mention Grant’s table to the press.

The South was already agitated. As Kennedy directed the drawing upof the proclamation, Governor Barnett attended an Ole Miss footballgame at Jackson Memorial Stadium, where 46,000 fans cheered not onlyfor their beloved university against the Kentucky Wildcats but also fortheir Governor. It was then that Barnett, responding to the chant of “Wewant Ross,” strode onto the floodlit field, stepped to the microphone, anddeclared, “I love Mississippi. I love her people. I love our customs.”

Just after midnight, President Kennedy went to sleep. The crisis hehad predicted that fall was starting, but it was starting in Oxford,Mississippi, not West Berlin.

Sunday, September 30–Monday, October 1, 1962

After attending mass at St. Stephen’s Church, the President hosted a lunchfor the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, at the White House. TheAnglo-American agenda was full. But Berlin, the Congo, and Cuba domi-nated the conversation. The discussion continued for a while after lunch.

For the moment, Mississippi was the most dangerous place in theworld for the federal government. After the British delegation left,Kennedy turned his principal attention to the problem of safely register-ing an African American, James Meredith, at the all-white University ofMississippi in Oxford. Governor Barnett had come up with a new plan forending this stalemate peacefully. He proposed that Meredith be brought tothe campus surrounded by a large group of federal agents. Barnett waslooking for a dramatic way to save face. The defenders of a white Ole Misswould attempt to stare down Meredith but would then retreat in the faceof a much larger force. The Attorney General, to whom the Governor hadsuggested the “show of force” scheme, turned it down. Robert Kennedythen threatened Barnett with making public that the Governor had beennegotiating with the Kennedy brothers behind the backs of the segrega-tionists. The Attorney General’s threat resulted in a new Barnett scheme.He suggested that the federal government sneak Meredith onto the cam-pus that afternoon. Barnett would then announce in a speech that he had

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962250

been tricked and Meredith was on campus. The President and RobertKennedy preferred this plan. At 6:00 P.M., James Meredith flew intoOxford accompanied by some Justice Department officials. Before hisarrival, a force of 300 U.S. marshals had assembled around the Lyceum,the main administration building on campus. The deputy attorney gen-eral, Nicholas Katzenbach, who was in charge of operations on the cam-pus, had expected that Meredith would be able to register that day. Butthis was impossible. So, as Governor Barnett issued a press release thatMeredith was on campus, U.S. marshals remained posted around theLyceum, while some distance away, in the dormitory Baxter Hall,Meredith was under federal protective guard for the night. The goal wasto keep him safe so that he could register the next morning.

At 10:00 P.M., the President spoke to the nation. He had delayed hisspeech two hours to await word that Meredith was safely on campus.From that moment on, the unexpected displaced the expected.

Approximately 10:40 P.M.–1:00 A.M.

I haven’t had such an interesting time since the Bay of Pigs.

Meeting on Civil Rights1

“Let us preserve both the law and the peace, and then, healing thosewounds that are within we can turn to the greater crises that are with-out and stand united as one people in our pledge to man’s freedom.”With those words, President Kennedy ended his televised address to thenation on the situation in Mississippi. The speech was intended to signala victory in James Meredith’s struggle to be the first African Americanto register at the University of Mississippi. Yet words less relevant to acrisis have seldom been spoken by a U.S. president.

As the President began his speech at 10:00 P.M., Eastern StandardTime, the situation was already unraveling in Oxford, Mississippi.James Meredith had arrived on campus with a large escort of U.S. mar-shals two hours earlier. According to an arrangement fixed earlier in

Meeting on Civi l Rights 251

1. Including President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Burke Marshall, Lawrence O’Brien, KennethO’Donnell, and Theodore Sorensen. Tapes 26 and 26A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’sOffice Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

the day, Kennedy called Mississippi governor Ross Barnett, who wasexpected to announce ruefully that the state of Mississippi had been“physically overpowered” and Meredith was on campus. Kennedy wasthen supposed to give a conciliatory speech that stressed the victory ofthe rule of law.

The rule of law was not winning where it counted this night, on thestreets of Oxford. In the interval between the Governor’s concessionspeech and Kennedy’s address, all hell broke out at the university. Acrowd of 2,500 surged toward the Lyceum, the university’s centraladministrative center. With 300 federalized U.S. marshals and hand-picked border patrol officers now on campus and ringing the Lyceum,the Governor’s representatives on campus decided to withdraw theMississippi highway patrol officers who had given a semblance of calmto the campus in the tense days since the appeals court had orderedBarnett to admit Meredith. Sensing a shift in the balance of power, thecrowd surged forward, and in self-defense the federal marshals launcheda volley of tear gas canisters. “I would like to take this occasion toexpress the thanks of this nation to those southerners who have con-tributed to the progress of our democratic development. . . . ” A cloud oftear gas was rising from the campus and Kennedy gave this discordantspeech. Aides had tried to stop him as news of the growing riot reachedthe White House. But the telecast had begun.

In the half-hour following the speech, the news from Mississippi hasgotten progressively worse. A jerry-built communications set-up relayedinformation from the campus to the White House. A series of walkie-talkies carried by the marshals and Justice Department aides in andaround the Lyceum kept Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General RobertKennedy’s field commander, informed. Using a pay telephone in the base-ment of the building, Katzenbach or the Attorney General’s press secre-tary, Ed Guthman, conveyed this information to Robert Kennedy or hisassistant Burke Marshall in the White House. Meanwhile down the mallat the Justice Department another Kennedy aide, Ramsey Clark, the assis-tant attorney general, maintained a direct line to the Justice Department’smakeshift Oxford headquarters, which was in a post office building a fewminutes from campus. Periodically, Clark called the Attorney General atthe White House with updates.

President Kennedy started taping as the impromptu domestic crisisteam was absorbing news that the mob had turned violent. Burke Marshallwas handling the telephone in the Cabinet Room for the Attorney General,with the President a worried observer.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962252

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now don’t you have to . . . Do youhave some other men? Yeah. Did you get all the marshals there now?2

President Kennedy: State police or . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How many you’ve got? And they’re

all there? Yeah. How are the state police? Is the crowd getting bigger?Unidentified: [talking to Robert Kennedy in the room] [Unclear] wants

you?Robert Kennedy: That’s fine.[on the phone] OK, well I’ll get back. I’ll let you know.[off the phone] Well, I think that—President Kennedy: What?Robert Kennedy: They think they have it in pretty good shape. [Puts

down the receiver.]President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: Did one marshal get his arm broken?President Kennedy: His arm broken?Robert Kennedy: The lousy, I mean, there you are appointed, some

politician gets you appointed deputy marshal and you’re sitting in thecourtroom . . . [telephone rings] moving . . . close to the judge . . . andsuddenly . . .

Burke Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yes, he is.President Kennedy: His arm broken, what, by a bottle?Unidentified: No, but he said they’re throwing [unclear]. It’s Ed.President Kennedy: Who?Unidentified: Ed.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, Ed.3 Well, how’s it look to you?Kenneth O’Donnell: Yeah, there might not be quite as much rush for

those bumps they’re handing out right after . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is it under control? Would you bring

the guard in?4

Theodore Sorensen: Yeah, but tomorrow’s going to be worse thantoday.

Marshall: Yeah, I was . . . even tonight.Unidentified: [Unclear.]

Meeting on Civi l Rights 253

2. The civilian contingent of U.S. marshals, border police, and federalized prison guards arrivedin stages between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. Washington time (5:00 and 7:00 P.M. Mississippi time).3. Probably Edwin Guthman, director of public information, Department of Justice.4. Earlier in the day President Kennedy federalized the Mississippi National Guard. Therewere units in Oxford and Jackson, Mississippi, that could be deployed if necessary.

Marshall: . . . where the [unclear] keep up with him tonight.President Kennedy: Yeah. You can’t help but get at it.O’Donnell: That was the last [unclear] from the outside of the cam-

pus [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]Sorensen: Most people like to—Unidentified: [Unclear.]Sorensen: Most people like [unclear] and then [unclear].Lawrence O’Brien: I wish they were. Got to keep them in line though.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are they mad at the marshals?O’Brien: . . . otherwise [unclear].Sorensen: As I say [unclear].Robert Kennedy: Evidently they just . . .President Kennedy: [Unclear] from Alabama, who’s come to think a

lot of them are [unclear].Unidentified: Get the judge to say that [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: I [unclear] . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK, well, I’m going to see if I can

get these troops started anyway.5 We can see. Well, I think if they, Ithink it’s better that we can control the situation. I don’t think it’s worthscrewing around. The weekend.6

President Kennedy: It’s going to be a long fall in Oxford, I think.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I’ll see if I can’t get them going any-

way. OK.While Robert Kennedy is speaking on the telephone, in the background anunidentified man says, “Kermit’s having trouble with his homework.”Unidentified: What’s the story now?Robert Kennedy: Well, he thinks the situation’s under control now,

but you know—President Kennedy: —I think we ought to get the guard within, you

know, shouting distance outside of town. I think it’s probably [unclear].Unidentified: Blocked off those roads?Robert Kennedy: Yeah. There’s enough people coming in from . . .

They got the . . .

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962254

5. The crisis has entered a new phase. It is about 10:45 P.M. in Washington, two hours earlier inMississippi, and the Kennedy administration is preparing to deploy the U.S. Army in Oxford.6. Task Force Alpha is waiting for orders in Memphis. Organized in the last 24 hours, itincludes the 503rd Military Police Battalion, the 31st Light Helicopter Company, the 138thTruck Company, a medical detachment, and two tear gas experts. The Attorney General ispressing the introduction of these troops on his men in Oxford.

Unidentified: That’s [unclear].Robert Kennedy: Well, [unclear] they got the people on the roads,

just to keep them informed about it.Marshall: [on the phone] Hello?Robert Kennedy: Then we get all around the city so as to [unclear].Marshall: [on the phone] This is Burke Marshall.Robert Kennedy: . . . came in and get control of . . . and then we have

control over the air. But if you have gas, you’ve got a pretty good opera-tion going. They got 500 marshals . . .7 [Laughter in the background.]

Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: You see, they’re sitting there and they’re throwing

iron . . .President Kennedy: Spikes?Robert Kennedy: . . . spikes, and they’re throwing Coke bottles, and

they’re throwing rocks.Unidentified: I gather they’re [unclear]—Robert Kennedy: Well, you tell that guy that just came out of

Cleveland from . . . just appointed by . . .Marshall: [on the phone] Dean?8

President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: Miller.Marshall: [on the phone] I know that [unclear].President Kennedy: But Bobby [unclear]’s a bookie from [unclear]—Sorensen: [Unclear.]O’Brien: That isn’t the way the American people envision marshals

[unclear].Marshall: [talking to people in the room] Is it Johnny Vaught?9

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: Yeah, the coach. What’s the good coach’s name?Unidentified: Johnny Vaught.Robert Kennedy: Let’s see if we can get him.Unidentified: He won’t believe it.Robert Kennedy: He might . . .President Kennedy: What’s Barnett doing?Marshall: [on the phone] . . . TCU or . . .

Meeting on Civi l Rights 255

7. Apparently there were only 300. See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the KingYears, 1954–63 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp. 662–63.8. Dean P. Markham.9. John H. Vaught was a University of Mississippi coach.

Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]Marshall: Did he come from Tennessee? TCU, wasn’t it?President Kennedy: Texas Christian University then.Robert Kennedy: Where he came from originally?Unidentified: Yeah.President Kennedy: I think he was out of Texas. Yeah.Unidentified: He was.Marshall: [on the phone] Dean [Markham]?President Kennedy: What are we waiting for . . . Cy Vance to tell us

how long it will take?The U.S. Army had forces on standby in Memphis, Tennessee, to calmthe situation in Oxford, Mississippi, and there was supposed to be a localMississippi National Guard unit available for reinforcing the federalmarshals on campus.Marshall: [on the phone] Do you think you could find him and talk to

him?President Kennedy: Why don’t we just tell him to get on and tell

him to take them out [unclear].Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Vaught saw the [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.] Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.President Kennedy: Let’s see this article.Marshall: [on the phone] See if he talks to the kids, yeah.President Kennedy: [reading] “Ross Barnett, Jr., son of the Mississippi

governor [unclear].”10

Marshall: [on the phone] Well, did Vaught talk to them tonight?President Kennedy: [reading] “[Unclear] National Guard Patrol

[unclear].”[Laughter.]Marshall: [on the phone] Why don’t you do it, and then if you think it

would do any good to have some.Unidentified: Did he get called up?Robert Kennedy: Do we have any other phone system other than

that, this we’re using here?Marshall: No.Unidentified: We don’t have anything else?President Kennedy: You want to get [unclear] and Secretary on it.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962256

10. Ironically, the Governor’s son was called up with his Mississippi National Guard unit tofight against his father’s segregationism.

Marshall: All right.Unidentified: Do you want in or out?Marshall: [on the phone] All right. [Pause.]Marshall: [to people in the room] He said he wants to keep all the foot-

ball squad out of it if there were any demonstrations.O’Brien: That would have been a hell of a squad. [Unclear] a couple

of hundred [unclear].Unidentified: They want [unclear].Unidentified: Yeah.Unidentified: This reminds me a little bit of the Bay of Pigs.11

Unidentified: Yech! [Laughter.]O’Brien: [Unclear], I will say that . . .Sorensen: Well, especially when Bobby said we’d provide air cover.12

[Laughter.]O’Brien: Yeah [unclear] they know [unclear].Sorensen: We could control the air . . .Unidentified: Except on one of the [unclear]. [Laughter.]O’Brien: Ed described [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Donnell: What do you think [of] the response to Jim McShane’s

men without the President protecting them?13 As you say, they [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Donnell: What about Jim? [Laughter.]Unidentified: One of the two places.Sorensen: My guess is, Bobby, that we’ll have the control of outsiders

down pretty good.14 You may be able to introduce—Marshall: —Well, we don’t have . . .Robert Kennedy: Well, the only thing is to keep . . .Marshall: . . . control of outsiders, I don’t think [unclear].Robert Kennedy: Yeah, we haven’t had any trouble from outsiders

Meeting on Civi l Rights 257

11. In April 1961, the United States backed an invasion force composed of Cuban exiles thatsought to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba. The invasion, marred by a series of errors inplanning and execution, failed miserably, much to the chagrin of the new administration.12. The reference here is to the U.S. decision not to provide air cover to support the invasionforce during the Bay of Pigs landing. Some claimed the administration’s failure to do sodoomed the operation.13. James McShane was chief of the federal marshals.14. Outsiders was the codeword for Ku Klux Klansmen, John Birchers, and other extremistswho had been threatening to descend on Oxford from across the Deep South to keep Ole Misswhite.

yet. I suppose you’ll always have the difficulty of people storming ontothe campus. They have a lot of gates. It’s a hell of a big campus, youknow. So you have a few marshals and a few people at each gate, and Isuppose you can stick a car in [unclear] . . .

Marshall: [on the phone]15 Hello [unclear]. Yeah. All right.Robert Kennedy: . . . we can always storm in there at eight tomorrow

morning or ten tomorrow morning. The problem is, you see, when youdon’t have anybody there that’s really interested in maintaining law andorder, and where their primary interest is to get us to bring troops in.16

You can imagine what would have happened if we’d gone through withwhat he wanted to do tomorrow morning.

Marshall: [on the phone] It’s now against them.Sorensen: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: Walk in there and try to get through and he’s there

with all his . . . That’s what his plan was. That he’d be there with hisstate police and sheriffs, and then assistant sheriffs and then volunteersbehind him, four lanes. And then we were to push our way through.

Unidentified: His agreement was they wouldn’t fire.Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] the state troopers.Unidentified: . . . tend to resist them anyhow.Robert Kennedy: Yeah. With nobody else knowing the plot but him

and me.Evelyn Lincoln: Peter Lawford is on the phone.17

Marshall: [on the phone] Well, he called on the students to act asresponsible citizens.

President Kennedy: That’s slightly ironic. I wish we’d taken that partout.

Marshall: [on the phone with Joseph Dolan] Yeah. All right, Joe.[to the people in the room] He says that the state police are against us.President Kennedy: Who does?Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yeah.Robert Kennedy: Of course, filled with all this poison.Unidentified: This way we’ll now [unclear].

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962258

15. Marshall is monitoring a continuously open phone line to Justice Department officials inMississippi.16. Robert Kennedy is referring to his failed negotiations with Ross Barnett. The MississippiGovernor’s primary concern seemed to be to maneuver the Kennedy White House so that it wouldoverplay its hand in Oxford and make political martyrs out of the Governor and his defenders.17. According to a White House telephone memorandum, Peter Lawford called the Presidentat 10:50 P.M. (Evelyn Lincoln Collection, Box 5, John F. Kennedy Library).

Unidentified: Feel a [unclear].Marshall: [on the phone] Well, he could probably do that [unclear].Unidentified: Jack [unclear] here in the Cabinet Room, would there

be [unclear].Marshall: [on the phone] He may be trying to avoid that.Robert Kennedy: And he just got word they ran him . . . [Laughter.]Unidentified: And you said [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Laughter.]Unidentified: They court-martialed every last one of them.Marshall: [to the people in the room] Dean [Markham] tried to call

the coach and his wife says he’s out.Unidentified: You should have thought of that quote during the elec-

tion. I would . . .Unidentified: That’s how I get the coach.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] Why don’t I try [unclear]?Marshall: [on the phone] Well, Bob will try to call him. Dean?Robert Kennedy: Get the number.Marshall: [on the phone] Dean? Oh, Dean. Dean? Listen, why don’t

we get Bob to try to call him from here? Well, he may . . . His wife maybe lying to you.

Sorensen: What do you think the chances are that Barnett is beinghonest with you and he’s not . . .

Marshall: [on the phone] All right. Well, we’ll see what happens.Sorensen: [unclear] . . . the state police? He’s just . . .Robert Kennedy: I don’t think he would.Marshall: [on the phone] All right.Robert Kennedy: I don’t think he’s telling them to lay off, but I don’t

think they’re enjoying this. You know, it’s one thing to get in for thewrong reason and not have a problem, and they see we’re having prob-lems and then, might have a sense of greater problems.

Sorensen: He said he didn’t want to get anyone killed, though, ordoes he mind that?18

Marshall: [on the phone] Sounds like it’s out of the country.Robert Kennedy: The only thing, like he said the other day to me, if fifty

people get killed down here, it might be embarrassing for the two of us.19

[Laughter.] It might hurt us, and then he went on to say that [unclear].

Meeting on Civi l Rights 259

18. Referring to Ross Barnett.19. Again referring to Ross Barnett.

Marshall: [Unclear] two, three, four.Lincoln: Secretary Vance.Marshall: [on the phone] See, now, we’ll give that a try.Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]It appears that Robert Kennedy goes to speak with the secretary of theArmy, Cyrus Vance, who briefs him on the readiness of the forces inMemphis to intervene.Marshall: [on the phone] Well, no, I’ll stay here.Unidentified: Bobby’s had [unclear].Unidentified: Huh?Unidentified: Bobby’s had a tough one.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Really a battle plan.Unidentified: The Teamsters in Mississippi.Unidentified: [Unclear].Unidentified: They’re just fighting the law.Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.Unintelligible side conversation while Marshall listens on the telephone.Marshall: [on the phone] No, you mean our marshal?Unidentified: [in a side conversation] You’re just saying [unclear].Marshall: [on the phone] Gee whiz. Well, can’t we get them some

food?Unidentified: Hear that?Robert Kennedy: So they go to the armory in Oxford. And there’ll be

someone there within an hour.20

Marshall: [on the phone] I know, but I mean, can’t we get . . .Robert Kennedy: . . . company.President Kennedy: They’ll be at . . .Robert Kennedy: And they’ll be . . .President Kennedy: . . . they’ll be at the armory in Oxford?Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Well, in four hours they’ll have about 800,

900.President Kennedy: In Oxford? But that’s not in the, that’s not at . . .Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s the armory there, so they’re not at the

university.President Kennedy: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: I think that’s the . . .

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962260

20. The Attorney General had been given inaccurate information. The first contingent of U.S.troops would not reach the airport at Oxford for another four hours.

President Kennedy: That’s the best. I think that’s fine. The problemis really the time lapse, isn’t it?

Robert Kennedy: Well, I think that it’s in the . . . They’re going to be . . .I mean, if you can tell, from what they say, they’re going to be all right foran hour.

Marshall: [on the phone] Well, I know, but I . . .President Kennedy: Then what happens after that?Robert Kennedy: Well, then you could . . . We have [a] company of . . .President Kennedy: Oh, you’re, so they’re flying them in?Robert Kennedy: . . . couple of hundred. No, we’ll have a couple of . . .

They’ll be a couple of hundred there within an hour.The President is relying on the Attorney General for information aboutthe troop movements. The order went out to Memphis at 11 P.M. to loadthe first contingent of 200 men aboard helicopters for the one-hourflight to Oxford. The White House assumes that the military operationis already in progress. In fact, it hasn’t even started.President Kennedy: Oh, I see. The others . . .Robert Kennedy: And there’ll be eight within four hours if he needs

them.President Kennedy: Oh, I see.Unidentified: [Unclear] said there’d be 200 within . . .Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.President Kennedy: Where will they go?Robert Kennedy: They’d all go into the armory.President Kennedy: I see.Robert Kennedy: And they’re all Mississippians.Unidentified: They’re dying in there.Robert Kennedy: And they got gas masks.Marshall: [may be on the phone] How long are they going out to . . .Unidentified: Yes.Robert Kennedy: And the General’s getting in touch with Nick, and

he can use them any time he wants.21 I’ll tell Nick or you can.President Kennedy: So there’ll be 200 there within an hour? [Unclear

exchange.]Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, Dean? Can we get Nick?Robert Kennedy: He did a hell of a job on the narcotics thing.President Kennedy: Who?Robert Kennedy: Yeah.

Meeting on Civi l Rights 261

21. Nick was Nicholas Katzenbach, the deputy attorney general.

President Kennedy: Was it a success? The conference?22

Robert Kennedy: Certainly. It really was.President Kennedy: Background.Marshall: How long will it take?Robert Kennedy: They’ll have a company there within an hour.Marshall: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: And 800 within four hours.Marshall: Oh, I see, a company. [Unclear] uniforms [unclear] Missis-

sippians.President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: Well, I think that what we at least show that the

marshals couldn’t do it by themselves, so.President Kennedy: Are we showing him or are they showing us?

[Laughter.]Unidentified: Don’t you think that this . . . [Unclear exchange involv-

ing the President.]Marshall: [talking on the phone] Hello, Nick?Unidentified: [Unclear] southerners on [unclear].Marshall: [talking on the phone] Just a minute, Bob wants to tell you

about these, and . . .President Kennedy: [Unclear] news at eleven.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello, Nick? Well, there’ll be a com-

pany there at the armory within an hour. And there’ll be 800 there, as Iunderstand it, within four hours.23 Now, General Billingslea is going toget in touch with you.24 Blakerslee or whatever the hell he’s named.

Marshall: Billingslea.Robert Kennedy: So, how does that sound?President Kennedy: Need any more marshals or some equipment?

Are the marshals holding up for some tear gas?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is the gas coming in there?Unidentified: Now, what is next?Marshall: They gassed some of our own marshals.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962262

22. The White House Conference on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, organized by DeanMarkham, was held 27–28 September 1962.23. This is Task Force Alpha, a 687-man team stationed at Millington Naval Air Station inMemphis. The advance group of 170 was supposed to have left by helicopter already. The restwas to travel by Interstate 55 to reach Oxford in the early morning. At this point, no troopsfrom the Task Force had yet left Millington.24. Brigadier General Charles Billingslea was commander of the 82nd Infantry Division, FortBenning, Georgia.

President Kennedy: Did they?Marshall: Dean says it’s bad for their morale.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.]Unidentified: What?Unidentified: Which isn’t too high, anyway.Marshall: Well, they’re doing a good job.O’Brien: You’re not kidding.Marshall: They haven’t had anything to eat.Unidentified: They’ll manage it.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I don’t mind that.Unidentified: It’s [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] And they should be home watching

the President on television.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Listen, Nick. You got enough gas

there now? OK, you’re in pretty good shape now, though?Marshall: [whispering] We’ll make these decisions tomorrow.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, is anybody trying to get . . .With Robert Kennedy on the telephone and another conversation goingon simultaneously in the Cabinet Room, the recording becomes very dif-ficult to understand. The President is apparently distracted by word thatJames Reston has just filed a story for the New York Times allegingthat Nikita Khrushchev was inviting Kennedy to a summit meeting.Unidentified: What is Reston [unclear] knock it down anyway.

[Unclear] ought to knock it down.Unidentified: Do you have an explanation for [unclear]?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is that enough time for you?President Kennedy: . . . see now I can get [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Did anybody else get any [unclear]?Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: When we visit Vienna, you . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah.Unidentified: . . . the chairman extended an invitation to you and

Mrs. Kennedy.25 Basically it’s a standing invitation.President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s right.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, should we try to find out if

they . . .

Meeting on Civi l Rights 263

25. Nikita Khrushchev, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Partyof the Soviet Union, also held the title of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

Unidentified: [Unclear] the American embassies. I hope your presi-dent comes over.

Unidentified: [Unclear] for a long time.President Kennedy: [Unclear.] That’s exactly it. That’s why Reston’s

words [unclear].26

Unidentified: [Unclear] do you see it? What did you say?Robert Kennedy: Is there any other way we can get gas?President Kennedy: At the appropriate time.Unidentified: At the appropriate time. Well, see Reston’s hitting the

West Coast tomorrow and he wants a story. That’s his story.27

President Kennedy: We ought to knock it down tonight; that’s justkicking that Reston right in the balls, isn’t it?

Unidentified: What’s that?Unidentified: It is aimed at that.Unclear speakers.Unidentified: [Unclear] Udall.28

President Kennedy: That’s for Udall.Unidentified: That’s right. Three columns. Head.President Kennedy: Front page?Unidentified: Front page.President Kennedy: It’s just an inaccurate story.Sorensen: Sure. Well, it’s an irresponsible story.President Kennedy: I’m surprised Reston would do it. He said we got

an invitation?Unidentified: Well, I haven’t seen the text.President Kennedy: It depends how he words it. Our answer would be

that on many occasions, Mr. Khrushchev has said that he would be glad towelcome—he’s told visitors—to welcome President and Mrs. Kennedywhen conditions would permit, but unfortunately because of the . . .

Sorensen: And Adzhubei told you that.29 And Dobrynin has said that.30

President Kennedy: He told you . . . yeah. I mean we’ve all on manyoccasions have stated that we’d be glad to have President and Mrs.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962264

26. James Reston was chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times.27. In a front-page story that appeared in the New York Times on 1 October, James Restonwrote that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had sent a private invitation to Kennedy to visitthe Soviet Union. According to Reston, the message was delivered to Kennedy by InteriorSecretary Stewart Udall, who had recently returned from the Soviet Union.28. Stewart L. Udall was secretary of the interior.29. Aleksei I. Adzhubei was editor of Izvestia and Khrushchev’s son-in-law.30. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States.

Kennedy when the situation was such, but of course with the difficultywe have in Berlin and other areas, it’s been generally agreed in bothMoscow and the United States that the situation would not have beenappropriate to [unclear]. That’s our position.

Unidentified: [Unclear] outcome.President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to at night knock down

Reston, ought we? Do you want to call him up? Or is that just going tomake him mad?

Sorensen: Well, you can’t . . . Don’t bother calling him up.President Kennedy: But if he knocks it down?Sorensen: He can’t. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: What?Sorensen: It’s probably too late anyway.President Kennedy: What?Sorensen: And his story is gone. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I just think he’d be embarrassed about

that. This one.Unidentified: Yeah, but I don’t think . . . Why don’t you just in your

morning briefing tomorrow give a routine answer? [Unclear voices.]The President’s attention returns to the more immediate problem inOxford, Mississippi.Marshall: I think that General Abrams and General Billingslea are

working on it. 31 Do you want to send those women down there?Robert Kennedy: I guess I better not.Marshall: What about the others? The lawyers?President Kennedy: What women are these?Marshall: Secretaries.Robert Kennedy: Secretaries.President Kennedy: Down to where, Oxford?Marshall: Yeah.President Kennedy: Oh, you mean Nick’s secretaries?Marshall: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Well, why don’t I put a hold on it and I’ll talk

to him later on tonight.Marshall: Hold on [unclear].President Kennedy: You don’t have any men secretaries?Marshall: [Unclear] could probably find them. I would think [unclear].

Meeting on Civi l Rights 265

31. Major General Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for militaryoperations.

President Kennedy: The FBI must have them.Sorensen: At least one or two here in the correspondence section.Marshall: They must have one.Unidentified: [Unclear.]The conversation becomes unclear and appears to be winding down.Only a few fragments are understandable before there is a break in thetape. When taping resumes, Robert Kennedy is on the telephone while anindistinct conversation goes on beside him involving Evelyn Lincoln.Robert Kennedy: [fades in] Yes [unclear].Unidentified: Who’s writing these speeches?Unidentified:[Unclear] the numbers you got.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yes, he did. Well, the Governor’s

announced it. The President’s announced it. Yeah. [Another phone rings.]Unidentified: Yeah.Lincoln: [Unclear] be back?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. What do they think of it?Lincoln: [answering the second phone] Hello?President Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen are having a separate con-versation.President Kennedy: [Unclear] says the debates didn’t do any good.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] No.Sorensen: I just knew that’s a crock. I just can’t believe that. I know

that [unclear].President Kennedy: I know it didn’t change Republican votes, but the

point is, my trouble was to keep the Democrats.Sorensen: I know. [Evelyn Lincoln can be heard in the background.]Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Does it look under control? Yeah.

Where are you going to get the guards to? Well, we’ve got a couple ofhundred in the beginning and eight, seven or eight [unclear].

Sorensen: And then the undecided on this, well, that’s a major part,the undecided. [Unclear] poll shows that you . . . the effect of a campaignis to move the undecided into your camp.

President Kennedy: Yeah.Sorensen: . . . and that included the debates and the Houston speech.

I’m sure the call had a lot [unclear].32

Robert Kennedy: [continues on the phone] Do you? [Pause.] Well,would you favor that I had troops coming in there? Yeah. Well, they’re

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962266

32. Sorensen is reminiscing about the key moments in the 1960 campaign. “The call” probablyrefers to then Senator Kennedy’s telephone call to Coretta Scott King in October 1960 whenher husband, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., was in a Georgia jail.

on their way. [Pause.] OK. No. [Pause.] Well, you can just stay there.What about . . . Is Nick there? Well, I’d just like to find out what he’sheard on getting that gas in there.

Marshall: Do you want to talk to Cy [Vance]? Cy would know.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. Well.President Kennedy: Can we get, what’s his name? The Governor’s

man?33

Marshall: [starts speaking on the phone] Hello?Robert Kennedy: He’s getting him.Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Oh, listen, he went off and I’m on.Unidentified: [in the background] What about gas?Marshall: [on the phone] Well, are they on their way, do you know?

[A telephone rings.]President Kennedy: [faintly in the background] Should I talk with the

General directly?34

Lincoln: Jim, did you want your girl to stay?Unidentified: If she could do me one last favor, which is to bring me

a glass of milkMarshall: [on the phone] All right. Where were they, at the airport?Lincoln: A glass of milk? [Unintelligible exchange.]Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] from now?Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] well that’s something to . . .Unidentified: Evelyn’s got some beers in the refrigerator.Marshall: [on the phone] Well, they’re coming in. Well, have they

walked out on you? They don’t have any gas masks.It appears that Sorensen and the President have reentered the room.Sorensen: [Unclear] matter, did we like [unclear] the troops on the

ground?President Kennedy: It seems to me [unclear].Sorensen: Yeah.President Kennedy: The governor has said the troops withdrew. The

marshals were . . . with nothing to do.Sorensen: We’ll announce that. Yeah, but . . .Marshall: [on the phone] The gas should be in there in a few minutes.35

Robert Kennedy: Is that Nick?Marshall: [to Robert Kennedy] This is Ed.

Meeting on Civi l Rights 267

33. Apparently a reference to Tom Watkins, the intermediary in the Barnett-Kennedy negotiations.34. Up to now, the White House team has relied on Secretary Vance’s descriptions of themovements of Task Force Alpha in Memphis.35. The federal force protecting the Lyceum ran out of tear gas. Because the MississippiNational Guard lacked their own supply, canisters of tear gas had to be flown in from Memphis.

President Kennedy: How do we get the gas in and out of there?Robert Kennedy: [apparently speaking to someone else] I guess you can

come in.Unidentified: I know, but one of us. [Chuckles.]Marshall: [on the phone] They have?Unidentified: Students [unclear] when they have a riot like this one,

do they?President Kennedy: Well, that’s what I said. [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: You what?President Kennedy: There weren’t any riots like this at Harvard just

because some guy yells . . . [Chuckling.]Unidentified: What’s that?Unidentified: That’s the only thing that [unclear].Unidentified: Um huh.Unidentified: Move [unclear].President Kennedy: What?Robert Kennedy: [could be on phone] Well, you ought to leave it to

the [unclear].Sorensen: [Unclear] have student riots like this and it is [unclear]

you ought to be prepared for the worst, but . . .President Kennedy: That’s it. That’s what we’re preparing for.

[Laughter.]Unidentified: Yeah, and evidently we got it.President Kennedy: Where is Nick? Is he up in the attic or just . . .

[Laughter.]Sorensen: He’s in the pillbox.President Kennedy: He’s a candidate [unclear]. Get him out of there.O’Donnell: Nick might see that this is a job that he was [unclear]

every year.Unidentified: And almost died [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]O’Brien: You know, with the marshals, Bobby, at least they were out

booking numbers or something . . . [unclear] in Chicago.Marshall: [possibly on the phone] No one saw it [down there].

[Laughter.]Marshall: [on the phone] No, no. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: [Unclear.]

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962268

Soon the White House would face the problem of arranging a convoy to bring the gas from theairport in Oxford to the campus.

Marshall: [possibly on the phone] No. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: There are no Boston marshals, are there?Marshall: [to the President] The coach is going to go out and talk to

them.President Kennedy: Perhaps, perhaps . . .Marshall: [to the people in the room] Perhaps?Unidentified: Yeah [unclear].President Kennedy: That’s why the . . . police . . . I remember in a riot

at Harvard, these guys go around and start asking for your identity card.Unidentified: University police.President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s the only one that scared the shit

out of me.While Marshall continues on the phone, some voices can be heard.Someone says, “If you could only ask her about . . . ” And EvelynLincoln says, “That would be fine.”Unidentified: We just got three points in the [unclear] match.President Kennedy: This [unclear] department.Marshall: [on the phone] He wants . . . Well, here’s Bob. He’ll talk to

you himself.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah. Right. Okay. Now, the

question I think we have to decide, and Nick’s going to have to talk tothat general, if 200 fellows walking up there in uniforms, whether that’sgoing to help or whether it’s going to really make it a . . . They’re allMississippians. No, I don’t know. They all have tear gas. But I think heshould talk to the military fellow there and see whether that would beof . . . Well, they said he’d been in touch with them. [Pause.] All right.Have we got the gas in there yet? [Pause.] Yeah. Could you if you hadyour uniform on?

President Kennedy: Are we going to get this every night?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello?Unidentified: [responding to the President] Huh?President Kennedy: Are we going to get this every night?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are you in touch with the military?Sorensen: [to the President] I think that may well be Barnett’s strategy.President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Sorensen: You know it’s what happened to Autherine Lucy.36 She had

some trouble—

Meeting on Civi l Rights 269

36. In February 1956, an African American woman, Autherine Lucy, entered the University ofAlabama under a court order. Rioting ensued, and university officials suspended Lucy for her

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well now, is the gas on the way?37

Unidentified: What did she do, withdraw?Unidentified: Yeah, personally [unclear]. Isn’t that right?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you? Do you want these troops

in there?38 Yeah. OK. [Pause.] He got hit by what? Yeah.Unidentified: Who?Robert Kennedy: Is he going to live? The state police have left?

[Unclear] put them in?Marshall: I [unclear] talk with the Governor.President Kennedy: What’d he say?Marshall: He said they can’t have pulled them out.Sorensen: What?Marshall: Watkins.Robert Kennedy: [having heard Marshall’s exchange with the President]

And he said, Watkins says, “They can’t have pulled out of there.” Yeah.They have, though?

President Kennedy: What’s Watkins say otherwise?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Six what?Marshall: [to the President] He said it’s dead.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.]Marshall: He just talked to the Governor and the Governor had just

talked to the highway patrol [and] that everything was under control.Concern rises in the Cabinet Room as news arrives that General EdwinWalker is in Oxford to rally extremists in defense of a segregatedUniversity of Mississippi. The President and the Attorney General beginto take more seriously the need to deploy the U.S. Army on campus.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh why? There’s going to be a fight

in the infirm[ary] . . . Have the marshals done pretty well?Marshall: The Bureau says there are people coming in from out of town.Unidentified: There are, huh?Marshall: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: [to the people in the room] General Walker’s been

out downtown getting people stirred up.39

[on the phone] Can we get it arranged to get him arrested?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962270

own protection. When she criticized the decision, she was expelled from the university, a rul-ing upheld by a federal judge.37. The Mississippi National Guard stationed at the Lyceum had run out of tear gas and werewaiting for a new supply. It wouldn’t reach them until much later.38. At this point Katzenbach tells the Attorney General that he doesn’t need any troops.39. Major General Edwin A. Walker, retired. For additional information on Walker, see“Conversation with Archibald Cox,” 1 October 1962, note 5.

President Kennedy: By the FBI.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.] Well, let’s see if we can

arrest him. Will you tell the FBI that we need an arrest warrant.President Kennedy: What’s his crime?Robert Kennedy: [to the people in the room] He’s been stirring people up.Sorensen: Incitement.President Kennedy: Inciting.Sorensen: Inciting insurrection.Robert Kennedy: Obstruction of justice.President Kennedy: [Grunts.] Would the FBI have trouble arresting

him on . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah.President Kennedy: How many agents do you have down there? I

think you ought to get those MPs into there and over near the airport. Idon’t see what you’ve got to lose, if they’re at the airport. You can alwayssend them back.

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. OK. All right. I’ll do that. Now,will you clear it with Nick? He said we didn’t need them a minute ago.

O’Brien: As far as [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear] is no longer . . .O’Brien: . . . it depends on which is, you know, but I think that the

thing is, you have less risk [unclear] they do and bring ’em in.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. All right. Oh, can somebody

sit on this? That’s it. [Hangs up the phone.][to the people in the room] He said that if they get the gas, they don’t

have a problem. 40

President Kennedy: When do they think they are going to get it?Robert Kennedy: Well, they think a couple of minutes, at least.41

Unidentified: Somebody’s injured? [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Who got hurt?Robert Kennedy: They’re going to have . . .Unidentified: No way, I tell you.Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] terrible [unclear].President Kennedy: Imagine them coming in there with gas masks

and beginning again.Unidentified: Yeah.President Kennedy: That’s what happens to all of these wonderful

operations. War.

Meeting on Civi l Rights 271

40. Referring to Katzenbach.41. A new supply of tear gas was about ten minutes away.

O’Brien: They haven’t [unclear] some of the gas in those gas masksso they all be [sound of sniffling].

Unidentified: And the next group. [Laughter.]Unidentified: Well do you have . . . President Kennedy: General Walker. Imagine that son of a bitch hav-

ing been commander of a division up till last year. And the Army pro-moting him.

Unidentified: You’re right.Unidentified: Yes.Sorensen: Have you read Seven Days in May? 42

President Kennedy: Yeah.Unidentified: Damned good book.President Kennedy: I thought that . . .Sorensen: It’s pretty interesting.Unidentified: Yeah.Sorensen: I read it straight through. It’s interesting.Unidentified: I didn’t really like it.O’Brien: Unrealistic? [Laughter.]Sorensen: And you thought it was too far-fetched, then?President Kennedy: No, I thought this [had a] sort of awful amateur’s

dialogue.Unidentified: Yeah, it was a [unclear].Unidentified: No, it’s not great writing, but I mean—President Kennedy: It’s not even good. . . . The only character that

came out at all was the general. The president was awfully vague. But Ithought the general was a pretty good character. [Extended pause.]

Robert Kennedy: . . . well, then General Walker starts bringing thosefellows, you know . . .

President Kennedy: What?Robert Kennedy: If General Walker starts bringing in fellows from

[unclear] and that—Marshall: There are rumors all over the place.President Kennedy: He’s bringing in what?Robert Kennedy: He’s getting them all stirred up. If he has them

march down there with guns, we could have a hell of a battle.Unidentified: Thugs.Sorensen: Did the FBI say Walker’s there [unclear]?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962272

42. Popular novel of 1962, written by Fletcher Knebel, about a military plot to overthrow theU.S. government.

Robert Kennedy: No. No. Walker’s baiting them.Marshall: [on the phone] John?43

Robert Kennedy: They need to keep an eye on him.Marshall: [on the phone] Is that football coach doing any good?Lincoln: Tom Watkins is calling you.Robert Kennedy: Why don’t you get it?Two simultaneous phone conversations proceed.Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, just a minute, I’m going to go and talk

to this fellow, Watkins.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Oh yeah. How’s it going?Marshall: [on a different phone] Hello? Yes? [Unclear.]Unidentified: . . . which isn’t based on just anything. We certainly do

want it to go as far as ever. We’ll just about [unclear] work hard [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, I get the picture. What about

getting the . . . Is Nick there? Would you ask him what the story is withthe gas?44

Unidentified: [possibly on the phone] What route is it going to be?Sorensen: We talk about [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] You just, yeah . . .Sorensen: [Unclear] be a shame to [unclear].Unidentified: [in the background] John, do you want some milk?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, well, I think they got a report

from them five minutes ago. [Unclear.] John said he’s stirring people up.It’s a long way from Wisconsin. Yeah, I know.

Oh, Nick? Oh, what’s the story? Well, I think I’m . . . Won’t you be ableto get it? How far away is it? Can these students see that? Is it covered allright? How much more . . . You’d guess about how much longer? Yeah. OK.

[to Marshall] How was Watkins?Marshall: He says [unclear] can’t send anything, can’t do anything.President Kennedy: What are they saying? He’s there now?Robert Kennedy: They’re saying . . .President Kennedy: Where are they? Up around the third floor?

Where are they? Are they in the administration building with Meredith?Robert Kennedy: No. Meredith is in another building.45

President Kennedy: Nobody knows where he is?

Meeting on Civi l Rights 273

43. Probably John Doar, on the staff of the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice.44. The car bringing tear gas from the airport got lost on its way from the airport.45. Meredith was in a dorm room in Baxter Hall. Evidently the President was unfamiliar withthe geography of the campus or the plan to protect Meredith.

Sorensen: How many are guarding the administration building?Robert Kennedy: He’s got forty or fifty marshals. The gas is a quar-

ter of a mile.President Kennedy: But they can’t get it through the . . .Robert Kennedy: Well they just . . . Yeah. You know.Marshall: They’re not guarding anything there.Sorensen: Then why don’t . . .Marshall: . . . the students.Sorensen: . . . why don’t they just let . . . The marshals just left?Marshall: What do you mean?Sorensen: [Unclear] spend the night . . .Unidentified: Where are the marshals?President Kennedy: Why don’t they go inside the building? I think

they would. I haven’t had such an interesting time since the Bay of Pigs.[Chuckling.]

Unidentified: Cuba [unclear]?Robert Kennedy: Since the day what?President Kennedy: Bay of Pigs.Unidentified: Does Tom Watkins sound like he’s—Robert Kennedy: The Attorney General announced today, he’s join-

ing Allen Dulles at Princeton University. 46 [Laughter.]Marshall: He sounds . . .Unidentified: You might take up this [unclear].Marshall: So he is. He’s a very reliable fellow.President Kennedy: What?Marshall: He’s been a very reliable fellow. But he sounds—every

time . . . every time there’s a suggestion that that conversation would getout, he sounds concerned.

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? No, I’m just wondering if youheard. No.

Unidentified: Do you want to hold that?Marshall: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] When they say he’s sending more

gas, we’ll know we’re in.Marshall: Sending what?Robert Kennedy: More gas.Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, I’m just holding it. Who?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962274

46. Dulles was the retired director of Central Intelligence.

Unidentified: [Unclear] is loose as a goose. [Laughter.]Marshall: [on the phone] That’s all right. This is Burke Marshall. A

what? A priest. Oh.O’Brien: That’s the best shot they could take. That’ll [unclear] in

Mississippi.Unidentified: Tell him to get that collar on quick.Marshall: [on the phone] Do you know if the football coach has talked

to the students?O’Brien: More appropriately [unclear] if his sweatshirt’s on.President Kennedy: Yeah. [Unclear] He may be down there [unclear].Unidentified: He’s coming.Unidentified: Well the football coach would make a, get him, pretty

good [unclear]. [Laughter.]Unidentified: Is that it?Unidentified: It’s got to be better [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Training.Marshall: Where was that company?47

Robert Kennedy: Right there. It’s just forming up.Marshall: Oh, it’s just forming?Robert Kennedy: The only question is, you want them there now?

That’s up to Nick.Marshall: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: All you’re going to have up to assist is 150–200

fellows.Marshall: Yes, it’s all there.48

Robert Kennedy: I think it’s all there. It’s within the hour, and thatwas fifty minutes ago. I am [unclear].

President Kennedy: Yeah, I think we ought to, I wouldn’t hesitate toput them there. I don’t think that’s where we’re going to have the diffi-culty. Not way beyond it. The problem is looking as if we’re not doingenough rather than too much right now.

Marshall: Yeah.President Kennedy: Good.O’Brien: Oh, I agree.President Kennedy: Better get them over there.

Meeting on Civi l Rights 275

47. This is apparently a reference to a local unit of the federalized Mississippi National Guard.48. This advance contingent was still three hours away from Oxford.

Marshall: I wonder if we shouldn’t just put them over there?Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but if it’s forming up and we can’t put—Marshall: Because it might discourage some of these people from . . .Robert Kennedy: Throwing?Marshall: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: That’s why, he’s in a . . . They’re just guessing.

[Pause.]Robert Kennedy: If they get the gas, it’s not really a—President Kennedy: Problem?Robert Kennedy: . . . problem because they’re going to get the . . .Marshall: Unless the Bureau . . . See the Bureau says that their peo-

ple are moving in.Unidentified: From outside?Marshall: Yeah. And they might be armed.President Kennedy: You see, once some one fellow starts firing,

everybody starts firing. That’s what concerns me.49

Marshall: Yeah.President Kennedy: If one person fires . . .O’Brien: How are they getting in?Marshall: What?O’Brien: How are these people coming into the campus?Marshall: How?O’Brien: Yeah. Why don’t they have the, I thought . . .Marshall: Well, you see . . .O’Brien: . . . they had the entrances wired off.Marshall: . . . that would be state police.O’Brien: The state police which means that the city’s gone back.Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah? Well, that’s good. All right. Well,

that’s good.50

President Kennedy: What’s that?Marshall: [to the President] They got the gas. They just got a gas truck.Lincoln: Geoghegan for you.51

Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? [Unclear.]President Kennedy: They got a gas truck.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962276

49. Robert Kennedy seems to be supporting his team’s view that once the tear gas arrives, themarshals under Katzenbach’s command can stabilize the situation.50. At 11:44 P.M. this news was reported to Ramsey Clark, assistant attorney general, LandsDivision, who was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.51. William Geoghegan, assistant deputy attorney general, legislative program, Department ofJustice. He was manning the command center at the Justice Department with Ramsey Clark.

Marshall: Yeah. Well, just hang on; I’ve got to go to another phonefor a minute.

Unidentified: I’ll hold this one.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] All right, can we get the answer to

that?Unidentified: Which?Marshall: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Or I can . . .Evelyn Lincoln: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Do you have a switchboard? How do you handle

that?Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I’m going to get direct lines in . . .President Kennedy: From that building?Robert Kennedy: Well, not this. We just kept an open line. But our

various installations around there, we have direct line that we put in lastweek.52

[on the phone] Hello. Is Nick there? Let me speak to him, please.[on the phone with Katzenbach] Yeah. Oh, you’re all set? Do you? I

think we should move that army up anyway, don’t you?53 Well, yeah. Upto you? Yeah. I don’t want to make it appear that we didn’t do enough.Let me ask Ed what he thinks, being there and talking. All right.

[to the people in the room] But he doesn’t think but, of course, theproblem is that they can’t . . . If we can get that Walker.

Marshall: That state trooper was seriously hurt.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] The kid’s arm?President Kennedy: That’s too bad. What happened? Did one of

those pellets hit him?Marshall: Yeah. But we’re flying him to Memphis to the hospital.President Kennedy: Did he break his back? Did it break his back?Marshall: I don’t know. But they’re putting him on a border patrol

plane and flying him up to the hospital in Memphis.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Ed, did the coach come?54

[to the people in the room] Well, he said, this is completely under control.

Meeting on Civi l Rights 277

52. This is presumably the direct line between Louis Oberdorfer at the Justice command cen-ter in the Oxford Post Office and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department.53. Robert Kennedy, who has accepted the President’s suggestion, may still be operatingunder the assumption that the advance contingent from Memphis had already reached thearmory in Oxford, a short distance from the campus. In fact, this group was still in Tennessee.54. Apparently Guthman spoke to John Vaught, the Ole Miss coach, who assured him thatthere was only a small group of troublemakers.

President Kennedy: What does he say about the students, what theywant?

Robert Kennedy: Ed just said that, they say that because it’s a rela-tively—compared to what a big campus it is, and there are so many stu-dents—it’s a relatively . . .

President Kennedy: Small group?Robert Kennedy: . . . small number. Because, you know . . .President Kennedy: Too bad that fellow getting hurt.Unidentified: [Unclear] pitchfork.Unidentified: Just . . .Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Mrs. Lincoln?Lincoln: Yes.President Kennedy: Do you want us to put on the TV? Listen

[unclear]. Ask him to send it over some [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, yeah.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, do you think that they’re going

to move in there with some guns, though, from out of town?Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Uh-huh.Unidentified: Now here’s how you get errors [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How do the marshals feel? Is that

where the . . . OK? Did they do anything about that?Unidentified: It’s still [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] So that’s all right?Unidentified: [Unclear] soldiers.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I mean if anything . . . Is there any-

thing you can do to send, you can’t send anybody in and arrest thatWalker, can we?55

Sorensen: She started a [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Suicide.Sorensen: I wouldn’t hesitate to [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are these kids breaking up at all?Sorensen: [Unclear] haven’t used the [unclear] since I was a kid.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Can’t arrest any of them? Well, I

don’t know whether it would break it up or what.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962278

55. About a half hour earlier (11:32 P.M.), Clark at Justice had instructed the FBI to arrestGeneral Walker, if possible.

Marshall: My guess is it won’t matter.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Would not. But you think the situa-

tion’s under control? How long will this ammunition last? Yeah, about that.But better plan for two hours. All right. Well, Nick, I think we just . . . weshould . . . it’s got to be up to you, being on the scene, as to whether youneed these fellows, but I think it’s gone beyond the stage that . . . What’sMillington?56 Well, they’re going to form in the armory there. Isn’t thatpretty close? Well, why don’t they go over to the armory? Are you in touchwith them, Nick?57 Well, I can’t send them right away. Well, did he get it upthere? [Pause.] Well, they can’t hurt you, though, can they?

Marshall: Did the guard unit seal off the campus?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but they keep telling me that

you’re in touch with the military, and that this . . . So are you in touchwith them? Well, I mean, have they told you how many they’re comingand . . . Well, can you ask them what the hell they’re doing?58 And willyou let me know? Right. [Pause.] Hello?

[to the people in the room] Oh, I’m just trying to get the operator.[on the phone] Oh, would you hold? [He puts the phone down.]Marshall: Wouldn’t that be just the thing for the guard to do?Robert Kennedy: What?Marshall: Seal off the campus.Robert Kennedy: Yeah.Marshall: And they’ll fight it?President Kennedy: What’s the problem now?Robert Kennedy: Well, it’s not a problem. It’s the same problem . . . of

getting the people in there. They think that they have it under control.President Kennedy: Are you questioning whether to bring the

guard in?Robert Kennedy: No, I’m just questioning . . . I’m just trying to fig-

ure the fact that they don’t know when they are going to get there, andall the rest of it. That is what I’ve been thinking about. And when you’redealing with, sort of, unknowns . . .

[on the phone] Hello?Marshall: He can’t communicate with the guard?

Meeting on Civi l Rights 279

56. Millington, Tennessee, site of the Memphis Naval Air Station.57. The Attorney General wants to know whether Katzenbach had spoken with LieutenantColonel John Flanagan, the chief of Task Force Alpha.58. Ramsey Clark has apparently told the Attorney General that Katzenbach is fully informedabout the movements of the Memphis force.

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, he can through my office.59

President Kennedy: Who is Vance in touch with? Memphis?Robert Kennedy: That’s where the General is.60 And he’s going to

get on this plane and come down?Marshall: Who’s the general? Is it General Abrams?Robert Kennedy: Billingslea.Marshall: Billingslea.Robert Kennedy: Have you seen him?Sorensen: Is he a National Guard general? Or . . .Robert Kennedy: I think regular.Sorensen: Huh?Marshall: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Regular.Sorensen: Brought down in the National Guard under his [unclear].Robert Kennedy: Yeah, he’s the theater commander. [Pause.]President Kennedy: This is what they must do every night in

Teheran and these places.Unidentified: That’s a hell of a job, don’t you think?President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Taking care of mobs and so forth. [Unclear.]President Kennedy: [Unclear] beginnings.Robert Kennedy: Yeah, because we say you don’t have to use too

much force.President Kennedy: The margin of force is . . .Lincoln: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Yeah.Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Hello?Lincoln: Ramsey Clark calling in. 61

President Kennedy: Who?Robert Kennedy: Ramsey Clark.President Kennedy: Where is Nick? And where’s his command cen-

ter? Is it right in the administration building?Robert Kennedy: Yeah.President Kennedy: He can see all that’s going on?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962280

59. Only Robert Kennedy’s aide at Justice, Ramsey Clark, is able to communicate with the U.S.Army or the National Guard. Katzenbach or Oberdorfer can only reach them throughWashington.60. Referring to General Billingslea.61. Clark was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.

Robert Kennedy: Yeah. And then, Jim McShane’s head of the mar-shals. And, Joe Dolan . . .62

President Kennedy: What’s Joe doing there?Marshall: He’s sort of . . .Robert Kennedy: Lou Oberdorfer.63

Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: McShane enjoy this?Robert Kennedy: No, but I think they all like him.President Kennedy: He’s pretty tough.Robert Kennedy: He knows what he’s doing. I don’t think anybody’s

going to push him around much. Let’s see, we’ve got some other goodones that they have. And then we’ve got three . . . We’ve got also about150—

Marshall: Bob, are you sure Nick’s in touch with the guard? He justtold Ramsey that he wasn’t and that he’d like to know when they’re ontheir way.64

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, well, that’s what I gave . . . He said the onlyway through is through the office. Of course, Cy keeps saying thatthey’re talking to one another. Let’s get Cy. You want to get Cy Vancefor me?

Marshall: [in the background, on the phone] Hello, Ramsey? [Unclear.]You’re not in touch with . . .

Unidentified: Sure is a great day.President Kennedy: What?Unidentified: It’s been a great day.O’Brien: Well, in substance, they’re defending this administration build-

ing and keeping students out of that one building where these students—Robert Kennedy: Yeah; then they have a student that’s—O’Brien: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: —named Meredith in another building.O’Brien: Yeah. They don’t know where [unclear], do they?Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I suppose they do. I don’t know if they know.Marshall: Right.Robert Kennedy: And they’ve got 35, 40 marshals there. Actually,

Meeting on Civi l Rights 281

62. Joseph P. Dolan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Justice Department.63. Louis F. Oberdorfer was assistant attorney general in the Tax Division of the JusticeDepartment. He is running the command center in the Oxford Post Office.64. Nick Katzenbach told Ramsey Clark at 12:05 A.M. (10:05 P.M. Mississippi time) that the sit-uation had reached a point where he needed reinforcements. He wondered when the localNational Guard unit would arrive.

out of the 500 that we have, about 330 or so are border patrolmen—theImmigration and Naturalization Service and about 150 marshals.

O’Brien: They’re a little tougher, aren’t they?Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The border patrol . . . But they haven’t been

through this, when we sent our marshals through a long special train-ing. They haven’t been through that, but they’re very well disciplined.They were the best [unclear].

Unidentified: Were they?Marshall: That’s an impossible situation. No one’s in touch with the

guard unit, as far as I can see.President Kennedy: Is it from Cy?Lincoln: Secretary Vance.President Kennedy: Yeah. [Pause.]O’Brien: Maybe it’s by design. The guard unit is in touch with no one.O’Donnell: [Unclear] to call the Attorney General’s office to call

them back to Memphis.Marshall: Well, they have to call the Attorney General’s office to get

the Attorney General’s office to call the Secretary of the Army. TheSecretary of the Army to call to Memphis, and then back to theSecretary of the Army to . . .

O’Donnell: They’re not really in Memphis but they’re supposedlythere on the road now. Aren’t they?

Marshall: They’re forming at the armory.O’Donnell: They formed this afternoon. I saw them form on televi-

sion.65

Marshall: But they’re forming . . .Sorensen: Again.Marshall: —again at the armory in Oxford. You see, it’s a local unit.O’Brien: Well, where were they forming when you saw them?Sorensen: That’s what I’m talking about, that’s . . .Marshall: But that’s that company.66

Sorensen: That’s just the Oxford units, you mean?Marshall: Yeah.Unidentified: Well, who are the [unclear]?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962282

65. There is confusion in the room between Task Force Alpha and the local MississippiNational Guard’s units shown getting prepared on television that afternoon.66. Again, as stated in note 65, there appears to be some confusion among the men as towhether they are discussing the movements of Task Force Alpha from Memphis or anotherlocal Mississippi National Guard unit in the Oxford area.

Sorensen: Well, we [unclear] students. Huh?Unidentified: Who were the [unclear]?O’Donnell: You ought to include the student members.Marshall: Yeah.O’Donnell: Well, how about the ones that formed in Jackson this

afternoon?Unidentified: Oh, but they . . .Marshall: See, Jackson is 180 miles away.O’Donnell: But aren’t they supposed to be on their way now?Marshall: Yes. Uh. huh. Four hours away means about three.O’Donnell: Then there’s a couple of thousand on their way, aren’t

they?Sorensen: [Unclear.]Marshall: Fifteen hundred. Twenty-five.O’Donnell: The question is who’s in touch with their commander

[unclear] will carry out.Marshall: Well, the one they would want to get in touch with right

now are the ones that . . . There’s a company in Oxford.Sorensen: That are right there in the armory.Marshall: Yeah.Sorensen: The ones that are right there.Marshall: Well, a company could do a lot of good.Sorensen: Maybe there’s a phone in the armory.Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? If they what? [Laughter in back-

ground.]Sorensen: [Unclear.]Lincoln: Ramsey [unclear].O’Donnell: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Yeah.Marshall: Well, after dark. [Unclear.]Unidentified: The hours are [unclear]. They’ll probably charge the

telephone. [Unclear.]O’Brien: I just put that together. I thought it was valid.Sorensen: It isn’t quite clear yet what our [unclear] administration

building is.Unidentified: You know, I can’t think what [unclear].O’Brien: [Unclear] I assume the students think he is there or why

would they keep [unclear]?Marshall: Well, the marshal stood there.Unidentified: Let’s say the marshal [unclear].O’Brien: [Unclear] near a pay phone.

Meeting on Civi l Rights 283

Unidentified: [Unclear] the phones in there. [Laughter.]Unidentified: Phones.Unidentified: I think maybe you’re right. That’s what it is.Marshall: [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear] tough when you’re fighting the bastards.Unidentified: Is there any fight with [unclear]?O’Brien: They got a very good [unclear].O’Donnell: Yeah. Well, if the [unclear] injured, they . . . Then you

could get their [unclear] to [unclear] the students.Unidentified: I can’t help, my impression was that the National

Guard unit was on its way to Oxford from their outlying [unclear].Sorensen: Well some are, apparently, four hours away, but the one at

Oxford is being called to the armory in Oxford.67

O’Brien: By whom?Unidentified: Cy. [Laughter.]Unidentified: What’s the problem?Unidentified: Well, it’s a rather vague one, I think. I don’t think I

could normally get in touch with them, the National Guard.Sorensen: A bicycle could go to the armory faster.Unidentified: Somebody ought to go down there.Unidentified: Well, the general will be [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Yeah, [unclear] starting to fire . . .President Kennedy: Want to call the Governor on that?Sorensen: Unless they get rid of the . . .Unidentified: [Unclear] fire marshals.President Kennedy: [Unclear] marshals.President Kennedy: Did you talk to Barnett?Marshall: [Unclear.]Unidentified: Students riot?Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t [unclear] Walker’s crowd.Sorensen: He’s arrived on campus? [Unclear] changes from outsiders.Robert Kennedy: What?Sorensen: I think there’s really a good justification for [unclear]

students.President Kennedy: Well, [unclear] I would not . . .Robert Kennedy: Not now.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962284

67. Evidently, because of the delay in getting Task Force Alpha down, the Secretary of theArmy has located some National Guard reinforcements closer to the campus.

President Kennedy: The only way that [unclear].Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah.President Kennedy: They can keep their options open because [unclear]

the MPs have left yet.Marshall: [on the phone] They need the Guard [unclear].O’Brien: [Unclear.] Walker’s intent.Unidentified: Huh?O’Brien: General Walker’s plan.Unidentified: [Unclear] Walker’s military career?Sorensen: I hear it was pretty good.Unidentified: It used to be in somebody . . .Sorensen: [Unclear] beachhead.Unidentified: We should . . .O’Donnell: Better get Cy Vance. The General [unclear] he used to

shove messages over to the Germans [about] what area they were goinginto. He would himself lead a company of guys no matter, and slit thethroats coming back on the way out. I tried to [unclear] they always hada message that they were coming.

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: I asked Lemnitzer, one day, I said, gee, I just couldn’t

believe that any guy . . . That I saw him on television, I couldn’t believethat such a stupid . . . could become a general because [unclear].68

O’Brien: [Unclear.]Unidentified: You have exams or anything like that?Unidentified: [Unclear] demonstrate conduct so . . .Unidentified: Yeah.Sorensen: According to [unclear]. In [unclear] and approach you on

question [unclear].Unidentified: Yeah.O’Brien: I saw them.Unidentified: Yeah.Unidentified: [Unclear.] The President could take [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.] We’ll do it in the House.Unidentified: Why, I hear those guys won’t mind their trucks.

They’re watching too much television. He saw the [unclear].Unidentified: He thought they needed mobilizing. See all of them,

they all had to go down and organize that, plus TV. They watch them-selves on TV.

Meeting on Civi l Rights 285

68. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Unidentified: Would they like to be sworn in the federal service?[Laughter.]

Unidentified: No.Sorensen: I guess that’s the most we get now.President Kennedy: [Unclear] to Cy Vance right here. [Unclear.]Unidentified: Where is he?Unidentified: Vance is [unclear].Unidentified: Say listen, we’re contributing a lot to this.Unidentified: Yeah.O’Brien: Makes it kind of fascinating. It’s getting like an election

night or something. That door opens, I went for the next bulletin.Unidentified: Bob asked me to stay and sleep good and then watch

the . . .President Kennedy: Now look, you ought to do [unclear], as soon as

Vance calls us back.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Hello?Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: He’s been shot.69

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, can you get them back?Unidentified: Walker isn’t . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, hello. Is Nick there?Marshall: [Whispers.] [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [to someone in the room] [Unclear.] The thing is

[unclear] about the military . . . He can’t tell me, can’t tell you anything.Unidentified: Is there any word from Cy or [unclear]?President Kennedy: I suppose he could get in the [unclear]. The

problem really is from there to here, not from . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, Ed? Yeah, what’s bad again?

[Pause.] What can you do, though, you see those guards can’t get inthere for awhile.

[to the people in the room] An AP man got shot.70

[on the phone] Well, I can’t find out from the military. [Pause.] Hesays what? Where does he get that word from? How does Ramsey Clarkknow in 15 minutes, do you know?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962286

69. Marshal Graham E. Same of Indianapolis was shot in the neck and in critical condition.“How a Secret Deal Prevented a Massacre at Ole Miss,” Look, 31 December 1962.70. William Crider of the Associated Press.

Marshall: What’s that [unclear]?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, how long can you hold there?[Sound of door opening.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]Lincoln: Ramsey Clark.Marshall: [on the phone in the distant background] Hello? Yeah.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah.[putting down the phone and speaking to the people in the room] They’re

storming where Meredith is.71

President Kennedy: Oh. The students are or the . . .Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] They’re storming where Meredith is.Marshall: [in the background] They’re outside. [Unclear.] Yes. Yes.President Kennedy: Well, are the other marshals going?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Nick?President Kennedy: [Unclear] necessary . . . You better try to stick

them, all the marshals in. . . . I suppose get in the cars. . . . I don’t seehow they can . . . They may not be able to move him out, I suppose.

Unidentified: Because they’re in . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, you better move them all out

and see if we can’t get them. You go ahead and do it. All right. [Puts thereceiver down.]

Marshall: Bob, do we have any word on the MPs?72

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, they’re on their way. You want to get Nick?President Kennedy: What?Robert Kennedy: You want to get Nick?President Kennedy: All right.Telephone rings.Lincoln: Hello?Unidentified: Hello, [unclear].O’Donnell: You don’t want to have a lynching.O’Brien: Yeah. [Long pause.] Good. [Long pause.]O’Donnell: [on the phone] Hello? Oh, you want Bob? Yeah. Who is

this? Ken O’Donnell. Yes. Yeah.Unidentified: [Unclear.]

Meeting on Civi l Rights 287

71. Fortunately, this was only a false rumor. Throughout the riot the lightly guarded BaxterHall escaped any serious harassment. There were only 24 marshals guarding Meredith in hisdormitory.72. Task Force Alpha. It is still in Memphis.

O’Donnell: [on the phone] Were they after him, or what? Are theyafter him now? [Pause.] Yeah. OK. [Replaces the receiver.]

[to Robert Kennedy] Bobby, it was the [unclear] that [unclear] firing.Sounds of people coming into the room. An indistinct conversation isoverheard where someone says “side arms.”Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Hello? Well, I think they have

to protect Meredith now. Well, that’s what I mean. They better fire, Isuppose. They got to protect Meredith. What? [Pause.] [Unclear] can’tdo anything. Is Meredith all right?

Unidentified: Well, I don’t know. If they can.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] They better protect Meredith now.

Well, can you make sure that he’s protected, Dean? [Pause.]

While Robert Kennedy hastened to react to the possibility that BaxterHall might be stormed, the President was in the Oval Office trying topressure Governor Ross Barnett to help restore order to the campus.Kennedy was especially concerned that the injured man receive medicalattention. This conversation was taped.

12:14 A.M.

We couldn’t consider moving Meredith if we haven’t been ableto restore order outside. That’s the problem, Governor.

Conversation with Ross Barnett73

Ross Barnett: . . . the Commissioner of the highway patrol to orderevery man he’s got.

President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, now, how long’s that going to take?We don’t want somebody . . .

Barnett: Well, I haven’t been able to locate him.President Kennedy: You can’t locate . . .Barnett: He went to the . . . Here’s what happened. He went to the

doctor’s office with this man that was hurt.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962288

73. Dictabelts 4E and 4F, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,Presidential Recordings Collection.

President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: And I finally located him there after you’d told me to get,

have him to get more people, don’t you see, if . . .President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: You needed ’em.President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: And he thought then that fifty he had would be sufficient.President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: But I told him by all means to order out every one he had if

he needed it.President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: And I’m certainly trying in every way . . .President Kennedy: Well, we can’t consider moving Meredith as

long as, you know, there’s a riot outside because he wouldn’t be safe.Barnett: Sir?President Kennedy: We couldn’t consider moving Meredith if we

haven’t been able to restore order outside. That’s the problem, Governor.Barnett: Well, I’ll tell you what I’ll do, Mr. President. President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: I’ll go up there myself . . .President Kennedy: Well, now, how long will it take you to get there?Barnett: . . . and I’ll get a microphone and tell them that you have

agreed to re—, to, for ’em to be removed . . .President Kennedy: No. No. Now, wait a minute. How long . . .Barnett: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Wait a minute, Governor.Barnett: Yes?President Kennedy: Now, how long is it going to take you to get up

there?Barnett: About an hour.President Kennedy: Now, I’ll tell you what, if you want to go up

there and then you call me from up there. Then we’ll decide what we’regoing to do before you make any speeches about it.

Barnett: Well, all right. Well . . .President Kennedy: No sense in . . .Barnett: . . . I mean, whatever you, if you’d authorize . . . President Kennedy: You see, if we don’t, we got an hour to go, and

we may not have an hour.Barnett: This, this man . . .President Kennedy: It won’t take you an hour to get up there.Barnett: . . . this man has just died.

Conversat ion with Ross Barnet t 289

President Kennedy: Did he die?Barnett: Yes.President Kennedy: Which one? State police?Barnett: A state policeman.President Kennedy: Yeah, well, you see, we got to get order up there,

and that’s what we thought we’re going to have.Barnett: Mr. President, please. Why don’t you, can’t you give an

order up there to remove Meredith?President Kennedy: How can I remove him, Governor, when there’s

a riot in the street, and he may step out of that building and somethinghappen to him? I can’t remove him under those conditions. You . . .

Barnett: Uh, but, but . . .President Kennedy: Let’s get order up there; then we can do some-

thing about Meredith.Barnett: . . . we can surround him with plenty of officials.President Kennedy: Well, we’ve got to get somebody up there now to

get order and stop the firing and the shooting. Then when you and I willtalk on the phone about Meredith . . .

Barnett: All right.President Kennedy: . . . but first we got to get order.Barnett: I’ll, I’ll call and tell them to get every official they can.President Kennedy: That’s right and then you and I will talk when

they get order there, then you and I will talk about what’s the best thingto do with Meredith.

Barnett: All right then.President Kennedy: Well thank you.Barnett: All right.President Kennedy hangs up.

Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued

President Kennedy returns to the Cabinet Room to report on his conver-sation with the Mississippi Governor.President Kennedy: He wants us to move him again. And I say,

“Well, we can’t move him if the situation’s like this.” And he says, “Well,we’ll take care of the situation if you move him.”

Robert Kennedy: I can’t get him out. How am I going to get him out?President Kennedy: That’s what I said to him. Now, the problem is, if

he can get law and order restored, . . . OK, we’ll move him out of there ifhe can get order restored.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962290

Unidentified: I don’t see how we can . . .Long pause. Sounds of doors opening and closing. Evelyn Lincoln can be

indistinctly heard talking in the background.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now we’d better get this . . . Now,

they might not recognize the kids today. Get him . . . get him up thereand get him out or something. I don’t know what the exit is. Yeah, yeah,they’re shooting at other . . .

Unidentified:. [Unclear.] He said [unclear] to you immediately. Robert Kennedy: I’m glad to see that . . . They always make sure of

everything, even if they don’t know what time it is.[on the phone] Can we be all right? Will they be all right? Have they

gotten into the room? I think we just have to protect him no matterwhat it is.

O’Donnell: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] All right. Would you get that, Ed?

See if we can get Barnett to get [the] highway patrol to bring doctorsin. [Door opens.]

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Nick? I’ll hold.O’Brien: Doctor.Sorensen: From the inside of the arm[ory] or wherever [unclear].O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello.President Kennedy: What about removing him if Barnett says that

he can restore law and order?Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s not what they, they’re firing at the

marshals.Unidentified: I’d sure as hell put all those bastards in the can.Unidentified: Yeah. That’s for sure.O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello. What’s it look like?O’Donnell: [Edwin] Guthman’s so scared he can’t talk. Helpless

feelings on the other end of that phone. You have to [unclear].O’Brien: [on the phone] This is Larry O’Brien. [Pause.]O’Donnell: [in the background] I hate to say it, but I [unclear].Unidentified: Well, we ought to do that [unclear] to Barnett.

[Indistinct exchange.]O’Brien: [on the phone] Yes. Yes. Hello? Yes. Hello? [to the people in the room] Two marshals have been shot.[on the phone] Yes, we’re on this line down there. We’re on this line.

Well, we’re talking down there. This is Larry O’Brien in the CabinetRoom. Hello? Yeah. So I understand. Yeah. Yeah. Are you able to movethem out of the administration building to where the boy is?

Meeting on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 291

Marshall: Have they got authority to return, Bobby?O’Brien: They know it.Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Brien: First. I thought they said [they] haven’t eaten since this

morning. [Unclear.] [Unclear] in the field, probably didn’t spend a lot oftime on the campus.

Evelyn Lincoln: [Heard faintly in the background.]Unidentified: [Unclear] people [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear] one reason was that the people [unclear].O’Brien: They say they can’t determine just what his next move is.

Let’s see what’s going to happen. He says these students are gettingready with a flying wedge to hit the dormitory and [face] these guys.He says, “No, they just have to face us, and somebody’s going to get it.”

Unidentified: Have they not shot back yet? The marshals?O’Brien: Apparently not. Said some of them were hit with buckshot. But

there are two of them seriously hurt. They really don’t know how badly yet.The problem . . . One’s bleeding in the throat. [Possible door sound.]

President Kennedy: Well, can I talk to them directly and on . . .Robert Kennedy: Do you want to get Nick for me?O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Is Nick there? All right.Robert Kennedy: The problem is, if we move him, they’re liable to

[unclear].Sorensen: About two hours.President Kennedy: What about the Guard?Robert Kennedy: Well, can’t the 82nd [unclear].Unidentified: How long before they get any more guards?Robert Kennedy: He told me he’d have several bunches in an hour.President Kennedy: An hour from now?Robert Kennedy: And in a pinch they’d have about [unclear interjec-

tion]. They took two hours.Marshall: And they [unclear]. [Continues speaking faintly in the back-

ground.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah? Nick? Hold on, here’s Bobby.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Nick? Oh, I just got, Ramsey

just asked me for . . . if they had permission to fire back. Do you have todo that? Well, can’t they just retreat into that building? [Pause.] Is hesafe over the other place? Oh, I think that they can fire to save him. Butnow, can you hold out for an hour there? [Pause.] Can you hold out if youhave gas? Is there much firing? Is there any way you could figure a wayto scare them off ? [Pause.] I’m sorry for that. I think that if we start a

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962292

battle with . . . Up in the air? Except then it might really start them. . . .Once you start firing, they can forget this . . . Will that help? OK. OK.[Puts down the receiver.]

President Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you hold?[to the people in the room] Do you think they can hold for an hour?Robert Kennedy: If they have gas.President Kennedy: And do they?74

Robert Kennedy: I think it really depends on how much firing.[Phone rings in the background.]

Unidentified: Pardon.Lincoln: [answering phone] Hello? Hello?Unidentified: How much firing?Robert Kennedy: The guards have arrived since you . . .Lincoln: [on the phone] This is Evelyn Lincoln. [calls out] Cy—Robert Kennedy: Cy Vance. . . . The President can take it.O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello. [Long pause.] Hello.[to the people in the room] Pretty damn hard once firing takes place, to

shut it off.Unidentified: Yeah, I know.Operator: Hello?O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello.Operator: Yes, do you want a line?O’Brien: [on the phone] Just leave it open. Hello. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

Well, we’ll leave this line open. All right. Right. [Puts the receiver down.][to the people in the room] Well, they can’t even get the injured guy to

the college dispensary. They’re trying to get a wedge to get him through.O’Donnell: Trying to get him through the crowd? [Long pause.]Sounds of a door opening and closing can be heard as Robert Kennedyreturns to the room, probably after a conversation with Cyrus Vance, thesecretary of the Army.Robert Kennedy: Damn Army! They can’t even tell if [unclear] the

MPs have left [yet].75

The Attorney General now realizes that he hasn’t any federal reinforce-ments in town. And Vance at the Pentagon cannot even tell him whenthe advance contingent of Task Force Alpha will arrive at the Oxfordarmory.

Meet ing on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 293

74. No. The embattled federal forces at the Lyceum are still without tear gas.75. It is about 12:17 A.M., over ninety minutes since the Attorney General ordered the move-ment of the troops from Memphis.

O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello?O’Donnell: Whether they’ve left yet?Robert Kennedy: Won’t even attempt to tell us.O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah. All right.Sorensen: You mean they’re not in contact with anyone . . .Robert Kennedy: Well, who knows what the reason is? Cy Vance

doesn’t know yet. [Pause.][Robert Kennedy leaves the room again.]Lincoln: [Unclear.]Pause. Sound of door opening. It appears that a midnight snack is beingserved.Unidentified: Cheese on this?Unidentified: Yes. O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello?Unidentified: [referring to the snack] And a roll.O’Brien: [on the phone] Nothing, huh? Right.Unclear voice in the background.O’Brien: [on the phone] Huh? Yes.O’Donnell: [Unclear.]O’Brien: Well, where were they?O’Donnell: [Unclear.] Out of the way. [Unclear.] I’ll be a son of a

bitch if the President of the United States calls up and says, “Get yourass down there.” Yeah, I would think they’d be on that fucking plane inabout five minutes.

Unidentified: They sort of roped them in.O’Brien: So, where they are afraid the problem is the . . . now this fly-

ing wedge of students that’s going to tackle the dormitory.76 Half theseguys, you know, they’ve about had it.

O’Donnell: But what’s the point of it . . . these guys . . . burning andlooting. I suppose they are going to kill us when they get here.

O’Brien: Yeah.O’Donnell: You start firing at a bunch of students?O’Brien: They’re afraid it’s going to happen.O’Donnell: Uh?O’Brien: That’s what they’re afraid is going to happen.77 . . . marshal

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962294

76. Baxter Hall, where Meredith is located.77. Tape 26 ends. There appears to have been some conversation lost before the Secret Servicereplaced the tape reel. Tape 26A begins, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,Presidential Recordings Collection.

seriously hurt; the others, some others got buckshot. Well, this must havebeen done under the premise that something’s going to happen [unclear].

[on the phone] Hello?Pause. An indistinct conversation can be heard in the background.O’Brien: [puts down the receiver] If necessary, is there any way that

we could get an ambulance?Sorensen: The police ought to be able to get an ambulance to the

[unclear].Unidentified: The Governor said, “Make sure and take that boy out

of there, and everything will be all right.”O’Brien: That’s the main thing.Unidentified: I’d take him out. By tomorrow, with those 5,000 bayo-

nets.Unidentified: Certain that there be no repercussions whether you

choose to bring troops in or not.Unidentified: No. No. I agree.Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Brien: . . . write this thing off now. Obviously, the townies [unclear].Robert Kennedy: They had in mind. [Doors open.]Sorensen: One that was hit by the gas?Unidentified: Yeah. [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]Robert Kennedy: Well, we can’t last that long. [Doors close.]O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello. Yeah. Hmm. Don’t worry. Oh

yeah. Robert Kennedy: The son of a bitch. He knows [unclear]. [Door opens

and closes.]President Kennedy: What? Yeah.Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] It’s not about the policemen. It’s about

other people being shot. If you get Barnett to get Meredith off thecampus . . .

President Kennedy: What?Robert Kennedy: Just to get Meredith off the campus. That’s what he

wants.Unidentified: Well he can [unclear]. [Sound of water being poured.]Robert Kennedy: That’s what he said.President Kennedy: Well, he wants to be able to say that he asked me

to get him off. And that I refused.Robert Kennedy: Now, he’s too . . .President Kennedy: You’ve got to get law and order and then you

can discuss what to do about Meredith. But he can’t do anything. Hedoesn’t even get ahold of the head of the state police.

Meeting on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 295

Robert Kennedy: What do they say?O’Brien: They don’t know. Nothing at the moment.Robert Kennedy: We’ll have to stick it to that Walker.78 [Door opens

and closes.]Sorensen: Can’t you get him arrested?Robert Kennedy: Well, I can’t do it now.Sorensen: Why not?Robert Kennedy: Well, he’s out there in the field.Unidentified: You mean there’s nobody that can go out and arrest

him?Robert Kennedy: Yeah.O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello?Robert Kennedy: Is he still being shot at, Larry?O’Brien: [talking on the phone] No. Any shooting? Things quiet now?

Quiet. Yeah. Yeah.[talking to people in the room] Everything’s quiet around there, but he

doesn’t know . . . they’re trying to check the dormitory.Robert Kennedy: The what?O’Brien: Trying to check around as to what’s going on in the dormi-

tories. He says it’s quiet around the area. One fellow’s seriously hurt andthey’re trying to get an ambulance.

Marshall: There’s supposed to be an ambulance going in, too. [Doorsounds.]

Unidentified: Jesus!Sorensen: Sad day in our country.No conversation as they wait for information to come in. Doors openand close.Sorensen: Any word yet on the military?Marshall: Well, they’re just leaving Memphis.79

Sorensen: Can they handle that [unclear]? [Unclear exchange.]Robert Kennedy: Hey, Burke?Marshall: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: Want to talk to Watkins?80 You put the call in?Marshall: What?Robert Kennedy: Watkins.Marshall: Should we call him?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962296

78. Major General Edwin A. Walker, retired.79. At 12:26 P.M., the departure of Task Force Alpha was still about ninety minutes away.80. Thomas A. Watkins.

Robert Kennedy: Yes.Doors open and close followed by silence. Then again there are sounds ofdoors opening and closing, with Evelyn Lincoln’s voice in the backgroundand an unclear exchange in the foreground ending with “Jesus Christ.”The President enters the room.President Kennedy: [Unclear] casualties [unclear] unless we’re lucky.O’Brien: The state policeman died. It’s too bad.Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? Yeah. Yeah. All right.Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Shotgun wound in his back.O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? [Pause.] Right. No. All right.[talking to people in the room] He told me they ought to get [unclear]

the fighting was [unclear] the campus [unclear] the assistant dean[unclear].

Unidentified: I understand it was [unclear]. [Voices can be heard mur-muring in the background.]

O’Brien: Yeah.The Attorney General enters the room.Robert Kennedy: What’s he say, Larry?O’Brien: Nothing at the moment. He just said that we’ve got a

stretcher.[on the phone] Hello? Maybe he . . .Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Well, how does it look now?O’Brien: So they sent 18 men out to the dormitory.81 They weren’t

sure if they were receiving fire or not.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] And what about there, they firing at

all now? [Pause.] Is Nick there? [Pause.] Well, I’d like to talk to him tosee what the . . . Oh, they’re there? Yeah. Who’s this?

Marshall: Let the people pick [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [in an aside] Now, they told them they had to land.

[Unclear exchange.]Robert Kennedy: They think we shouldn’t do that.Unidentified: Not today.Robert Kennedy: You shouldn’t just, you shouldn’t say things.Unidentified: Why don’t you pick up the phone? That will get them

flying.

Meeting on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 297

81. Originally Katzenbach posted 6 men to guard Meredith; as the situation deteriorated oncampus, 18 additional men were dispatched from the Lyceum front to reinforce Baxter Hall.

Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] probably shouldn’t say anything [unclear].These guys have capable fellows there.

O’Brien: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: The National Guard. They can [unclear].O’Brien: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] Yeah. Oh Nick? How’s it

look? The fellow from the London paper was there, was he?82 Londonpaper. [talking to the people in the room] He says the fellow from theLondon paper died. . . . Yeah.

President Kennedy: We ought to get some more troops. I wonder ifit takes this long to get people ready around here.

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Have the troops, have the NationalGuard showed up? Did they fire? Are they firing at all down there?

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is it quieter?Marshall: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Who’ve you got up there at the other

place? Yeah, but I mean I think you want to get somebody that’s up therethat knows how important it is to keep Meredith alive. Yeah, but I meanit should be somebody that you know. And that should stay right byMeredith and shoot anybody that puts a hand on him. And it has got tobe the absolute . . . OK? [The telephone rings in the background.]

[speaking to the people in the room] It’s a little quieter. [Unclear.]

The Attorney General steps out to call secretary of the Army CyrusVance to inquire about the status of the long anticipated Task ForceAlpha. Hoping to reduce any further delays, the Attorney Generalwants to know whether the advance contingent can be flown directly tothe campus. Robert Kennedy used his brother’s telephone and the callwas taped.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962298

82. At approximately 12:30 A.M., Jack Rosenthal of the Justice Department called the WhiteHouse to report that a reporter for the London Daily Sketch, Paul Guihard, had been killed inthe riot. His body was found next to a women’s dormitory on campus. See Dictabelt 4F2,Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential RecordingsCollection.

Approximately 12:40 A.M.

[H]ow long before they’ll be there?

Conversation from the Oval Office between Robert Kennedy and Cyrus Vance83

Cyrus Vance: Yeah, see the problem is one of light getting in there,and they’re just going to get in wherever they can on the campus.

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, and then they’re, we could use at least a cou-ple hundred right there.

Vance: Yeah, well . . .Robert Kennedy: I don’t know how. They don’t have transportation

in from the airport.Vance: No. They will land on the campus. These are their instruc-

tions. Wherever they can get in, Bob.Robert Kennedy: OK.Vance: Right.Robert Kennedy: But when, how long before they’ll be there?Vance: Uh, well, they left—take a look at my watch—must be about,

I would guess 10 or 15 minutes ago. And it was supposed to take aboutan hour. Bob, I don’t want to guess . . .

Robert Kennedy: No.Vance: . . . at the thing because I don’t know precisely.Robert Kennedy: OK. All right.Vance: Right.Robert Kennedy: Thanks.Robert Kennedy hangs up.

Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued

At approximately the same time that Vance is confirming to RobertKennedy that the helicopters have taken off, General Charles Billingsleacalls the Justice Department (12:42 A.M.) with similar information. Thefirst helicopters actually took off at 2:08 A.M. (12:08 A.M. Mississippi time).O’Donnell:[Unclear.] Somebody shot [unclear] the London paper

[unclear].

Meeting on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 299

83. Dictabelt 4F3, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

Unidentified: Right.Unidentified: It’s going to be a big story over in Europe, don’t you

think?Unidentified: Yeah.O’Donnell: I have a hunch that Khrushchev would get those troops

in faster. That’s what worries me about this whole thing.Unidentified: Why?O’Donnell: I think that . . .O’Brien: You know, but most of them [unclear] you get them there

first [unclear].O’Donnell: [Unclear.]O’Brien: [Unclear.]O’Donnell: I just don’t quite understand it. I mean, why would

[unclear].O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Anything doing?Marshall: Larry, is there any sign of the Guard?O’Brien: [on the phone] Find any Guard there at all? Any arrivals?

Any word?Unidentified: I wish those marshals would arrive. No state police

guarding them [unclear] troops [unclear]. The state police they can’tfind [unclear].

Marshall: That’s what the Governor said. We didn’t find the state police.Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah, I know. National Guard.O’Donnell: The MPs are airborne? At least?Marshall: What?O’Donnell: Are they airborne?Marshall: Yeah. They’re airborne. No, they are. They are in fact air-

borne.Unidentified: Yeah.Marshall: I mean, unless they’re lying to us.Sorensen: Well, they were not exactly accurate when they told us

that they were.Marshall: They were two hours off to begin with.O’Brien: [on the phone] Not at the airport?Marshall: [Unclear] off something like that.Sorensen: It wasn’t two hours? [Unclear] regular Army?Marshall: Yeah.O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah.Marshall: Or at least one of them.O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah. Fine. Right.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962300

[talking to people in the room] The current problem is how to get thetrucks off the campus back to the airport to bring the troops in.

Marshall: Are the troops . . .O’Brien: The MPs.Marshall: They’re going to land on the campus.O’Brien: Well, he said that there’s a question whether they can or not.Marshall: Why?O’Brien: Well, I don’t know. Lights or what have you.O’Donnell: They have a helicopter?Marshall: Yeah.O’Brien: So that’s what they’re checking out now. They were going to

have them land in the airport and bring them in by truck, but now . . . ?Marshall: They can’t get the trucks off the campus?O’Brien: Yeah.Door opens. The President and the Attorney General enter.Sorensen: A few hundred students and rednecks have really got the

entire U.S. Army [unclear].Unclear chatter; someone jokes, “Take a cab from the airport.”Unidentified: Think some of the townspeople would drive them in?Marshall: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: What about a baseball field with night lights or

anything like that?O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello?Robert Kennedy: Burke, should we [unclear] them?Marshall: We cannot [unclear].Robert Kennedy: Yeah.O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Well, they won’t be able to land.Unidentified: Unless they can open it. [Unclear] can get it open.O’Brien: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: But can Ramsey look at the map and see whether,

where else there is?84

Marshall: Well, there is a practice field right next to the large [unclear].Robert Kennedy: Well, why don’t they [unclear].Marshall: That’s where they [unclear].Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t know whether they can find it,

though. [Unclear.]Marshall: If there’s no lighting. That’s a problem.

Meeting on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 301

84. Ramsey Clark was assistant attorney general in the Lands Division of the Department ofJustice.

O’Donnell: [Unclear] the weather’s all right, we can [unclear].Unidentified: In the dark?O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Yeah. [Unclear exchange.] [talking on

the phone] Yeah.Unidentified: Helicopters.O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Yeah.Unidentified: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: Second time in.O’Brien: [to the people in the room] Maybe they have sixty guardsmen

there now. One of them was just wounded, so they know they’re there.85

President Kennedy: One of the guards was wounded?O’Brien: They said they just brought him in. So he says they esti-

mate they’ve [unclear]. He arrived in a group of sixty.Unidentified: You were right about it anyway.President Kennedy: What?Unidentified: That’s good anyway.Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Brien: Sixty men . . . sixty men under the command of a Captain

Falkner, is the name.86

O’Donnell: That’s Faulkner’s son.87

O’Brien: Yeah.O’Donnell: [Unclear.]Marshall: [talking on the phone] All right. Where did they land?O’Brien: One of the Oxford group, then?O’Donnell: Yeah. Must be.O’Brien: That’s what they have, sixty.Marshall: [Talking on the phone unintelligibly in the background. Unclear

exchanges.]O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah. Yeah. Oh. Yeah.[to the people in the room] Taking care of those sixty guardsmen pretty

quick. One of them got hit in the arm with a brick. He’s down. And theother one got a cut across [unclear].

Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Donnell: He won’t like it.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962302

85. The first confirmation for the White House that some National Guard reinforcements, a con-tingent of some 55, had reached the campus. Ramsey Clark at Justice learned this at 12:48 A.M.86. Captain Murry Falkner, cousin of William Faulkner.87. William Faulkner, author.

Unidentified: The corpsman.O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Well, as long as they’re [unclear] backs

to the bricks and rocks, that’s a hope. Yeah. Yeah. [Unclear exchange in thebackground.]

O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Is that right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. OK.Right.

O’Donnell: [Unclear] the marshal who fired that gas gun . . .O’Brien: [talking on the phone while Marshall is whispering in the back-

ground] No shooting, now though, huh? Yeah. Anything going? Yeah.Good. OK. He’s in the next room. I’ll keep this line open. OK. All right.[Meanwhile, an indistinct conversation is going on in the background.] OK,Dean, I’ll tell him.88 He’s in the next room [unclear]. OK.

O’Donnell: [Unclear.] [telling a story] He said, “All right.” He said,“Who?” He said, “Governor, this is the Boston Post.” “Who the hell elsewould it be this time of the night?” “Governor, your daughter’s car hasbeen found cracked up down on the Cape. Do you have any statement?”“Certainly, the thief must be apprehended.” [Laughter.]

Sounds of the door opening and closing followed by a pause.O’Brien: You say you’re unsure about that car that’s been showered

and hit with bricks.Unidentified: [Unclear.]O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? Hi Joe. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.]

Larry O’Brien. Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah. Well, I’ll get on it . . . yeah. OK.[Pause.]

Sorensen: They say if you ever made a chronological listing of thereports we’ve gotten over that phone in the last three hours, it wouldn’tmake any sense at all.

O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello. [Pause.] Yeah. You wantBobby? Who’s this? Yeah, hold on a minute. [Puts down receiver.]

He wants Bobby. [Sounds of door opening and closing.]Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] Hello? Yeah.O’Brien: [Unclear.]Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] They tell me the fellow from

the London paper was killed. . . . Well, they found him back of somedormitories. Yeah. Yeah, that’s true. What are we going to say about allthis, Ed?89 You know, we’re going to have a hell of a problem about why

Meeting on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 303

88. Dean P. Markham.89. Probably Edwin Guthman, director of public information at the Department of Justice.

we didn’t handle the situation better. Yeah, yeah. [Pause.] OK. Well, Ithink we are going to have to figure out what we are going to say.[Pause.] Do you want to? Oh yeah, well you did terrific. I think it’s justa question of the fact that I made the decision to send [pause]. OK. Youwant to hold on?

Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? This is Burke. Yeah. Yeah.Lincoln: Bill Geoghegan calling you. 90 Want to take it?Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Oh, Mrs. Lincoln? Oh, Ed? Listen, can

you hold on just a minute while I take a call from Bill? Hello? Just hold on.Phone rings. Then there are sounds of a door opening and closing.Operator: What number? Lincoln: One line. [Door opens and closes.]Marshall: [on the phone] Ed? They can’t get the trucks out to them.

We’re going to try to land some on the campus. [Pause.] We’re not.[Pause.] Yeah, we ought to do that. It’s really a [pause]. Yeah. Let himknow if they’ve gone. . . . Oh, he was there, all right. What he was doingI don’t know. I don’t know, Ed.

Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Yeah, they did . . . Yeah. OK. They’ve all

been evacuated, I underst—[pause]. Yeah. Real war. No. God, that’s dumb.That’s uh, that Army, you know, they’re just late. Well, they’re in the air.91

Yeah. I don’t think they do. They’ve got pistols. Well, they’re . . . Yes, theydo. I mean, they’ll all be there by the morning, Ed. Yeah, I know. Yeah.

Robert Kennedy: Is Ed there?Marshall: What?Robert Kennedy: Ed?Marshall: He just said, “Hold on,” and . . .Robert Kennedy: I’d like to speak to him, then.Marshall: Fine. [on the phone] Hello? Who’s this? Oh Dean? Is Ed

around? Could—well, when he comes back, Bob wanted to talk to him.[Pause.]

[to people in the room] Do they know what they’re going to do withthe MPs?

Unidentified: Not exactly.Robert Kennedy: Well, I think they [unclear] and maintain law and

order, and then they can figure it out.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962304

90. William A. Geoghegan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Department ofJustice. He was the number two at the crisis center in the Justice Department.91. It was about 12:55 A.M. and the helicopters are about to take off.

Marshall: Well, I mean, do they know where they’re going to landthem?

Robert Kennedy: Oh, in another 15 or 20 minutes, I think. They haveit pretty much under control, though, in effect. [Unclear.]92

Marshall: Oh, here’s Ed. [on the phone] Just a minute, Ed.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Ed? I think that probably you

should get that crowd together and brief them on all that, when it quietsdown and all. [Door opens.]

Lincoln: Bill Geoghegan’s calling you.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but you see, we’re going to be

blamed for not doing enough. And I think that you trace it. First, thatwe had the agreement with the Governor. Uh—Do you . . . Do you wantto hold on? [He puts the receiver down.]

Marshall: [on the phone] Hello, Ramsey?Robert Kennedy: [seems to walk to other side of the room] Well, he’s

besieged, of course, from behind. . . . But he’s under siege.President Kennedy: So has he agreed with us?Robert Kennedy: Yeah, of course, he just figured that he . . . but I

mean uh—[on the phone] Hello. Unidentified: What about?Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] What about the reporters there? Do

they see the picture? [Unidentified background conversation.]Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, I just think that, but the point

that we want to get over you know is that the Governor said . . . madethis arrangement. We didn’t sneak him in. I think that’s going to be thecry, that we snuck him in unprepared.

Well, can I tell you what the . . . Of course, the point is, at first, hesaid, he came in in [a] helicopter, and of course they know he didn’t, andthen the gate was opened to everybody to come through . . . and the statepolice guided him in. Yeah. Well, I just think that we are going to take alot of knocks because of people getting killed, the fact that I didn’t getthe people up there in time.

President Kennedy: [on another phone] Well, now, did Bob Watkins[unclear].93

Meeting on Civi l Rights , Cont inued 305

92. The advance contingent of Task Force Alpha landed at 1:50 A.M. Not only were they about45 minutes later than the Attorney General had assumed, but these troops had to land atOxford airport due to the cloud of tear gas that obscured any possible landing areas in or nearthe campus. The situation on the campus was still far from being under control.93. Tom Watkins, Governor Barnett’s intermediary.

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I think the fact, then, they promisedthe state police would stay and then the state police left. And he tookresponsibility . . .

President Kennedy: [on the phone] All right.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] . . . under this arrangement for main-

tenance of law and order.President Kennedy: [on another phone] Yeah.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I’ll do that, but I just thought you’d

cover the points, and OK . . .President Kennedy: [on another phone] All right. Just call me now

that it’s going to be important [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but I mean, just so you know

the facts and so that that we can . . . Yeah. OK.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now, how is it down there now?Marshall: OK. I’ll call you [unclear].Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK.Unidentified: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK. Would you hold?Marshall: Well, we ought to get . . . Oh, have we called up other

Guard units?Robert Kennedy: Well, they were sending them all, I guess.Marshall: They are?Robert Kennedy: Well, I’m not sure. [Unclear.]Doors close and the machine is left running. It is about 1:00 A.M. andthe Cabinet Room is empty. Someone enters the room again and turnsthe machine off.

1:45 A.M.

[W]e’ve got to get this situation under control.

Conversation with Ross Barnett94

President Kennedy is losing his patience both with the U.S. Army, whichhas yet to arrive on the scene in Oxford, and with the MississippiGovernor, who has not contributed anything to restoring order at Ole

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962306

94. Dictabelt 4F4, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

Miss since the unfortunate decision to remove the state troopers overfour hours earlier. The President does not know that Governor RossBarnett is indeed preparing to speak to the people of Mississippi aboutthe crisis in Oxford. All that is known in Washington is that the FBI inOxford has just detected a group of 150 state troopers sitting in theircars doing nothing but watching the unfolding tragedy.

The conversation begins with unrelated fragments of phone conversation,perhaps on another line; then the recording of the main conversation begins.Unidentified: He treated a number of other people. I asked him how

many doctors he had, and how many . . .Recording switches to following conversation.Ross Barnett: [Unclear—]President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: —and I, he said that what we were talking about we would-

n’t have any trouble. Do it tonight, you know.President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, our people say that it’s still a very

strange situation. They wouldn’t feel that they could take a chance ontaking him outside that building. Now if we, can we get these fellows? Ihear they got some high-powered rifles up there that have been shootingsporadically. Can we get that stopped? How many people have you gotthere? We hear you only got 50.

Barnett: Well, I have approximately 200 there now, Mr. President.That’s not that . . .

President Kennedy: You got 200?Barnett: Sir, about 200.President Kennedy: Well, now let me get in touch with my people.Barnett: . . . and we don’t have but 210 or [2]12, patrolmen, you see.President Kennedy: I see. Well, now, let me get my people back again.Barnett: I’m doing everything in the world I can.President Kennedy: That’s right. Well, we’ve got to get this situation

under control. That’s much more important than anything else.Barnett: Yes. Well, that’s right.President Kennedy: Now, let me talk to my people, and let me find

out what the situation is there.Barnett: Yes.President Kennedy: They called me a few minutes ago and said they

had some high-powered rifles there. So we don’t want to start moving . . .Barnett: Mr. President . . .President Kennedy: . . . anybody around.Barnett: . . . people are wiring me and calling me saying, “Well,

Conversat ion with Ross Barnet t 307

you’ve given up.” I said, I had to say, “No, I’m not giving up, not givingup any fight.”95

President Kennedy: Yeah, but we don’t want to . . .Barnett: “I never give up. I, I have courage and faith, and, we’ll win

this fight.” You understand. That’s just to Mississippi people.President Kennedy: I understand. But I don’t think anybody, either

in Mississippi or anyplace else, wants a lot of people killed.Barnett: Oh, no. No. I . . .President Kennedy: And that’s what, Governor, that’s the most

important thing. We want . . .Barnett: . . . I’ll issue any statement, any time about peace and vio-

lence.President Kennedy: Well, now here’s what we could do. Let’s get the

maximum number of your state police to get that situation so we don’thave sporadic firing. I will then be in touch with my people and then youand I’ll be talking again in a few minutes; see what we got there then.

Barnett: All right.President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.Barnett: All right now.President Kennedy: I’ll be back.President Kennedy hangs up.

1:50 A.M.

[C]an you get them so that we stop this rifle shooting?

Continuation of Conversation with Ross Barnett96

Kennedy again emphasizes to Barnett the importance of restoring order,while Barnett assures the President that he is doing everything possibleto gain control of the situation.

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962308

95. Throughout the evening, the Governor was deluged with calls and telegrams urging himnot to “sell out” to the Kennedys. In response to such talk, Barnett went on the air shortlybefore midnight (local time), and declared, “I call on Mississippians to keep the faith andcourage. We will never surrender.”96. Dictabelt 4F5, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

President Kennedy: Hello.Unidentified: Just one moment, sir.Unidentified: There you are, sir. There’s the President.President Kennedy: Hello. Hello.Ross Barnett: Mr. President?President Kennedy: Yes, Governor.Barnett: I just talked with Colonel Birdsong . . . 97

President Kennedy: Right.Barnett: . . . who is our director of the highway patrol . . .President Kennedy: That’s right.Barnett: . . . and he assures me that he has approximately 150 men

there now.98

President Kennedy: Now, we got a report that they’re all in theircars two or three blocks away.

Barnett: I told ’em, just like you asked me, to get moving.President Kennedy: I see. Now, can you get them so that we stop this

rifle shooting? That’s what we got to stop.Barnett: Well, he says he’s doing all that he can. He says they’re

strangers in there.President Kennedy: I know it, well that’s what we hear.Barnett: And he’s calling for 50 more, and that’ll put it up around

200.President Kennedy: Can they get those students to go to bed?Barnett: Well, he says he’s trying to, and I don’t think it’ll be long

before he can get them all to bed.President Kennedy: OK. Will you stay at . . .Barnett: Maybe not, I can’t tell.President Kennedy: Well, let’s stay right at it. We ought to be, that’s

what we got to do before we can do anything.Barnett: . . . he’s reporting constantly to a gentleman who has con-

trol of the activities of the troops there.President Kennedy: Yeah.Barnett: And he understands that he’s doing all he can.President Kennedy: Well, I think that it’s very important, Governor,

aside from this issue; we don’t want a lot of people killed just because they,particularly, evidently two or three guardsmen have been shot. And, ofcourse, our marshals and then that state trooper, so we don’t want . . .

Continuat ion of Conversat ion with Ross Barnet t 309

97. T. B. Birdsong was head of the Mississippi Highway Patrol.98. This is presumably the 150 men seen sitting in their cars near campus.

2:00 A.M.

When will they be there?

Conversation between Robert Kennedy and Creighton Abrams99

Task Force Alpha finally arrived at the Oxford Airport at 1:50 A.M., afterthe cloud of tear gas over Ole Miss had prevented a daring landing at thecampus. The President and his brother feared new delays. It had takenCaptain Murry Falkner’s National Guard Unit well over an hour tomove the few miles from downtown Oxford to the Lyceum. With the air-port even farther away from the campus, the White House wondered howthe U.S. Army could accelerate the deployment of its 200-man advancecontingent.

The tape begins with General Creighton Abrams’s trying to explainthe Army’s plan to move the men. Abrams is monitoring the situationfrom the Millington Naval Air Station, outside Memphis, Tennessee.

Creighton Abrams: Mr. Geoghegan reports to me that there are morethan enough trucks at the strip, with 180 men in the helicopters. 100

Robert Kennedy: You got 180 men? Where are the rest of them?Abrams: Moving on the road.Robert Kennedy: When will they be there?Abrams: Uh, about two hours and three-quarters. That would be

quarter of three in the morning our time.Robert Kennedy: Quarter of five our time? How many of them are

there?Unidentified: [off the phone in the room] Quarter of five.Robert Kennedy: How many of them are there?Abrams: The 500.Robert Kennedy: And when do the rest of . . .

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962310

99. Dictabelts 4F7 and 4G1, Cassettes A and B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s OfficeFiles, Presidential Recordings Collection.100. Geoghegan and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department War Room have maintained theonly continuous contact to the U.S. Army during this crisis. The U.S. Army evidently relies onthe Justice Department War Room for information about the battle conditions in Oxford.After this crisis, the Army would be criticized for not having done any preliminary reconnais-sance in Oxford.

Abrams: Behind that’s another battalion, marching right behindthem, of 680.

Robert Kennedy: They’re MPs?Abrams: MPs.Robert Kennedy: What was the delay in getting them out of

Memphis?Abrams: They . . . I don’t know the details of it, Mr. Kennedy. They . . .

this is the best response they could make, apparently, under the circum-stances.

Robert Kennedy: Well, who’s in charge of that?Abrams: Each of those battalions has a battalion commander, and both

battalions are under the command of General [Charles] Billingslea. Theyhad a meeting over here this afternoon, which I did not attend. But theyhad a meeting in which they discussed all these plans.

Robert Kennedy: Well, didn’t they say they could get off and downthere within an hour?

Abrams: Yes, they expected a much more rapid response than hasoccurred. I know General Billingslea did.

Robert Kennedy: What happened then?Abrams: I don’t know.Robert Kennedy: Is somebody going to find out?Abrams: Yes, sir.Robert Kennedy: [Sighs.] What about the battle group?Abrams: We have gotten ahold of the battle group and have diverted

them. We got ahold of them at [unclear].Robert Kennedy: When will they be down there?Abrams: . . . Tennessee. I don’t have a new estimate on that, sir.

We’ve, it’s only been within the last 15 or 20 minutes that we got aholdof them, and it hasn’t been recast. But I can get it very shortly.

Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Will you call me back at the White House?Unidentified: [Unclear.]101

Abrams: I will.Robert Kennedy: OK. Thank you.Abrams: Yes, sir.Robert Kennedy hangs up.

Conversation between Robert Kennedy and Creighton Abrams 311

101. This conversation continues on Dictabelt 4G.

4:20 A.M.

General, you ought to consider what kind of communicationyou’re going to set up at that airport because you’re going tohave people flying in there.

Conversation with Creighton Abrams102

Five and one half hours after President Kennedy ordered U.S. troops tothe campus at the University of Mississippi, Task Force Alpha reached theriot zone. President Kennedy is frustrated by the delays and misinforma-tion swirling about this entire operation. Once he knows that the troopshave arrived, he decides to make a point of stressing the need for bettercoordination and implementation once daylight returns to Oxford.

Evelyn Lincoln: Hello.Unidentified: General Abrams calling the President from Millington,

Tennessee.103

Lincoln: [off the phone to President Kennedy] General Abrams is onthe line at the other end.

President Kennedy: Hello. Hello?Unidentified: Here you are, sir?Creighton Abrams: General Abrams.President Kennedy: Yes, General.Abrams: I have a report from General [Charles] Billingslea.President Kennedy: That’s right. Now, the Attorney General has

him on the other phone.[off the phone to Robert Kennedy] Is that General Billingslea you got?[back to Abrams] We got him on the other phone. So we’ll be talk . . .Abrams: The MP company arrived on the campus at 2:15 local time.President Kennedy: Right. OK, now, General, what about the rest of . . .

When are these other MPs going to get there? Do you know?Abrams: The 503rd MPs should arrive at approximately zero four-

thirty.President Kennedy: That’s local time there?

S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30–M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962312

102. Dictabelt 4G2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.103. Location of Memphis Naval Air Station.

Abrams: Local time.President Kennedy: That’s, in other words, that’s two hours?Abrams: Local time here.President Kennedy: That’s the group that set out by truck, is it?Abrams: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: So, your addition—Abrams: They’re followed by another MP battalion that should arrive

at five. There, there’s just the length of the battalion between them.President Kennedy: In other words, but the next MP group to arrive

won’t be for two hours. Is that correct?Abrams: That’s correct, sir.President Kennedy: Then after that there’ll be some more in a half

hour. Then what about that battle group?Abrams: They, they . . . Just a moment, sir.[off the phone to someone in the room] The battle group is [unclear].[back to President Kennedy] Six o’clock, sir.President Kennedy: What? Six o’clock.Abrams: Six o’clock.President Kennedy: Well, now, General, you ought to consider what

kind of communication you’re going to set up at that airport becauseyou’re going to have people flying in there. Seems to me you ought tohave very good communications with that airport as well as the campus.

Abrams: Yes.President Kennedy: With General . . . In other words, General

Billingslea ought to have a communication with the airport. You oughtto have a communication with the airport and Billingslea because we’regoing to have people flying in there all day tomorrow.

Abrams: Yes.President Kennedy: And then, of course, we got the problem of

transportation and all the rest. So these are all matters that you’ll bedealing with. But I think communication is very important.

Abrams: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: OK. Fine, General. Thank you.President Kennedy hangs up.

The arrival of U.S. troops calmed the situation immediately on campus.The student mob dispersed and an uneasy peace took hold. The changein the situation in Oxford gave the President an opportunity to get somesleep. The Attorney General and Burke Marshall went to the JusticeDepartment, and Kennedy retired to the Mansion for a nap.

Conversation with Creighton Abrams 313

Monday, October 1, 1962

The President managed to get about three hours’ sleep after the previ-ous night’s vigil. Still in the family quarters, he called Governor RossBarnett to press for some local assistance in keeping order. Concernedthat a large number of outsiders would be in the area, the Presidentbelieved that local officials would be especially useful in helping to keepthe peace.

8:46 A.M.

And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, butat least it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to dotoday.

Conversation with Ross Barnett1

Begins in midconversation.Ross Barnett: . . . let the public know we’ve talked so many times,

don’t you think?President Kennedy: That’s correct. Now here’s what I’m going to . . .Barnett: Now, I can tell you . . . I think you said it mighty well last

night, that “tried to reach the conclusion and couldn’t,” or words to thateffect.

President Kennedy: Now, I was very . . . As you know in my speech, Ididn’t even mention [unclear] . . .

Barnett: “[Unclear] fail,” I believe you said.2

President Kennedy: That’s right, you know, and I didn’t go into . . .Barnett: You made a wonderful statement there.

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962314

1. Dictabelt 4G3, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.2. The text of Kennedy’s 30 September 1962 radio and television speech on the situation atthe University of Mississippi can be found in the Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy,1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 726–28.

Conversat ion with Ross Barnet t 315

President Kennedy: Well, now, the thing is, Governor, I want yourhelp in getting these state police to continue to help during the daybecause they’re their own people. And we are going to have a lot ofstrange troops in there, and we are going to have paratroopers in and allthe rest. And I think the state police should be the key, and that dependson you.

Barnett: Oh, I . . . You’ll have, you’ll have the whole force that wehave.

President Kennedy: Well, now, you tell them . . .Barnett: The [unclear] men are not equipped like yours.President Kennedy: I understand that. But during the daytime they

can help keep order on these roads and keep a lot of people from comingin. And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, but atleast it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to do today.

Barnett: All right, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.Barnett: I’ll stay here now.President Kennedy: Thank you very much.Barnett: Thank you so much.President Kennedy: And keep after your state police now.Barnett: I will.President Kennedy: Thanks.Barnett: I’ll call him as soon as we hang up . . .President Kennedy: Thanks.Barnett: . . . n’ tell him to do all he can to keep peace.President Kennedy: OK, thanks, Governor.Barnett: And when’ll I hear from you again?President Kennedy: I’ll be talking to you about noon, my time.Barnett: OK. Thank you so much. Good-bye.President Kennedy: OK, Governor.President Kennedy hangs up.

Still upstairs at the White House, the President called the solicitor gen-eral, Archibald Cox, to discuss some legal issues raised by the Oxfordriot. In particular, the President was considering seeking the arrest ofGovernor Barnett and Major General Edwin Walker. The President wasdue to see Cox at the Supreme Court in less than a half hour at theswearing in of Arthur Goldberg as associate justice. He was giving theSolicitor General some warning as to what was on his mind.

9:31 A.M.

I wonder if we can get more precise information on where weare legally on arresting people, including the Governor if nec-essary and others?

Conversation with Archibald Cox3

Phone rings.Evelyn Lincoln: Hello.Unidentified: I have Mr. Archibald Cox, the solicitor general, return-

ing the President’s call.Lincoln: OK.President Kennedy: Hello.Archibald Cox: Good morning, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Good morning, I’m just on my way up there.4

Now, the only question I had was whether there are any additionalproclamations or powers, et cetera, that we might need in the Mississippimatter if it gets worse, for arresting people, and under what charge andwhat legal penalties they face, and so on. For example, we want to arrestGeneral Walker, and I don’t know whether we just arrest him under dis-turbing the peace or whether we arrest him for more than that. 5 I won-der if . . . How long are you going to be at the court this morning?

Cox: Not beyond half past ten.

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962316

3. Dictabelt 4G4, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.4. The President was on his way to the Supreme Court to attend the swearing in of Arthur J.Goldberg as associate justice.5. Major General Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, retired, was on the scene in Oxford and waspresent in the crowd on the night of the riot. On 1 October, he was arrested on four charges,including insurrection, and was held in lieu of $100,000 bail. After his arrest, Walker asserted,“They don’t have a thing on me.” He also issued a statement to Governor Ross Barnett, claim-ing his (Walker’s) efforts had been undertaken on behalf of the “stand for freedom everywhere.”While Walker apparently played more of an observer’s role in the melee, prior to the riot, hehad issued a call from his home in Dallas, urging “patriotic” Americans to join him inMississippi to oppose the federal government and the integration of the campus. Worth notingis that in 1957, Walker had commanded federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas, in a celebratedevent in the history of the civil rights movement; in 1962, he observed, he would be on theright side. After resigning from the Army in 1961, Walker had devoted himself to public affairs;his activities often centered on the claim that Communists had infiltrated the U.S. Governmentand the country generally. On 6 October, Walker was released on $50,000 bail, and returned toTexas the next day, where he was greeted by some 200 supporters. He was never tried.

President Kennedy: Yeah, well then I wonder if we can get more pre-cise information on where we are legally on arresting people, includingthe governor if necessary and others?6

Cox: Right.President Kennedy: And what the penalties are because we might

want to announce that on the radio and television that anyone involvedin any demonstration or anything would be subject to this penalty, andmaybe the General could announce it.7

Cox: Right. Good-bye.President Kennedy: All right. OK. Thank you.Cox: Thank you.

After returning from the Supreme Court, the President met with DavidBell and Elmer Staats on the federal budget. At 11:30 A.M., the Presidentwould be presenting the Distinguished Service Medal to General LymanLemnitzer, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CyrusVance, the secretary of the Army, was expected to be in attendance.Before Vance came to the White House, Kennedy wanted to be sure thatthe U.S. Army contingent in Mississippi was going to be large enoughfor any contingency.

11:12 A.M.

Now how are we doing on our schedule?

Conversation with Cyrus Vance and Robert McNamara8

President Kennedy: Hello.Cyrus Vance: Yes, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Oh, yeah, I understood they’re having some riot-

Conversation with Cyrus Vance and Robert McNamara 317

6. Barnett was never arrested because the Kennedy administration believed the potential costsoutweighed any possible gains that might accrue from his arrest and prosecution. Accordingto a January 1963 White House memorandum [see Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice (pbk.ed.; New York: Atheneum, 1977, pp. 237–38], there was little point in arresting and tryingthe governor, which would have made him a “hero.”7. Attorney General Robert Kennedy.8. Dictabelt H, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

ing downtown, and so on, and throwing rocks, and so on, at the troops.Now how are we doing on our schedule?

Vance: Our schedule is still proceeding as I gave it to you [seems to besound of hanging up a telephone], sir.

President Kennedy: Yeah, well, you don’t know . . . Has anybodyarrived this morning?

Vance: [speaking off the telephone to someone in the room] Has anybodyarrived this morning from those 1,700?

[speaking to President Kennedy] Not yet, due in earliest at, what [speak-ing off the phone to someone in the room], ten o’clock their time is it? Let’ssee, what’s their time?

President Kennedy: Midnight. That’d be midday.Vance: 11:20.President Kennedy: 11:20 their time?Vance: Yep.President Kennedy: That’s 1:20 our time, isn’t it?Vance: Yes.President Kennedy: Now that is what, 1,700 more?Vance: Yeah. That’s, let’s see, that first increment is 900. Yeah.President Kennedy: And they’re due in at 1:20? What group is that?Vance: 1:20. Yeah, 1:20 our time.President Kennedy: What group is . . . ?Vance: That is the 82nd Airborne.President Kennedy: Right. I see. OK. Fine. All right. Are you going

to come over to this ceremony . . . ?9

Vance: No, I thought I’d better stay here, sir.President Kennedy: I see. Well, now I talked to Secretary McNamara;

he said something about you might be able to have 20,000 troops by mid-night. Is . . . ?

Vance: That’s right. We are taking steps to get them in. The ordershave been given. The only limiting factor may be the weather, which isclosing in. But we’re developing alternates so that we can get them insome way or other.

President Kennedy: I see. You mean you might send them to Memphisand then what?

Vance: If we can’t get into Memphis, we’ll try Columbus. Now thismay add a little bit of time in getting them back, so we may not be able

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 1, 1962318

9. The Distinguished Service Medal was presented to General Lyman Lemnitzer in the WhiteHouse Rose Garden on 1 October 1962.

to finally make it by twelve, but we’ll do everything we can to get themin as soon as possible.

President Kennedy: I see. OK. Fine.Vance: Just a second; Bob [McNamara] is here.Robert McNamara: Hello, Bobby.President Kennedy: Yes. Oh, this is . . . No, this is the President.McNamara: [Unclear], oh, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Yeah.McNamara: I think that with the priority the Air Force is giving this

and we’re diverting all our MATS aircraft and our troop carrier aircraft,we can get them there by midnight.10

President Kennedy: Right. I see. You coming over for this . . . ?McNamara: No, sir. I just gave my citation to Ros and he will read it.

I thought I’d stay here . . .President Kennedy: I see. OK.McNamara: . . . and follow this.President Kennedy: Righto. Fine. Thank you.McNamara: Thank you.President Kennedy hangs up.

By late in the day, a force of nearly 5,000 National Guardsmen and sol-diers were in Oxford, Mississippi. As of the next morning, 8,735 troopswould have reached the town.

After the ceremony for General Lemnitzer, the same group wit-nessed the swearing in of Maxwell Taylor as Lemnitzer’s replacement.The President then went for a swim and his lunch. In the afternoon, hehad an unrecorded conversation with George Ball, Ralph Dungan, andCarl Kaysen. This brought the President’s official day to an end.

Tuesday, October 2, 1962

The legislative tide was turning in the administration’s favor. In July ithad seemed President Kennedy would achieve very little of his domesticagenda due to congressional obstruction. But in two months, what was

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962 319

10. The acronym MATS stands for Military Air Transport Service.

once called the “Won’t Do” Congress had been somewhat transformed.On Monday the Senate had passed a version of the Foreign Aid Bill thatrestored 70 percent of the cuts made by the House. And this morningthe President was able to sign one more bill that had seemed in troubleearlier in the summer. At a 9:30 A.M. ceremony he signed the U.N. BondAct, which authorized a substantial U.S. loan to the international organi-zation. This was encouraging too, in light of Kennedy’s concerns in lateAugust that events in the Congo would derail its passage.

Kennedy was taping very little at this point. Following a meeting withformer U.S. ambassador to France James Gavin, the President received aconfidential briefing from military aide Major General Chester V. Clifton.It is possible the President received the results of the September 29 in-and-out U-2 flight over Guantánamo and the western tip of Cuba. Thismission brought evidence of new SAM sites but no surface-to-surface mis-sile installations. Cuba was certainly the subject of a meeting at 11:12 A.M.with George Ball and Carl Kaysen. Ball presented the President with aseries of alternatives for dealing with non–Soviet bloc ships trading withCuba. As a result of this meeting, the President chose “to close all UnitedStates ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage was used or isbeing used in Bloc-Cuba trade.”1

Cuba was also the focus of a luncheon given by Kennedy for the for-eign ministers of 19 Latin American countries. There he pressed for ajoint hemispheric approach to the increasing Soviet presence in Cuba.

The one meeting Kennedy taped was a discussion of the 1963 budgetin light of its implications for future tax policy. Current budget estimatesexceeded the political threshold of $100 billion, a first for the federalbudget, with a $6 billion deficit. Would a budget that size kill any possi-bility of tax cuts in 1963? Already Kennedy had to consider the possiblepolitical consequences in 1964 of this level of deficit spending.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962320

1. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy, 2 October 1962,FRUS, 11: 3–4. Carl Kaysen noted the President’s reaction to this memorandum in NationalSecurity Action Memorandum No. 194, 2 October 1962, ibid., pp. 4–5.

4:20 –5:20 P.M.

So, if we go ahead with the idea of a substantial tax cut, wedon’t believe in these people who say that they have to cutexpenditures equivalently. But we do believe that you have toput on a performance that looks like you’re being careful withthe expenditures.

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal2

As the 87th Congress struggled to finish its business—adjourning onOctober 13, 1962—and with the 1962 midterm elections fast approaching,President Kennedy hoped to settle on a budget policy that would enhancethe prospects for his party in the midterm election, the passage of pendingtax cut legislation to be introduced in 1963, and his own reelection effort in1964. He would make clear in the following discussion that the kind of pol-icy he desired—a deficit now, produced largely with a tax cut and increasedor accelerated public works expenditures—would be exceedingly difficultto sell to either Wilbur Mills or Harry Byrd, respective chairs of the Houseand Senate committees on which the fate of his tax cut proposal ultimatelyrested. Rehearsing the economics of gap-closing and full employment,Kennedy and his advisers would discuss both the budget as a whole andspecific questions related to individual budget items.3 Should the officialbudget be changed to reflect trust fund transactions? Would SenateFinance Committee chairman Harry Byrd swallow any budget over thepotentially shocking $100 billion mark and still endorse the administra-tion’s tax cut proposal?4 Could committee chairman Wilbur Mills deliver a

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 321

2. Including President Kennedy, Gardner Ackley, David E. Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, WalterHeller, Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer B. Staats. Tape 27.1, John F. KennedyLibrary, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.3. When Ted Sorensen wondered aloud why raising the employment “score” from 93 to 96 per-cent, from A-minus to A, deserved such high political priority, Kennedy’s Council of EconomicAdvisers (and staff economist Arthur Okun in particular) undertook to outline and documentthe changes in general economic conditions that resulted from small changes in unemploymentrates. What came to be called Okun’s law suggested that 3 extra percentage points in unemploy-ment implied a 10 percent gap between actual and potential GNP. This gap was estimated to beapproximately $51 billion at the time of Kennedy’s inauguration and had closed to approxi-mately $30 billion at the beginning of 1962.4. Indeed, when Lyndon Johnson finally convinced Byrd to pass the 1964 Tax Cut bill out of theSenate Finance Committee in January 1964, a budget introduced then under $100 billionassured the success of President Johnson’s lobbying efforts. “Harry,” Johnson announced after

tax cut from the House Ways and Means Committee with sufficient alacrityto lift the economy before it fell too far behind its full-employment poten-tial? Would a recession be required to force Mill’s hand, or could theadministration convince him and others that to wait for a recession wouldmean failing to exploit the potential of an economy that was growing butgrowing all too sluggishly?

Because the performance of the U.S. economy had most recently fallenshort of administration projections—a $555 billion GNP at midyear,when the Council of Economic Advisors had forecast $570 billion—theadministration’s full-employment goal, established conservatively at 4percent, was no longer a realistic target for 1963 but had to be pushedback to the middle of the presidential election year of 1964.5 Slippage inthe employment target was a symptom of a larger problem for thePresident and his economic team. Leading economic indicators wereoffering only an indistinct picture of current economic trends; the signif-icant durable goods orders category, for example, had reversed its direc-tion every month from May to August. Kennedy needed to know wherethe economy was heading to make a firm decision on tax cuts.

Somehow the White House had to reconcile a certain reluctance toact, in the face of opposition from Congress and much of the U.S. busi-ness community, with a growing unease at inaction, produced by anuncertain, perhaps teetering, domestic economy. To find a good eco-nomic policy when the best was beyond the political pale, as Kennedyadviser Walter Heller once put it, was the task at hand as the Presidentconvened the following meeting.

Begins in midconversation.Elmer Staats: . . . well, we’ve thought of that, Mr. President, just to

inject . . . one note of optimism is that I think it is very likely that youwill not have a deficit on the income . . . the national income basis which,as you know—and nobody else seems to know [unclear] the question—

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962322

presenting the official budget for fiscal year 1965, “I’ve got the damn thing under $100 billion . . .way under. It’s only $97.9 billion. Now you can tell your friends that you forced the President ofthe United States to reduce the budget before you let him have his tax cut” [quoted in RichardGoodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 262].5. The 1963 target was introduced in Kennedy’s first Economic Report to Congress deliveredon 22 January 1962 [see “Message to the Congress Presenting the President’s FirstEconomic Report. 22 January 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 45].

that the amount of the deficit will be less than the amount of the cut . . .the net reduction in taxes.6 So that you could say that tax reduction isreally what’s causing the deficit. You need that for full-range growthbecause . . .

President Kennedy: That is what sustains the argument that thedeficit is necessary to counteract [unclear], but you’d have a tough timejustifying this tax cut because they’ll say we should reduce expenditures.As much as you have intended to reduce the taxes, we’re going to have tomake the argument that the deficit is desired.

Douglas Dillon: Yeah, well, also you have the other argument thattax reduction is desirable to take the brakes off growth and providesincentives and that to make reductions equivalent to that would meanthat you’d have to cut your defense budget and things like that. And,obviously, either way it’s the—

President Kennedy: Well, I don’t, I don’t mind taking on that argu-ment so much. I’m not as—

Dillon: Although I find the second one, that’ll pitch everything on theeconomic angle, that people don’t understand, although I think it’s . . .will have to be made politically.

Theodore Sorensen: That’s really my point also, Doug. In otherwords, we can say that, at least on the income . . . national income basis,we could give you a balanced budget if we’re not thinking a tax cut, butwe think the tax cut is needed.

David Bell: Well, you can’t, economically, sustain precisely that point . . .if I recall the figures correctly. Because without the tax cut, the economywould not be pushing high enough so that that would be true, you see.7

Sorensen: Because of the feedback on taxes?Bell: Exactly—because of taxes. But, the point, I think, is—President Kennedy: Well, the problem is . . . is ’64.Dillon: Another thing that complicates that, Mr. President, is this idea

of what we said we’d do is to make a retroactive tax cut. And, the effect ofthat really is that, for most of these assumptions, are that you won’t be ableto get any of that retroactivity in operation except by refunds which takeplace in ’64. So in ’64 you have a double deduction: you have the deduction

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 323

6. The national income basis is a method of budgetary accounting, unlike the standard federalprocedure known as the administrative budget, that includes trust fund receipts and expendi-tures (Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, etc.), omits gov-ernment transactions in financial assets (e.g., federal loans), and records liabilities when theyare incurred (accrual basis) and not when cash changes hands.7. To produce enough revenue to achieve balance.

on the income side, not only from tax-rate reduction but also from therefunds for ’63, which are claimed backwards. So it’s—I’ve forgotten whatthe figure is—about a 3 or 4 billion dollar deficit.

Bell: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Deficit?Bell: Yeah. But . . . the assumption is made here that the figures you

see there is about 2 billion dollars. The deficit in ’60—fiscal ’64, whichrepresents refunds—

Charles Schultze: If—Bell: —to people who paid—Schultze: If you—Bell: —their taxes in ’63.Schultze: If you look on page 7, and look at that fiscal ’64 figure of a

13 billion dollar deficit, if the reductions were not retroactive, that figurewould be 9.6 billion.

Bell: Yes, you’re right. And—Schultze: And even if the . . . if the corporate rates were retroactive,

but we coupled that with the Mills plan, but the personal rates were notretroactive, it would still be 9.6—8

Bell: You’d get—Schultze: You get below your 10 billion figure. This means that a

great deal of the . . . we put this into the picture, if we did that, went backto where we left off and we left out the commitment, just on the personalincome tax, your 981/2 billion figure would be less than a 100 billion; itwould be a substantially less increase than in previous years; you couldprobably cut your deficit below 10 billion to this 9.6; and you could citethe fact that the tax cut is equal to about three fourths of the deficit.That is, that the tax cut of 7 billion that this is based on is equal to three-fourths of the deficit. Now, the argument against that is that the lack ofretroactivity would not permit your return to full employment, butwould bring it down to about 41/2 percent rather than 4 percent in ’64.

Bell: The retroactivity part of it that you really have to be asked tomake a decision on, very obviously, is a tricky one, because the time youneed the economic boost from a tax cut would probably be next spring,

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962324

8. Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, had suggested in ear-lier meetings with the President and other administration officials that the Internal RevenueService could reduce withholding rates, alone or in conjunction with a tax cut, to jump-startthe economy.

and that’s not the most likely time to get the tax bill enacted. So, this isgoing to be a difficult legislative problem.

President Kennedy: Unless you have to divide it, I don’t know. Wecould look for that.

Dillon: Even if you do that, if, you see, if it passes very quickly, you . . .there’s no particular feeling that, say if it even became law some time inMay, then you probably couldn’t get the refund checks out in time. On theother hand, in ’63 . . .

President Kennedy: There’s nothing we can do about the deficit,then, with respect to recession in the winter or spring, is there? As far asa tax cut?

Walter Heller: But, do you really think that’s a . . . that’s an inescapablecon[clusion] . . . legislative judgment, given the fact that there had been acouple of cases where Congress has whistled through a tax cut?

Dillon: Oh, if we could get a tax cut through in March, we could get,oh . . . we could get, definitely, some of the refunds out in time, but notall of them.

President Kennedy: Well, John Gerrity called, said in about thirtyminutes Kaiser Steel’s going to take the price on it and cut it. 9 Twelvedollars a ton across the board?10

Unidentified: Fools! [A whistle.]Unidentified: A cut!Unidentified: A cut!President Kennedy: Twelve dollars a ton?Unidentified: Gee! [Unclear exchange. Laughter.]Staats: Well, I would . . . Let’s see, It would be . . .Unidentified: Eight percent . . .Staats: One hundred and four dollars . . .

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 325

9. John Gerrity was the Washington bureau reporter for the New York–based Daily BondBuyer. See Walter Heller’s later comments in the transcript.10. Later that day, Kaiser Steel Company announced cuts on products from its Fontana,California, mill. It changed its price for plates and structural shapes to $108 a ton from $122a ton; for hot-rolled steel to $104 a ton from $116.50 a ton (compared to the $106 a toncharged by eastern mills); and for cold-rolled steel to $143 a ton from $148 a ton. The pricecut on which Kennedy and his advisers are commenting here is the price cut for Kaiser’s hot-rolled steel. Chairman Edgar Kaiser noted later that day that the cuts were made to endregional differences, to make the West more competitive domestically, and to “materiallyassist in combating foreign steel imports to the West coast.” Immediately after the Kaisercuts, U.S. Steel’s Geneva Steel division in Torrance, California, and Pittsburg, California,announced comparable cuts.

Unidentified: Twelve dollars . . .Staats: I mean 140 dollars, which is about—Unidentified: Eight percent.Bell: Eight percent. Yeah.Heller: This fellow Gerrity’s very close to the steel industry. . . .President Kennedy: Who is it?Heller: And there’s a good chance that that’s right. He’s a reporter

now for the Bond Buyer. He used to be up on the Hill. That’s one IrishCatholic—

President Kennedy: What’s the effect going to be of that? On theeconomy?

Sorensen: It ought to be good.President Kennedy: Good?Bell: It’ll stimulate buying of steel. . . .President Kennedy: How would it?Bell: On the other hand, it may be regarded as a symptom of a—President Kennedy: Recession?Bell: —of a recession.Heller: Yes, I think the first reaction will be—Unidentified: Stockholders will—Heller: —the stock market will say—Unidentified: [Unclear.]Heller: —now the squeeze is going to get tighter.Schultze: This may be what this stuff ’s all about, anticipating this.

[Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]Gardner Ackley: That lowers their profit position, too.Schultze: Well, that’ll be the principal thing, I think, the impact on

profit.Heller: Of course, steel users will not be entirely unhappy about this.President Kennedy: That’s Roger’s. Roger Blough’s six-dollar

increase . . .11

Heller: This is a retroactive—

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962326

11. The President is referring here to the $6 a ton across-the-board increase implemented byRoger Blough and U.S. Steel back on 10 April 1962, followed by increases by five other steelcompanies the next day, and rescinded by all when the President objected publicly, said that hehad been double-crossed, and began deploying his government contract, antitrust, and tax lawleverage to force the rescission.

President Kennedy: Roger Blough is obviously . . . is just saying that—Heller: —justification for the President’s action.12

Bell: Not long—President Kennedy: Well, he could say, “No, it isn’t a justification,”

that if he ignored it, they would have to bring it down anyway.Unidentified: No, I think it’s better than my calling Roger.President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Ackley: What Walter’s saying is that this is not [unclear] this enter-

prise system we have, and so are our foreign competitors.Dillon: And so . . .Unidentified: They have [unclear].Schultze: I would lay a small bet that this won’t—Unidentified: [Unclear.]Schultze: —involve one, more than one company.13

President Kennedy: Why?Schultze: Why—Heller: One percent of the industry, Mr. President.Staats: And a maverick 1 percent at that.Heller: Yeah.Dillon: They don’t . . . barely sell the Pacific coast.Schultze: This is a market maneuver, not only on the stock market

but in order to get Kaiser up a notch or two, you see.Heller: Yeah, that’s right. That’s the competitive system.President Kennedy: They’re all just a bunch anyway, you know.Unidentified: [Unclear], that’s right.Bell: Since the outlook for the economy is not clear . . . Heller: Well, now, Dave, before . . . is it, is this an operating assump-

tion that we can’t possibly get a quick, simple kind of tax reduction,across the board, of some kind?

Dillon: When? By March?Bell: I take it that it depends on what the economic situation looks

like.President Kennedy: I think it’s . . . I suppose it’s possible that you

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 327

12. Heller’s implication is that Kennedy’s effort to achieve a rescission of the April 1962 steelprice increases was an effort to force the steel companies to abide by, rather than thumb theirnoses at, market fundamentals. Able to raise prices in the short run due to oligopoly positionsin the U.S. market and lucrative government contracts, the U.S. steel industry’s pricing powerwas fast being undermined by increasing foreign competition.13. As noted above, U.S. Steel’s Geneva division did follow suit.

could always, well, if you had any votes or if you broke even in the con-gressional election maybe you can justify coming back and doing it ifyou really thought it was necessary.14

Ackley: The economic conditions, I think, are obvious enough.Dillon: Well, the vote answer is that’s the new Congress. They wouldn’t

start doing anything until close to the first of February.Schultze: I would say in answer to your question, Walter, my own

judgment would be that if the economy is more or less moving along atthe present tide, no. You’ve got to have something that’s recognizable asa recession.

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Heller: Is there any, anything approaching a commitment from

Wilbur Mills to move fast if—?President Kennedy: Oh, well, you know, it just depends really, on the

situation. I think—15 [Unclear exchange.]Dillon: If you get those hearings, if they both have hearings, you

know, [unclear] but certainly Byrd would on anything like this. 16

President Kennedy: In June and July, is that the one?Unidentified: In fact there [unclear] the hearings [unclear] month.Bell: Well, in view of the fact, the possibility that, or the fact that we

don’t know what the most likely possibility is for the economy at thisstage, we are suggesting that the tax bills, in effect, be worked on overthe next Monday or two . . . which would be appropriate for either con-tingency—if the outlook looks very good going on into ’63, or looks asthough a recession is going to be breathing down our neck. And that ifthese questions of the timing and retroactivity and the nature of the taxreduction and all that, on which the Treasury will be working on, bebrought back to you later this fall.

The presentation here, however, is intended to indicate that whicheverway it goes, you . . . it looks as though it’s kind of political to present adeficit in ’64 of the size and magnitude . . . that we may want to be pre-senting a proposition for economic reasons, which would be . . . make a

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962328

14. The President is returning to the idea of the special session of the lame duck Congress,which he discussed with Wilbur Mills on August 6 (see Volume 1, “Meeting with WilburMills,” 6 August 1962).15. Kennedy had arranged several recent meetings with Mills to discuss this issue (ibid).16. Harry F. Byrd, Sr., was a U.S. senator from Virginia, 1933 to 1965; chairman of the SenateFinance Committee, 1955 to 1965; and founder of the Joint Committee on Reduction ofFederal Expenditures.

pretty, a pretty large deficit indeed. Now, so far as the expenditures areconcerned, we do have a need for some instructions on them at this point.If you look at the thing that says “attachment” there, there’s no reason foryou to be called. And I’ll tell you in just a minute some other politicalfacts. The key point is that, as indicated there on pages 1 and 2, we findbuilt-in changes of about 5 billion dollars, which means—17

President Kennedy: What will those be . . . the major . . . in space, Isuppose?

Bell: Yeah. Space. At the bottom you’ll see a billion and a half of it isdefense, another billion and a half for NASA.18

President Kennedy: Where’s that? Oh, I see . . . both under five bil-lion. Now, is that the pay increase?19

Bell: No, we do not count the pay increase as built-in, Mr. President;we count that as optional. That’s on top of this. This is simply theincreased expenditures associated with the procurement plans and theforce plans that you’ve already approved.

President Kennedy: Three billion of the five billion is defense andspace . . . ?

Bell: Right.President Kennedy: And a half a billion, really a half, is HEW?20

Bell: Right.President Kennedy: Now, you’ve got a billion and a half left. Bell: You’ve got a full table on page 5.President Kennedy: I see.Bell: Now, beyond this, we think there is another billion seven, which

represents sensible carrying forward of your program, and, indeed, itincludes legislative proposals that are not passed this year but whichyou’ve already recommended to the Congress. And that, the nature ofwhich . . . the amounts of those increases are also indicated in the tableon page 5. This is how we get the one being kept forward.

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 329

17. Early versions of this item may be found in the Theodore Sorensen Papers, ClassifiedSubject Files, Budget, 1966, Box 44, and Bureau of the Budget, Box 47.18. National Aeronautical and Space Administration.19. The reference is to the effects of the “Pay Bill” that Kennedy would sign nine days later on11 October 1962 granting pay increases to all federal employees [see “Remarks Upon Signingthe Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents,pp. 756–57].20. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (later the Departments of Education and ofHealth and Human Services).

President Kennedy: Yeah.Bell: And we should warn you that there are a number of the cabinet

officers and agency heads that think these figures are too tight. And thatis also indicated in the table on page 5.

Staats: In other words, that’s [unclear], Mr. President, are in excessof the amounts that we indicated here.

President Kennedy: Because [unclear] . . . what is the billion fivebased on?

Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Bell: It is . . . out of the back . . . very detailed statements that includes

. . . The biggest single item is the 500 million dollar increase in Navy air-craft . . . Navy aircraft expenditures which . . . let’s see, payments on theplanes that are, that are now being ordered or were ordered last year,F4Hs in very large part.21 And another 300 million dollars of shipbuild-ing, increased expenditures for shipbuilding under the shipbuilding pro-gram which has already been embarked on. There, that’s principally thestart-up on Polaris submarines.22 There are other elements which add upto close to a billion and a half as [unclear].

President Kennedy: AEC?23

Bell: Now, we would take the AEC down a little bit. This is stronglyopposed by Seaborg and it implies that both a tight program on weapons—our advice does—and a tight program on civilian power reactors and thatsort of thing.24 The NASA program, if you would draw your attention tothe fact that our figures—the figure we have included in the 100.4 billionwhich is 4 billion dollars of expenditures for NASA—that figure now lookslow, not because they are going to add anything in particular but because,well, they’ve got better cost figures and this figure should be, according tothem—we haven’t fully reviewed this—about 4.7. We think that that’sunnecessarily high, but it clearly is several hundred million dollars too lowunless some change were to be made in the ongoing program.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962330

21. The F4Hs were fighter planes, later renamed F4A, and also known as “Phantoms.”22. Polaris submarines, nuclear-powered submarines capable of submerged firing of Polaris bal-listic missiles, began patrolling the seas in 1960. The third generation of Polaris submarines,typified by the USS Lafayette and the USS Alexander Hamilton and capable of firing the 2,500-mile A3 Polaris missile, were, at the time of this meeting, currently under development.23. The abbreviation AEC stands for Atomic Energy Commission.24. Glenn T. Seaborg was chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961 to 1971.Recipient of the 1951 Nobel Prize in chemistry and discoverer of many of the knowntransuranium elements, including plutonium, Seaborg also worked on the Manhattan Projectduring World War II.

President Kennedy: I don’t like that. I notice aid to impacted schooldistricts and all the rest, built-in increases . . .25

Bell: Yes.President Kennedy: That’s Interior . . . oh, we’re just not going to be

able to do all that, except saline water [unclear] less than that, but someof the rest of that Interior, Justice . . .26

Bell: Beginning on page 15, Mr. President, we have indicated whatthe kind of cutbacks below our figures which would be necessary toreach this alternative target figure of 98.5. Let me get back to that point.

President Kennedy: What’s that on? What page?Bell: On 15.Unidentified: I think it’s to some advantage, though, Dave, to know

how [unclear] will look at the various increased expenditures.Unidentified: Yeah, and lead up to—President Kennedy: What about our putting in a . . . What effect

would it have if we put in the federal budget for the next three years? Asyou know, the Congress, suddenly, they vote for these programs; nobodyrealizes where it’s going to go. We have to take all this. I don’t knowwhether we would gain or lose if we put in some of the next three years’expenditures, and income, and estimates already put in this year.

Bell: Well, they would show . . . and a steadily improving relationshipbetween receipts and expenditures.27 I’m sure they would be sharplyattacked as “pie in the sky,” as just making the situation look good.

They would be perfectly honest figures, but any figures that farahead are necessarily fairly shaky. We would have to—in defendingthem—we would need to not to unveil any news . . . that wouldn’t behard to defend under those carrying forward existing programs.

President Kennedy: What about when the FAA does a supersonicstring of jet transports?28 I see the French and the British have joinedtogether on that. I’m interested in that, because that’s a . . . an areawhere we’ve got to maintain our position. There also is a dollar in it . . .sale of aircraft abroad.

Bell: Well, it’s an item that thus far we do not have in—President Kennedy: Yeah.

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 331

25. Additional federal aid to school districts in areas of prominent federal installations, justi-fied on the basis of diminished property tax base in the affected areas, was $229 million in thefinal education appropriations bill for FY 1963.26. “Saline water” refers to pilot desalinization projects.27. Not, perhaps, what President Kennedy expected to be forecast.28. The abbreviation FAA stands for the Federal Aviation Administration.

Bell: —the 100.4. So that would mean—President Kennedy: I’d like to see if we could get a breakdown of

what he’s going to do with that 100 million, and then the arguments asto why you don’t think they put it in.

Bell: [Volume fades several times during Bell’s comments.] Yes, well, we haveat our request, he has been making these contractors with special studies.That’s not our concern. It’s difficult to separate the figures by the first ofDecember. Bob McNamara, as you may know, Mr. President, has expressedsome skepticism about this supersonic transport, whether we ever get anurgency in terms of the market for it. 29 There’s also the question of why wedon’t do this with the British and the French. Why do we insist on beingcompetitive? It’s going to cost us a hell of a lot of money to develop it, andit’s going to cost them a hell of a lot of money to develop it; maybe we oughtto do it together. How much of a revolutionary notion that would be—

Staats: Doesn’t he have a feeling it’s more of a prestige item—?Bell: Yes.Staats: —than it would be commercially profitable in that program,

for a long, long time?Bell: This is a very high [unclear] for this fall’s budget consideration.

Do you want a special memorandum early in this—?President Kennedy: Well, I don’t mean to put it in there, but I, any-

way . . . I was just sort of interested in itself . . . Whatever the propertime would be.

Bell: Well, in any event, it’s not in our . . . [sound fades and returns] . . .at this point, Mr. President.

Ten-second pause.President Kennedy: Cancel the Skybolt?30 Well, you can’t do that;

there’s a commitment with the British, I think.31 Can’t cancel Skybolt.Mobile Minuteman and [unclear] in all services.32 And a big Fall

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962332

29. Robert S. McNamara was secretary of defense.30. The transport was an air-launched missile system on which Britain had relied to prolong itsmanned-bomber nuclear deterrent. An American commitment to share Skybolt with the Britishhad been initiated in the Eisenhower administration, most likely at Camp David in March 1960.Early in November 1962, according to Richard Neustadt’s “Top Secret” report to the President on“Skybolt and Nassau,” “the Secretary of Defense put to the President and to the Secretary of Statethe likelihood that we would terminate our Skybolt program” [Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK:The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 27].31. “They can’t cancel Skybolt on us,” one Air Force General told a budget bureau aide in1962. “The British are in with us” (Neustadt, Report to JFK, p. 30).32. The FY 1963 budget proposal included funding for 200 additional Minuteman interconti-nental ballistic missiles (surface-to-surface).

increase in equipment modernization. Proposed pay legislation. Well,he’s going to have . . . they have . . . . Are they due as much as the otherfederal employees?33

Bell: We had thought so, and therefore we had . . . our figures includea pay increase as of January 1 in ’64, one year after this Spring.

President Kennedy: Well, I’m inclined to think we’d have difficultyavoiding increasing their pay.

Staats: You’d have difficulty letting it start earlier than that, and theyhad difficulty, as you may recall, Mr. President, in getting them to post-pone it because—

President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, I think we’ve got to go on that.Bell: Well, these aren’t the only things you could do, but they are

illustrative of the fact that anything you did to try to knock this $100billion figure down is going to run you into budgets like this.

Ten-second pause.Bell: I would think, for instance, that it would be quite difficult to

eliminate all new starts for public works.34

President Kennedy: NASA. We got a pretty good . . . have you got agood budget group that goes with . . . looking at all these NASA expen-ditures?

Bell: Yes, we do. It’s handled by the same people that handle the mili-tary budget: Veatch35 and Shapley,36 and then about four able, youngerguys who have been watching the program the last two or three years. Wehave a pretty good feeling about the work, in so far as the budget side of itis concerned . . . on the NASA program. But it’s a big program; . . . it’sjumping up every day.

President Kennedy: It’s a question of whether we’re doing too manythings [unclear].

Bell: Well, this will be coming to you in about three weeks with a spe-cial study and report on that. But, it does not look to me as though youare going to want to trim it back to the extent it would be necessary to—

Ackley: Does your report read that, Defense and NASA, we’re deal-

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 333

33. Due to the “Pay Bill,” signed into law by President Kennedy nine days later (11 October1962).34. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962, inwhich Bell advises against a policy of “no new starts.”35. Ellis H. Veatch, chief of the Military Division, Bureau of the Budget. Though this divisionwould be renamed on several occasions, Veatch remained its chief until 1974.36. Willis Shapley, deputy to Ellis Veatch and budget analyst for NASA and other science-oriented agencies and programs.

ing with both space, both military and space just thrown together. . . .Can your report [unclear]?

President Kennedy: I’m going to look here for some of the . . .What’s your thought, Mr. Secretary?

Dillon: Well, the basic problem, where we see it, is that it’s probablybased on the extensive experience up until tax time of this year—February, March, and quite a little bit—but we feel that instead it wouldjust be impossible to go up and get a tax reduction if our spending . . .our increase in spending next year is larger than the increase in spend-ing that we’ve had in any year so far. And that’s what the 100.4 is.

But the increase in spending in fiscal ’62 over ’61 was 6.2 billion[unclear], and ’61 over ’60, rather, ’62 over ’61 it was 6 billion. And theproposed increase here is 6.7 billion . . . increase in expenditures. And . . .which is a larger increase than we’ve had before, so we just really, wehave to somehow get that down a respectable amount below the 6.2 and6 billion increases, which were the previous ones, if we’re going to justifya tax reduction.

Now the exact amount below is a difficult thing to judge. We said981/2, which would put the increase at 4.8 compared with, with the 6and 6.2. But the bulk of the real increase is that we think it has to besubstantially below what we think [unclear]. It might be you wouldhold on the debt limit thing which you came mighty close to veto,which could be quite a . . . be very difficult. Of course, we’ll know bet-ter, we’ll be able to measure this better after we see what happens inNovember, but—

President Kennedy: Obviously, if we get . . . set back seriously inNovember, we will—

Dillon: Well, on the debt limit case, we seem to have the Republicanvote.37 Increasingly, they all decide they want to vote against the increase sothat when . . . This is just not responsible, but it is just symptomatic of a—

President Kennedy: Yeah. I’m sure it’s going to—Dillon: So, if we go ahead with the idea of a substantial tax cut, we

don’t believe in these people who say that they have to cut expendituresequivalently.38 But we do believe that you have to put on a performancethat looks like you’re being careful with the expenditures.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962334

37. The administration had already lobbied successfully for a prior debt limit increase inMarch 1962.38. Harry F. Byrd, for example.

Unidentified: I would turn around and [unclear] your spendingincreasing faster than you ever have—

Dillon: [Unclear] certain [unclear]. Well, right across the board for atotal figure of 6.7 increase, which is about 15 percent or 10 percent big-ger than you’ve ever done before.

Bell: Aren’t the . . . but the bulk of the increase under our . . . morethan two-thirds of the increase that we projected here would be in thenational security and international field, and so on. So it could not beattacked on the grounds it was letting loose of the strings on the civilianside. I know that Aikman is not party to the increase with something atWest Point, but I guess he is.

Now, it’s difficult to make an accurate estimate—along the lines Dougis talking about—because we don’t know how firm this 93.7 figure’s goingto be. It’ll be another three or four weeks before we have a really . . . a goodsolid figure for ’63 expenditures, now that the Congress is completingaction. Remember last year when we had our midyear budget review, wesuddenly came up with a billion dollar agricultural expenditure that wehadn’t expected. Now we hope we’ve guarded against any unexpectedfinds this year, but we shouldn’t think of the 93.7 as too precise, as yet.Think of it as being—

President Kennedy: Of course, Ken Galbraith, though, thinks we’re notgoing to get the tax cut at all while we run a deficit. 39 It might be you’d dobetter for the economy if you have the expenditures for those . . . [unclear]and Berlin, that you get them and . . . tax . . . but, however, that’s a view-point we’re just not going to be able to get. 40 Economic education has notproceeded enough to let you . . . to think of the Congress, as tough as this isgoing to be—next one probably—to get that kind of a tax cut through.

Bell: This is about the proper position to take. This is hammered-down-type figure in the program that you’ve—

President Kennedy: Except I will say everybody wants to increase theseexpenditures. I know how desirable all these programs are, but I just . . .

Bell: Remember, sir, that this is . . . the figure they gave us originallywas 108 billion.

Sorensen: More than the [unclear], Mr. President, it seems. What

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 335

39. John Kenneth Galbraith was ambassador to India and a Harvard economist. Galbraith hadargued, quite prominently, that increased expenditures were a preferred alternative to tax cutsif the administration sought a fiscal stimulus.40. Military buildup and added expenditures related to the ongoing Berlin crisis.

the Budget Bureau has done in their [unclear] submissions, and it wor-ries me that some of it we’ve already cut too far to get down to the 100.4.

Bell: The third and fourth columns there.President Kennedy: As far as 1964, the agency—Bell: Yeah.Unidentified: Yeah.Ten-second pause.Sorensen: So that while I’m sympathetic to Doug’s point, I don’t

know where the $2 billion can be cut out.Twenty-second pause.President Kennedy: About this goal in three years. Has that got the . . .

where do you think . . . or are we just suggesting what these expendituresare going to be?

Heller: I like the idea.Sorensen: I don’t think it . . . I’m trying to think of . . . you’d just,

you’d just be taking on that and many more enemies unnecessarily.Bell: Maybe because it would show the expenditures rising.Sorensen: Yes.President Kennedy: Well, It doesn’t rise so much, though, except in

space. So far I’ve gotten space. They got NASA. That’s the big rise.Bell: Well, these figures would have to be revised a lot—President Kennedy: Yeah.Bell: —further than they have been.President Kennedy: That’s right.Bell: My guess is—President Kennedy: I don’t see any enormous—Bell: —if you tightened them up, they would probably look like—President Kennedy: HEW’s the biggest.Bell: —105, 109.President Kennedy: And HEW went from 4.2 in ’62 up to 9.3.Dillon: Well, economic aid—President Kennedy: Well, we’ll have to just cut that back. But, I see

nothing else except for HEW with a really big rise. Treasury interest,but the—

Sorensen: Housing and Home Finance.Bell: It would be comforting to a lot of people to see those NASA fig-

ures, because it would show that they’re going to taper off after anotheryear or more of a rapid rise.41 HEW would be the big issue, that’s right.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962336

41. Figures are in the form of multiyear projections, discussed here.

President Kennedy: What is that increase for?Bell: Well, it’s a—President Kennedy: Population increases?Bell: No, there’s a big increase in education, which is connected with

the bill, the elementary and secondary bills you’ve had up there now.President Kennedy: Well, they’re not going to pass that.42 That’s just

a . . . start off with that realization.Bell: What do you mean? You—President Kennedy: Starting off, we ought to talk about whether

we’re going to go again with that.Bell: Oh, yes, I see what you mean. Well, that’s . . . that’s a . . . well,

that’s at least a billion dollars and maybe more, but the increase thatshows here between ’64 and ’69 . . . Another substantial increase is in thehigher education field. There is some increase in welfare, which is natu-ral. You know, they go up every year—by 2[00], 3[00], or 400 milliondollars. And—

Staats: NIH goes up over a billion dollars. 43

Bell: NIH keeps on rising—I’ve forgotten the precise rate we’veassumed in here, but 2 or 3, say $250 million a year, something like that—increase.44

Dillon: Regularly.Bell: The people who are in favor of health research have their eyes

set on $2 billion by 1970. This would be . . . to take it there this is less ofa rapid rate of increase than they have proposed. I believe those are theprincipal increases in HEW, I don’t—

President Kennedy: HHFA.45 That would be . . . what’s the reason forthat hike?

Bell: Well, that’s mostly built-in. That’s the steady rise in the UrbanRenewal program which was financed a year ago, with the Housing Actof ’61. And it would be showing quite substantial increases in outlays asthe cities get their Urban Renewal projects to the point at which pay-ments made to those cities—

President Kennedy: What about mass transit? Bell: Mass transit’s in here, also. I’ve forgotten the precise figures

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 337

42. These bills, for additional aid to schools, were defeated in the 87th Congress.43. The abbreviation NIH stands for National Institutes of Health.44. The original budget proposal for NIH for FY 1963 was $741 million, an increase of $113million over FY 1962.45. Housing and Home Finance Agency.

that are here. If you want to think seriously about this, Mr. President, wecan very readily put together a memo to show you the kinds of figuresconnected to programs that would be implicit in—

President Kennedy: Well, it would only be if it were not going to bea rapid increase which would look like we’re inundating them. And theonly advantage would be if you’re going to give an impression that thisis [unclear].

Dillon: This is [unclear] increase.Bell: Well, and if it does give that impression . . . I mean it logically

does. Whether it would look that way and be politically vulnerable, I—Heller: Dave, I doubt that it would look that way, and I’m not sure

that we want them all saying that it’s—[Unclear exchange.]Dillon: —things way ahead of us and not too [unclear].Unidentified: Umm . . .Unidentified: That’s true.Dillon: That’s very ostentatious.Bell: Well, it’s up in the air with 3 more billion dollars than we said

we’d [unclear].Heller: Well, not only that, when you’ve got the economy going full

tilt, you’d probably want to hold back some programs.Bell: That wouldn’t be so hard.Unidentified: Yeah.Unidentified: On the other hand, you might take some [unclear].Dillon: I think on the expenditures thing, while 981/2 seems a good

figure, providing you freeze inflation, but, the basic essence of the thingis that you just have to come back, so that your increase in expendituresis something clearly less than it has been. And I would say that thisshows you’ve done the best you possibly can on expenditures at the sametime you—

Schultze: This would . . . I would say, Doug, that in the eight years Iwas up there, I never heard anyone use that as a measuring stick.46

Dillon: What?Schultze: Whether expenditures increased more this year than they

increased last year or the year before that. And, secondly . . . and myguess is that this increase, percentage-wise, is smaller than those previ-ous increases.

Dillon: Probably about the same.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962338

46. From 1952 to 1959, Schultze served as a staff economist with the Council of EconomicAdvisers.

President Kennedy: Well, I don’t think the . . . you know, I think it’sjust really a question of whether it’ll be a 100 billion figure and so on,plus the fact you’re asking for a tax cut of 6 or 7 million dollars; and thenhave . . . maybe you can’t do anything about it.47 If you ask for a tax cutwith a $4 billion deficit, it’s probably just as hard a political struggle ifyou ask for it with 6 billion . . . probably. We don’t know how many peo-ple who . . . all of the Republicans are going to be against us unless weget a tax bill which is so designed to take care, in a sense disproportion-ately, of their constituency.48

Dillon: Because one thing is, too, is that this figure is a higher figurethan anyone has contemplated anywhere. It’s gonna be a shock. Butthere’s not much you can do about it. I think everyone, I think, expects a4 or 5 billion dollar increase in expenditures, but I don’t think any ofthem think it should be moved this high next year. Even Mr. Byrd hasn’tmentioned that [unclear].

Heller: Well, the Senate bill is high.Sorensen: We’re probably going to go this high this year.Dillon: Huh?Sorensen: Yes, he [unclear]—Unidentified: Well . . .Sorensen: —in one of his speeches.Dillon: Hmm.Bell: If we can . . . one of the things that you’re suggesting, implicitly,

is that if you estimate a little generously on the ’63 expenditures, whichwe’re about to put out a release on, that you’re likely—

Unidentified: Yeah.Bell: —if that were 95 billion dollars instead of 93.7 . . . The

Congress, after all, has added a number of things. They moved forwardthe date of the pay increase, and added money for health research andmilitary perks, and so on. Then, the big jump in ’63 to ’64, would fit yourdescription even of these figures.

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 339

47. Speaking rapidly here, President Kennedy said “million dollars” when he meant to say “bil-lion dollars.”48. Convinced that aggregate demand was the linchpin to greater private investment and tothe growth of the economy, both President Kennedy and Chairman Heller of the CEA origi-nally sought a tax cut proposal under which the lion’s share of the decreases would go to indi-viduals and to the less well-off. Other cuts and incentives for wealthier individuals and forcorporations were gradually added in as the political obstacles became clearer and the neces-sary amendments were considered. This was true in the area of tax reform as well, where evenmore compromises had to be made to secure only a few somewhat modest changes.

Dillon: Uh-huh . . . uh-huh. [Unclear.]Bell: I don’t know but—Schultze: One way of looking at it, in capsule form in terms of fiscal

policy, is that the first two years we’ve tried to get the economy going byincreasing expenditures and the budget deficits. Now if we go to a sharpincrease in expenditures and tax cuts on top of it, we leapfrog over theintermediate step which is tax cuts, withholding expenditure increases—down, which is a—

Bell: The budget that was presented to them—Schultze: —kind of an intermediate step.Bell: —in January of this year, because the budget will show a rela-

tively small expenditure increase—under 21/2 billion dollars—and a bal-ance if the economy would perform as we hoped it would. Now, thereason there isn’t a 31/2 billion increase in expenditures, but 6, is because’62 expenditures were lower than we thought they would be, by about $2billion, a little over. And ’63 is going to be higher than we thought inJanuary. But the budget policy was a very conservative one in January.49

It wasn’t a . . . it wasn’t a deficit policy to lift the economy; it was deliber-ately a balanced-budget policy.

Schultze: No, I’m speaking in terms of results, so—Bell: Yeah.Schultze: But what we—[Unclear exchange.]Bell: Well—[Unclear exchange.]Bell: The result is that the economy has not moved forward as it

should and we’re stuck with a deficit. It isn’t because we planned itthat way.

Dillon: No.Schultze: Oh, no. No, we haven’t planned it . . . yeah.Heller: We need to remember that on the . . . on the basis that makes

economic sense—the income and product account—we went into bal-ance . . . second quarter of this year, virtually.50

President Kennedy: What about the change in our method ofbudget-keeping as far as the repayable loans, and so on?51 Has anybodygot any thoughts on that?

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962340

49. Revenues, from lower-than-expected levels of economic growth, also trailed most forecastsfor this period.50. Income account is national income accounts basis. See note 3.51. Prepared on the national income accounts basis, the federal budget would not include fed-eral repayable loan outlays or proceeds.

Bell: We’ve been working with the council.52 We had some brief dis-cussion earlier on this. We have a staff paper that everybody is lookingat. If you take out repayable loans, it doesn’t take out very much, around$3 billion or 3 plus, in this particular series of budget years. If you justtake it out and say the budget should be regarded as the figures exclu-sive of this, you don’t gain enough to make much impact on the deficitfigures, and you pick up a fight for yourself without much benefit. Inconsequence, and third . . . secondly, we looked at the questions of . . .

President Kennedy: Three billion dollars might be of use to us.Bell: Well, yes . . . in the sense that it would reduce the budget deficit,

apparent deficit. We’ve assumed that we should present a set of budgetfigures that represent the federal financial transactions in some kind oftotal sense. And then we say, and alongside of it, here are the income andproduct account figures which are a more accurate indicator of the eco-nomic effects of the federal budget.

And, of course, the repayable loans are excluded from that so that theincome and product account deficit will presumably look that much bet-ter than the cash figures that we use. And, accordingly, we get that bene-fit . . . we expect we will have that benefit by using the income andproduct account figures.

And our question, therefore, is what about the overall budget figure?Do we also take it out of there? You can, of course, ask, “Should we takemore out?” We could take out repayable loans plus capital items of vari-ous kinds. Go to a quasi-capital budget. We’ve had some preliminary dis-cussion with Walter and his boys on this. There’s a little disagreementamong us, and I think it might be better if we brought the question toyou a little later rather than today.

Heller: I agree.Bell: I think there’s some majority sentiment against rather than for

this point, but it isn’t a matter that’s closed up, nor . . . one on whichwe’re ready to ask you to sign off.

Take the Chamber of Commerce committee. You’ve seen the prelimi-nary draft of their report that you asked Mallon53 to set up, I mean,Plumley.54 Mallon’s the chairman of the committee. . . .

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 341

52. The President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller, James Tobin, KermitGordon, and staff.53. Henry Neil Mallon was chairman and director of Dresser Industries.54. H. Ladd Plumley was chairman and president of State Mutual Life Assurance Company ofAmerica and president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. President Kennedy asked Plumley

President Kennedy: Have they been through much of this with youabout what the expenditures are?

Bell: We met with them, yes. There are on the committee two orthree quite able people—Frank Pace55 is a member, and Norman Ness56

is a member—who really know what they’re talking about. They’re . . .we’ve been working with them all along. And one of them showed us adraft of the report in an early stage, and what it was, if they carrythrough as it is now drafted, it’s going to recommend, implicitly, aban-donment of the administrative budget, but the use of the cash state-ment—consolidated cash statement—as the main presentation of federalreceipts and expenditures.57 Now, this is not necessarily a bad idea. Thiswould show a total which next year would be around 116 billion dollarsof expenditures and around a hundred and—

Schultze: About three and a half lower in deficit.Bell: Yeah. Now, that includes all the trust fund receipts. It includes

the trust funds, and since the trust funds are gonna be running somesmall surplus next year, that will help the overall . . . would help theoverall appearance of the budget . . . cut the deficit. You could say this isthe overall summary of the federal receipts and expenditures. Withinthis, there are the following categories—

President Kennedy: What’d be the advantage of having this?Bell: Well . . .President Kennedy: Why do they think it’s a good idea, this group?Bell: Well, they have different ideas. Some of them think it’s good sim-

ply because it would produce a bigger figure than the one we’re now using.President Kennedy: And they want to—Bell: Make a horror story . . . say that the budget is obviously getting

out of hand. Others simply say that this is a better representation of thetransactions in the federal government, and a better figure to have inpeople’s minds is how big the federal government’s financial transac-tions actually are in relation to anything you want to measure itagainst—total national income or product or what not.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962342

and others at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to study both government budgeting and theadministration’s tax cut proposal.55. Frank Pace, Jr., was chairman and director of General Dynamics Corporation.56. Norman Ness was vice president and director of the International Milling Company,Minneapolis, and director of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange.57. Like the national income budget, the consolidated cash basis includes trust fund receipts.Unlike the national income budget, it records transactions on a cash, rather than accrual, basisand includes net loans and other credit transactions. In FY 1967 the federal governmentwould begin reporting its official budget in this form.

President Kennedy: There’s no doubt that all these programs aredesirable. I mean, like mass transit, I can go explain things that ought tobe done. The question really . . . I mean even in defense . . . I mean inthese other countries, nobody else is spending this kind of [unclear] areeven cutting their defense expenditures and all these other people. We’vegot space and AEC in addition to defense, and foreign assistance whichnone of the rest have. It’s really a question of whether we’re spendingand figuring and thinking about a tax cut, whether these agencies, Idon’t think we have confidence in their [outlook] . . . because they’reonly considering their own agency and not the overall . . . We really haveto worry about—

Bell: Their figures are 108; ours are 100. We’ve taken a big discountfrom their figures already. We think that these both represent a reasonableprogram to carry forward the kind of things that you . . . all of us have con-sidered are desirable for the growth and security of the country.Furthermore, we think that this is a . . . these are figures which are easilysustainable by the economy. There isn’t the slightest doubt that this is asensible program in terms of the use of resources. On any real grounds, thisis a good program; however, what it is that the [unclear] that Doug talksabout and other political considerations are obviously very important.

Sorensen: As you know, Mr. President, this is one kind of meeting wehave where we all agree about what we’ve done. When we have a meet-ing on, let’s say, on military assistance, and somebody else on how a damwill save that state, and so on, and it’s a . . . it gets pretty tough to . . . Ithink the Budget Bureau has cut hard. Now, and we . . . I think we reallyneed a decision from you today as to whether we want a budget in theneighborhood of 100.4 or in the neighborhood of 98.4, so they can goahead and make their tax, economic, and budget decisions on that basis.If you find on pages 15 to 19—

President Kennedy: I think we ought to—Sorensen: [Unclear] that those things ought to be cut out, then.President Kennedy: Well, I think we probably ought to try to get it

under a 100 billion just for . . . if we can do that, then we have the politi-cal argument of the tax thing. So I suppose we’d better try to put itninety . . . I know that nobody doesn’t like to go the 99.3 route, but . . .

Sorensen: Because it just means for sure that you bust the 100 maybethe year after, which is a worse year to do it.

Bell: Well . . .President Kennedy: They’re going to say a 100 billion budget any-

way, but why don’t we say—[Obscuring noise.]Unidentified: Keep it below a 100 . . . half a billion of leeway.

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 343

President Kennedy: That’s right.Bell: Well . . .Heller: If we shift emphasis to the other budget, they’re going to be

well above a 100 billion anyway.Unidentified: Well, this is, again, the—President Kennedy: This is the advantage of the cash—58 [Unclear

exchange.]Bell: That’s true, Mr. President. That would be one advantage to fol-

lowing the Chamber of Commerce suggestion . . . cash total.President Kennedy: Well, here’s what I’d like us to do with all . . .

to make this decision with a little more light than I have now. I thinkthe Treasury, if the Secretary thinks that that’s what we ought to do.But I think we ought to get from the Treasury, after a consultationwith the Budget [Bureau], what it is we would take out in order toreach that figure. Then we can tell whether we ought to do it, whetherit’s worth . . . whether the advantage we gain in the way we sell it,whether it’s worth taking out 2 billion dollars. I don’t know. . . . That’swhat we have to decide. It may not well be, and I don’t know enoughabout what we’d be taking out. Have you got down what we’d be takingout of it?

Unidentified: Right. That’s what [unclear].Dillon: Well, that’s . . . there’s a lot of things together there; I don’t

know whether they’re the only things to be taken out or not.Unidentified: That’ll take a little longer than it’s worth?Bell: We definitely tried to take the marginal items.Dillon: What you considered really marginal?Bell: [Unclear] not only [unclear].President Kennedy: Those are the ones that we all want to take . . .

from 16 to 19?Bell: That’s right. These are the ones which we think would be the—President Kennedy: Well, we can’t . . . we can’t postpone the pay

thing.59

Dillon: Well, I just never figured that we could do anything aboutthe Skybolt. We’ve got an international commitment on that. [Unclear.]

President Kennedy: [Unclear] into Skybolt?Bell: Skybolt is . . . it’s pretty close to being up for consideration for

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962344

58. Consolidated cash budget.59. Federal pay raises instituted by the “Pay Bill” signed nine days later (11 October 1962).

cancellation on its own merits. If it weren’t for the British commitment,we might very well be recommending it as a normal part of—60

President Kennedy: Let me ask how much the British are puttinginto the development of Skybolt compared to us?

Bell: Oh, damn little . . . damn little. It’s practically all ours.Schultze: Mr. President, we haven’t really looked at the expenditure

figures since July. We made an estimate in July. Since that time wehaven’t a program to counter . . . a different mix or different selectionand then on . . . we haven’t attempted to do that today.

Bell: One thing that might be interesting, Mr. President . . .President Kennedy: I think you ought to do that though, if you’re

gonna give—Bell: We could pretty well, if you wanted us to, we could go shoot at

an increase—if that made any sense—an increase of less than $6 billionfrom whatever the ’63 figure turns out to be when we know. I don’t thinkthat makes much difference in terms of bill consultations, but Doug saidhe’d work with the Ways and Means Committee. . . . It may mean some-thing to them.

President Kennedy: Do you think that if they’re given 100.4 is . . .This is aside from what the increase is. Is it just the percent of theincrease that disturbs you, or is it the 100 billion?

Dillon: Well, it’s everything all added together. I mean it’s the factthat it’s a 100 billion; that’s more than anybody expects. Now, if we’dbeen at 96, and everybody had known that we’re coming up to 100, that’sone thing. But Byrd and all these other people who think that we justspend money much too fast, they’ll make their own estimates and say,“Well, next year it’ll be another 4 or 5 billion and we’d be approaching100 billion dollars.” None of them are dreaming that you’re going to goover it, and so it would be a shock to them. And, again, I think that’s afact that we have to recognize. It’s very important. For that reason, the100 billion figure does mean something to them. And I think it’d be bet-ter if the . . . 99.3, that much out of 100.4, because it’d look like you’ve atleast tried.

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 345

60. Days later, on 26 October 1962, after receiving confidential information from RoswellGilpatric that Secretary McNamara would seek to cancel the Skybolt program, Dave Bell senta memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, intended originally from the President, that noted a“firm recommendation by the Secretary [McNamara] that the SKYBOLT missile be can-celled” (Neustadt, Report to JFK, p. 33).

Schultze: Well, the simplest line to take, which is a very difficult lineto take budgetwise, but the simplest line to take from the standpoint ofaccuracy, is that in this year in which we’re trying to reduce taxes and getthe economy moving to this prescription, we’re going to live with ourbuilt-in increases, the things we have to live with, and we’re not going toauthorize any new programs. This is a price we’re going to have to pay.Now, this is the only kind of simple, political logic, I think, that you canmake, rather than a . . . than a pick and choose. And, I guess—

President Kennedy: Now, I’ll tell you what; let’s get on with it.Unidentified: About the consulting . . .President Kennedy: Why don’t we get the Treasury with the Bureau

of the Budget to tell us what they would take out of that, in order to savethat which—

Dillon: We could do that, but [unclear] moot point is [unclear].President Kennedy: [Unclear] we’ll have alternatives for what we

choose or not choose.Dillon: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Well, that’s one question. Now, those will have

to wait until we see what you’re suggesting we omit in order to cut thisthing down.

Sorensen: Well, that . . . even that isn’t necessary, Mr. President,unless the Treasury feels that the list which Dave’s put together onpages 16 to 19 is not an adequate list.

Staats: I have a slant, Mr. President . . . [Unclear exchange.]Staats: This list here adds up . . . adds up to 2.8 billion. To get down

to Doug’s figures, it’d be only 1.9. So we have definitely put in here moreitems that add up to 2.8 than you would need to get down to—

President Kennedy: Why don’t you give us a [unclear].Dillon: Some of the things aren’t on this list. For instance—President Kennedy: What else have we got to decide?Bell: That’s all . . . at this point.President Kennedy: [Unclear] do something else, so we can talk a lit-

tle more?Bell: All right.President Kennedy: But, in other words, we don’t see any new budg-

eting procedures that are going to make our problem easier, do we?Bell: I do not, Mr. President, but we haven’t signed off on—President Kennedy: Is everybody agreed that we shouldn’t try to put

up an advance sort of list? It seems to me in some of these programswhere the increase will be much marked and where there is going to be aplateau, that it may be advantageous to indicate it.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962346

Bell: Yes. [Unclear exchange.]Dillon: —the space program, and particularly with HEW you could

say that this list was [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]President Kennedy: —we won’t allocate for [unclear]. I think it’s fac-

ing the facts, because they’re the ones . . . two-thirds of our increases havebeen in these areas. We can look for the next three or four years at this . . .

Ackley: We soften the impact of the $100 billion breakthrough, if weadd in the cash figures.

President Kennedy: It doesn’t say foreign aid, too. We’ve got to con-sider what we should do with foreign aid.

Dillon: That’s something we want to look at, because actually thesefigures—foreign aid—are too high, and the Budget Bureau reducedthem themselves, because they were based on back when . . . beforeAppropriations had cut substantially. [Unclear] reduced these figuresautomatically, so we [unclear].

Bell: [Unclear.] McNamara is not necessarily, when he gets throughwith the next month or so, going to come in with figures this low.Certainly, they’re not going to be lower, and they may very well be sub-stantially higher. If he adds divisions, for instance, that he is considering—

President Kennedy: They’re the 16, in addition?Bell: Above 16. That was Max Taylor’s recommended addition.61

President Kennedy: Well, Max is going to be an expensive chief.Dillon: He’s gonna be an expensive [unclear]. [Laughter.]Bell: The space budget looks as though it’s going to have to be

higher than what we have here. Seaborg, Celebrezze,62 Freeman63 areamong the agency heads who have already put us on notice that theywill be proposing substantially larger figures.

President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Bell: It isn’t going to be easy, but we come to this figure. If you want

to go to the lower figure, then I think we should start it by talking to theCabinet . . . who we’re going to need to take along. But we should say tothe Cabinet that the figures that they and we have been talking about,that you have reviewed now, and they look to you too high, and you haveinstructed us to go back and trim them back. Because this is the kind of

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 347

61. General Maxwell D. Taylor, former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy andArmy chief of staff, had been sworn in by President Kennedy as Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff on 1 October 1962, the day before convening this recorded tax and budget meeting.62. Anthony J. Celebrezze was secretary of health, education, and welfare, July 1962 to July 1965.63. Orville L. Freeman was secretary of agriculture, January 1961 to January 1969.

backing that we would require to go back to these people and open it upon the low side.64 And that could be better, you know . . . easier than—

Dillon: [Unclear.]Bell: I’m not saying we don’t want to do it. But I think we ought to, if

that’s the way you want it.Dillon: One thing, Mr. President, that’s . . . I think important.

Looking at this, it’s one of the big areas, and this is this NASA programwhere for us to cut back anything you’d have to slow up the date of thelanding on the moon. I asked Dave what that meant and he said thatmeant ’67. Now . . . well, I . . . we’ve always had this commitment to bethere by the end of the—

President Kennedy: No, we really felt that ’67 . . . . We said the end ofthe—

Dillon: End of the decade.President Kennedy: Yeah. I think we probably should not . . . I think

we . . . currently there may be some things we’re doing in space whichare superfluous or just supportive but not vital. But I don’t think weought to . . . I’d rather unbalance my budget and all the rest, and—

Dillon: You want us to get there by ’67?Unclear exchange between Dillon and President Kennedy.President Kennedy: —not have the commitment. Then if we could

justify it, we could make a mistake and we’d be penny-wise and [pound-foolish]. And really . . . except, the only question I really have is whetherthat agency isn’t doing many more things up in space than—

Bell: Well . . .President Kennedy: —than is to be done.Bell: Yeah.President Kennedy: And the Defense Department.Bell: Yeah, with this we have—President Kennedy: Our Titan III, and so on.65

Bell: Yeah. For this we have a full-scale review which is now . . . justcoming into focus now, and we’ll be back to you in about two weeks on it,which takes Titan III versus the C1 and the other elements.66 There isn’tmuch duplication, direct, as you know. But the Air Force has a Geminiprogram, now, as well as NASA. They want to use Gemini for militaryflyers, to learn how to operate out there. And we are questioning that, so

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962348

64. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962.65. The Titan III was the largest intercontinental ballistic missile.66. The C1 is the Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport plane.

that . . . But I don’t think there’s much there; we won’t find there’s agreat deal of duplication to cut out. I think that we will achieve—whenwe bring this to you, and it’s been nailed down—some limits on the mili-tary program which will be very helpful.

Meeting begins to break up.Unidentified: [Unclear.] I’m going to meet Senator Douglas on the

[unclear].67

President Kennedy: I’m meeting him at 5:30. [Unclear exchange.]Dillon: Mr. President, if you could say that I have talked about this

overview, now, you know . . . if that would counteract the New YorkTimes last Sunday?68

President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah. That’s right, about the business thing.Yeah. Well, what we can . . . what we’re going to put in the economy, wegot there. What we’re going to take out as opposed to the [unclear] . . . theheart. What can we say?

Dillon: Well, we . . . I guess they’re getting the figures together. I thinkthat on an expenditure basis, on a national income accounts basis, we’regiving much more stimulation, certainly, than we were in the last . . . in thesecond quarter of this year. I think that would be something that . . . you’llhave the figures in a couple of days, that—

Bell: Yeah, [unclear] difficulty is—Dillon: —you could talk about.Bell: —not the difficulty. But what the point is, that on an income . . .

on a real basis . . . on an income and product accounts basis, what we aredoing now is running a deficit. That is stimulating the economy. We, ofcourse, have not publicly announced any figure for the deficit. And wewill not, presumably . . . will not do so until this review of the budgetcomes out a few days after the election . . . except determining that wehave plans for it, as the—

President Kennedy: I mean, isn’t it possible for us to say that we’respending $4 billion more to [unclear] last quarter?

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 349

67. Paul H. Douglas was a Democratic senator from Illinois, 1949 to 1967, and chairman ofthe Joint Economic Committee, 1959 to 1967.68. Possibly James Reston, “Seattle: The Mood of the Country and President Kennedy,” NewYork Times, 23 September 1962, p. 10E. Reston noted: “Not since the heyday of anti-Roosevelt feeling in the Thirties has there been such personal and emotional feeling against‘that man in the White House.’” Though this feeling may well be what Dillon hopes to coun-teract, Reston concluded by adding that “the main strategic objective of the Democraticparty now, as always, is to have elections decided on a simple partisan basis, and theRepublicans, by making a party issue out of the steel price controversy and the stock marketcrash, have clearly furthered this aim.”

Bell: It would be possible, yes.Dillon: Just to say that. Something like that.President Kennedy: I think we have to go to . . . can’t we say that in

the first six months there was this plateau effect during the last—Dillon: Everyone knows there’s a seasonal effect, and I think you’ve

got to disengage a little bit out of that, because that is so . . .Bell: The seasonal effect is—Dillon: You can’t take credit for the seasonal effect. That wouldn’t—Bell: Well, the seasonal effect is not real. That’s simply a cash—Dillon: A cash—Bell: —that situation there. It doesn’t have to mean that—Dillon: [Unclear.]Bell: —there’s a real effect on the economy.Sorensen: Oh, you mean we’re putting in 4 billion dollars more, sea-

sonally adjusted?Bell: Yes, that’s right.Heller: Well . . .Dillon: In fact, you’re putting in some more, but—Bell: Yeah.Dillon: —in addition, they’re putting in more demands; it’s just sea-

sonal.President Kennedy: I think we ought to try to get it in shape for put-

ting out, whether it ought to be put out by the Treasury, or the council,or the Budget Bureau . . . . We can decide when we take a look at the fig-ures.

Bell: That’s fine.President Kennedy: I think that with all this trouble, right now, the

market’s having, the quicker we do that, the better.Bell: Well, now, we’ll have the figures, I think, tomorrow.President Kennedy: What do you think, the Sunday [New York]

Times? Should we get that fellow who writes to . . . where is the mosteffective . . . ?

Heller: I think in the Sunday Times and send it [unclear].Bell: Sunday Times, Monday Wall Street Journal. I think that’s proba-

bly the way to do it.Dillon: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: Well, I think that we ought to probably let

Treasury or the . . . if we’re going to put it in those mediums, we oughtto let Treasury or the Bureau of the Budget do it.

Schultze: How about Treasury?Dillon: Well, no one’s going to get past the [unclear].

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962350

Bell: [Laughter.]President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I don’t think we—Bell: [Unclear] statement of fact.President Kennedy: Maybe it ought to come from the Bureau of the

Budget. I don’t think we want to have Walter do it. 69

Bell: No, I think that’s right.Dillon: [Unclear] political thing with the Bureau of the Budget.

[Unclear exchange.]Unidentified: I think we can—Dillon: It might need to be done right after the Congress quits.Bell: There’d be some logic in a preliminary flash figure right after

the Congress leaves, you know, it would be something to hang it onthere if the Congress left and our quick estimate of the effect of theiractions on the budget seems to . . . indicates that we are now—

President Kennedy: I think it ought to come out of the [Bureau ofthe] Budget. So let’s try to do it as quickly as we can. We can estimateCongress going on Saturday. Maybe we could do it in the Sunday papersor Monday because that’s a quicker—

Bell: OK.President Kennedy: OK.President Kennedy turns the machine off.

Before welcoming the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee,Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, into his office, the President had to takecare of a matter even more pressing than the ’63 budget. At about 2:30P.M., Governor Barnett had called the White House to request that thefederalized Mississippi National Guardsmen be returned to state con-trol. The President understood that he had to minimize the amount oftime that Oxford appeared to be under siege. Kennedy began taping aconversation of this matter with Kenneth O’Donnell in the Oval Officebefore calling the secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance. With the recorderstill running in the Oval Office, Kennedy also taped most of the tele-phone conversation with Vance.

Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal 351

69. Walter Heller was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Compared to Dave Bellat the Bureau of the Budget, and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, Heller was consideredthe most outspoken liberal voice in the administration on matters economic.

5:25 P.M.

[T]he first 24 hours the use of force was desirable, and now itwon’t be. So that I suppose every time you get a picture of some-body getting knocked down, it feeds the fire around that place.

Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and Cyrus Vance70

On October 2 as of 8:00 A.M., 8,735 Army troops had reached Oxford,with more heading toward the town. By the next day (October 3), thenumber would reach 9,827. According to the New York Times, the totalnumber of troops (including the National Guard) in Oxford and the sur-rounding area was approximately 15,000. The Army units were underthe direction of General Hamilton Howze.

President Kennedy: Secretary Vance, he doesn’t [unclear].71

Kenneth O’Donnell: Now, Mr. President, there are 2,500 NationalGuard troops that we’d like to take out, you know, the chlorine that sunk[unclear].

President Kennedy: Yeah.O’Donnell: There is a danger that we are going to use guards to do it.

[Unclear] have not been federalized. Twenty-five hundred to do it anyway.President Kennedy: Get the guards in. Well, what will they use?O’Donnell: The 2,500 are not involved anyway for the [unclear].President Kennedy: Yeah. Who conducted? Who [do] we turn them

over to?O’Donnell: The state.President Kennedy: All right.O’Donnell: And these are the ones who’ll try to do something?

[Unclear.]President Kennedy: OK, fine. Now, who are we going to have

announce that?O’Donnell: Vance just called me, he said he’s proceeding to do it but

he won’t . . .

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962352

70. Tape 27, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential RecordingsCollection. The telephone call with Cyrus Vance is on Dictabelt 4J.1, Cassette B, John F.Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. They have beenspliced together to reproduce all sides of this three-way conversation.71. Cyrus Vance was secretary of the Army.

President Kennedy: Will he announce it then?Evelyn Lincoln announces that Secretary Vance is on the line.Evelyn Lincoln: Secretary Vance.President Kennedy: [on the telephone] Hello?Cyrus Vance: [Unrecorded.]President Kennedy: Oh, yes this is fine about the 2,500 troops then?Vance: [Unrecorded.]President Kennedy: About being used for that chlorine business?Vance: [Unrecorded.]President Kennedy: Yeah, for that purpose?Vance: [Unrecorded.]President Kennedy: And then they would not be called back in?Vance: [Unrecorded.]President Kennedy: Right. Now, [the dictabelt recording begins here]

what about the other, the troop situation down there? How do you, howare you, how many . . .

Vance: We have got, it should be about 10,000 now. Those are whatHowze is trying to stabilize in the Oxford area, sir.72 And what we pro-pose to do on this, was General Wheeler was going to get in touch withGeneral Howze, ask him to prepare a plan with respect to the phasedwithdrawal of troops of Mississippi.73 And to submit that back so that wecould then come and submit it to you, sir.

President Kennedy: Yeah, the quicker we could probably make somepublic indication of that, then, of course, the better off—

Vance: Right, sir.President Kennedy: —psychologically it would be. They think that

that’s the number that they may need for awhile?Vance: Yeah. They think that for the time being or so that this is the

safest number to have there.President Kennedy: I see.Vance: It may be somewhat excessive, sir, but my feeling is it’s better

to be safe on [unclear].President Kennedy: Now, do they have some instructions down there

about how they should handle people? That they . . .Vance: Minimum force [unclear] minimum force.President Kennedy: . . . so we could, you know, that’s been sort of

restated. I think it may have to be restated today because in the first 24

Conversat ion with Kenneth O’Donnel l and Cyrus Vance 353

72. Hamilton Howze, commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, was in charge of the military atthe Oxford campus.73. General Earle G. Wheeler.

hours the use of force was desirable, and now it won’t be. So that I sup-pose every time you get a picture of somebody getting knocked down, itfeeds the fire around that place. So I suppose at least it ought to bebrought to his attention to see how he thinks it should be done.

Vance: Right. Well, we will do so.President Kennedy: OK. Fine.Vance: Sir, do you want to release anything [unclear], would you like

us to do it in terms of the public release?President Kennedy: Let me just think about that. Now, we’ve got the

question of this release back to the state. Probably if we do it, it’s a littlebit too . . . Has he asked us to do it, Barnett? Has Barnett asked us forthem or who’s asked?

Vance: Barnett has not asked us; Barnett has not asked us to do this.President Kennedy: Yeah. Who has asked us to do it?Vance: Mr. President, I can’t tell you who in the state of Mississippi has.President Kennedy: He did. You see, well, now . . . Why don’t we do it

this way? You people announce that the President has approved the troop—Vance: All right. [Unclear] “the President has approved.” We’ll

release it over here and check the [unclear] . . .President Kennedy: We ought to find out who’s asked us to do it,

though, so that . . . [off the phone to Kenny O’Donnell] Well, when did he ask us to do it?O’Donnell: The Governor asked us to.President Kennedy: Well, when did he ask us, do you know?O’Donnell: He asked us about 2[:00] or 2:30.President Kennedy: [on the phone to Vance] The guess is that they,

Kenny says that the Governor asked the civil defense, and so on. Ofcourse, I suppose he didn’t ask for the troops because he didn’t have toask us for the troops.

O’Donnell: No, he asked them for a declaration of a national emer-gency so he could get . . . [unclear].

President Kennedy: We’d given them that [unclear], that we’d givethem a declaration of national emergency?

[speaking to Vance on the phone] Well, now who have you been talkingto about this, Cy? Is it McDermott?74

Vance: McDermott. Yeah.President Kennedy: About the 2,500? What they’re going to do with

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 2, 1962354

74. Edward A. McDermott was director of the Office of Emergency Planning and a memberof the National Security Council.

2,500 troops, I don’t know. We agreed to help them get the thing out.75 But Idon’t know what they’re going to do with 2,500 soldiers to get it out, so . . .

Vance: The letter I have from McDermott says, “While we have noway to judge the appropriate figure, the state director of civil defense ofMississippi has informed the Public Health Service officials that 2,500troops would be needed.”

O’Donnell is saying something to the President in the background.President Kennedy: [to O’Donnell] Did they?O’Donnell: He hasn’t [unclear] number of troops.President Kennedy: I see. All right, well, I see. Well, then, I would

think we ought to say that at the request of the civil defense director—Vance: State director of civil defense of Mississippi.President Kennedy: —that yes, the President has approved the . . .Vance: Yeah. Fine.President Kennedy: And so we don’t get Barnett into it . . .Vance: Right.President Kennedy: Right. OK. Fine.Vance: Yes, indeed, sir.President Kennedy: Thank you, bye.After hanging up the telephone, the President switches off both tapemachines.

President Kennedy’s next appointment was with Senator Paul Douglasof Illinois. The Douglas meeting and one later with Allan E. Lightner,Jr., the senior U.S. diplomatic representative in Berlin, went untaped.Kennedy left the office for the pool at 8:00 P.M.

Wednesday, October 3, 1962

The Kennedy administration continued making gains in Congress. TheSenate sent the White House a tax revision bill containing the Kennedybusiness investment deduction. The price for this was the defeat of ameasure to recoup some of the lost revenue through a withholding tax

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 3, 1962 355

75. Possibly another reference to the chlorine.

on dividends and interest. Compromises also surrounded Senate passageof the Foreign Aid Bill. The administration did not get as large anappropriation as hoped; but the Senate was far more generous than theHouse, which had cut the tab from $4.8 billion to $3.6 billion. TheSenate authorized $4.4 billion.

What little President Kennedy taped this day dealt with influencingthe Senate-House conference on foreign aid to discourage the House fromincorporating its cuts in the final bill. Kennedy also added to his record oftaped civil-rights calls to the secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance.

9:20 A.M.

We would like to come over if we can . . . General Wheelerand I, to discuss [a] withdrawal plan with you, sir.

Conversation with Cyrus Vance1

On October 3, 9,827 Army troops remained in Oxford. Small numbers offorces began to depart from Oxford by truck and helicopter for eitherMemphis or Columbus Air Force Base. Nevertheless, the total number ofregular troops in Oxford continued to increase slightly over the nextseveral days, reaching 10,113 by the morning of October 8.2

President Kennedy: Cy?Cyrus Vance: Yes, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Morning.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 3, 1962356

1. Dictabelt 4J.2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.2. On October 8, the Army removed the remaining check points from the Ole Miss campus,allowing cars to enter without being searched. Despite this, troops still patrolled the grounds,the town of Oxford, and the surrounding countryside. More than 5,400 troops that had beenstanding by at installations in Memphis and Columbus, Mississippi, were ordered to return totheir bases. According to the New York Times, on 8 October, 3,000 National Guard troops,14,000 regular troops, and 1,500 military police remained on duty. Of the regular troops onduty, half were at bases in Memphis and Columbus, 90 miles away.

On 10 October, the Army completed a significant withdrawal of troops from the Oxfordarea, reducing the number of men from 10,000 to 5,200. The remaining troops were dividednearly equally between regular Army and federalized Mississippi National Guard members.At peak strength, there had been some 23,600 men in Oxford and the surrounding area.

Vance: Morning, sir. We would like to come over if we can, abouttwelve, General [Earle G.] Wheeler and I, to discuss [a] withdrawalplan with you, sir.

President Kennedy: Good. Fine. OK, I’ll be right here.Vance: Fine, sir.President Kennedy: Good. OK.Vance: See you then.

Robert Kennedy recalled that as a result of the logistical foul-up on thenight of September 30, the President was “as mad at Cy Vance and theinformation that Cy Vance was giving him as I’ve seen him during thecourse of the administration. He asked for an investigation to be con-ducted.”3 Vance and Lieutenant General Earl G. Wheeler, the new chiefof staff of the U.S. Army, were due to come to the White House later thatmorning to discuss the withdrawal plan for Oxford and, perhaps, to dis-cuss the conduct of the presidential investigation.

Before the arrival of Vance and Wheeler, the President made tele-phone calls to the Speaker of the House and to Lawrence F. O’Brien, aspecial assistant to the President, who handled congressional affairs, todiscuss the forthcoming conference on the foreign aid bill.

10:05 A.M.

I don’t know what my psychology would be these days on Otto.

Conversation with John McCormack4

The President wanted to discuss with the Speaker of the House possiblestrategies for getting an increased authorization for foreign aid out ofthe upcoming conference on the Foreign Aid Bill committee meeting.Otto Passman, Democratic representative from Louisiana and chairmanof the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations

Conversat ion with John McCormack 357

3. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: TheUnpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 168.4. Dictabelt 4K.3, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

Committee, an inveterate foe of foreign aid, would have to be induced toaccept, in conference, the addition of $300 to $400 million to the $3.6billion in foreign aid in the House version of the bill. Apparently beforestarting to record, the President had told McCormack that LarryO’Brien, his special assistant for congressional relations, would be com-ing up to the Hill to see him and Passman.

President Kennedy: . . . foreign aid conference. I didn’t know whether itwould be possible for him to come up and speak to you about our thoughts.Then perhaps you and I could talk on the phone again and you could giveme your judgment about what we ought to try to work out with Otto.

John McCormack: Sure. A . . . absolutely. And . . . we meet at eleventoday, and Larry can come up anytime. . . . Oh, I’ll come off the rostrumonce we get going. We’re going into the . . . I’ll get into the third supple-mental, so will it be convenient for him about half past eleven or so?

President Kennedy: Good. Fine. I’ll have him up there.McCormack: I think . . . You see, Otto agreed; when I said my under-

standing . . . I’ll put it that way . . . that he’d go at least 300 in this titleone, and probably a little more.

President Kennedy: Right. Right.McCormack: Is that right? President Kennedy: Right. That’s right. He . . . you remember, we

were talking about 350 and then he said, “Well, we will go over 300 andsee what more we can do.” Now, in view of the fact that we did well in theSenate, actually an even split would take us to 400 million over the Housefigure. So I thought that if he went up there with . . . Larry would havetwo sets of figures, and then we could just see what we could do with him.

McCormack: And I was thinking that a . . . My thought would bethat . . . that you and I and Passman and whoever you wanted in from thedepartment would sit . . . get together down at the White House.Naturally it would be at the White House.

President Kennedy: Right. Right.McCormack: I think your . . . the psychological effect, don’t you see?President Kennedy: Right. I don’t know what my psychology would

be these days on Otto. [Laughter.] I’ll tell you—McCormack: Well, I know, Mr. President, it’s a pretty tough . . . It . . .

it may not get all we seek, but it will get a hell of a lot more than hewould give to someone else.

President Kennedy: OK. Good. Well, I’ll have Larry up there andthen I’ll be glad to meet whenever . . . you think would be best today.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 3, 1962358

McCormack: Today?President Kennedy: Well, I think if they are going into conference

tomorrow, either today, or whatever time you thought. Today or tomor-row would be fine with me.

McCormack: Better today. In other words, he’d . . . he would allocateit, as I understood it, anyway you wanted.

President Kennedy: Right. What we got to try to do is get him up toas near 400 as we can.

McCormack: I know. I agree with you.President Kennedy: I’ll have Larry up there, though, at 11:30. McCormack: All right.President Kennedy: Thanks, Mr. Speaker.McCormack: Right. Right.

The President then called Lawrence F. O’Brien to inform him of his dis-cussion with the Speaker.

Sometime That Morning

[O]nce you get him briefed on the 400 . . . we can arrange tosee Otto.

Conversation with Lawrence F. O’Brien5

President Kennedy spoke to Special Assistant Larry O’Brien to followup on his discussion with the Speaker of the House John McCormack.The President anticipated having a personal lobbying session withCongressman Passman at the White House, but wanted O’Brien first totalk over the foreign aid numbers with the Speaker. Kennedy would alsoraise an unidentified matter with O’Brien. That portion of the conversa-tion was either not recorded or erased.

Unidentified: Hello.Evelyn Lincoln: The President asked for Mr. O’Brien. He’s on.

Conversat ion with Lawrence F. O’Brien 359

5. Dictabelt 4K.6, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.

Unidentified: OK.President Kennedy: Larry?Larry O’Brien: Yes, sir, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Tell him to call . . . . The Speaker said that he’d

call you at 11:30 and then, perhaps, he will want to arrange—once youget him briefed on the 400—6

O’Brien: All right.President Kennedy: —we can arrange to see Otto, if necessary, down

here.7

O’Brien: Right.President Kennedy: Now, the second thing is that I talked to Charlie . . .8

O’Brien: Yeah.

Secretary Vance and General Wheeler entered the White House at 12:14P.M. Kennedy did not tape this meeting. After these military advisers left,the President had lunch with J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the FederalBureau of Investigation. The President then went to the ExecutiveMansion for the rest of the day. He did not swim today and may havebeen feeling the initial effects of the illness that would keep him in bedall of October 4.

During the afternoon, the President presumably received reports onthe progress of Walter Schirra’s nine-hour space mission. In earlySeptember, Schirra’s mission had influenced the scheduling of the finalphase of the DOMINIC nuclear test series because of concerns over theradiation effects of high-altitude testing.9 At 6:17 P.M., the Presidentspoke with Schirra, who had returned safely and was onboard the air-craft carrier USS Kearsage. At 6:30, the President held an unrecordedmeeting in the Oval Room of the White House with his Soviet special-ists. It is not known when that meeting ended.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 3, 1962360

6. The Speaker of the House, from 1962 to 1971, was John W. McCormack, Democratic con-gressman from Massachusetts, 1928 to 1971.7. Otto Passman was a Democratic U.S. House member from Louisiana, 1947 to 1977, andchairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.The most powerful and outspoken opponent of foreign aid in Congress, Passman continuallyclashed with the Kennedy administration over its foreign aid requests.8. Unidentified.9. See “Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series,” 5 September 1962.

Monday, October 8, 1962

After spending all of October 4 upstairs at the White House with a cold,the President set off on a three-day campaign swing through Ohio,Michigan, and Minnesota. Having returned home Sunday night, thePresident entered the Oval Office at 9:32 A.M.

While the President was out of Washington, the Berlin situation hadheated up again. On October 6, a British military vehicle, seeking tocome to the aid of a man who had been shot at the Wall, had been pre-vented from entering East Berlin. Meanwhile talks on Berlin betweenSoviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Dean Rusk had brought noprogress. On Sunday the three Western powers were considering a for-mal protest to the Soviets because the bar on the British military vehiclewas a violation of the Four Power agreements.1

Also during the President’s absence, another U-2 had flown a Cubamission. In accordance with the September 10 decision on the reconnais-sance plan for Cuba, this U-2 hugged the Cuban coast without crossingover any territory to avoid identified surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.Back from his honeymoon, the director of central intelligence, JohnMcCone, wanted the next U-2 flight to be more daring. Agents on theisland were reporting the existence of surface-to-surface missiles andmissile sites in one of the regions of Cuba not photographed sinceAugust 29. McCone wanted a U-2 to cover those areas, even though thismeant risking the loss of the plane to a Soviet-made SAM.

McCone had met resistance from the West Wing of the White Houseand was on the President’s schedule for October 8. On October 5,McGeorge Bundy, the special assistant to the President for national secu-rity affairs, had defended the reconnaissance plan in conversation withMcCone. Bundy argued that the lack of “hard information” from the cen-ter of the island was not really cause for concern because the Soviets“would not go so far” as to put nuclear missiles in Cuba.2 McCone wouldhave his chance today to make his case directly to the President.

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962 361

1. See the New York Times, 6–8 October 1962; Telegram, Rusk (New York) to StateDepartment, 6 October 1962, FRUS, 15: 348–51.2. McCone, “Memorandum of Discussion with the President’s Special Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs” (Bundy), 5 October 1962, FRUS, 11: 13–15.

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962362

Before McCone’s arrival, the President had scheduled a meeting withSenator Wayne Morse of Oregon. As Morse was about to enter theWhite House, the President called the Senate Majority Leader, MikeMansfield, for some advice.

10:30 A.M.

I think that a lot of them are a little bit afraid of Mikebecause of his power on the Interior and other appropriationscommittees over there. They thought, well, they better go along.

Conversation with Mike Mansfield3

A fight had developed on Capitol Hill over a proposed $10 million appro-priation for a National Aquarium in Washington, D.C. The sponsor of theproject was Representative Mike Kirwan of Youngstown, Ohio. A longtimesupporter of organized labor and New Deal–Fair Deal legislation, Kirwanwas best known in recent years as a champion of pork-barrel legislation.Chairman of the Interior and Related Agencies Subcommittee of theHouse Appropriations Committee (and second-ranking Democrat on theAppropriations Committee), he was nicknamed Big Mike and Prince ofPork. Democratic Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Frank Churchof Iowa and others opposed the aquarium, with support from newspapersthat termed it a blatant boondoggle.4

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s secretary, Bobby Baker,one of the most astute vote counters on the Hill, had alredy warnedDemocrats against letting principle dictate their positions on the aquar-ium, and Morse, Church, and others who ignored this advice had alreadysuffered Kirwan’s retribution, seeing the conference committee on theInterior Appropriations Bill eviscerate public works planned for theirstates. With Mansfield, Kennedy sought to rescue Morse and the othersand undo some of the potential political fallout. Having asked the nationto give him more Democrats in the upcoming midterm elections, to

3. Dictabelt 4K.7, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.4. Morse had developed a reputation for stubbornness and had shown a willingness to takeon his own party—Republican until 1952, an interlude as an independent, and Democraticfrom 1955.

change a simple numerical majority into a working majority by addingliberals and moderates to offset conservative southern Democrats,Kennedy could ill afford a party quarrel of this kind.

Recording begins in midconversation.President Kennedy: I suppose that he’s going to blow me out of the

water? 5

Mike Mansfield: Not you. Kirwan.President Kennedy: Yeah, but he’s asked . . . I suppose he’s probably

going to ask me to do something. Is there anything I can do?Mansfield: Well, now, the only thing is this: What . . . he’s very much

disturbed that because of his opposition to the Aquarium Bill, thatKirwan has knocked out a lot of his projects—6

President Kennedy: That’s right.Mansfield: —in the Public Works Bill. He will show you newspaper

clippings which will indicate his and Edith Green’s defeat.7 And there’snothing that you can do. . . . All you can say is that you’ll call up Kirwanand see what you can do, and we’ll probably get Bob Kerr to do the samething over here.8

President Kennedy: I see. Well, why did the senators let it go?9

Because, I suppose they’re mad at him [Morse] too, aren’t they? He’sbeen kicking everybody around for so long that—

Mansfield: Well . . .President Kennedy: —finally, they decided to kick him, I guess,

didn’t they?Mansfield: Of course, well . . . that’s partly it, but it was a personal

thing with—President Kennedy: Kirwan.Mansfield: —Mike. And I think that a lot of them are a little bit

Conversat ion with Mike Mansf ie ld 363

5. Referring to Morse.6. Morse was upset that the Interior Department Appropriations Bill, after passing the Senateand having been sent to House-Senate conferees, had been stripped of planning appropriationsfor the Columbia and Willamette river channel projects, funds for construction of the YaquinaBay and Harbor project, and funds for a reclamation project at Pendleton, all in Oregon. 7. Edith Green was a Democratic U.S. House member from Oregon, 1955 to 1974. 8. Robert S. Kerr was a U.S. senator from Oklahoma, 1948 to 1963, and chairman of theSenate Finance Committee. The irony of Kennedy’s request to have Kerr intercede on behalfof Morse here is that Morse had recently led a filibuster against Kennedy’s Comsat proposal, aproposal to privatize government satellite development, ultimately steered through to passageby none other than Senator Kerr.9. In the conference committee.

afraid of Mike because of his power on the Interior and other appropria-tions committees over there. They thought, well, they better go along.

President Kennedy: Yeah.Mansfield: And it’s . . . the amounts are really small. They don’t

mean anything.President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.Mansfield: But I think that, if you will, say, you will call Kirwan,

and I’ll get Bob Kerr to talk to Kirwan. That might be the best wayout of it.

President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah. Well, why don’t I call Kirwanbefore I see Wayne, and see whether I can do anything?

Mansfield: OK.President Kennedy: But, I mean, Wayne . . . [chuckles] OK, Mike.

Right.Mansfield: OK, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Good-bye, now.

Following this bit of legislative business, Kennedy met with Wayne Morsefor twenty minutes. The rest of the morning was devoted to foreign policy,and the President did not tape any of it. John McCone and McGeorgeBundy came to discuss, among other topics, the secret negotiations withFidel Castro over the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. James B.Donovan, mediator for the United States, had just arrived in Havana forhis second meeting with Castro. Having negotiated the trade of Soviet spyWilliam Fisher, also known as Rudolf Abel, for imprisoned U-2 pilotFrancis Gary Powers in the winter of 1962, Donovan was trusted by bothsides in the Cold War as an honest negotiator. And U-2s may have figuredin another aspect of this conversation. As mentioned in the editors’ intro-duction for October 8, McCone was in the midst of a campaign to per-suade the White House to permit a U-2 to fly over east central Cuba,where agents had pinpointed a possible missile installation. Bundy hadopposed McCone’s recommendation on October 5, considering it anunnecessary risk. McCone must have made some progress, as he was ableto press Kennedy further on the need for a U-2 overflight of Cuba againthe next day, October 9.

Following this Cuba discussion, the President met with his scienceadviser, Jerome B. Wiesner. The DOMINIC test series still had a month togo, and with the successful completion of the Schirra mission, there wasnothing holding back the last remaining high-altitude tests. Then thePresident performed some more legislative business, which he did tape.

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962364

12:00 P.M.

Now, it’s really your choice, and I think that if you ask Hubertand Bob not to override, they would not and would fight it.But, I don’t know whether you want to put that much at stakeon it or not.

Conversation with Albert Gore10

The Self-employed Pension Bill, H.R. 10, was passed 361–0 by Housevote on September 25 and 70–8 by Senate vote on September 28.Permitting self-employed persons to establish tax-deductible pensionfunds, it vexed the President in several ways. It was estimated to cost theU.S. Treasury an expected $100 to $125 million at a time when PresidentKennedy hoped to produce a tight budget for the upcoming fiscal year—mostly to secure passage of his tax cut proposals; it represented animportant step toward taxpayer equity but did not cover all groups withequal claims; and it struck the President that if introduced later, in a gen-eral tax reform package, it might well help secure passage of such reform,in itself a principal goal of the administration.11

Because Senator George Smathers (D-Florida) threatened to block apocket veto by keeping Congress in session as long as it would take,President Kennedy had determined that he could only sign the bill orissue an outright veto. The lopsided margins by which the bill had passeddid little to encourage a veto, and his conversation here with SenatorAlbert Gore, a prominent supporter of the administration and member ofthe Senate Finance Committee, would focus on the likelihood of an over-ride were Kennedy to issue a veto.12 Gore was one of the eight senatorswho voted against the measure during its final passage, contending that itconflicted with the administration’s tax reform proposals designed to

Conversat ion with Alber t Gore 365

10. Dictabelts 4K.8 and 48.2, Cassettes band M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s OfficeFiles, Presidential Recordings Collection. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator fromTennessee, 1953 to 1971.11. “The President’s Special News Conference with Business Editors and Publishers,” PublicPapers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1963), pp. 714–15. Under the bill, a self-employed person would be allowed to deductfrom taxable income 50 percent of contributions to a retirement fund. The annual deductionswould apply to a maximum of 10 percent of annual income with a ceiling of $2,500.12. Along with Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, Gore was the chief supporter of administra-tion plans for general tax reform.

eliminate special favors for the wealthy and politically well connected.Having ten days with which to act on passed legislation while Congressremained in session, Kennedy was fast approaching the deadline for adecision on a veto.

President Kennedy: Hello.Albert Gore: Yes?President Kennedy: Albert, how are you?Gore: Fine. How are you, Mr. President?President Kennedy: Oh, very good. Well, now, it looks, unfortunately

like we’re beginning to run out of time—Gore: Yeah, I’m afraid so.President Kennedy: —on H.R. 10. Unfort[unately] . . . I wish to hell

that Congress had gotten out Saturday.13 Now, what is your thoughtabout how we should do this? I don’t want to veto it if . . . unless we’vegot a prayer. Now, do you think we could . . . what do you think we couldget in the Senate? I don’t think we can do very well in the House.

Gore: Well, it depends on [unclear] . . . Mike will help you. 14

President Kennedy: Yeah, but Hubert’s for the bill. 15

Gore: Well, he’s for the . . . Now, Ralph Yarborough told me that hewould sustain a veto—16

President Kennedy: Right.Gore: —and announce for it. I’d say it would depend on Hubert and

Bob Kerr.17 If they will resist overriding a veto, then Mike and I can cor-ral enough others to prevent its being overridden.

President Kennedy: Well, now Hubert has told me at the last week’sbreakfast, and he said it again Saturday, that he wants . . . that he’s forthe bill.

Gore: Well . . .President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what I’ll do is I’ll get ahold of

Hubert and . . . but . . . and see where he thinks we are. What we don’t—

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962366

13. Allowing for a pocket veto.14. Mike Mansfield was a Democratic U.S. senator from Montana, 1953 to 1977, and Senatemajority leader, 1961 to 1977.15. Hubert H. Humphrey was a Democratic U.S. senator from Minnesota, 1949 to 1964 and 1971to 1978; majority whip during the Kennedy administration; and vice president, 1965 to 1969.16. Ralph Yarborough was a Democratic U.S. senator from Texas, 1957 to 1971.17. Robert S. Kerr was a U.S. senator from Oklahoma, 1948 to 1963, and chairman of the SenateFinance Committee during the Kennedy administration until his death on 1 January 1963.

Dictabelt 4K.8 ends at this point, in the middle of the conversationbetween President Kennedy and Senator Gore. The conversation is con-tinued on Dictabelt 48.2.President Kennedy: —to do is end up the session which is beginning

to pass some pretty good bills, and have it . . . have us overridden so thatwe’re 300 to 3 in the House and, you know, get about 8 or 9 votes in theSenate. That won’t . . . if we could get it close then we’ve got a . . . then itseems to me that we’d be glad to . . . I’d like to veto it.

Gore: Yeah.President Kennedy: But what we ought to do is see how many we can

get; otherwise we’ll end up on such a negative note that we won’t be invery good shape going into the election to ask for a Democratic Congress,and we’d give the Republicans something to write about for a week.

Gore: Well, of course, I want you to do whatever you think is best tobe done.

President Kennedy: Right.Gore: I am more or less saying that if you want to make a fight to

prevent the veto from being overridden, my opinion is it can be defeatedin the Senate. But it can’t be defeated unless you put yourself on the lineon the thing. Now, it’s really your choice, and I think that if you askHubert and Bob not to override, they would not and would fight it. But,I don’t know whether you want to put that much at stake on it or not.

President Kennedy: Right. Well, let me do this. Let me talk to MikeMansfield. He’s against the bill, Hubert’s for the bill, and Smathers is forthe bill. And, of course, Bobby Baker’s for the bill. . . .18

Gore: Well, you know it’s a hell of a thing, with a Democratic major-ity, to have a paid employee who is a lobbyist for a special interest bill.

President Kennedy: I know, well, he’s working for you fellas.Gore: I know [laughing].President Kennedy: [chuckling] Not for me.Gore: He never did work for you in the Senate.

Conversat ion with Alber t Gore 367

18. Bobby Baker was secretary to the Senate majority leader, 1955 to 1963. As secretary toSenate majority leaders Lyndon Johnson and Mike Mansfield, Baker established himself as apreeminent head counter and dispenser of unofficial favors. He also became an unofficial lob-byist through his Washington, D.C., law firm, Tucker and Baker, and earned a substantialincome even as he drew the meager salary attached to his official occupation. Though officiallyattached to Senator Mansfield at this point, Baker worked much more closely with SenatorKerr and often reflected Kerr’s views on any particular piece of legislation or governmentbusiness. In January 1967, Baker would be convicted of income tax evasion, theft, and conspir-acy to defraud the government.

President Kennedy: [laughing] No, I know that . . . I know that. But Iwill talk to Mike and ask Mike what . . . how many votes he thinks he canget and also Bob Kerr, and I’ll be talking to you again before we do any-thing. Now, it may be that the House won’t have a quorum by Wednesday.We can see what that situation is. But I won’t do anything on this thinguntil late . . . until whatever the time limit is on it.

Gore: I doubt very much if the House will have a quorum, and theSenate will have a hell of a time getting a quorum.

President Kennedy: Well, we’ll take a look. So we’ve got another 48hours on it, and in the meanwhile, I’ll be talking to you beforewhat[ever] . . . I make a decision.

Gore: Whatever you do is satisfactory to me, and I’ll come back upand make whatever fight you want made.

President Kennedy: OK, fine . . . well—Gore: Whatever you decide, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Good. Well, I’m going to have breakfast with

Mike in the morning and then I’ll be back in touch with you before wemake a final decision.

Gore: OK.President Kennedy: Thanks, Albert.

On October 10, 1962, two days after this conversation and six hoursbefore the deadline, Kennedy signed the Self-employed Pension Billwithout comment.

Kennedy’s last appointment before lunch was an unrecorded meetingwith Walt W. Rostow, counselor of the Department of State and chair-man of the Policy Planning Council.

The only meeting the President taped on this day was a continuationof the previous Tuesday’s $100 billion budget discussion. This followedan unrecorded meeting of Bell, Sorensen, O’Brien, and O’Donnell.

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962368

4:48–5:10 P.M.

[S]ome feel that we’re going to have to break the 100 billiondollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in the elec-tion year.

Meeting on the Budget19

Though Pennsylvania senator Joseph Clark lamented in 1963 when dis-cussing the national debt and the federal deficit that “no topic in ourtime has been the victim of so much nonsense,” few then were willing tocountenance the ideas of President Kennedy and his economic adviserson the subject. Kennedy and CEA chairman Walter Heller and otheradministration economists called for a small measure of deficit spending,for accelerated public works outlays, and for a federal income tax cut tomove the nation’s economy toward full employment and toward its pro-ductive potential.20 Though U.S. corporations had increased their indebt-edness in the 1957 to 1962 period by approximately 200 percent, U.S.individuals by approximately 380 percent, and state and local govern-ments by approximately 400 percent, the federal government wasexpected to avoid this trend; Kennedy’s political opponents lost littlesleep driving this point home to the American public.

As President Kennedy planned for last-minute campaign stops,mostly in the Midwest and Northeast (and in Senator Clark’s home stateon five separate occasions), former President Eisenhower was engaged ina campaign tour of his own, stumping for Republican congressional can-didates, speaking pejoratively of Kennedy’s domestic program as the“Far Frontier,” and warning the nation of Kennedy’s, and by proxy, theDemocratic Party’s, fiscal recklessness. At the meeting detailed below,Douglas Dillon, Kennedy’s secretary of the Treasury, and formerlyunder secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration, began byrecalling the methods under which spending plans had been presented in

Meeting on the Budget 369

19. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Henry Fowler, Walter Heller,Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer Staats. Tape 27A, John F. Kennedy Library,President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.20. See “Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting aProposed Stand-By Capital Improvements Act. 19 February 1962,” Public Papers of thePresidents, pp. 143–44; “Remarks Upon Signing the Public Works Acceleration Act. 14September 1962,” ibid., pp. 682–83.

the previous administration. Though the first part of the meeting wasnot captured on tape, the recorded portion began with Dillon counselingthe use of low-spending estimates and reminding his colleagues in theKennedy administration of how that device had helped the Eisenhoweradministration limp toward its modestly higher spending targets.

Kennedy pressed Chairman Heller to use the White House as a “pul-pit for public education in economics.” Nevertheless, the Presidentbelieved that there were limits on what the administration could do.Though a tax cut would be difficult to pass, increased spending—in anobvious and direct fashion—seemed politically out of the question.21

Consequently, with an eye toward the creation of a conservative-liberalcoalition and the postwar reconfiguration of a tax code designed largelyfor World War II, Kennedy gravitated more and more toward the taxcut proposal as the preferred economic stimulus.22 Accordingly, ques-tions like how to spend more on targeted investments, how to avoid dra-conian cuts elsewhere, and how to present a budget that would appear“responsible” enough to win a tax cut, defined the discussion as Kennedyand his advisers considered and wrestled with the administration’sfuture budget proposals.

Begins in midconversation.Douglas Dillon: . . . expenditures on the low side, because it wouldn’t

mean anything if they actually . . . if more was spent because it was . . .how much you would spend on past commitments, whether you spentmore than estimated. It doesn’t stop you from delivering somethingthat’s already in the pipeline. And we deliberately made our estimateslow, thinking they might run over, and actually they very seldom, if ever,did. Oh, it was . . . services couldn’t deliver quite as many and some hap-pily stayed with it. But the key thing is what you request. And in a way,what you rec[ommend] . . . put down for these two items in expendi-tures; you really run off the preceding year’s tendency for a good esti-

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962370

21. Heller noted that when Kennedy called for a balanced budget in his 1961 State of theUnion address, “we counted seven escape hatches” [quoted in Walter W. Heller, NewDimensions in Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 31].22. Kennedy may never have given up on the idea of economic prosperity through increasedgovernment spending. Only 11 days before his assassination, with the tax cut bill as yet bot-tled up in the Senate Finance Committee, Kennedy reminded Heller, “First we’ll get your taxcut, and then we’ll get my expenditure programs” (quoted in Heller, New Dimensions, p. 113).

mate rather tightly. So I think that these two figures can stand up verywell on the basis of the previous criterion.

President Kennedy: I think we can do something there. Now, the . . .Peace Corps.

David Bell: This is also, of course, the USIA and the State Department;there are small increases for both.

Elmer Staats: For the Peace Corps, this would hold them at about thelevel of where they would be just about a year from now. About a yearfrom now they’ll be just about 10,000.

President Kennedy: Soybeans? Has Larry O’Brien left?23 We’regoing to know a little more after this election about agriculture.24

Dillon: Sure. Well, Dave said there have been some other reductions;. . . price support would be real difficult.25 He said he felt soybeans waspossible and wouldn’t make any difference anyway if you can use itright.26

Bell: The main . . . the main money in here is the rural housing loans.That’s the main issue, Mr. President.

Dillon: Let’s see . . . it’s 50 million and 75.Bell: The REA generating loans is also a tough one.27 [Pause.] Well,

these—Dillon: In determining anything, it’s just . . . just not going up as fast

as you were doing. That’s the whole point . . . if that’s where you’re plan-ning to go.

President Kennedy: I don’t think we can probably get medical careby if we don’t cover the non–Social Security beneficiaries.28

Meeting on the Budget 371

23. Lawrence F. O’Brien was special assistant to the President for congressional relations,1961 to 1965.24. In the domain of agricultural policy, the Kennedy administration was attempting to moveaway from price supports to a regime characterized by direct payments to producers and less-ened market interference. 25. The reference is to reductions in agricultural price supports.26. Soybeans, emerging as a major export crop, were not subject to acreage control limita-tions, nor would they later be eligible for direct payments. In most years—1957, 1958, and1961 being the exceptions—soybean market prices had remained above predetermined sup-port levels.27. The REA is the Rural Electrification Administration.28. Kennedy’s proposal for medical care for the aged was not faring well, politically, and at theend of his administration, stood as one of his more notable legislative failures. Indeed, theMedicare proposal that finally became legislation in 1965 required quite a bit of politicalmaneuvering, the addition of a Medicaid program for the poor of all ages, and the force of theJohnson landslide in the 1964 presidential election in order to prevail.

Dillon: Well, this is just a deferment for one year—President Kennedy: Yeah.Dillon: —if you wanted to.President Kennedy: Yeah.Bell: Now, this would mean on the education, Mr. President, this

would mean no program at all in the elementary and secondary field.That’s what the implication of this would be.

President Kennedy: Well, we can’t get it by.29 It’s just really as if . . .almost a political question as to whether we update it or recommend it,because [unclear] I think was—

Bell: There have been these suggestions to . . . Remember this yearyou had a recommendation for a quality improvement bill. And this 141million is just everything we had in for that and, as well as, direct aid toschool districts for construction and teachers’ salaries and so on.

President Kennedy: All right. Well I want Ted [Sorensen] to look atwhat we ought to do about . . . what we ought to recommend in the field ofeducation.

Theodore Sorensen: I think, like many things in this list, Mr.President, we can make a judgment on this at the time we make our leg-islative program judgments, and the time we make that judgment reallyis after election day. If we lose 40 seats, we’re not going to be going upwith the same education bill.

President Kennedy: If we lose ten seats. We lost one already. Twenty-second pause.All right, on the Interior Department, I think we can do something

on that by taking another item . . .Bell: Well, the Indian schools is an important—President Kennedy: That’s pretty hard to do, we don’t want to . . .

but the other thing, oceanography, helium, conservation, water fowl landacquisition, fisheries program, increased acquisition of recreational land,acceleration to improvement of parks and public lands. All those—

Dillon: This is all increased acquisition and acceleration of improve-ments that we’re talking about; they’d still be moving ahead at presentrates which is already increased over what was ever done before.[Unclear] that’s all we’re talking about.

President Kennedy: Occupational safety legislation. What is that, now?

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962372

29. As he predicted, Kennedy’s aid to education proposals for the 87th Congress weredefeated.

Bell: That’s a legislative proposal and it’s not much money. Six oreight million . . .

Sorensen: Grants to states. It’s a very small amount.Bell: Yeah, 6 or 8 million dollars.President Kennedy: What does it do? What do we do with them?Bell: They would be grants to the state labor departments to pro-

mote occupational safety standards in factories.Unidentified: It’s research.Bell: [Unclear] would also be involved.Dillon: And, as I said to this thing, this is illustrative—Unidentified: Uh-huh.Dillon: —and economic [unclear] 6 or 7 million dollars . . .Bell: The key point here—President Kennedy: Well, I think the only way you’re really going to

save much with these 6 and 8 million dollar grants—Unidentified: [Unclear.]Bell: Yes. That’s right.President Kennedy: [Unclear] big programs are too—Bell: Yeah.President Kennedy: —have too . . . but, I mean, if you get these agen-

cies all thinking about these smaller ones . . .Bell: Well, the important issue here would be the training . . . piece of

that. We got in a big fight with the Labor Department about that. We’realready a good deal lower than they think we should be.

Twelve-second pause.President Kennedy: GSA.30 That could—Bell: That, of course, is, that’s work on buildings, primarily. And you

can set that about any pace you want.President Kennedy: Reduced direct housing loans are proposed,

25,000 housing loans, 23,000 loans?Bell: Yeah.President Kennedy: I don’t know really why the Veterans

Administration is in the direct loans these days, anyway. How is it?Bell: Simply for historical reasons. We got in after World War II. And

successive Budget Bureaus and presidents have been trying to get themout. Last year, after a considerable fight with Teague, we got an agreementunder which this program goes along, but the veterans begin to lose eligi-

Meeting on the Budget 373

30. The abbreviation GSA stands for General Services Administration.

bility after a certain number of years.31 And a good slug of the veterans arebeginning, now, to lose their eligibility under that legislation. So this willbe phased out in a period of four or five more years . . . the bulk of it, as Irecall. By ’68, I think . . . you’re just about through with this. But that wasthe best we could do in terms of the legislative agreement. And, meantime,they do have the authority and the veterans are eligible. So you, presum-ably, have to . . . they . . . they’re under restriction now. They’re holdingback. They could lend a lot more. The question is kind of where you drawthe line of how much heat you’re willing to take to prevent loans beingmade that actually could be made under the existing law.

Unidentified: Yeah.Bell: Twenty-five thousand is about the level this year, and it’s about

the same as the level last year. This involves some cutback.Fourteen-second pause.President Kennedy: But, some feel that we’re going to have to break

the 100 billion dollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in theelection year.

Dillon: Well, I think you may well. . . . I don’t know what you’regonna be in, you may well break it in NOA; that’s going to be a differentfigure entirely.32 We’re talking about expenditures here. How muchhigher is NOA in August, here?

Sorensen: I thought we’d already broken a 100 billion dollars.Unidentified: Oh, we’re up by 6 or 7 billion.Dillon: Well, that was a different NOA. [Pause.]Sorensen: You know that it’s being broken this year?Unidentified: Yeah.Bell: About to be five . . . under these figures which are August 30th

figures.Dillon: So that . . . that includes—Bell: Mostly 2 billion dollars for the IMF and a lot of things like

that, that are not actual expenditures.33 It won’t be actual expenditures.Dillon: If we break it next year in NOA so the budgets that are going

in would be over—Bell: No, it’s broken now!

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962374

31. Olin E. “Tiger” Teague was a U.S. representative from Texas, 1947 to 1979; chairman ofthe House Committee on Veterans Affairs, 1963 to 1973; and a much-decorated World War IIveteran.32. The abbreviation NOA stands for new obligational authority.33. The abbreviation IMF stands for the International Monetary Fund.

Dillon: Well, it will be again next year.Bell: Oh, yes, yes . . . [unclear].Dillon: So, for that reason, I would think in the . . . if it’s broken, then

the . . . I’m only thinking of the expenditure side, would seem to be your. . . your tax reduction . . . what chance you have to get it.

Walter Heller: Well, there . . . there, you know, there are some otherarguments that point on the up side. Every dollar of expenditure increasegives you more punch. You get a dollar of tax reduction because you’resurer of the economic impact and certainly the . . . the slack in the economy.

Secondly, I suppose there is there some validity in the argument that ifCongress is going to cut taxes, and they’re going to want to make a show-ing of cutting your expenditure proposals—as part of the price of admis-sion of the tax cut—to put them up a little higher doesn’t make you look asgood, I grant, if they cut, but it gives them the feeling that they’ve paid theprice of admission for a tax cut. Well, it’s just that a number of thesethings, I think, are cheaper if we do them now than if we do them later.

Dillon: The real problem with that cutting business is that they getthose people involved, and the Ways and Means Committee and theFinance Committee are not the Appropriations Committee, and theywill, they’ll [unclear]. The chances of getting any tax reduction is goingto be very difficult anyway, and it’s required that . . . showing that we’rereally trying to hold down expenditures.

Bell: I think . . . I believe, now, that you have to—Dillon: Well, they’re not—Bell: I don’t make anything out of your third argument. The others, I

think, are something that, you know . . .Unidentified: [Unclear.]Bell: The basic problem is that the President’s program would cost

this much. And if you’re going to cut it, you’re going to cut the pro-grams. And this is on the one side, and the strategy of dealing with theCongress is on the other side, although there are arguments both wayson the strategy side.

Dillon: But these are all sort of picking at things, and—Unidentified: [Coughs.]Dillon: —certainly they are all . . . the foreign aid ones are not

enough, are not any cuts, actually, and—Bell: Yes, Congress—[Unclear exchange.]Dillon: —very little.Bell: Yeah, not very much, but—President Kennedy: How about the Indian thing we can cut, but that

isn’t very much money in that anyway . . . it’s only about 4 or 5 million?

Meeting on the Budget 375

Bell: Which, sir?President Kennedy: The Indian schools.Bell: Oh no, sir, it’s more than that. I’d say, probably, 15 or 20 million.President Kennedy: Is it really?Bell: Yeah. You see, the previous administration left us in lousy shape

on Indian schools.Staats: I don’t believe it’s that much in this one year, but it’s about a

three- or four-year program all together. But in the first—President Kennedy: Are the schools pretty bad?Bell: Well, yeah.Staats: Yeah, pretty—Bell: Some of the kids didn’t have school at all.Staats: A lot of the children just don’t have any school.President Kennedy: Well, if we’ve got to get a good speech, well, we

ought to give it Wednesday night or through this weekend.34 I ought tostick to my script, about some of the things we’ve done. As I say, thatthing on agriculture is really impressive. It’s hard to give these speechesto these . . . threefold, obviously, but it seems to me, over the weekend, ifwe can sort of get about three or four speeches—like this Indian schoolthing—it’d show what we’ve done there as opposed to . . . it would builda better base for—

Bell: I think this is, this is 10 million dollars.President Kennedy: I think that’s sort of the theme for this weekend.Bell: Ten million dollars [unclear].President Kennedy: Congress will be closing . . . these will be dead-

locked.Unidentified: [Unclear] the Indian schools.Dillon: The increase.Unidentified: Ten [unclear], sir.President Kennedy: It’s a hell of a story, the . . . I think the agency

may even see it right. Put them all together . . . four different speeches orthree, you’ll have a chance to do these domestic things.

[Pause.] OK, now . . .Dillon: We simply . . . approach on this, as Ted said, a lot of these

decisions you can’t take until you sit down and do the final thing. It’s just

M O N DAY, O C TO B E R 8, 1962376

34. President Kennedy gave a series of congressional campaign speeches in Ohio, Michigan,and Minnesota, 5 to 7 October 1962, and in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and NewYork, 12 to 15 October 1962. Wednesday, 10 October 1962, he spoke in Baltimore, Maryland.

a question whether to start off trying to make decisions up here or startoff down here and then if you spot down—

President Kennedy: All right, well, let’s start off with 98.5, Dave, andthen let’s . . . we’ll have to get each one.35 Anything that’s added beyond thatwill have to be added as a result of a decision that we’ll take individually.

Bell: OK.President Kennedy: We may go up to 108 billion, [unclear] go back

to a hundred, but let’s start with the . . . Are you going to [unclear]?Dillon: I don’t know where you come out.Unidentified: Before the last election—Staats: These are bridges we can cross a little better after we get a

little further along with our message. [Pause.]Dillon: Mr. President, you might like to note that [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: [Unclear.]Dillon: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: We can divide that, Ted, I was thinking that. . . .

So what do you think about this thing, trying to—Sorensen: Well, I think, you know it depends a little bit on the audi-

ence.President Kennedy: Hard to make it as a speech, but I . . . I’d like to

get it in as a sort of—Sorensen: Going on nationwide television, that is something that—Unidentified: [Unclear.]Sorensen: [Unclear] I’m already concerned [unclear] that the whole

thing together, although that’s . . . that’s—President Kennedy: That’ll be a boring speech?36

Sorensen: It’s a less-boring speech. What you need to remember is,given that audience type and—

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Sorensen: Out in Minnesota and all . . .President Kennedy: You haven’t got about15 [unclear] that’s a mean

feat. [Unclear] can stand on the ground. Now those [unclear].Unidentified: Yeah.

Meeting on the Budget 377

35. Reference is to the $981/2 billion administrative budget (excluding trust fund transactions).36. After his 13 August 1962 televised address to the nation on economic policy, delivered with aplethora of statistics and accompanying charts and graphs, President Kennedy seemed particu-larly concerned that such presentations never be delivered again in such an uninteresting style.

President Kennedy: That poll shows Judd ahead.37

Sorensen: [Unclear] the firsthand meeting [unclear].Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: If Judd gets to 43 percent . . .Sorensen: Yeah, [unclear] and Andersen’s pulled up an old [unclear].38

Unidentified: [Unclear.]Unidentified: That just seems ridiculous.Heller: Did Hubert say that he was doubtful about that poll?38

President Kennedy: Which one?Heller: This . . . you haven’t [unclear] this poll, this last one?39

President Kennedy: Yeah, well, no . . . I think we’d better, I don’tthink they’ve got much of a poll. I just think the problem is that . . . oop,turn that up, will you? Just turn them up.

The President turned off the machine.

The Secretary of the Treasury stayed behind to continue the discussionwith the President and Walter Heller. The President had some time formore telephone calls, then he went to the pool at 7:03 P.M.

Tuesday, October 9, 1962

The President left only one recording from this important day. An hourbefore he was to sign a piece of pork barrel legislation to satisfy a diffi-cult and powerful congressman, the President called Senate MajorityLeader Mike Mansfield for mutual congratulations on the approval of acompromise version of the foreign aid bill providing for a $300 millionincrease over the amount voted by the House.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 9, 1962378

37. Walter H. Judd was a Republican U.S. representative from Minnesota and keynote speakerat the 1960 Republican National Convention. Judd, in what was considered a mild upset at thetime, lost in the 1962 election to Democratic state senator Donald M. Fraser.38. This is mostly likely a reference to Elmer Lee Andersen, governor of Minnesota, then run-ning for reelection in 1962. His reelection bid resulted in the closest election in Minnesotahistory with a loss to his opponent by 91 votes.39. Hubert H. Humphrey was a U.S. senator from Minnesota.40. A University of Minnesota professor of economics before joining the Kennedy administra-tion, Walter Heller was particularly interested in this Minnesota congressional race.

9:54 A.M.

Are you sure you don’t want to witness this—this extraordi-nary action as I’m bulldozed and bludgeoned and beaten intobeing the greatest friend of the fish . . . ?

Conversation with Mike Mansfield and Mike Kirwan1

Congressman Michael “Big Mike” Kirwan had raised the hackles of SenatorWayne Morse by removing, in conference committee on the Interior andOther Agencies Appropriations Bill, several large public works projectsdestined for Morse’s Oregon. His sole reason, publicly announced, wasthat Morse had refused to support his $10 million national aquarium pro-posal for the same bill. Recognizing both the capricious nature of Kirwan’smaneuvers and also the importance of pleasing the chair of the DemocraticCongressional Campaign Committee, who was also a senior member of theAppropriations Committee, Kennedy asked Senator Mansfield and SenatorRobert Kerr of Oklahoma to help him settle the Kirwan-Morse dispute.President Kennedy confers here with Mansfield before speaking to Kirwanin an effort to conclude a settlement agreeable to Kirwan, Morse, and thePresident himself. And though the President signed the Aquarium Billlater that morning, as he promises here, and Kirwan dutifully restoredMorse’s public works projects in the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, thenational aquarium project itself, planned for the Hains Point area of thenation’s capital, remained dependent on congressional funding that wasultimately never provided.

Mike Mansfield: [Unclear] it’s for you, Mike Kirwan and I.President Kennedy: Right.Mansfield: I told Mike to put the Oregon items back.President Kennedy: Right.Mansfield: And, he would appreciate it—if you’re going to do it—he

asked [unclear] that you sign the Aquarium Bill as soon as you can.President Kennedy: Right. In other words, you would not wait on it?

Conversat ion with Mike Mansf ie ld and Mike Kirwan 379

1. Dictabelt 49.1, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection. Mike Mansfield was Democratic U.S. senator from Montana, 1953 to1977, and Senate majority leader, 1961 to 1977. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. rep-resentative from Ohio, 1937 to 1970.

Mansfield: No.President Kennedy: Right.Mansfield: It would make Mike very happy.President Kennedy: Oh, good. I’ll sign it this morning, then.Mansfield: Fine [unclear] here—wait a minute. Good-bye. Here’s

Mike.President Kennedy: Yeah.Mike Kirwan: Hello.President Kennedy: Hello, hello.Kirwan: Yes.President Kennedy: How are you doing?Kirwan: This is Mike . . .President Kennedy: Are you sure you don’t want to witness this—Kirwan: No, no . . . no.President Kennedy: —this extraordinary action as I’m bulldozed and

bludgeoned and beaten into being the greatest friend of the fish . . . ?Kirwan: That’s . . . . Do you want me to go down, then?President Kennedy: I’ve eaten more fish . . .Kirwan: What? Well, do you want me to go down?President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you come down and watch it?Kirwan: All right. That’s what I’ll . . . when are you going to do it?President Kennedy: Well, I’ll do it whenever you want to be down here.Kirwan: All right. I’ll go right down now, then.President Kennedy: OK. Right.

The President had an important meeting on Berlin scheduled with theFrench foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, with whom heintended to share U.S. estimates of how long it would take the allies torespond to a Soviet provocation in Berlin. It would take four days, forexample, to launch a battalion-sized probe on the Berlin autobahn. The twomen would agree that, given the current tensions on Berlin, contingencyplanning had to be improved to allow for a much faster response time.2

The President also had two significant meetings on Cuba. Beforelunch he met with John McCone, Robert Kennedy, Edwin Martin,George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Ralph A. Dungan. In the late after-noon he met again with John McCone, and included Maxwell Taylor andRoswell Gilpatric. The principal decision facing Kennedy was whether toendorse the CIA request for a U-2 flight over San Cristóbal in west cen-

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 9, 1962380

2. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 October 1962, FRUS, 15: 351–55.

tral Cuba. The flight was to be over Cuba for only 12 minutes but wouldcome close to some identified SAM sites. The risks were high. The lasttime the CIA had photographed this part of the island was August 29and new SAM sites might have been constructed since then. ThePresident approved this mission.3 The U-2 would make its direct over-flight on October 14.

Wednesday, October 10, 1962

John McCone made an unscheduled visit to the White House on October10. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had just met with theHouse Appropriations Committee to discuss James B. Donovan’s negoti-ations with Fidel Castro on the Bay of Pigs prisoners. McCone foundsome congressional uneasiness about these negotiations. Newspapers onTuesday had carried front-page stories on Donovan’s mission, a poten-tial partisan political issue. Donovan was running for the Senate againstthe Republican Jacob Javits in New York. It was reported that the 1,113prisoners were expected back in Miami by the weekend.1 The DCI alsowanted to brief the President on low-level photographs of the cargoeson the Soviet merchant ships headed for Cuba. Several ships carriedcrates that photoanalysts believed contained IL-28 bombers. This wasthe first hard evidence of the delivery of weapons that might be con-strued as offensive in character.

Kennedy did not tape this meeting; however, from McCone’s detailedsummary it is clear that the President was disturbed by these new pho-tographs.2 As he had done when the first U-2 photographs of SAM siteswere developed, Kennedy asked that this material be withheld from therest of his administration. His argument was that the domestic politicalsituation was such that any leak of the information about possiblebombers would reduce his independence of action. McCone arguedagainst strict restriction and gained the President’s approval to reducingthe circle of the informed to the President’s key advisers and those intel-ligence officers required to give expert analysis.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 10, 1962 381

3. Gilpatric “Notes on a Meeting with the President,” 9 October 1962, described in FRUS, 11: 17.

1. “Final Parley Set on Cuba Captives,” New York Times, 9 October 1962. James Donovanreturned from Cuba on October 11 empty handed.2. Memorandum on Donovan Project, Meeting 10 October 62, John McCone, FRUS, 11: 17–19.

“We’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba,” McCone recordedthe President as saying. Kennedy expected a new operational plan forCuba from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the week of October 14.

At some point during the day, the President called an old friend,Senator George Smathers of Florida. Like McCone, Smathers was a prodon the subject of Cuba. The President, Smathers later recalled, “alwaysidentified me with pushing, pushing, pushing.”3 The immediate reasonfor the telephone call was that the President had signed Smathers’s Self-employed Pension Bill. The President so disliked his friend’s bill that hesigned it without ceremony.

Time Unknown

I just don’t want these guys around; particularly if this Cubanthing ever works out . . . So, we’ve got to get them out tomor-row night. Then everybody goes home, and, shit, nobody knowswhat the hell’s going on.

Conversation with George Smathers4

Wanting to avoid the imminent override of a veto he had hoped to deliver,Kennedy consented to sign H.R. 10, the Self-employed Pension Bill, onlyhours before its deadline, and three days before the adjournment of the87th Congress. The bill’s chief Senate sponsor, George Smathers ofFlorida, had warned the President on September 28 not to consider apocket veto; Smathers pledged to keep Congress in session past the sign-ing deadline to prevent just such a possibility. Though President Kennedyobjected to the legislation on the grounds that it would reduce federalrevenue by $100 to $125 million and would largely benefit wealthy attor-neys and physicians, he signed it, reluctantly, and called Smathers after-ward to break the news. There would, however, be no signing ceremonyfor this bill and Kennedy would ask Senator Smathers not to broadcastnews of the signing that evening.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 10, 1962382

3. Cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: BallantineBooks, 1978), p. 530.4. Dictabelt 50.3, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection. George A. Smathers was a Democratic U.S. senator from Florida, 1951to 1969.

Despite their differences over this bill, Kennedy and Smathers enjoyeda warm relationship marked by frequent golf outings and White Housebreakfasts. Ostensibly a courtesy call to inform Smathers of the late-breaking news, this conversation would meander, as well, into a discus-sion of the James Meredith–University of Mississippi crisis, the Donovannegotiations with Castro, and the lingering showdown over the handfulof appropriations bills yet to be completed.

President Kennedy: [Unclear] Smathers that I’d do what you want todo, and I just signed that goddamned bill.5

George Smathers: Did you really?President Kennedy: Yeah, in spite of the fact that they tell me there

isn’t a quorum present up there. I just figured that a hundred were goingto show—in spite of what Drew Pearson said.

Smathers: I was getting ready to say, that article by . . . DrewPearson’s going to be mad at you.6

President Kennedy: Well, I know that. He is going to be mad at me,but that won’t be new.

Smathers: Yeah. That’s right, well he’s such a bad guy . . . But youreally signed it?

President Kennedy: Yeah, I signed it.Smathers: Well, I think that’s fine. Actually, Mr. President, I—President Kennedy: No, no, no . . . don’t tell me how good it is.Smathers: No, I’m not going to tell you how good it is; I’m going to

tell you, politically, it’ll be good. It’ll be good.President Kennedy: What about . . . can you get those guys out of

there tomorrow night? 7

Smathers: I think so. It’s Russell now. 8

Conversat ion with George Smathers 383

5. The Self-employed Pension Bill, H.R. 10, also known as the Keough-Smathers Bill.6. Reference to a Drew Pearson column published that morning in the Washington Post, dis-cussed in greater detail, below (see Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round: Sen.Smathers Puts Up Roadblock,” Washington Post, 10 October 1962, p. D11).7. A reference to the Senate and to Congress in general. On the heels of the first national elec-tions during the Kennedy administration, the President is anxious to see Congress adjournand head home for the last few weeks of the campaign.8. Richard Russell, Democratic U.S. senator from Georgia, was in the middle of a fight withHouse conferees over the Department of Agriculture Appropriations Act, one of a handful ofappropriations bills not yet completed. Jamie Whitten, Democratic U.S. representative fromMississippi and chair of the House Agriculture Subcommittee of the AppropriationsCommittee, had suggested that Senate amendments not previously considered by a House

President Kennedy: I know, but, God, can’t we tell him we’ll give itout of the contingency or we’ll do it with something else? I mean isn’tthere something that we can do with that goddamned Jamie Whitten?9

Smathers: I know it, it’s awful. But that’s the . . . everything else issoluble—quickly . . . except that. I—

President Kennedy: Well, if we get everything else, I just don’t wantthese guys around; particularly if this Cuban thing ever works out, wewant them out of there.

Smathers: That’s right.President Kennedy: So, we’ve got to get them out tomorrow night.

Then everybody goes home, and, shit, nobody knows what the hell’sgoing on.

Smathers: Exactly . . . exactly.President Kennedy: There’s nothing that can be done with those god

. . . Come on. You’d think those southerners . . . I thought you southern-ers were thick as thieves?

Smathers: Well, we are! We are! But not . . . but Jamie doesn’t wantto go home. The difficulty is—

President Kennedy: He doesn’t want to go home?Smathers: He doesn’t want to go home. He wants to stay up here.President Kennedy: That’s a—Smathers: And Dick Russell doesn’t want to go. He told me this after-

noon, he said . . . I said, “Dick, can’t we get this damn thing settled?” Andhe said, “Well, not before next week.” I said, “Well, Jesus Christ!” And hesaid, “Well, frankly, I’m not much interested in going home anyway.”

President Kennedy: God, that’s a selfish fucking attitude, isn’t it?With a lot of guys running for reelection?

Smathers: Yes, it is . . . yes. I know it. It’s terrible. But many south-erners don’t want to go home. This is a problem. Sam Ervin said, 10 “I’velost my enthusiasm for going home, now with this Mississippi thing.”11

President Kennedy: He thinks he’s going to get a lot of—

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 10, 1962384

committee or sent down from the President were to be excluded from the conference reportand final bill. Angered on the basis of principle and by the removal of a $1.6 million amend-ment for a peanut-marketing research facility in Dawson, Georgia, Russell intended to keepCongress working until he got his way.9. See note 8.10. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., was Democratic U.S. senator from North Carolina, 1954 to 1975.11. Reference to the crisis at the University of Mississippi following James Meredith’sattempts to register from 25 September to 1 October.

Smathers: Sikes12 and Herlong, all of these fellas ought to be run-ning, and they’re here.13 Paul Rogers talked to him a little while ago . . .he’s not going home!14

President Kennedy: Why? He doesn’t want to listen to all that moan-ing?

Smathers: Well, they don’t want to listen to all that moaning andthey don’t want to be put in a position where they’ve either got to jumpon you or, you know, get with Barnett.15 And they don’t figure thateither one is too good at the moment. So they’re just trying to let it cool.

President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah.Smathers: And this is what I think is wrong—President Kennedy: Of course, I think they ought to be able to get

some middle position . . . just regret this—Smathers: That’s right. Well, the southern governors did very well.President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.Smathers: They did very well.President Kennedy: I think, why don’t they just keep quiet about it

and just say “Well, it’s a regrettable incident—period.” That’s all I’d sayif I were a southerner.

Smathers: Yeah.President Kennedy: Just say “I regret what happened, this is not very

. . . ” you know, and then just go on to something else. Shit, nobody’s—Smathers: Well, that’s what I’m saying. We handled it all right—President Kennedy: Then nobody knows whether you regret that

Meredith entered or you regretted that troops were used or you regret-ted bloodshed or you regretted that you knew me.

Smathers: That’s right. I deplore—President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Smathers: —extremism. See, we handled it well in Florida, and it could

have been handled with a little . . . exercised a little judgment and—President Kennedy: Leadership.Smathers: —and leadership, it could have been handled elsewhere.

And then I’d move on.

Conversat ion with George Smathers 385

12. Robert L. F. Sikes was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1941 to 1979, andsenior member of the House Appropriations Committee.13. A. Sydney Herlong, Jr., was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1949 to 1969.14. Paul G. Rogers was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1955 to 1979.15. Ross Barnett, segregationist governor of Mississippi from 1960 to 1964, refused to registerMeredith at Ole Miss, touching off a riot and President Kennedy’s deployment of federal troops.

President Kennedy: [Snickers.]Smathers: Thompson said he was pretty disturbed about the fact that

. . . you . . . didn’t take his word for it . . . said Thompson.16 We’re goingto finally find the southern [unclear] that is going to say, “Thompsontalked to me about going to the President.” We haven’t found it yet. AndDrew Pearson gets you right over the barrel.

President Kennedy: What about Drew? He was pretty mean thismorning, wasn’t he?17

Smathers: God, he was nasty. Jesus!President Kennedy: That comes out of “my shins are black and blue”?Smathers: That’s right. I eat your food and then I spit all over you

and kick you in the shins . . .President Kennedy: He doesn’t know about all those votes you gave us?Smathers: That’s right. He doesn’t want to know about them. He’s

going to stay with those four fellas, or eight fellas.President Kennedy: Estes? He’s got Estes.18

Smathers: Estes and Albert.19

President Kennedy: Yeah, Estes feeds him that stuff.Smathers: Yeah, I know it.President Kennedy: Estes and Albert.Smathers: That’s right.President Kennedy: And Wayne.20

Smathers: And Wayne gives it to him. Wayne’s up here raising hellagain.

President Kennedy: Is he? About what? His public works?21

Smathers: Yeah.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 10, 1962386

16. Reference to William “Bill” Thompson, president of the East Coast Railway, who had recentlyjoined President Kennedy, Smathers, and Bill Dale of the First National Bank of Orlando for acruise aboard the presidential yacht, Honey Fitz. All three of Kennedy’s guests were the subject ofan acerbic Drew Pearson column in the Washington Post that morning and were cited as evidenceof Kennedy’s predilection for treating his political enemies better than his political allies.17. Pearson, “Sen. Smathers Puts Up a Roadblock.” “The interesting thing,” Pearson noted,assaying the Kennedy-Smathers relationship, “is that the more the debonair Senator kicks himon the legislative shins, the more his old golfing partner comes back smiling.”18. Estes Kefauver was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1949 to 1963, and theDemocratic vice-presidential nominee in 1956.19. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1953 to 1971.20. Wayne Morse was Republican U.S. senator from Oregon, 1945 to 1952; Independent U.S.senator from Oregon, 1952 to 1955; and Democratic U.S. senator from Oregon, 1955 to 1969.21. Public works projects for Oregon removed during conference committee on Interior andOther Agencies Appropriations Act at the behest of Representative Michael Kirwan, the chairof the House conferees.

President Kennedy: Jeez! We got that all fixed!Smathers: I know, but he’s still mad, and still talking about it, and he

came in and made a big speech yesterday about how he told you. . . . Hesaid, “I said, Mr. President, I’m not going to permit this to happen. I’mnot going to let our Democratic party . . . ”Have you ever heard anythingso repulsive in your whole life?

President Kennedy: I know it. He never says . . . It doesn’t matter tome, and here we got it all fixed with Kirwan and I signed his goddamnedbill, 22 and I called him up and said he’ll let it go on the Supplemental.23

No, no, he wants to . . . he’s sore at me because I took away his issue.Smathers: That’s right. That’s right.President Kennedy: But he comes . . . oh well.Smathers: But he’s making some more over here.President Kennedy: Another speech?Smathers: Yeah. He’s got a speech on . . . I don’t know what the hell

it was. Something about the District of Columbia.President Kennedy: Wait until he hears about H.R. 10.Smathers: Oh, he’ll die. He’ll die. Well, I’m delighted you signed it,

and—President Kennedy: Well, don’t say anything about it for a while.

Until they get out of there tonight. OK?Smathers: I won’t say anything.President Kennedy: OK. It’ll come out soon enough.Smathers: Yeah.President Kennedy: Gore will be coming in [unclear] up from

Tennessee.24

Smathers: Yeah. That’s right.President Kennedy: OK.Smathers: Thank you a million.President Kennedy: Righto.Smathers: I really appreciate it, and best of luck.

After speaking with Smathers, the President called the House sponsor ofthe pension bill.

Conversat ion with George Smathers 387

22. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. representative from Ohio. See “Conversationbetween President Kennedy and Mike Mansfield,” 8 October 1962, for additional detail on theKirwan-Morse confrontation.23. Supplemental Appropriations Bill.24. President Kennedy had promised to inform Senator Gore of his intentions regarding H.R. 10.

Time Unknown

Oh, God. You are the greatest . . .

Conversation with Eugene Keogh25

Congressman Eugene J. Keogh, the third-ranking member of the HouseWays and Means Committee, had championed and cosponsored the Self-employed Pension Bill with Senator George Smathers.26 After signingthe bill quietly on October 10 and first phoning Smathers with the news,the President then telephoned Keogh, most likely to deliver the samenews. What follows is a fragment of their conversation, in which Keoghendorses the Communications Satellite Act, signed by PresidentKennedy several weeks earlier on August 31, 1962.

Eugene Keogh: [Unclear] this communications satellite.President Kennedy: Oh, God. You are the greatest . . . I just called

you and Smathers. You, obviously have a direct line to each other, or elseyou’ve got one down here.

Keogh: No, I just cut him off to talk to you.President Kennedy: Did you? Well . . .Keogh: I do commend it though.President Kennedy: I said to Smathers, “Don’t—

Before the end of the day, the President had a conversation with anunidentified official about James Meredith’s public criticisms of the racialcomposition of the troops sent to maintain order in Oxford, Mississippi.On October 9, the Army had begun withdrawing large numbers oftroops from Oxford.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 10, 1962388

25. Dictabelt 49.1, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.26. Eugene J. Keogh was Democratic U.S. representative from New York, 1937 to 1967. Keoghretired in 1967 after 30 years in Congress, though he was only 59 years old at the time.

Time Unknown

[A]pparently, we had no Negro troops on patrol.

Conversation about James Meredith27

On October 9, 1962, in a handwritten statement, James Meredithasserted that the U.S. Army had “resegregated” the troops that remainedon campus. As Meredith wrote: “The first two days of my stay at theUniversity . . . the military units looked like American units. All soldiersheld their positions and performed the task for which they had beentrained. . . . Since that time the units have been resegregated. Negroeshave been purged from their positions in the ranks.” That same day,Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance stated that when troops were “firstemployed in the Oxford area Negro soldiers were not used on patrols inorder to avoid unnecessary incidents.” On October 6, when the situationwas stabilized, African American troops were again used “in the per-formance of all normal functions in the units in all operations.”

President Kennedy: Now today, James Meredith charged that theArmy was segregating them and I wondered what had been done withthat discussion I had Friday night.28 Do you know anything about it?

Unidentified: No, sir. Except that Cy[rus Vance], you know he’s outat the hospital, as you probably heard, at long last. Cy, he called me just afew minutes ago and said that he talked with your brother about this.

President Kennedy: Yeah.Unidentified: And that he wants to put out a statement. Now what

the facts are, apparently, we had no Negro troops on patrol.President Kennedy: Yeah.Unidentified: They were in the units, but they have been returned to

their full duties within the last days, or day or so, something like that.We’re trying to find out exactly what Meredith said and we are fixing upa statement for Cy to put out, describing exactly what the situation is.

President Kennedy: Well, you better let me have it.

Conversat ion about James Meredi th 389

27. Dictabelt 50.2, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.28. “Meredith Charges Army Segregated Oxford Force,” New York Times, 10 October 1962.

Unidentified: All right.President Kennedy: As I say, I assume that after I talked to him

Friday, he began to put them back in again.President Kennedy: The only thing is [Deputy Attorney General

Nicholas] Katzenbach told me that on the patrols it was just the whitesoldiers . . .

Unidentified: . . . Yes . . .President Kennedy: . . . so I didn’t know what happened with that

discussion I had had Friday.Unidentified: No, Cy didn’t tell me about talking with you, but I

assume that’s when they did it because I know . . . President Kennedy: . . . Well, as of yesterday, they were still just

white in the patrol cars.Unidentified: I see.President Kennedy: So I’d like to find out. You better call Cy again

and ask him what he did after Friday, number one. Tell him, number two,to be careful what he says because evidently Katzenbach said yesterday itwas just whites. And then let me know what the statement’s going to bebefore you put it out.

Unidentified: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: OK. Thanks.Unidentified: Right. Bye

The President had at least one Mississippi-related meeting this day.Between 5:26 and 5:50 A.M. he met with the U.S. Army chief of staff,General Earle G. Wheeler. Kennedy did not tape it.

The White House was turning its attention ever more to themidterm elections. At 8:00 P.M. the President left for a two-hour visit toBaltimore. Thursday, October 11, would be a half day in the Oval Office.Following meetings with the U.S. ambassador to Guinea, WilliamAttwood, and the journalist John Gunther the President signed theTrade Bill and left for New York City. From Thursday afternoonthrough Sunday night, October 14, the President would campaign inNew York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 10, 1962390

Tuesday, October 16, 1962

On September 4 President Kennedy responded to reports of Soviet armsshipments to Cuba by choosing to issue (through press secretary Salinger)a statement noting that this was happening and drawing a line thatwarned only against Soviet deployment of “offensive” weapons in Cuba.Everyone, including the Soviets, understood that in this context offensivemeant systems able to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States. TheWhite House statement was at least as significant for what it said Kennedywould tolerate. It told administration insiders, like those involved in theongoing debate about the future of the Mongoose program against Castro,that Kennedy would accept Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. Kennedy’sbest hope thus was to overwhelm the critics with a barrage of officialstatements downplaying the significance of these shipments of “defensive”arms in order to deflate the opposition case.

The Republicans had reacted with even more serious charges. Probablyon the basis of the many reports and rumors coming out of Cuba and con-veyed by private Americans in contact with Cuban exile groups, Republicansenator Kenneth Keating of New York announced on the floor of the Senatethat there were “Soviet rocket installations in Cuba.” With Republicans onthe offensive, Kennedy felt obliged to make yet another statement. Bundy’sadvice was critical. President Kennedy would be giving a press conferenceon September 13. Cuba was bound to come up. On September 11 theSoviet government declared unequivocally that Moscow had not sent andwould not send nuclear missiles to Cuba. There was no need for this, theSoviet government announced. The next day Bundy urged Kennedy torepeat, in person, the line Salinger had put out on September 4. Bundyopened his memo by telling Kennedy that if he wanted to invade Cuba, heshould then reject his advice, because Kennedy would be minimizing theSoviet threat there. But, as Bundy knew, President Kennedy had told hisaides repeatedly that he did not want a U.S. invasion of Cuba, that the realdanger came from the Soviet Union, and that this danger was likely toarise later that year in Berlin.1

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1. On the sources for Keating’s allegations, see Max Holland, “A Luce Connection: SenatorKeating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (Fall1999), pp. 139–67. Bundy to President Kennedy, “Memorandum on Cuba for the Press

President Kennedy himself underscored a position that acceptedwhat was already discovered and drew a line against what the Sovietshad just promised they would not do. Kennedy said that “unilateral mili-tary intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently beeither required or justified.” He added that if Cuba “should ever . . .become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the SovietUnion, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect itsown security and that of its allies.” The administration mounted a force-ful campaign of denial, with the President right in the front line. TheSoviet assurances were repeated by the amiable Soviet ambassador,Anatoly Dobrynin, who spoke with Robert Kennedy and soon afterwardwith the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, sayingflatly to each man that the Soviet government had no intention whateverof using Cuba as an offensive military base.

Over the month until the crisis actually broke, Kennedy remained ofthe view that the notion of the Soviets’ turning Cuba into a missile basecame largely from the imagination and zeal of Republicans campaigningfor Senate and House seats up for election in November (although hisbrother Robert and the Republican CIA director, John McCone, had alsovoiced this fear). Largely at the instance of Keating and RepublicanSenator Homer Capehart of Indiana, the Senate on September 20 passedby 86 to 1 a resolution authorizing the use of force against Cuba “to pre-vent the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military capa-bility endangering the security of the U.S.” On October 10, Keating rose inthe Senate to charge that the Soviets were establishing intermediate-rangemissile bases in Cuba.

Kennedy knew of no intelligence data that warranted the Senate res-olution or supported Keating’s allegation. He had learned that, in addi-

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962392

Conference,” 13 September 1962, National Security Files, Box 36, “Cuba General September62,” John F. Kennedy Library. Bundy’s introduction comes quickly and clearly to the point:

1. The congressional head of steam on this is the most serious that we have had. It affects bothparties and takes many forms.

2. The immediate hazard is that the Administration may appear to be weak and indecisive.3. One way to avoid this hazard is to act by naval or military force in the Cuban area.4. The other course is to make a very clear and aggressive explanation of current policy and

its justification.

Bundy then argued for this “other course,” urging Kennedy to explain “The threat is under con-trol [Bundy’s emphasis]. Neither Communist propaganda nor our own natural anger shouldblind us to the basic fact that Cuba is not—and will not be allowed to become—a threat to theUnited States.”

tion to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the Soviets were sending cratescontaining unassembled IL-28 bombers to Cuba. These bombers, thoughcapable of carrying nuclear weapons, were being phased out of the SovietAir Force as obsolete. In themselves, they were not a cause for worry.Moreover—though this was before evidence came in regarding the IL-28s—the CIA’s topmost analytic group, its Board of National Estimates,produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate. Use of Cuba by theSoviet Union as a base for offensive ballistic missiles, said the board,“would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet pol-icy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingnessto increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. hasdisplayed thus far. . . .”2

But as September turned to October with new kinds of Soviet armsbeing discovered in Cuba almost every week, an increasingly worriedPresident was keeping an eye on accelerated contingency planning byState and Defense in case he was driven toward some kind of militaryaction against Cuba.3 Kennedy not only had reason to feel justified in dis-counting the Republicans’ charges; he also felt he had a right to curbsuspected leaks from the intelligence community feeding those charges.After he had shown Kennedy photographs of the crates containing IL-28bombers on October 11, McCone noted: “The President requested thatsuch information be withheld at least until after the elections as if theinformation got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issuewould be injected into the campaign and this would seriously affect hisindependence of action.”4

That Kennedy could make such a request of McCone, a Republican, isremarkable, but the final phrase, about his “independence of action,” maywell have had wider significance to him. A letter from Khrushchev datedSeptember 28 had brought Kennedy potentially ominous news about

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2. Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” 19September 1962; reprinted in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. MaryMcAuliffe (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), pp. 91–93.3. Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 14 and was already wonderingabout the feasibility of an air strike against SAM sites. See the meeting on 21 September inwhich he reminded McNamara about the need to keep the plans up to date. On 2 October,prodded by the Chiefs, McNamara offered them a big list of contingencies for possible action,led off by a Soviet move against Berlin or Soviet deployment of “offensive” systems to Cuba(see Kennedy to McNamara, 21 September 1962, in FRUS, 10: 1081; McNamara to Taylor, 2October 1962, in FRUS, 11: 6–7).4. McCone, “Memorandum on Donovan Project,” 11 October 1962, in CIA Documents,McAuliffe, pp. 123–25.

Berlin. In it, Khrushchev said, “the abnormal situation in Berlin shouldbe done away with. . . . And under present circumstances we do not see anyother way out but to sign a German peace treaty.” Moreover, Khrushchevcommented angrily on agitation in the United States for action againstCuba. The congressional resolution, he said, “gives ground to draw a con-clusion that the U.S. is evidently ready to assume responsibility forunleashing nuclear war.” Khrushchev asserted that he would not forcethe Berlin issue until after the U.S. congressional elections, but heseemed to say that, by the second half of November, time would run out.Kennedy discussed his reactions to the letter with his top “demonolo-gists,” a nickname for his advisers on the Soviet Union, in the conversa-tion that he recorded on September 29.

Therefore, as mid-October arrived, Kennedy and members of his cir-cle had reason to expect a crisis, perhaps their greatest crisis yet, overBerlin. To them, Khrushchev remained a mystifying figure, and in hislast high-level meeting with an American, on September 6 with InteriorSecretary Stewart Udall, Khrushchev had crudely threatened to go towar in order to force the issue in Berlin. Then there was Khrushchev’smeeting at the same time with the poet Robert Frost, in which the Sovietleader said he believed the United States and Western Europe to be weakand worn out. He invoked Tolstoy’s comment to Maxim Gorky aboutold age and sex: “The desire is the same; it’s the performance that’s dif-ferent.” As Frost cleaned this up when answering questions from U.S.reporters, it came out: “He said we were too liberal to fight.” This washow Kennedy first heard it, and it infuriated him, not least because itprovided fodder for Republicans in the congressional campaign.5

On Sunday, October 14, on ABC’s news program Issues and Answers,Bundy was denying the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to thenational television audience just as a high-flying U-2 reconnaissance air-craft of the U.S. Strategic Air Command was flying a limited photo-graphic mission directly over Cuba. For nearly a month, Director ofCentral Intelligence John McCone had pressed for such a flight.Secretary of State Dean Rusk had resisted. McCone suspected that theSoviets planned to turn Cuba into an offensive military base. Rusk wor-ried lest some protests about U.S. overflights or some incident like that of1960 complicate delicate ongoing negotiations. Moreover, Rusk knewthat most Soviet experts, including those in McCone’s own CIA, thought

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962394

5. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 351.

McCone wrong. When Soviet SAMs were spotted in Cuba at the end ofAugust, McCone pressed harder for U-2 flights, for he interpreted theseSAMs as harbingers of offensive surface-to-surface missiles. Rusk’s resist-ance also hardened, for the Soviet SAMs were SA-2s, which had shot downPowers’s U-2 in 1960. The shootdown of a Taiwanese U-2 over westernChina on September 8 added to Rusk’s and Kennedy’s fears. Bundy hadallied himself with Rusk. On September 10 Kennedy chose the cautiousapproach. But, as worrying evidence mounted, McCone—with RobertKennedy’s support—won approval on October 9 for another U-2 flightdirectly over Cuba.6 That flight took place on October 14.

During October 15, experts at the CIA’s National PhotographicIntelligence Center (NPIC), in a nondescript building at 5th and K Streetsin Washington, pored over photos from that October 14 U-2 flight overCuba. Seeing images of missiles much longer than SAMs, they leafedthrough files of photos from the Soviet Union and technical data micro-filmed by Soviet officer (and Anglo-American spy) Oleg Penkovsky. Theycame up with a perfect match. These were medium-range ballistic missiles(MRBMs) of the SS-4 family. At about 5:30 in the afternoon, ArthurLundahl, the head of NPIC, passed the news to CIA headquarters out inLangley, Virginia.7

In ignorance of what was in progress at NPIC, McNamara had metthat afternoon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dozens of lower-level offi-cials. Although McNamara explained that Kennedy had decided not totake any military action against Cuba during the next three months, thegroup reviewed plans for a massive air strike on Cuba and for an invasion.

That evening, Bundy and his wife gave a small dinner at their homeon Foxhall Road for Charles (Chip) and Avis Bohlen. Chip Bohlen wasgoing off to be U.S. ambassador to France. Called away to the telephone,Bundy heard CIA deputy director for intelligence Ray Cline say crypti-cally, “Those things we’ve been worrying about—it looks as thoughwe’ve really got something.” “It was a hell of a secret,” Bundy wrotelater. Though he considered immediately calling Kennedy, he concludedthat a few hours made no difference. The President had been in NewYork State, speaking for Democratic congressional candidates, and had

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6. For more background on the discovery of the missiles, see Graham Allison and PhilipZelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2d ed.; New York: Longman,1999), pp. 219–24, 331–37.7. Full details are in Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban MissileCrisis, ed. Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 187–217. (Brugioni was inNPIC at the time.)

gotten back to Washington in the early hours of the morning. Bundy, ashe also wrote later, “decided that a quiet evening and a night of sleepwere the best preparation” the President could have for what lay aheadof him. Kennedy never reproached Bundy for giving him that extra rest.8

Bundy brought his news to the private quarters of the White Houseat about 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October 16. In the major morning papers,the President had seen one front-page story about Cuba. The WashingtonPost reported that “Communist sources” were floating a rumor of a pos-sible trade—the West to make concessions on Berlin in return for aslowdown in the Soviet buildup of Cuba. State Department spokesmanLincoln White denied seeing any such proposal and said, “It would havebeen kicked out the window so fast it would have made your head swim.”The Post’s front page and that of the New York Times featured a Bostonaddress by Eisenhower, attacking the Kennedy administration’s “drearyforeign record.” In his administration, Eisenhower said, “No walls werebuilt. No threatening foreign bases were established.”

President Kennedy told Bundy to round up officials—secretly—for ameeting later that morning. He phoned his brother Robert and askedhim to come to the White House, where they briefly discussed the sensa-tional news. At 9:25 President Kennedy began his regular schedule,meeting astronaut Walter Schirra and his family. In a brief break, justbefore 10:00, the President went to Kenny O’Donnell’s office and, asO’Donnell later recalled, said, “You still think the fuss about Cuba isunimportant?”

“Absolutely,” O’Donnell answered. “The voters won’t give a damnabout Cuba.”

Kennedy then gave O’Donnell the news. “I don’t believe it,” O’Donnellreplied. “You better believe it,” Kennedy said and added drily, “KenKeating will probably be the next President of the United States.”9

After two more routine meetings that morning, Kennedy was able toopen up about the missiles again for about half an hour with Bohlen, whowas paying a previously scheduled farewell call as he prepared to departfor Paris. Kennedy finished his meeting with Bohlen and went on to theCabinet Room.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962396

8. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 395–96.9. Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers, with Joe McCarthy, “Johnny, We Hardly KnewYe” (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), p. 369.

11:50 A.M.–1:00 P.M.

We’re certainly going to do [option] number one. We’re goingto take out these missiles.

Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis10

Kennedy was in the Cabinet Room with his five-year-old daughter,Caroline, when his advisers filed into the Cabinet Room, accompanied byLundahl and other experts from NPIC who set up photograph displayson easels. As Caroline was taken back to the residence and the meetingbegan, Kennedy turned on the tape recorder.

Marshall Carter: This is the result of the photography taken Sunday,sir. There’s a medium-range ballistic missile launch site and two newmilitary encampments on the southern edge of the Sierra del Rosario inwest-central Cuba.

President Kennedy: Where would that be?Carter: West-central, sir. That’s . . .Arthur Lundahl: South of Havana. [quieter, as an aside] I think this

[unclear] represents these three dots we’re talking about. Carter: Have you got the big pictures?Lundahl: Yes, sir.Carter: The President would like to see those.The launch site at one of the encampments contains a total of at least

14 canvas-covered missile trailers measuring 67 feet in length, 9 feet inwidth. The overall length of the trailers plus the tow bars is approxi-mately 80 feet. The other encampment contains vehicles and tents butwith no missile trailers.

Lundahl: [quietly to President Kennedy] These are the launchers here.Each of these are places we discussed. In this instance the missile traileris backing up to the launching point. The launch point of this particularvehicle is here. This canvas-covered [unclear] is 67 feet long.

Carter: The site that you have there contains at least eight canvas-

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 397

10. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. DouglasDillon, Roswell Gilpatric, Sidney Graybeal, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson,Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Maxwell Taylor. Tape28, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

covered missile trailers. Four deployed probable missile erector launch-ers. These are unrevetted.11 The probable launch positions as indicatedare approximately 850 feet, 700 feet, 450 feet—for a total distance ofabout 2,000 feet.

In Area Two, there are at least 6 canvas-covered missile trailers,about 75 vehicles, and about 18 tents. And in Area Number Three wehave 35 vehicles, 15 large tents, 8 small tents, 7 buildings, and 1 build-ing under construction. The critical one—do you see what I mean?—isthis one.

Lundahl: [quietly to President Kennedy] There is a launcher rightthere, sir. The missile trailer is backing up to it at the moment.[Unclear.] And the missile trailer is here. Seven more have been enlargedhere. Those canvas-covered objects on the trailers are 67 feet long, andthere’s a small building between the two of them. The eighth one is theone that’s not on a particular trailer. [Unclear] backs up. That looks likethe most-advanced one. And the other area is about 5 miles away. Thereare no launcher erectors on there, just missiles.

President Kennedy: How far advanced is this?Lundahl: Sir, we’ve never seen this kind of an installation before.President Kennedy: Not even in the Soviet Union?Lundahl: No, sir. Our [nine seconds excised as classified information].12

But from May of ’60 on we have never had any U-2 coverage of theSoviet Union.13 So we do not know what kind of a practice they woulduse in connection with—

President Kennedy: How do you know this is a medium-range ballis-tic missile?

Lundahl: The length, sir.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962398

11. An erector launcher trailer can carry a missile and then be secured in place at a designatedlaunch point. The missile launcher is then erected to the firing angle and the missile is firedfrom it. To say the site is unrevetted means that earthworks or fortifications to protect againstattack or the blast from the missile have not been constructed.12. In an earlier, less stringent declassification of this material, more of this sentence was leftintact, reading (once errors were corrected): “Our last look was when we had TALENT cover-age of [three seconds excised as classified information] and we had a 350-mile [range] missileerected just on hard earth with a kind of field exercise going on.” TALENT was a codewordfor overhead photography. The briefer was probably describing photography of the Tyuratammissile test range in the Soviet Union.13. May 1960 was when Soviet air defenses shot down a CIA U-2 reconaissance aircraftpiloted by Francis Gary Powers. Then-President Eisenhower suspended further U-2 flightsover the Soviet Union. Powers was captured and eventually repatriated to the United States.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 399

President Kennedy: The what? The length?Lundahl: The length of it, yes.President Kennedy: The length of the missile? Which part? I mean

which . . . ?Lundahl: The length of the missile, sir, is—President Kennedy: Which one is that?Lundahl: This will show it, sir.President Kennedy: That?Lundahl: Yes. Mr. Graybeal, our missile man, has some pictures of

the equivalent Soviet equipment that has been dragged through thestreets of Moscow that can give you some feel for it, sir.

Sidney Graybeal: There are two missiles involved. One of them isour [designation] SS-3, which is 630 mile [range] and on up to near700. It’s 68 feet long. These missiles measure out to be 67 foot long. Theother missile, the 1,100 [mile range] one is 73 foot long.

The question we have in the photography is the nose itself. If the nosecone is not on that missile it measures 67 feet—the nose cone would be 4to 5 feet longer, sir—and with this extra length we could have a missilethat’d have a range of 1,100 miles. The missiles that were known throughthe Moscow parade—we’ve got the data on that [unclear] on the pictures.

President Kennedy: Is this ready to be fired?Graybeal: No, sir.President Kennedy: How long . . . ? We can’t tell that can we, how

long before it can be fired?Graybeal: No, sir. That depends on how ready the GSC [ground sup-

port for the missile] [is], how—President Kennedy: Where does it have to be fired from?Graybeal: It would have to be fired from a stable, hard surface. This

could be packed earth. It could be concrete, or asphalt. The surface has tobe hard. Then you put a flame deflector plate on that to direct the missile.

Robert McNamara: Would you care to comment on the position ofnuclear warheads? This is in relation to the question from the President—when can these be fired?

Graybeal: Sir, we’ve looked very hard. We can find nothing that wouldspell nuclear warhead in terms of any isolated area or unique security inthis particular area. The mating of the nuclear warhead to the missile—from some of the other short-range missile data—[it] would take about acouple of hours to do this.

McNamara: This is not fenced, I believe, at the moment?Lundahl: Not yet, sir.

McNamara: This is important, as it relates to whether these, today,are ready to fire, Mr. President. It seems almost impossible to me thatthey would be ready to fire with nuclear warheads on the site withouteven a fence around it. It may not take long to place them there, to erecta fence. But at least at the moment there is some reason to believe thewarheads aren’t present and hence they are not ready to fire.

Graybeal: Yes, sir. We do not believe they are ready to fire.Maxwell Taylor: However, there is no feeling that they can’t fire

from this kind of field position very quickly: isn’t that true? It’s not aquestion of waiting for extensive concrete pads and that sort of thing.

Graybeal: The unknown factor here, sir, is the degree to which theequipment has been checked out after it’s been shipped from the SovietUnion here. It’s the readiness of the equipment. If the equipment ischecked out, the site has to be accurately surveyed—the position has tobe known. Once this is known, then you’re talking a matter of hours.

Taylor: Well, could this be an operational site except perhaps for thefact that at this point there are no fences? Could this be operational now?

Graybeal: There is only one missile there, sir, and it’s at the actual,apparently, launching area. It would take them—if everything werechecked out—it would still take them in the order of two to three hoursbefore they could get that one missile up and ready to go, sir.

Lundahl: Collateral reports indicated from ground observers thatconvoys of 50 to 60 of these kinds of Soviet vehicles were moving downinto the San Cristobal area in the first couple of weeks of August. Butthis is the first time we have been able to catch them on photography, ata location.

Theodore Sorensen: You say there is only one missile there?Graybeal: There are eight missiles there. One of them is in what

appears to be the position from which they’re launched, in the horizon-tal, apparently near an erector to be erected in vertical position.

Dean Rusk: Near an erector? You mean something has to be built?Or is that something that can be done in a couple of hours?

Graybeal: Mobile piece of equipment, sir. We haven’t any specific[unclear] on this, but here is the way we believe that it could actually belifted. Something of this nature. [Unclear] evidence would be the erec-tor’s helping to raise the missile from its transporter up into a verticalposition with the flame deflector on the ground.

McNamara: Am I correct in saying that we have not located anynuclear storage sites with certainty as yet?

This is one of the most important problems we face in properly inter-preting the readiness of these missiles. It’s inconceivable to me that the

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962400

Soviets would deploy nuclear warheads on an unfenced piece of ground.There must be some storage site there. It should be one of our importantobjectives to find that storage site.

Lundahl: May I report, sir, that two additional SAC [U-2] missionswere executed yesterday. They were taken to the Washington area lastnight. They’re currently being chemically processed at the Naval Centerin Suitland and they’re due to reach us at the National PI Center around8:00 tonight.14 Both of these missions go from one end of Cuba to theother, one along the north coast and one along the south. So additionaldata on activities, or these storage sites which we consider critical, maybe in our grasp, if we can find them.

McNamara: And is it correct that there is, outside of Havana, aninstallation that appears to be hardened that might be the type of instal-lation they would use for nuclear warheads, and therefore is a prospec-tive source of such warheads?

Lundahl: Sir, I couldn’t put my finger on that. The Joint AtomicEnergy people may be looking at that and forming a judgment.15 Butfrom photos alone I cannot attest to that.

Carter: There would appear to be little need for putting this typeof missile in there, however, unless it were associated with nuclearwarheads.

Rusk: Don’t you have to assume these are nuclear?McNamara: Oh, I think there’s no question about that. The question

is one of readiness to fire, and this is highly critical in forming our plans.The time between today and the time when the readiness to fire capabil-ity develops is a very important thing. To estimate that, we need toknow where these warheads are. And we have not yet found any proba-ble storage of warheads. And hence it seems extremely unlikely that theyare now ready to fire, or may be ready to fire within a matter of hours, oreven a day or two.

Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.16

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 401

14. These are references to the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center in Suitland,Maryland, and to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, directed by Lundahl, thatwas part of the CIA.15. Lundahl was referring to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) of theU.S. Intelligence Board.16. In an earlier, less stringent, declassification of this material, most of the next sentence wasleft intact, reading (once errors were corrected): Lundahl: “ . . . If new types of radars, orknown associated missile firing radars or associated with missile firing, are coming up on that,that might be another indicator of readiness. We know nothing of what those tapes [of elec-tromagnetic emissions] hold, at the moment.”

Rusk: When will those be ready? By the end of the day, do you think?Lundahl: They’re supposed to be in, sir. I think that’s right. Isn’t it,

General Carter?Carter: The readout from Sunday’s [U-2 flights] should be available

now. We have done some—Rusk: Weren’t there flights yesterday as well?Carter: Two flights yesterday.Rusk: You don’t have the results from those yet?Carter: No.The room is silent for about eight seconds.President Kennedy: Thank you.Lundahl: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: Well, when is . . . ? [Are] there any further

flights scheduled?Carter: There are no more scheduled, sir.President Kennedy: These flights yesterday, I presume, cover the . . .Lundahl: Well, we hope so, sir—McGeorge Bundy: [Unclear], Mr. President. Because the weather

won’t have been clear all along the island. So we can’t claim that we willhave been—certainly we surely do not have up-to-date photographiccoverage on the whole island. I should think one of our first questions isto—

President Kennedy: Authorize more flights.Bundy: —consider whether we should not authorize more flights on

the basis of COMOR priorities.17

There’s a specific question of whether we want a closer and sharperlook at this area. That, however, I think should be looked at in the con-text of the question of whether we wish to give tactical warning and anyother possible activities.

McNamara: I would recommend, Mr. President, that you authorizesuch flights as are considered necessary to obtain complete coverage ofthe island. Now this seems to be ill defined. But I purposely define it thatway because we’re running into cloud cover on some of these flights andI would suggest that we simply repeat the flight if we have cloud coverand repeat it sufficiently often to obtain the coverage we require.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962402

17. The acronym COMOR stands for the interagency Committee on Overhead Reconaissance,a committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board. Chaired by James Reber, COMOR set guidelinesand priorities for U.S. surveillance overflights of other countries.

President Kennedy: General Carter, can you go do that?Carter: Yes, sir.McNamara: Now this is U-2 flying.Carter: U-2, sir.McNamara: This specifically excludes the question that Mac [Bundy]

raised of low-level flying, which I think we ought to take up later, after ourfurther discussions of the possibilities here.18

Lundahl: I have one additional note, sir, if I may offer it.Of the collateral information from ground observers as to where

these kinds of trailers have gone, we don’t have any indications else-where on the island of Cuba except for this San Cristóbal area, where wedo have coverage. But we have no ground collateral which indicatesthere might be an equivalent thing going on somewhere else.

President Kennedy: In other words, the only missile base—interme-diate-range missile base—that we now know about is this one. Is that cor-rect? Is this one or two? This is one. . . .

Carter: There’s three of them.Lundahl: Three, sir.Bundy: Three [unclear] associated. Do I understand that this is a bat-

talion, as you estimate it, Mr. Graybeal?Graybeal: Yes, sir. We estimate that four missiles make up a battalion.

So that in this one that you’re looking at, Mr. President, has eight mis-siles. That’d be two battalions out of a regiment size. This one in front ofthe table is a second separate installation from which we can see six mis-siles. So there are probably two more battalions there. The other missilesmay be under the tree. The third installation has the tents, but there areno missiles identified anywhere in that area.

President Kennedy: These are the only [ones] we now know about?Graybeal: Yes, sir.Lundahl: Other than those cruise missiles that you’re familiar with,

those coastal ones. And the surface-to-air missiles.19

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 403

18. Low-level reconnaissance overflights went underneath clouds, low and fast, over their tar-gets. These flights were carried out by air force or navy tactical reconnaissance units with air-craft like the F-101 or F8U. In September the CIA had asked McNamara to dispatch low-leveloverflights over Cuba but at that time he declined, preferring to leave the work to the U-2.19. The Soviet SAM sites in Cuba were first identified after a U-2 overflight of Cuba on 29August and the White House was briefed about this discovery on 31 August. The discover-ies contributed to the first U.S. warning to the Soviets against deploying “offensiveweapons” announced on 4 September. The same U-2 mission revealed another kind of mis-

Unidentified: Any intelligence on that thing?President Kennedy: Mr. Rusk?Rusk: Mr. President this is, of course, a very serious development.

It’s one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could carrythis far. They seemed to be denying that they were going to establishbases of their own [in Cuba] and this one that we’re looking at is aSoviet base. It doesn’t do anything essential from a Cuban point of view.The Cubans couldn’t do anything with it anyhow at this stage.

Now, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that willeliminate this base. I don’t think we can sit still. The question then becomeswhether we do it by a sudden, unannounced strike of some sort or we buildup the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriouslyabout giving in, or even the Cubans themselves take some action on this.

The thing that I’m, of course, very conscious of is that there is nosuch thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It’s so inti-mately involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places that anyaction that we take will greatly increase the risks of a direct action involv-ing our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world.

So I think we have to think very hard about two major courses ofaction as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we thinkthere is the overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks thatare involved in doing that. I don’t think this in itself would require aninvasion of Cuba. You could do it with or without such an invasion—inother words, if we make it clear that what we’re doing is eliminating thisparticular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselvesare not moved to general war. We’re simply doing what we said we woulddo if they took certain action. Or we’re going to decide that this is thetime to eliminate the Cuban problem by action [unclear] the island.

The other would be, if we have a few days from the military point ofview, if we have a little time, then I would think that there would be another

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sile site, near Banes in eastern Cuba, that CIA analysts needed more time to analyze. Theyfinally judged (correctly) that this missile was a cruise missile (more akin to a smallunguided jet aircraft, without a ballistic trajectory) with a range of 20 to 40 nautical miles,apparently designed for coastal defense. President Kennedy was briefed in person about thisfinding on 7 September (see Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 120–27).

President Kennedy was concerned that the nature of this arguably defensive system notbe misunderstood and that news about it not leak out into the ongoing, volatile domesticdebate over his response to the Soviet buildup in Cuba. A new codeword classification,PSALM, was thereupon created—with a tightly restricted distribution—for future reports onSoviet deployments in Cuba. A new, even more explicit, public warning against deployment of“offensive weapons” was announced by the White House on 13 September.

course of action, a combination of things, that we might wish to consider.First, that we stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt actionto make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pacthas been violated, and [unclear] over the next few days, under the terms ofthe Rio Pact.20 The OAS could constitute itself as an organ of consultationpromptly, although maybe it may take two or three days to get instructionsfrom governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, atany moment take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspectionteam be permitted to come and itself look directly at these sites, provideassurances to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, butit will be another step in building up our position.

I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro,perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through hisrepresentative at the U.N. I think perhaps the Canadian ambassadorwould be the best, the better channel to get to Castro, get him apart pri-vately and tell him that this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba isbeing victimized here, and that the Soviets are preparing Cuba fordestruction, or betrayal. You saw the [New York] Times story yesterdaymorning that high Soviet officials were saying, “We’ll trade Cuba forBerlin.” This ought to be brought to Castro’s attention. It ought to besaid to Castro that this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable.The time has now come when he must, in the interests of the Cuban peo-ple, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union and prevent this mis-sile base from becoming operational.

And I think there are certain military actions that we might wellwant to take straight away. First, to call up highly selected units, up to150,000, unless we feel that it’s better, more desirable, to go to a generalnational emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If weannounce, at the time that we announce this development—and I thinkwe do have to announce this development some time this week—weannounce that we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, andwe will enforce our right to do so. We reject the condition of secrecy inthis hemisphere in a matter of this sort.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 405

20. The Organization of American States (OAS) was created after World War II as a collectiveorganization of states in the Western Hemisphere for several cooperative purposes, includingthe task of responding (by a two-thirds vote) to aggression from a member or nonmemberstate, including economic or political sanctions. The founding documents were signed inMexico City (1945) and especially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signedin Rio de Janeiro (1947) and usually referred to as the Rio Pact. The OAS, spurred by theUnited States, had adopted sanctions against Cuba in early 1962.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962406

We reinforce our forces in Guantánamo.21 We reinforce our forces inthe southeastern part of the United States, whatever is necessary fromthe military point of view, to be able to give, clearly, an overwhelmingstrike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And also totake care of any MiGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami orat the United States. Build up heavy forces, if those are not already inposition.

We then would move more openly and vigorously into the guerrillafield and create maximum confusion on the island [of Cuba]. We won’tbe too squeamish at this point about the overt/covert character of whatis being done.

We review our attitude on an alternative Cuban government, and getMiro Cardona and his group in, Manuel Ray and his group, and see ifthey won’t get together on a progressive junta that would pretty wellcombine all principal elements, other than the Batista group, as the lead-ers of Cuba. And have them, give them, more of a status—whether weproceed to full recognition or not is something else. But get the Cubanelements highly organized on this matter.

I think also that we need a few days to alert our other allies, for con-sultation in NATO. I’ll assume that we can move on this line, at the sametime, to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going intoCuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes fromcoming in. Tell the British, and anyone else who’s involved at this point,that if they’re interested in peace they’ve got to stop their ships fromCuban trade at this point. In other words, isolate Cuba completely with-out, at this particular moment, a forceful blockade.

I think it would be important for you to consider calling in GeneralEisenhower, giving him a full briefing before a public announcement ismade as to the situation and the courses of action which you mightdetermine upon.

But I think that, by and large, there are these two broad alternatives:One, the quick strike.The other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is an

utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that Mr. Khrushchev maynot himself really understand that or believe that at this point.

I think then we’ll be facing a situation that could well lead to generalwar. Now with that we have an obligation to do what has to be done, but

21. Guantánamo was and is a U.S. naval base on the eastern end of Cuba, with U.S. rightssecured by a long-term treaty signed decades before Castro seized power.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 407

to do it in a way that gives everybody a chance to pull away from it beforeit gets too hard.

Those are my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturallyneed to think about this very hard for the next several hours, what I andmy colleagues at the State Department can do about it.

McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in thissituation I want to comment upon and, in relation to them, I would like tooutline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask GeneralTaylor to expand upon them.

But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining somemilitary alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that weought to accept as foundations for our further thinking. My first is that ifwe are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against anypart of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to thetime these missile sites become operational. I’m not prepared to saywhen that will be. But I think it is extremely important that our talk andour discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will beplanned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because,if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we canstate we can knock them out before they can be launched. And if they’relaunched there is almost certain to be chaos in part of the East Coast orthe area in a radius of 600 to 1,000 miles from Cuba.

Secondly, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must bedirected not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sitesplus the airfields, plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields buthidden by that time, plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now this is afairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites,and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, notof U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least, in the hun-dreds, more likely in the low thousands—say two or three thousand. Itseems to me these two propositions should underlie our discussion.

Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying outand what may be some of the consequences? We could carry out an airstrike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such anair strike within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it couldbe done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the Chiefswould prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days. But we are preparedfor that quickly.

The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initialday, if necessary. Presumably there would be some political discussionstaking place either just before the air strike or both before and during.

In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for aninvasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after thestart of the air strike that would be possible, if the political environmentmade it desirable or necessary at that time.

Fine. Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be somedegree of mobilization. I would think of the mobilization coming notbefore the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following,say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasionrequirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that itcould be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of theauthority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase,and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.

Now this is very sketchily, the military capabilities, and I think youmay wish to hear General Taylor outline his.

Taylor: We’re impressed, Mr. President, with the great importanceof getting a strike with all the benefit of surprise, which would mean ide-ally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground,where we can take them out.

That desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made, ifthe other optimum would be to get every missile before it could becomeoperational. Practically, I think, our knowledge of the timing of thereadiness is going to be so difficult that we’ll never have the exact, per-fect timing. What we’d like to do is to look at this new photography, Ithink, and take any additional, and try to get the layout of the targets inas near an optimum position as possible, and then take them out withoutany warning whatsoever.

That does not preclude, I don’t think Mr. Secretary, some of the thingsthat you’ve been talking about. It’s a little hard to say in terms of time,how much I’ve discussed. But we must do a good job the first time we goin there, pushing a hundred percent just as far, as closely, as we can withour strike. I’m having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr.President, at 4:00, to talk this out with them and get their best judgment.

I would also mention among the military actions we should take, thatonce we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible,we should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade.So I suppose that, and also, a reinforcement of Guantánamo and evacua-tion of dependents.

So really, in point of time, I’m thinking in terms of three phases.One, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and

get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job.Then, virtually concurrently, an air strike against, as the Secretary

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962408

said, missiles, airfields, and nuclear sites that we know of. At the sametime, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantánamo and evac-uate the dependents. I’d then start this continuous reconnaissance, thelist that you have is connected, continuing over Cuba.

Then the decision can be made as we’re mobilizing, with the air strike,as to whether we invade or not. I think that’s the hardest question militar-ily in the whole business, and one which we should look at very closelybefore we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.

Rusk: There are certainly one or two other things, Mr. President.[Soviet foreign minister Andrei] Gromyko asked to see you Thursday[October 18]. It may be of some interest to know what he says aboutthis, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. Ijust want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be rele-vant to this topic. I might say, incidentally, sir, that you can delay any-thing else you have to do at this point.

Secondly, I don’t believe, myself, that the critical question is whetheryou get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot thosemissiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Unionhas got quite a different decision to make if they shoot those missiles,want to shoot them off before they get knocked out by aircraft. So I’mnot sure that this is necessarily the precise element, Bob.

McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our plan-ning should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don’t know whatkinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don’tknow what kinds of control they have over those warheads.

If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher wascapable of launching that warhead I would, frankly, I would stronglyurge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think thedanger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue would beexcessive. This is why I suggest that if we’re talking about an air attack Ibelieve we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry itoff before these become operational.

President Kennedy: What is the advantage? There must be somemajor reason for the Russians to set this up. It must be that they’re notsatisfied with their ICBMs. What’d be the reason that they would . . . ?

Taylor: What it’d give them is, primarily, it makes a launching basefor short-range missiles against the United States to supplement theirrather defective ICBM system, for example. That’s one reason.

President Kennedy: Of course, I don’t see how we could prevent fur-ther ones from coming in by submarine. I mean, if we let them blockadethe thing, they come in by submarine.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 409

McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in,quite frankly, is to say you’ll take them out the moment they come in.You’ll take them out and you’ll carry on open surveillance. And you’llhave a policy to take them out if they come in.

I think it’s really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry outan air attack of the kind we’re talking about. We’re talking about an airattack of several hundred sorties because we don’t know where these[Soviet] airplanes are.22

Bundy: Are you absolutely clear on your premise that an air strikemust go to the whole air complex?

McNamara: Well, we are, Mac, because we are fearful of these MiG-21s.23 We don’t know where they are. We don’t know what they’re capa-ble of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, youmust assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft.Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you mustassume that those aircraft have high-explosive potential.

We have a serious air defense problem. We’re not prepared to reportto you exactly what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we mustassume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, insmall numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water.And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites,knock those out, leaving intact Castro’s air force, and run the risk that hewould use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas—eitherwith or without nuclear weapons. It would be a very heavy price to payin U.S. lives for the damage we did to Cuba.

Rusk: Mr. President, about why the Soviets are doing this, Mr.McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev mayhave in mind is that he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superi-ority, but he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclearweapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours.

Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.President Kennedy: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?Taylor: We have the Jupiter missiles.Bundy: We have how many?McNamara: About 15, I believe to be the figure.

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22. A sortie is one mission by one airplane. If eight airplanes flew against a target, that wouldbe 8 sorties. If the planes flew two missions in one day, that would be 16 sorties in the day.23. The MiG-21 (NATO designation “Fishbed”) was a short-range Soviet fighter-interceptorthat could, in some configurations, carry a light bomb load against nearby targets.

Bundy: I think that’s right. I think that’s right.Rusk: But then there are also delivery vehicles that could easily be

moved through the air.McNamara: Aircraft.Rusk: Aircraft and so forth, route them through Turkey.And Mr. McCone expressed the view that Khrushchev may feel that

it’s important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles,and he’s doing that to sort of balance that political, psychological flank.

I think also that Berlin is very much involved in this. For the firsttime, I’m beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev isentirely rational about Berlin. [Acting U.N. secretary-general] U Thanthas talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to keep oureye on that element.

But they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cubaagainst each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action inCuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect toBerlin. In other words, like the Suez-Hungary combination [in 1956]. Ifthey could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the worldwould be confused and they would have what they would consider to bejustification for making a move somewhere else.

But I must say I don’t really see the rationality of the Soviets push-ing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cubato this country.

Bundy: It’s important, I think, to recognize that they did make thisdecision, as far as our estimates now go, in early summer, and that thishas been happening since August. Their TASS statement of September12 [actually 11] which the experts, I think, attribute very strongly toKhrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicitstatement: “The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designedexclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The president of the UnitedStates and the American military, the military of any country, know whatmeans of defense are. How can these means threaten the United States?”

Now there. It’s very hard to reconcile that with what has happened.The rest, as the Secretary says, has many comparisons between Cubaand Italy, Turkey, and Japan. We have other evidence that Khrushchevhonestly believes, or at least affects to believe, that we have nuclearweapons in Japan. That combination . . .

Rusk: Gromyko stated that in his press conference the other day, too.Bundy: Yeah. They may mean Okinawa.McNamara: It’s unlikely, but it’s conceivable the nuclear warheads

for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 411

Bundy: Now it seems to me that it is perfectly possible that they arein that sense a bluff. That doesn’t make them any less offensive to us,because we can’t have proof about it.

McNamara: No. But it does possibly indicate a different course ofaction. And therefore, while I’m not suggesting how we should handlethis, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: toascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later inthe discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternativeways of approaching it.

President Kennedy: Doug, do you have any . . . ?Douglas Dillon: No. The only thing I would say is that this alterna-

tive course of warning, and getting public opinion, and OAS action, andtelling people in NATO and everything like that. It would appear to meto have the danger of getting us wide out in the open and forcing theRussians, the Soviets, to take a position that if anything was done theywould have to retaliate.

Whereas a quick action, with a statement at the same time sayingthis is all there is to it, might give them a chance to back off and not doanything. Meanwhile, you’ve got to think that the chance of gettingthrough this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a quickstrike than building the whole thing up to a climax, and then goingthrough with what will be a lot of debate on it.

Rusk: That is, of course, a possibility, but . . .Bundy: The difficulties. I share the Secretary of the Treasury’s

[Dillon’s] feeling a little bit. The difficulties of organizing the OAS andNATO. The amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that ifthey can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can’t we? The division in thealliance. The certainty that the Germans would feel that we were jeop-ardizing Berlin because of our concern over Cuba. The prospect of thatpattern is not an appetizing one.

Rusk: Yes, but you see, everything turns crucially on what happens.Bundy: I agree, Mr. Secretary.Rusk: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they do back it

up, then you have exposed all of your allies and ourselves to all these greatdangers without the slightest consultation, or warning, or preparation.

Bundy: You get all these noises again.President Kennedy: But, of course, warning them, it seems to me, is

warning everybody. And obviously you can’t sort of announce that infour days from now you’re going to take them out. They may announcewithin three days that they’re going to have warheads on them. If wecome and attack, they’re going to fire them. So then what’ll we do? Then

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962412

we don’t take them out. Of course, we then announce: “Well, if they dothat, then we’re going to attack with nuclear weapons.”

Dillon: Yes, sir. That’s the question that nobody—I didn’t under-stand—nobody had mentioned is whether this takeout, this mission, wasgoing to be able to deal with it with high explosives?

President Kennedy: How effective can the takeout be, do they think?Taylor: It’ll never be a hundred percent, Mr. President, we know. We

hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike. But this is not just onething, one strike—one day, but continuous air attack for whenever nec-essary, whenever we discover a target.

Bundy: You are now talking about taking out the air force as well, Ithink, speaking in those terms.

I do raise again the question whether we [unclear] the military prob-lem. But there is, I would think, a substantial political advantage in lim-iting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause ofaction.

Alexis Johnson: I suggest, Mr. President, that if you’re involved inseveral hundred strikes, and against airfields, this is what you would do:Preinvasion. And it would be very difficult to convince anybody that thiswas not a preinvasion strike.

I think also, once you get into this volume of attack, that public opin-ion reaction to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion—there’svery little difference. And from both standpoints it would seem to methat if you’re talking about a general air attack program, you might aswell think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by aninvasion just as simply, with as little chance of reaction.

Taylor: Well, I would think we should be in a position to invade atany time, if we so decide. Hence that, in this preliminary, we should bethinking that it’s all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons.

President Kennedy: Well, let’s say we just take out the missile bases.Then they have some more there. Obviously they can get them in bysubmarine and so on. I don’t know whether you just can’t keep highstrikes on.

Taylor: I suspect, Mr. President, that we’d have to take out the sur-face-to-air missiles in order to get in. To get in, take some of them out.Maybe [unclear].

President Kennedy: How long do we estimate this will remain secure,this information, until people have it?

Bundy: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr.President, I think we are in unusually and fortunately good position. We setup a new security classification governing precisely the field of offensive

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 413

capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter.That limits this to people who have an immediate, operational necessity inintelligence terms to work on the data, and the people who have—

President Kennedy: How many would that be, about?Bundy: Oh that will be a very large number, but that’s not generally

where leaks come from. And the more important limitation is that onlyofficers with a policy responsibility for advice directly to you receivethis.

President Kennedy: How many would get it over in the DefenseDepartment, General, with your meeting this afternoon?

Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We’d have to ask forrelaxation of the ground rules that Mac has just enunciated, so that I cangive it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.

President Kennedy: Would that be about 50?Taylor: No, sir. I would say that, at this stage, 10 more.McNamara: Mr. President, I think, to be realistic, we should assume

that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, atleast by political representatives of both parties within, I would say, I’mjust picking a figure, I’d say a week. And I say that because we havetaken action already that is raising questions in people’s minds.

Normally when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The dupli-cated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copygoes to CINCLANT.24 A copy goes to CIA. And normally the photointerpreters and the operational officers in these commands are lookingforward to these. We have stopped all that, and this type of informationis going on throughout the department.

And I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands ofmembers of Congress, for example, for more than a week.

Rusk: Well, Senator Keating has already, in effect, announced it onthe floor of the Senate.

Bundy: [speaking over Rusk] Senator Keating said this on the floor ofthe Senate on the 10th of October: “Construction has begun on at least ahalf-dozen launching sites for intermediate-range tactical missiles.”

Rusk: That’s correct. That’s exactly the point. Well, I suppose we’llhave to count on announcing it not later than Thursday or Friday of thisweek.

Carter: There is a refugee who’s a major source of intelligence on

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24. Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic. Headquartered in Norfolk, CINCLANT at thistime was Admiral Robert Dennison.

this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms whichwe can recognize, who is now in this country.

President Kennedy: Is he the one who’s giving Keating his stuff ?Carter: We don’t know.Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether, as a matter of tactics,

we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. Itseems to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by anopen officer of the intelligence agency.

Carter: I think that’s right.President Kennedy: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?Vice President Johnson: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I

think that we’re committed at any time that we feel that there’s a buildupthat in any way endangers, to take whatever action we must take to assureour security. I would think that the Secretary’s evaluation of this thingbeing around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one. I wouldn’t think it’dtake a week to do it. I think they ought to [unclear] before then.

I would like to hear what the responsible commanders have to saythis afternoon. I think the question we face is whether we take it out orwhether we talk about it. And, of course, either alternative is a very dis-tressing one. But, of the two, I would take it out—assuming that thecommanders felt that way.

I’m fearful if we . . . I spent the weekend with the ambassadors ofthe Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine.But I don’t think, I don’t rely on them much for any strength in any-thing like this.

And I think that we’re talking about our other allies, I take the posi-tion that Mr. Bundy says: “Well we’ve lived all these years [with mis-siles]. Why can’t you? Why get your blood pressure up?” But the fact isthe country’s blood pressure is up, and they are fearful, and they’re inse-cure, and we’re getting divided, and I don’t think that . . .

I take this little State Department Bulletin that you sent out to all thecongressmen. One of the points you make: that any time the buildupendangers or threatens our security in any way, we’re going to do what-ever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And whenyou say that, why, they give unanimous support.

People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. I think wehave to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see whatthey say. I’m not much for circularizing it over the Hill or with our allies,even though I realize it’s a breach of faith, not to confer with them.We’re not going to get much help out of them.

Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 415

three of our principal allies or heads of government we could communi-cate with, at least on a 24-hour notice basis—

Vice President Johnson: I certainly—Bundy: —ease the . . .Vice President Johnson: Tell the alliance we’ve got to try to stop the

planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else they’re[the Soviets] sending. Just not going to permit it. And then—

Bundy: Stop them from coming in there.Vice President Johnson: Yeah.President Kennedy: Well this is really talking about are two or three

different potential operations.One is the strike just on these three bases.The second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking

about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anythingelse connected with missiles.

Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launch-ing a blockade, which requires, really, the third and which is a larger step.

And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the degree of consulta-tion. I don’t know how much use consulting with the British . . . I expectthey’ll just object. Just have to decide to do it. Probably ought to tellthem, though, the night before.

Robert Kennedy: Mr. President?President Kennedy: Yes?Robert Kennedy: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I

would say that you’re dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second,air and the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all theirmissiles. You’re covering most of Cuba. You’re going to kill an awful lotof people, and we’re going to take an awful lot of heat on it. And then—you know the heat. Because you’re going to announce the reason thatyou’re doing it is because they’re sending in these kind of missiles.

Well, I would think it’s almost incumbent upon the Russians then, tosay, “Well, we’re going to send them in again. And if you do it again,we’re going to do the same thing to Turkey. And we’re going to do thesame thing to Iran.”

President Kennedy: I don’t believe it takes us, at least . . . How longdoes it take to get in a position where we can invade Cuba? Almost amonth? Two months?

McNamara: No, sir. No, sir. It’s a bare seven days after the air strike,assuming the air strike starts the first of next week. Now, if the air strikewere to start today, it wouldn’t necessarily be seven days after today, butI think you can basically consider seven days after the air strike.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962416

President Kennedy: You could get six divisions or seven divisionsinto Cuba in seven days?

Taylor: No, sir. There are two plans we have. One is to go at maxi-mum speed, which is the one referred to you by Secretary McNamara,about seven days after the strike. We put in 90,000 men in 11 days.

If you have time, if you can give us more time, so we can get all theadvance preparation and prepositioning, we’d put the same 90,000 in, infive days. We really have the choice of those two plans.

President Kennedy: How would you get them in? By ship or by air?McNamara: By air.Several: Airdrop and ship.McNamara: Simultaneous airdrop and ship.President Kennedy: Do you think 90,000 is enough?Taylor: At least it’s enough to start the thing going. And I would say

it would be, ought to be, enough.McNamara: Particularly if it isn’t directed initially at Havana, the

Havana area. This is a variant. General Taylor and . . .President Kennedy: We haven’t any real report on what the state of

the popular reaction would be to all this, do we? We don’t knowwhether . . .

Taylor: They’d be greatly confused, don’t you think?President Kennedy: What?Taylor: Great, great confusion and panic, don’t you think? It’s very

hard to evaluate the effect from what the military consequences might be.McNamara: Sometime today, I think, at the State Department, we

will want to consider that. There’s a real possibility you’d have to invade.If you carried out an air strike, this might lead to an uprising, such thatin order to prevent the slaughter of the free Cubans, we would have toinvade to reintroduce order into the country. And we would be preparedto do that.

Rusk: I would rather think if there were a complete air strike againstall air forces, you might as well do it. Do the whole job.

President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s decide what we ought to bedoing.

Robert Kennedy: Could I raise one more question?President Kennedy: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: Is it absolutely essential that you wait seven days

after you have an air strike? I would think that seven days, that’s whatyou’re going to have all—

Taylor: If you give less, you run the risk of giving up surprise. If youstart moving your troops around in order to reduce that.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 417

Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The only thing is, there’s been so muchattention on Berlin in the last . . . Would you have to move them so thateverybody would know it was Cuba?

Taylor: Well, it’s troops, plus shipping even more so, you know.You’re going to have to assemble the ships necessary, and that will bevery very overt, and we can think of no way to cover that up.

McNamara: May I suggest, Max, that we mention this other plan wetalked about. We should be prepared for a series of eventualities after the airstrike starts. I think it’s not probable, but it’s conceivable that the air strikewould trigger a nationwide uprising. And if there was strong oppositionamong the dissident groups, and if the air strike were highly successful, it’sconceivable that some U.S. troops could be put in in less than seven days.

Taylor: That’s correct. At first our air, our airdrops, and our Marines.Well, the airdrop at least, beginning in five days. That might do the trickif this is really a national upheaval.

McNamara: So we should have a series of alternative plans is all I’msuggesting, other than the seven days.

Robert Kennedy: I just think that five days, even a five-day period—the United States is going to be under such pressure by everybody not todo anything. And there’s going to be also pressure on the Russians to dosomething against us.

If you could get it in, get it started so that there wasn’t any turningback, they couldn’t . . .

President Kennedy: But I mean the problem is, as I understand it . . .you’ve got two problems.

One is how much time we’ve got on these particular missiles beforethey’re ready to go. Do we have two weeks? If we had two weeks, wecould lay on all this and have it all ready to go. But the question really iswhether we can wait two weeks.

Bundy: Yeah.Taylor: I don’t think we’ll ever know, Mr. President, those opera-

tional questions, because with this type of missile, it can be launchedvery quickly with a concealed expedience—

Bundy: Do we have any intelligence—Taylor: —so that even today, this one, this area, might be opera-

tional. I concede this is highly improbable.Bundy: One very important question is whether there are other

areas which conceivably might be even more operational that we havenot identified.

McNamara: This is why, I think, the moment we leave here, Mac, wejust have to take this new authority we have and put it—

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962418

Bundy: May I ask General Carter whether the intelligence, the col-lateral intelligence [information from human sources], relates only tothis area, as I understood it this morning?

Carter: That’s right. That’s why we specifically covered this area onthe one [U-2 flight] Sunday [October 14] because [unclear].

McNamara: May I go back for a second, however, to the point thatwas raised a moment ago? Mr. President, I don’t believe that if we hadtwo weeks, if we knew that at the end of two weeks we were going in, Idon’t believe we could substantially lessen the five- or seven-day periodrequired after the air attack, prior to the invasion, for the size force we’retalking about. Because we start with the assumption the air attack musttake them by surprise. We would not be able to take the actions requiredto shorten the five- to seven-day period and still assure you of surprise inthe air attack. And, therefore, we haven’t been able to figure out a way toshorten that five- to seven-day period while maintaining surprise in theair attack.

President Kennedy: What are you doing for that five days? Movingships, or where are the ships?

McNamara: Moving ships. And we have to move transport aircraftby the scores around the country. We should move ships. Actually, theship movement would not be as extensive in the 7-day invasion as itwould be in an 11-day [invasion] after the air strike.

Taylor: [Unclear] place after the air strike.McNamara: We have been moving already, on a very quiet basis,

munitions and POL. We will have by the 20th, which is Friday I guess[actually Saturday], we will have stocks of munitions, stocks of POLprepositioned in the southeast part of this country. So that kind of move-ment is beginning.

President Kennedy: What’s POL?McNamara: Petroleum, oil, and lubricants. So that kind of movement

has already been taking place and it’s been possible to do it quietly.President Kennedy: What about armor, and so on? What about armor?McNamara: The armor movement would be noticeable if it were car-

ried out in the volume we require. And hence the point I would make isthat, knowing ahead of time, two weeks ahead of time, that we wouldcarry out the invasion, would not significantly reduce the five- to seven-day interval between the strike by air and the invasion time, given thesize force we’re talking about.

Taylor: I think our point of view may change somewhat with a tacti-cal adjustment here, a decision that would take out only the known mis-sile sites and not the airfields. There is a great danger of a quick dispersal

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 419

of all the interesting aircraft. You’d be giving up surprise. There’s no[unclear] attack. Missiles can’t run off quite as readily.

President Kennedy: The advantage of taking out these airplaneswould be to protect us against a reprisal by them?

Taylor: Yes.President Kennedy: I would think you’d have to assume they’d be

using iron bombs and not nuclear weapons. Because, obviously, whywould the Soviets permit nuclear war to begin under that sort of half-assed way?

McNamara: I think that’s reasonable.Roswell Gilpatric: But they still have 10 IL-28s and 20 to 25 MiG-

21s.25

President Kennedy: So you think that if we’re going to take out themissile sites, you’d want to take out these planes at the same time?

Gilpatric: There are eight airfields that are capable of mountingthese jets. Eight—

Bundy: But, politically, if you’re trying to get him to understand thelimit and the nonlimit and make it as easy for him as possible, there’s anenormous premium on having a small, as small and clear-cut an action aspossible, against the hazard of going after all the operational airfieldsbecomes a kind of—

President Kennedy: General—McNamara: War.Gilpatric: —the number of hours required for each type of air strike,

if we were just going for the . . .McNamara: Yeah, sure. Sure.President Kennedy: Well, now, what is it we have, what is it we want

to, need to, do in the next 24 hours to prepare for any of these three? Itseems to me that we want to do more or less the same things, no matterwhat we finally decide.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962420

25. The IL-28 (NATO designation “Beagle”) was a twin-engined light/medium jet bomber ofan early postwar design (production began in 1950) with a cruising radius of about 750 miles,able to carry 6,500 pounds of nuclear or conventional (“iron”) bombs. On 28 September aNavy reconaissance aircraft in the Atlantic had photographed a Soviet freighter carrying tenfuselage crates for these bombers to Cuba. The Soviet freighter arrived on 4 October. Due todelay in the Navy’s transmission of its photos to CIA interpreters, the IL-28s were not identi-fied until 9 October. McCone briefed President Kennedy about this discovery on 11 October.At that time Kennedy told McCone, “We’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba” and saidhe was looking forward to the JCS operational plan that was to be presented the followingweek (see McCone to File, “Memorandum on Donovan Project,” 11 October 1962, in CIADocuments, McAuliffe, p. 124; Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 172–74).

Bundy: We’ve authorized, Mr. President, we have a decision, for addi-tional intelligence reconnaissance.

A minor decision that we’ll talk to Keating. It seems to me—President Kennedy: I don’t think Keating will be that helpful.Bundy: We’ll leave that out.President Kennedy: Yeah.Robert Kennedy: I think that then he’ll be saying afterwards that we

tried to . . .Bundy: All right. The next item. I should think we need to know the

earliest readiness for the various sizes of air strike and how long theywould take to execute.

President Kennedy: Mean probability.Dillon: One other question is: What, if anything, has to be done to be

prepared for an eventuality of a Soviet action?Bundy: [Unclear] alert [unclear].President Kennedy: And then I think what we ought to do is to fig-

ure out: What are the minimum number of people that we really have totell. I suppose, well, there’s de Gaulle.

Bundy: You want de Gaulle. It’s hard to say about Adenauer. You’vegot to tell, it seems to me, you’re going to have to tell SACEUR, and thecommandant.26

Dillon: I would think this business about the Soviet reaction, thatmight be helpful if we could maybe take some general war preparationtype of action that would show them that we’re ready if they want tostart anything without, what you might, risk starting anything. You justdon’t know. . . .

Bundy: On this track, one obvious element on the political side is: Dowe say something simultaneously to the Cubans, to the Soviets, or do welet the action speak for itself ?

Rusk: This is the point, whether we say something to the Cubans andthe Soviets before any, before . . .

President Kennedy: I think, what we ought to do is, after this meet-ing this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider thesevarious proposals.

In the meanwhile, we’ll go ahead with this maximum, whatever isneeded, from the flights. And, in addition, we will . . .

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 421

26. The acronym SACEUR stands for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe—alwaysa U.S. officer. The SACEUR at that time was General Lauris Norstad. The commandant wasthe commandant of the U.S. Sector of Berlin, Major General Albert Watson.

I don’t think we’ve got much time on these missiles. They may be . . .So it may be that we just have to . . . We can’t wait two weeks whilewe’re getting ready to roll. Maybe we just have to just take them out,and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may bewhere we end up.

I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to presentwhat we’re going to do anyway. We’re certainly going to do [option]number one. We’re going to take out these missiles.

The questions will be whether, what I would describe as number two,which would be a general air strike. That we’re not ready to say, but weshould be in preparation for it.

The third is the general invasion. At least we’re going to do numberone. So it seems to me that we don’t have to wait very long. We ought tobe making those preparations.

Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have defi-nitely decided against a political track. I, myself, think we ought to workout a contingency on that.

Rusk: We’ll develop both tracks.President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to do the OAS. I think

that’s a waste of time. I don’t think we ought to do NATO.We ought to just decide who we talk to, and how long ahead, and how

many people, really, in the government. There’s going to be a differencebetween those who know that—this will leak out in the next few days—there are these bases. Until we say, or the Pentagon or State, won’t be hard.We’ve already said it on the . . . So let’s say we’ve got two or three days.

Bundy: Well, let’s play it, shall we, play it still harder and simply saythat there is no evidence. I mean, we have to [unclear] be liars.

President Kennedy: We ought to stick with that until we want to dosomething. Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let’s—

Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion, Mr. President?President Kennedy: Yes.Bundy: There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best

we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American businessblack and describe the rest as intensive budget review sessions.27 But Ihaven’t been able to think of any other.

President Kennedy: Nobody, it seems to me, in the State Department.I discussed the matter with Bohlen of the Soviet part and told him hecould talk to [Llewellyn] Thompson. So that’s those two. It seems to me

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962422

27. In this context the word black means to keep undercover, covert.

that there’s no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked toabout it in any level at all until we know a little more.

And then, as I say, in Defense we’ve got to keep it as tight as possible,particularly what we’re going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people knowabout what’s there. But what we’re going to do about it really ought tobe, you know, the tightest of all because [unclear] we bitch it up.

McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back thisafternoon prepared to answer three questions.

First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very impor-tant question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yesor no.

President Kennedy: By “surface our”?McNamara: I mean, should we state publicly that, that you have

stated we will act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be cer-tain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are sched-uling U-2 flights or other surveillance—

Bundy: [chuckling] This is covert reconnaissance.McNamara: Well, all right, or reconnaissance flights to obtain this

information. We’ll make the information public.President Kennedy: That’d be one. All right, why not?McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we

precede the military action with political action? If so, on what timing?I would think the answer is almost certainly yes. And I would think

particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that ifthese are to be done, they must be scheduled, in terms of time, very, verycarefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very,very precise series of contacts with him, and indications of what we’ll doat certain times following that.

And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regardingthe effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think—

President Kennedy: How long it would take to get them organized.McNamara: Exactly. We’ll be prepared—President Kennedy: In other words, how many days from tomorrow

morning would it . . . How many mornings from tomorrow morningwould it take to get the, to take out just these missile sites, which weneed to know now. How long before we get the information about therest of the island, do you figure, General?

Bundy: It could take weeks, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Weeks?Bundy: For complete coverage of a cloud-covered island.Unidentified: Well, depending on the weather.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 423

Taylor: Well, we’ve got about 80 percent now, don’t we?Carter: Yes, sir. It depends much on what we get out of yesterday’s

flight, sir. They won’t be—Bundy: There are clouded areas, Mr. President, as I understand it.

And there are areas that are going to be very substantially in permanent,or nearly permanent, cloud cover.

Carter: We’ll have preliminaries by six tomorrow morning.President Kennedy: Well, there is the part of the island that isn’t

covered by this flight we’re [expecting to learn about] by tomorrowmorning. What about doing that tomorrow, plus the clouded part, doinglow level? Have we got a plane that goes—

Bundy: We can certainly go low level, and we have been reluctant todo that.

The one thing to worry about on low level is that that will create asense of tactical alert in the island. And I’m not sure we want to do that.Our guess is that the high-level ones have not, in fact, been detected.

Taylor: I think that’s correct.Bundy: No reactions.President Kennedy: I would think that if we are going to go in and

take out this, and any others we find, that we would at the same time doa general low-level photographic reconnaissance.

Bundy: You could at the same time do a low level of all that we havenot seen. That would certainly be sensible.

President Kennedy: Then we would be prepared, almost any day, totake those out.

Bundy: As a matter of fact, for evidentiary purposes, someone hasmade the point this morning that if we go in on a quick strike, we oughtto have a photographic plane take shots of the sites.

President Kennedy: All right. Well, now, I think we’ve got to watchout for this, for us to be doing anything quickly and quietly and com-pletely. That’s what we’ve got to be doing the next two or three days. So,we’ll meet at 6:00?

Robert Kennedy: How long? Excuse me. I just wondered how long itwould take, if you took it and had an invasion.

Taylor: To mount an invasion?Robert Kennedy: No. How long would it take to take over the island?Bundy carries on a side conversation about how to describe this meetingto the press.Taylor: Very hard to estimate, Bobby. But I would say that in five or

six days the main resistance ought to be overcome. We might then be inthere for months thereafter, cleaning that up.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962424

McNamara: Five or seven days of air, plus five days of invasion,plus—

President Kennedy: I wonder if CIA could give us the state . . . thelatest on his popular . . . so we get some idea about our reception there.

I just hate to even waste these six hours. So it may be that we willwant to be doing some movements in the next six hours.

Unidentified: About the execution of the [unclear]?President Kennedy: Yeah.The meeting now begins to break up. Various separate conversationsbegin as some people leave. President Kennedy’s next appointment wasfor a formal lunch with the crown prince of Libya.President Kennedy: I want to add [unclear], better also. Are you two

coming to lunch?Rusk: I was supposed to, but . . .President Kennedy: George, are you supposed to come?Ball: No.President Kennedy: You went to check out [unclear].Rusk: Ros [Gilpatric], were you supposed to go [unclear]? Could you—President Kennedy: Six tonight?Bundy: Six.President Kennedy: All right, seven.Bundy: Seven is better actually for you, Mr. President. Is 6:30 man-

ageable? That would be still better because you’re supposed to be outthere [at a dinner party] at eight.

President Kennedy: Well, that’s all right. That, then, seven. Between6:30 and 7:00. As close to 6:30 as you can, be there.

How many would there be? I’d like to have, I think we ought to havethe members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff here. [Unclear reply from Gilpatric.]Well, then, you bring who you think ought to be brought.

Bundy: [calling to departing participants] And I urge everybody to usethe East Gate rather than the West Gate.28

President Kennedy: I think we ought to get . . . What’s Mr. McConedoing out there, General?

Carter: He’s burying his stepson tomorrow morning.29

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 425

28. The West Gate was on the same side of the White House as the White House Press Roomand was the usual path for observing the comings and goings of official visitors. The EastGate was the usual entrance for the residential side of the White House, used more for socialfunctions and tours.29. McCone had remarried in August. His wife’s son, Paul Pigott, had died on 14 October

Others are talking in the background.Robert Kennedy: He’s back tomorrow.Unidentified: I just talked to him on the phone. I think he’d rather come

back.President Kennedy: So, why don’t . . . you discussed it with him? Is

he familiar with this information?Carter: Yes, sir. He’s aware of what has happened.Robert Kennedy: I talked to him about an hour ago.President Kennedy: Is he coming here?Robert Kennedy: He’ll be here tomorrow morning. They’re burying

the child today, his son.President Kennedy: Why don’t we leave it in his judgment. [Mixed

voices.]Robert Kennedy: I think we might tell him. He said he’s going to talk

to you about this. Maybe just tell him about the meeting tonight.President Kennedy: All right. Now the other question is on—he’s

[McCone] the man to talk to the General, Eisenhower. Where is the Generalnow? Eisenhower?

I’ll take care of that. I’ll have [unclear]. I want to get [unclear].Bundy: [apparently to Dillon] It’s too complicated. [Dillon makes an

unclear reply.] Yeah.Rusk: George, the President wants you to take my place at lunch [with

the Libyan crown prince].Ball: All right. But I’ve got . . . You know that I’ve got a 1:45 speech.

Look, look, maybe they can reschedule that. [Rusk makes an unclear reply.]They can reschedule that.

Rusk: That’s fine.There is a brief, unclear exchange between President Kennedy, McNamara,and Taylor about reconnaissance flights and then Kennedy leaves, with thetape machine still running.Taylor: [Unclear] mission pilots [unclear]. If we can make a decision

here to use whatever facilities we have. [Mixed voices.]McNamara: [Unclear] hold off on this thing until tomorrow. [Unclear]

first thing.Bundy: But you will run the reconnaissance?McNamara: Yeah, I was just talking to him. I’m going to get there right

now. And I would suggest in this period we get [unclear names] and every-

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962426

from injuries suffered in an auto racing accident in California. McCone had left Washington toaccompany the body to Seattle for the funeral.

body else and sit down at the table and figure out where these planes are.And consider what camps there are. [Mixed voices.]

Why don’t you come down with, drive back [with us]? Why don’t youride—pick up your car and drive over with us to the Pentagon and havelunch with us over there? Why don’t you call from here [unclear names] andcome over, or anybody else you choose? [Unclear.] And then we can sitdown [unclear] and sort out in great detail and see what we really need.

Vice President Johnson: [concerned about improving his jet transport andcommunications as he travels] I have [unclear] authority. I wonder if there’sany good reason why you shouldn’t go to somebody and put [unclear]. Ifyou had immediate [unclear] or something else, I’m away from you for fouror five hours. I have a Grumman Gulfstream that I’ve leased. I want you tolease it for MATS [Military Air Transport Service], after the election. Letme use it for the [Lockheed] Jetstar. It’s a hell of a lot better for these smallairfields. When I think about [unclear].

Anyway, I have a lease now and what I’d like to have is the best commu-nication that you have that you’re . . . if it can be done.

McNamara: Oh sure, sure.Vice President Johnson: As it is now, I’m going to get 100–200 miles

from Washington on the [unclear reference to communication].McNamara: Oh sure.

6:30 –8:00 P.M.

I think any military action does change the world. And Ithink not taking action changes the world. And I think theseare the two worlds that we need to look at.

Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis30

The morning meeting had ended with an understanding that the Pentagonteam would analyze possibilities for a quick air strike, possibly followedby an invasion. Rusk and others at State would study how the adminis-

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 427

30. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. DouglasDillon, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, EdwinMartin, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Tapes 28and 28A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962428

tration could act promptly and effectively against the missiles withoutsurprising allies in the hemisphere and Europe and possibly losing theirsupport.

While this went on, Kennedy kept to his announced schedule. Hepresided over a formal lunch for the crown prince of Libya. Adlai Stevensonwas present. After lunch, Kennedy invited Stevenson to the family quarters.Showing Stevenson the U-2 photos, Kennedy said, “I suppose the alterna-tives are to go in by air and wipe them out or to take other steps to renderthe weapons inoperable.” Stevenson’s position was: “Let’s not go into an airstrike until we have explored the possibilities of a peaceful solution.”

During the afternoon, Stevenson took part in the meetings at theState Department. So did Soviet experts Bohlen and Thompson and theassistant secretary for Latin America, Edwin Martin.

At Justice, Robert Kennedy had meanwhile held in his own office ameeting of those involved in Operation Mongoose. Describing the “gen-eral dissatisfaction” of the President with progress thus far, the AttorneyGeneral focused discussion on a new and more active program of sabo-tage that had just been prepared by the CIA. Pressed by the CIA repre-sentative (Richard Helms) to explain the ultimate objective of theoperation and what to promise the Cuban exiles, Robert Kennedy hintedthe President might be becoming less averse to overt U.S. militaryaction. He wondered aloud how many Cubans would defend Castro’sregime if the country were invaded. After discussing the possibility ofhaving Cuban émigrés attack the missile sites, he and the rest of thegroup seemed to agree this was not feasible.

At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with CIN-CLANT, the commanders of SAC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC),and the general commanding the 18th Airborne Corps. McNamarajoined later. Presuming that the Soviets would not initiate a nuclear waragainst the United States, the JCS favored an attack, regardless ofwhether the missiles were operational. They nevertheless approved sev-eral prudential steps to increase U.S. readiness for nuclear war. AfterMcNamara left, the JCS agreed that they did not favor use of low-levelreconnaissance flights over Cuba, fearing that they would “tip our hand.”They also agreed they would rather do nothing than limit an air strikeonly to MRBMs.31 In the last 40 minutes before returning to the White

31. Based on notes taken from transcripts of JCS meetings in October–November 1962. Thenotes were made in 1976 before these transcripts were apparently destroyed. They have sincebeen declassified and are available from the National Security Archive, in Washington, D.C.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 429

House, McNamara and Gilpatric worked out an outline of three alterna-tive courses of action, which McNamara would present at the meeting.

From 4:00 on, Kennedy himself had been occupied with his regularschedule. He was able to return to the missile problem only as his advis-ers gathered in the Cabinet Room at 6:30. Taylor arrived a bit late, afterthe meeting began. President Kennedy activated the tape recorder as themeeting opened with the intelligence briefing.

President Kennedy: Find anything new?Marshall Carter: Nothing on the additional film, sir. We have a much

better readout on what we had initially.There’s good evidence that there are back up missiles for each of the

four launchers at each of the three sites, so that there would be twice thenumber, for a total of eight which could eventually be erected. This wouldmean a capability of from 16 or possibly 24 missiles.

We feel, on the basis of information that we presently have, that theseare solid propellant, inertial guidance missiles with 1,100-mile range,rather than the oxygen propellant [and] radar controlled [type]. Prima-rily because we have no indication of any radar, or any indication of anyoxygen equipment. And it would appear to be logical from an intelligenceestimate viewpoint that if they are going to this much trouble, that theywould go ahead and put in the 1,100 miles because of the tremendouslyincreased threat coverage. I’ll let you see the map.

President Kennedy: What is this map?Carter: That shows the circular range capability.President Kennedy: When was this drawn? Is this drawn in relation

to this information?Carter: No, sir. It was drawn in some time ago, I believe. But the

ranges there are the nominal ranges of the missiles rather than the max-imum. That’s a 1,020 [mile] circle, as against 1,100.

President Kennedy: Well, I was just wondering whether . . . SanDiego de los Baños is where these missiles are?

Carter: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: Well, I wonder how many of these [maps] have

been printed out.McGeorge Bundy: The circle is drawn in red ink on the map, Mr.

President.President Kennedy: Oh, I see. It was never printed?Carter: No, that’s on top.President Kennedy: I see. It isn’t printed.

Carter: It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solidpropellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be opera-tional within two weeks, as we look at the pictures now. And once opera-tional they could fire on very little notice. They’ll have a refire rate offrom four to six hours, for each launcher.

President Kennedy: What about the vulnerability of such a missile tobullets?

Robert McNamara: Highly vulnerable, Mr. President.Carter: They’re vulnerable. They’re not nearly as vulnerable as the

oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire.We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near

the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have beenobserving an unusual facility which now has automatic antiaircraft weaponprotection. This is at Bejucal. There are some similarities but also manypoints of dissimilarity between this particular facility and the national[nuclear] storage sites in the Soviet Union. It’s the best candidate for asite, and we have that marked for further surveillance. However, there isreally totally inadequate evidence to say that there is a nuclear storagecapability now.

These are field-type launchers. They have mobile support, erection,and check-out equipment. And they have a four-in-line deployment pat-tern in launchers which is identical, complexes about five miles apart,representative of the deployments that we note in the Soviet Union forsimilar missiles.

President Kennedy: General, how long would you say we had beforethese, at least to the best of your ability for the ones we now know, willbe ready to fire?

Carter: Well our people estimate that these could be fully operationalwithin two weeks. This would be the total complex. If they’re the oxy-gen type, we have no . . . it would be considerably longer, since we don’thave any indication of oxygen refueling there, nor any radars.

Alexis Johnson: This wouldn’t rule out the possibility that one ofthem might be operational very much sooner.

Carter: Well, one of them could be operational much sooner. Ourpeople feel that this has been being put in since, probably, earlySeptember. We have had two visits of a Soviet ship that has an eight-foothold capacity sideways. And this, about so far, is the only delivery vehiclethat we would have any suspicion that they came in on. And that came inlate August, and one in early September.

George Ball: Why would they have to be sideways though?Carter: Well, it’s just easier to get them in, I guess.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962430

President Kennedy: Well, that’s fine.Dean Rusk: The total readout on the flights yesterday will be ready

tonight, you think?Carter: It should be finished pretty well by midnight.President Kennedy: Now wasn’t that supposed to have covered the

whole island? Was it?Carter: Yes, sir. In two throws [flight paths].President Kennedy: Except for . . .Carter: But part of the central and, in fact, much of the central and

part of the eastern [portions of Cuba] was cloud covered. The westernhalf was in real good shape.

President Kennedy: I see. Now what have we got laying on fortomorrow?

Carter: There are seven, six or seven—McNamara: I just left General Carroll.32 We’re having ready seven U-2

aircraft: two high-altitude U-2s, five lesser-altitude U-2s; six equippedwith an old-type film, one equipped with a new type, experimental film,which hopefully will increase the resolution.

We only need two aircraft flying tomorrow if the weather is good.We will put up only two if the weather is good. If the weather is notgood, we’ll start off with two and we’ll have the others ready to go dur-ing the day as the weather improves. We have weather aircraft surround-ing the periphery of Cuba, and we’ll be able to keep track of the weatherduring the day over all parts of the island. Hopefully, this will give uscomplete coverage tomorrow. We are planning to do this, or have thecapability to do this, every day thereafter for an indefinite period.

Carter: This is a field-type missile. And from collateral evidence, notdirect, that we have with the Soviet Union, it’s designed to be fielded,placed, and fired in six hours.

It would appear that we have caught this in a very early stage ofdeployment. It would also appear that there does not seem to be thedegree of urgency in getting them immediately in the position. Thiscould be because they have not been surveyed. Or it could also be becauseit is the shorter-range missile, and the radars and the oxygen have notyet arrived.

President Kennedy: There isn’t any question in your mind, however,that it is an intermediate-range [actually medium-range] missile?

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 431

32. General Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Carter: No. There’s no question in our minds at all. These are all thecharacteristics that we have seen with live ones.

Rusk: You’ve seen actual missiles themselves and not just the boxes,have you?

Carter: No, we’ve seen . . . in the picture there is an actual missile.Rusk: Yeah. Sure there is [tone is serious, not sarcastic].Carter: Yes. There’s no question in our mind, sir. And they are gen-

uine. They are not a camouflage or covert attempt to fool us.Bundy: How much do we know, Pat? I don’t mean to go behind your

judgment here, except that there’s one thing that would be really cata-strophic, [which] would be to make a judgment here on a bad guess asto whether these things are . . . We mustn’t do that.

How do we really know what these missiles are, and what theirrange is?

Carter: Only that from the readout that we have now, and in thejudgment of our analysts, and of the Guided Missile and AstronauticsCommittee which has been convening all afternoon, these signatures areidentical with those that we have clearly earmarked in the Soviet Union,and have fully verified.33

Bundy: What made the verification? That’s really my question. Howdo we know what a given Soviet missile will do?

Carter: We know something from the range firings that we have vet-ted for the past two years. And we know also from comparison with thecharacteristics of our own missiles as to size and length and diameter. Asto these particular missiles, we have a family of Soviet missiles for whichwe have all accepted the specifications.

Bundy: I know that we have accepted them, and I know that we’vehad these things in charts for years. But I don’t know how we know.

Carter: Well, we know from a number of sources, including ourIRONBARK sources, as well as from range firings which we have beenvetting for several years, as to the capabilities.34 But I would have to getthe analysts in here to give you the play-by-play account.

Rusk: Pat, we don’t know of any 65-foot Soviet missile that has arange of, say, 15 miles, do we?

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962432

33. The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) was anotherinteragency committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board.34. The word IRONBARK was a codeword for information passed to the United States byColonel Oleg Penkovsky, an officer in Soviet military intelligence. Penkovsky had alreadyfallen under suspicion and was arrested six days later (on 22 October, Washington time). Hewas later executed by the Soviet government.

Carter: Fifteen miles? No, we certainly don’t.Rusk: In other words, if they are missiles this size, they are missiles

of considerable range, I think.McNamara: I tried to prove today—I am satisfied—that these were

not MRBMs. And I worked long on it. I got our experts out, and I couldnot find evidence that would support any conclusion other than that theyare MRBMs. Now, whether they’re 1,100 miles, 600 miles, 900 miles isstill a guess in my opinion. But that they are MRBMs seems the mostprobable assumption at the moment.

Bundy: I would apparently agree, given the weight of it.President Kennedy: Is General Taylor coming over?McNamara: He is, Mr. President.President Kennedy: Have you finished, General?Carter: Yes, sir. I think that’s it.Rusk: Mr. President, we’ve had some further discussions with people

this afternoon and we’ll be working on it, probably this evening. But Imight mention certain points that some of us are concerned about.

The one is the chance that this might be the issue on which Castrowould elect to break with Moscow if he knew that he were in deadlyjeopardy. Now this is one chance in a hundred, possibly. But in any eventwe are very much interested in the possibility of a direct message toCastro, as well as Khrushchev, [which] might make some sense herebefore an actual strike is put on. Mr. Martin, perhaps you would outlinethe kind of message to Castro that we had in mind.

Edwin Martin: This would be an oral note, message through a thirdparty, first describing just what we know about what exists in the missilesites, so that he knows that we are informed about what’s going on.

Second, to point out that the issues this raises as far as U.S. securityis concerned: It’s a breach of two of the points that you have made pub-lic. First the ground-to-ground missile and, second, and obviously, it’s aSoviet-operated base in Cuba.

Thirdly, this raises the greatest problems for Castro, as we see it. Inthe first place, by this action the Soviets have threatened him with attackfrom the United States, and therefore the overthrow of his regime—used his territory to put him in this jeopardy. And secondly the Sovietsare talking to other people about the possibility of bargaining this sup-port and these missiles against concessions in Berlin and elsewhere, andtherefore are threatening to bargain him away. In these circumstances,we wonder whether he realizes the position that he’s been put in and theway the Soviets are using him.

Then go on to say that we will have to inform our people of the

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 433

threat that exists here, and we mean to take action about it in the nextday or so. And we’ll have to do this unless we receive word from him thathe is prepared to take action to get the Soviets out of the site. He willhave to show us that, not only by statements—privately or publicly—but by action. That we intend to keep close surveillance by overflights ofthe site to make sure, to know, what is being done. But we will have toknow that he is doing something to remove this threat, in order to with-hold the action that we intend, we will be compelled, to take.

If Castro feels that an attempt by him to take the kind of action thatwe’re suggesting to him would result in serious difficulties for himwithin Cuba, we at least want him to know that, ask to convey to himand remind him of the statement that you, Mr. President, made a yearand a half ago, to the effect that there are two points that are nonnego-tiable. One is the Soviet tie and presence. And the second is aggressionin Latin America. This is a hint, but no more than that, that we mighthave sympathy and help for him in case he ran into trouble trying tothrow the old-line Communists and the Soviets out.

Rusk: Yes.Martin: And give him 24 hours to respond.Rusk: The disadvantage in that is, of course, the advance notice if he

judges that . . . We would not, in this approach here, say exactly what wewould do. But it might, of course, lead him to bring up mobile antiaircraftweapons around these missiles themselves, or take some other action thatwill make the strike there more difficult. But there is that move.

There are two other problems that we are concerned about. If we strikethese missiles, we would expect, I think, maximum Communist reaction inLatin America. In the case of about six of those governments, unless theheads of government had some intimation requiring some preparatorysteps from the security point of view, one or another of those governmentscould easily be overthrown. I’m thinking of Venezuela, for example, orGuatemala, Bolivia, Chile, possibly even Mexico. And therefore the ques-tion will arise as to whether we should not somehow indicate to them, insome way, the seriousness of the situation so they can take precautionarysteps, whether we tell them exactly what we have in mind, or not.

The other is the NATO problem. We would estimate that the Sovietswould almost certainly take some kind of action somewhere. For us totake an action of this sort without letting our closer allies know of amatter which could subject them to very great danger is a very farreaching decision to make. And we could find ourselves isolated, and thealliance crumbling, very much as it did for a period during the Suez

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962434

affair, but at a moment of much greater danger over an issue of muchgreater danger than the Suez affair for the alliance.

I think that these are matters that we’ll be working on very hard thisevening. But I think I ought to mention them because it’s necessarily apart of this problem.

President Kennedy: Can we get a little idea about what the militarything is? Well, of course, [number] one, is to suggest taking these out.

McNamara: Yes, Mr. President. General Taylor has just been withthe Chiefs, and the unified commanders went through this in detail.

To take out only the missiles, or to take out the missiles and the MiGaircraft and the associated nuclear storage facilities, if we locate them,could be done in 24 hours warning. That is to say, 24 hours between thetime of decision and the time of strike, starting with a time of decisionno earlier than this coming Friday [October 19] and with the striketherefore on Saturday [October 20], or anytime thereafter with 24hours between the decision and the time of strike.

General Taylor will wish to comment on this, but the Chiefs arestrong in their recommendation against that kind of an attack, believingthat it would leave too great a capability in Cuba undestroyed. The spe-cific number of sorties required to accomplish this end has not beenworked out in detail. The capability is for something in excess of 700sorties per day. It seems highly unlikely that that number would berequired to carry out that limited an objective, but at least that capabilityis available in the Air Force alone, and the Navy sorties would rise ontop of that number. The Chiefs have also considered other alternativesextending into the full invasion. You may wish to discuss [that] later.But that’s the answer to your first question.

President Kennedy: That would be taking out these three missilesites, plus all the MiGs?

McNamara: Well, you can go from the three missile sites, to thethree missile sites plus the MiGs, to the three missile sites plus MiGsplus nuclear storage plus airfields, and so on up through the potentialoffensive.

President Kennedy: Just the three missiles [sites], however, would be—McNamara: Could be done with 24-hours notice, and would require a

relatively small number of sorties. Less than a day’s air attack, in otherwords.

President Kennedy: Of course, all you’d really get there would be . . .what would you get there? You’d get the, probably, you’d get the missilesthemselves that have to be on the . . .

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 435

McNamara: You’d get the launchers and the missiles on the—President Kennedy: The launchers are just what? They’re not much,

are they?McNamara: No. They’re simply a mobile launch device.Maxwell Taylor: This is a point target, Mr. President. You’re never

sure of having, absolutely, getting everything down there. We can cer-tainly do a great deal of damage because we can whip [unclear]. But, asthe secretary says here, there was unanimity among all the commandersinvolved in the Joint Chiefs that, in our judgment, it would be a mistaketo take this very narrow, selective target because it invited reprisalattacks and it may be detrimental.

Now if the Soviets have been willing to give nuclear warheads tothese missiles, there is just as good reason for them to give a nuclearcapability to these bases. We don’t think we’d ever have a chance to takethem again, so that we’d lose this first strike surprise capability.

Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence, get allthe photography we need, the next two or three days—no hurry in ourbook. Then look at this target system. If it really threatens the UnitedStates, then take it right out with one hard crack.

President Kennedy: That would be taking out some of those fighters,bombers, and—

Taylor: Fighters, the bombers. IL-28s may turn up in this photogra-phy. It’s not at all unlikely there are some there.

President Kennedy: Think you could do that in one day?Taylor: We think that [in] the first strike we’d get a great majority

of this. We’ll never get it all, Mr. President. But we then have to comeback day after day, for several days. We said five days, perhaps, to do thecomplete job. Meanwhile we could then be making up our mind as towhether or not to go ahead and invade the island.

I’m very much impressed with the need for a time, something likefive to seven days, for this air purpose, because of the parachute aspect ofthe proposed invasion. You can’t take parachute formations, close forma-tions of troop carrier planes in the face of any air opposition, really. Sothe first job, before there is any land attack including parachutes, isreally cleaning out the MiGs and the accompanying aircraft.

McNamara: Mr. President, could I outline three courses of action wehave considered and speak very briefly on each one?

The first is what I would call the political course of action, in which wefollow some of the possibilities that Secretary Rusk mentioned this morn-ing by approaching Castro, by approaching Khrushchev, by discussing withour allies. An overt and open approach politically to the problem, attempt-

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962436

ing to solve it. This seemed to me likely to lead to no satisfactory result,and it almost stops subsequent military action. Because the danger of start-ing military action after they acquire a nuclear capability is so great, Ibelieve we would decide against it, particularly if that nuclear capabilityincluded aircraft as well as missiles, as it well might at that point.

A second course of action we haven’t discussed, but lies in between themilitary course we began discussing a moment ago and the politicalcourse of action, is a course of action that would involve declaration ofopen surveillance: A statement that we would immediately impose a block-ade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future and an indica-tion that, with our open surveillance reconnaissance which we would planto maintain indefinitely into the future, we would be prepared to immedi-ately attack the Soviet Union in the event that Cuba made any offensivemove against this country.

Bundy: Attack who?McNamara: The Soviet Union. In the event that Cuba made any

offensive move against this country. Now this lies short of militaryaction against Cuba, direct military action against Cuba. It has somemajor defects.

But the third course of action is any one of these variants of militaryaction directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the mis-siles. The Chiefs are strongly opposed to so limited an air attack. Buteven so limited an air attack is a very extensive air attack. It is not 20sorties or 50 sorties or 100 sorties, but probably several hundred sorties.We haven’t worked out the details. It’s very difficult to do so when welack certain intelligence that we hope to have tomorrow or the next day.But it’s a substantial air attack. And to move from that into the moreextensive air attacks against the MiGs, against the airfields, against thepotential nuclear storage sites, against the radar installations, against theSAM sites, means—as Max suggested—possibly 700 to 1,000 sortiesper day for five days. This is the very, very rough plan that the Chiefshave outlined, and it is their judgment that that is the type of air attackthat should be carried out.

To move beyond that, into an invasion following the air attack,means the application of tens of thousands, between 90 and over 150,000men, to the invasion forces.

It seems to me almost certain that any one of these forms of directmilitary action will lead to a Soviet military response of some type, someplace in the world. It may well be worth the price. Perhaps we shouldpay that. But I think we should recognize that possibility and, moreover,we must recognize it in a variety of ways.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 437

We must recognize it by trying to deter it, which means we probablyshould alert SAC, probably put on an airborne alert, perhaps take otheralert measures. These bring risks of their own associated with them.

It means we should recognize that by mobilization. Almost certainly,we should accompany the initial air strike with at least a partial mobi-lization. We should accompany an invasion following an air strike with alarge-scale mobilization, a very large-scale mobilization, certainly exceed-ing the limits of the authority we have from Congress, requiring a decla-ration therefore of a national emergency.

We should be prepared, in the event of even a small air strike andcertainly in the event of a larger air strike, for the possibility of a Cubanuprising, which would force our hand in some way. [It] either forces usto accept an unsatisfactory uprising, with all of the adverse commentthat would result, or would force an invasion to support the uprising.

Rusk: Mr. President, may I make a very brief comment on that?I think that any course of action involves heavy political involve-

ment. It’s going to affect all sorts of policies, positions, as well as thestrategic situation. So I don’t think there’s any such thing as a nonpoliti-cal course of action. I think also that we have to consider what politicalpreparation, if any, is to occur before an air strike or in connection withany military action. And when I was talking this morning, I was talkingabout some steps which would put us in the best position to crack thestrength of Cuba.

President Kennedy: I think the difficulty, it seems to me, is . . . I com-pletely agree that there isn’t any doubt that if we announced that therewere MRBM sites going up that that would change . . . we would securea good deal of political support after my statement. And that the factthat we indicated our desire to restrain, this really would put the burdenon the Soviets.

On the other hand, the very fact of doing that makes the military . . .we lose all the advantages of our strike. Because if we announce that it’sthere, then it’s quite obvious to them that we’re gonna probably dosomething about it, I would assume.

Now, I don’t know that. It seems to me what we ought to be think-ing about tonight is: If we made an announcement that the intelligencehas revealed that there are . . . If we did the note, message, toKhrushchev . . . I don’t think that Castro has to know we’ve been payingmuch attention to it, any more than . . . Over a period of time it mighthave some effect, [but] he’s not going to suddenly back down, change. Idon’t think he plays it that way.

So having a note to Khrushchev. It seems to me my press statement

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962438

was so clear about how we wouldn’t do anything under these conditions,and under the conditions that we would. He must know that we’re goingto find out. So it seems to me he just . . .

Bundy: That’s, of course, why he’s been very, very explicit with us incommunications to us about how dangerous this is—

President Kennedy: That’s right.Bundy: —in the [September 11] TASS statement and his other mes-

sages.President Kennedy: But he’s initiated the danger, really, hasn’t he?

He’s the one that’s playing God, not us.McNamara: So we could—Rusk: And his statement to Kohler on the subject of his visit and so

forth, completely hypocritical.35

At this point, about 30 minutes into this meeting, the recording wasinterrupted, apparently while the reels were being changed on the taperecorder in the basement. About a minute of conversation appears tohave been lost before recording resumed.36

McNamara: There is a great possibility they can place them in oper-ational conditions quickly unless, as General Carter said, the system mayhave a normal reaction time, set up time, of six hours. Whether it has sixhours or two weeks, we don’t know how much time has started.

Nor do we know what air-launch capabilities they have for warheads.We don’t know what air-launch capability they have for high explosives.It’s almost certainly a substantial high explosive capability, in the sensethat they could drop one or two or ten high-explosive bombs some placealong the East Coast. And that’s the minimum risk to this country werun as a result of advance warning, too.

Taylor: I’d like to stress this last point, Mr. President. We are veryvulnerable to conventional bombing attack, low-level bombing attacks,in the Florida area. Our whole air defense has been oriented in otherdirections. We’ve never had low-level defenses prepared for this country.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 439

35. The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Foy Kohler, had met with Khrushchev earlier in themorning of 16 October (Moscow time). His report on their long conversation had arrived inWashington during the afternoon (Washington time), so Rusk and others would have read thereport just before this meeting. In the initial summary report of that conversation (Moscow970, 16 October 1962), Khrushchev promised that he would not do anything to worsen rela-tions until after the U.S. congressional elections in early November. He planned to visit NewYork later in November for a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly and would then renewthe dialogue on Berlin and other matters. Khrushchev said the Americans “could be sure hewould take no action before meeting which would make situation more difficult.”36. At this point Tape 28 ends and the recording resumes on Tape 28A.

So it would be entirely possible for MiGs to come through with conven-tional weapons and do some amount, some damage.

President Kennedy: We’re not, talking overall, not a great deal ofdamage. If they get one strike.

Taylor: No. But it certainly is [unclear]—Douglas Dillon: What if they carry a nuclear weapon?President Kennedy: Well, if they carry a nuclear weapon . . . you

assume they wouldn’t do that.Taylor: At minimum, I think we could expect some conventional

bombing.Rusk: I would not think that they would use a nuclear weapon unless

they’re prepared for general nuclear war. I just don’t see that possibility.Bundy: I would agree.Rusk: That would mean that—you know we could be just utterly

wrong—but we’ve never really believed that Khrushchev would take ona general nuclear war over Cuba.

Bundy: May I ask a question in that context?President Kennedy: We certainly have been wrong about what he’s

trying to do in Cuba. There isn’t any doubt about that. Not many of usthought that he was going to put MRBMs on Cuba.

Bundy: No. Except John McCone.Carter: Mr. McCone.President Kennedy: Yeah.Bundy: But the question that I would like to ask is, quite aside from

what we’ve said and we’re very hard locked on to it, I know: What is thestrategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs inCuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?

McNamara: Mac, I asked the Chiefs that this afternoon, in effect.They said: “Substantially.” My own personal view is: Not at all.

Bundy: Not so much.McNamara: And I think this is an important element here. But it’s all

very . . .Carter: The reason our estimators didn’t think that they’d put them

in there, is because of—37

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962440

37. Carter was referring to the Special National Intelligence Estimate, “The Military Buildupin Cuba,” of September 19, which had concluded that the Soviet Union “could derive consider-able military advantage” from deploying MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba but that such a devel-opment was incompatible with Soviet practice and policy because “it would indicate a fargreater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. hasdisplayed thus far. . . .” in CIA Documents, McAuliffe, document 33.

Bundy: That’s what they said themselves in [the] TASS statement.Carter: That’s what they said themselves. But then, going behind

that—President Kennedy: But why? Didn’t they think they’d be valuable

enough?Bundy: Doesn’t improve anything in the strategic balance.Carter: Doesn’t improve anything. That was what the estimators felt,

and that the Soviets would not take the risk.38

Mr. McCone’s reasoning, however, was: If this is so, then what possi-ble reason have they got for going into Cuba in the manner in whichthey are, with surface-to-air missiles and cruise-type missiles? He justcouldn’t understand why the Soviets were so heavily bolstering Cuba’sdefensive posture. There must be something behind it. Which led himthen to the belief that they must be coming in with MRBMs.

Taylor: I think from a cold-blooded point of view, Mr. President,you’re quite right in saying that these are just a few more missiles tar-geted on the United States. However, they can become a very, ratherimportant, adjunct and reinforcement to the strike capability of theSoviet Union. We have no idea how far they will go.

But more than that, these are, to our nation it means a great dealmore, as we all are aware, if they have them in Cuba and not over in theSoviet Union.

Bundy: Oh, I ask the question with an awareness of the political . . .[chuckles]

President Kennedy: Well, let’s say . . . I understand, but let’s just saythat they get these in there. And then you can’t . . . They get sufficientcapacity, so we can’t . . . with warheads. Then you don’t want to knockthem out because that’s too much of a gamble.

Then they just begin to build up those air bases there, and then putmore and more. I suppose they really . . . Then they start getting readyto squeeze us in Berlin. Doesn’t that . . . ?

You may say it doesn’t make any difference if you get blown up by anICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one from 90 miles away.Geography doesn’t mean that much. . . .

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 441

38. Carter was partly in error. In fact, as indicated in the previous note, the estimatorsthought the deployment would improve the Soviet military position. This was a unanimousview in the intelligence community. Every lower-level expert, whether in State, the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, the armed forces, or the CIA, all believed (and separately wrote) thatMRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would materially improve the Soviet position in the strategicbalance of power.

Taylor: We would have to target them with our missiles and have thesame kind of pistol pointed at the head situation as they have in theSoviet Union at the present time.

Bundy: No question. If this thing goes on, an attack on Cubabecomes general war. And that’s really the question: Whether . . .

President Kennedy: That’s why it shows the Bay of Pigs was reallyright. If we had done it right. That was [a choice between] better andbetter, and worse and worse.

Taylor: I’m impressed with this, Mr. President. We have a war planover there for you. [It] calls for a quarter of a million American soldiers,marines, and airmen to take an island we launched 1,800 Cubans against,a year and a half ago. We’ve changed our evaluations about it.

Robert Kennedy: Of course, the other problem is in South America ayear from now. And the fact that you’ve got these things in the hands ofCubans here, and then, say, some problem arises in Venezuela. Andyou’ve got Castro saying: “You move troops down into that part ofVenezuela; we’re going to fire these missiles.” [Unclear interjection byDouglas Dillon.] I think that’s the difficulty, rather than the [unclear]. Ithink it gives the [unclear] image.

President Kennedy: It makes them look like they’re coequal with us.And that . . .

Douglas Dillon: We’re scared of the Cubans.Robert Kennedy: We let the . . . I mean, like, we’d hate to have it in

the hands of the Chinese.Dillon: I agree with that sort of thing very strongly.Edwin Martin: It’s a psychological factor. It won’t reach as far as

Venezuela is concerned.Dillon: Well, that’s—McNamara: It’ll reach the U.S., though. This is the point.Dillon: Yeah. That is the point.Martin: Yeah. The psychological factor of our having taken it.Dillon: Taken it. That’s the best [way of putting it].Robert Kennedy: Well, and the fact that if you go there, we’re gonna

fire it.President Kennedy: What’s that again, Ed? What are you saying?Martin: Well, it’s a psychological factor that we have sat back and let

them do it to us. That is more important than the direct threat. It is athreat in the Caribbean. . . .

President Kennedy: I said we weren’t going to [allow it].Bundy: That’s something we could manage.President Kennedy: Last month I said we weren’t going to [allow

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962442

it]. Last month I should have said that we don’t care. But when we saidwe’re not going to, and then they go ahead and do it, and then we donothing, then I would think that our risks increase.

I agree, what difference does it make? They’ve got enough to blow usup now anyway. I think it’s just a question of . . . After all, this is a politi-cal struggle as much as military.

Well, so where are we now? Where is the . . . ? I don’t think the mes-sage to Castro’s got much in it.

Let’s just try to get an answer to this question: How much . . . ? It’squite obviously to our advantage to surface this thing to a degree before . . .first to inform these governments in Latin America, as the Secretary sug-gests. Secondly, let the NATO people who have the right to some warning:Macmillan, de Gaulle. How much does this diminish . . . ? Not [tellingthem] that we’re going to do anything, but the existence of them, withoutany say about what we’re gonna do.

Let’s say, 24 hours ahead of our doing something about it, we informMacmillan. We make a public statement that these have been found onthe island. That would be a notification, in a sense, of their existence andeverybody could draw whatever conclusion they wanted to.

Martin: I would say this, Mr. President. That I would . . . that ifyou’ve made a public statement, you’ve got to move immediately, oryou’re going to have a [unclear] in this country.

President Kennedy: Oh, I understand that. We’ll be talking about . . .Say we’re going to move on a Saturday. And we would say on a Fridaythat these MRBMs, that the existence of this, presents the gravest threatto our security and that appropriate action must be taken.

Robert Kennedy: Could you stick planes over them? And say you madethe announcement at six, Saturday morning? And at the same time, orsimultaneously, put planes over to make sure that they weren’t taking anyaction or movement and that you could move in if they started moving inthe missiles in place or something. You would move in and knock . . . Thatwould be the trigger that you would move your planes in and knock themout. Otherwise you’d wait until six or five that night. I don’t . . . is that . . . ?

Taylor: I don’t think anything like that [would work]. I can’t visual-ize doing it successfully that way. I think that anything that shows ourintent to strike is going to flush the airplanes and the missiles into con-cealment. These are really mobile missiles.

President Kennedy: They can just put them—Taylor: They can be pulled in under trees and forest and disappear

almost at once, as I visualize it.McNamara: And they can also be readied, perhaps, between the time

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 443

we, in effect, say we’re going to come in and the time we do come in.This is a very very great danger to this coast. I don’t know exactly howto appraise it, because I don’t know the readiness period, but it is possi-ble that these are field missiles. And then in that case they can be readiedvery promptly if they choose to do so.

Carter: These are field missiles, sir. They are mobile-support typemissiles.

Taylor: About a 40-minute countdown. Something like that’s beenestimated.

Roswell Gilpatric: So you would say that the strike should precedeany public discussion?

McNamara: I believe so, yes. If you’re going to strike. I think, beforeyou make any announcements, you should decide whether you’re going tostrike. If you are going to strike, you shouldn’t make an announcement.

Bundy: That’s right.Dillon: What is the advantage of the announcement earlier? Because

it’s to build up sympathy, or something, for doing it. But you get thesimultaneous announcement of what was there, and why you struck,with pictures and all—I believe would serve the same [purpose].

Ball: Well, the only advantage is it’s a kind of ultimatum in whichthere is an opportunity of a response which would preclude it [thestrike]. I mean it’s more for the appearance than for the reality. Becauseobviously you’re not going to get that kind of response.

But I would suppose that there is a course which is a little different,which is a private message from the President to the prime . . . to . . .

Alexis Johnson: To Macmillan and to de Gaulle.Ball: And that you’re going to have to do this. You’re compelled, and

you’ve got to move quickly, and you want them to know it. Maybe twohours before the strike, something like that, even the night before.

Dillon: Well, that’s different.Ball: But it has to be kept on that basis of total secrecy. And then the

question of what you do with these Latin American governments isanother matter. I think if you notify them in advance, it may be all over.

President Kennedy: That’s right. They could take . . .The Congress would take; [we would have to take] the Congress

along.Bundy: I think that’s just not right.President Kennedy: I’m not completely . . . I don’t think we ought to

abandon just knocking out these missile bases, as opposed to . . . That’s amuch more defensible [and] explicable, politically, or satisfactory in

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962444

every way, action than the general strike which takes us into the city ofHavana, and it is plain to me, takes us into much more hazardous . . .shot down . . .

Now, I know the Chiefs say: “Well, that means their bombers can takeoff against us.” But . . .

Bundy: Their bombers take off against us. Then they have made ageneral war against Cuba of it, which then becomes much more theirdecision.

We move this way and the political advantages are very strong, itseems to me, of the small strike. It corresponds to “the punishment fits thecrime” in political terms. We are doing only what we warned repeatedlyand publicly we would have to do. We are not generalizing the attack. Thethings that we’ve already recognized and said that we have not found itnecessary to attack, and said we would not find it necessary to attack . . .

President Kennedy: Well, here’s . . . Let’s look, tonight. It seems tome we ought to go on the assumption that we’re going to have the gen-eral, number two we would call it, course number two, which would be ageneral strike and that you ought to be in position to do that, then, if youdecide you’d like to do number one.

Bundy: I agree.Robert Kennedy: Does that encompass an invasion?President Kennedy: No. I’d say that’s the third course.Let’s first start with, I’d just like to first find out, the air, so that I

would think that we ought to be in position to do [options] one and two,which would be:

One would be just taking out these missiles and whatever otherswe’d find in the next 24 hours.

Number two would be to take out all the airplanes.And number three is to invade.Dillon: Well, they’d have to take out the SAM sites also, Mr.

President.President Kennedy: OK, but that would be in two, included in num-

ber two. Of course, that’s a terrifically difficult—Dillon: Well, that may be [option] three and invasion [is option]

four.Taylor: In order to get in to get the airfields, there’s a certain num-

ber we’d have to get.Martin: Well, isn’t there a question whether any of the SAM sites are

operational?Taylor: We’re not sure yet.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 445

President Kennedy: OK. Well, let’s say we’ve decided we’re going thewhole way. So let’s say that number two is the SAM sites plus the air.

Bundy: It’s actually to clear the air, to win the air battle.President Kennedy: Yeah, well, whatever.Now, it seems to me we ought to be preparing now, in the most covert

way, to do one and two, with the freedom to make the choice about num-ber one depending on what information we have on it. I don’t know whatkind of moves that requires, and how much is that going to . . . ?

McNamara: Mr. President, it requires no action other than what’sbeen started. And you can make a decision prior to the start, Saturday orany time thereafter.

President Kennedy: Well, where do we put all these planes?Taylor: You recall we have this problem, Mr. President. We’re going

to get new intelligence that will be coming in from these flights andthat’s gonna have to be cranked into any strike plans we’re preparing. Sothere is that factor of time. The Secretary has given you the minimumtime to make a decision now, so that we can brief the pilots and thencrank in the new intelligence. I would point out that—

McNamara: If I may, Max, to answer the question you asked: As Iunderstand it, we don’t have to decide now we’re going to do it. All wehave to decide is if we want Sweeney to be prepared to do it.39

Taylor: That’s correct.McNamara: And Sweeney has said that he will take the tape that

comes in tomorrow and process it Thursday and Friday [October 18 and19] and prepare the mission folders for strikes on Saturday [October 20]or earlier, every day thereafter.

Taylor: Yes. The point is that we’ll have to brief pilots. We’re holdingthat back. And there’ll be, I would say, 400 pilots will have to go to bebriefed in the course of this. So I’m just saying this is widening thewhole military scope of this thing very materially, if that’s what we’resupposed to do at this time.

President Kennedy: Well, now, when do we start briefing the pilots?Taylor: They’ll need at least 24 hours on that, when this new intelli-

gence comes in.President Kennedy: In other words, then, until tomorrow. All I was

thinking of—at least until—

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962446

39. General Walter Sweeney, commander of USAF Tactical Air Command. Sweeney had ear-lier been placed in charge of all tactical strike planning under the relevant operational CINC,which was CINCLANT (Admiral Dennison).

Bundy: Can they be briefed in such a way that they’re secure? Theyhave no access to—

McNamara: Let’s go back just a second, now. The President does nothave to make any decision until 24 hours before the strike, except thedecision to be prepared. And the process of preparation will not, in itself,run the risk of overt disclosure of the preparation.

Bundy: Doesn’t it imply briefing, the preparation?Taylor: It does, but—McNamara: It implies the preparation of mission folders.Taylor: Say, 24 hours before they go, they start a briefing.I’d like to say this, Mr. President, the more time you can give, the

better. Because they can then do a lot more rehearsing and checking outof all these pilots. So, while I accept the time cycle, I—

President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s say you give a pilot . . . I mean,how does he find his way down to a SAM site off of one of those things?

Taylor: Well, they’ll give him a target folder with all the possibleguidance, and so on, to hit the target.

President Kennedy: They know how to do that.Taylor: Yes, sir. They’re well trained in that procedure.McNamara: Mission folders have already been prepared on all the

known targets. The problem is that we don’t have the unknown targets,specifically these missile launchers and the nuclear storage, and we won’thave that until tomorrow night at the earliest. And it’ll be processed pho-tographically on Thursday, interpreted Thursday night, turned into targetfolders on Friday, and the mission could go Saturday. This is Sweeney’sestimate of the earliest possible time for an air strike against the missiles.Decision by the President on Friday, strike on Saturday.

As General Taylor pointed out, if we could have either another day ofpreparation, which means no strike till Saturday, and/or alternativelymore than 24 hours between the time of decision and the first strike, itwill run more smoothly.

President Kennedy: Right. Well, now, what is it, in the next 24 hours,what is it we need to do in order, if we’re going to do, let’s first say, oneand two by Saturday or Sunday? You’re doing everything that is . . .

McNamara: Mr. President, we need to do two things, it seems to me.First, we need to develop a specific strike plan limited to the missiles

and the nuclear storage sites, which we have not done. This would be apart of the broader plan, but I think we ought to estimate the minimumnumber of sorties. Since you have indicated some interest in that possi-bility, we ought to provide you that option. We haven’t done this.

President Kennedy: OK.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 447

McNamara: But that’s an easy job to do.The second thing we ought to do, it seems to me, as a government, is

to consider the consequences. I don’t believe we have considered the con-sequences of any of these actions satisfactorily. And because we haven’tconsidered the consequences, I’m not sure we’re taking all the action weought to take now to minimize those.

I don’t know quite what kind of a world we live in after we havestruck Cuba, and we’ve started it. We’ve put, let’s say, 100 sorties in, justfor purposes of illustration. I don’t think you dare start with less than100. You have 24 objects. Well, you 24 vehicles, plus 16 launchers, plus apossible nuclear storage site. Now that’s the absolute minimum that youwould wish to kill. And you couldn’t possibly go in after those with lessthan, I would think, 50 to 100 sorties.

Taylor: And you’ll miss some.McNamara: And you’ll miss some. That’s right.Now after we’ve launched 50 to 100 sorties, what kind of a world do

we live in? How do we stop at that point? I don’t know the answer tothis. I think tonight State and we ought to work on the consequences ofany one of these courses of actions, consequences which I don’t believeare entirely clear to any of us.

Ball: At any place in the world.McNamara: At any place in the world, George. That’s right. I agree

with you.Taylor: Mr. President, I should say that the Chiefs and the com-

manders feel so strongly about the dangers inherent in the limited strikethat they would prefer taking no military action rather than to take thatlimited first strike. They feel that it’s opening up the United States toattacks which they can’t prevent, if we don’t take advantage of surprise.

President Kennedy: Yeah. But I think the only thing is, the chances ofit becoming a much broader struggle are increased as you step up the . . .Talk about the dangers to the United States, once you get into beginningto shoot up those airports. Then you get into a lot of antiaircraft. Andyou got a lot of . . . I mean you’re running a much more major operation,therefore the dangers of the worldwide effects, which are substantial tothe United States, are increased. That’s the only argument for it [the lim-ited strike].

I quite agree that, if you’re just thinking about Cuba, the best thingto do is to be bold, if you’re thinking about trying to get this thing undersome degree of control.

Theodore Sorensen: In that regard, Mr. President, there is a combi-nation of the plans which might be considered, namely the limited strike

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962448

and then the messages, or simultaneously the messages, to Khrushchevand Castro which would indicate to them that this was none other thansimply the fulfilling of the statements we have made all along.

President Kennedy: Well, I think we . . . in other words, that’s a mat-ter we’ve got to think about tonight. I don’t . . .

Let’s not let the Chiefs knock us out on this one, General, because Ithink that what we’ve got to be thinking about is: If you go into Cuba inthe way we’re talking about, and taking all the planes and all the rest,then you really haven’t got much of an argument against invading it.

Martin: It seems to me a limited strike, plus planning for invasionfive days afterwards to be taken unless something untoward occurs,makes much more sense.

Taylor: Well, I would be . . . personally Mr. President, my inclinationis all against the invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effec-tively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States.

President Kennedy: But you’re not for the invasion?Taylor: I would not be, at this moment. No, sir. We don’t want to get

committed to the degree that shackles us with him in Berlin.McNamara: This is why I say I think we have to think of the conse-

quences here. I would think a forced invasion [an invasion forced theUnited States], associated with assisting an uprising following an exten-sive air strike, is a highly probable set of circumstances. I don’t knowwhether you could carry out an extensive air strike of, let’s say, the kindwe were talking about a moment ago—700 sorties a day for five days—without an uprising in Cuba. I really—

Alexis Johnson: Based on this morning’s discussion we went intothis, talked to some of your people, I believe, a little bit. And we felt anair strike, even of several days, addressed to military targets primarily,would not result in any substantial unrest. People would just stay homeand try to keep out of trouble.

McNamara: Well, when you’re talking about military targets, wehave 700 targets here we’re talking about. This is a very damned expen-sive target system.

Taylor: That was in that number [unclear], Mr. Secretary. But that’snot the one I recommended.

McNamara: Well, neither is the one I’d recommend.President Kennedy: What does that include? Every antiaircraft gun?

What does that include?Taylor: This includes radar and all sorts of things.McNamara: Radar sites, SAM sites, and so on. But whether it’s 700

or 200, and it’s at least 200 I think—

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 449

Taylor: More in the order of 200, I would say.McNamara: It’s at least 200. You can’t carry that out without the

danger of an uprising.Robert Kennedy: Mr. President, while we’re considering this problem

tonight, I think that we should also consider what Cuba’s going to be ayear from now, or two years from now. Assume that we go in and knockthese sites out. I don’t know what’s gonna stop them from saying: “We’regoing to build the sites six months from now, and bring them in [again].”

Taylor: Nothing permanent about it.Robert Kennedy: Where are we six months from now? Or that we’re

in any better position? Or aren’t we in a worse position if we go in andknock them out, and say: “Don’t do it”? I mean, obviously, they’re gonnahave to do it then.

McNamara: You have to put a blockade in following any limitedaction.

Robert Kennedy: Then we’re going to have to sink Russian ships.Then we’re going to have to sink Russian submarines.

Taylor: Right. Right.Robert Kennedy: Now, [think] whether it wouldn’t be the argument,

if you’re going to get into it at all, whether we should just get into it,and get it over with, and take our losses. And if he wants to get into awar over this . . .

Hell, if it’s war that’s gonna come on this thing, he sticks those kindsof missiles in after the warning, then he’s gonna get into a war over sixmonths from now, or a year from now on something.

McNamara: Mr. President, this is why I think tonight we ought toput on paper the alternative plans and the probable, and possible conse-quences thereof, in a way that State and Defense could agree on. Even ifwe disagree, then put in both views. Because the consequences of theseactions have not been thought through clearly. The one that the AttorneyGeneral just mentioned is illustrative of that.

President Kennedy: If it doesn’t increase very much their strategicstrength, why is it—can any Russian expert tell us—why they . . . ?After all Khrushchev demonstrated a sense of caution over Laos. Berlin,he’s been cautious—I mean, he hasn’t been . . .

Ball: Several possibilities, Mr. President. One of them is that he hasgiven us word now that he’s coming over in November to the U.N. Hemay be proceeding on the assumption, and this lack of a sense of appar-ent urgency would seem to support this, that this isn’t going to be dis-covered at the moment and that, when he comes over, this is somethinghe can do, a ploy—that here is Cuba armed against the United States.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962450

Or possibly use it to try to trade something in Berlin, saying he’lldisarm Cuba if we’ll yield some of our interests in Berlin and somearrangement for it. I mean that—it’s a trading ploy.

Bundy: I would think one thing that I would still cling to is that he’snot likely to give Fidel Castro nuclear warheads. I don’t believe that hashappened or is likely to happen.

President Kennedy: Why does he put these in there, though?Bundy: Soviet-controlled nuclear warheads.President Kennedy: That’s right. But what is the advantage of that?

It’s just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs inTurkey. Now that’d be goddamn dangerous, I would think.

Bundy: Well, we did, Mr. President.Alexis Johnson: We did it. We did it in England.President Kennedy: Yeah, but that was five years ago.40

Alexis Johnson: That’s when we were short. We put them inEngland too when we were short of ICBMs.

President Kennedy: But that was during a different period then.Alexis Johnson: But doesn’t he realize he has a deficiency of ICBMs

vis-à-vis our capacity perhaps? In view of that he’s got lots of MRBMsand this is a way to balance it out a bit.

Bundy: I’m sure his generals have been telling him for a year and ahalf that he was missing a golden opportunity to add to his strategiccapability.

Ball: Yes. I think you look at this possibility that this is an attempt toadd to his strategic capabilities.

A second consideration is that it is simply a trading ploy, that hewants this in so that he can—

Alexis Johnson: It’s not inconsistent. If he can’t trade then he’s stillgot the other.

Various speakers begin talking simultaneously.Bundy: —political impact in Latin America.Carter: We are now considering these, then, Soviet missiles, a Soviet

offensive capability.Ball: You have to consider them Soviet missiles.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 451

40. In late 1957, in the wake of fears arising from the Soviet Sputnik flight and concerns aboutSoviet missiles targeted at Europe, the United States had publicly offered to deploy intermedi-ate-range ballistic missiles, Jupiters, on the territory of its European allies. The Jupiters werenot actually deployed to Turkey (and Italy) until 1961–62. A similar type of missile, the Thor,was deployed to England; those are the ones Johnson is talking about.

Carter: It seems to me that if we go in there lock, stock, and barrel,we can consider them entirely Cuban.

Bundy: Ah, well, what we say for political purposes and what wethink are not identical here.

Ball: But, I mean, any rational approach to this must be that theyare Soviet missiles, because I think Khrushchev himself would never,would never, risk a major war on a fellow as obviously erratic and fool-ish as Castro.

Taylor: His second lieutenant.Robert Kennedy: Well, I want to say, can I say that one other thing is

whether we should also think of whether there is some other way we canget involved in this, through Guantánamo Bay or something. Or whetherthere’s some ship that . . . you know, sink the Maine again or something.41

Taylor: We think, Mr. President, that under any of these plans wewill probably get an attack on Guantánamo, at least by fire. They haveartillery and mortars easily within range, and with any of these actionswe take we’ll have to give air support to Guantánamo and probably rein-force the garrison.

President Kennedy: Well that’s why, it seems to me, that if we decidethat we are going to be in a position to do this, either [strike options]one and two, Saturday or Sunday, then I would think we would also wantto be in a position, depending on what happens, either because of aninvasion, attack on Guantánamo, or some other reason, to do the inva—to do the eviction.

Taylor: Mr. President, I personally would just urge you not to set aschedule such as Saturday or Sunday—

President Kennedy: No I haven’t.Taylor: —until all the intelligence that could be . . .President Kennedy: That’s right. I just wanted, I thought, we ought

to be moving. I don’t want to waste any time, though, if we decide thattime is not particularly with us. I just think we ought to be ready to dosomething, even if we decide not to do it. I’m not saying we should do it.

Taylor: All of this is moving, short of the briefing. We’ve held back,we’ve restricted people. . . .

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962452

41. A reference to the mysterious explosion that sank the USS Maine while it was visitingHavana harbor during a period of tension between the United States and Spain over the condi-tions of Spanish rule in Cuba. Robert Kennedy is echoing the belief that this incident precipi-tated the U.S. declaration of war that began the Spanish-American War in 1898.

President Kennedy: I understand.What about, now, this invasion? If we were going to launch that,

what do you have, what do we have to be doing now so that ten daysfrom now we’re in a position to invade, if that was the need?

Taylor: I would say that my answer would be largely planning, par-ticularly in the field of mobilization, just what we will want to recreateafter we earmark these forces to Cuba.

I might say that air defense measures we’re starting to take already.We moved more fighters into the southeastern United States and aregradually improving some of our patrol procedures, under the generalguise of preparations for that part of the country. We don’t think there’dbe any leaks there that might react against our military planning. But Irepeat that our defenses have always been weak in that part of the country.

President Kennedy: Mr. Secretary, is there anything that, or any ofthese contingencies, if we go ahead, that . . . the next 24 hours . . . We’regoing to meet again tomorrow on this in the afternoon. Is there any-thing . . .

McNamara: No, sir. I believe that the military planning has been car-ried on for a considerable period of time and is well under way. And Ibelieve that all the preparations that we can take without the risk ofpreparations causing discussion and knowledge of this, either among ourpublic or in Cuba, have been taken and are authorized. All the necessaryreconnaissance measures are being taken and are authorized.

The only thing we haven’t done, really, is to consider fully thesealternatives.

Bundy: Our principal problem is to try and imaginatively to thinkwhat the world would be like if we do this, and what it will be like if wedon’t.

McNamara: That’s exactly right. We ought to work on that tonight.Sorensen: This may be incidental, Mr. President, but if we’re going

to get the prisoners out, this would be a good time to get them out.42

President Kennedy: I guess they’re not gonna get . . . Well . . .Bundy: You mean, take them out. [Laughs.]

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 453

42. Sorensen was referring to long-standing negotiations between the Kennedy administrationand Castro, carried on by intermediaries, to obtain the release of Cuban exiles imprisoned afterthe failed landing at the Bay of Pigs. The most recent intermediary, lawyer James Donovan, hadpersuaded Castro to accept some exchange of food and drugs rather than money, but his nego-tiations were still in progress at the time of the crisis. The negotiations eventually succeeded,and the released prisoners arrived in the United States at the end of 1962.

Sorensen: No. What I meant was, if we’re gonna trade them out . . .President Kennedy: They’re on the Isle of Pines, these prisoners?Robert Kennedy: No, some of them are. They’re split up.Bundy: If you can get them out alive, I’d make that choice.President Kennedy: There’s no sign of their getting out now, is

there? The exchange?Robert Kennedy: No, but they will take a few weeks.President Kennedy: A few weeks.Robert Kennedy: Yeah. You know they’re having that struggle

between the young Cuban leaders and the [unclear] . . .Bundy: We have a list of sabotage options, Mr. President. It’s not a

very loud noise to raise at a meeting of this sort, but I think it wouldneed your approval. I take it you are in favor of sabotage.

The one question which arises is whether we wish to do this in navalareas, international waters, or in positions which may—mining interna-tional waters or mining Cuban waters may hit . . . Mines are very indis-criminate.

President Kennedy: Is that what they [the Special Group-Augmentedthat dealt with covert action against Castro] are talking about? Mining?

Bundy: That’s one of the items. Most of them relate to infiltration ofraiders, and will simply be deniable, internal Cuban activities.

The question that we need guidance from you on is whether you nowwish to authorize sabotage which might have its impact on neutrals, oreven friendly ships.

President Kennedy: I don’t think we want to put mines out rightnow, do we?

McNamara: Should wait for 24 hours at least before any [unclear].Bundy: Well, let’s put the others into action then in Cuba, the inter-

nal ones, not the other ones.President Kennedy: Mr. Vice President, do you have any thoughts?

Between [strike options] one and two?Vice President Johnson: I don’t think I can add anything that is

essential.President Kennedy: Let’s see, what time are we going to meet again

tomorrow? What is it we want to have by tomorrow from the . . .We want to have from the Department [of State] tomorrow, in a lit-

tle bit more concise form, whether there is any kind of a notification wewould have to give. How much of a [unclear]?

And, number two, what do you think of these various alternativeswe’ve been talking about.

Three, whether there is any use in bringing this to Khrushchev in the

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962454

way of, for example . . . Do we want to, for example . . . Here is Dobryninnow, he’s repeated . . .43

I’ve got to go to see Schroeder. Let’s meet at . . . why don’t we meetat twelve? What time do I get back tomorrow night [fromConnecticut]?44

Sorensen: Reasonably early. Get back about 7:45.President Kennedy: Can we meet here at nine?Bundy: Mr. Secretary, some of us are in trouble with the dinner for

Schroeder tomorrow night.President Kennedy: OK. Well, why don’t we . . . I don’t think we’ll

have anything by noon tomorrow, will we?Bundy: Do you want to wait until Thursday morning [October 18],

Mr. President?President Kennedy: Looks to me like we might as well. Everybody

else can meet if they want to, if they need to. Well, the Secretary of State,the Secretary of Defense, can call [meetings]—

McNamara: I think it’d be very useful to meet, or else stay after-wards tonight for a while.

Bundy: It would be a great improvement not to have any moreintense White House meetings. The cover will grow awfully thin. If wecould meet at the State Department tomorrow . . .

President Kennedy: All right. Then I could meet you, Mac, when Iget back tomorrow and just as well, whatever the thing is. And then wecan meet Thursday morning.

The question is whether . . . I’m going to see Gromyko on Thursdayand I think the question that I’d really like to have some sort of a judg-ment on is whether we ought to do anything with Gromyko, whether weought to say anything to him, whether we ought to indirectly give himsort of an ultimatum on this matter, or whether we just ought to goahead without him.45 It seems to me that he said we’d be . . . The ambas-sador [Dobrynin] told the attorney general, as he told Bohlen the otherday, that they were not going to put these weapons there. Now eitherhe’s lying, or he doesn’t know.

Whether the Attorney General saw [might see] Dobrynin, not act-

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 455

43. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States.44. President Kennedy was scheduled to see West German foreign minister GerhardSchroeder on Wednesday morning, 17 October. He was then scheduled to take a brief cam-paign trip after lunch to Connecticut and return late on Wednesday evening.45. Andrei Gromyko, foreign minister of the Soviet Union, had just arrived in the UnitedStates for a series of meetings.

ing as if we had any information about them, [and] say that: “Of course,they must realize that if this ever does happen that this is going to causethis . . .” Give a very clear indication of what’s going to happen.

Now I don’t know what would come out of that. Possibly nothing.Possibly this would alert them. Possibly they would reconsider theirdecision, but I don’t think we’ve had any clear evidence of that, and itwould give them . . . We’d lose a week.

Sorensen: You mean tell them that . . .President Kennedy: Well, not tell them that we know that they’ve got

it. But merely, in the course of a conversation, Dobrynin, having said thatthey would never do it . . . The Attorney General, who sees Dobryninonce in a while, would . . .

Sorensen: How would we lose a week?President Kennedy: What?Sorensen: How would we lose a week?President Kennedy: Oh, we would be . . . what Bobby would be saying

to them, in short, is: “If these ever come up, that we’re going to do . . . thePresident stated that we would have to take action. And this could causethe most far reaching consequences.” On the possibility that that mightcause them to reconsider their action.

I don’t know whether he [Dobrynin] is, they are, aware of what Isaid. I can’t understand their viewpoint, if they’re aware of what we saidat the press conferences [of September 4 and 13]. As I say, I’ve never . . .I don’t think there’s any record of the Soviets ever making this direct achallenge ever, really, since the Berlin blockade.

Bundy: We have to be clear, Mr. President, that they made this deci-sion, in all probability, before you made your statements. This is animportant element in the calendar.

Dillon: They didn’t change it.Bundy: No, indeed they didn’t change it. But they . . . It’s quite a dif-

ferent thing.Dillon: There was either a contravenance on one . . .Bundy: My, I wouldn’t bet a cookie that Dobrynin doesn’t know a

bean about this.President Kennedy: You think he does know.Robert Kennedy: He didn’t know. He didn’t even know [unclear], in

my judgment.Carter: Oh, yes. There’s evidence of sightings in late August, I think,

and early September, of some sort.Gilpatric: It seems to me, Mr. President, in your public presentation

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962456

simultaneous or subsequent to an action, your hand is strengthenedsomewhat if the Soviets have lied to you, either privately or in public.

Bundy: I’ll agree to that.Alexis Johnson: And therefore, without knowing, if you ask Gromyko,

or if Bobby asks Dobrynin again, or if some other country could get theSoviets to say publicly in the U.N.: “No, we have no offensive . . .”

Robert Kennedy: But TASS, of course, said they wouldn’t.President Kennedy: What did TASS say?Unidentified: That was a while back.Robert Kennedy: —said that they wouldn’t send offensive weapons

to Cuba.Bundy: Yeah, the TASS statement I read this morning. . . . No, the

TASS statement. It’s . . .Dillon: We don’t know if Khrushchev’s in control [unclear].Bundy: No, we don’t have any detail on that.President Kennedy: Well, what about my . . . the question would be

therefore what I might say to Gromyko about this matter, if you wantme to just get in the record, by asking him whether they plan to do it.

Bundy: Putting it the other way around, saying that we are puttinggreat weight upon the assurance of his.

Ball: Well, I think what you get is to call their attention to the state-ment that you’ve made on this. And that this is your public commitmentand you are going to have to abide by this, and you just want assurancesfrom him that they’re living up to what they’ve said, that they’re notgoing to . . .

President Kennedy: Well, let’s say he said: “Well, we’re not plan-ning to.”

Bundy: [reading from TASS statement of September 11] “The governmentof the Soviet Union also authorized TASS to state that there is no need forthe Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression for aretaliatory blow to any other country, for instance, Cuba. Our nuclearweapons are so powerful in their explosive force, the Soviet Union has sopowerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need tosearch for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.”

President Kennedy: What date was that?Bundy: September 11th.Dillon: When they were all there.Carter: Or certainly on the way.President Kennedy: But isn’t that . . . But, as I say, we haven’t . . .

really ever had a case where it’s been quite this. . . . After all, they backed

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 457

down in [supporting the] Chinese Communists in ’58. They didn’t gointo Laos. Agreed to a cease-fire there.46 We haven’t had [unclear].

Several speakers begin conversing simultaneously.Bundy: I was troubled before by the absence of a nuclear storage site.

That’s very queer.President Kennedy: What?Bundy: I’m as puzzled as Bob is by the absence of a nuclear storage site.Taylor: We don’t know enough about it yet, and we [unclear] . . .Bundy: I understand that. We may learn a lot overnight.Martin: Isn’t it puzzling, also, there are no evidence of any troops

protecting the sites?Taylor: Well there are troops there. At least there are tents, presum-

ably they have some personnel.Bundy: But they look like [unclear]. It’s as if you would walk over the

fields and into those vans.President Kennedy: Well it’s a goddamn mystery to me. I don’t know

enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any othertime since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so cleara provocation, I don’t know when it’s been. Because they’ve been awfullycautious, really. The Russians . . . I’ve never . . .

Now, maybe our mistake was in not saying some time before thissummer, that if they do this we’re going to act. Maybe they’d gone in sofar that it’s . . .

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but then why did they put that [TASS] state-ment in?

President Kennedy: This was following my statement, wasn’t it?Robert Kennedy: September 11th.President Kennedy: When was my statement?[to General Taylor, who had started to speak] What?Taylor: [From the] ground up. Well, I was asking Pat [Carter] if

they had any way of getting quick intelligence. That means somebody inthere and out of there so we can really take a look at the ground.

Ball: No, this [TASS statement] is two days before your statement[but seven days after the White House statement of September 4].

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962458

46. President Kennedy was referring to the most recent of several confrontations in the TaiwanStraits, in 1958, when China shelled offshore islands under Taiwan’s control and threatened toinvade Taiwan, then linked by a mutual defense treaty with the United States. He was also refer-ring to a Communist insurgency against a pro-Western government in Laos that became the recip-ient of significant U.S. aid. Heading off the threat of direct U.S. intervention, a negotiated cease-firein Laos took effect in May 1961, followed by negotiations about neutralizing the country.

Carter: We can try it. Your problems about exfiltration and yourproblems with training an individual as to what to look for are not han-dled in 24 hours.

McNamara: A better way would be to send in a low-flying airplane,and we have today put those on alert. But we would recommend againstusing the low-flying planes until shortly before the intention to strike.

Taylor: That was considered by the commanders today, and they’reall of the opinion that the loss of surprise there was more serious thanthe information we’d get from that.

Ball: I would think it would be very valuable to have them go inshortly before the strike, just to build the evidence. I mean, then you’vegot pictures that really show what was there. . . .

President Kennedy: Now with these great demonologists, did Bohlenand Thompson, did they have an explanation of why the Russians aresticking it to us quite so . . . ?

I wonder what we’re going to say up in Connecticut. We expect thedomestic [unclear]. [Chuckles.] Don’t care for the . . .

Overlapping discussions about schedules for Wednesday, October 17, follow.President Kennedy: We’re going to be discussing [unclear] budget

[in a Cabinet meeting on October 18].What about Schroeder? Do I have anything we want to say to

Schroeder?47

Bundy: We haven’t a lot on that, Mr. President, which we’ll have foryou early in the morning. I don’t think it’s very complicated. The bigissue that has come up is Schroeder makes a very strong case for refus-ing visas on the ground that he thinks that that would undermine moralein Berlin in a very dangerous way. I think that’s the principal issue that’sbetween us.

President Kennedy: I wonder if we could get somebody to give mesomething about what our position should be on that.

Bundy: You want that? Yeah, very happy to. You want it tonight?President Kennedy: No, no. Just in the morning.The meeting is breaking up. There are more fragments of simultaneousconversations.President Kennedy: That’s very good, General. Thank you.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 459

47. The principal subject at the forthcoming meeting with Schroeder was to be the contin-gency that the Soviets or East Germans might require formal visas for entry to EastGermany or East Berlin. For the West Germans this prospect skirted too close to diplomaticrecognition of the East German regime.

Carter: Mr. McCone is coming in tonight.Fragments of other discussions are heard. Someone mentions a mannamed Riley, possibly Rear Admiral Riley, director of the Joint Staff,who is waiting for McNamara, who answers: “Is he in Mac’s office?Yeah I’ll go down to see him.” At the same time Carter is talking toPresident Kennedy.Carter: I would suggest that we get into this hot water partly

because of this.President Kennedy: Yeah. I want to talk to him in the morning. I’d

like to just debrief [unclear] Mr. McCone [unclear] General Eisenhower.Bundy: He won’t be . . . Does he get back tonight?Carter: Coming in tonight, yes, sir. Bundy: Could you have him come in in the morning?Carter: I’m going in to meet him in the morning.Bundy: Could he come in then at 9:30?Carter: Sure.President Kennedy leaves the Cabinet Room. The recording machine isstill running as McNamara, Bundy, Ball, and a few others begin theirown informal discussion of the crisis issues.McNamara: Could we agree to meet, midafternoon?Ball: Any time you say, Bob.McNamara: And then guide our work tonight and tomorrow on that

schedule? Why don’t we say three? This’ll give us some time to cover whatwe’ve done, and then do some more tomorrow night if necessary [unclear].

Bundy: Would it be disagreeable to make it a little earlier? I ought toget to a four [o’clock] meeting with Schroeder.

McNamara: I thought he said two, I think. We have really plenty oftime between now and then. At two P.M. we’ll do it at State.

Now, could we agree what we’re gonna do? I would suggest that—Max, I would suggest that we, and I don’t . . . In fact, I know

[unclear]. [Taylor replies.]I would suggest that we divide the series of targets up by, in effect,

numbers of DGZs and numbers of sorties required to take those out, fora series of alternatives starting only with the missiles and working upthrough the nuclear storage sites and the MiGs and the SAMs, and soon, so we can say: “This target system would take so many aimingpoints, and so many objects would take so many sorties to knock out.”48

Not because I think these are reasonable alternatives—

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962460

48. The DGZs are Designated Ground Zeros, the precise aim points for explosives.

Bundy: They’re not really going to be realistic, even, but they give—McNamara: —but they give us an order of magnitude to [give to]

the President, to get some idea of this. And this we can do, and this canbe done very easily.

But the most important thing we need to do is this appraisal of theworld after any one of these situations, in great detail.

Bundy: Sure, that’s right.McNamara: And I think probably this is something State would have

to do, and I would strongly urge we put it on paper. And we, I’ll, behappy to stay now or look at it early in the morning, or something likethat, in order that we may inject disagreement if we—

Bundy: What I would suggest is that someone be deputied to do apiece of paper which really is: What happens?

I think the margin is between whether we [do the] take out the mis-siles only strike, or take a lot of air bases. This is tactical, within a decisionto take military action. It doesn’t overwhelmingly, it may substantially, butit doesn’t overwhelmingly change the world.

I think any military action does change the world. And I think nottaking action changes the world. And I think these are the two worldsthat we need to look at.

McNamara: I’m very much inclined to agree, but I think we have tomake that point: Within the military action [there is] a gradation.

Bundy: I agree, I agree. Oh, many gradations. And it can have majoreffects. I don’t mean to exaggerate that now.

The question is: How to get ahead with that, and whether . . . I wouldthink, myself, that the appropriate place to make this preliminary analy-sis is at the Department of State. I think the rest of us ought to spendthe evening, really, to some advantage separately, trying to have our ownviews of this. And I think we should meet in order, at least, to tradepieces of paper, before 2:00. Tomorrow morning, if that’s agreeable.

McNamara: Why don’t we meet tomorrow morning? And withpieces of paper, from State, and—maybe you don’t feel this is reasonable,but I would strongly urge that, tonight, State—

Bundy: Well, who is State’s de facto [person in charge for this]? Areyou all tied up tonight? Or what?

Ball: No, no. The situation is that the only one who’s tied up tonightis the Secretary, and he is coming down at eleven from his dinner to lookat what we will have done in the meantime.

Martin: Alex [Johnson] is back waiting for him.Ball: Oh, good. We’ll have Alex; we’ll have Tommy [Llewellyn

Thompson]. Well, we’ve kept this to our . . . this has been . . .

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 461

Bundy: But you have Tommy? I . . .Martin: I talked to him this afternoon some.Bundy: Do you have any . . . ? I’d be fascinated by this, the first sense

of how he sees this.Martin: Well the argument was really between Hilsman’s demonolo-

gists, who were already cut in because they [unclear], who thought thiswas a low-risk operation.49 Tommy thought it was a high-risk operationby the Soviets, in other words, that they were taking real chances. Theother people rather thought that they probably had miscalculated us andthought this wasn’t a risky operation. You know, from the way they weregoing at it, either impatient like the SAM sites hadn’t been set up to pro-tect it—the various factors which suggest to them that they didn’t thinkanything was going to happen. Tommy leaned the other way.

McNamara: Could I suggest that tonight we actually draft a paper,and it start this way:

Just a paragraph or two of the knowns. The knowns are that the SAMsare here. Let’s say, the probable knowns, because we’re not certain of anyof them. The probabilities are the SAM system isn’t working today. Thisis important. The probabilities are that these missiles are not operationaltoday. The probabilities are that they won’t be operational in less than xdays, although we can’t be certain. Pat said two weeks. I’m not so sure I’dput it that far. But there’s just two or three of these knowns.

I would put in there, by the way, the number of [unclear] they’reunprotected. Another known I’d put in is that they have about 50x MiG-15s, -17s, and -19s. That they have certain crated—I’ve forgotten—say10x crated MiG-21s, only one of which we believe to have been assem-bled. That they have x crated IL-28s, none of which we believe to havebeen assembled. This is, in a sense, the problem we face there.

Bundy: You should state, or the [Central Intelligence] Agency shouldstate the military knowns.

McNamara: Well, we can do this in just ten seconds, a very, very sim-ple statement, I think. But then I would follow that by the alternatives,not all of them, but the more likely alternatives that we consider open tous. And I would hope we could stay just a second here and see if wecould sketch them out now.

Bundy: I’d like to throw one in of a military kind—shall we get themin order, and you [unclear]?

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962462

49. Roger Hilsman was assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. A demonolo-gist is a Kremlinologist, or an expert on the Soviet Union.

I would like to throw one in that I do not think the army and theChiefs would normally consider. And that is the possibility of genuinelymaking a quite large-scale strike, followed by a drop, followed by a recov-ery of the people dropped to get these things, and not simply to increasethe chance that we’ve hit most of them. There’s always incompleteness ina military, in an air, operation. But if these things are what the picturesshow, you could drop a battalion of paratroopers and get them. Now whatyou do with a battalion, I grant you, is a hell of a problem.

I think there’s an enormous political advantage, myself, within theseoptions, granted that all the Chiefs didn’t fully agree, to taking out thething that gives the trouble and not the thing that doesn’t give the trouble.

McNamara: This, as opposed to an air attack on them?Bundy: This would be supplementary to an air attack. I mean, how

are you gonna know that you’ve got them? And if you haven’t got them,what have you done?

Ball: Well this, of course, raises the question of: Having gotten thisset, what happens to the set that arrives next week?

McNamara: Oh, I think . . . Let me answer Mac’s question first. Howdo we know we’ve got them? We will have photo recon, military, withthe strike. Sweeney specifically plans this and—

Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.McNamara: Pardon me?Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.Carter: Yeah, but the [unclear] on the ground very well [unclear], Mac.Bundy: It’s true.McNamara: Terrible risk to put them [paratroopers] in there.Bundy: I agree, I think it’s probably a bad idea, but it troubles me

[unclear].McNamara: I think the risk troubles me. It’s too great in relation to

the risk of not knowing whether we get them.Bundy: Well . . .McNamara: But, in any case, this is a small variant of one of the plans.Bundy: That’s right, it’s a minor variant of one of the plans.McNamara: It seems to me that there are some major alternatives

here. I don’t think we discussed them fully enough today. And I’d like tosee them laid out on the paper, if State agrees.

The first is what I still call the political approach. Let me say it: a non-military action. It doesn’t start with one and it isn’t going to end with one.And I, for that reason, call it a political approach. And I say it isn’t goingto end with one because, once you start this political approach, I don’tthink you’re going to have any opportunity for a military operation.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 463

Ball: It becomes very difficult.McNamara: But at least I think we ought to put it down there.Ball: You’re right.Bundy: And it should be worked out. I mean, what is the maximum—Unidentified: Your ride is waiting downstairs.Ball: Very good, thank you.McNamara: Yeah, it should definitely be worked out. What, exactly,

does it involve? And what are the chances of success of it? They’re notzero. They’re plus, I think.

Gilpatric: We did an outline this morning along these lines.McNamara: All right. That’s [alternative] one, anyway.Bundy: But, do you see, it’s not just the chances of success. It ought to

be examined in terms of the pluses and minuses of nonsuccess, becausethere is such a thing as making this thing pay off in ways that are of somesignificance, even though we don’t act, or go with that.

McNamara: I completely agree with that. And this is my secondalternative, in particular, and I want to come to in a moment. But thefirst one, I completely agree it isn’t . . . I phrased it improperly. It’s notthe chances of success. It’s the results that are following this [unclear].

Bundy: Following this.Yep.McNamara: Now, the second alternative, I’d like to discuss just a sec-

ond because we haven’t discussed it fully today, and I alluded to it amoment ago.

I’ll be quite frank. I don’t think there is a military problem there.This is my answer to Mac’s question—

Bundy: That’s my honest [opinion?] too.McNamara: —and therefore, and I’ve gone through this today, and I

asked myself: “Well, what is it then if it isn’t a military problem?”Well, it’s just exactly this problem: that if Cuba should possess a capac-

ity to carry out offensive actions against the U.S., the U.S. would act.Unidentified: That’s right.Unidentified: You can’t get around that one.McNamara: Now it’s that problem. This is a domestic political prob-

lem. In the announcement we didn’t say we’d go in and not [that] we’dkill them. We said we’d act. Well, how will we act? Well, we want to actto prevent their use. That’s really the [unclear].

Now, how do we act to prevent their use? Well, first place, we carryout open surveillance, so we know what they’re doing. At all times.Twenty-four hours a day from now and forever, in a sense, indefinitely.

What else do we do? We prevent any further offensive weapons com-ing in. In other words, we blockade offensive weapons.

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962464

Bundy: How do we do that?McNamara: We search every ship.Ball: There are two kinds of blockade: a blockade which stops ships

from coming in; and simply a seizure—I mean simply a search.McNamara: A search, that’s right.Ball: Yeah.Martin: Well, it would be the search and removal, if found.Bundy: You have to make the guy stop to search him. And if he won’t

stop, you have to shoot, right?Martin: And you have to remove what you’re looking for if you find it.McNamara: Absolutely. Absolutely. And then an ultimatum. I call it

an ultimatum. Associated with these two actions is a statement to theworld, particularly to Khrushchev, that we have located these offensiveweapons. We’re maintaining a constant surveillance over them. If thereis ever any indication that they’re to be launched against this country, wewill respond not only against Cuba, but we will respond directly againstthe Soviet Union with a full nuclear strike.

Now this alternative doesn’t seem to be a very acceptable one. Butwait until you work on the others.

Bundy: That’s right. [Laughter.]McNamara: This is the problem, but I’ve thought something about

the others this afternoon.Ball: Bob, let me ask you one thing that seems slightly irrelevant.

What real utility would there be in the United States if we ever actuallycaptured one of these things and could examine it and take it apart?

McNamara: Not very much. No, no.Ball: Would we learn anything about the technology that would be

meaningful?McNamara: No, no. I don’t . . . Pat may disagree with me. . . .Carter: No.McNamara: Well, in any case, that’s an alternative [the blockade].

I’d like to see it expressed and discussed.Martin: If it takes two hours to screw a [war]head on, as a guy

[Sidney Graybeal] said this morning, two to four hours. . . .McNamara: Oh, by the way, that should be one of the knowns in this

initial paragraph.Martin: Yeah. They’ve got all night. How are we gonna surveil them

during the night? I think because there are some gaps in the surveillance.McNamara: Oh, well, it’s really . . . yes. It isn’t the surveillance, it’s

the ultimatum that is the key part in this.Martin: Yeah.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 465

McNamara: And really, what I tried to do was develop a little pack-age that meets the action requirement of that paragraph I read. Because,as I suggested, I don’t believe it’s primarily a military problem. It’s pri-marily a domestic political problem.

Carter: Well, as far as the American people are concerned, actionmeans military action, period.

McNamara: Well, we have a blockade. Search and removal of offen-sive weapons entering Cuba. Mac again, I don’t want to argue for thisbecause I don’t—

Carter: No. I think it’s an alternative.McNamara: —think it’s a perfect solution by any means. I just

want to . . .Bundy: Which one are [we] still on, would you say?McNamara: Still on the second one.Ball: Now, one of the things to look at is whether the actual opera-

tion of a blockade isn’t a greater involvement almost than a militaryaction.

McNamara: Might well be, George.Bundy: I think so.McNamara: It’s a search, not an embargo.Ball: No.Carter: It’s a series of single, unrelated acts, not by surprise. This

coming in there, on a Pearl Harbor [kind of surprise attack], just fright-ens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond. The Board of NationalEstimates have been working on this ever since . . .

Bundy: What goes beyond what?Carter: What happens beyond that. You go in there with a surprise

attack. You put out all the missiles. This isn’t the end. This is the begin-ning, I think. There’s a whole hell of a lot of things . . .

Bundy: Are they working on a powerful reaction in your [agency]?Carter: Yes, sir. Which goes back to [what] Mr. Secretary—Bundy: Good.Martin: Because this is the central point.McNamara: Well, that then takes me into the third category of

action. I’d lump them all in the third category. I call it overt militaryaction of varying degrees of intensity, ranging . . .

And if you feel there’s any difference in them, in the kind of a worldwe have after the varying degrees of intensity, you have to divide cate-gory three into subcategories by intensity, and probable effect on theworld thereafter. And I think there is, at least in the sense of the Cuban

T U E S DAY, O C TO B E R 16, 1962466

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 467

uprising, which I happen to believe is a most important element of cate-gory three. It applies to some elements, some categories in categorythree, but not all.

But, in any event, what kind of a world do we live in? In Cuba whataction do we take? What do we expect Castro will be doing after youattack these missiles? Does he survive as a political leader? Is he over-thrown? Is he stronger, weaker? How will he react?

How will the Soviets react? What can . . . How could Khrushchevafford to accept this action without some kind of rebuttal? I don’t think hecan accept it without some rebuttal. It may not be a substantial rebuttal,but it’s gonna have to be some. Where? How do we react in relation to it?

What happens if we do mobilize? How does this affect our allies’ sup-port of us in relation to Berlin? Well, you know far better than I the prob-lems. But it would seem to me if we could lay this out tonight, and thenmeet at a reasonable time in the morning to go over a tentative draft, dis-cuss it, and then have another draft for some time in the afternoon . . .

Ball: One kind of planning, Bob, that we didn’t explicitly talk abouttoday, which is to look at the points of vulnerability around the world,not only in Berlin, not only in Turkey.

McNamara: Sure. Iran.Ball: Iran and all of them.McNamara: And Korea.Ball: What precautionary measures ought to be taken.McNamara: Yes, yes.Ball: These are both military and political.McNamara: Exactly. And we call it a worldwide alert. Under that

heading we’ve got a whole series of precautionary measures that we thinkshould be taken. All of our forces should be put on alert. But, beyond that,mobilization, redeployment, movement, and so on.

Well, would it be feasible to meet at some time in the morning? Mac,what would you think?

Bundy: I ought to join the President for the meeting with Schroeder,and I’ll be involved in getting started for that from about 9:30 on. I couldmeet any time before that.

Carter: Well, now, the President was going to see Mr. McCone at9:30.

Bundy: That’s right.McNamara: Well, why don’t we meet at 8:30.Bundy: Fine.McNamara: Let’s try that.

Bundy: OK.McNamara: Now, there’s not much we can do to help. I’d be happy to,

though, if you think of anything we can do. We’ll go to work tonight andget these numbers of sorties, by target systems, laid out. [Admiral]Riley’s up in Mac’s office and I’ll go down there now and get them startedon it.

Carter: I think Mr. McCone could be helpful to you all in themorning.

McNamara: Well, I think he should try to stay here at 8:30.Carter: He’s been worrying about this for a heck of a long time.Ball: Sure.

This small informal meeting then breaks up. The recording picks up a fewfragments of conversation. Bundy and Ball talk about eating suppertogether. Bundy and Ball apparently refer to the secretarial problems thatarose from informing so few people about the crisis. Then there is silence.After a few minutes a man comes in to clean the room. Evelyn Lincolnwalks in, speaks briefly to him, and apparently she turns off the machine.

Everyone was still trying to conceal the start of the crisis by appearingto maintain their known schedules. President Kennedy went to anotherfarewell dinner for Bohlen, hosted by columnist Joseph Alsop. At the din-ner he drew Bohlen aside and they had a long, animated, private conversa-tion. Kennedy reportedly asked Bohlen if he could stay, but Bohlen fearedthat delaying his long-planned departure for Paris might arouse unwantednotice and comment.

Meetings resumed that evening at the State Department, winding upin Rusk’s office at about 11:00 P.M. McNamara slept at the Pentagon thatnight. McCone returned to Washington.

Wednesday, October 17, 1962

As arranged on Tuesday, Kennedy’s advisers had met at 8:30 Wednesdaymorning, October 17, in a conference room on the seventh floor of theState Department. McCone, now back in Washington, joined them. There,Ball reiterated his opposition to any military action, expressing doubtthat the Soviet leaders really understood what they had done. Thompson

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962468

argued that Khrushchev knew what he was doing and wanted a showdownon Berlin. In this view, Khrushchev thought the missiles in Cuba armedhim for that confrontation. Taylor and McCone sided with Thompson.After less than an hour, McCone and Bundy left for the White House.

Arriving at about 9:30 A.M., McCone briefed President Kennedy. TheCIA director came away with the impression that Kennedy, too, leanedtoward prompt military action. Kennedy asked McCone to go toGettysburg and give Eisenhower a full briefing. McCone then drove offto Pennsylvania and reported back later that Eisenhower thought thesituation was intolerable. The former president said he would supportany decisive military action.

Meanwhile Kennedy had moved on to his 10:00 meeting.

10:00 –11:30 A.M.

I don’t know, Mr. Minister . . . if we should make this thegreat issue, whether we can win that fight. . . . Can we jus-tify—we’re talking about opinion in the world—fighting ourway up the autobahn because they won’t give a visa?

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder1

On September 10 Kennedy had met with his top advisers to approve a pre-ferred sequence of military actions in a conflict over Berlin. Rusk urgedallied ambassadors in Washington to accept the plan, hoping the Sovietswould notice this united resolve and step back from confrontation.

McNamara declared in a press conference on September 28 that theBerlin situation was the most severe since the combat operations duringthe Korean War. The United States would “utilize whatever weapons areneeded to preserve our vital interests,” he said. “Quite clearly, we con-sider access to Berlin a vital interest.”2 This sense of danger intensifiedin the early weeks of October.

Khrushchev’s letter of September 28 made it clear that, once the U.S.

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 469

1. Including President Kennedy, Gerhard Schroeder, and translator Kusterer. Tape 29, John F.Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.2. Editorial Note, FRUS, 15: 336.

congressional elections were over, he would return to the issue of Berlin,this “dangerous hotbed which spoils our relations all the time.” Kennedybelieved that Soviet interference with access to Berlin was imminent andthat the West needed to make some move to defuse the situation beforesuch action took place. Kennedy also believed that the vulnerableWestern position in Berlin was complicating the situation in Cuba. Hetold West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt on October 5 that, if not for Berlin,the United States would feel free to take action against Cuba. A few dayslater, he told French foreign minister Couve de Murville that the Sovietactions on Cuba made the chances of reaching agreement on Berlin veryslim. Kennedy feared that Khrushchev might try to “force something.”

Kennedy’s sense of urgency was aggravated by his frustration withthe West Germans. The general atmosphere of U.S.–West German rela-tions was bad. Kennedy felt, with some cause, that Adenauer was voicingcomplaints about U.S. weakness to almost anyone who would listen andwas planting hostile stories in the press. More concretely, the visa issuewas one point of contention. The East Germans wanted visitors fromthe Western zones of Berlin to have to obtain East German visas fortheir passports. Getting those visas would acknowledge that the visitorwas crossing from one country into another rather than from one AlliedZone to another. Since the Western position in Berlin rested on preserv-ing the Allied Zones, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his for-eign minister, Gerhard Schroeder, said the GDR visa requirement mustbe resisted. Brandt favored accepting East German visas rather thanresort to countermeasures that might risk a clash.

Frustrated by the impasse over Berlin, Kennedy wanted the Germansto come up with new ideas. But the proposals coming from Bonn andBerlin did not impress him. Brandt had warmed to Adenauer’s sugges-tion of a plebiscite in Berlin, an idea the chancellor discussed with Bundyat the beginning of October. Adenauer also advocated another offer tothe Soviets: The Germans would accept a ten-year moratorium on dis-cussions of German reunification if Moscow would promise not to dis-turb Western access to Berlin. Adenauer thought Kennedy might makethis proposal to Khrushchev during the Soviet leader’s planned visit tothe United States in November.3

Behind all this the Americans and West Germans had quite differentperspectives on the Soviet threat, which came quickly to the surface. The

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962470

3. Memorandum of Conversation between Adenauer and Ambassador Walter Dowling, 12October 1962, Adenauer Papers, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, III/61.

Americans thought they could see various signs pointing to a comingcrunch on access to Berlin, including intelligence information on East blocsecurity preparations for some sort of confrontation by November. A weekearlier, Kennedy warned Adenauer: “I have been reviewing our plans forpreparations for any crisis that may be forced upon us by the Soviet Union inBerlin, and I am increasingly convinced that we need to make stronger andclearer arrangements.”4 Rusk had just met with Soviet Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko in Paris, the first such high-level U.S.-Soviet meeting inmonths. The entire three-hour discussion was devoted to arguments aboutBerlin. So the U.S. leaders, from Kennedy on down, were deeply uneasyabout Berlin, though a bit puzzled about whether the Soviets would reallytest U.S. promises to go to war over Berlin. Worried about the threat, theAmericans wanted to improve their military readiness for a crisis and (espe-cially Kennedy) wanted to avoid any unnecessary flash points.

The West German government stance, by contrast, was to persuadethe U.S. government to take a very tough stand on every detail of Westernstatus in Berlin. Their argument was that the Soviets were not such abig threat if they could see the Americans were strong and determined.So the West Germans appeared to downplay the Soviet threat in order toargue for a tough U.S. political position, while the Americans empha-sized the Soviet threat in arguing that they needed more political flexi-bility. The Americans felt that NATO militaries needed to be more readyfor action. These differing perspectives had surfaced in Rusk’s own meet-ing with Schroeder two days earlier (on October 15).

Going into his meeting with Schroeder, Kennedy understood all this.He also knew that, just the day before (October 16), in addition to thealarming and still secret news about Soviet missiles in Cuba, AmbassadorFoy Kohler had cabled a report back from Moscow of a lengthy conver-sation with Khrushchev. Khrushchev had repeated that the Sovietswould make no move on Berlin until after the U.S. midterm elections inNovember.5 As for the U.S. threat to defend access to Berlin with force,Khrushchev commented: “If U.S. doesn’t agree [to the Soviet position],that would force Soviets to sign peace treaty [ending Allied rights inBerlin] despite fact U.S. is threatening to start war. [It] must be recog-

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 471

4. See State Topol 399, 25 September 1962, in FRUS, 15: 327; letter from Kennedy toAdenauer, in “Germany, Security, 10/62–12/62” folder, President’s Office Files, Box 117, JohnF. Kennedy Library.5. Khrushchev also discussed Cuba, protesting U.S. provocations. Moscow 981, 16 October1962, FRUS, 15: 359–62.

nized that, in our electronic age, when one button is pressed, other but-ton is pressed automatically. There is no sense in dialogue of threats.This is silly policy. So U.S. should take position of reason.”6

Kennedy will not say a word about missiles in Cuba to the WestGerman foreign minister. But as the discussion slowly comes to the heartof the matter—U.S. readiness to threaten war in taking a rigid stance onAllied rights (as on the visa issue he knows Schroeder will emphasize7)—the Soviet missiles in Cuba cannot be far from Kennedy’s thoughts.

Schroeder spoke English reasonably well. So while he used his trans-lator to be sure he expressed himself clearly, the translator did notbother to translate what Kennedy said.

President Kennedy: Mr. Minister, would you care for some coffee ororange juice?

Gerhard Schroeder: Oh, I’d prefer tea, if [unclear].President Kennedy: [to others] Coffee? Tea?Unidentified: Tea.President Kennedy: [on phone] Maybe we can get three or four teas

and three or four coffees and a cup of orange juice? [aside, to someone else] . . . Yes, I left them on the table in my, on the

desk in my office.[turns to Schroeder] Well, I’m glad to see you, Mr. Minister. You’ve

come in a couple of times, but . . . We have pretty strong feelings, asyou’re aware, that we’re going to have great difficulty with Berlin in thenext few months. And I wanted to, first, to see what your thought wasabout what the Soviet schedule might be, and what actions they weremost likely to take. I thought you might know what our contingencyplanning is to deal with those actions.

Schroeder: If you’ll allow me to speak German and get translated, itmakes a big difference.

Zunächst [unclear] für die Gelegenheit danken, das wir hier zusam-men sind, insbesondere herzliche Grüße des Bundeskanzlers überbrin-gen, der sich freut, Sie in ein Paar Wochen zu sehen. Und ich betrachtediese Reise als eine sehr nützliche Vorbereitung, auch für den Besuch,den der Bundeskanzler machen wird.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962472

6. Moscow 981, 16 October 1962, in FRUS, 15: 360.7. Bundy warned Kennedy that Schroeder would raise the visa issue, during the previousevening’s deliberations on the missiles in Cuba.

Kusterer [hereinafter referred to as Translator]: Well, first of all, Mr.President, I would like to thank you very much indeed for the opportu-nity which you provide us [to] meet with you. And I’d like to extend toyou the most cordial greetings of the chancellor, who is looking forwardpersonally to seeing you in a few weeks’ time, and I myself consider mytrip to be a quite useful preparation for that very visit.8

Schroeder: Nun, dazu ihre Fragen zur Berlin-Situation, zu denmöglichen Absichten der anderen Seite und unserer Haltung zu der Vor-bereitungsmaßnahmen. Nach unserer Auffassung ist nicht mit Sicherheitzu sagen, ob die Russen tatsächlich die Absicht haben, gegen EndeNovember, oder gegen Ende des Jahres, die Krise durch eigene Handlungzu verschärfen oder nicht. Wir neigen eher zu der Meinung, daß dieSowjets bei allen versuchen, [unclear] Dings psychologischen Druck,auszuüben. Im Gründe darauf [unclear] auch sind weiter zu sprechen, undweiter zu versuchen, ihre Ziele ohne Gewalt zu erreichen. Das kann mannicht mit Sicherheit sagen, aber ich glaube, man muß folgende Faktoren inRecht [unclear]. Erstens haben die Sowjets, dort wo sie herumgefragthaben, bei den anderen Nationen wenig Unterstützung für den Gedankendes Separatvertrags gefunden. Und einen Separatvertrag zu unterzeich-nen, in den sozusagen nur mit der eigenen Firma und ihren Unterfirmenunterzeichnen, ist für die Sowjets nicht so furchtbar reizvoll, denn dannwerden sie international keine gute Ausgangsposition haben, um dasdurchzustehen, was sich daran anschließen könnte. Insoweit würde ich dieHaltung der anderen nicht festgelegten Staaten, eher als, von unseremStandpunkt aus, positiv betrachten.

Die weitere Frage ist, welche konkreten Maßnahmen haben dieSowjets etwa in Berlin weiter vor. Die Zahl von Maßnahmen, die sie nochergreifen könnten, ohne zu einer Konfrontation zu kommen, ist nur nochsehr beschränkt. Es ist nicht mehr viel Spielraum zwischen Dingen, diesie tun können und einer wirklichen, und im Augenblick, einer wirklichenKonfrontation. Deswegen muß man gleichzeitig ins Auge fassen, welcheMaßnahmen können etwa die sowjetzonaler Leute ergreifen, nur natür-lich abgestimmt mit dem Auftrag mit den Sowjets. Und das bedeutet[unclear] gibt es ein Problem, den wir eine besondere Aufmerksamkeitzuwenden müssen. Das ist dieses Problem, ob der Zivilzugang durchweitere Paß—und Visumforschriften erschwert werden soll. Aber vielle-icht darf ich erst einmal.

Translator: Now as to the question of the Berlin situation and the pos-

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 473

8. Adenauer had been invited to visit Washington November 7 to 8.

sible Soviet intentions, and also our views as to the contingency planning.In our opinion, it is not certain that the Russians really do have the inten-tion, by the end of November or by end the year, to increase the crisis byany action of their own. We are more inclined to believe that the Soviets,in spite of all attempts to bring psychological pressure to bear, have, inspite of this, they basically continue, and will want to continue, to talk andto try to achieve their objectives without having to resort to force.

Now, of course one cannot be quite sure about this, but I think oneshould take account of several factors. First of all, the Soviets, in theirattempts up to now at getting support from other nations for a separatepeace treaty, have so far registered rather little support, and for them tosign a separate treaty only with their own signature, and the signature oftheir subcontractors [the East Germans and other bloc states], so tospeak, isn’t really something really much worthwhile, because from theinternational point of view this would not provide them with any reallyfirm and good point of departure. So I think that the attitude which thenoncommitted states have taken so far can really be considered to be posi-tive from our point of view.

Now the further question, of course, is what special measures theSoviets may have in mind over Berlin, and the number of steps whichthey could still take without coming to the point of confrontation isreally rather limited. And there isn’t really much more margin for them,for any measures or steps or actions they could take, without comingreally close to that point of confrontation. And therefore, it is for us, ofcourse, at the same time necessary to envisage what possible action theSoviet-occupied zone authorities [East Germans] might take, of course,after having received approval from the Soviets. And there’s one specificproblem which I think we should study, and that is the problem ofwhether they might try, by the introduction of passport and/or visarequirements, to arrest and interfere with civilian traffic.

Schroeder: Dieser Problem ist, nach meiner Meinung, deswegen sowichtig, weil wir verhindern müssen, daß sich in der Zugangsfrage über-haupt irgendwelche Verschlechterungen gegenüber dem derzeitigen Standergeben. Und ist das ja leider eben so, daß diese Fragen dort zum Teil aus-gesprochene Papierfragen sind, in dem Sinne, daß wenn man jetzt durch dieZone fahren will, man an den Grenzpunkt ankommt, man sein Personal-ausweis abgibt, einen Stempel bekommt, und dann durch die—ein PaarMark bezahlt—und dann durch die Zone durchfährt. Und natürlich könntedie andere Seite dieses Stück so spielen, daß anstatt, daß man ein—zunächst so spielen—daß als man ein Zettel bekommt und dann [den]Ausweis, sie sagen, “Das ist jetzt ein Visum, was Sie [unclear] bekommen.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962474

Dieses Visum kann man hier bekommen, und dieses Visum kann man auchin Ostberlin beantragen.” In anderen Worten, das, was sich hier zunächsteinmal für das Auge ändert, ist unter Umständen nicht so furchtbar tief-greifend. Das ändert sich aber eine Menge in der rein rechtlichen Situation,weil nämlich die Visaerteilung eine Geschichte ist, die man ganz nachreinem [unclear] kann, es gibt dann keinerlei Anspruch auf ein Visum. Mitanderen worten, wenn es zu dieser Einführung käme, und [unclear] esakzeptieren wollte, würde das praktisch bedeuten, viel stärker als bisher,diesen Landzugang nach Berlin abhängig zu machen von der Sowjetzone,und damit natürlich ihre rechtliche—völkerrechtliche Bedeutung, im Sinneeine Anerkennung, einige Stufen höher gehen.

[Unclear] gibt es ein Paar Probleme. Es gibt zum Beispiel dasProblem, daß im Verhältnis zu allem anderen ausländischen Verkehr, amBeispiel amerikanischen Zivilverkehr, solche Visa bereits erteilt wordensind, was ein sehr dummer Punkt ist, von unserem Standpunkt aus, bei[unclear] Geschichte. Ich will das nicht im Einzelnen darstellen. Ichhabe die Überzeugung, daß wenn man irgendwelche weiteren Versch-lechterungen des Zivilzugangs findet, man eines Tages an der Stelle ist,wo der militärische Zugang im—in eine ganz große Notenlage gerätdadurch. Das braucht er vielleicht zunächst, nur weitere Papier-erfordernisse unterworfen werden soll, und die Weltöffentlichkeit nursehr schwer verstehen wird, daß wir mal gerade in dem anderen Wegdurch sehr viel neue Stempel Papiere hingenommen haben, man für denmilitärischen Verkehr nicht bereit sein würdest zu tun.

Translator: The question is so important in my mind because we willhave to avoid any further deterioration of access as compared to what thepresent situation is. Unfortunately, most of these questions can easily bepaper questions, if I may say so, because if now, you want to go through,to transit the Soviet-occupied zone, you drive up to the checkpoint, yougive them your identity card—in the civilian field—you give them youridentity card, you get it stamped, you pay a few marks’ toll, and then youproceed on your way. Now, of course, this could, at least in the begin-ning, be played by the other side in this way: that instead of giving thepassengers a little paper, they will say, “Now what you receive now is avisa. This visa can be obtained here at the checkpoint; it can also beapplied for in East Berlin.” In other words, the visible change isn’t reallyvery great, and doesn’t visibly reach really far, but it changes, of course,a lot in the legal situation, because a visa is, of course, something whichyou’re at complete liberty to issue or to deny. And in other words, if thevisa was introduced and accepted, this would really mean that demandaccess, much more than up to now, would be dependent on the discretion

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 475

of the . . . or left to the discretion of Soviet-occupied zone, and this wouldby inference mean some further steps in recognition in—under interna-tional law.

Now, there are some problems connected with that type of thing. Forexample, the problem that, so far as other foreign civilian traffic is con-cerned, it appears that even up to this point, visas have already beenaccepted for American civilian travelers, for instance, which of course isa rather unfortunate point in this matter. Now, I don’t want to go intoany detail, but I am convinced that if one would accept any deteriorationof the civilian access, this might [unclear] place oneself one day in a spotinsofar as military access is concerned, because if, in the field of militaryaccess also some paper formalities were introduced, it would really bedifficult to reject them, especially in the eyes of world opinion. And itwould be very difficult for world opinion to understand why one has justaccepted the same thing in the civilian field, and why now suddenly thisis such an impossible thing to accept in the military field.

Schroeder: Die Sowjets werden ja, wenn die klug sind, und sie sindganz bestimmt sehr klug, das ganze Spiel so spielen, daß sie es möglichstnicht gegen die Weltmeinung zu spielen brauchen, und daß sie esmöglichst ohne Einsatz von eigener Gewalt spielen können. Das kannzum Beispiel folgendermaßen aussehen, wenn ich das einmal an einemhypothetischen Beispiel darstellen darf. Nehmen wir an, die Sowjets wür-den unterzeichnen am ersten Dezember einen Friedensvertrag in demalle Bestimmungen über Berlin darin stünden, die Alliierten dürfen dortnicht länger sein, alle Befugnisse gehen nach Pankow über, und so weiter.Und sie würden sagen, “Dieser Friedensvertrag tritt in Kraft am erstenJanuar 1963, und wir brauchen eine Übergangszeit für ein halbes Jahr,während die westlichen Alliierten noch in Berlin bleiben. Sie werden aberein anderes Papier als bisher brauchen, um nach Berlin zu kommen. DiesePapiere werden in Pankow ausgestellt, aber da wir großzügige Leutesind, sind wir auch bereit, sie an den Übergangsstellen auszustellen. Dortsind die Papiere bereits vorbereitet, und dieses Verfahren tritt am erstenJanuar in Kraft.”

Was tut man dann auf der westlichen Seite, in der Zeit vom erstenDezember bis zum ersten Januar? Und was tut man wenn der erste Januarherangekommen ist? Vor allendings was wird die Weltöffentlichkeit sagen?Was soll man tun am ersten Januar? Soll man am ersten Januar nur nochmit Gewalt durchfahren? Oder wird die Weltöffentlichkeit nicht sagen,“Nun, also, ihr habt schon doch so viele Stempel hingenommen, in der[unclear] hat sich nicht viel geändert.” Mit anderen Worten, man brauchteine Haltung die den Sowjets ganz klar macht, daß sie mit dem Versuch,

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962476

dieses Spiel [unclear] Rattenweise zu spielen, eben nicht durchkommenwerden. Und deswegen, eben glaube ich, muß man im Grunde anfangen,bereits das Problem der etwa des [unclear] Zivilverkehrs, ganz energischzu behandeln.

Translator: Now if the Soviets are shrewd people, and they certainlyare, they will play the game, if ever possible, not against world opinion,and they will play that game if possible without having to resort to force.And they can do that, for instance, in the following hypothetical case: letus assume that the Soviet Union signs a separate peace treaty on the firstof December, a separate treaty which contains all of the provisions whichthey have announced. That is to say, the Western Allies have no longerany right to be in Berlin, everything is being transferred to Pankow [theEast German capital], and so on; that they would further say that thispeace treaty will enter into force on the first of January 1963, but thatthere appears a requirement for a transitional period, and that thereforethe Western powers can continue to stay in Berlin for another sixmonths as of the first of January ’63. But in order to be able to transitthrough the Soviet occupied zone, it is required to have a different docu-mentation than up to now. This documentation can be obtained at thecheckpoints as well as in Pankow itself. But it can also be obtained at thecheckpoints. That they would say these papers would be prepared, andthe whole arrangement or procedure would enter into force on the firstof January.

The question, of course, arises: What does the West do in the periodbetween the first of December and the first of January? And what does itdo on and after the first of January? Especially, what will be the reactionof world opinion if, for instance, the West were to decide that, as fromthe first of January, the access will be kept open by force? What wouldworld opinion say? It would say, “Well, you’ve just accepted this stamp,it’s not really much of a new requirement, and there hasn’t been a lot ofchange which it would be worthwhile the use of force.” In other words, itis necessary for us to have an attitude which makes it quite clear to theSoviet Union that any attempt on their part to try and proceed byinstallments will fail. And therefore, I think that basically we shouldreact very strongly already in the case of any further deterioration of thecivilian traffic.

Schroeder: Und [unclear] ein Paar Folgerungen. Die eine ist die, daßman in der “contingency planning” auch ein ganz genaue, realistischeBetrachtung über etwaiger Erschwerung des Zivilzugangs haben muß.Dafür gibt es verschiedene Varianten, die wir vielleicht jetzt nicht zuerörteren brauchen.

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 477

Da gibt’s es hier aber zweitens daraus, daß man vom politisch-, diplo-matisch-, und psychologischen Standpunkt aus, alles tun muß, um denSowjets rechtzeitig klar zu machen, daß man nicht die Absicht hat, zumBeispiel die Einführung von Visa hinzunehmen, und daß man darauf mitenergischen Mitteln reagieren wird. Das sind die beiden Dinge, die indiesen Zusammenhang von . . . erforderlich sind. Und ich glaube tatsäch-lich, es gibt eine Art Interdependenz, um den Ausdruck [Tea is delivered,Schroeder interrupts himself to say “Danke schön.”] zu gebrauchen, zwis-chen dem zivilen Verkehr und dem militärischen Verkehr, und ich meine,es wird notwendig sein, daß man das bei den ganzen Planung[en] real-istisch in Rechnung stellt.

Translator: Now, there are of course some conclusions to be drawnfrom this situation, and the first conclusion I see is that the contingencyplanning of course must really realistically consider and take into accountany possible deterioration in the field of also civilian access. There arecertain numbers of variations that can be imagined, but I don’t think it isnecessary to go into that detail now.

The second conclusion would be that in the political, diplomatic, andpsychological fields, one really must do everything to make it quite clear,to drive it home to the Soviet Union, that we have no intention whatso-ever of, for example, accepting the introduction of a visa requirement, butthat on the contrary the West would react very strongly to any suchmove. I think that is necessary, and I further think that there is, to usethat term, a clear interdependence between civilian and military traffic,and I think that should be taken into account realistically in our planning.

President Kennedy: Let me say, Mr. Minister, that I agree that thereis a clear interdependence between the military and the civilian. There isa substantial difference between them, however, with regards to access.We could always supply ourselves militarily by air if we can’t supply thecity by ground. Now, in addition, at the present time, as I understand it,the civilian traffic is treated differently than military traffic. The docu-mentation presented by civilian traffic is different from the documenta-tion presented by military traffic. The degree of authority which theEast German regime exercises on civilian traffic is different from theauthority that they exercise on military traffic. Is this at all true?

Schroeder: Ja, das ist sicherlich, das ist sicherlich so. Aber es kommteine Stelle, wo die Sache ganz gefährlich wird, wo nämlich weitereVerschlechterung[en] des Zivilverkehrs eine Situation hervorrufen, dasmacht zunächst geringfügige Verschlechterung, zu optisch geringfügigeVerschlechterung des militärischen Verkehrs schwer hinnehmen, schwer-er und schwerer ablehnen kann. Und die Frage ist natürlich ob man,

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962478

[unclear] gerade bei [unclear] Änderung des zivilen Verkehrs einfachsagen mögen, “Nun, wir akzeptieren das”; oder man sagt, “Wir akzep-tieren das unter gar keinen Umständen.”

Und wenn wir sagen, “Wir akzeptieren das unter gar keinenUmständen,” dann bliebt die Frage: “Was zu tun?” Darauf gibt es eine the-oretische Antwort. Man kann sagen, “Nun, das ganze Verkehr aufs Landund Wasser und Straße stoppt, und wir gehen nur durch die Luft.” Dasmag [unclear] des Personenverkehrs mehr oder weniger möglich sein. Dahaben wir bereits große Verzweifel, da wenn es eine [unclear] elektronis-che Störung gibt in den Luftwegen, in der schlechten Jahreszeit, und soweiter und so weiter, läßt sich nicht einmal nach unsere [unclear] denZivilverkehr durch die Luft absichern, von der Güterversorgung ganz zuschweigen. Und im selben Augenblick, das natürlich “viability” von Berlinauch schwerste gefährdet. Wir sind sogar der Meinung, daß bereits dieEinführung, auch ohne daß man diese Art von Reaktion wöhlt, die ein-fache Einführung des Visumszwangs, der täglich also für—die Visen, diesind täglich erteilt werden, für 20,000 Leute, nicht wahr, daß das bereitseine solche Verlangsamung und Verminderung des Berlinzugangs wird,daß damit einfach eins der Hauptessentials in die “viability” von Berlin aufdem Spiele steht.

Wenn man darauf erstmal reagiert hat, daß man in die Luft gegangenist, und wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen keine Wirkung auslösen, muß manunter Umständen unter schweren schweren [unclear] verlust, und da werweiß welchen Konzessionen, dabei wieder zurückgehen. Deswegen ist eseine sehr weittragende Frage, wie man sich einstellt bei der Visaerteilung.

Die Linien, die man da bei Verkehrsteuerung wohl über zieht, daßman den lebensnotwendigen Verkehr nach Berlin weiter gehen läßt undihn im Grunde für ihn das Visaerfordernis akzeptiert, die Bevölkerungaufruft, alle unnötigen Reisen zu hinterlassen und den Luftweg dafür zubenutzen, gleichzeitig wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. Dies isteine mittlere Lösung; ob man mit einer solchen mittleren Lösung wirk-lich durchkommen würde, daß mag zweifelhaft sein. Ich meine, aber, daßdie Planung, gleich würdig ob man einen milden oder einen sehr stren-gen Standpunkt wählt, tatsächlich noch einmal auf das Genauestedurchgedacht werden muß, und so daß man ein [unclear] stellen muß,wie man sich verhalten wird.

Vor allendingen, auch mit den Berlinern. Denn hier gibt es ein Bißcheneine Verschiedenheit der Betrachtung, die aus eine gewissen Verschiedenheitder Interessen stammt. Die Berliner brauchen die Anerkennungsproblemund die Gesamtdeutschen Probleme nicht als ihre unmittelbare Hauptsorgeanzusehen. Die Berliner sehen den möglichst unbehinderten Zugang nach

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 479

Berlin als ihre Hauptsorge an, aber die Auseinandersetzung geht in demGrunde über Berlin hinaus, in dieser Sache, so daß es nicht—die Interessenhier—nicht ganz identisch sind. Und man muß versuchen, diese Interessenauf einem Punkt zu bringen, damit sie ungefähr harmonisiert [sind].

Translator: Well, that’s certainly true. But the point comes where itwould be very dangerous to have accepted already a further deteriora-tion in the civilian traffic, because this would place us in a situationwhere optically minor changes in the field of military traffic would bevery difficult to reject. And the question of whether we say, if there’s anyfurther deterioration of civilian traffic, the question now is, whether wesay, “Okay, we will acquiesce in it,” or whether we say we are not goingto accept that in any way.

If we say we are not going to accept that in any way, we of coursehave to ask ourselves what are we going to do? There is a theoreticalanswer, the theoretical answer being that surface transport to Berlinwould come to an end. Now, there may be a possibility of ensuring moreor less the transportation of personnel from and to Berlin by air, buteven there we have our doubts insofar as bad seasons, any serious elec-tronic interference is concerned, leaving completely aside the questionof goods transportation, which we do not think it will be possible tocarry out by air. And then, of course, we’ve reached a point where via-bility is really seriously affected. We even think that the simple intro-duction of visa, the very fact that a visa requirement would be introduced,would mean that per day 20,000 visas would have to be issued for peopletraveling to and from Berlin. And this fact in itself would already slowdown and reduce the Berlin access. So really, [unclear] there’s oneessential, that is, viability, which really is at stake if anything of the kindhappened.

If we move, lift the traffic up into the air, and if the economic coun-termeasures we take do not have the effect which we are thinking of,then we might well find ourselves at the point where, at the price of highconcessions and high loss of prestige, we would have to come back fromthat stand which we have taken. So the question, of course, of how wereact to these requirements is, I think, extremely important.

The line which has been followed in planning up to now is that thevital surface transport would continue and that one would, for that pur-pose, accept the visa, at the same time appealing to the population not todo any unnecessary surface travel, and at the same time, of course, intro-ducing economic countermeasures. Now, this is an intermediate solution.The question as to whether it will have the result which we are expectingit to have is, of course, an open one. But I think that, at any rate, whether

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962480

one will in the final analysis come to a more restricted or a very strictreaction in the planning stage, it is necessary to rethink very hard thewhole planning and to come to agreement as to how we will really act.

We also, especially, have to come some agreement on that point withthe Berliners, because there is some difference in the perspective between,and some difference of interests between, the Berliners and the FederalRepublic as such. The problem of—

Schroeder: [interrupting translator] Or the Western position as such.Translator: Or the Western position as such, thank you. The problem

of recognition and the problem of all-German policy is not felt by theBerliners as their really direct concern and really immediate concern.The Berliners think that their immediate and direct concern, of course, isthe unrestricted access, but the problem itself, of course, and all the impli-cations reach far beyond Berlin alone, so there is not quite the same inter-est with the western Berliners and with the West, and therefore it isnecessary for us to try to bring these interests to a certain point.

President Kennedy: Mr. Minister, if you . . . if they insist on thesevisas, and then West Germans going in, or traffic, say that they won’tsubmit to them, and that traffic stops, then where are we?

Schroeder: Das bedeutet—im Grunde, bedeutet das Ganze die Frage,ob man ins Auge fassen will, oder ins Auge fassen kann, und ich stelle dasnur als eine Frage, den Landzugang nach Berlin vom ersten Augenblick,an dem ernsthaft blockiert wird, wirklich mit Gewalt offenzuhalten, oderob man, die ganze Gedankenführung so ordenlich, daß man sagt, “Lassenwir das Land, nehmen wir die Luft, und warten wir ab die Wirt-schaftsmaßnahmen und der Gleichen wirken.”

Ich glaube, und das sage ich aus meiner persönlichen Meinung, daß eseine sehr gefährliche Vorstellung wäre, mich darauf einzulassen, daß mandas Problem durch Ausweichen in die Luft [unclear] zu lösen [unclear].

Translator: Basically the question of course is—and I am only rais-ing the question without trying to give an answer now to it—but basi-cally the question is whether we will and whether we can, in case theland access is harassed, whether we will and whether we can, from thefirst moment of such blockage onward, keep that access open by force, orwhether we will say, “Well, let’s drop the land traffic, the surface traffic,and let’s lift it up into the air and wait for the effect of the economiccountermeasures.”

Now, I personally believe that it would be really dangerous to think thatthe problem could be solved by simply lifting up the traffic into the air.

President Kennedy: Well, I think that we discussed what action wewould take if there was a forcible blockage of traffic on the ground. The

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 481

only question would be whether the blockage took place because of the,of a paper barrier rather than one of arms or force. Whether we, in thatcase, would be warranted, if the blockage is by paper, warranted takingthe force if we didn’t like the kind of visa or the kind of papers whichwere being requested of the civilian traffic.

Schroeder: Aber wir sind—das Problem ist gerade, wenn man dashier nicht tut, obwohl die “viability” von Berlin im Grunde daran hängt,welche Chance hat man, sich bei, dann denn für den militärischenVerkehr, nur in Anführungszeichen das Erfordernis, von etwas mehrPapier gestellt wird, zu sagen, “Dies aber ist eine gewaltsame Stelle.”

Translator: Well, Mr. President, the question of course arises, if onedoesn’t do it at that stage, at that point, although viability is involved,what are our chances of doing it when, in the military field only, somepaper requirement, new paper requirement is introduced? What chancedo we then stand to reply, to react by force?

President Kennedy: Well, I would think it does raise the question ofwhether any sort of paper documentation which we would accept in thecivilian traffic. I say, military traffic you can always move by air, so thatyou don’t have quite the same problem. But the civilian traffic you can’tmove by air, so civilian traffic as a practical matter is basically a differentproblem. If you’re going to say that you’re not going to have any civiliantraffic submit to these visas, and you can’t carry the civilian traffic by air,then you’re going to have, in a sense, a blockade of Berlin imposed by us.And with all the difficulties that would come upon the city, with the citynot wholly sympathetic to that position, vis-à-vis arguing that this is anunreasonably legalistic position that we’ve taken, it seems to me that thatmay end up in a somewhat more . . . slightly ambiguous position than wewould if we said, “Well, we don’t accept this authority, but if it’s a matterof moving civilian traffic in and out, we would agree.” [Unclear.]

Schroeder: Ich meine es liegt auf der Hand, das wird eine sehrschwierige Frage ist, aber die hängt im—einfach eben damit zusammen,und das gilt nach meiner Meinung eben vor Allendingen auch für denmilitärischen Verkehr, ob man sich gegenüber dem militärischen Verkehrvorstellen, “Nun, wir können die Luft ausweichen.” Oder man sagt, “Diesist ein lebenswichtiges Problem, oder ein militärisch-lebenswichtigesProblem, den Landverkehr aufrecht zu erhalten.”

Ich sage ihnen ganz offen, ich würde der Auffassung sein, daß es einmilitärisch-lebenswichtiges Problem ist, den Landverkehr offen zu halten,um mich nicht damit mit zu vergnügen, daß man in die Luft gehen kann.Ich bin mir ganz darüber klar, daß das schwere Entscheidungen beinhal-

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962482

tet, aber unter Umständen ist man ganz anderen Entwicklung entgegen,wenn mal den militärischen Verkehr durch die Luft nimmt, um dann zusehen, wieviel weiter man kommen wird. Das hat man ’48–’49 getan. Undzwar diese Luftbrücke hat es gegeben. Die ist dann schließlich aus eineranderen Situation mehr oder weniger ohne Entscheidung, ohne jedenfallswirklich wirksame Verbesserung zu schaffen, aufgegeben worden, weildie Interessenlage auf der sowjetischen Seite geändert hat, aber ich würdenicht glauben, daß man heute mit dieser Art von militärischer Aktionwirklich die Auseinandersetzung mit den Sowjets positiv bestehen kann,sondern auf dieser Weise geht man möglicherweise einer schweren poli-tisch-diplomatischen Niederlage entgegen.

Ich habe das Problem eigentlich nur in dieser Schärfe aufgeworfen,damit man [unclear] sieht, in welche Lagen man geraten kann, und manmuß die möglichen Lagen vorher, glaube ich, absolut realistisch und gener-alstabsmäßig durchgedacht haben, um nicht eines Tages an einer Stelle zustehen, wo man, wo das Publikum den Eindruck gewinnt, “ihr habt dochnicht ganz entschlossen gehandelt,” weil man versucht [unclear] auszuwe-ichen. Die Lösung, die wir jetzt für derzeit [unclear], für das Problem desZivilzugangs, sieht so aus, um es noch einmal zu sagen, daß man sagt,“Nun, der lebenswichtige Verkehr muß weiter gehen. Nimmt die Visa, dafür[unclear] unten Potenz [unclear]. Macht keine unnötigen Reisen. Wersonst reisen muß, geht durch die Luft. Wir werden das bezahlen, wir wer-den das organisieren, und wir werden das finanzieren. Und wir werdendann wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen eintreten lassen.” Und Verhinderungendes Interzonenhandels oder Kündigung des Interzonenhandels, entsprech-ende Handlung der drei Westallierten, möglichst entsprechende Handlungalle NATO-Partner gerichtet gegen die Sowjetzone.

Aber wenn das nicht den gewünschten Effekt dabei führt, dann bleibtman in der Situation, entweder nur ein[en] begrenzten Berlinverkehr zuhaben, oder das Visaerfordernis ganz zu nehmen, und man befindet sich,in der Tat, auf einer gleitenden Skala, die leider nach unten gleitet, undnicht auf einer aufsteigenden [unclear] zur Besserung.

Translator: I’m certainly fully aware that this is an extremely diffi-cult problem, and it is connected also especially with the question [of]whether in the military field, military traffic, one will want to take adecision then in case of any such introduction, also in the military field,to lift it up into the air, or whether it is considered vital—also militarilyvital—to keep land access open. I frankly believe that it is also militarilyvital to keep the land access open and not simply try and lift everythingup into the air.

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 483

I am, of course, aware that this implies a very heavy and very difficultdecision, but it is possible that if one goes into the air and says, “Well,let’s see how we can get along,” we might be placed before differentdevelopments, which might place us rather in a spot. Now there was, ofcourse, the airlift in 1948–49, and under a different situation it more orless came back on the surface without any effective improvement. And itcame back because the interests for the Soviet side had changed. But I donot think that now, with any such military action as taken in ’48–’49, itwill be possible for us to really meet the Soviet challenge. But [instead]we may be well in for a major diplomatic and political defeat.

Having raised the question . . . and I only want to see that every pos-sible development, every possible situation is really thought about in awar-gaming manner, if I may say, so as not one day to find oneself in aposition where the public would gain the impression that after all they[the Western allies] are not so very firm, firmly resolved and they aretrying to evade the problems. The solution which up to now has been, torepeat that, which up to now has been envisaged for any such deteriora-tion of civilian traffic was that the vital traffic would continue, thatunder protest one would accept the visa, that one would appeal to thepopulation not to do any unnecessary travel, that the necessary travelwould have to be financed and lifted up into the air, and that economiccountermeasures would be taken by us insofar as the interzonal trade isconcerned, either diminishing or completely renunciating it, and corre-sponding action, economic counteraction, by the three Western powersand possibly by all NATO members.

But if all these measures remained without effect, then of course wewould be in a situation where we would either have reduced access toBerlin or we would have to accept all the visa requirements for all thetraffic, and we would find ourselves suddenly on a declining gliding scale.

President Kennedy: I don’t know, Mr. Minister, if the question of thevisas is the . . . if we should make this the great issue, whether we canwin that fight [unclear]. That’s the problem. We don’t want to have adiplomatic defeat. We don’t want to have Berlin isolated either, becauseof the forcible blockade of their own or because of a decision of ours notto move. And the question really is as to whether a visa is the issue uponwhich to hang our use of force, your use of economic countermeasuresand your use of force with us. Can we justify—we’re talking about opin-ion in the world—fighting our way up the autobahn because they won’tgive a visa? When [unclear]—when, after all, civilian traffic has beensubmitting itself to being stamped? That’s a pretty sophisticated—

Schroeder: Das ist in der [unclear], aber die ganze Schwierigkeit der

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962484

Auseinandersetzung der Berlinfrage mit der Sowjets liesst leider in dieserArt von Dingen—man hat das immer mit der Salami verglichen—ichhabe das Beispiel nie sehr schön gefunden, weil es aus der Lebens-mittelbranche stammt—aber die ganze Schwierigkeit ist natürlich, daßman hier ein Stück weiter und weiter und weiter gedrückt wird, bis manan einer Stelle ist, wo die Anderen [unclear], “Das habt [unclear] allesschon getan. Sollte das noch eine—soll das nicht auch noch gehen?” Unddeswegen ist man dabei, dieses Paket sozusagen stückweise zu verlieren,ohne das sich bedeutende Dinge eigenen.

Die Schwierigkeit liegt, nach meiner Meinung, in gerade, in poli-tisch-psychologischen Dingen. Wie das ganze Berlinproblem, letztlichnoch, so wie es jetzt steht, eher auch ein großer politisch-, diplomatisch-,psychologischer Krieg ist, als ein militärischer Krieg ist. Und aufunserer Seite muß Folgendes gelten: Wie reagiert die Bevölkerung wennwir wieder eine neue Sache hinnehmen müssen? Ist das—ermutigt dasdie Bevölkerung? Oder entmutigt das die Bevölkerung? Die Antwort istklar. Es müßte die Bevölkerung entmutigen. Das ist ganz sicher, [unclear]sagen ein Schritt weiter bergab. Ob der Schritt groß ist oder klein ist,spielt keine Rolle. Und es bedeutet für Pankow, wenn sein Visarechtanerkannt ist, ein Stück weiter Bergauf. Das kann man, glaube ich, nichtverzweifeln.

Nun, man kann versuchen, das noch mit ein Kompromiß zu überbi-eten. Die zweite Frage ist, wie reagieren die Sowjets darauf ? Wasbedeutet das, da diesja alle Stücke sowjetischer Strategie sind? Wasbedeutet es für die Sowjets? Es bedeutet für die Sowjets einen gewissenweiteren Erfolg—mit anderen Worten, ein Stückchen Ermutigung.

Und Berlin kann überhaupt nur dadurch gehalten werden, daß dieSowjets die Überzeugung haben, “Hier gibt es irgendwo, ohne das wirdas genau wissen, wir die Sowjets, eine unübersteigbare Grenze, die wirunter gar keinen Umständen übersteigen können. Das wissen die Sowjets.Ich bin der Überzeugung, daß Khrushchev seinerseits überzeugt ist, daß[es] gewisse Dinge gibt, für die, die Amerikaner und [unclear], die derWesten wirklich kämpfen würde. Er muß nur die Partie so spielen, daßman sozusagen weiter und weiter eingeengt ist, ohne reagiert zu haben.Und dann hat er natürlich in dieser psychologischen Auseinandersetzung[unclear] einen großen Erfolg erhoben.

Es ist nicht, nach meiner Meinung, also nicht, daß die Sowjets wissen,unter bestimmten Umständen würde man kämpfen. Das wissen sie, unddas glauben sie auch. Sie glauben sogar, das man ein Nuklearkrieg wegenBerlin riskieren wird, obwohl ihnen—den Sowjets—das ziemlich ver-rückt erscheint. Aber sie glauben das. Aber sie werden ihre eigenen

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 485

politisch-diplomatisch-psychologischen Möglichkeiten daran ermessen,wie wir diese anderen Fragen behandeln. Und deswegen ist es eben sowichtig, obwohl das nun ein Visum ist oder nicht, daß diese Frage—ichwill jetzt nur einmal sagen—mit dem größtmöglichen Nachdruck behan-delt wird, und nicht angesehen wird, als eine Frage, ein Stück Papier wird.

Translator: Now, that certainly is quite true, but the difficulty overall this Berlin conflict with the Soviets is that . . . well, it has always beencompared to a salami—an example which I never liked very muchbecause it comes out of a food store—but really the difficulty is thatpiece by piece and little by little, one is being maneuvered into a pointwhere everybody will say, “Now you’ve accepted all that already, whyshould just this little thing not be possible for you to accept?” And that isthe, really, the problem for us, that we might well lose this whole gameby installments without there ever occurring any major event, or havingoccurred any major event. But the game would still be lost.

And the difficulty, in my opinion, really lies in this political and psy-chological field. Quite as Berlin, quite generally, is as of now much morea political, psychological, diplomatic war than it is a military one. Andfor us, it is also important what the reaction of the people will be whenwe acquiesce in the next minor change in, deterioration in access. Will itbe encouraging for the—will our reaction be encouraging or discourag-ing for the population? And I think the answer to that one is quite clear:It will discourage them, and it will be considered as a further step, smallas it may be, on the declining scale. And to Pankow [the East Germancapital], of course, the recognition of its visa requirement wouldundoubtedly be one step up. There can be no doubt about this.

Now, of course one can try to avoid this by finding a compromise, butthe second question involved is of course also: What will the Soviet reac-tion be? Because all this is part of a more comprehensive Soviet strategy.And what does our reaction to any such move mean to them? And it means,of course, some success to them, and that means encouragement to them.

Now, Berlin can only be held if the Soviets can be convinced, and areconvinced, that there is some specific point—without our wanting to beforced or being able to say in this discussion now which that point shouldbe—but somewhere there is this point which we will not go beyond, andbeyond which we will not accept any [unclear]. And the Soviets certainlyknow that. I’m convinced that Khrushchev himself is convinced that thereare some things at points which the U.S. and the West will fight. But ofcourse, he will try to play this game in such a way as to whittle down ourfreedom of action without our reacting to every slice that is torn off, andthat would, of course, mean success to him, psychologically.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962486

I don’t think it’s enough, really, for the Soviets only to know that undercertain circumstances we will fight. They do know that. They even believethat we’re going to wage a nuclear war over Berlin, although from theirpoint of view this looks a rather crazy decision to take. But they stillbelieve that we will wage a nuclear war over Berlin if necessary. But theirown intentions, or their further moves, of course depend on how we dealwith the precedent, or how we have dealt with the precedent move. Nowthe question is really so vitally important, now, whether this is the visa orwhether it is something else. But it is not merely a paper requirement. Itreally goes much further than that.

President Kennedy: Well, I understand the difficulty, but you have tomake some decisions in the next three or four weeks about the matter.

I know this argument about salami, and what point we draw the line.I agree that that’s important. I just think we ought to make sure that inour desire to demonstrate some firmness, that we don’t draw the line atthe wrong place. The civilian traffic at the present time accepts EastGerman control. That traffic submits its documents to the East Germanauthorities. They stamp the documents—that’s a kind of acquiescence intheir authority. The degree of difference between that kind of acquies-cence and acquiescence in the acceptance of a different paper doesn’tseem to me to be dramatic enough to hang all of our future on that issue.

The West German government has made it clear it’s not going torecognize [East Germany]. All the rest of us [in the Alliance] have.Whether we therefore want to set in train all the reactions on this ques-tion of a difference in the paper, I think, is a matter that we ought tomake up our mind about very shortly. If we make it the important issueand then acquiesce, then it’s going to be a major defeat. [Schroeder inter-jects: “No.”] If we say that we would accept East Germans on the check-points, and that this . . . we’ll sign these papers which we don’t have anyregard for, and which have no standing, then it will become less impor-tant. So we’ve got to decide in advance whether we want to make itimportant or whether we want to attempt to downgrade it and regardthe actual movement in and out as the key issue.9

Schroeder: Ich möchte nur einen Satz noch zu diesen Problemen sagen.Es ist eben doch ein ganz großer Unterschied, ob ich an einen Grenzpunkt

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 487

9. Acceptance of East Germans at the checkpoints as surrogates or agents of the SovietUnion, in contrast to accepting them as representatives of a sovereign East Germany, hadbeen a little-known part of contingency planning since 1954. But this practice was discardedin 1958, when leaders and the public became aware of it.

heranfahre und dort eine Sache abgestempelt wird, und ich durchfahre,oder aber, ob man das tun kann, was die Leute ohne weiteres tun können,sagen “Alle Visa gibt es überhaupt nur noch in Ostberlin. Oder wir sindbereit auf Eurem Boden Visabureaus zu eröffnen, zum Beispiel in WestBerlin.” In anderen Worten, die Zone kommt durch das anerkannteVisaerfördernis in eine ganz andere Lage, darauf zu sagen, “Wir geben imMonat überhaupt nur 50,000 Visen.” Und was machen wir dann? Mitanderen Worten, sie könnten sowohl die Zahl der Visen als den Ort derVisaerteilung feststellen. Von daran eine Menge Förderung knüpfen, dieangeblich entgegenkommen sein sollen, in Westdeutschland oder in WestBerlin Visastellen zu eröffnen. Das ist die [unclear] Gefahr, die hinterdieser Sache liegt.

Translator: I just wanted to add one point, Mr. President, on thisissue. There is, of course, a big difference of whether you drive up to acheckpoint and you get your stamp and then you proceed, or whetherthey can do—the Soviet-occupied Zone people [East Germans] can dowhat they certainly could do to say that visas can only be issued in EastBerlin. Or they say, “We’ll be very generous; we’ll make it easy for you.We’ll open visa-issuing agencies in West Berlin,” for instance.

Schroeder: Or in West Germany.Translator: Or in West Germany. In other words, the zone really

comes into a completely different situation. They might as well say,“We’ll only issue 50,000 visas per month.” And they can fix the number,fix the place and connect it up with other demands that are worse. Underthe label of being very generous, saying, “We’ll open up these visa-issu-ing agencies—”

President Kennedy: [interrupting] But I would assume that underthose conditions the economic countermeasures that we would takewould be sufficiently oppressive to them that this kind of action, which israther superficial, would not be useful to them.

Schroeder: Das ist die Frage, wie weit wirtschaftliche Maßnahmendabei wirksam sind. Ehrlich gesagt, bin ich von der Wirksamkeit derwirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen dann nicht überzeugt, wenn die andereSeite bereit ist, das Risiko zu laufen. Dann wenn sie—die andere Seitebereit ist, das Risiko zu laufen, dann kann sie die wirtschaftlichenMaßnahmen dann sich hinnehmen. Ich würde jedenfalls davor warnen,zu glauben, daß wirtschaftlicher Druck genügte, um die gewünschtenVeränderungen hervorzurufen.

Translator: Berlin, of course, is at risk as to how far the economiccountermeasures will be effective. Quite honestly, I’m not convinced that

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962488

they are effective if the other side is prepared to really run the risk. Thenthey can certainly put up with everything we can do in the field of eco-nomic countermeasures. So I would rather warn to the belief that eco-nomic countermeasures alone, and in themselves, will be sufficientlyeffective.

President Kennedy: Let me say, there’s a couple of other matterswhich . . . I appreciate the Minister’s discussion.

Schroeder: Well, I’m sorry they’re just a little bit long on this.[Kennedy interjects: “No, no, but I—”] I think it’s very important we bothget to make a start with it—

President Kennedy: I want . . .Unidentified: Go on.President Kennedy: The other question is on this matter of the nego-

tiations with . . . these discussions which have been carried on with[Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, which so far have beenunsuccessful. Since last spring [spring of 1962], the Communist insis-tence on the withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin, of course, hasmeant that nothing has proceeded.

Now, it may be they won’t always stay on that, that they’ll withdrawthat condition and come back again to access and boundaries and atomicweapons and all these other matters which were discussed some monthsago before they got on this other matter. Do you have any thoughtsabout . . . particularly . . . I don’t see why Mr. Khrushchev would want tocome over here and talk about Berlin if all he’s going to talk about iswhat we’ve been very clear is not a matter that is subject to negotiation.

Schroeder: Nach meiner Meinung ist erstens noch nicht ganz sicher,ob Khrushchev wirklich kommen wird, und kommen will. Khrushchevhat diese Besuchsankündigung, nach meiner Meinung hervorragendbenutzt, um den Westen mit Spekulation zu beschäftigen. Aber, deswe-gen weiß ich nicht ob er es wirklich tun wird. Ich will nur einmalannehmen, daß er es tatsächlich vor hat.

Dann würde ich es als ein Zeichnen dafür ansehen, daß er nichtgeneigt ist, den sagen Sie mal härtesten Kurs zu steuern. Er müßte, also,schon kommen, in der Erwartung, daß man irgendwelche Dinge arrang-ieren kann. Khrushchev—wir haben das in Genf gesehen im März, undwir haben das in Juli gesehen mit Gromyko—man wird das—Sie werdendas vielleicht morgen Nachmittag wieder sehen—haben in der Tat denscheidenden Punkt daraus gemacht, westliche Anwesenheit in Berlin.Wir haben [unclear]—die Sowjets haben sich ein Bißchen zu optimistischausgedrückt, darüber, daß man sich über Grenzen, Demarkationslinien,

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 489

Nichtangriffspakte, Nuklearfragen, und so weiter geeinigt hätte. Nachmeiner Meinung, haben wir [unclear] doch keineswegs über diese Fragengeeinigt, die Sowjets stellen es aber so dar, durch diplomatische Kanälen,als ob man sich in diesen Fragen geeinigt hätte.

Stellen Sie sich mal auf den Standen der Sowjets, man hätte sich indiesen Fragen geeinigt, dann möchten Sie im Grunde annehmen, daß dieSowjets weiter den Versuch machen werden, über die Anwesenheit desWestens in Berlin sozusagen eine Verständigung auf gleichender Skala,anbei zu verführen. Nach meiner Meinung war das im Grunde deutlich zusehen in Genf, daß sie im Grunde folgende Fragen gestellt haben, “Wielange wollt ihr in Berlin bleiben? Wollt ihr ewig in Berlin bleiben?” Dannhaben die Sowjets den Vorschlag gemacht, “Also, man halte die HälfteEurer Truppen vier Jahre da, nimmt dazu noch einige Polen, Tschechen,und einige Dänen und Holländer, vermindert diese Sachen jedes Jahr umein Viertel, und nach Vier Jahre werde die Sache erledigt.” Ich bin derÜberzeugung, daß die Sowjets tatsächlich geglaubt haben, daß sei eineweitere Kompromißangebot. Ich gehe davon aus, daß das, was sie imNovember ’58 gesagt haben, “Nun, schön, also, machen wir in BerlinStatus quo in Berlin. Machen wir [unclear] entmilitarisierten Stadt.” Daßsie sich das vorgestellt haben, als eine Kompromißangebot, was ihnen dasGesicht wahren, wie es [unclear] das Gesicht wahren [unclear].

Sie sehen, diese Angebot ist nicht angenommen worden, und ichhalte im Grunde für möglich, daß sie noch weiter arbeiten an einer inihren Augen—nicht in unseren Augen—Kompromißangebot zu sagen,“Nun, wenn Ihr nicht Vier Jahre bleibt, vielleicht bleibt Ihr acht Jahre,oder neun Jahre, oder zehn Jahre, oder sechs Jahre, oder was immer.” Ichwürde glauben, daß Khrushchev eine Anstrengung in dieser Richtung,und ein Erfolg in dieser Richtung, sehr, sehr viel lieber wäre, als das erBerlins wegen jetzt ein noch höheres Risiko laufen muß. Mit anderenWörteren, ich glaube, daß Khrushchev, wenn er kommen sollte, imGrunde eher kommen wird mit dem Versuch, sozusagen, nach einemKompromiß, der nicht angenommen worden ist, eine Art zweitenKompromiß versucht. Aber daß ist meine persönliche Auffassung. Daskann man wie immer, wie alles was die Sowjets tun werden, nicht wirk-lich beweisen.

Translator: Now in my opinion, first of all, I would like to say that Iam not sure in any way, either in the negative nor in the positive way,whether Khrushchev will or will not come. I think he has very extremelyskillfully used that announcement to get the press to indulge in all sortsof speculation, and that is why I’m not quite sure that he will come.

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962490

But just for the sake of argument, let’s assume he will come. And if hedoes, I would consider that as some indication that he is perhaps not reallycoming along with the intention of going the toughest course. So hewould probably come expecting that something could be arranged. Now,we have seen this in Geneva in March, and also in July with Gromyko—you’ll probably have the same experience tomorrow, Mr. President, [inyour meeting] with him [Gromyko]—that Khrushchev and the Sovietshave always made the crucial point, or the only point really for them, wasthe Western presence in Berlin.10 And in my opinion the Soviet Union hasbeen a little too optimistic in its utterings about boundaries, demarcationlines, nonaggression pacts, nuclear weapons, acting as though all this waspractically and virtually settled and agreed, while in my opinion there iscertainly not yet any agreement on these questions. But in their view inthe diplomatic, through diplomatic channels, the Soviets present it asthough these matters had already been agreed.

Now, putting myself in the Soviets’ place for a moment, if all this . . .and taking it as they do, that all this is practically arranged and agreed,then I would rather think that the Soviets would continue to try via the, or[unclear] concerning, the Western presence in Berlin, to come to anunderstanding on a sort of gliding scale. In my opinion, this has been quiteclear in Geneva, where they raised the question, “How long do you wantto stay in Berlin? Do you want to stay in Berlin forever?” And then theysuggested that the forces in Berlin should be reduced by one-half, and forthe next four years we would add some Poles, Czechs, Danes, and Dutch[troops], and we would reduce it by 25 percent each year, and after aperiod of four years, that’s the end of it. Now I’m convinced that theSoviets, from their point of view, really thought that this was a compro-mise offer. And I even think that the November ’58 proposal ofKhrushchev’s to turn Berlin into a free and demilitarized city was, in theireyes, a compromise offer intended to serve as a face-saver for both sides.

Now they’ve seen that this offer has not been accepted, and therefore

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 491

10. Schroeder is referring to the major talks on Berlin between Rusk and Gromyko, inGeneva, in March and July 1962. On both occasions the Soviets had pressed the issue of theWestern troop presence in Berlin very hard, reinforced by secret letters sent to Kennedy fromKhrushchev. It was after the July 1962 round of meetings that Khrushchev began telling U.S.diplomats and visitors that it was "clear our dialogue was coming to [an] end." He wouldhave to proceed to settle the Berlin matter without being intimidated any longer by U.S.threats. See, for example, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson’s conversation with Khrushchevrecounted in Moscow 228, 26 July 1962, in FRUS, 15: 253.

I think that they simply continue to work on what they consider—wecertainly would not, of course—but what they consider to be a compro-mise proposal, where they would say, “Well, if it’s not four years, it maybe six, or ten, or eight years, or something of that sort.” So I think thatreally Khrushchev would simply prefer to see his effort in that directioncrowned by success than at the present moment to run any higher risk inBerlin. And therefore, I believe that if he comes, having seen that onecompromise has not been accepted, what they consider to be a compro-mise, he may come along with a second one. Now this is, of course, myvery personal opinion. As in everything that has to do with the Soviets,there’s no possibility of proving that one is right.

Schroeder: [adding to translator’s words] At least not beforehand.[Laughter.]

President Kennedy: Well I agree there are. . . . I think Mr. [Foy]Kohler [U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union] yesterday was given theimpression that we had practically agreed on a nuclear test ban, exceptfor a few minor details which I am sure are unimportant. Well, I, Mr.Minister, I think we . . . I don’t know why Mr. Gromyko wants to see ustomorrow. I’m seeing him tomorrow, and I don’t know what proposalhe’ll have in regard to Khrushchev, to the possibility of coming, or whatdiscussion he wants on Berlin.

The other problem which we have . . . I think we ought to get thisquestion of visas settled between the British and French and you and us.

Schroeder: And the Berliners, too.President Kennedy: And the West Berliners, before the end of the

month. I know you feel very strongly about it. I think we ought to get itloud and clear ourselves, all of us. I suppose the Ambassadorial Group is[unclear].11

Schroeder: Yes.President Kennedy: My impression was that we had more or less

come to some conclusion. What had we settled in that conference in thelast year, 18 months—

Unidentified: I’m not sure at all, Mr. President, but this has been dis-cussed.

Schroeder: Wenn sie mir erlauben, daß mal zu sagen, Herr President,wenn man ein oder zwei Jahre geplant hat, und immer wieder geplant

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962492

11. Kennedy is referring to the Washington Ambassadorial Group, a working group of repre-sentatives from the United States, Britain, France and West Germany that regularly met todiscuss Berlin and German issues.

hat, dann liegt die Gefahr sehr nah, daß der Plan ein Bißchen auseinan-der läuft, und ich glaube, wir sind jetzt in einem Stadium, in dem mansich das alles noch einmal neu ansehen muß, und das ganz realistischund klar auf die [unclear] und Annahmen bringen muß, um zu sehen,was der Kern der ganzen Geschichte ist. Ich habe gestern mit demSecretary of Defense gesprochen, und er war offenbar sehr klar derMeinung, daß man diese ganze Planung jetzt einmal, sozusagen auf demneuesten Stand überholen, und daß mal Stromlinien—der Ausdruck istvon mir—etwas Stromlinien [unclear] sein muß.

Translator: If you’ll permit me to say this, Mr. President, if one hasbeen going on planning and replanning for one or two years, of course,there is the danger that the harmonization is not 100 percent between thevarious stages of the plans. And therefore I think that we have reached apoint where the whole thing should be reexamined and brought up todate under the most realistic and sober consideration, and to really try tofind what is the crux of the matter. Yesterday I had a really interestingtalk with Mr. McNamara, and he rather was of the opinion, it seemed tome, that really this planning should be brought up to date, and—that’snot a term he used, but I would use it—should be streamlined.

Schroeder: Darf ich nur einen Satz dazu [unclear]. Ich [unclear] dieMeinung, man muß diese ganzen Möglichkeiten noch einmal wiederrichtig wie Kriegsspiele hin und her spielen, und da wird es gut sein, dieklügsten Leute die wir haben, die Sowjets spielen zu lassen.

Translator: May I add just one sentence? I am of the opinion that allof these various contingencies should be played through in a sort of wargame, and then it would be quite good to have the most intelligent [peo-ple we have] play the Soviet part.

President Kennedy: Well, I’m not as generous as you about theRussians. [All laugh.]

Schroeder: [laughing] Nein, also, ich möchte nicht falsch verstandenwerden. Nur um ganz sicher zu gewinnen, sollten wir möglichst, dieklügsten für die [unclear] auf die anderen Seite setzt. Ich würde dieRussen sonst auch nicht zu [unclear].

Translator: Now, don’t misunderstand me, Mr. President, it’s just tobe quite sure that we don’t miss any point, but that is why we shouldhave the most intelligent play the Soviet part. But I certainly wouldn’tthink that the Soviets are more intelligent as well.

President Kennedy: Yeah, they’ve got a great geography as theirasset.

I read this morning Mr. [West German defense minister FranzJosef] Strauss’s interview in the New York Times which made two points.

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 493

One is the completeness of the comradeship between the French and theGermans in military matters. And the other is the question of at whatpoint . . . his opposition to the use of German forces, if this matter cameto a crunch, until [unclear] secondary stage [of a Berlin crisis]. If thismatter comes to a military [unclear], it seems to me that the law is goingto rest with the side which has the larger force and that therefore thereisn’t much use once the military action begins in questioning whetherthe use of German troops would throw a shadow on our judicial—juridi-cal rights to be in West Berlin.

Schroeder: I’m not sure whether you said “completeness” of Franco-German understanding or “not completeness.”

President Kennedy: “Completeness of comradeship,” I think, is thephrase Mr. Strauss used.

Schroeder: Did he really say completeness of comradeship? That’s—[Resumes speaking German.]

Ich will mal die deutsch-französischen Sachen herauslassen. Ichdenke, über die französischen Möglichkeiten in dieser Sache, so realis-tisch, wie ich annehme daß Sie, Herr President, darüber denken.

Aber der andere Punkt ist wichtiger, denn [unclear] die Frage, wiestark ist das deutsche Engagement in dieser Sache. Und daran darf es über-haupt keiner Zweifel geben, das das deutsche Engagement in dieser Sachegenau so stark ist, wie das amerikanische, aus, in welchen Sachen, ausGefühlsgründen und aus patriotischen Gründen daraus, eher betonter alsdas amerikanische, es überhaupt sein kann. Das dürfte eigentlich zwischenuns keine Frage sein. Und das was ich—dieses Interview habe ich nurflüchtig gelesen, es ist mit der Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung gewesen—daswas dort drinnen gesagt ist, wenn man es objektiv ließt, ist genau derStand der Planung zwischen Live Oak und NATO. Es gibt hier eine LiveOak Planung, die dann übergeht in einer NATO Sache, und da unsereganzen Truppen der NATO unterstellt sind, gehören wir in dem NATO-Abschnitt dieser Sache. Das [unclear] die [unclear] auf dem Papier undnach der derzeitigen Planung. Aber ich habe überhaupt keinen Zweifeldaran, daß wenn es jetzt zur größeren militärischen Auseinandersetzungkommt, wir einfach deswegen von vornherein drinnen sind, weil wir haltvorne stehen. Das ist auch eine große Selbstverständlichkeit, in meinerMeinung.

Translator: I may leave perhaps the German-French thing aside—just one sentence on that. I have about as realistic a view of these thingsas you, I suppose, Mr. President.

But the second point, I think, is more important, and that is to whatdegree is Germany committed in this matter, and there can be no doubt

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962494

about the fact that our commitment is exactly the same as that of theUnited States, and perhaps even a little more so, out of feeling and out ofpatriotism, than it ever could be for the United States, so there shouldreally be no question whatsoever between us. Now I haven’t read thisinterview, which was given to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung by HerrStrauss. I haven’t read it in every detail; I just had a short look at it. Butwhen you look at what it says, really, it means that it is—it correspondsexactly to what the stage of planning is between Live Oak and theNATO planning.12 And as all our forces are assigned to NATO, we areautomatically a part of the NATO plan in that context. But that is, ofcourse, the situation on paper. I have no doubt that the real situation, ifthere were any major military confrontation or conflict, would be thatwe are in it right from the very first moment, simply because we areright up in front, so this is a matter of course.

President Kennedy: And the . . . this doesn’t really have so much todo with what we’re talking about, but the other day in talking to theFrench foreign minister about the disposition of French forces, of actu-ally France maintaining its forces in France rather than in easternWestern Germany and forward strategy, because this indicates a rathersharp division between us all on this question of exactly what our mili-tary strategy is, and where our forces ought to be, where the divisionbetween those forces and the use of nuclear weapons ought to be.13

These are matters which seem to be somewhat unresolved, and WestGermany has an important role to play in helping resolve them. We’vebeen unable to persuade the French to move [unclear] their forces intoWest Germany and up into the forward line. And if we don’t have theFrench forces up there then really, we’ve got inadequate forces.

Schroeder: Wir haben an sich vorgesehen—ich weiß nicht ob esschon geschehen ist—de Gaulle diesen Punkt noch mal sehr klar zumachen, daß wir das in der Zeit den Zustand als ganz unbefriedigendansehen. Wenn ich richtig unterrichtet bin, sozusagen von französischerSeite [unclear] sind, seien die Unterhaltungen, die sie damals gehabthaben, von der französischen Seite der Standpunkt entwickelt worden,ihre Schwierigkeiten legen im Augenblick darin, daß sie dabei sein, ihreTruppen von Algerien nach Frankreich zurückzunehmen und sie mehr

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 495

12. Live Oak was the planning group for NATO, created by General Lauris Norstad to dealwith military contingencies surrounding Berlin. Its headquarters were outside of Paris. It washeaded by a British general assisted by U.S. and French officers, and a German observer.13. The French foreign minister was Maurice Couve de Murville.

aus Gründen des Innerenaufbaus, und der Disziplin, und so weiter, lieberauf französischen Boden zu haben. Angeblich ist dieses Argumentvorgebracht worden. Ich halte das Argument nicht für so sehr überzeu-gend, denn die Franzosen würden, nach meiner Meinung, in der Lagesein, unter Umständen mit amerikanischer Unterstützung, so weit esnicht um die Ausstattung der Truppen und Divisionen handelt, dieseDivision weiter vorne zu postieren.

Ein Bißchen liegt, nach meiner Überzeugung, in der französischenStrategie, die Auffassung, das es eine Art von—daß es zwei Schlachtendaß es im Grunde zwei Schlachten gebe: eine Schlacht um Deutschland,die verloren wird, und eine Schlacht um Frankreich, die gewonnen wird.Die letzen französischen Manöver haben in der Tat einen Stand gehabt, indem—in der Zusammenfassung, am Schluß, oder in dem Ausgangslage,glaube ich sogar, [unclear] Franzosen ist gesagt würde, “Die Schlacht inDeutschland ist verloren gegangen, und nun stellt sich hier für uns diesoundso Situation.” Ich bin kein Stratege und kein Berufssoldat, aber ichfinde, daß diese Annahmen, die die Franzosen ihren Übung zugrundelegen, nicht ganz im unseren Jahrhundert gehören. Aber vielleicht täuscheich mich, und vielleicht sind die große militärischer Genies die Franzosen.Ich möchte darüber keine [unclear].

Translator: Now we have the intention—I don’t know if this hasalready been done—but we intend to make it very clear to de Gaulle thatwe feel that the present situation is very unsatisfactory. If I am wellinformed, in that discussion with you, you were referring to just now, theFrench have said that that sort of difficulty now about these Frenchforces was that they were moving them back from Algeria to France andfor reasons of discipline and morale and so on it was better to have themon French soil. Now, I don’t really think that this is an extremely con-vincing argument, because in my opinion the French would be quiteable, with some American aid, to equip their forces in such a way thatthey can be sent to the forward line.

In my conviction, the French strategy really is based on the ratherwell-known French opinion that there are actually [going to be] twobattles, one [a] battle of Germany, which will be lost, and one [a] battleof France, which will be won. In fact, the last French maneuvers had thatassumption—that the battle of Germany was lost—as their point ofdeparture, and from there they proceeded in their maneuvers. Now, I amnot a strategist nor a professional soldier, but I would think that theseassumptions, and working assumptions, do not fully belong to our cen-tury [laughter]. I may be wrong; the French may be more ingenious in

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962496

Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 497

the field of military strategy. I don’t want to voice any, or to attributeany value to these things. I’m just voicing my opinion.

President Kennedy: I would think that when Mr. [French defenseminister Pierre] Messmer and Mr. Strauss are together that this wouldbe a matter in which, their accord being complete, that they would beable to settle. [More laughter.]

Schroeder: Wenn ich dazu eine Meinung aüßeren darf, würde ichglauben, daß es dann besser sei, sich nicht mit Monsieur Messmer zuverständigen, sondern mit General de Gaulle zu verständigen [unclear].[Laughter.]

Translator: If I may just voice an opinion on that, I think that in thatcase it would be better to come to an accord not with Messmer but withGeneral de Gaulle.

President Kennedy: Well, the Chancellor [Adenauer] may be, andGeneral de Gaulle . . . [unclear] but we haven’t been able to convince him.

Let me say that I have to go, unfortunately, up to Connecticut but I’mglad to get a chance to talk to you, Mr. Minister. We’ve been very appre-ciative of your efforts to maintain and coordinate our joint policy in thelast months. I’m sure that you and Mr. Rusk can come to a host of under-standings while you’re here.

I’ll certainly consider very carefully what you said about the matterof the visas. I think we ought to reach a conclusion on the issue that wetalked about. If we decide to take the line that you suggested, that’s onething. If we decide together that we ought to go the other way, then weought to prepare for that. I think this is really a symbolic concession,because I think if we increase our ground forces, and this is either/or, wecome to the conclusion that here is where we stand. Or, if we don’t, weought to prepare the way for making it unimportant.

After we see Mr. Gromyko, we may have a somewhat clearer ideaabout Mr. Khrushchev’s visit. I don’t think this is very important. I don’tthink it’s very desirable. Do you see any evidence out of it, that it wouldbe useful if the Soviet position was to change substantially over Berlin?Is there some evidence of that? If we were going to be able to reach anaccord on nuclear matters, [but] it [the test ban agreement] seems tobe quite far away. So I don’t think the visit’s going to be useful. I have asense it might actually make it rather dangerous, and as far as I’m con-cerned, I’m not going to encourage it. Mr. Khrushchev asked [unclear]we could talk about that at this time. If he still wants to come, then ofcourse we could see him.

But I think we ought to try to improve the [Berlin] planning. I think

the Ambassadorial Group is going to be the repository of our hopes, andtheir planning should be more realistic.

In addition, I think governments ought to commit themselves some-what more to their plans. Don’t you think? I hadn’t realized until just theother day that it would take almost three days to mobilize this force for theinitial probe, by the time you get it on the autobahn. Well, in three days, toput a company of engineers on the autobahn is much too long a time. Youought to have that stationed right next to the autobahn. You need to do itin two to three hours, because time is so vital in this matter. So that I dothink that the planning . . . Couve de Murville didn’t realize this, SecretaryRusk didn’t realize it, and I didn’t realize it until I just happened to asktwo weeks ago, because we had had similar experience a year or so agowhen we put that battalion up the autobahn and it took 48 hours to reachthe autobahn, which I hadn’t been aware of. So that I think that we’re . . .

I don’t think our planning is as good as it ought to be, and I don’tthink the governments involved—the German, the French, the Britishand the American—all of us have given as many commitments as I thinkwe ought to give. We don’t really know what the British are ready to do,and the French are ready to do. They may say they don’t know whatwe’re ready to do, but we’re ready to say what we would do under thesevarious contingencies in some detail. So I think that your visit is veryuseful, and I hope before the end of the month we can get a greaterdegree of finality in understanding, as I say, between the British and theFrench and ourselves and you.

Schroeder: Zunächst möchte ich noch mal herzlich danken für dieseUnterhaltung und für das, was Sie gerade zuletzt [unclear] gesagthaben, und ich hoffe, daß wenn wir das nächste Mal, bei Gesundheit, unswieder sehen, ich denke am 7. November, daß wir dann schon ein gutesStück weiter sind in der Überholung der Pläne, und daß wir dann dieUnterhaltung fortsetzten können.

Translator: Mr. President, let me just thank you very much indeedfor this conversation, this opportunity which you’ve offered me. And I dohope that by the next time we meet, which will be, if everything goeswell [for Chancellor Adenauer’s visit], by the 7th of November, we willalready have achieved much progress in the planning, and we will thenbe able to continue to talk about it.

The meeting then concluded. President Kennedy returned to his sched-ule, attending the National Day of Prayer at St. Matthew’s Cathedral andthen going to a lunch at the Libyan embassy for the visiting Crown

W E D N E S DAY, O C TO B E R 17, 1962498

Prince. He was back at the White House for only about 20 minutes beforetaking off for his previously scheduled political trip to Connecticut. Hewould return to Washington that night.

Thursday, October 18, 1962

President Kennedy had spent most of the previous day on a scheduledcampaign trip to Connecticut. After his return the previous evening, hewas still concealing the crisis from the press and public by keeping to hisregular schedule as much as he could. That schedule began on October18 at 9:30 A.M. with an awards ceremony, followed by a Cabinet meetingto discuss the budget, a meeting Kennedy chose to record.

10:00 –10:38 A.M.

We are, therefore, going to have to review . . . what is in theadministration’s program. . . . And we may very well end upby cutting back on some of the things that the administrationhas stood for. . . . [E]ven when we have done this . . . [t]heproblem that the President spoke of, in presenting an expendi-ture increase, and a deficit, and a tax reduction proposal—allat once—will remain.

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 19641

Compared to the unfolding missile crisis, the Cabinet meeting may seemmundane. Kennedy is planning a tax cut to stimulate the economy. Heexpects opposition from conservative committee chairmen in Congress.So in this meeting he focuses on both current spending levels and trendsand on his budget planning for fiscal year 1964. Anxious to propose new

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 499

1. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, Anthony Celebrezze, J. Edward Day, C. DouglasDillon, Najeeb Halaby, Walter Heller, Luther Hodges, Theodore Sorensen, Aubrey Wagner,James Webb, and Jerome Wiesner. Tape 30, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,Presidential Recordings Collection.

programs and stimulate the economy with greater federal spending, thePresident nonetheless wants to present budgets that run only modestdeficits and appear to be tightly managed products of surpassing frugal-ity, budgets that can favorably be compared to those produced by hisRepublican predecessor.

This meeting offers a brief and unvarnished portrait of the budgetarypolitics that would come to dominate the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-trations. Embracing a “New Economics” that sought to boost the econ-omy with some deficit spending and employ more presidential activism,President Kennedy at the same time feels drawn toward the older veritiesof political economy. Budgets and economic policies characterized by lais-sez-faire, fiscal austerity, and the smallest possible federal workforceremained popular with the public and the U.S. Congress alike. PresidentKennedy seems to know this, and perhaps even shares the sentiment.

David Bell: When you consider the portions of the budget that areessentially unmalleable . . . interest on the debt, payments to veteransunder the compensation laws [and] other unchangeable commitments,then you will see that we have some substantial review work to do dur-ing this fall budget season.

You want me to continue, sir, while the photographers are here?2

President Kennedy: Yeah, sure . . . yeah, you can go ahead. [Unclear.]Bell: Now there are two principal points to bear in mind. First of all,

the President recognizes that the planning figures that we all reachedlast summer represent a sensible program for carrying forward the com-mitments the administration has made—

President Kennedy: You might as well wait, Dave.There is some mostly inaudible, quiet conversation, as some machinenoise disturbs the discussion. To the listener it sounds like a workman’sdrill is being used on some construction in the West Wing of the WhiteHouse. The following exchange can be heard.President Kennedy: This [unclear], I have learned, was designed by

Mr. Jones for the . . . possibly the death of [unclear].Unidentified: I thought the Vice President might want to give you

this but since he’s not here, here is the Sam Rayburn stamp.3

[Unclear exchange.]

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962500

2. Photographers are taking pictures at the beginning of the meeting; they leave as it begins.3. Sam Rayburn of Texas, then the Speaker of the House, died of cancer in November 1961.

Unidentified: On the stamp?President Kennedy: Yeah.Unidentified: [Unclear, but clearly a good punch line, followed by loud

laughter.]Unidentified: All of this was done by the Bureau of Engraving and

Printing, right here.Mixed voices. An unclear exchange, perhaps about a donation or appro-priation to a college, can be made out.Unidentified: It seems to me [unclear] make the request. I think we

might [unclear]. Jim Farley talked to with me about it, [unclear].4 Yousee he has [unclear].

Oh all kinds. You see, it’s one of the world’s great intellectuals. . . . Ithought, then, maybe the college up there [unclear]. They’re all quali-fied [unclear] come down here or something. He has it up there as akind of a foundation and he has a full-time staff of people to take care ofthat sort of thing. [Unclear exchange.] [Unclear] ease into giving himsome pictures [unclear].

Unidentified: [Unclear] talk to the college about it.[Unclear exchange.]Unidentified: Well, I believe it’s already turned over to this collection

of [unclear] women’s Catholic college, and [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]Unidentified: [Unclear] discussion of numbers.Unidentified: Yeah, that’s all they get.Unidentified: Well I intend to pay for it out of my own pocket and

get rid of any questions.President Kennedy: Why don’t you let me know how much it costs?Unidentified: All right.The group settles down as David Bell restarts the meeting.Bell: Mr. President, I would mention the point that the President

recognizes that to reduce the expenditure total, as he has asked us all todo, will necessarily require some cutbacks in program commitments thathave been made, or that have been stood for by this administration, interms of legislation that has been sent on to Congress or plans that weall have had in mind with his approval. We are, therefore, going to haveto review, during the fall, not with the idea of limiting what we add tothe administration’s program, but reconsidering what is in the adminis-tration’s program, and to some extent . . . And bringing to the President

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 501

4. Jim Farley was Franklin Roosevelt’s postmaster general from 1933 to 1940 and chairman ofthe Democratic National Committee from 1932 to 1940.

a series of issues. And we may very well end up by cutting back on someof the things that the administration has stood for.

Secondly, even when we have done this there will still be a substan-tial increase, necessarily, in the ’64 budget on the expenditure side. Theproblem that the President spoke of, in presenting an expenditureincrease, and a deficit, and a tax reduction proposal—all at once—willremain. And we’re not going to be able to get him off that hook. But,obviously, under those circumstances, the budget should be rock solid.

I have a suggestion about procedure. It seems to me it would be unwise,at this point, to stop and ask all of you to reconsider the budgets you aresubmitting. Many of the budgets have already reached the bureau. Othersare in the final stages. I suggest they come right on in. We will considerthem and will be suggesting areas for considering possible reductions. AndI suggest that you all—from this meeting on—direct your staffs to do thesame thing. And we will then be, simultaneously the bureau and your ownorganizations—working on the question of what reductions can be madebelow the final figures we had previously agreed on.

With respect to policy, we have a few suggestions. It is clear that innearly . . . well, I should probably say in every agency, it will be neces-sary to go below the planning figures. This is going to mean differentthings in different agencies. I suspect that, on the civilian side, the twoagencies where we are going to have the most difficulty is Agricultureand Health, Education and Welfare. Those are the largest civilian budg-ets. They both have very volatile elements within them. They both havelarge legislative programs, to this point. Therefore, we will need to bespending a good deal of time.

And for the benefit of those two secretaries, may I illustrate the prob-lem by saying, in preparing the planning figures, we had already agreedthat the difference in view between us and the departments—in the case ofAgriculture, of some 400 million dollars; in the case of HEW of some 200million dollars. It now appears to me, that to meet the President’s target itis likely to be necessary to cut below our figures, in the case of Agricultureby another 1[00] or 200 million dollars, and in the case of Health,Education and Welfare by as much as 2[00] to 400 million dollars.

Anthony Celebrezze: More?Bell: Yes, sir.Celebrezze: You mean 600 million all together?Bell: Yes, sir. This simply illustrates the extent of the range of dis-

cussion that we’re going to be engaged in during this next few weeks.We do not think that it would be wise or appropriate to set arbitrary

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962502

figures or arbitrary rules. We do not, for example, want to propose a “nonew starts” policy.5 We think that some new starts are as urgent as any-thing that will be in the budget. Clearly, we will be proposing fewer newstarts than we had in mind last summer. But we don’t think a flat, arbi-trary rule of no new starts would be a wise thing to do.

Instead we want to apply—and you to apply—a priority sense acrossthe whole range of what is now being done and what is proposed to beadded. We will ask you to consider what is going to be done in 1963 thatmay have effect on ’64. For illustration, the Food Stamp Program is onewhich is expanding during this year.6 The rate of expansion during thisyear will clearly have a significant impact on what is going to be thebudget situation for next year. Therefore, in a case like that, we will beasking you to consider ’63 plans as well as ’64 plans.

We would ask you to be careful, especially during these next fewcampaign weeks, on specific commitments to figures or to projects or toprograms. The glowing words should be used without figures attached,insofar as possible. We’ll have to ask that legislative proposals bereviewed. For illustration, the education proposals will obviously have tobe reviewed. The urban mass transit proposal will have to be reviewed.The recreational land purchase program will have to be reviewed.

Finally, we would suggest that we all try to hit especially hard atincreases in the number of employees. The State Department was, Ithink, the main agency which in the 1963 budget did not ask forincreased employees. Now this made a very favorable impression onCapitol Hill and in the country at large and I think that the impression,the image, the public understanding of what this next budget will . . .represents will be substantially influenced by the degree to which it canbe clearly, on its face, an extremely tight and restricted budget in so faras personnel increases are concerned. They may not involve, really, verymuch money, but the numbers of persons by themselves, the numbers ofemployees, are looked at, will be looked at. And in consequence, I think,they are worth very special attention.

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 503

5. This refers to a hypothetical policy under which no new initiatives or programs would beentertained in planning the following year’s budget.6. Adopted in 1939 and discontinued in 1943, the federal Food Stamp Program was adoptedanew in 1961 as a pilot program in selected counties and municipalities. Changed fundamen-tally at this point from a program designed to distribute farm surpluses to one that focusedmore on improved nutrition, it grew markedly as it expanded to cover more people and agreater variety of foodstuffs.

President Kennedy: What has our personnel gone up since January’61, Dave? Do you know?

Bell: Yes, about—Luther Hodges: 160,000, but—7

President Kennedy: How much?Hodges: 160,000, but only 117,000 of that, Mr. President, could be

called regular employment. The rest of them are seasonal. But, [at] thelatest date 160,000 since January 31.

President Kennedy: Well, now how does that compare to the periodof President Eisenhower’s?

Bell: His first 18 months? I don’t know.President Kennedy: We don’t know even his first 18 months? I heard

that was quite a substantial increase.Bell: Yes, sir, but during the first year or so of President Eisenhower’s

term, the employment in the Executive Branch was declining because ofthe closing out of the Korean War, and the—

President Kennedy: Well, let’s just take the last two or three years.What was the ratio of his increases compared to the—

Bell: This would be substantially larger than what was happening inthe closing years of the Eisenhower administration.

President Kennedy: It seems to me—Theodore Sorensen: It’s a lot more stable at that point, Mr. President,

the last two years [of the Eisenhower administration].President Kennedy: I think 160’s quite a lot, even if you adjusted, say

for—Bell: Even take out the 70,000 that’s seasonal, it is a lot, that’s right.President Kennedy: I think we ought to . . . I don’t see, really, that we

ought to approve every one of these from now on. Because I think that’sthe . . . one of the most obvious evidences of things not being completelyin control.

Unidentified: It’s fewer in total than it was ten years ago, though.President Kennedy: The total of the whole federal government?Unidentified: Yes.Bell: The total, yes, that’s correct. The total civilian employment is

below what it was ten years ago . . . that was the time of the Korean Warbulge, and there were a lot of—

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962504

7. The total number of federal employees in 1962, including postal workers, was approxi-mately 1.6 million.

President Kennedy: How much is the Post Office?J. Edward Day: That’s 584,000.President Kennedy: What was that? How much of an increase have

we had?Day: It goes up about 15,000 a year.Hodges: It’s 28,000 over January ’61.Bell: That increase, Mr. President, the increase in Post Office is

roughly comparable to the increases in the preceding years. The bigjumps we’ve had have been in Defense, in Space, in Agriculture, andInterior, and scattered also to some extent in HEW reflecting the OldAge Survivors Insurance expansion.

Unidentified: I think the figure we ought to emphasize is the relationto population, of 19 out of 1,000 in ’45. Now it’s 13 out of 1,000 new fed-eral employees.

Bell: Now these are points of defense, and they are good ones.Nevertheless, I think the President is correct. The impression in Congressand in the country, is that these are large increases in personnel. No mat-ter how solidly they are justified, they look big. It would be hard to goalong with that kind of increase and a budget presentation such as is nec-essary to be made.

Sorensen: On the other hand, you can show a great savings in person-nel and not a savings in money by contracting out to a lot of workers.

Unidentified: That’s right.Jerome Wiesner: This is particularly true of space where we were

likely to do a great deal in-house that we might have contracted out.Now that we’ve started on that course we can’t really change it.

Bell: Especially since it is the preferable course.Wiesner: Yeah.Bell: That’s all I had, Mr. President, but there may be some questions.President Kennedy: Well, what’s the next subject on the agenda?Sorensen: Let’s just say a word about welfare programs.Bell: Excuse me, Ted, before you do that . . . Are there any questions?James Webb: I’d just like to make one point, though, so that we don’t

leave the wrong impression. We spend 92 cents out of every dollarappropriated to us now, outside government. And have only enough in-house capability to manage this large enterprise. And our in-house per-sonnel, Jerry, is not going up by anything like the magnitude of theoutside. I just want to be sure that you know that we have elected to doin-house certain things that are quite important to us as a means of con-trolling the whole program, we still have got this 90:10 ratio.

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 505

Unidentified:8 Well, we have determined that [unclear] basis for Indianprojects. For example, there’s a program with the objective of [unclear]that number. There aren’t very many, but that’s a policy decision.

Douglas Dillon: I would think one thing that might be of interest toall of you is . . . just happened. Just pure coincidence to come out at thesame time—the U.S. News and World Report, in their current issue, datedOctober 22nd, has the lead article right across here on the front page:“Can the U.S. Support a Tax Cut in ’63?”9 And it’s really a type of politi-cal problem that’s illustrated here that the President and his director ofthe budget were referring to. We don’t guarantee that previous goal, butthis is the general problem we’re up against. And I thought you might beinterested in reading that.

Day: I need to be sure everybody knows about another aspect. ThePay Bill that has passed also provides that there might well be anotherpay increase next spring that would be indicated at least by—BLS[Bureau of Labor Statistics] statistics aside—from the two steps thatare spelled out in the law.10

Bell: That’s right.Day: I think that’s another thing a lot of people are going to wake up

to, sort of at the last minute, and raise their hands in horror, once theyfind that out.

Bell: The postmaster general’s referring to the fact that the new PayBill, which requires the President to submit annually recommendations forchanges that would be necessary to keep federal pay levels comparable tothose in private industry. There’s an annual survey conducted by the BLSas to what the levels are in private industry. And the President then, each

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962506

8. The presidential daily diary lists both Stewart Udall, secretary of the interior, and John A.Carver, Jr., assistant secretary of the interior, as being in attendance at this meeting. It is likelythat one or the other is making this statement.9. See “People of the Week: Byrd vs. Dillon, Differing Views on a Tax Cut,” U.S. News andWorld Report, 22 October 1962, p. 21. The opening line of this brief article reads, “Should theU.S. Government cut taxes without a cut in federal spending?” Harry F. Byrd, Sr., chairman ofthe Senate Finance Committee, answered by saying that to do so would be evidence of “unmit-igated fiscal irresponsibility.” Dillon argued instead that the nation’s growing infrastructure,training, and research requirements made the tax cut, without offsetting spending cuts, anabsolute necessity.10. Day was referring to H.R. 7927, signed by President Kennedy on 11 October 1962. Thislegislation mandated salary increases (of approximately 11 percent) for approximately 590,000postal employees and (of approximately 10 percent) for approximately 1 million nonpostal fed-eral employees. It also provided for a 5 percent increase in retirement benefits for all federalemployees and included a postal rate increase, increasing first class postage from 4 cents to 5cents. Its estimated costs were $504 million in FY 1963 and $1.049 billion in FY 1964.

spring, will be submitting to the Congress recommendations to keep fed-eral pay levels in line with comparable levels of work in private activity.

At the same time that the President signed this bill, as you all know,he sent each of you a memorandum on manpower control and utilization.Our basic notion is that we should be able to offset, to a very largeextent, the annual increases in pay levels by annual increases in produc-tivity. As you know, as we, starting this fall, as we review the budget, weare going to try to be finding . . . trying to focus on the question ofwhether we cannot plan into each agency’s program increases in produc-tivity, so that we can program fewer employees where workloads staylevel. And where workloads rise, the rise in employees would be lessthan the rise in workload. There’s a long way to go before we can do thisefficiently in each agency, but this is the effort on which we are nowembarked, and we’ll be discussing this with each of you during the fall.

Najeeb Halaby: Dave, does this effect in any way the acceleration ofthe public works impact programs that we’ve all been busily working onfor immediate implementation?

Bell: Well, you’ll recall, Najeeb, that the only public works, the onlything that is being accelerated, are those public works which are in the’63 budget—

Halaby: Yeah.Bell: —and are supported by appropriations that the Congress has

made. If there are any of those which seem to you to have substantial1964 effects—and to be of relatively low priority—yes, indeed, theyshould be reexamined. If they are simply part of the ’63 program, thatshould go ahead in any event, then the instruction stands from thePresident to get it done as quickly in the year as is possible then in orderto assist the general economic situation.

Aubrey Wagner: If we have a choice, throwing an expenditure to fis-cal ’63 or fiscal ’64, which way should we throw it, speaking generally?

Bell: To ’63. [Short pause.]Sorensen: I simply wanted to say that at the same time that we’re

preparing next year’s budget, we must prepare next year’s legislative pro-gram. For a variety of reasons, we will not make any decisions in that pro-gram until after the election, but some of them will be . . . aren’t going tobe able to be fully developed in that short period of time between the elec-tion and the first of the year when the President begins to present his mes-sage to the Congress. So, I would hope that if all of you already have beenofficially and formally contacted by the Budget Bureau as to whether youhave any new legislative proposals, if you have any new proposals, if youwould make sure that they are being staffed out in your department, that

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 507

they are being sent over to the Budget Bureau or to my office so that wewill have them in plenty of time to think them through and to considerthem for inclusion in the President’s program.

Secondly, there is a great deal of the President’s program which wentto the 87th Congress which they simply didn’t have time to consider.There are a few which they had time to consider, and which they didn’tpass. I think that you ought to examine each of those proposals to seewhether you want to make some change in the President resubmittingthem next year, or whether they should be resubmitted at all. In anycase, if the Congress altered them in committee or sent them for testi-mony or further experience, some change would be required. [Dillonwhispering in background.] I hope you’ll be making those changes and beready to discuss them with my office and the Budget Bureau. I justwanted to make sure everyone was on notice that they would be havingthat work completed in a month or so.

President Kennedy: Anybody got anything else? Otherwise, Ted doyou—

Unidentified: The Secretary of State will not be here, so there won’tbe—

President Kennedy: Right. I think we probably all got hung up in the . . .I think it’s tough on this budget. But I will say, just before we leave,

that Ambassador Galbraith says that we’ll never get a tax cut throughanyway, and what the economy needs is expenditures.11 And that, there-fore, you shouldn’t cut your programs, because that’s the only way you’reever going to get the kind of spending which this economy needs tomaintain a reasonable rate of growth.

But I figured you’d be doing that anyway. [Boisterous laughter.]Webb: Mr. President, it looks like we’re going to get the range of

orbit 12–37.12 If we can, it’ll—Unidentified: I think we [unclear]. Good job.At this point the formal meeting comes to a close as some participants

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962508

11. John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard professor of economics, had been appointed ambassadorto India by President Kennedy in 1961. Though he understood the primary political virtues ofthe tax cut proposal—the speed with which it could be implemented and its potential toattract support from the business community and from conservative politicians—Galbraithconsistently pressed for increased public expenditures as a more appropriate alternative.12. With Wally Schirra’s recent Mercury orbit (3 October 1962), and two “secret” satellitelaunchings from Vandenberg Air Force Base also taking place in the month of October 1962 (9October and 26 October), “range of orbit” speculations were, perhaps, a frequent part of KennedyWhite House conversation, and in this case, it appears, an integral part of an inside joke.

begin filing out of the room. Some remain and engage in less formalconversation for about another 20 minutes. With the exception of thefollowing excerpts, most of these conversations are not distinct and are,therefore, difficult to comprehend. Douglas Dillon, Dave Bell, andchairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter Heller, whoapparently came in late, are among the last to leave and can be heardmore clearly over the last few minutes of the recording. Few of the frag-ments are meaningful until the following exchange.Walter Heller: I take it your fellows are getting together something

on the growth side for next Monday, because that meeting a week fromThursday, the 26th . . .

Dillon: I’ve got that trip to Mexico [for an Inter-American Confer-ence] and everything else, the EPC meeting. [Unclear.]

Another unclear set of exchanges in overlapping conversations. Thereare several audible fragments, clearly referring to estimates of economicgrowth.Heller: Well, you know, what strikes me that we need to do, really . . .

We’re trying to get the administration to put out a statement on growth,and you know, in that statement, it could say that [unclear]. [Backgroundconversation ensues.]

Unidentified: [Unclear] could be growth in your office.Unidentified: No, no . . . I’m not talking about my personal office.Heller: [continuing] Now then, if there is some easing, maybe the first

step in growth policy should be to maintain the expansion, to sharpenexpansion, to keep up, to try to get to the limits of potential. Somethinglike that might be, you know, if we could get that in there, clearly, in thepolicy section, we have the statement you want.

[aside, to Dave Bell] Dave, before you get away, I wonder . . . we’regoing to have a problem in connection with the midyear review, aren’twe, of how clean we come? Well, there are two problems.

Bell: Yes, we sure are.Heller: There are two problems. One is: What are our internal fig-

ures going to be for GNP and so forth? And the second is: What is ourstance? Last year, after all, we came awfully damn clean and said whatour . . . I think we went on and said what our GNP estimates were forthe first and second quarters of the ensuing year, because, in connectionwith the I & P. 13

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 509

13. Reference to income and product accounts and related National Income and ProductAccounts budget. The latter refers to the method of budgetary accounting (unlike the standard

Bell: Well, all we’ve said so far is that there will be a release on thisafter the election. Now, your question is what’s going to be in that release?

Heller: Yeah. That’s right.Bell: And—Unidentified: We have [unclear] every day that we would need to put

out the projections of GNP.Dillon: If you want to put any out, the most I’d go is a projection—Heller: For the fourth quarter for the year.Bell: Well, presumably . . . we could presumably say our revenue esti-

mates for the year will be such and such. How much you break down therevenue estimates remains a detail to be discussed—the extent to whichyou back it up with a GNP estimate. I had assumed we would have to putout the equivalent of a GNP estimate for calendar year ’62.

Dillon: That’s right.Heller: Now, however, last year we, after all, went more heavily on to

the I & P Accounts budget. That implied an estimate. . . . I don’t knowwhether we . . . I think we specified . . . I may be wrong. Either in yourpress conference on it—

Bell: Yeah . . . now, remember, we’re not going to publish a pamphletthis year. We’re not going to do the whole thing in a press release.

Dillon: This could be a very brief [statement].Bell: We’ll get together as much—Heller: At the midyear there’s going to be no [unclear] budget review

at all?Bell: Nevertheless, I had assumed we would have some reference to

the income and product figures.Heller: Yes. Well, now, if you do—Bell: Without going into any detail.Heller: All right. But suppose they say, “Well now, your income and

product figures for the year are so and so.”Bell: Yeah.Heller: “Clearly, Mr. Bell, you must have some GNP figures underly-

ing that for the first and second quarters of next year.” What? You’vegot to be prepared for that.

Bell: Yeah.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962510

federal procedure known as the administrative budget) which includes trust fund receipts andexpenditures (Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, and so on),omits government transactions in financial assets (federal loans, for example), and records lia-bilities when they are incurred (accrual basis) and not only when cash changes hands.

Heller: And . . . but that’s the externals. And internally, we have a bigunresolved difference for the first and second quarters of next year.

Bell: Well, internally, [unclear].Dillon: Our basic thing on that was—Heller: We’ll have to resolve it towards the high side in order to

make this [deficit?] thing seem—Dillon: [apparently in a separate conversation] Also, our basic thing on

that was that we wouldn’t have said what the balance is if we didn’t wantto face this now. We could face it a lot better when we have to which isearly December.

Bell: Early November, this is after the election.Dillon: No, no . . . I mean for the next year . . . January 1st.Bell: Oh yes, but the next . . . we will need some choice of figures.Heller: Yes.Dillon: Oh yes, [unclear] choice of figures for this thing. But the pub-

lic, the basic thing, will feel much “solider” about it. And I don’t think inour next choice of figures we necessarily have to resolve our thing aboutthe first . . .

Unidentified: Well what have we got to do?Bell: We’ll have to . . . I don’t know that we need to resolve the pres-

ent figures, but we have to come down—Unidentified: A single revenue figure.Dillon: That can be just by ad hoc sort of thing. [A few people

chuckle.]Bell: Yeah, that’s right. We don’t need to resolve the substantive

issue—Dillon: Yeah.Unidentified: The first and second quarter issue, well sure we’ll get

some tough questions. Well then we’ll just have to, just have to . . .Bell: Dance.Unidentified: Well, I think this could be [unclear]. I’d rather do the

dance than get my [unclear, laughs].Unidentified: Oh, there, sure, sure.At this point, voices begin to fade as the remaining meeting participantsleave the room. Minutes later, Evelyn Lincoln speaks to an unidentifiedmale just before recorder is turned off.Lincoln: Are we coming here? Is the eleven [o’clock] meeting . . . is

it in here?Unidentified: Oh yes it is. I think it’s a fine time to go back and . . .

Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 511

11:10 A.M.–1:15 P.M.

Somehow we’ve got to take some action. . . . Now, the questionreally is to what action we take which lessens the chances of anuclear exchange, which obviously is the final failure.

Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis14

Sometime during the previous day, possibly before he left the WhiteHouse for his scheduled political trip to Connecticut, Kennedy received amemo from Adlai Stevenson urging that Kennedy send personal emis-saries to Khrushchev and Castro instead of taking any military action.Stevenson warned that any U.S. military action could lead to reprisals inTurkey or Berlin and could then escalate. “To start or risk starting anuclear war is bound to be divisive at best,” he wrote, “and the judgmentsof history seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment.” While hesaid that he understood Kennedy’s dilemma, he wrote with underscoring:“the means adopted have such incalculable consequences that I feel youshould have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases any-where is negotiable before we start anything.”15 Stevenson then returnedto his duties at the United Nations in New York.

That same morning of October 17 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconvenedto plan just the military action that Stevenson so abhorred. The Joint Staffhad worked through the night to come up with plans for air strikes againstfive different sets of targets. Identified by Roman numerals I to V, thesealternative plans were frequently discussed in the following days. They aregiven here, with associated numbers of sorties; the estimated sortie num-bers continued to climb as planning continued.16 The initial numbers were:

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962512

14. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, RoswellGilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, Edwin Martin, John McCone,Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, Maxwell Taylor, and LlewellynThompson. Tapes 30 and 30A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, PresidentialRecordings Collection.15. Stevenson letter to President Kennedy, 17 October 1962; reprinted in The Cuban MissileCrisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, eds. Laurence Chang and PeterKornbluh (New York: New Press, 1992), pp. 119–20.16. The sortie numbers were derived by examining a target and determining how many indi-vidual aim points should be hit in order to destroy it. Then planners used training experi-ence to judge how many bombs would need to be dropped on an aim point to be fairly surethat one would hit it. From that, after incorporating attrition from enemy action or mechani-

I. Missile and nuclear storage sites only 52II. Same as above plus IL-28s, MiG-21s 104

III. Same as above plus other aircraft, SAMs, cruise msls, and msl boats 194

IV. All military targets but tanks 474V. All military targets; prelude to invasion 2,002

The Chiefs still opposed any strike limited only to the missile sites.They continued also to view any blockade as merely a complement to,not an alternative for, an air strike. They assumed, in addition, that ablockade would require a formal declaration of war.

About 15 senior officials had met again for several hours the after-noon of October 17.17 Almost all leaned toward taking some politicalaction before launching an air strike. They reviewed a large number of pos-sible courses of action and speculated about imaginable Soviet responses.McNamara and Taylor worried that any diplomatic efforts would alertthe Soviets and thwart an effective strike. McNamara and Gilpatric belit-tled the significance of the Soviet MRBM deployments for the overallstrategic balance. McCone and Taylor argued that the MRBMs did,indeed, change the balance. But this difference of opinion did not preventgeneral agreement that the United States could not allow the Sovietdeployment to stand.

It was in this context that Kennedy’s advisers, for the first time, dis-cussed in detail the pros and cons of a blockade. Bohlen and Thompsoncontinued to insist that Khrushchev’s aim was to achieve something withregard to Berlin and that the U.S. government ought not to be divertedfrom that by concentrating its attention exclusively on Cuba.

Kennedy had invited former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to joinhis circle of advisers. Formidably self-assured and gifted not only withcutting wit as well as great ability in advocacy, Acheson participated in

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 513

cal problems, planners could come up with sortie numbers. These numbers first grewbecause new targets were identified. They later grew because the staff began incorporatingadditional requirements for escort, air defense suppression, and poststrike reconnaissance. Afew days later, exasperated by the latest revision, Taylor exclaimed to his JCS colleagues:“What! These figures were reported to the White House. You are defeating yourselves withyour own cleverness, gentlemen.” Notes taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the JointChiefs of Staff, p. 6.17. These meetings were attended (though not everyone was there all of the time) by RobertKennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, McCone, Ball, Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson, CharlesBohlen, Thompson, Theodore Sorensen, Martin, possibly Paul Nitze, and (late in the day for ashorter time) Dean Acheson.

these Wednesday meetings, calling for a prompt air strike with noattempt at prior negotiation. Before adjourning for dinner, the confereeshad also reviewed the possibility of a blockade coupled with a declarationof war against Cuba.

During the dinner break Robert Kennedy and Sorensen drove to theairport to meet the President, returning from Connecticut. Sorensengave him a written summary of the day’s discussions, emphasizing howfluid matters remained. (It included a list of around twenty questions asyet unresolved.) President Kennedy decided to stay out of the discus-sions until the next day. Robert Kennedy and Sorensen then returned tothe State Department. The meeting resumed at 10:00 P.M. and went untilnearly midnight.

During this late-hour meeting, Rusk had endorsed and elaborated onthe alternative of a strike against the missile sites with no prior negotia-tion. Taylor and McCone supported him, with McCone’s mentioningEisenhower’s views. Bohlen still urged that an ultimatum be given beforean attack. Thompson, Martin, and Gilpatric preferred a complete block-ade with the declaration of war.

At the end of this meeting, Robert Kennedy summarized the majoroptions that had been aired. They apparently were:

An ultimatum to Khrushchev followed by a strikeA limited strike without prior warning or negotiation, but with

notifying key alliesA political warning followed by a naval blockade and readiness

for other actionsA large-scale strike after some political preparationProceeding directly to an invasion.

Sorensen’s earlier note for Kennedy had a similar list. Various formsof political action and messages to Khrushchev were considered, as wellas various kinds of strikes. Many questions were identified for furtheranalysis, especially about likely Soviet responses.

During the night of October 17–18, a few officials wrote brief papersfor the President summarizing their personal beliefs. Douglas Dillonsubmitted a memo stating opposition to negotiations of any kind withKhrushchev. He recommended a blockade coupled with intensive surveil-lance of Cuba and a demand that Cuba begin removal of the weaponsforthwith. If the Cubans refused or the military pronounced the blockadeinfeasible, Dillon favored an immediate air strike. He said that the SovietUnion had “initiated a test of our intentions that can determine the

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962514

future course of world events for many years to come.” He continued, “I. . . believe that the survival of our nation demands the prompt elimina-tion of the offensive weapons now in Cuba.”18

George Ball wrote a passionate memo arguing that the MRBMsmade little strategic difference. Noting that “we tried Japanese as warcriminals because of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor,” Ball argued thata surprise strike, “far from establishing our moral strength . . . would, infact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a mannerwholly contrary to our traditions, by pursuing a course of action thatwould cut directly athwart everything we have stood for during ournational history, and condemn us as hypocrites in the opinion of theworld.” Ball recommended a blockade that might ultimately cripple andbring down the Castro government.19

Bohlen, preparing to depart for Paris, also wrote a memo for Rusk,concisely explaining his preference for giving the Soviets an ultimatumbefore launching a strike. Though he had taken a different view, Ruskwas impressed and apparently persuaded by Bohlen’s memo and decidedto share it with his colleagues and President Kennedy when they nextgathered at the White House.20

On the morning of October 18, Sorensen noted for Kennedy that “twobig questions must be answered, and in conjunction with each other.” Onewas which kind of military action to choose, and the other was whetherpolitical action, such as a letter to Khrushchev, should precede any mili-tary move. The Rusk approach, he said, was for a strike without warning.The Bohlen approach was to approach Khrushchev first.21

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 515

18. C. Douglas Dillon, “Memorandum for the President,” 17 October 1962; reprinted in TheCuban Missile Crisis, 1962, Chang and Kornbluh, pp. 116–18.19. “Position of George W. Ball,” 17 October 1962, ibid., pp. 121–22.20. In their conversation at dinner on Tuesday night, October 16, Kennedy had asked Bohlento postpone his highly publicized departure for Paris and help with the crisis. Bohlen worriedabout the notice his change of plans would cause but said he would try to come up with acover story. The next day Bohlen discussed the matter with Rusk, who thought that Bohlenshould proceed with his plans and that Thompson could provide the needed advice on theSoviet Union. Rusk called President Kennedy, and Kennedy called Bohlen and told him to goahead with his departure.

On the morning of 18 October, Kennedy changed his mind, possibly after reading Sorensen’snote highlighting Bohlen’s advocacy. Just before the 11:00 meeting transcribed here, Bohlen wassummoned (from the airport) to come to the White House. On the phone, Bohlen convinced thePresident to let him go ahead with his travel, since he was now expected at a public event that dayin New York. Robert Kennedy later voiced bewilderment and anger about Bohlen’s decision.21. Sorensen to Kennedy, 18 October 1962, “Cuba—General: 10/15/62–10/23/62” folder,National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library. Dillon’s approach—an ultimatum and block-

Meanwhile, intelligence analysts had pored over photos from the ear-lier U-2 flights. They found something new—evidence of fixed IRBMsites in addition to the MRBM sites that had already been identified.With twice the range of MRBMs (2,200 miles instead of 1,100) and war-heads of roughly twice as much yield (up to 5 megatons), these missilescould menace all parts of the continental United States except the PacificNorthwest.

As officials received this new information on the morning of October18, their attitudes hardened. McNamara called McCone to say that he nowthought prompt and decisive action necessary. Taylor told the Joint Chiefsthat the news tipped him toward supporting the maximum option—fullinvasion of Cuba. This then became the unanimous position of the JCS.These early-morning discussions of the new intelligence set the mood asofficials filed into the Cabinet Room.

John McCone: . . . photography of one mission on Sunday, October14, and two on Monday, October 15. These are quite completely readout. There were six missions run yesterday. We expect the initial read-out to start late tonight and probably take 36 to 48 hours to completethe readout from the six missions.

Dean Rusk: Those missions involve any incident?McCone: Not to my knowledge, no.President Kennedy: They don’t know what coverage they got, do

they?Arthur Lundahl: The weather picture has not yet emerged, sir. We’re

flying in clouds and we don’t have the film yet in the National PI[Photographic Interpretation] Center [also known as NPIC]. It startsto come in this afternoon, shortly after lunch.

McCone: We think we got the entire island. What we didn’t getbecause of clouds, we won’t know until after we develop them.

I think you should know that these six missions involve 28,000 linearfeet of film. And when this is enlarged, it means the Center [NPIC] hasto examine a strip of film 100 miles long, 20 feet wide. Quite a job.

Go ahead, Art.Lundahl: Yes, sir. Mr. President, gentlemen, the first and most impor-

tant item I would seek to call to your attention is a new area hitherto never

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962516

ade, then a strike—was thus close to Bohlen’s. Ball’s suggestion—a blockade followed bypolitical pressure—was different.

seen by us, some 21 miles to the southwest of Havana, which we have at themoment labeled a probable MRBM/IRBM launch complex. The name ofthe town nearest is this [Guanajay]. It is there.

The two sites, sir, numbers one and two—are 21/2 miles apart. Andenlarging this one, we look at it, and we see for the first time a pattern ofmedium/IRBM sites that looks like the things we have been seeing inthe Soviet Union. There are two [launch] pads, here—and here. Theyare separated by 750 feet. There’s a control bunker with cable scars[marks on the ground showing cable emplacements] going up intosmall buildings inboard of each of the pads. There’s no equipment on thepads yet. They’re under construction. The security fence has been super-imposed around the place and on 29 August, the last time we went overthis area, the ground had just scarcely started to be scratched.

At the same time, 21/2 miles south of there is site number two. On 29August, there were no scratchings on the ground at all and since thattime, these scratchings have taken a form slightly different. There’s thispattern 2-1-2-1-2, [which] is called the offset inline. They’re slightlymore inline in here. There looks like there’s going to be a fourth one[pad] up in here, but the spacing is the same.

The orientation of the axis of the pads, 315 [degrees], which willbring you into the central massif of the United States. We call itM/IRBM, sir. We have never identified, irrevocably, the signature of theSoviet intermediate range ballistic missile which is estimatedly a 2,000-mile missile. But the elongation of the pads and the location of the con-trol bunkers, between each pair of pads, has been the thing that hassuggested to our hearts, if not our minds, the kind of thing that mightaccompany an IRBM.

So we have at the moment labeled it as such and let the guided mis-siles intelligence analysts come up, finally, with a true analysis of whatthe range of these missiles might be that are eventually accommodatedon this set of pads.

If I may switch to the next one, sir.President Kennedy: Let’s take a look?Lundahl: Yes, sir. For comparison purposes, Mr. President, I showed

the other day, when I was here [Tuesday, October 16], the sites that wehad described to you the other day, the three that we showed you werethese down near San Cristobal. The one with erectors and missiles. Theone here, just with the missiles and no erectors. And this one here at anearly stage of construction, with tenting and encamping materials, butneither missiles nor erectors. The date of that photography was 14October, and the impression of this third site is contained in this illusion

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 517

here, wherein I think you can see the equipment, the buildings and thehousing, and so forth.

On the next day, and admittedly in better photographic cover, we seethis same area that is shown in here with, now, missile erectors, probablyoff in here, vehicles, more vehicles, buildings, missile transporters, and avariety of equipment and additional things under construction. Theimpression one would gather is that there is some sense of speed withwhich they are proceeding in the construction of this particular base.May I pass that one over to you, sir? Thank you.

Also, earlier, Mr. President, we reported to you a number of what wecall cruise missile sites, short-range coastal defense-type missiles start-ing out with the Banes site, with another one located at Santa Cruz delNorte, up here in the Havana area.22 At the time of that reporting, therewere two launchers at this position, here and here.

Since the coverage of that day, two more launching positions havebeen added outboard of those two positions. The launchers here—the[unclear] is uncovered. You can actually see the launcher itself and,down in this small revetment here, appears to be the winged kind of air-breathing missile which will go on it. It’s a short stubby-winged fellowwhich conforms with the cruise type of missile that we have seen before.So our opinion of this thing remains the same. We now just wouldreport two additional launching positions at that complex.

Finally, Mr. President, at the very westernmost tip of Cuba, theisland, we have San Julian airfield, 7,000 feet by 150 feet, which has hith-erto been barricaded. Rows of stones and other kinds of materials pre-venting this [from being able] to be used by anybody. Now we see thebarricades being removed from the two runways. And in this hardstandat the edge of the tarmac, enlarged up in here, we find 22 of those crates,some 60 feet long, which we have interpreted from the deckside photog-raphy that the Navy had taken, to be, possibly, the crates that wouldaccommodate the IL-28, or Beagle, type of aircraft. This field is longenough to accommodate those craft. I think they need something around6,000 feet to take off. We have 7,000 feet. We definitely had not yet seenthe Beagle IL-28. One fuselage has been taken from one of the boxes. It’sup at this location. It’s 58 feet long, which is about the length of theBeagle fuselage, and you can see the wing roots, but the actual wing tipshave not yet been installed. We’ve just caught them, apparently, at the

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962518

22. These briefings had been given on 7 September.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 519

start of the assembly operation. And it would appear that San Julian, thishitherto unused airfield, may be the locus for IL-28 activity.

That’s all I have at the moment, Mr. President.President Kennedy: What percentage of the island have we got cov-

ered here?Lundahl: In these separate missions, the one of Sunday, October the

14th, and two on Monday, October the 15th, [the coverage] represents aconsiderable percentage from north to south and from east to west. Butthe business of plotting the [areas obscured by] clouds has not beencompletely done, so I can’t give you a good figure.

President Kennedy: But, in other words, from the information wehave prior to the development of these new films, you would say thereare how many different missile sites? As well as how many differentlaunch pads on each site?

Lundahl: Well, sir, we had not found anything like the MRBM sitesin any of the photography up to this 15 October bit. We had found, andadded to it last night, one more surface-to-air missile site, so that madea total of 23, as of this location. However, one of them has been pulledup and moved away, at Santa Lucia. We don’t know where they pullthese things up and move them to, but we have seen 23 surface-to-airmissile sites. We’ve seen three of these surface-to-surface cruise type ofmissile sites at Banes and up here over at del Norte, and then down onthe Isle of Pines.

We have one other type of missile site up here north of Havanawhich we haven’t been able to identify yet, as being either cruise or someother type of site, but which we’re carrying [as] unknown.

And now we’ve added to this. In the briefings of the last couple ofdays we’ve added the field type of installation, this 650- or 1,100-milemissile as it probably is, near San Cristóbal with these three sites locatedhere which we briefed on the other day [October 16]. And in the pho-tography of Monday of this week, we’ve now added what looks like amore fixed type of site, conforming to a signature which we have seen—

President Kennedy: In other words, you have got five different mis-sile sites?

Lundahl: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: And how many pads on each site?Lundahl: Well sir, at this location here we don’t have pads, we have

these erectors, these 60-foot long objects that lay on the ground. Therewere four erectors there. We have found three erectors not yet in posi-tion but lying around to be disposed here. And we had more erectors but

they’re under the trees and we can’t tell. But it would seem as thoughthere are going to be four erectors at each of those locations, and itwould appear that there are going to be four launch pads at each of thosetoo. But these [new sites] will be firmer type of launchings. And thesewill be the portable field type of launching equipment.

McCone: The GMAIC committee made an estimate that between 16and 32 missiles would be operational within a week, or slightly more.23

This was an estimate that appeared yesterday.Maxwell Taylor: Have any electronic emissions from the SAMs been

picked up? I had a report they were showing life.McCone: No. If they are, there are some SIGINT [signals intelli-

gence] responses on Monday [October 15] that did not state conclu-sively that the radars were operational. However, we do estimate thatsome of these SAM sites will be operational within a week’s time.

President Kennedy: If an unsophisticated observer . . . If we wantedto ever release these pictures to demonstrate that there were missilesthere, it would not be possible to demonstrate this to the satisfaction ofan untrained observer, would it?

Lundahl: I think it would be difficult, sir. By some eight years ofexperience in looking at the evolution in the Soviet Union, the signatureemerges very clearly to us. I think the uninitiated would like to see themissile and the tube that it fits in.

President Kennedy: May I—McGeorge Bundy: The implication is, if we go in by air [with a

strike], we would have simultaneous low-level photography for this pur-pose.

McCone: That’s right.Robert McNamara: And there is a picture that is not here of what I

call site number 1, of which I believe the uninitiated could be persuadedthere were missiles.

Lundahl: I would concur on that, sir. The canvas coverings of allthose missiles lying on trailers in there at lower level, particularly as Mr.Bundy says, could, I think, very clearly impact on people.

President Kennedy: Thank you. Lundahl: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: But when will we get the data, really, on the

entire island, to the extent that we can?

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962520

23. The abbreviation GMAIC stands for the Guided Missile and Astronautics IntelligenceCommittee, an interagency committee of the interagency U.S. Intelligence Board.

Lundahl: Sir, there are five missions coming in today, as Mr. McConesaid, some 28,000 feet [of film], the first two of which are in slightly afternoon. We would seek to read them out during the night. And then as theothers come in, in the next two to three days, we will be going all out toread it on a 24-hour basis. But it is quite a volume of film to look at. We’retrying to be accurate, as accurate as we possibly can. I would hope that,comes the weekend, we might have a fair grasp on all five [McCone hadmentioned six missions], plus whatever number of additional ones Mr.McNamara will run between yesterday and the end of the week.

President Kennedy: Thanks.Lundahl: Yes, sir. [He collects his briefing materials.]Rusk: Mr. President, I think this changes my thinking on the matter

if you have to [unclear] from the point of view of U.S. [unclear]. Thefirst question we ought to answer is: Is it necessary to take action? And Isuppose that there is compelling reason to take action here. For if noaction is taken, it looks now as though Cuba is not going to be just anincidental base for a few of these things, but, basically an [unclear] withMRBMs, and IRBMs, and that sort of thing. Cuba could become a formi-dable military problem in any contest we would have with the SovietUnion over a threat in any other part of the world. I think our colleaguesin Defense will want to comment on that very carefully because that’s avery important point. But I do think that when the full scope of thisbecomes known, that no action would undermine our alliances all overthe world very promptly.

On September 4th you said, “There is no evidence of any organizedcombat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country, or of military basesprovided by Russia, in violation of the ’34 treaty relating to Guantánamo,or of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other signifi-cant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet directionand guidance. Were it to be otherwise the gravest issues would arise.”

Now that statement was not made lightly at that time. These ele-ments that were mentioned were pointing our fingers to things thatwere very fundamental to us. And it was intended as a clear warning tothe Soviet Union that these are matters that we will take with theutmost seriousness. When you talk about the gravest issues, in the gen-eral language of international exchange, that means something veryserious.

I think also we have to think of the effect on the Soviets if we were todo nothing. I would suppose that they would consider this a major back-down and that this would free their hands for almost any kind of adven-ture they might want to try out in other parts of the world. If we are

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 521

unable to face up to a situation like Cuba against this kind of threat, thenI think they would be greatly encouraged to go adventuring and wouldfeel that they’ve had it made as far as intimidation of the United States isconcerned.

I think also that we have an almost unmanageable problem in thiscountry getting any support for the foreign policy that we would need topursue, if we are going to sustain the cause of independence of states andfreedom in all parts of the world. We’ve got a million men in uniformoutside the United States. We’ve got foreign aid programs. We’ve got amajor effort we’re making in every continent. And it seems to me thatinaction in this situation would undermine and undercut the enormoussupport that we need for the kind of foreign policy that will eventuallyensure our survival.

Now action involves very high risks indeed, and I think that thisadditional information, if anything, increases the risk because the chal-lenge is much more serious and the counteraction, I would suppose,would have to be heavier than we have, in fact, been talking about. Butwe can expect you would have to have in the back of your own mind,with whatever decision you take, the possibility—if not the likelihood—of a Soviet reaction somewhere else running all the way from Berlinright around to Korea, and the possibility of a reaction against theUnited States itself. I don’t think that you can make your decision underany assumption that this is a free ride, or easier, or anything of that sort.

I would suppose that with those first missiles that we were talkingabout, that a quick strike with quick success in the matter of a couplehours’ time—with 50 to 60 sorties, that sort of thing, where it’s obviousthen that the matter is over and finished and that was the purpose of ourengagement—that that would have a much more reduced risk of a mili-tary response on the other side. But getting these other installations andgetting involved in various parts of the island, I think would increase therisk of a military response down there.

The action also has to be thought of in connection with alliance soli-darity. There we’re faced with conflicting elements. Unless we’re in a sit-uation where it is clear that the alliance is with us and understands theproblem, then an unannounced, or unconsulted, quick action on our partcould well lead to a kind of allied disunity that the Soviets could capital-ize upon very strongly.

It’s one thing for Britain and France to get themselves isolatedwithin the alliance over Suez. But it’s quite another thing for the allianceif the United States should get itself in the same position because we are

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962522

the central bone structure of the alliance. I think this is a different kindof problem that we have to think very hard about.

Now, I think that, as far as I’m concerned, I would have to say to youthat if we enter upon this path of challenging the Soviets, the Sovietswho themselves have embarked upon this fantastically dangerous course,that no one can surely foresee the outcome.

I was prepared to say when I came over here, before when I got thisinformation, that even the 50-sortie strike would very probably move byspecific steps into much more general action, at least as far as Cuba isconcerned, and possibly in other situations.

Now, there is another fact, Mr. President, that bothers me consider-ably. I think the American people will willingly undertake great dangerand, if necessary, great suffering, if they have a deep feeling that we’vedone everything that was reasonably possible to determine whether thistrip was necessary. Also that they have a clear conscience and a goodtheory of the case.

The first point, whether this trip is necessary. We all, of course, remem-ber the guns of August where certain events brought about a general situa-tion in which at the time none of the governments involved really wanted.24

And this precedent, I think, is something that is pretty important.We had a clear conscience in World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack

up against the background of Hitler’s conduct resolved that problem. Inthe case of Korea, we had an organized large-scale aggression fromNorth Korea, and we were doing it as part of a general United Nationscommitment. Even with that start, the Korean aspect of it—the Koreanwar—got out of control as far as the general support of the Americanpeople were concerned, before it was over.

Now, these considerations that I’ve just mentioned would militate infavor of a consultation with Khrushchev and an implication that we willact because, in the first instance, there is the possibility, only a possibil-ity, that Mr. Khrushchev might realize that he’s got to back down onthis. We can’t be . . . I have no reason to expect that. This looks like avery serious and major commitment on his part. But at least it will takethat point out of the way for the historical record, and just might have init the seeds of prevention of a great conflict.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 523

24. Rusk was referring to events that preceded and immediately followed the outbreak ofWorld War I in 1914, using the title of a well-known book recently published about thisepisode, The Guns of August, by Barbara Tuchman.

The Rio Pact is, I think clearly, our strongest legal basis for whateveraction we need to take. The other possibility is a straight, is a straightdeclaration of war, which carries with it many legal privileges as a bel-ligerent that would be extremely useful for us to have. But there isplenty of room in the Rio Pact for meeting this kind of threat, and Iwould suppose—Mr. Martin will have to comment on this—I wouldsuppose there would be no real difficulty in getting a two-thirds vote infavor of necessary action.

But if we made the effort and failed to get the two-thirds vote at thetime, which I would doubt would be the result, then at least we will havetried. And as far as the American people are concerned, we’d have doneour very best on that.

Now, it seems to me, that the further information we have about thebases, other bases in other parts of the island, the buildup generallythroughout Cuba, does raise the question as to whether a declaration ofa national emergency and, if necessary, a declaration of war on Cuba maynot be the necessary step here rather than spotty single strikes here andthere around about the island. Because this could become a cops and rob-bers game, each strike becoming not only more difficult from a militarypoint of view, but more difficult from your, from a political point of view,and it looks as though we have a larger problem to solve. And we mayhave to solve it in a larger way.

Now the principal alternative to that is, of course, to put in the shortstrikes, the brief strikes, and try our hand at getting it over withpromptly as far as these particular installations are concerned. But theseother bases, I think, create larger problems. Casualties go up a great dealand the challenge goes up a great deal. I think that the question iswhether—I’d like to hear my colleagues comment on this—whether theaction we would take, would have to take even in the most limited sense,would have to be large enough to involve the greatest risks in any event.Therefore we might as well solve the problem.

I would like to . . . Mr. Bohlen left a note last night after our meeting,wrote it out at about midnight or early this morning, just before he left.And I would like to read you certain paragraphs of this. He said:

The existence of Soviet MRBM bases in Cuba cannot be toler-ated. The objective therefore is their elimination by whatever meansmay be necessary.

There are two means in essence: by diplomatic action or by mili-tary action.

No one can guarantee that this can be achieved by diplomatic

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962524

action, but it seems to me essential that this channel should be testedout before military action is employed. If our decision is firm (and itmust be) I can see no danger in communication with Khrushchev pri-vately, worded in such a way that he realizes that we mean business.

This I consider an essential first step no matter what militarycourse we determine on if the reply is unsatisfactory. The tone andtenor of his reply will tell us something, but I don’t believe that athreat of general nuclear war should deter us. If he means it, hewould have so reacted even if the strike should come first.

My chief concern about a strike without any diplomatic effort isthat it will eventually, that it will immediately, lead to war with Cubaand would not be the neat quick disposal of the bases, as was sug-gested. Furthermore, I am reasonably certain that the allied reactionwould be dead against us, especially if the Soviet Union retaliatedlocally (in Turkey or Italy or in Berlin).

A communication with Khrushchev would be very useful for therecord in establishing our case for action.

In general I feel that a declaration of war would be valuable sinceit would open up every avenue of military action: air strikes, invasionor blockade. But we would have to make a case before our allies tojustify such a declaration of war. If we acted first and sought to jus-tify it later we would be in a spat of great consequence.

Finally, I feel very strongly that the belief in a limited, quick actionis an illusion and would lead us into a total war with Cuba on a step-by-step basis which would greatly increase the probability of generalwar.

That best course would be, he says, a carefully worded and seriousletter to Khrushchev, before we take the action, the steps, and then fol-lowed by a declaration of war. We were talking about this last night. Ithink it is in this range of problems that we need to concentrate ourattention, Mr. President. Otherwise we just . . . how we see the nature ofthe threat. I think our Defense colleagues ought to talk a moment aboutthe actual military aspect of the threat itself.

McNamara: Mr. President, here is listed . . . there are a series ofalternative plans ranging from Roman numeral I was about 50 sorties,directed solely against the known MRBMs, known as of last night, toRoman numeral V, which covers the alternative invasion plan.

All of these plans are based on one very important assumption: Thatwe would attack, with conventional weapons, against an enemy who isnot equipped with operational nuclear weapons. If there’s any possibility

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 525

that the enemy is equipped with operational nuclear weapons, I’m certainthe plans would have to be changed.

Last evening we were discussing the relative merits of these forms ofmilitary action, assuming that at some point military action was required.It has been the view of the Chiefs, based on discussions within the lasttwo days, and it was certainly my view, that either Roman numeral I orRoman numeral II, very limited air strikes against very limited targets,would be quite inconclusive, very risky, and almost certainly lead to fur-ther military action prior to which we would have paid an unnecessaryprice for the gains we achieved.

And therefore the Chiefs and I would certainly have recommendedlast night, and I would recommend more strongly today, that we notconsider undertaking either Roman numeral I, or Roman numeral II. Inother words, we consider nothing short of a full invasion as applicablemilitary action. And this only on the assumption that we’re operatingagainst a force that does not possess operational nuclear weapons.

President Kennedy: Why do you change . . . why has this informa-tion changed the recommendation?

McNamara: Last evening, it was my personal belief that there weremore targets than we knew of, and it was probable there would be moretargets than we could know of at the start of any one of these strikes.The information of this morning, I think, simply demonstrates the valid-ity of that conclusion of last evening.

Secondly, when we’re talking of Roman numeral I, it’s a very limitedstrike against MRBMs only, and it leaves in existence IL-28s with nuclearweapon-carrying capability, and a number of other aircraft withnuclear weapon-carrying capability, and aircraft with strike capabilitythat could be exercised during our attack, or immediately following ourattack on the MRBMs, with great possible risk of loss to eitherGuantánamo and/or the eastern coast of the U.S.

I say great loss, I’m not thinking in terms of tens of thousands, butI’m thinking in terms of sporadic attacks against our civilian population,which would lead to losses, I think, we would find it hard to justify inrelation to the alternative courses open to us, and in relation to the verylimited accomplishment of our limited number of strikes.

Robert Kennedy: Bob, what about alternative number II, on the basisthat you’re going against offensive weapons? You’re going to go againstthe missiles, and you’re going to go against their planes. What are thearguments against that? I mean that would prevent them knocking ourpopulation.

McNamara: It is much to be preferred over number I, in my opinion.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962526

It would have to be larger than is shown now because of the additionalnumber of targets required, and it gets very close to alternative III, interms of number of sorties. Number II [strike] was prepared before wehad the additional information, of last night’s [photo] interpretation.We showed a hundred sorties. I think it more likely that number II, withthe information we now have, and the information we’re likely to havetoday and tomorrow, would merge into number III, which is a 200-sortiestrike. I doubt very much we could stop there.

Taylor: I would agree with that statement of the Secretary’s, thatreally II is hardly possible now. We’re really talking about III, you real-ize, because you’ll have to take the SAM sites out, if you’re going to gofor all the airfield strikes. We’re probably going out to the point whereyou’re going to have to take other targets related to affecting [unclear].

McCone: I think that’s particularly true if you expect to have any fol-low-on surveillance. The SAM sites will soon become operational andeven though we take out, if we follow I and II, we are still going to havea requirement to know what’s going on.

Taylor: We’re going to have a prolonged air war, I would say, indefi-nitely either under I, II, or III, actually.

Theodore Sorensen: Well, under II, you don’t need to take out theSAM sites before they become operational.

Taylor: They may be operational at any time.McNamara: We have almost certainly added 2 more targets than are

indicated here. There were 16 targets shown. We have at least 3 moretargets from evidence since last night, and we will certainly have somemore tonight and tomorrow. And, therefore, II merges very directly intoIII. If the SAM sites become operational, II becomes III because, in avery real sense, that’s maybe the—

President Kennedy: Let me ask you this, Bob, what we’re talkingabout is III versus V, isn’t it?

McNamara: Yes, sir.President Kennedy: Then the advantage of III is that you would

hope to do it in a day.McNamara: Yes, and it could be done in a day.President Kennedy: And invasion V, would be seven, eight, or nine

days, with all the consequences. . . .McNamara: That is correct.President Kennedy: The increase in tension.Now, if we did III, we would assume that by the end of the day their

ability to use planes against us, after all they don’t have that much range,so they’d have to come back to the field and organized it right.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 527

McNamara: Yes. You would assume, by the end of the day, their airforce could be nearly destroyed. I say nearly because there might be afew sporadic weapons around.

Taylor: Yes, I would stress the point, Mr. President, that we’ll neverbe guaranteeing 100 percent.

McNamara: That’s right. That’s right.President Kennedy: But at least as far as their . . . except with

nuclear. I would think you would have to go on the assumption that theyare not going to permit nuclear weapons to be used against the UnitedStates from Cuba unless they’re going to be using them from everyplace.

McNamara: Well, they could . . . I’m not sure they can stop it. This iswhy I emphasized the point I did. I don’t believe the Soviets wouldauthorize their use against the U.S., but they might nonetheless be used.

And, therefore, I underline this assumption, that all of these cases arepremised on the assumption there are no operational nuclear weaponsthere. If there’s any possibility of that I would strongly recommend thatthese plans be modified substantially.

Now I would go back just one second. I evaded the question SecretaryRusk asked me, and I evaded it because I wanted this information dis-cussed first. The question he asked me was: How does—in effect—howdoes the introduction of these weapons to Cuba change the militaryequation, the military position of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R.?

And, speaking strictly in military terms, really in terms of weapons,it doesn’t change it at all, in my personal opinion. My personal views arenot shared by the Chiefs. They are not shared by many others in thedepartment. However, I feel very strongly on this point and I think Icould argue a case, a strong case, in defense of my position.

This doesn’t really have any bearing on the issue, in my opinion,because it is not a military problem that we’re facing. It’s a politicalproblem. It’s a problem of holding the alliance together. It’s a problem ofproperly conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves. And the prob-lem of holding the alliance together, the problem of conditioningKhrushchev for our future moves, the problem of dealing with our domes-tic public, all requires action that, in my opinion, the shift in military bal-ance does not require.

President Kennedy: On holding the alliance. Which is going tostrain the alliance more: This attack by us on Cuba, which most alliesregard as a fixation of the United States and not a serious militarythreat? I mean, you’d have to . . . an awful lot of conditioning would haveto go in before they would accept, support our action against Cuba,because they think that we’re slightly demented on this subject.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962528

So there isn’t any doubt that whatever actions we take against Cuba,no matter how good our films are, are going to cause [problems] inLatin America. A lot of, a lot of people would regard this as a mad act bythe United States, which is due to a loss of nerve because they will arguethat, taken at its worst, the presence of these missiles really doesn’tchange the . . . If you think that, they’re going to, certainly. With all theincentives to think the other way, viewing this as you do as an American,what’s everybody else going to think who isn’t under this gun?

McNamara: Aren’t the others going to think exactly as I do?Taylor: May I comment, Mr. President?With regard to what we’ve just seen in intelligence, it seems to me

three things stand out. The first is the very rapid . . . the energy withwhich they are developing the mobile missiles. In the course of 24 hourssince Sunday [October 14, the day of the U-2 flight that first pho-tographed the MRBM sites]. They are moving very fast to make thoseweapons operational.

Whether they’re operational today? I would agree with the Secretarythat probably not, but I don’t think anyone can assure you. At any time atleast one or more of these missiles will become operational.

Now, number two, the IL-28s. We’ve been expecting this. But nowthey’ve turned up in a very plausible location, I would say, and they’relying there inviting attack—an ideal time to take them out.

Now third, the IRBMs really put a new factor in, as I look at it.Yesterday, when we looked at this we had only a few of the mobile type[MRBMs]. I was far from convinced that the big showdown would berequired. Today we’re getting new pictures, and the vision of an islandthat’s going to be a forward base, can become a forward base, of majorimportance to the Soviets.

Also, the targets that we’re seeing, however, the kind of air attackwe’re talking about means nothing. We can’t take this threat out byactions from the air. So that we have argued more and more that if,indeed, you’re going to prevent that kind of thing, invasion is going tobe required.

Bundy: But you don’t mean that you can’t prevent it in the sense ofstopping it from happening the next day. You mean that for the long pullyou’re going to have to take the island.

Taylor: Yes, you can’t destroy a hole in the ground. We can’t preventthis construction going ahead by any air actions. Conceivably diplomaticaction might stop it, but only diplomatic action, or occupation as far as Ican see, can prevent this kind of threat from building up.

Now, if those statements are roughly correct, then what does it mean

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 529

in terms of time? Well, it means that, insofar as getting the mobile mis-siles out, time is of the essence. But the faster the better, if it’s notalready too late. And I would say that, again, we’re not sure that it is nottoo late, with respect to one or more of the missiles.

With the IL-28s, our air people think it would be two to three weeksbefore they’re ready to fly. So that would give us considerably more lati-tude in terms of time.

The MRBMs give us a rather complete time because, the experiencein the Soviet Union is an average of about six months to get these ready.And these started about the first of September.

President Kennedy: You say MRBM. That’s—McNamara: It’s the fixed site, yes [that had been identified as a prob-

able IRBM, not MRBM].President Kennedy: That [missile] gives an extra 800 miles [of

range], gives them an extra—McNamara: It makes it 2,000 miles [range]. An extra 1,000 miles

[over the MRBMs].Taylor: So that there is no pressure of time from that point of view

even though it’s the more egregious danger in the long run. So that’sabout the thoughts that arise in my mind, and I think the Chiefs will joinme in that.

There is one factor we talked about at length yesterday. It’s the polit-ical actions which Mr. Bohlen recommends, and many others think mustbe done. Certainly militarily that is undesirable, if we really have in mindthe urgency of taking out by surprise the missiles, and the IL-28s.

On the other hand, if we consider it politically necessary, it’s quitetrue that an offsetting [unclear] if we could be making military moves ofreadiness to reinforce the political action, and actions that can shortenthe time of our reaction.

President Kennedy: Let me ask you: If we gave, say, this 24-hournotice, getting in touch with Khrushchev, or taking the other actionswith our allies, I would assume that they would move these mobile mis-siles into the woods, wouldn’t they?

Taylor: There’s is a danger, Mr. President. If you’re talking in termsof 24 hours I would doubt it. But the more you add on—

President Kennedy: [Unclear] carry them away?McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t believe they’re equipped to do

that. I say that because if they are equipped to do that, they would havebeen equipped to erect them more quickly. I think that it’s unlikely theywould move them in 24 hours. If they were to move them in 24 hours, Ithink we could keep enough reconnaissance over the island during that

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962530

period to have some idea of where they moved. I have every reason tobelieve we’d know where they were.

McCone: It would take a little longer though.McNamara: What?McCone: It would take a little longer and take very careful recon-

naissance to know where they are.Bundy: Why are you so confident that they couldn’t hide them or get

them in immediate readiness in 24 hours?McNamara: Well, I’m not confident. I didn’t say they couldn’t get

them in immediate readiness in 24 hours, Mac. I don’t believe that wewould lose them with a 24-hour discussion with Khrushchev.

President Kennedy: How quick is our communications with Moscow?I mean, say we sent somebody to see him, I mean he was there at thebeginning of the 24-hour period, to see Mr. Khrushchev, how long wouldit be before Khrushchev’s answer could get back to us, just by communi-cation?

Llewellyn Thompson: I think it would have to go in code. Probably . . .what, five to six hours, I guess.

President Kennedy: Well, you can—Thompson: You could telephone, of course.Robert Kennedy: It wouldn’t really have to go in code, would it?Thompson: Well, you would shorten the time a lot by not putting it

into a highly confidential code [unclear].President Kennedy: That would be a couple of hours?Thompson: Yes.Rusk: I think the quickest way might be, actually, not to run into any

delays on their end, would be to give it to Dobrynin here in an actualtext, and let him transmit it, because that would get to Khrushchevstraight away, whereas somebody else might have the problem of settingup an appointment.

McCone: I think more importantly—President Kennedy: What?McCone: I think the one point on this that ought to be . . . bear in

mind—this was brought up in the [U.S.] Intelligence Board meetingthis morning rather forcefully, that, so far as we know, there is no statedrelationship that makes these Soviet missiles or Soviet bases. Theattempts that Castro made to ally himself with the Warsaw Pact, or tojoin the Warsaw Pact, or even to engage in a bilateral [defense treaty]with Moscow, apparently either were deferred or failed. He sent Raul[Castro] and Che Guevara to Moscow a few months ago, apparently forthat purpose, that and his other purposes.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 531

Hence, if we were to take action with this present status, the Sovietswould have some latitude as to how they might want to respond if theydid at all.

On the other hand, if as a result of a warning, or of a communicationwith them, they declare these their bases, then we would have a differentkind of problem because it would be the problem of committing anaction against a stated base of theirs. And this might mean a war of dif-ferent proportions.

President Kennedy: The question is really whether the Soviet reac-tion, and who knows this, would be measurably different if they werepresented with an accomplished fact days after, I mean one day, not theinvasion [unclear] just the accomplished fact. [The question is] whethertheir reaction would be different than it would be if they were given achance to pull them out.

If we said to Khrushchev that: “We have to take action against it. Butif you begin to pull them out, we’ll take ours out of Turkey.” Whether hewould then send back: “If you take these out, we’re going to take Berlin”or “We’re going to do something else.” And then we’d be . . .

Thompson: An important factor there is, if you do this first strike,you’d have killed a lot of Russians and that doesn’t . . . inevitable reac-tion. On the other hand, if you do give him notice, the thing I would fearthe most is a threat to Turkey and Italy to take action, which wouldcause us considerable difficulty [unclear].

President Kennedy: You mean if . . .Bundy: What is your preference, Tommy?Thompson: My preference is this blockade plan. I think this declaration

of war and these steps leading up to it. I think it’s very highly doubtful thatthe Russians would resist a blockade against military weapons, particularlyoffensive ones, if that’s the way we pitched it before the world.

President Kennedy: What do we do with the weapons already there?Thompson: Demand they’re dismantled, and say that we’re going to

maintain constant surveillance, and if they are armed, we would thentake them out. And then maybe do it.

I think we should be under no illusions; this would probably in theend lead to the same thing. But we do it in an entirely different postureand background and much less danger of getting up into the big war.

The Russians have a curious faculty of wanting a legal basis despiteall of the outrageous things they’ve done. They attach a lot of impor-tance to this. The fact that you have a declaration of war. They would berunning a military blockade legally established. I think it would greatlydeter them.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962532

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 533

President Kennedy: In other words . . . what?Robert Kennedy: Could you maybe just run through it? Because he

hasn’t heard the explanation of the blockade, what that entails.Roswell Gilpatric: There is a paper there on that, the course number

two there, Mr. President, in front of you. There is a concept for this.President Kennedy: In other words, under this plan however, we

would not take these missiles that they now have out, or the planes theynow have out.

Thompson: Not in the first stage. I think it would be useful to saythat if they were made operational we might, or would—

President Kennedy: Of course then he would say that: “Well, if youdo that, then we will . . .”

Thompson: As Chip [Bohlen] says, I agree with him, that if they’reprepared to say: “All right, if you do this, then this is nuclear world war,”then they would do that anyway. I think he [Khrushchev] would make alot of threatening language but in very vague terms in keeping his—

President Kennedy: Yeah. I would think it more likely he would justgrab Berlin. That’s the more likely.

Thompson: I think that or, if we just made the first strike, then Ithink his answer would be, very probably, to take out one of our bases inTurkey, and make it quick too and then say that: “Now I want to talk.”

I think the whole purpose of this exercise is to build up to talks withyou, in which we try to negotiate out the bases. There are a lot of thingsthat point to that.

One thing that struck me very much is, if it’s so easy to camouflagethese things or to hide them in the woods, why didn’t they do it in thefirst place? They surely expected us to see them at some stage. That, itseems, would point to the fact their purpose was for preparation ofnegotiations.25

Robert Kennedy: Maybe they have some in there.Thompson: They may.Taylor: May I ask whether military moves in this five day period

would be acceptable from the point of view of the State Department?Alexis Johnson: Oh yes, certainly.George Ball: I think it would be helpful, certainly be helpful—Sentences unclear; Thompson refers to “credibility.”

25. In fact it is not at all easy to hide even the MRBMs in the woods and of course not thefixed IRBM sites. But Thompson is relying on the assumption that was then prevalent, ifunexamined.

Alexis Johnson: Now, of course, Mr. President, there are obviouscounters to the blockade. The obvious one being in Berlin.

President Kennedy: Yes.Robert Kennedy: And also the argument against the blockade is that

it’s a very slow death. And it builds up, and it goes over a period of months,and during that period of time you’ve got all these people yelling andscreaming about it, you’ve got the examination of Russian ships and theshooting down the Russian planes that try to land there. You have to do allthose things.

President Kennedy: Submarines.Edwin Martin: Since we’re all clear on the Soviet reaction, if as

Tommy and Chip predicted the Soviets would not try to run the block-ade, then they would have deserted their friends in Cuba. And I thinkthere would be considerable political chaos in Cuba, if the Sovietsdeserted them before our conference.

Thompson: Also, I would assume you would be in negotiationsdirectly with Khrushchev.

Taylor: In the case of any of these attack plans, in all logic we wouldhave a blockade concurrently. In other words, in my judgment all ofthese military actions imply also the blockade.

Bundy: I agree.Ball: Oh yeah, sure, sure. But what would you do about a declaration

of war as a military action? Do it?Bundy: Simultaneously, it seems to me you declare that a state of war

exists, and you call the Congress.Thompson: I think Khrushchev will deny that these are Soviet bases.

[Unclear.] I think that what he’d say is: “What are you getting so excitedabout? The Cubans asked us for some missiles to deal with these emigrebases that are threatening, have attacked and are threatening attack.” Andthat: “These are not missiles other than defensive. They’re much lessoffensive than your weapons in Turkey. You’ve got these armed withnuclear warheads. We haven’t given any nuclear weapons to them. Theseare simply to deal with the threat to Cuba.” That would be his general line.

Rusk: Well, that would be patently false on its face because of thenature of the weapons. [Mixed voices.]

Bundy: If we act, they’d better be Cuban missiles, surely.Rusk: I think our action is aimed at Cuba just as much as possible in

this situation.Thompson: You want to make it, if you do any of these steps, make it

as easy as possible for him to back down.I think almost certainly it leads to . . . his answer would be also: “This

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962534

is so serious, I’m prepared to talk to you about it.” We could scarcelyrefuse then. That’s if you have world war being threatened. So I thinkyou’d just immediately assume the next step. That’s why I think that theAttorney General’s point, while certainly valid, is somewhat weakened inthat during this period you would be negotiating out this thing.

Rusk: But if he were to say: “Let’s talk.” Then you’d have to say to him:“Stop immediately all activities on such and such fields, sites and so forth.”

Thompson: I’d impose a blockade while you do it.President Kennedy: The blockade wouldn’t be sufficient. Because he

could go on developing what he’s got there. We don’t know how muchhe’s got there.

Alexis Johnson: Yeah. But he would—You impose the blockade onCuba, and he imposes the blockade on Berlin. And then you start to talk.And he would trade these two off.

Rusk: That’s what he would figure.Alexis Johnson: That’s what he would figure, yes.Thompson: Seems to me that one point on this—there are a lot of

little signs—but I was always curious as to why he [Khrushchev] saidhe would defer this [a renewed confrontation over Berlin] until after theelection. It seems to me it is all related to this.

McCone: I’m sure he was waiting for Berlin to ask.Mr. President, you might be interested in General Eisenhower’s

reaction to this. I talked to him at your request.I briefed him, showed him the photography and all the rest of this.

He was careful, I think, not to take a position, because I had no positionand I was very careful not to indicate to him your position, as agreed inour telephone conversation.

However, I can report that the thrust of his comments would indicatethat he felt first that the existence of offensive capabilities in Cuba wasintolerable from the standpoint of this country.

Secondly, I think he felt that limited actions such as strafing, as antic-ipated in I, or II, or even III, in this paper, would not be satisfactory. Itwould cause the greatest fear and concern with our allies and in all areasof the world where the Soviets might take similar action against installa-tions—the United States installations that were in jeopardy with otherssuch as Turkey or Pakistan or elsewhere.

He felt really that if a move was made—and I think if I pinned himdown he would recommend that—it should be an all out military action.He talked of conceiving it to go right to the jugular first, not an invasionthat involves landing on the beach and working slowly across the island.But a concentrated attack right on Havana first and taking the heart of the

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 535

government out. And he felt if this was done, probably the thing would bein disarray, so it could be done with a minimum loss of life and time.

Now he said that without the benefit of specific knowledge of troopdeployments, and equipment deployments, and so forth of the Soviets, orof the Cubans, but I thought this would be of interest to you.

Rusk: Mr. President, one thing that would have to be considered:There would be a number of steps that you would have to take on whichyou would need the authority of a national emergency or a declaration ofwar, some of the defense steps and some of these kind of steps wouldbring in additional manpower and there are other powers that the attor-ney general would know about that could be important here.

Thompson: One other point that maybe . . . seems to me might bemissed, that is since Castro’s gone this far in conniving, I suppose—assuming that he didn’t protest at putting these things in there—itseems to me that in the end it does lead to the fact that Castro has to go.

But if we did this blockade, and any of these steps, and Castro attackedGuantánamo and so on, you’ve got a much better position in which then togo ahead and take him out than if it’s started by some surprise attack byus. I gather it’s fairly likely that Castro would do something there to—

Taylor: Certainly, if we take any of these military actions, I think wehave to assume a reaction against Guantánamo.

Douglas Dillon: Mr. President, what is the whole idea, I’m not quiteclear, of talking to Khrushchev ahead of time? What could he do thatwould remove this danger that we have from these MRBMs that arepresent and already there? What could he do that would satisfy us? Itseems to me very difficult to see any action you can take that he mightsay: “Sure, I’ll take them out sometime,” and then do the opposite theirold way.

I can’t quite understand how we achieve anything. We may achievesomething in sort of . . . for history in showing we’ve done something.But that’s a different argument than the argument of really trying toachieve anything. I don’t see how we really achieve anything with them.

Rusk: Yes, sir. There are the two alternatives. In general, he mightreduce his involvement. He might step it up in his reply.

Dillon: But you can’t believe his reply, whatever it is.Rusk: But you can check his reply.Thompson: I think the most he’d do in the way of concession would

be to say that he will not take any further action while these talks go on.Meantime, we’ve said that we were going to keep an eye on him, and theproblem is that if they become operational, they might be turned to theCubans. [Unclear.] But I don’t think he’d ever just back down.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962536

Unidentified: As Bob said, they are operational, or they will be nextweek. Nothing’s going to stop that.26

Ball: No, I think that your position with the rest of the alliance is goingto be stronger if you have given Khrushchev a chance to do something.

Bundy: It depends what he says and does, George, it seems to me.Ball: Well, if he makes a threat you go ahead, I mean you can’t be

stopped. But that seems to me to be very much—Bundy: He must have that speech all figured out. The one thing that he

[Khrushchev] must know is that he’s going to have to say something tous about this at some point. I think there’s a reasonable chance Gromyko’sgoing to make the speech [in his meeting with President Kennedy] thisafternoon.

Thompson: He gave [U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union] Foy[Kohler] some indication of it, what he plans, I think [in a conversationon October 15 ].

President Kennedy: Well what did he say, how do you mean—yeah.Taylor: Well, I presume that our communication with Khrushchev

could be in such terms that it wouldn’t indicate the detail of our knowl-edge of these weapons, in other words, make him feel the American eye isright on this particular site. Think we can convey that message withoutgiving it away?

McCone: I don’t think he can believe that we don’t know all about this.It’s done in a semiovert way. These convoys have moved. People haveobserved them. We’ve got refugee reports, gossip of all kinds. All that weknow doesn’t come from our aerial photography, by any manner or means.

I’m inclined to think that if we were . . . I think the board studyingthis would agree that there would be a . . . that Khrushchev wouldengage us in some type of a negotiation, that we’d be locked into [it] andcouldn’t move.27 I don’t think there would be an answer that would be sonegative that it would give us freedom of action. Hence, it would besomewhat like the Geneva test suspension business. We got into it andwe couldn’t get out of it!

President Kennedy: The only, to me—McCone: The [unclear] thing would be built up right under our—

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 537

26. At this point Tape 30 ends and Tape 30A begins, in the John F. Kennedy Library catalogu-ing system.27. The Board of National Estimates at the CIA was then preparing a Special NationalIntelligence Estimate, distributed the next day, on “Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Coursesof Action on Cuba.”

President Kennedy: The only offer we would make, it seems to me,that would have any sense, according to him, would be the . . . givinghim some out, would be our Turkey missiles.

Bundy: I believe, Mr. President, that that is equally valid if we makethe sudden strike. Now, I think it may well be important to have a mes-sage in Khrushchev’s hands at that moment, saying that we, among otherthings, all the wicked things that have led to this, but also that we under-stand this base problem and that we do expect to dismantle our Turkishbase. That has one small advantage, which is that if he strikes back, wewill have at least given him a peaceful out on that.

President Kennedy: You see, Berlin is—Bundy: I don’t think we can keep that Turkish base in this counter

[-move].Dillon: I think you get your same point by doing this thing simulta-

neously. That way as you do by the other thing [unclear].Rusk: A direct exchange though that seems to be a Cuba-Turkey

exchange, would be quite serious. Now it’s true that we have talked withthe Turks a year ago about getting those, taking the Jupiters out of therefor other reasons.28

Bundy: No, no, I don’t . . . to advance it is good, but as simply oneway of reducing your costs and controlling your dangers.

Alexis Johnson: What you want is to talk to the Turks as if you weregoing to put a Polaris or two in those waters.29

Bundy: Yeah. Which should make everyone feel better. We haveSoviet submarines are going to be in the Caribbean. I mean this is apolitical not a military problem.

McNamara: If there is a strike without a preliminary discussion withKhrushchev, how many Soviet citizens will be killed? I don’t know. It’dbe several hundred at absolute minimum.

Bundy: Killed, as in casualties?

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962538

28. The Kennedy administration had considered abandoning the delayed deployment ofJupiter missiles to Turkey and had discussed the possibility with Turkish officials in thespring of 1961. The Turks wanted the missiles. Before top administration officials resolvedthe problem, the confrontation in Vienna between Kennedy and Khrushchev over Berlin inter-vened. After Khrushchev’s intimidating rhetoric in Vienna, the administration agreed that theTurkish deployment had to proceed, since canceling the deployment might then be mistakenas a sign of U.S. fear or weakness.29. The principal idea then being considered for the replacement of Turkish and other obso-lescent land-based ballistic missiles deployed in Europe was to offer some sea-based substitutefor them, possibly linked to the Polaris nuclear missile submarines then entering service.

McNamara: Killed. Absolutely. We’re using napalm, 750-pound bombs.This is an extensive strike we’re talking about.

Bundy: Well, I hope it is.McNamara: I think we must assume we’ll kill several hundred Soviet

citizens. Having killed several hundred Soviet citizens, what kind ofresponse does Khrushchev have open to him?

It seems to me that it just must be a strong response, and I think weshould expect that. And, therefore, the question really is are we willingto pay some kind of a rather substantial price to eliminate these missiles?I think the price is going to be high. It may still be worth paying to elim-inate the missiles. But I think we must assume it’s going to be high—thevery least it will be will be to remove the missiles in Italy and Turkey. Idoubt we could settle [the problem] for that.

Dillon: Well, I think they’ll take Berlin.Ball: Mr. President, I think that it’s easy sitting here to, to underesti-

mate the kind of sense of affront that you would have in the allied coun-tries within—even perhaps in Latin America, if we act without warning,without giving Khrushchev some way out. Even though it may be illu-sory, I think we still have to do it because I think that the impact on theopinion and the reaction would be very much different.

A course of action where we strike without warning is like PearlHarbor. It’s the kind of conduct that one might expect of the Soviet Union.It is not conduct that one expects of the United States. And I have a feel-ing that this 24 hours [warning] to Khrushchev is really indispensable.

President Kennedy: And then if he says: “Well if you do that, we’regoing to grab Berlin.” The point is, he’s probably going to grab Berlinanyway.

Ball: Sure. We go ahead.President Kennedy: He’s going to take Berlin anyway.Alexis Johnson: We pay that price.McNamara: I suspect the price we pay to Khrushchev will be about

the same, whether we give him the advance warning or don’t give himthe advance warning. The advance warning has the advantage of possiblygiving him an out that would reduce the requirement that we enter withmilitary force. That’s a bare possibility, not great. It has the advantageGeorge has mentioned of causing less friction with the rest of the world.

It has some disadvantages: a reduction of military surprise, but thedisadvantage of that is not very great.

It carries with it, however, I believe, the great disadvantage that onceyou start down that course he outmaneuvers you.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 539

Dillon: Well, the only advantage I see to it is the one you say, George,and that is that if you decide to do this, and you want to put yourself inthe right position with the world, you [do this] as part of a [military]program that never stops. You have 24-hour notice. But you’re under noillusion that anything he says is going to stop you.

You go ahead and do it [the strike]. You’re not doing it for the pur-pose of getting him to come up and do something. What you’re doing isto set the stage. That makes some sense.

Alexis Johnson: If you go the blockade route, you could take moretime in these steps; on the other hand, you hold the danger of his outma-neuvering you.

President Kennedy: If he grabs Berlin, of course. Then everybodywould feel we lost Berlin, because of these missiles, which as I say, do notbother them.

Thompson: My guess is that he would not immediately attack Berlin,but he would precipitate the real crisis at first, in order to try to sap ourmorale and—

Dillon: The difference is that in Cuba we’ve shown that we will takeaction, at a point which nobody knows. That’s the great danger, now, tous; they think we will never take action. So I think our position has[unclear] possibility [unclear].

Bundy: I think he [Thompson] and I agree. I think the precipitationof a Berlin crisis is just as bad, if we’ve let this happen to us, against allour promises to ourselves.

Dillon: Worse.President Kennedy: You mean, in other words, in late November

when he [Khrushchev] grabs Berlin?Robert Kennedy: What do we do when he moves into Berlin?Bundy: If we could trade off Berlin, and not have it our fault.

[Chuckles.]Dillon: Well, that’s the danger. To have already acted in Cuba and—McNamara: Well, when we’re talking about taking Berlin, what do

we mean exactly? Does he take it with Soviet troops?President Kennedy: That’s what it would seem to me.McNamara: Then we have . . . I think there’s a real possibility. We

have U.S. troops there. What do they do?Taylor: They fight.McNamara: They fight. I think that’s perfectly clear.President Kennedy: And they get overrun.McNamara: Yes, they get overrun, exactly.Unidentified: Well, you have a direct confrontation.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962540

Robert Kennedy: Then what do we do?Taylor: Go to general war, if it’s in the interest of ours.Unidentified: It’s then general war. Consider the use of . . .President Kennedy: You mean nuclear exchange? [Brief pause.]Taylor: Guess you have to.Bundy: I do see your . . . If you go in at the same time that you do this

[attack on Cuba] and you’ll say to him: “Berlin still means general war.”I don’t think he will do it that way.

Unidentified: I doubt whether he would . . . I don’t think he’d[unclear].

Rusk: You’d have to start at least with tactical nuclear weapons if hetried to attack Berlin [unclear] a blockade.

Taylor: I think they’d use East German forces, rather than bringingtheir own troops in.

President Kennedy: Let me ask you. It seems to me we have beentalking about the alliance, you’ve got two problems. One would be theproblem of the alliance when we say to them that the presence of thesemissiles requires a military action by us. There’s no doubt that they willoppose that, because they’ll feel that their risks increase, and this is a riskto us. They’ll argue what is Secretary McNamara’s point.

If we don’t take any action, then of course there will be a more grad-ual deterioration, I suppose. Isn’t that the argument?

Rusk: I think that will be very fast.Dillon: Very rapidly.Bundy: Very rapid.Dillon: Very rapid.President Kennedy: After my statement, and then, I mean . . .

Somehow we’ve got to take some action because we couldn’t . . . Becausethe alliance would disintegrate.

Now, the question really is to what action we take which lessens thechances of a nuclear exchange, which obviously is the final failure. That’sthe obvious direction. . . . so that . . . And at the same time, maintainsome degree of solidarity with our allies. Now, if you want that to be thecourse, then it would seem to me that II might [unclear].

Dillon: From the point of view of our allies, they think that certainlythis strong setup in Cuba, this sort of weakens our ability to help themeverywhere. So it is in the interest of the alliance to have this thing elim-inated even though it does create some dangers.

President Kennedy: Now, to get a blockade on Cuba, would we haveto declare war on Cuba with a blockade?

Bundy: Yes, we do.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 541

Alexis Johnson: Yes, we do. This contemplates a declaration of waras well.

Bundy: We don’t have to, in the sense that . . . but it makes it easier,and better.

Ball: Well, it makes it legal. Otherwise, we’d have great difficultywith our allies if we didn’t have a declaration of war, in my judgment.

Alexis Johnson: [Unclear] under the Rio Pact, under the [September20] resolution that was passed by the Congress.

President Kennedy: I think we shouldn’t assume we have to declarewar. The declaration of a state of war is a . . . Because it seems to me ifyou’re going to do that, you really—it doesn’t make any sense not toinvade. I think we ought to consider whether we do need the . . .

At least let’s just think with this a minute. We do the message toKhrushchev and tell him that if work continues, etcetera, etcetera. We atthe same time launch the blockade. If the work continues, that we go inand take them out.

We don’t declare war. It doesn’t seem to me that a declaration of war . . .Then I think you have to get into an invasion. What do you do—whenhe—?

Ball: The great difficulty of a blockade without a declaration of waris that it is an illegal blockade, that it will be very difficult—

Bundy: It is an act of aggression against everybody else.Ball: Everybody. Including our allies.Rusk: What? You could have a blockade imposed under Article 8 of

the Rio Treaty. After all, this is within the territorial framework of theRio—

President Kennedy: None of our allies. I don’t think anybody whogets excited because their ships are stopped under these conditions.They’re not very much help to us anyway. What does Article 8 say?

Rusk: Article 8 is—President Kennedy: [reading from Article 8] “For the purposes of this

Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree willcomprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs . . . breaking of . . .breaking of consular . . . interruption of [economic relations or] of rail, sea,air. . . .”

Under what authority would we—Rusk: [quoting the last phrase of Article 8] “use of armed forces.”President Kennedy: Yes, but we can’t unilaterally . . .Rusk: No, but I mean in the Organ of Consultation [of the

Organization of American States]—President Kennedy: That would take a week, wouldn’t it?

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962542

Rusk: No, I don’t think it would. Ed, how quickly could they—?Martin: I think two or three days it could be done. But I don’t think . . .Unidentified: I doubt it that quickly. I don’t think you would do it so

fast.Robert Kennedy: How many votes [in the OAS] would you have

against it [a blockade]?Martin: Probably four for sure.President Kennedy: Mexico. Brazil. Chile.Martin: Cuba and Bolivia.President Kennedy: Yeah. Probably Ecuador.Martin: No, Cuba’s not in it. Ecuador I think we might get.Rusk: Bolivia might not come.Martin: Bolivia might well not attend. So you would have three sure.Rusk: Because they’re temporarily out of the OAS.President Kennedy: Now, obviously, knowing the Soviets and the

way Khrushchev reacts always, I don’t think that we could assume thathe’s going to stop working.

I’m not sure exactly what we get out of this particular course of action,except that it doesn’t go quite—it doesn’t raise it [the escalation] imme-diately as high as it would be under ordinary, other conditions.

Ball: Mr. President, I would like to suggest that if you have a block-ade, without some kind of ultimatum, that work must stop on the missilesites or you take them out. That you’ll have an impossible position withthe country, because they will not sit still while work goes on makingthese things operational. And I think this is one of the real problems ofthe blockade, is that it’s a rather a slow agony and you build up all kindsof fears and doubts in the minds of people here.

Now on the question of the blockade, I think that it is Tommy’s viewthat even the Soviet Union would be influenced by the question as towhether there was a declaration of war or not.

Thompson: Yes, I think so. You might be able to frame it in such away that if your world postures were going to prevent this threat to usfrom these offensive weapons, and therefore, you were surveilling prop-erly, if they . . . if work goes on, then we will stop any further suppliescoming in. And for that reason, and to that extent, we are in a state ofwar with Cuba. It’s a little different from saying we’re going to war todestroy them. That’s really the thing to make you . . . At least yourworld posture isn’t [unclear].

Bundy: It seems to me that’s your whole posture. Even if you go inwith a strike, your posture is simply that this man has got entangled inthe notion of doing unacceptable things, from the point of view of the

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 543

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962544

security of the hemisphere. That has to be your posture. And if thosestop, we’re not concerned with what there is, the freedom of Cuba.

You will, in fact, get into the invasion before you’re through, I’msure. Either way.

Thompson: Well, I think you probably will the other way too, in theend, very likely.

Alexis Johnson: On the other hand, if you do declare a blockade, andthe Soviets do observe it, this could very quickly bring down Castrowithin Cuba, very quickly. If they in effect appear to be deserting him.This is the problem of course in their [the Soviets’] observing it.

Ball: And Khrushchev’s ability to observe it would be greatly helpedif there were a legal basis.

Alexis Johnson: Yes, yes.McCone: Don’t you think that it would be an almost impossible

thing for him to accept?Dillon: Well, except this is the confrontation with them rather than

Cuba.McCone: With his prestige at stake. I don’t think he would recog-

nize a blockade. I think he would tell you [unclear] was his right and hewould go right through.

Taylor: Well, John, I don’t think you have to have a blockade in any ofthese military situations. Certainly if we invade, we’re going to blockade.

McCone: I’m not talking about what we have to do. I realize that. I’mtalking about his observance of it, or recognition of it, or respect of it. Idon’t think he’d do that.

Thompson: I don’t think he’d want to take military action aroundCuba. He’s too much at a disadvantage there. It would be more danger-ous than somewhere else. That’s why I think he might respect it, ormaybe he takes the big action in Berlin which is this gamble which he’sshown for four years he’s reluctant to take.

I think he’s building up now to, and probing to see whether or not hecould do it [Berlin]. The strongest argument to me for a strike, is thatthat would be very convincing and dangerous to him in Berlin.

Rusk: I think that this is the other part of the coin. He may feel he hasto respond. But he knows that he’s dealing with people [the Americangovernment] who are going to respond to him. [Khrushchev thinks:] Ormaybe he’s a little crazy and you can’t trust them.

Taylor: I would think the credibility of our response in Berlin isenhanced by taking action in Cuba, rather than being diminished.

Bundy: I think this could be right. [Mixed voices murmuring agreement.]Taylor: If he’s going to blockade Berlin, he’ll do it regardless of the . . .

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 545

President Kennedy: Let’s say the situation was reversed, and he hadmade the statement about these missiles similar to the ones I made about[Cuba]. Similar to the ones about our putting missiles in Turkey. And hehad made the statement saying that serious action could result if we putthem in, and then we went ahead and put them in. Then he took them out[attacked them] some day.

To me, there’s some advantages of that if it’s all over. Hungary.30 It’sover so quick, supposedly, then really . . . almost the next move is up tohim. Now, he may take these moves, but . . .

Dillon: I think that’s entirely right.Thompson: I gather, it’s the military view that this would lead, in the

end, to an invasion. It wouldn’t be over quickly. We’d bomb and thewhole deal. And you’d have to have air cover over these people and blockthe planes as they come out.

McNamara: I would think so.Taylor: I think we’ll get into this air gambit regardless, Mr.

President.President Kennedy: The invasion?McNamara: Invasion.Taylor: Because [of] actions against Guantánamo, for example. And

our surveillance requirements will get us into dogfights over the island.We’ll be threatened by—

President Kennedy: No, but we’ll be taking out their planes—Taylor: —I think sooner or later, we’ll be—President Kennedy: Well, that’s what I meant. We go ahead. Let’s

just say this is a prospective course of action.And tomorrow afternoon [Friday, October 19] I’d announce these

[unclear] and the existence of these missiles, and say that we’re callingCongress back, and when we consider this Saturday morning, so every-body knows about it. It isn’t Pearl Harbor in that sense. We’ve toldeverybody.

Then we go ahead Saturday [October 20] and we take them out, andannounce that they’ve been taken out. And if any more are put in, we’regoing to take those out.

Bundy: And the air force.

30. President Kennedy was referring to the rapid Soviet suppression of the revolt in Hungaryduring November 1956 and the perceived Western inability to organize an effective response,especially because of the simultaneous distraction of the Anglo-French-Israeli military actionagainst Egypt arising from the Suez crisis.

President Kennedy: And the air force. And that we don’t want anywar, and so on and so forth, but we’re not going to permit this, in view ofthe fact that—

Taylor: We would take the air force out tomorrow, too? I mean, that’sa little too fast for us—

President Kennedy: On Saturday.Taylor: On the 21st [Sunday] we could get this [attack] out.President Kennedy: Sunday has historic disadvantages [referring to

memories of Pearl Harbor]. [Bundy laughs.]Taylor: Any additional time at all is good.President Kennedy: What?Taylor: Any additional time at all is good.President Kennedy: The race is against these missiles, but obviously

Sunday or Monday. To announce, the day before, the existence of these.We won’t announce what we’re going to do. But we are going to call theCongress back. Then we go ahead and do it the next morning.

Robert Kennedy: Even if you announce pretty much, you can almosthint that you’re going to have to take some action.

President Kennedy: Well, we don’t . . . We can decide exactly how farwe’d go.

Taylor: Of course, a public announcement, militarily, is more disad-vantageous than just talking to Khrushchev.

President Kennedy: Well there’s no doubt they’d move the planesand so on . . . Wouldn’t they?

Taylor: They would make every effort to, yes.Sorensen: Mr. President, what is the advantage of your public

announcement?Rusk: He can simply announce what is there.Sorensen: What is the advantage of that?President Kennedy: The advantage of calling Congress back is only

that we don’t launch . . . as I can see the only advantage, is that every-body gets the information that they are there before we attack. Whateversolidarity that that may induce. And it wouldn’t put us quite in the posi-tion of almost acting in such a bad way. But I—

Taylor: Would a few hours do rather than 24 hours, Mr. President?President Kennedy: Well that’s what I—Bundy: U.S. solidarity is the least of our problems.President Kennedy: What did you say?Bundy: U.S. solidarity—President Kennedy: Oh, I meant the solidarity—Robert Kennedy: I think George Ball—

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962546

Sorensen: A simultaneous announcement would do that really, Mr.President.

Robert Kennedy: I think George Ball has a hell of a good point.President Kennedy: What?Robert Kennedy: I think just the whole question of, you know,

assuming that you do survive all this, we don’t have, the fact that we’renot . . . what kind of a country we are. The fact that you just don’t[unclear].

Rusk: This business of carrying the mark of Cain on your brow forthe rest of your lives is something [unclear].

Robert Kennedy: The fact that they’ll be mad. We did this againstCuba. We’ve talked for 15 years that the Russians being [planning for]the first strike against us, and we’d never do that. Now, in the interest oftime, we do that to a small country. I think it’s a hell of a burden to carry.

Thompson: By far the strongest argument against this is that, killingthe Russians, which to my mind means you are going to end up thewhole way, and [unclear].

McNamara: Yes, this is why I don’t believe we can stop with a largeair strike. If we’ve killed Russians, we’re going to have to go in. Theycan’t stop. That’s the main reason we have to go on.

President Kennedy: Let’s just say, wait a second Bob, but if we makethis announcement. Say, the afternoon before we send a message toKhrushchev, saying that: “We said that we’d have to do it. We’re going tohave to do it, and you ought to get the Russians out of there within thenext 12 hours.”

Now that . . . we lose a good deal of advantage as far as surprise. Butwhat, of course, we are trying to do is to get these missiles. I’m not soworried about the air. If they [the aircraft] have got atomic bombs, theycan get a couple of them over on us anyway, but at least the air you cantake out, can’t you? After all they don’t maintain their position over thatisland each time a plane takes off. There are not that many, after all.

Alexis Johnson: You get a denial out of Gromyko this afternoon, thatthey have any bases there, that the Russians are establishing anythingthere. . . .

Taylor: He might deny the Russians are in.Alexis Johnson: He might deny there are any Russians there.Bundy: He won’t do that.President Kennedy: They’ve said there are Russians.Bundy: They’ve said there were Russians, in the TASS statement [of

September 11].Alexis Johnson: Yes. As far as these bases are concerned, then you’re

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 547

striking against Castro. Nobody could be more surprised than we wereto find Russians there, because we’ve been told there were none and thatit was not a Russian base.

Rusk: If the military situation doesn’t require it, if you took just a lit-tle more time before you actually hit, and you let the several public opin-ions know about this in Cuba, as well as in the Soviet Union. It would bemore difficult in the Soviet Union to get really informed. But if peoplerealize that this is a major thing coming, then something may crack.

Thompson: There’s one important related point to that, on which wehave the first varied information. That is that Khrushchev got himselfinto this aggressive posture in Berlin and everything on his own. I mean,he’s taken credit for it time and time again.

And the advantage that hasn’t been mentioned about the notificationto him is that he would have to show it to his colleagues, and there is apossibility of restraint there. I think there was some indication that inthe abortive Paris summit meeting, that he was under strict instructionsto break that up because they were afraid to go down the course he wasfollowing.31 There is some chance that this could happen.

I mean we haven’t had any solid information on this. But I can citevery minor things that happened at the time of the U-2 [shootdown]where the military, who normally never talk to me, came over and triedto calm me down, that sort of thing, and showing that they were con-cerned that Khrushchev was being impetuous and running risks.

Although there are advantages and disadvantages, I feel stronglyabout some notification to him.

President Kennedy: Now, what is it we ask him to do under that notifi-cation?

Thompson: We have a draft letter there, in which . . .Rusk: Got to get him to provide some [unclear] to the United Nations.Thompson: It would have to be changed, that’s right.President Kennedy: What is it we’d be trying to get out of him?Sorensen: I think you would have to say, perhaps with high-level repre-

sentation, that only . . . and his instructions would [be] that the only satisfac-tory answer he could return with, or report to you, would be Khrushchev’s

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962548

31. Thompson was referring to the planned Paris summit between Eisenhower andKhrushchev in May 1960. After the shoot-down of a U.S. U-2 over Soviet airspace and afterEisenhower took personal responsibility for authorizing such flights, Khrushchev canceled thesummit shortly before it was to take place. At the time Thompson was the U.S. ambassador inMoscow.

agreement that he was going to begin immediately to dismantle these basesand we would do the same in Turkey—

Rusk: We’re asking, that in order to keep the fig leaf—Sorensen: —and a summit meeting.Rusk: —in order to keep the fig leaf on for the President, we’d tell

him that we expect him to use, tell Castro—Bundy: Castro to do it.Rusk: —to stop these bases. And we’d urge him to let us know that

any Russian missile technicians are being withdrawn.Sorensen: And the message or messenger would have to make clear

that any other answer, whether it’s delay or other counterproposals, isunsatisfactory.

Thompson: Well I think that’s worth a little bit of discussion if thereis the possibility, and I don’t know about a deal for the bases for Turkey.And we substitute Polaris for the missiles we’ve got there. It seems tome in negotiations this isn’t entirely to be rejected. Negotiations withhim over this whole broad complex of questions. We’ve got to have iteventually or else have war.

And there’s some advantage even in our proposing it. Say: “Thiswon’t wait for your trip in November, come on over.”

Because these other paths, it seems to me, you’re playing Russianroulette. You’re flipping a coin as to whether you end up with world waror not.

President Kennedy: The only question is whether, giving him thetime, whether he makes a guarantee. Now, as I say, he’s not going to beany more happy about this than we are, I assume. Though the only thingis, he seems to be happier with the fact that he’s taking much more of arisk than perhaps we would have taken.

But . . . if he responds, giving us an ultimatum in a sense, the ques-tion really is whether we’re worse off then. There is an argument thatwe are worse off, if . . . in that . . .

He might accept something when it’s accomplished, just like wemight. [As] in the case of Hungary. He wouldn’t accept it perhaps somuch in advance.

Thompson: I think Mr. McCone’s right. If you approach him, you arealmost certainly going to have to get into negotiations.

Rusk: Well you may have a negotiation proposal, that doesn’t meanthat you have to get into it. Because the condition of it might be: Youstop this work on these missiles—

Thompson: But if this is accompanied with this notification that weare going to bomb Cuba if the work goes on in this. And if it’s accompa-

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 549

nied with the blockade on any further supplies of this sort, this is astrong action.

President Kennedy: No, I feel that there’s a difference in our action,and therefore in their response, between our knocking out these missilesand planes, and invading Cuba.

Thompson: I think there is.President Kennedy: Obviously, if he knocked out our missiles . . . If he

had said that he that was going to knock out our missile sites, and went anddid it one afternoon in Turkey, it would be different than if the Russian armystarted to invade Turkey. Face it: there’s a ten-day period of shootings.

And nobody knows what kind of success we’re going to have withthis invasion. Invasions are tough, hazardous. They’ve got a lot of equip-ment. A lot of—thousands of—Americans get killed in Cuba, and I thinkyou’re in much more of a mess than you are if you take out these . . .

I mean, this is all presumption, but I would think that if he invadesIran, it takes ten days and there’s a lot of fighting in Iran. We’re in amuch more difficult position [with an invasion] than if he takes outthose bases out there. It may be that his response would be the same,nobody can guess that, but by stretching it out you increase the . . .

Robert Kennedy: I don’t think you have to make up your mind ifyou’re going to invade. Even in the first 24 hours, 48 hours—

Taylor: We can’t invade that fast, Mr. President. It will take at leastseven days, unless we have some advance preparations that we can’tmake now.

President Kennedy: Why is that? Why? You mean, getting thesepeople into there?

Taylor: Getting in position. We’re now not making any moves thatcould give away our intentions.

Robert Kennedy: So I think you can always hold that out.President Kennedy: The only question is Guantánamo. I would think

Castro’s reprisal would be against Guantánamo, wouldn’t it?Taylor: That’s right. And we can immediately jump in there and

defend Guantánamo.Rusk: Is this quite clear, would it not be well to bring the dependents

out?Taylor: We have that—that could be done very quickly [four seconds

excised as classified information]—will be there, all during this period.We’ll keep shipping there.

Rusk: I just think if we reinforced Guantánamo and simply explainedat the moment, do this as quick as possible, that we are pulling thedependents out only to make room for the reinforcements.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962550

Taylor: Well, you could do that if that is acceptable. We’d like to dothat if that’s acceptable to you.

President Kennedy: How many dependents are there?Taylor: Twenty-two hundred plus.President Kennedy: Now, what about holding Guantánamo itself ?

Shouldn’t we, really, if we’re considering taking some action on Sunday,shouldn’t we really be having some ships and troops off of there?

Taylor: We have—One minute and forty-nine seconds excised as classified information.But they can leave under the guise of going to the Pacific, if you

want to.Alexis Johnson: Wouldn’t you, at the same time you make your

approach to Khrushchev, wouldn’t you immediately start evacuation ofdependents?

Taylor: Anytime you can give us the word go—President Kennedy: Obviously, yeah. [Others agree.] But I’m just

wondering about whether . . .Obviously Castro’s response wouldn’t be against Guantánamo. If he

overruns Guantánamo, we’re going to have to invade. But . . .Taylor: He won’t overrun Guantánamo, I’ll tell you. We may have a

big fight around the place. But by the time we get the Marines in, withthe carrier-based aviation, we can hold Guantánamo.

President Kennedy: Now, there isn’t anything we ought to be doingin the next three or four days, as far as the Navy?

Taylor: Many things, sir, but all of them have a certain visibility.The great bottleneck in this invasion plan is the assembly of ship-

ping. The shipping and moving of heavy equipment such as the tanksout of Fort Hood. So that anything that we do in that field will tend tocontract the time. Thus if you do decide that you have to have a period ofdiscussion, if we could be doing those things in that period of time, thenwe’d reduce the reaction time.

Rusk: Well, some of this surfacing it wouldn’t be bad if the time[unclear].

McNamara: Very good. Mr. President, I would suggest that we notconsider the actions we might take here which would surface, or in anyway might surface, until you’ve decided: One, when you want to makethis information available to our public. Because we’re sitting tight on allthis at the present time and any of these actions are likely to cause—

President Kennedy: Let’s start going through now what—Robert Kennedy: Can I just ask a question? President Kennedy: Yes.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 551

Robert Kennedy: How much time . . . ? For instance, the Presidentgoes on Sunday [October 21], say you had the attack on Monday[October 22], the air attack. How many days after that would you beprepared to invade, if that was necessary?

McNamara: Seven to ten days.Taylor: There are two ways to do it—Robert Kennedy: Get these fellows [the Marine units] around from

the West Coast?Taylor: There are two ways to do it, Mr. President, while we’re on

the subject. One is a quick reaction to landing which gets troops inseven—[Twelve seconds excised as classified information.]

The second is certainly preferable militarily. On the other hand, if thatlength of time doesn’t fit into the overall plan, we could do it the other way.

Rusk: Mr. President, on the declaration of war point, on the invasionside of things, [if you made the quick strike against these Cuban installa-tions, you could at that point say that any reaction against the UnitedStates or Guantánamo]32 would bring about a state of war with Cuba.Then you’ve put considerable pressure on them to stop it right there.

President Kennedy: Well, now, as I said, the advantage of givingKhrushchev notification—if we’re going to give Khrushchev notificationwe might as well give everybody else—is to get his Russians out ofthere if we wants to, or to back down if he wants to?

Thompson: I think the first [advantage] is the point about our allies.If we eventually face the crunch on Berlin that we would have some ofthem still with us.

Secondly, to give him a chance to back down or at least to . . .Thirdly, to get a negotiation with him.President Kennedy: What is the suggested method if we are going to

communicate with Khrushchev? Dobrynin? Or send somebody?Thompson: I’d be inclined to telegraph to Foy [Kohler, in Moscow]

to . . .Rusk: I’d do it simultaneously. I’d do it [unclear].Robert Kennedy: What do you think about a personal emissary from

the President? I think it would be somebody who could go in and just . . .as well as having a letter, be talking to him about it.

Rusk: Well you’d . . . you’d almost have to announce at the same timewhat the situation is in Cuba.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962552

32.The bracketed clause was transcribed from the sound segment that is missing from ourcurrent copy of this tape.

Bundy: Yeah.Rusk: Because unless you send someone that has no visibility . . .Robert Kennedy: Well, I think you can get somebody on a plane.President Kennedy: It might take you a couple of days to get an

appointment with Khrushchev and so on.Rusk: I just think a written message through Dobrynin is probably . . .Dillon: A written message to which he has to reply in writing is . . . Thompson: Otherwise you get a fuzzy conversation in which it’s

very hard to . . .Robert Kennedy: How do you handle the letter?Thompson: He’s pretty adept at these matters.Rusk: Adlai Stevenson thinks a special emissary might be very advis-

able.President Kennedy: Let’s say we ask Mr. Robert Lovett to go over

there, with a letter. You’d have to put him on a plane; you’d have to sendhim to Moscow; you’d have to make an appointment with Khrushchev;all that would take . . .

Rusk: You’d have to wrap up the Soviet pilots, get a special plane.Thompson: You’d have to fill him in pretty completely on the back-

ground. I don’t know how he would handle the conversation.Bundy: You’re going to have to do that with Foy. He doesn’t know

much.Thompson: I wouldn’t suggest he necessarily needs to deliver it per-

sonally. You can just send it around. I would think just getting it toKhrushchev is . . .

President Kennedy: What does that do for us though, Tommy? I mean,do you think that there’s a chance that he might—do what with the . . .

Thompson: What Khrushchev will do?Bundy: Khrushchev will call for a summit.Thompson: I think that’s almost certain.I think it’s quite possible that he would say that: “I’m prepared to

take no further action in Cuba pending these talks.” And in the meantimeif we made this announcement there, would then make the announce-ment: That we will knock these things off; if there were any furtherwork done on them. And stop any others from coming in.

In the meantime, the military makes their moves in preparation foran invasion. So I don’t think [unclear]. The Russians would know this,and this is a strong warning to them. In some ways . . .

President Kennedy: Well, if we ever get to a summit, then he’s goingto be talking about Berlin.

Dillon: Well the only point in talking to them is the point originally

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 553

that George made, [which] is that it gives us a better position with ourallies. Not perhaps with Khrushchev but with the world.

Ball: I think the history too would give us a better position.Dillon: That’s it. For history, or to the world, we’ve done it. But

that’s what we’re doing it for. We’re not doing it to the . . . and if he doeshave other [unclear].

McCone: [Unclear] a demand on him right away. For instance, thereare quite a number of ships, in transit. You demand that they would beturned around.

Thompson: If he does have trouble at this point—McCone: And demand that this work stop at once.Bundy: How much better are you off before history if you ask him 24

hours ahead of time, if he says: “I want a summit,” and you say, “Nuts.”Rusk: [Unclear.] It’s what has to happen in Cuba. Before there can be

a summit.Sorensen: And before we would call off—Bundy: You can have that in the first message. It’s very likely he

would propose that we meet. But we can’t meet unless we can haveagreement on these things.

Taylor: Doesn’t the Gromyko call this afternoon have some advan-tages from the possibility that we can get him to lie that he doesn’t havethem—

Rusk: Well I was going to suggest that the President considerexpressing to Gromyko our deep disturbance about all this provocationin Cuba. Read to him from this paragraph of this statement of September4th and see what Gromyko says. See if he will lie about it, becauseAmbassador Dobrynin said there are no offensive weapons there and soforth, but Dobrynin might not know.

Robert Kennedy: Well, what if he says there are? Then what do you do?Rusk: I don’t think the President ought to disclose to Gromyko what

we have in mind, until we get an actual message to him [Khrushchev].Robert Kennedy: What if he says to you: “We’ve just got the same

kind of weapons you’ve got in Turkey. Because they’re no more offensivethan your weapons in Turkey”? Then what do you do? What do you do?

Rusk: He’s talking about [a Turkish and NATO deployment decisionmade] five years ago and that’s not relevant. Well, first the Rio Treaty.

Second, that we have here in this postwar era a rough status quo.When they took strong action against Hungary, on the ground that thiswas on their side of that status quo. Now they’re penetrating into thishemisphere which violates not only modern obligations but historicwell-known policies of the United States toward this hemisphere.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962554

In fact, in any event NATO was itself built as a direct response toSoviet aggression, fully registered on the agenda of the U.N. In 1946 wedidn’t have any allies. There was no Rio Pact or NATO or CENTO orSEATO. The only allies that we had were those that were the disappear-ing allies that fought together during World War II. And these thingscame into being as a result of Stalin’s policies. It makes all the differencein the world in this situation.

President Kennedy: How many missiles do we have in Turkey?Bundy: Fifteen.Plus nuclear-equipped aircraft?McNamara: Yes.33

Gilpatric: Yes.Robert Kennedy: Well if you went that far [in talking to Gromyko]

and decided to do that, we could perhaps resolve the thing aboutKhrushchev saying: “Well . . . this poses a problem for us. We’re going tohave to take whatever steps . . .”

Ball: Well I think you’d have to say this is totally unacceptable.Robert Kennedy: I mean, if you get into it at all, if you went into it as

blatantly as that . . .I suppose the other way is to do it rather subtly [with Gromyko]

with me saying: “What are you doing in Cuba? It’s embarrassing in thiselection. What kind of missiles are you sticking down there?”

Taylor: Well, if he admits it, we have the advantage of being able todiscuss it without indicating our own knowledge of the situation. If hedenies it, you have something that we can [unclear] Khrushchev withlater.

Bundy: That’s correct.Robert Kennedy: This would indicate, the frontal approach would

indicate that you have knowledge of it. If you did it you’re likely[unclear].

Rusk: I think you start off talking about a general provocation inCuba, as far as the American people are concerned, in the hemisphere.

Sorensen: Actually, I think the Attorney General’s suggestion is apretty good gambit, to say to him: “Well, Khrushchev was not going todo anything before our election. But look what he’s doing in Cuba and soon.” And see if he . . .

McCone: [suggesting another line] “Well, the accusations that are

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 555

33. The United States had stockpiled nuclear bombs in Turkey, under U.S. control, for possibleuse by Turkish (or U.S.) F-100 aircraft.

being made by Senator Keating and others is that there are missilesdown there.”

Ball: I wouldn’t think the President would disclose it this afternoon,though [with Gromyko].

Bundy: The President ought to get him down and [unclear].Sorensen: No, just talk about what appears in the press, which is stir-

ring up these elections.Rusk: There would be some significance that Khrushchev in his talk

with [U.S. ambassador to Moscow Foy] Kohler did not deny there weremissiles there.34

President Kennedy: He didn’t?Rusk: No.Bundy: He wasn’t charged with it, but he didn’t put it that way.Rusk: I think . . . referring to refugee reports [unclear] that they

know now that we know. They must know now that we know. That’swhy they’re working around the clock down there.

Robert Kennedy: Well, then maybe if they [the Soviets] said that, Isuppose you wouldn’t have to send a message to Khrushchev. Then youcould do it all.

Bundy: At this point.Taylor: One point we haven’t mentioned, Mr. President, is the fact

we still haven’t all the intelligence. I’m impressed with how our mindshave changed on this in 24 hours based upon this last intelligence. Ithink before we really commit ourselves we ought to get the full pictureof this island.

Bundy: I agree.Gilpatric: That’s why Monday [October 22], I think, is better than

Saturday [October 20].Taylor: I think so, very much so.President Kennedy: Monday?Taylor: As long as you think you can hold it.McCone: I think, tomorrow morning at this time we could have a

quite a good deal more information, from the photography we ran yes-terday.

I’m worried about this getting out. I think it’s remarkable that it’sbeen held this week. For that reason I feel that we mustn’t delay too long.

President Kennedy: We haven’t much time.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962556

34. Rusk is referring to Khrushchev’s conversation with Ambassador Kohler on 16 October,described in a cable Kohler sent back to Washington that day.

McNamara: Mr. President, I think we can hold it, however, tillMonday [October 22]. I think the thing that is lacking is not more intel-ligence, although that will modify our position somewhat. What’s lackinghere is a real well thought out course of action, or alternative courses ofaction.

I think we ought to go back this afternoon and split up into a coupleof groups and assign one group one course of action, another groupanother course of action and work them out in great detail. My guess isthat both of these courses of action—really there are only two we’retalking about.

I would call one a rapid introduction to military action. The other isa slow introduction to military action. Those are really the only twocourses of action that we are talking about.

The slow introduction is a political statement followed, or accompa-nied, by a blockade. The rapid introduction is a brief notice to Khrushchevfollowed by a strike.

Now those are basically the only two alternatives we’ve discussedwith you. We ought to take both of those and follow them through andfind out what the prices are likely to be and how to minimize thoseprices.

President Kennedy: Well, let me ask you this. Is there anyone herewho doesn’t think that we ought to do something about them? I guessthere’s only . . .

McNamara: I, for one, am not clear however which of these twocourses we should follow.

President Kennedy: Well, we’ve got so many different alternativesas far as the military action. As I say, we have the blockade without adeclaration of war. We’ve got a blockade with a declaration of war.We’ve got strikes I, II, and III. We’ve got invasion. We’ve got notifica-tion to Khrushchev and what that notification ought to consist of.

Robert Kennedy: In other words, it’s not really that bad though.Because if you have the strike, you don’t have to make up your mindabout the invasion. I mean, that’s not going to come for three or fourdays—

President Kennedy: A blockade—Bundy: In one sense you have to make up your mind to face it if you

have to.Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I think everybody’s [unclear]. So all you have

really, as Bob says, all you have is really the two courses of action.And I think that as long as it really has come down to this after talk-

ing about this for 48 hours . . .

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 557

Alexis Johnson: Mr. President, there’s one problem—Robert Kennedy: I think his idea of us going back and trying to put it

down for you more definitively rather than you trying to discuss it . . .Rusk: Well, and even there I think the real issue is: What do you do,

if anything, before you strike?Dillon: When do you tell the press? Exactly what do you say to

them?Robert Kennedy: And then what do you tell the American people.

And I think that we should go back . . .President Kennedy: Well now as I . . . militarily you’re not really in a

position to do this strike until Monday, is that it?Taylor: That is correct.McNamara: May I suggest, Max, that we still keep open the possibility

of [a decision on] Saturday [October 20]. [Air Force General Walter]Sweeney, the other night, said Saturday. Now I know that events havechanged. We’ve got more targets and so on since then, Mr. President. ButI don’t think this is absolutely critical and I don’t think we need to decidethis morning.

Taylor: Unless the President really needed it [unclear]; we can cer-tainly need it militarily. . . .

McNamara: We need it. We need it.President Kennedy: Well, now the only argument for going quicker

than that really, not only is the one that it may leak but also that the—Bundy: Level of readiness.President Kennedy: I don’t know, whether if there are two of them

[Soviet MRBMs in Cuba] ready, whether that makes a hell of a differ-ence anyway.

Bundy: I don’t think so.President Kennedy: Because if they’re going to fire nuclear missiles

at us . . .Bundy: If they were rational, Mr. President.Taylor: We may find on this photography that has been taken, Mr.

President, how it’s highly desirable to take out everything that is visibleat the time we go.

McNamara: It would seem to me your instructions to us, or ourassumptions, ought to be that we’re going to be ready at the earliest pos-sible moment regardless of whether you want us to go there or not. Andthat earliest possible moment is for an air strike Saturday morning[October 20]. That’s the earliest possible moment.

Taylor: The strikes should be number III and number IV.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962558

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 559

McNamara: And we ought to be ready for strikes III, IV, or V, ineffect.

And the second thing we ought to do is get this intelligence in hereand interpret it as rapidly as possible. Now, we’ve taken actions to do that.

The third thing we ought to do is really think through these coursesof action more definitively and get back to you tonight, I would think,with options laid out.

Taylor: That’s right.Robert Kennedy: Bob, militarily, which would be the best day to

strike? Saturday, Sunday or Monday? Militarily. Considering . . .McNamara: Balancing everything off . . . Robert Kennedy: I think that’s the entire question before us.McNamara: Max is figuring, they keep saying Monday [October

22]. I would say Saturday [October 20].Taylor: I would say Tuesday [October 23].Robert Kennedy: Well, even though the missiles will be in place?Taylor: The more time we’ve got, the better we can do it. [Mixed

voices.]Robert Kennedy: The missiles will be in place though, Max.Rusk: Mr. President, on that, General Taylor mentioned yesterday

that we’ve got a relatively untrained armed forces at the moment interms of combat experience. It’s going to take some very careful work inall echelons. And if we overlook steps that are necessary to give us theprotection that we need against, say, mining and things of that sort,through a rush here, and if somebody really gets hurt . . .

Taylor: It’s one thing for us to have time to get the orders out butanother thing to get the orders out and then have experienced men as acheck that everything has gone as we ordered.

McNamara: I’m not suggesting a date. I’m simply suggesting thatour action ought to be to plan for the earliest possible strike becausethere is another penalty we pay with untrained personnel, and withoperational nuclear weapons we run great dangers. And that this is thething that we must keep in our minds. I don’t know when these [Soviet]weapons are going to be operational but we may find some tonight thatare, or tomorrow night, or Saturday night.

But I don’t think that we have to decide that now. That is a judgment.We ought to be ready—

President Kennedy: We ought to be ready in case. It looks likethey’re [the Soviets] going to be and you’ve got to be ready Saturdaymorning.

McNamara: That’s right. Exactly.Taylor: But may I assume that category I and II is out? That we are

planning for III, IV, or V? If we do that, that will simplify our planningand arrangements.

Bundy: Can I raise the question of the President’s going away?President Kennedy: Yeah, I want to ask about that. I’m supposed to

go . . . start at 11:30 or 12:00 tomorrow [on a scheduled campaign trip].If I cancel it, of course, it’s a major—What?

Unidentified: It’s pretty important, I should think.President Kennedy: To go?Robert Kennedy: It really is.Dillon: You can’t cancel it.President Kennedy: What?Dillon: It’s very difficult to cancel it now.President Kennedy: Without an explanation. I better figure on going

on Friday. I can always come back late Friday night if this turns out . . .So we better just go ahead on that.

Now, the only thing is, we ought to have, probably, a meeting before Igo see Gromyko. I see him at five.

Ball: Mr. President, the only question I think you ought to consideris that if there should be a leak and, given the campaigning, I think thatthe public might find it pretty underhanded.

Robert Kennedy: I’d just deny the leak.Bundy: Which leak? Of what?McCone: I don’t think you can. I don’t think [Senator Kenneth]

Keating would leak this. Robert Kennedy: No, I’d just say that, John, this couldn’t be more

untrue. And so what, after it’s all over. I think everybody just has—McCone: I don’t think you can deny the leak. I think that there’s too

much information on this through the refugee channels.Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but it’s been in there all the time, John.

Nothing has come up in the last three days that’s going to—McNamara: You don’t deny the leak. What you say is: “There have

been a number of rumors going around. I’ve asked the Central IntelligenceAgency and the Defense Department to check every one of these. We’reinvestigating it; we’re querying refugees; we’re taking every possible stepto determine the condition.”

Bundy: And there’s no present change in the government’s position.Sorensen: But the President isn’t going to hold a press conference

anyway.Rusk: There is the other question too, as to whether, since we’re

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962560

heading into, what we are heading into here. The President hopes tounify or not, by going on this trip this weekend? Unify the country?

President Kennedy: I don’t need to unify the country. That’s not thepurpose of the trip. [Laughter.]

The only problem is, calling it off, obviously that’d be a major storyas to why we called it off. So unless we were about to proceed Saturdayor Sunday, I’d better not call it off.

We are going over to Monday unless we get our sequences into aposition where we can surface this thing by Friday afternoon. Theminute I call off [this trip], this thing is going to break. Because thenevery newspaperman will be around to everybody and then they’regoing to get it. So I don’t think I can call this thing off tomorrow with-out having this thing—unless we are ready to have it surface tomorrow.

Dillon: I don’t think there’s any problem about unifying the countrybecause once you . . . This action will unify it just like that. No problemat all. [Mixed voices, general agreement.]

Bundy: I wouldn’t [unclear] this weekend.President Kennedy: Well, I’m not going to.McCone: [Unclear] unanimously support that.Rusk: Now there may be some inquiries about this meeting this

morning.Bundy: I still believe that our best cover is intensive review of the

defense budget. Now we haven’t had to use it yet. [Laughter.]President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s all right because we had this

[10:00] Cabinet meeting.Dillon: It’s credible after the Cabinet meeting. More credible than it

was.Thompson: And, of course, I’d be seeing you in preparation for

Gromyko’s visit.Bundy: Martin isn’t here and I think it’s really very important.35

Martin: No, I’ll disappear.Rusk: Now, Mr. President, I have invited Gromyko to dinner after

our talk, but I’m inclined to call him and say that talks may go on for awhile and that we better cancel this dinner. I think this . . .

Bundy: I think it’s worth thinking about the channel of yourself toGromyko, though. And if we decide on a warning, having [someone

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 561

35. Martin was there. Bundy meant that people should not reveal that Martin was there, sincethat would reveal that the meeting concerned Latin America and their cover story wouldunravel.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962562

with] a good deal of responsibility and having someone play it bothways. Not for Friday night, not for tonight.

Rusk: [Unclear] won’t happen. I can see some real disadvantages insitting through a dinner there and appearing to be cozy and [unclear]and friendly and that sort of thing. But I think with the translation,with the interpretation going on, this meeting [between PresidentKennedy and Gromyko] is apt to go beyond 7:30. It will go three orfour hours.

President Kennedy: What, my meeting with him?Rusk: Yes.Dillon: Mr. President, I have one thing.President Kennedy: It won’t go that long.Dillon: As you know, I am supposed to be leaving Saturday after-

noon to go down to Mexico City for this—the Inter-American confer-ence opens Monday. I could wait and go Sunday if that made anydifference. I’ll have to leave various things that we’ll have to—

President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we wait on that because we’ll allknow a little better on the schedule.

Why don’t you . . . if you want to just call off the dinner on some . . . Idon’t know what your pretext is going to be. They’ll probably want us . . .

Rusk: You’re leaving town tomorrow night?President Kennedy: Yeah. Let’s see what happens. Why don’t you

wait to call it off until things are really [unclear], saying: “The Presidenthas asked . . .”

But now, what have we . . . ? What is this group going to do as far asmeeting? Trying to get some more final judgments on all these ques-tions which we turned around?

Sorensen: Well, can I make a suggestion there, Mr. President?It seems to me that the various military courses have been outlined

here as the Secretary says. They need to be developed in more detail,step by step, and so on. But there has also been general though notunanimous agreement that you are likely to be making some kind of rep-resentation to Khrushchev ahead of time, maybe very shortly ahead oftime. And I think that you ought to have, in great detail, drawn up whatthat representation would consist of. Were it a letter, what will be a sat-isfactory answer? And soon.

President Kennedy: Yes. Well, we have to have . . . certainly to do theKhrushchev. We have to decide in advance we’d do it, or whether I wouldmake the public statement that we really had talked about the afternoonbefore.

These are some of the questions now. How do we want to function?

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 563

Rusk: Well, I think that we ought to draw the group together exceptfor those who are going to be needed on military assignments.

McNamara: I don’t believe the military problem, the military plans,need much elaboration. That isn’t really what I was thinking about.

What I was really thinking about is this give-and-take here.Bundy: That’s very true.McNamara: Which we haven’t gone through. I think the price of any

one of these actions is going to be very very high. I can visualize a wholeseries of actions that the Russians are going to take. And it seems to mewe ought to lay those down. And then we ought to consider, how can wereduce that price?

And I would suggest, therefore, that under the guidance of State,because this is primarily an international political problem, we developtwo groups here. And that we have Defense and State people in those twogroups, and we take two or three hours this afternoon to let thosetwo groups take these two basic alternatives. They can derive anynumber of variations they wish to.

But one is a minimum military action, a blockade approach, with aslow buildup to subsequent action. And the other is a very forceful mili-tary action with a series of variants as to how you enter it. And considerhow the Soviets are going to respond. This is what we haven’t done.

Dillon: Well, not only the Soviet response but what the response tothe response will be.

McNamara: [Mixed voices.] I think that’s it, exactly. So then, how werespond to these responses.

Rusk: They’re beginning to work on them already. Ball: We’ve done a good deal of work on this.Rusk: Yes, we could pull those together.McNamara: Well, I think it would be useful to pull it together.President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s see. Mr. Secretary [Rusk], I

ought to meet with you at 4:30 with Tommy before the Gromyko [meet-ing] to see where we are on this conversation. Then, at the end of theGromyko conversation, we may want to have . . . I don’t think we’ll gothree or four hours but let’s say we finish in two hours. I don’t know whathe wants to see us about. And then, whether we ought to, some time thisevening, have another meeting based on what Gromyko said and seewhere we are with planning.

Bundy: I hate to be worried about security all the time but I thinkevening meetings are very dangerous. I think they create a feelingaround the town and almost inevitably people have to leave dinners. Ithink it’s a very—

President Kennedy: Well, I’m going to leave right now so why don’tyou, Mr. Secretary and Mr. McNamara, decide how we are going to pro-ceed for this afternoon. In any case, I will meet you [Rusk] at 4:30 andwe will meet . . .

Mr. Lovett is coming down here. He’ll be here at a quarter of five orat five. We can . . .

[speaking to Bundy] Are you going to be in with me with Gromyko?Bundy: Whatever you want.President Kennedy: There’s no need to be. Why don’t you—Bundy: I’ll talk to him.President Kennedy: —discuss with Mr. Lovett and see whether he’s

got any thoughts about it. And we will then be in touch tonight. At least,Bundy will communicate anything that Gromyko may have said to seewhether that affects any of our . . . [Bundy whispers something, perhapsabout Lovett.] I’ll talk to him.

President Kennedy then leaves the meeting, and it begins to break up. Afew participants stay behind and continue to talk in mixed conversations.The following are the more audible fragments of these conversations onthe recording.Dillon: As long as this has been all briefed to the Congress, I quite

agree [unclear].Bundy: He’s coming into the White House, I gather, at five to five.

Do you want to [unclear] briefing [unclear] here or go over it yourself ?Gilpatric: Actually, Mr. Secretary, I think this blockade paper might

interest you [unclear].Bundy: Well, the question of reactions is what Bob has in mind [for

the analytical work to be done].McNamara: That’s right.Bundy: That’s . . .Alexis Johnson: Soviet reactions and our counterreactions.Bundy: Yeah.Alexis Johnson: We’ve catalogued Soviet reactions, but . . .Rusk: [aside to someone else] Why don’t you come to my office at

around, say, 2:00 or 2:30. 2:30.Taylor: Bob, one of the things that has not been laid out in front of

the President is mobilization requirements. At this point I—McNamara: Yes, certainly, and [unclear].Rusk: [Unclear] Bob is that . . . well, we can put some words on a

piece of paper. But you can’t really say much about the Soviet reaction.You can say what they may be.

Taylor: For that reason, though, I think we have to recognize that

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962564

we will have to start mobilizing when we make this strike. We have tohave the necessary alert [unclear] available strength to meet any ofthese possibilities.

Rusk: Yeah.Gilpatric: There are about five areas; we’ve done a fair amount of

work trying to figure out where it is possible—McNamara: I don’t think we have had enough discussion among this

group, enough serious discussion, of a blockade approach versus imme-diate strike approach.

Gilpatric: No, that’s true.McNamara: So I’d at least suggest we get together to do that.Dillon: I think you ought to think on the blockade approach too, of

not just of what it does to the Russians but what the effect is on the restof our own people and on the rest of Latin America of allowing thesethings that’s there. The commitment [unclear] which they will under theblockade approach.

Thompson: If you announce at the same time that you are going totake them out of there [unclear] remove [unclear].

Martin: As far as the blockade approach is concerned, if it is a blockadewhich is adequate, if it has a chance of bringing down Castro. This will bemuch more satisfactory in Latin America than just taking out the missiles.

Robert Kennedy: Has a blockade ever brought anybody down?Bundy: The missiles go to blockade, I think. The missiles are . . . I

can’t see that you do the missiles without the . . .Taylor: I wouldn’t take these things out without resolving to let

nothing else in.Dillon: Oh no. But I mean the blockade without the missiles.Alexis Johnson: If you don’t make them operational.Rusk: I would think blockade with at least [strikes] I or II. [Option]

One I guess would be a pretty good size wallop. But a blockade plus thatwould be a minimum in any event. Wouldn’t it?

Taylor: The minimum. That would make the only sense—Bundy: Well, are there people for a blockade without a strike?Thompson: I am.McNamara: I am. [Unclear].Robert Kennedy: I am.Alexis Johnson: Well, I think there’s a big difference, [unclear].Taylor: If you’re talking about 24 hours or something like that, but

not for longer.Thompson: A blockade on military weapons, plus moving your

troops, getting into position, and that would be in connection with the

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 565

announcement that you’re going to overfly it, and that you were going tostrike if this thing went on.

Taylor: If there were any further work done.Thompson: And all these other measures to . . .Dillon: Well that would mean overflying low altitude [reconnaissance].Alexis Johnson: That’s right. At low altitude.Thompson: Yes. I would do all those things.Taylor: And air engagement over the island.Bundy: The great advantage of that, of course, is you don’t kill any

Russians.McNamara: This is the main theory.Alexis Johnson: Or Cubans.Bundy: Or Cubans.Gilpatric: It’s not a direct conflict.Dillon: Well what happens when they start shooting down your

planes?Taylor: Well, yeah. That’s the point. You hit them [unclear] chance

again.Rusk: Then they’ve escalated. Then they’ve escalated.Taylor: Now the only military advantage is the fact you can be doing

these things which you would like to do before we execute an invasion.Alexis Johnson: Now, the blockade approach we contemplated here

though has a considerable number of steps leading up to it.McNamara: That’s right.Alexis Johnson: This is not an immediate, we didn’t contemplate—Martin: Both in terms of political negotiations and military pre-

paredness.Alexis Johnson: Military preparedness and political negotiations.Gilpatric: If you announce a blockade, how long before it is actually

imposed?Rusk: Well immediately.McNamara: Well it becomes effective over a period of hours, 48 hours.Alexis Johnson: You see if you are going to do it within the frame-

work, you have the two choices. You do it—well, three choices really. Youdo it unilaterally without declaration of war. This is about the worst of all.

Unidentified: This would get you in real trouble.Bundy: You must declare. I think the President did not fully grasp that.Alexis Johnson: Then you’ve got the OAS track that the Secretary

[Rusk] was talking about here. Some way of getting it sanctioned underthe OAS support.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962566

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 567

And then you have getting it sanctioned under OAS plus declarationof war on our part are the three—

Martin: May I also point out that I think you can start the politicaldiscussions, and the military preparations, and have a blockade as part ofthese initial actions, without having decided whether your final actionwill stop with the blockade or will include military—

Bundy: Do your blockade before OAS consent?Dillon: The purpose of a war is to destroy your enemy and that’s

the only purpose of it. And so, if you do declare war, how do you . . . Imean, you only justify the blockade on the basis of that is what it’sgoing to do. And that you’re going to carry it through completely andtotally, so there’s not much difference between that and straightaction.

Rusk: Of course, there’s another advantage to the blockade actiontoo. Put on a blockade and then the Soviets hit the Turkish missile sites.Then your hands are probably free to [unclear].

McNamara: I think you have to look to the end of the other course toreally see the potential of a blockade. The end to the other course, theend to the other course is the missiles out of Cuba and some kind of aprice. Now the minimum price are missiles out of Turkey and Italy, itseems to me.

Martin: With Castro still there?McNamara: Pardon me?Martin: Castro’s still there.Bundy: No, Castro goes out on either of these roads in my judgment,

at the end of the road.McNamara: He may or may not. This is something to think about.But, in any case, the minimum price you pay under the military

course of action is missiles out of Turkey and Italy. And they may be outby physical means. Because of the Russians moving against them. Andyou have a serious potential division in the alliance. Now it seems to methat’s the best possible situation you could be in as a result of the militarycourse. I can visualize many worse situations.

Under the blockade, [tapes changing, material repeated] the best possi-ble situation—

Bundy: The other thing you can do with a blockade is consult. That’sclear. You can consult with everybody.

McNamara: The best possible conclusion of a blockade, it seems tome, is that the alliance is not divided. You have agreed to take your mis-siles out of Turkey and Italy, and the Soviets have agreed either to take

them out of Cuba or impose some kind of control comparable to yourcontrol over the missiles in Turkey and Italy. Now that’s the best possiblesolution. There are many worse solutions.

Taylor: Now, I thought we were hoping last night that we would getthe collapse of Castro.

McNamara: Well you might get that.Martin: I think so, too. [Unclear] best, I think—Bundy: I believe that Castro is not going to sit still for a blockade and

that that’s to our advantage. I’m convinced myself that Castro has to go.I always thought . . . It never occurred to [me before], I just think, his[Castro’s] demon is self-destruction and we have to help him do that.

McNamara: Well, then you’re going to pay a bigger price. Because—Bundy: Later.McNamara: Later. And I think that’s a possibility. But the price is

going to be larger. I really think we’ve got to think these problemsthrough more than we have.

At the moment I lean to the blockade because I think it reduces thevery serious risk of large-scale military action from which this countrycannot benefit under what I call program two [surprise strike].

Bundy: Russian roulette and a broken alliance.McNamara: Russian roulette, exactly so, and a broken alliance.Robert Kennedy: Can I say this? What are the chances of . . . You’ve

got to say to him, “They can’t continue to build these missiles. All rightthen, so you’re going to have people flying over all the time.” Well, atnight it looks a little different than it did the next morning.

McNamara: Oh, he’s not going to stop building. He’s going to con-tinue to build.

Robert Kennedy: But not if you knock them out though, Bob?McNamara: I think this goes back to what you say, at the time of

blockade. I’m not sure you can say that.Robert Kennedy: Are you going to let him continue to build the mis-

siles?McNamara: This goes back to what you begin to negotiate. He says:

“I’m not going to stop building. You have them in Turkey.” At the timeyou’ve acted by putting the blockade on. That’s done.

Robert Kennedy: All right. Then you let them build the missiles?And you let them—

McNamara: Then you talk.Thompson: Is your assumption that he would run the blockade?McNamara: No, no. But they have goods inside that they use to carry

on construction.

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962568

Robert Kennedy: We tell them they can build as many missiles asthey want?

McNamara: Oh, no. No, what we say is: “We are going to blockadeyou. This is a danger to us. We insist that we talk this out and the dan-ger be removed.”

Robert Kennedy: Right. Now, but they’re going to go ahead and buildthe missiles.

McNamara: That’s right.[responding to an interjection] Overflights, definitely.So they—Robert Kennedy: They put the missiles in place and then they

announce they’ve got atomic weapons.McNamara: Sure. And we say we have them in Turkey. And we’re

not going to tolerate this.Sorensen: What is the relationship then between the blockade and

the danger?McNamara: Well, all this time Castro is being strangled.Thompson: Why wouldn’t you say that if construction goes on, you

would strike?McNamara: Well, I might, I might. But that is a more dangerous

form of the blockade.Taylor: What is your objection to taking out the missiles and the air-

craft?McNamara: My real objection to it is that it kills several hundred

Russians, and I think we’re going to have [unclear] a very strong responseto it.

Taylor: [Unclear] all around the world. They have—Unidentified: Then you start killing Russians, you get into escalation.McNamara: All right. Then I’ll go through the other courses of

action and—Robert Kennedy: Let’s just pursue that a little bit. You put the block-

ade on and then you tell them they can go ahead and construct the . . . McNamara: No, I don’t tell them.Robert Kennedy: Well, you don’t tell them [to go ahead,] but they

go ahead.McNamara: What I say is: “The danger must be removed.”Robert Kennedy: All right. They construct their—McNamara: But I don’t say that it has to be stopped tomorrow.Robert Kennedy: —they construct their missiles.Bundy: Could I ask how the discussion is going to proceed? I’m

sorry, I have to [unclear].

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 569

Robert Kennedy: Can we resume?Rusk: Could you come on that basis at 2:00 or 2:30?Bundy: I have a speech at 1:30 which is going to be very conspicuous

if I don’t give it.Rusk: Yeah. All right. Come when you can, at any time.Robert Kennedy: At 2:30?Rusk: 2:30. I suppose several [of us] have got to get away here at the

moment [unclear]. I think we’ve got to pursue this further and, Bob, Ithink that perhaps we could detail Alex [Johnson] and Paul [Nitze] andTommy [Thompson] to sketching in the body of these two alternatives[unclear].

Bundy: I thought Ted [Sorensen] [would] try various sizes of mes-sage with the drafts that exist with Tommy.

Rusk: I think we ought to get together as a group and talk aboutthese issues [unclear] heart of the matter.

McNamara: Yeah, I agree.Rusk: At 2:30.McNamara: 2:30. All right.Bundy: Couldn’t you and Tommy work on drafts—possible mes-

sages?Almost everyone but McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, Sorensen, and Thompsonthen gathers his papers and leaves, talking on the way out.Bundy: The Secretary wants to do it. [Unclear exchanges.]Thompson: Alexis, are you going to be free to work on this?Alexis Johnson: Free? [Unclear.] [Laughter.] [Unclear exchanges.]Unidentified: You want to come right over?Unidentified: I’ve got to have lunch with [unclear].Unidentified: Oh, are you?Unidentified: I’ve got to eat sometime! I haven’t eaten a thing yet.Laughter; more trailing discussions of departing officials. Two sepa-rate, simultaneous conversations can be overheard.Alexis Johnson: I might bring [unclear name] and Bill Bundy

[unclear].Taylor: I’ll be talking to you.Alexis Johnson: All right. Are we going to enlarge this out?Taylor: Meanwhile, they’re mobilizing and [unclear]. We’ll take out.

[Unclear response.]Unidentified: I haven’t enlarged this out at all. I thought everybody

in the office just—Unidentified: What did you figure out doing?Unidentified: Me too! [Unclear exchanges.]

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962570

McNamara (?): Are you going to handle the recon briefing?Taylor: Sure, sure.McNamara (?): Well, this is what I’d really like you—Taylor: We’ve got the President here. He says [strike options] III,

IV, or V. That’s what we’re going to [unclear] at this point.McNamara: In effect those cover I and II anyhow.Taylor: You can’t—you’re not quite—he’s not quite seeing as

[unclear] that one out because they get interlocked [unclear].McNamara: I know it. I realize that, but I’d rather work on III, IV,

and V that I or II.Taylor: [Unclear] take that decision [unclear].McNamara: Yeah.Bundy: I’m just checking the security of this chamber. [Quiet; unclear

exchanges.]Taylor: I suspect that [unclear].McNamara: Mac, one thing . . . I realize [unclear] security [unclear]

get in here without [unclear]. I really think we ought to [unclear]. Wehave to come up with [unclear].

Bundy: The President has all morning tomorrow. I . . .McNamara: I think we’re two meetings away from a decision

[unclear] and now it’s entirely a decision of security [press leaks].Bundy: That’s the problem.McNamara: But, we don’t have [unclear] in terms of time [unclear].

It’s well worth wasting the time if that’s the case.Bundy: Oh, I don’t think time bothers me at all.McNamara: I wouldn’t worry about the security. Not that much. We

can hold this [unclear]. I’m certain we can hold it.Bundy: But now let me tell you what [unclear].Sorensen: Particularly with the fact that [unclear]. There’s so much

speculation driving so many rumors.McNamara: [Unclear] rumor and all.Sorensen: Congress is out of town now, and there’ll be a lot of

[unclear].McNamara: My only point, Ted, is I think we need a meeting to see

the President. Because, we’re advancing. We’re further than we wereyesterday at this time. We might be further ahead tomorrow if we talk[unclear].

Bundy: I think everybody ought to give real attention . . . I’ve got, forexample, a newspaper [unclear].

McNamara: Yeah. Yeah.Bundy: It’s complicated.

Meeting on the Cuban Miss i l e Cris i s 571

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962572

Thompson: Did you figure on [unclear].McNamara: Well, I would strongly urge [perhaps urging the night

meeting that had worried Bundy] . . . At least I would urge you not tocancel it solely because of security. Because otherwise there are otherways [unclear] security.

Unidentified: Twenty-four hours.Unidentified: That’s vital.

Then the room fell silent. The tape recorder continued running for morethan 20 minutes until it ran out of tape or was turned off.

President Kennedy went to his scheduled meeting with the Japaneseminister for trade and industry, Eisaku Sato, and then had lunch in theMansion.

Near Midnight

During the course of the day, opinions had obviously switchedfrom the advantages of a first strike on the missile sites and onCuban aviation to a blockade.

Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis36

After lunch and a brief swim, while still in the Mansion, PresidentKennedy met with former secretary of state Dean Acheson. Achesonoutlined his views in favor of an immediate air strike without priorwarning to the Soviets.

At 3:30 P.M. Rusk and McNamara came back over to the White Housefrom their meetings at the State Department and reported on theirprogress. At 4:30 Rusk again returned to the White House, this time withThompson, to prepare President Kennedy for his meeting with Soviet for-eign minister Andrei Gromyko. That meeting began at 5:00. MeanwhileBundy, as planned, briefed and talked with former secretary of defenseRobert Lovett. McNamara and McCone also spoke to Lovett.

36. Tape 31.1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential RecordingsCollection.

The meeting with Gromyko lasted until about 7:15. Gromyko empha-sized the need to settle the Berlin issue. Though he repeated the promisethat the Soviets would do nothing before the November elections in theUnited States, he warned that later in that month the Soviet governmentwould bring the Berlin problem to conclusion. If there was no understand-ing, Gromyko said that “the Soviet government would be compelled, andMr. Gromyko wished to emphasize the word compelled,” to take steps toend the Western presence in Berlin. Gromyko described the Western mili-tary presence in Berlin as a “rotten tooth which must be pulled out.”

Gromyko also complained about U.S. threats against Cuba. TheSoviet Union was only training Cubans in the use of defensive weapons.President Kennedy said that “there was no intention to invade Cuba” andthat he would have been glad to give Khrushchev assurances to thateffect, if asked. Yet Soviet shipments of arms to Cuba were an extremelyserious matter, as a result of which the two countries faced “the mostdangerous situation since the end of the war [World War II]. ”

Returning to Cuban fears, Gromyko referred to the Bay of Pigs inva-sion attempt of 1961. Kennedy cut in to say that he’d already admittedthat this had been a mistake. He repeated that he “would have givenassurances that there would be no further invasion, either by refugees orby U.S. forces.” But since the Soviet shipments of arms had begun in July,the situation had changed.

Kennedy then read from his September 4 and 13 public statements,looking for a reaction. None was evident. The two leaders also discussedthe ongoing negotiations to restrict nuclear testing and Kennedy agreedto see Khrushchev when the Soviet leader came to the United States forthe U.N. meeting in November.37

After Gromyko left, Rusk and Thompson stayed and PresidentKennedy asked Lovett and Bundy to join them. Two years later Lovettrecalled their discussion as follows:38

[Kennedy] phoned down and asked me to come up to his office.When I went in, there was the President, Dean Rusk, LlewellynThompson, and that was all. At his suggestion, I went into Mrs.

Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meet ing 573

37. Quotations are from the full State Department Memorandum of Conversation for themeeting (A. Akalovsky was the notetaker), in National Security Archive, Cuban Missile CrisisFiles, 1992 Releases Box.38. From an interview by Dorothy Fosdick for the John F. Kennedy Library Oral HistoryProject, 19 November 1964. The interview was only two years after the event, and Lovett hadkept substantial notes of the session that he had reexamined in preparing for this interview. So

Lincoln’s office to avoid the press which seemed to have taken overthat section of the office building [the north side of the West Wingof the White House]. I learned that the reason for this was thatGromyko had just left.

When I went into the President’s office [the Oval Office], he wassitting in his rocking chair, with Rusk and Thompson on his left andthe sofa, on his right, vacant. He motioned Bundy and me to it. Heasked me if I had gotten the briefing and all the facts available, and Isaid that I had. He grinned and said, “I ought to finish the story bytelling you about Gromyko who, in this very room not over 10 min-utes ago, told more bare-faced lies than I have ever heard in so shorta time. All during his denial that the Russians had any missiles orweapons, or anything else, in Cuba, I had the low-level pictures in thecenter drawer of my desk and it was an enormous temptation toshow them to him.”39

The President then asked me what I thought of the situationand I outlined briefly the philosophy which I felt would be appro-priate here for the President to take, as well as the military stepswhich seemed to be called for. I urged the quarantine route [Lovettis using the term that later passed into common usage; it was thenstill called the blockade] as the first step . . . and the matter wasdiscussed in some detail with Rusk and Thompson joining in.40

At about this stage of the discussion the door onto the RoseGarden opened and the Attorney General came in and joined the dis-cussion. The President asked me to repeat what I had previouslysaid, and I did so. Robert Kennedy asked two or three very searchingquestions about the application of any blockade and indicated that hefelt as I did about the necessity for taking a less violent step at theoutset because, as he said, we could always blow the place up if neces-sary but that might be unnecessary and then we would then be in theposition of having used too much force. He did not support one of the

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962574

we find the account an unusually detailed record of a key moment in the shaping of Kennedy’sconclusions about how to proceed.39. In fact they were not low-level pictures. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba had not begun.40. Lovett explained in the same oral history interview that he thought a tight blockadeshould precede air strikes and a possible invasion. The blockade allowed a demonstration ofnational will to persuade the Russians to withdraw their missiles without great bloodshed,without appearing trigger-happy. His doubt, according to his notes of the time, “lay in the areaof the willingness of the Administration to follow through on a course of action undertaken byit.” This meant a full blockade, not letting up until the objective was accomplished, and beingready to escalate if necessary.

arguments which I had made to the effect that it might be contendedin the United Nations that we were guilty of an act of aggression ifwe ordered an air strike or an invasion whereas the imposition of aquarantine [blockade] could, I thought, be . . . justified far more eas-ily on the grounds that we were trying to prevent an aggression byremoving the tools which might make it possible in the hands of theCubans. I was, however, delighted to see that he was apparently ofthe same opinion that I was.

He also indicated that the President had received advice fromanother source that a full-stage invasion should be made and thatstill another adviser had strongly pled for an air strike. I remembercommenting that the President would undoubtedly receive two orthree more opinions, as I had observed it was a normal occupationalhazard in dealing with military matters to get three men togetherand get at least four opinions.

A considerable amount of the discussion with the President cen-tered on the possible reaction of the Russians and Thompson talkedon this point at some length. There seemed to be a consensus—bythis time various members of his staff had come in on three or fouroccasions to tell the President that it was past dinnertime—that thosewere risks which had to be taken in the national interest and as a mat-ter of national and world security. The whole subject of the protectionof the Western Hemisphere was gone over at some length and finallythe Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson withdrew [to goto the Gromyko dinner that was beginning at 8:00] and the Presidentwent over again three or four elements in this picture. The AttorneyGeneral and I were asked to stay and join him for dinner.

As I had been through a rather rugged day, which started at 6:30in the country, I asked the President’s leave to return to New York atsome reasonable hour and he smilingly agreed. I caught the lastshuttle out to LaGuardia [airport in New York City] and got homeafter midnight.

President Kennedy returned to his residential quarters for dinner atabout 8:20. Meanwhile, at the State Department, meetings had contin-ued with people coming and going. State’s acting legal adviser, LeonardMeeker, had been brought into the deliberations to do a legal analysis ofblockade options. Meeker suggested the term defensive quarantine insteadof blockade.

At about 9:15 P.M. Kennedy called the group of advisers back to theWhite House. Since the meeting was after hours, he dared not hold it in

Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meet ing 575

T H U R S DAY, O C TO B E R 18, 1962576

the West Wing of the White House for fear that reporters would noticeand wonder. So the meeting was held in the Oval Room on the secondfloor of the Executive Mansion. Therefore the session could not be tape-recorded.

At this meeting there was continued agreement that the UnitedStates must act, though Bundy voiced a dissenting view. The group gen-erally agreed that U.S. action should probably start with a blockaderather than an immediate attack. Kennedy discussed the timing of a pos-sible announcement of the blockade and directed that detailed planningbegin. The meeting broke up sometime near midnight.

After the others left, President Kennedy went to the Oval Office, pos-sibly accompanied by his brother. Aware that he had been unable torecord the meeting, President Kennedy turned on the recording machinethere in the Oval Office and began to dictate.

President Kennedy: [Unclear], Secretary [Robert] McNamara, DeputySecretary [Roswell] Gilpatric, General [Maxwell] Taylor, AttorneyGeneral [Robert Kennedy], George Ball, Alexis Johnson, Ed Martin,McGeorge Bundy, Ted Sorensen.41 During the course of the day, opinionshad obviously switched from the advantages of a first strike on the mis-sile sites and on Cuban aviation to a blockade.

Dean Acheson, with whom I talked this afternoon, stated that while hewas uncertain about any of the courses, favored the first strike as beingmost likely to achieve our result and less likely to cause an extreme Sovietreaction. That strike would take place just against the missile sites.

When I saw Robert Lovett, later after talking to Gromyko, he wasnot convinced that any action was desirable. He felt that the missilestrike, the first strike, would be very destructive to our alliances. TheSoviets would inevitably bring about a reprisal; that we would be blamedfor it—particularly if the reprisal was to seize Berlin. And that we’d beregarded as having brought about the loss of Berlin with inadequateprovocation, they having lived with these intermediate-range ballisticmissiles for years.

Bundy continued to argue against any action on the grounds thatthere would be, inevitably, a Soviet reprisal against Berlin and that this

41. These were apparently the participants in the White House meeting that had just ended.Dean Rusk and Llewellyn Thompson had stayed at the State Department attending the dinnerfor Gromyko, which dragged on until after midnight.

Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meet ing 577

would divide our alliance and that we would bear that responsibility. Hefelt we would be better off to merely take note of the existence of thesemissiles, and to wait until the crunch comes in Berlin, and not play whathe thought might be the Soviet game.

Everyone else felt that for us to fail to respond would throw intoquestion our willingness to respond over Berlin, [and] would divide ourallies and our country. [They felt] that we would be faced with a crunchover Berlin in two or three months and that by that time the Sovietswould have a large missile arsenal in the Western Hemisphere whichwould weaken our whole position in this hemisphere and cause us, andface us with the same problems we’re going to have in Berlin anyway.

The consensus was that we should go ahead with the blockade begin-ning on Sunday night. Originally we should begin by blockading Sovietsagainst the shipment of additional offensive capacity, [and] that wecould tighten the blockade as the situation requires. I was most anxiousthat we not have to announce a state of war existing, because it wouldobviously be bad to have the word go out that we were having a warrather than that it was a limited blockade for a limited purpose.

It was determined that I should go ahead with my speeches so that wedon’t take the cover off this, and come back Saturday night [October 20].

President Kennedy then turned off the tape recorder.

Friday, October 19, 1962

To the press and public, this was a day on which the President was sched-uled to fly to Cleveland, Ohio, and then on to Illinois for speeches andactivities in Springfield and Chicago. But before leaving town, Kennedywanted to confer secretly and directly with his military leaders.

9:45–10:30 A.M.

This blockade and political action, I see leading into war. Idon’t see any other solution for it. It will lead right into war.This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis1

Continuing their analysis of earlier U-2 photography, National Photo-graphic Interpretation Center analysts confirmed that the two MRBMsites near San Cristobal each had a regiment with eight SS-4s on launch-ers and eight more at hand for a second salvo. They pronounced bothsites already operational. They had found another regiment of SS-4s eastof Havana near Sagua La Grande. They expected these eight missiles tobe operational within a week.

Although they had still spotted no IRBMs, the suppositions of theday before were hardening into a certainty that the two sites nearGuanajay were intended for 2,200-mile-range SS-5s. The photos showedpermanent construction, for SS-5s were too big and heavy to be firedfrom mobile launchers. And it was the construction pattern that was thegiveaway, for they had not only seen it in photographs of the SovietUnion; they had technical data supplied by the spy Oleg Penkovsky.Seeing evidence of a nuclear warhead storage site in the area, the ana-

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962578

1. Including President Kennedy, George Anderson, Curtis LeMay, Robert McNamara, DavidShoup, Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler. Tape 31.2, John F. Kennedy Library, President’sOffice Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.

lysts predicted that the IRBMs would be up and operational in six toeight weeks.2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff met at 9:00. Taylor told them about the pre-vious night’s meeting and that the President and his advisers were lean-ing toward a blockade of some kind. He said President Kennedy wantedto see them in a few minutes. The Chiefs agreed to recommend a massiveair strike against Cuban military targets with no advance warning. Theydisagreed on the question of invasion; Taylor resisted this step. Theythen drove to the White House. McNamara joined them for their meet-ing with the President.

President Kennedy’s view of the Joint Chiefs was respectful butskeptical, with a touch of the former junior Navy officer’s attitudetoward top brass. His most recent experience with the military in a cri-sis had angered him—not for the first time. On September 30, only afew weeks earlier, at the peak of the crisis over the admission of a blackstudent, James Meredith, to the University of Mississippi, Kennedy hadcalled on troops to provide security amid violent chaos on the campus.He had felt the military was unresponsive, remarking at one point to anaide (with the tape recorder running) that “They always give you theirbullshit about their instant reaction and their split-second timing, but itnever works out. No wonder it’s so hard to win a war.”

The Chiefs filed into the Cabinet Room at 9:45. Taylor was accompa-nied by Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, a formidably competent fig-ure then widely respected in the country for his prowess as a leader andorganizer both during World War II and in the creation of the Air Force’sStrategic Air Command. With them was Chief of Naval OperationsGeorge Anderson, a tall, handsome admiral who looked as if Hollywoodhad cast him for the part. Anderson was widely admired in the Navy as a“sailor’s sailor,” and his sermons on clean living had earned him the nick-name “Straight Arrow.” There was also Army Chief of Staff EarleWheeler, whose reputation had been earned as a brilliant staff officer andWashington planner. Marine Corps commandant David Shoup had theopposite reputation. Shoup had won the Medal of Honor on the blood-soaked atoll of Tarawa in 1943 but was known, by 1962, as uninformed orerratic in the paper battles of the Pentagon. President Kennedy turned onthe recorder in the Cabinet Room as the meeting began.

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 579

2. The estimates briefed on 19 October were written down in a joint estimate of GMAIC,JAEIC, and NPIC, “Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba,” 19 October 1962.

Maxwell Taylor: Mr. President, as you know, we’ve been meeting onthis subject ever since we discovered the presence of missiles in Cuba.And I would say the debates in our own midst have followed very closelyin parallel those that you’ve heard from your other advisers.

From the outset I would say that we felt we were united on the mili-tary requirement: we could not accept Cuba as a missile base; that weshould either eliminate or neutralize the missiles there and prevent anyothers coming in. From a military point of view that meant three things.

First, attack with the benefit of surprise those known missiles andoffensive weapons that we knew about. Secondly, continued surveillancethen to see what the effect would be. And third, a blockade to prevent theothers from coming in.

I would say, again, from a military point of view, that seemed clear.We were united on that.

There has been one point, the importance of which we recognize,where we have never really firmed up our own position. Namely, thepolitical requirements and the measures to offset the obvious politicaldisabilities of this course of action. We know it’s not an easy course ofaction, and it has at least two serious weaknesses.

The first is we’re never sure of getting all the missiles and the offen-sive weapons if we fire a strike. Secondly, we see—all of us, all your advis-ers—that there would be a very damaging effect of this on our alliances.

To offset that, I have reported back some of the political measuresconsidered. I think most of us would say we recognize that some of thosethings must be done, although they would be at some loss to our mili-tary effectiveness of our strikes. I reported the trend last night whichI’ve detected for a couple of days, to move away from what I would call astraight military solution toward one based on military measures plusblockade. And that has been reported to the Chiefs this morning. I’vetaken the task Mr. McNamara assigned last night and we’re working onthat at this time.3

I think the benefit this morning, Mr. President, would be for you tohear the other Chiefs’ comments either on our basic, what I call the mili-tary plan, or how they would see the blockade plan.

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962580

3. Very late on 18 October Gilpatric, acting for McNamara, asked that the Chiefs work on howto help Latin American countries with their internal security, which of these countries couldhelp the United States blockade Cuba, which offensive weapons should be included in a block-ade, the possibility of blockading aircraft as well as ships, and related questions.

President Kennedy: Let me just say a little, first, about what theproblem is, from my point of view.

First, I think we ought to think of why the Russians did this. Well,actually, it was a rather dangerous but rather useful play of theirs. If wedo nothing, they have a missile base there with all the pressure thatbrings to bear on the United States and damage to our prestige.

If we attack Cuba, the missiles, or Cuba, in any way then it givesthem a clear line to take Berlin, as they were able to do in Hungaryunder the Anglo war in Egypt. We will have been regarded as—theythink we’ve got this fixation about Cuba anyway—we would be regardedas the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin. We would have no sup-port among our allies. We would affect the West Germans’ attitudetowards us. And [people would believe] that we let Berlin go because wedidn’t have the guts to endure a situation in Cuba. After all, Cuba is5[,000] or 6,000 miles from them. They don’t give a damn about Cuba.And they do care about Berlin and about their own security. So theywould say that we endangered their interests and security and reunifica-tion [of Germany] and all the rest, because of the preemptive actionthat we took in Cuba. So I think they’ve got . . . I must say I think it’s avery satisfactory position from their point of view. If you take the viewthat what really . . .

And thirdly, if we do nothing then they’ll have these missiles andthey’ll be able to say that any time we ever try to do anything aboutCuba, that they’ll fire these missiles. So that I think it’s dangerous, butrather satisfactory, from their point of view.

If you take the view, really, that what’s basic to them is Berlin andthere isn’t any doubt [about that]. In every conversation we’ve had withthe Russians, that’s what . . . Even last night we [Soviet foreign ministerAndrei Gromyko and I] talked about Cuba for a while, but Berlin—that’s what Khrushchev’s committed himself to personally. So, actually,it’s a quite desirable situation from their point of view.

Now, that’s what makes our problem so difficult. If we go in and takethem out on a quick air strike, we neutralize the chance of danger to theUnited States of these missiles being used, and we prevent a situationfrom arising, at least within Cuba, where the Cubans themselves havethe means of exercising some degree of authority in this hemisphere.

On the other hand, we increase the chance greatly, as I think they—there’s bound to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is—oftheir just going in and taking Berlin by force at some point. Which leavesme only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons—which is a hellof an alternative—and begin a nuclear exchange, with all this happening.

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 581

On the other hand, if we begin the blockade that we’re talking about,the chances are they will begin a blockade and say that we started it.And there’ll be some question about the attitude of the Europeans. Sothat, once again, they will say that there will be this feeling in Europethat the Berlin blockade has been commenced by our blockade.

So I don’t think we’ve got any satisfactory alternatives. When webalance off that our problem is not merely Cuba but it is also Berlin andwhen we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and recognizethe importance of our allies to us, that’s what has made this thing be adilemma for three days. Otherwise, our answer would be quite easy.

Curtis LeMay: Mr. President—President Kennedy: On the other hand, we’ve got to do something.

Because if we do nothing, we’re going to have the problem of Berlin any-way. That was very clear last night [in the meeting with Gromyko]. We’regoing to have this thing stuck right in our guts, in about two months[when the IRBMs are operational]. And so we’ve got to do something.

Now the question really is, what are we . . . let’s see. [Apparently read-ing passages from a document.] Three . . . [unclear]. It’s safe to say thattwo of these missiles [sites] are operational now; [missiles] can belaunched within 18 hours after the decision to fire has been reached.We’ve seen [unclear] already alerted. These missiles could be launchedwithin 18 hours after the decision to fire. We have now located 12 fixedlaunch pads near Havana. They’d [the IRBMs] be ready in December of’62. It says [unclear] additional missiles may be [unclear] . . . nuclearstorage [unclear] . . . yields in the low megaton range. Communication,targeting, and an integrated air defense system is now nearing opera-tional status. What does that mean, integrated?

Taylor: That means that we’re hearing electronic emissions now,suggesting that they have sectors for the air defense of Cuba. I believethis is the latest intelligence here.

President Kennedy: I just wanted to say that these were some of theproblems that we have been considering. Now I’d be glad to hear from . . .

Taylor: Well, I would just say one thing and then turn it over toGeneral LeMay. We recognize all these things, Mr. President. But Ithink we’d all be unanimous in saying that really our strength in Berlin,our strength anyplace in the world, is the credibility of our responseunder certain conditions. And if we don’t respond here in Cuba, we thinkthe credibility of our response in Berlin is endangered.

President Kennedy: That’s right. That’s right. So that’s why we’vegot to respond. Now the question is: What kind of response?

LeMay: Well, I certainly agree with everything General Taylor has

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962582

said. I’d emphasize, a little strongly perhaps, that we don’t have anychoice except direct military action. If we do this blockade that’s pro-posed and political action, the first thing that’s going to happen is yourmissiles are going to disappear into the woods, particularly your mobileones.4 Now, we can’t find them then, regardless of what we do, and thenwe’re going to take some damage if we try to do anything later on.

President Kennedy: Well, can’t there be some of these undercovernow, in the sense of not having been delivered?

LeMay: There is a possibility of that. But the way they’ve lined theseothers up—I would have say that it’s a small possibility. If they weregoing to hide any of them, then I would think they would have hid themall. I don’t think there are any hid. So the only danger we have if wehaven’t picked up some that are setting there in plain sight. This is pos-sible. If we do low-altitude photography over them, this is going to be atip-off too.

Now, as for the Berlin situation, I don’t share your view that if weknock off Cuba, they’re going to knock off Berlin. We’ve got the Berlinproblem staring us in the face anyway. If we don’t do anything to Cuba,then they’re going to push on Berlin and push real hard because they’vegot us on the run. If we take military action against Cuba, then I thinkthat the . . .

President Kennedy: What do you think their reprisal would be?LeMay: I don’t think they’re going to make any reprisal if we tell

them that the Berlin situation is just like it’s always been. If they make amove we’re going to fight. Now I don’t think this changes the Berlin sit-uation at all, except you’ve got to make one more statement on it.

So I see no other solution. This blockade and political action, I seeleading into war. I don’t see any other solution for it. It will lead rightinto war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.

[Pause.]Because if this [unclear] blockade comes along, their MiGs are going

to fly. The IL-28s are going to fly against us. And we’re just going togradually drift into a war under conditions that are at great disadvan-tage to us, with missiles staring us in the face, that can knock out ourairfields in the southeastern portion [of the United States]. And if they

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 583

4. In fact the SS-4 MRBMs, the only type which were mobile, were far too large to move intodense woods, especially with all their associated equipment. But it took a few more days beforeU.S. officials comprehended this limitation. The SS-5 IRBMs were to be deployed at fixed con-crete sites.

use nuclear weapons, it’s the population down there. We just drift into awar under conditions that we don’t like. I just don’t see any other solu-tion except direct military intervention right now.

George Anderson: Well, Mr. President, I feel that the course ofaction recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of viewis the right one. I think it’s the best one from the political point of view.

I’ll address myself to the alternative of the blockade. If we institute ablockade, from a military point of view we can carry it out. It is easierfor us and requires less forces if we institute a complete blockade ratherthan a partial blockade, because instituting a partial blockade involvesvisit and search of all of these neutral ships, and taking them in, perhaps,to ports, will certainly cause a great deal more concern on the part of theneutrals, than if we go ahead and institute a complete blockade.

If we institute a complete blockade, we are immediately having a con-frontation with the Soviet Union because it’s the Soviet-bloc ships whichare taking the material to Cuba.

The blockade will not affect the equipment that is already in Cuba, andwill provide the Russians in Cuba time to assemble all of these missiles, toassemble the IL-28s, to get the MiGs and their command and control sys-tem ready to go. And I feel that, as this goes on, I agree with GeneralLeMay that this will escalate and then we will be required to take othermilitary action at greater disadvantage to the United States, to our mili-tary forces, and probably would suffer far greater casualties within theUnited States if these fanatics do indeed intend to fire any missiles.

We certainly cannot guarantee under those circumstances that wecould prevent damage and loss of life in the United States itself. I thinkwe have a good chance of greatly minimizing any loss of life within theUnited States under the present conditions, if we act fairly soon,although we do recognize they’re moving very fast. I do not see that, aslong as the Soviet Union is supporting Cuba, that there is any solutionto the Cuban problem except a military solution.

On the other hand, we recognize fully the relationship to the Berlinsituation. The Communists have got in this case a master situation, fromtheir point of view, where every course of action posed to us is character-ized by unpleasantries and disadvantages. It’s the same thing as Koreaall over again, only on a grander scale.

We recognize the great difficulty of a military solution in Berlin. Ithink, on balance, the taking [of] positive, prompt affirmative action inBerlin demonstrating the confidence, the ability, the resolution of theUnited States on balance, I would judge it, would be to deter the Russians

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962584

from more aggressive acts in Berlin and, if we didn’t take anything, they’dfeel that we were weak. So I subscribe fully to the concept recommendedby the Joint Chiefs.

President Kennedy: It seems to me that we have to assume that justwhen our two military . . . When we grabbed their two U.N. people [asspies] and they threw two of ours out [of the Moscow embassy], we’vegot to assume there’s going to be—

Anderson: Tit for tat.President Kennedy: —that they would strike this . . . I mean they can’t

do it [accept our attack] any more than we can let these go on withoutdoing something. They can’t let us just take out, after all their statements,take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians and not do anything.

It’s quite obvious that what they . . . I would think they would do, istry to get Berlin. But that may be a risk we have to take, but it wouldseem to me . . .

LeMay: Well, history has been, I think, the other way, Mr. President.Where we have taken a strong stand they have backed off. In Lebanon,for instance.5

Taylor: I would agree, Mr. President. I think from the point of viewof face they’ll do something. But I think it will be considerably less,depending on the posture we show here. I can’t really see them puttingthe screws in. The dangers of hitting Berlin are just as great or greaterafter our action down here, because we have our—

President Kennedy: Right. But I think they’re going to wait for threemonths until they get these things [the IRBMs as well as the MRBMs]all ready, and then squeeze us in Berlin. The only thing, at that point, forwhat it is worth [and] it may not be worth much, but at least we’d havethe support of Europe this way.

Taylor: That is true.President Kennedy: We have to figure that Europe will regard this

action . . . no matter what pictures we show afterwards of [missiles] ashaving been . . .

Taylor: I think that’s right.Earle Wheeler: Mr. President, in my judgment, from a military point

of view, the lowest-risk course of action if we’re thinking of protecting

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 585

5. A landing of thousands of U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1958 was unopposed, and the blood-less action was believed to have prevented a takeover of Lebanon by anti-Western dissidentssupported by the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union.

the people of the United States against a possible strike on us is to goahead with a surprise air strike, the blockade, and an invasion becausethese series of actions progressively will give us increasing assurancethat we really have got the offensive capability of the Cuban-Soviets cor-nered. Now admittedly, we can never be absolutely sure until and unlesswe actually occupy the island.

Now, I’ve also taken into consideration a couple of other things at thepresent time. To date, Khrushchev has not really confronted us withSoviet power. In other words, he has not declared Cuba a part of theWarsaw Pact. Nor has he made an announcement that this is a Sovietbase, although I think that there is a chance that he may do this at anytime, particularly later in November when he comes to the United States.And this course of action would then immediately have us confrontingthe Soviets and not Cuba. And at that time Soviet prestige, world pres-tige, would be at stake, which it is not at the present time.

The effect of this base in Cuba, it seems to me, has at least two siz-able advantages from his point of view and two sizable disadvantagesfrom our point of view.

First, the announcement of a Soviet base in Cuba would immediatelyhave a profound effect in all of Latin America at least and probablyworldwide because the question would arise: Is the United States inca-pable of doing something about it or unwilling to do something about it?In other words, it would attack our prestige.

Not only that. Increasingly, they can achieve a sizable increase inoffensive Soviet strike capabilities against the United States, which theydo not now have. They do have ICBMs that are targeted on us, but theyare in limited numbers. Their air force is not by any manner of means ofthe magnitude and capability that they probably would desire. And thisshort-range missile force gives them a sort of a quantum jump in theircapability to inflict damage on the United States. And so as I say, from amilitary point of view, I feel that the lowest risk course of action is thefull gamut of military action by us. That’s it, sir.

President Kennedy: Thank you, General.David Shoup: Mr. President, there’s a question in my mind. Under

what circumstance would Cuba want to inflict damage on the UnitedStates? The placing of the kind of weapons and the bombers that can dothat certainly demand a hell of a lot of attention. There’s one feature ofthis that I’ve been unable to reconcile. And I wonder whether theAmerican people and the other nations of the world can reconcile it. Thatis that we are now so anxious or we’re discussing the anxiety of eliminat-ing the possibility of damage to America from the Cuban area, whereas for

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962586

a good many months the world has known, and we’ve known, that we havetremendously greater potential already aimed in on us from Russia and ithas been for many months. And we didn’t attack Russia. I think that’s ahard thing to reconcile, at least it is in my mind, and I would think itwould be in the American public and other nations of the world. If it’s amatter of distance, that it’s closer now, well, missiles land pretty . . . If theyhave nuclear warheads down there, we know they have them in Russia. Soif they want to inflict damage, it’s a question of whether Khrushchevwants to have them do it, and him keep out of it.

So if there is a requirement to eliminate this threat of damage, thenit’s going to take some sizable forces to do it. And as we wait and waitand wait, then it will take greater forces to do it.

And as long as it isn’t done, then those forces . . . increasinglyrequirements for greater forces will be absolutely tied to that function.They’re going to have to stand by to take care of that function. And youwill then have a considerable force of troops, ships, aircraft tied to thisrequirement that some day may happen.

I can’t conceive that they [the Cubans] would attack us just for thefun of it. They might do it at the direction of Khrushchev. But I cannotsee why they would attack us because they couldn’t invade and take us.So there’s a question in my mind, in the political area and as I say thepublic and the people, what does this mean?

Does it mean they’re [Cuba] getting ready to attack us, that littlepipsqueak of a place? If so, Russia has a hell of a lot better way to attackus than to attack us from Cuba.

Then, in my mind, this all devolves upon the fact that they [theSoviets] do have it. They can damage us increasingly every day. Andeach day that they increase, we have to have a more sizable force tied tothis problem and then they’re not available in case something happenssomeplace else. And each time you then have to take some action inBerlin, South Vietnam, Korea, you would be degrading. You’d have todegrade your capability against this ever-increasing force in Cuba.

So that, in my opinion, if we want to eliminate this threat that is nowcloser, but it’s not nearly the threat that we’ve experienced all thesemonths and months, if we want to eliminate it, then we’re going to haveto go in there and do it in a full-time job to eliminate the threat againstus. Then if you want to take over the place and really put in a new gov-ernment that is non-Communist, then you’ll have to invade the place.And if that decision is made, we must go in with plenty of insurance of adecisive success and as quick as possible.

President Kennedy: Well, it is a fact that the number of missiles

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 587

there, let’s say . . . no matter what they put in there, we could live todayunder. If they don’t have enough ICBMs today, they’re going to havethem in a year. They obviously are putting in a lot of—

LeMay: This increases their accuracy against the 50 targets that weknow that they could hit now.

But the big thing is, if we leave them there, is the blackmail threatagainst not only us but the other South American countries that theymay decide to operate against.

There’s one other factor that I didn’t mention that’s not quite in ourfield, [which] is the political factor. But you invited us to comment on thisat one time. And that is that we have had a talk about Cuba and the SAMsites down there. And you have made some pretty strong statements abouttheir being defensive and that we would take action against offensiveweapons. I think that a blockade and political talk would be considered bya lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this.And I’m sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too.

In other words, you’re in a pretty bad fix at the present time.President Kennedy: What did you say?LeMay: You’re in a pretty bad fix.President Kennedy: You’re in there with me. [Slight laughter, a bit

forced.] Personally.Taylor: With regard to the blockade plan, Mr. President, I say we’re

studying it now to see all the implications. We’re not . . . we reallyhaven’t gone into it deeply. There are two things that strike us from theoutset. One is the difficulty of maintaining surveillance. We just don’tsee how they can do that without taking losses and getting into someform of air warfare over this island.

Second, there is the problem of Guantánamo, which is a curiousobstacle to us to some degree. I might ask Admiral Anderson to com-ment on how we can protect our position in Guantánamo during a stateof blockade.

Anderson: Well, our position in Guantánamo becomes increasingly vul-nerable because certainly the imposition of the blockade is going to infuri-ate the Cubans and they have got a mass of militia and they can come onaround Guantánamo. And I don’t know whether they would actually attackGuantánamo or not. But we would certainly have to provide increasedforces around there to defend Guantánamo, which we’re in the process ofreinforcing right now. Also, they have these short-range cruise missiles.They have three groups of those primarily for coast defense. Their MiGs,their aircraft, all pose a threat to Guantánamo. So the threat is greatlyincreased and intensified during the course of a blockade.

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962588

Taylor: I think Guantánamo is going to cease to be a useful naval baseand become more of a fortress more or less in a permanent state of siege.

President Kennedy: If we were going to do the . . . There’s a gooddeal of difference between taking a strike which strikes just the missilesthat are involved—that’s one action which has a certain effect, an escalat-ing effect. The other is to do a strike which takes out all the planes, that’svery much of an island sweep. Third is the invasion, which takes a periodof 14 days or so by the time we get it mounted. Maybe 18 days. Well wehave to assume that—I don’t know what—the Soviet response to each ofthese would have to be different. If one were slowly building up to aninvasion and fighting our way across the island . . . That’s a different situ-ation from taking out these offensive weapons. It seems to you that—

LeMay: I think we have got to do more than take out the missiles,because if you don’t take out their air at the same time you’re vulnerabledown in that section of the world [unclear] strikes from their air. Theycould come in at low altitude and do it. Because we haven’t got much of alow altitude capability.

In addition, that air would be used against any other surveillance youhave, too. So if you take out the missiles, I think you’ve got to take outtheir air along with it, and their radar, and their communications, thewhole works. It just doesn’t make any sense to do anything but that.

President Kennedy: Well, except that what . . . they’ve had the airthere for some time. And what we’ve talked about is having ground-to-ground missiles.

There isn’t any . . . You know, as I say, the problem is not really somewar against Cuba. But the problem is part of this worldwide strugglewhere we face the Communists, particularly, as I say, over Berlin. Andwith the loss of Berlin, the effect of that and the responsibility we wouldbear. As I say, I think the Egyptian and the Hungary thing are the obvi-ous parallels that I’m concerned about.

LeMay: If you lose in Cuba you’re going to get more and more pres-sure right on Berlin. I’m sure of that.

Taylor: This worldwide problem has certainly been before us, Mr.President. We haven’t ignored it. For me, it’s been a deterrent to myenthusiasm for any invasion of Cuba, as I think you know.

On the other hand, now that we’ve seen that it’s not just going to bea place where they needle us by mobile missiles as I thought perhapsearlier in the week, but really an organized base where the numbers ofmissile complexes are—

President Kennedy: Of course General Shoup’s point, which is alsomade, is that there isn’t any doubt [that] if it isn’t today, it’s within a

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 589

year they’re going to have enough. . . . when we’ve talked about the num-ber of ICBMs they have. They may not be quite as accurate. [But]they’ve got enough, they put them on the cities and you know how soonthese casualty figures [mount up]—80 million, whether it’s 80 or 100—you’re talking about the destruction of a country. So that it . . . justregardless if you begin to duplicate your . . .

Taylor: And we lose our—President Kennedy: You’ll lose it all on cities.Taylor: And we can never talk about invading again, after they get

these missiles, because they’ve got these pointed at our head.President Kennedy: Well, the logical argument is that we don’t really

have to invade Cuba. That’s not really . . . That’s just one of the difficultiesthat we live with in life, like we live with the Soviet Union and China.

That problem, however, is after . . . for us not to do anything, then waituntil he brings up Berlin. And then we can’t do anything about Cuba.

But I do think we ought to be aware of the fact that the existence ofthese missiles does add to the danger but doesn’t create it. The danger isright there now. They’ve got enough to give us, between submarines andICBMs, or whatever planes they do have, I mean now they can kill, espe-cially if they concentrate on the cities, I mean they’ve pretty well got usthere anyway.

Taylor: And by logic we ought to be able to say we can deter thesemissiles as well as the Soviet missiles, the ones from the Soviet Union. Ithink the thing that worries us, however, is that these [being] in poten-tially under the control of Castro. Castro would be quite a different fel-low to own missiles than Khrushchev. I don’t think that’s the case now,and perhaps Khrushchev would never willingly do so. But there’s alwaysthe risk of their falling into Cuban hands.

Shoup: Mr. President, one other item about the Guantánamo thing.Any initiative on our part immediately gives them the—I don’t know theauthority—but the right probably to let fly at Guantánamo. And thus,the weapons that they have, including now another SAM site or two atwork on the place, plus surface-to-surface missiles . . . They have a con-siderable number of gun emplacements within range of Guantánamo. Sounless something is done to also at the same time neutralize this abilityto take on Guantánamo, well Guantánamo is in one hell of a fix.

President Kennedy: The only thing is, General, it’s going to take us . . .before we could . . . what can we do about Guantánamo if we do this airstrike and they retaliate on Guantánamo?

Anderson: Mr. President, our thinking on Guantánamo is this. We’re

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962590

reinforcing it right now, building up the strength for the defense ofGuantánamo. We have air all earmarked to suppress the weapons whichwould be brought to bear immediately on Guantánamo. We would evacu-ate the dependents from Guantánamo immediately prior to the air strike;get them clear. I think that with the forces that we’ve put in there and theair that is available, we can handle the situation in Guantánamo.

LeMay: The bulk of the naval air is available to defend Guantánamo.Taylor: This can go on indefinitely. This could become a sort of

Cuban Quemoy, where they shell us on odd days and make strikes andthings of that sort.6 There’s no end in sight, really.

Anderson: Unless you carry on, yeah.Taylor: That’s right. I see.Shoup: It eliminates the airfield there, in a sense so we can operate.

They can bombard; then we can fix it; and we can operate. But it certainlyterrifically reduces the potential value of the airfields there, the potentialvalue of the shipping area, and what you then have is just a hunk of dirtthat you’re hanging on to for pride, prestige, political reasons, or whathave you.

Taylor: It’s a liability, actually.Shoup: It becomes of no value unless [we destroy] the weapons and

that, of course, includes your doggone airplanes that can bomb it. Unlessthe weapons that can cause trouble there are eliminated, all you have is ahunk of dirt that’s taken a hell of a lot of people to hang on to.

President Kennedy: Well, let me ask you this. If we go ahead with thisair strike, either on the missiles or on the missiles and the planes, I under-stand the recommendation is to do both. When could that be ready?

LeMay: We can be ready for attack at dawn on the 21st [Sunday],that being the earliest possible date. The optimum date would beTuesday morning [October 23].

Taylor: Tuesday is the optimum date.President Kennedy: I suppose with this news now . . . They’ve got

two of them [MRBM sites] ready, we’re running out of time, are we?Taylor: This is the mobile missiles you’re referring to sir? I have not

seen that.Robert McNamara: Mr. President, I think it’s highly questionable

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 591

6. Taylor is suggesting an analogy between the potential Cuban harassment of Guantánamo andChina’s continuing shelling beginning in 1958 of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu,held by Taiwan, accompanied by China’s threats to invade both these islands and Taiwan itself.

that they have two ready. This says . . . it’s best to assume they do, butthe best information we have indicates it’s still highly [doubtful].

President Kennedy: Why is it Tuesday instead of Sunday, General?What’s the argument for that?

LeMay: Well—President Kennedy: We can’t hold this much longer.Taylor: We were told to get ready as fast as possible. We aren’t rec-

ommending Sunday. We’d prefer Tuesday.President Kennedy: Well, the only problem I see is that it starts to

break out in the papers.LeMay: Well, we would prefer Tuesday. Here’s the only reason. We’ve

had this plan for some time.Some outside noise begins to interfere with general sound quality. Forseveral minutes, only fragments of conversations are audible.McNamara: For the U-2 photography we’ll have complete coverage

of the island, interpreted I would guess by late today.President Kennedy: So then just—Taylor: This morning I asked the question, Bob, and the estimate

was later than that to see everything [unclear].President Kennedy: Well, let’s say it’s this evening then. But you say

that would be Monday. It’s just really a question of how long this thingcan hold without getting out.

Taylor: Mr. President, I’ve never been impressed with the argumentof some of your advisers on that point. It seems to me we’ve had so manyreports out of Cuba we can shrug them all off as rumors that [unclear].

President Kennedy: Well, when is that you begin to tell so many ofthe military that there’s going to be this strike, that there’s a chance of itgetting out? The pilots and so on and their families.

Taylor: I don’t think . . . The danger is minimal. The danger is mini-mal. The last time we spoke to these pilots—and we are briefing pilotstoday—it’s not a very large number of pilots—it’s only a briefing onthese particular subjects. The other srikes are all [unclear].

President Kennedy: How effective is an air strike of this kind gener-ally against a missile base?

LeMay: Well, I think we can guarantee hitting them.President Kennedy: If it doesn’t take care of the mobile, what does it

do to them? [Unclear.]Le May: The mobile missiles aren’t the problem. It’s the other ones,

where there isn’t much there [unclear] are now [unclear].Anderson: But these are [unclear].Taylor: [Unclear] the island.

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962592

President Kennedy: [Unclear.]Taylor: Twenty thousand [unclear].Anderson: You could hit it with a rocket or something like that, but

[unclear] more important.President Kennedy: Then, now the invasion would take . . .Taylor: Seven days after the air strike you could start the invasion

going on for about 11 days.Unidentified: [Unclear.]President Kennedy: It would go on for 11 days and then we would . . .

We would, in other words, be prepared for it, but not necessarily . . . we’dstill have seven days to decide whether we want to go in.

Taylor: We have flexibility. Once we strike we would start moving[unclear] even though you didn’t decide that [unclear].

Wheeler: Mr. President, going back to the relationships betweenCuba and Berlin. And I certainly feel that the Soviets have concoctedwhat they think is a masterful strategy.

There is no acceptable military solution to the Berlin problem, whereasthere is in Cuba. There’s no acceptable political-economic solution tothe Cuban problem. Conceivably, a solution to the Berlin problem lies inthe diplomatic-economic-political field, if we put enough pressure on theSoviet bloc.

Now if we act in Cuba and they respond by making immediately atreaty with the East Germans and surrounding Berlin, denying our accessto Berlin, our garrison—the people in Berlin—can survive there for along time, assuming that the Russians are not just overrunning the citywith their own troops. Could we not apply sufficient diplomatic-economic-financial pressures to the entire Soviet bloc and gradually expand this sothat we, for a suitable period of time, we’re progressively cutting theSoviet bloc off from their access to most of the countries in the free world?And at the same time have some sort of an acceptable, what would appearto be an acceptable long-range political solution to all of Berlin?

Forty-eight seconds excised as classified information.President Kennedy: In any case, there’s no . . . unfortunately. I’m just

thinking we come out second-best. So we just . . . I think there’s a meetingat eleven. I might as well continue with my tour because [unclear] surfaceall this, and we’ll be back in touch tonight. I’m probably [unclear].

I appreciate your views. As I said, I’m sure we all understand howrather unsatisfactory our alternatives are. The argument for the block-ade was that what we want to do is to avoid, if we can, nuclear war byescalation or imbalance. The Soviets increase; we use [force]; theyblockade Berlin. They blockade for military purposes. Then we take an

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 593

initial action so that . . . We’ve got to have some degree of control. Thosepeople [the Soviets] last night were so away from reality that there’s notelling what the response would be.

Taylor: Did he [Gromyko] give any clue, Mr. President?President Kennedy: Well, he talked tough about Berlin. On Cuba he

really just talked about their defensive aspirations. He said, “We’re onlysending defensive weapons in.” Of course, that’s how they define theseweapons, as defensive.

Taylor: Well, Mr. President—President Kennedy: General Shoup, your point is not to argue against

action by saying that we’ve been living with this sort of thing for years.Shoup: A lot of people advance that. That is a real question for a rec-

onciliation, for our people, and you and everybody else when . . . We’vehad a hell of a lot more than this aimed at us, and we didn’t attack it. Butthey’re closer, their distance is closer, and as General LeMay pointedout, there are certain areas in which he will certainly get in, if, as I pre-sume, we’re going to take him on.

President Kennedy: Well, I think . . . I don’t think that it adds partic-ularly to our danger. I think our danger is the use of nuclear weapons[unclear] anyway. Particularly on urban sites. With submarines andplanes. They’ve got enough now; they sure will have in a year’s [time]. Idon’t think that’s probably the major argument. The major argument isthe political effect on United States [unclear] Cuba. The certainty is theinvasion is key for us.

On the other hand, there are going to be a lot of people that are justgoing to move away from us, figuring that our . . . I mean, we haven’tprepared [unclear] existence. There isn’t any doubt if we announce evi-dence of the missile sites, most people, including the Soviets would takea provocative act. Instead, the first announcement may be, under theplan suggested, an act that we took. So that we’ve got a real problem inmaintaining the alliance.

Wheeler: Today . . . am I clear that you are addressing yourself as towhether anything at all should be done?

President Kennedy: That’s right.Wheeler: But that if military action is to be taken, you agree with us.President Kennedy: Yeah.Shoup: I question how to reconcile . . . the last thing you really want

is [unclear] less threat than you’ve had for a long time.Taylor: Mr. President, may I mention one thing before you go on

because time is running out: the question of the low-level [reconnais-

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962594

sance] flights to get evidence. We discussed [them] last night and we’reprepared to do them tomorrow. I’m a little concerned about doing that ifthere’s any likelihood of our following a military course.

President Kennedy: Exactly. Oh, I agree. That’s why we’ve got—McNamara: No question that we should not undertake those until a

decision has been made as to which course of action would—presumablyyou’re ready?

LeMay: Yes, sir. We are.McNamara: Good.LeMay: [Unclear.]Taylor: Thank you very much, Mr. President. We appreciate the

chance to talk with you.Anderson: Sir, did you make a decision on the [unclear], I mean the

[unclear].President Kennedy: I told [unclear] to go ahead [unclear].Anderson: All right then.President Kennedy: The Attorney General told me all the reports

that he got was that your reaction [unclear].Anderson: I think everything is pretty well under control.President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s right.President Kennedy and McNamara begin talking privately to one side.Taylor: I know the press is out here talking about [unclear]. [Unclear

exchanges.]McNamara: [Unclear.] Max, may I suggest this? That for [unclear]

the Chiefs organize themselves following two alternative courses. One,the blockade in great detail. What are the instructions you ought to do?What ships can you do? And how would you do it without endangeringthe ships? In other words you—

Taylor: Pull them out.McNamara: Pull them out. Exactly. Now, I realize that this [unclear]

the ocean and that [unclear] greater naval force and so on. That wouldbe the assumption you would try to start on. At the same time, let someother Chief or Chiefs work in great detail on the air strike. Because—Isay this because as far as the President is concerned, we’ve just talked invery general terms about the air strike.

Taylor: Yeah.McNamara: And with every passing day the number of airplanes that

we would have in the air, the firepower, is increasing.Taylor: The civilian targets are increasing too.McNamara: Oh, I’m not suggesting that. I’m just saying that, if the

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 595

President were to decide on this, we should tell him exactly what wemean. What will we include? What authorities do we want?

Taylor: Those figures I showed you last night are the last [unclear].McNamara: Well, just take Guantánamo. What authority does the

Navy want in the event that the Air Force carries out an air strike onmissiles, SAM sites, airfields, and so on?

Taylor: The Navy is doing a certain amount of that in coordinatingproblems related to the [unclear]. At the same time, they’d have closedefense aircraft [unclear].

McNamara: Right. But how many air strikes are they likely to carryout from Guantánamo? It’s maybe 200 to 300.

Taylor: 125 a day is roughly [unclear].McNamara: Yeah. Yeah, that’s right.Taylor: I think we can get that information very quickly. We have

that [unclear]. We don’t have the surveillance requirements of the block-ade and also the level of defense in Guantánamo [unclear].

McNamara: That’s right. Yes. And we ought to plan both of those.I’m surprised the surveillance of the blockade isn’t [unclear].

LeMay: I agree with you.McNamara: I’m not sure that I would fully agree that this is bound

to lead to some consequences. Can’t we use these drones?7

Taylor: If they’re adequate. I don’t think any of us have any greatconfidence.

Unidentified: [Unclear.]McNamara: Oh. Oh sure, they’d knock some of them down. But the

rate of loss might be 10, 15, 20 percent.Taylor: Well—McNamara: And it takes quite a while. It’d take at least four to six

weeks I would think given [unclear] drones [unclear]. [Unclear exchanges.]Taylor: Any other chores, Bob, that you want us to—McNamara: No, I think not, Max. The—Taylor: Well, I will go with you and Vern.Wheeler: I gather that with the authorization of the movement of the

reinforced battalion from the West Coast to Guantánamo, if we see fit tomove an extra company in, that’s perfectly OK.

Taylor: I saw that covert plan [unclear] in the cable. You might wantto look at that and decide if it looks alright. It seemed to me a bit, a little

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962596

7. Drones are pilotless, remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft.

too much. I don’t think we have anything to say on that. In fact I don’tthink you need to say anything when we’re coming in in this staggeredway [unclear].

Shoup: Is the coast clear out there? [Perhaps referring to PresidentKennedy’s having taken off from the South Lawn in the presidential helicopter.]

Mixed voices murmuring, a few fragments are intelligible. The remain-ing generals seem to be discussing various topics, including targets andtheir transportation back to the Pentagon.Wheeler: The way to do that is the Joint Reconnaissance Group

[JRG] getting the requirements from DIA, the input on the public rela-tions from us. They already have wide profiles. They will have to beadjusted in the light of the [unclear].

Taylor: And you do [unclear] surrogate possibilities.Wheeler: Yes, sir. Actually, we have authorized the Joint Reconnais-

sance Group to deal directly with the flight leader.McNamara: I think it would be helpful if some one of the Chiefs would

talk with DIA about it and get this formalized before [unclear, unclearexchange]. And have [DIA director General Joseph] Carroll work with theother groups here. There’s this National Reconnaissance Office that’sinvolved in this thing. There’s a, in a sense, a third agency, that’s responsi-ble for the U-2, the drones, anything relating to special reconnaissance forCIA and DIA. We need to keep him involved. Carroll knows how to do this.

Wheeler: I think the JRG has all these strengths. That’s a real fineoutfit. Real fine outfit. They deal with DIA and some of these people on adaily basis, so I’m sure we can pull it together really quickly.

After a brief, inaudible exchange McNamara and Taylor leave. Appar-ently only three or four people remain in the room.Shoup: Well what do you guys [unclear]. You, you pulled the rug

right out from under him.LeMay: Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?Shoup: I just agree with that answer, General. I just agree with you.

I just agree with you a hundred percent. I just agree with you a hundredpercent. That’s the only goddamn . . .

He [President Kennedy] finally got around to the word escalation.[Unclear] I heard him say escalation. That’s the only goddamn thingthat’s in the whole trick. It’s been there in Laos; it’s been in every god-damn one [of these crises]. When he says escalation, that’s it. [Pause.]

If somebody could keep them from doing the goddamn thing piece-meal. That’s our problem. You go in there and friggin’ around with themissiles. You’re screwed. You go in and frig around with anything else,you’re screwed.

Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 597

LeMay: That’s right.Shoup: You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing,

some way, he could say: “Either do this son of a bitch and do it right, andquit friggin’ around.” That was my conclusion. Don’t frig around and gotake a missile out.

Wheeler: Well, maybe I missed the point [unclear].LeMay: [Unclear] off any decision, Dave.Shoup: Well, that wasn’t my intention. Goddamn it, if he wants to do

it, you can’t fiddle around with taking out missiles. You can’t fiddlearound with hitting the missile sites and then hitting the SAM sites. Yougot to go in and take out the goddamn thing that’s going to stop youfrom doing your job.

Wheeler: It was very apparent to me, though, from his earlierremarks, that the political action of a blockade is really what he’s . . .

Shoup: That’s right. His speech about Berlin was the real . . .Wheeler: He gave his speech about Berlin, andLeMay: He equates the two.Shoup: That’s right.Wheeler: If we smear Castro, Khrushchev smears Willy Brandt [in

Berlin].LeMay: Berlin [unclear] talk about it. I think our best chance is that

we won’t have anything happen.Wheeler: [Unclear, mixed voices.] I gather that I can go ahead and

issue these orders? [Unclear exchange.]Unidentified: [Unclear] do the National Guard, cut it down to 600

and come back over a month with 300 replacements. [Unclear exchange.]LeMay: We’re all set then.Wheeler: Well, this is good. I can get those people moving.Unidentified: Right. OK then.The generals leave, and the tape runs out shortly afterward in the now -empty room.

President Kennedy was now less sure that the blockade was the rightanswer. This might have been because of the weight of arguments he hadheard from the Joint Chiefs. He had also talked again to Bundy, probablyat the start of his day, before the meeting with the Joint Chiefs. Bundyhad changed his mind during the night and had switched from support-ing no action (because of concerns about Berlin) to supporting a surpriseair strike. Though we can see from the meeting with the Chiefs thatPresident Kennedy continued to favor a blockade, it is possible thatBundy’s change of heart gave the President added cause for reflection.

F R I DAY, O C TO B E R 19, 1962598

After the crisis Bundy privately recorded that Kennedy, just before heleft Washington on October 19 (in the few minutes after his meetingwith the Joint Chiefs), asked Bundy to keep the air strike option openuntil he returned. In another brief exchange as he prepared to depart onhis campaign trip to Ohio and Illinois, President Kennedy asked hisbrother, with Sorensen standing by, to “pull the group together.”8

The President wanted to act soon and said Bobby should call if and andwhen he should cut short his trip and return to Washington. At 10:35 thepresidential helicopter lifted off from the South Lawn of the White House.

Saturday, October 20, 1962

On Friday, October 19, the meetings at the State Department ran all dayand into the night. The day started with advisers divided into two camps,one favoring a blockade and the other favoring an air strike. Bundy saidthat, in the course of a sleepless night, he had decided that an air strikewas needed. Decisive action would confront the world with a fait accom-pli. He said he had spoken with President Kennedy and passed along thisadvice. Acheson, Dillon, McCone, and Taylor agreed with Bundy.

McNamara disagreed. Ball said he was wavering. Robert Kennedythen said, with a grin, that he too had spoken with the President and that asurprise attack like Pearl Harbor was “not in our traditions.” He “favoredaction” but wanted action that gave the Soviets a chance to pull back.1

Rusk then suggested that the group divide into working groups torefine the blockade and air strike scenarios. It became plain to all, after

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962 599

8. Bundy’s recollection is drawn from notes excerpted from his private papers by FrancisBator. Bator shared this information in an April 1998 letter to Ernest May and PhilipZelikow. Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, who attended almost all of themeetings during the crisis, remembered that the apparent consensus that had formed infavor of the blockade on October 18 “came unstuck” on Friday, 19 October. Alexis Johnsonthought this was because of Dean Acheson’s argument for an air strike. U. Alexis Johnsonwith Jef Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,1984), p. 383. In fact Kennedy had already heard Acheson’s case on the afternoon of the 18th,before the consensus formed that night, and had not talked again to Acheson. On the “pull thegroup together” exchange, see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row,1965), p. 692.

1. This account draws on several sources, but these and other quotations from the 19 Octobermeetings are from minutes drafted by State Department deputy legal adviser Ralph Meeker,in FRUS, 11: 116–22 (Robert Kennedy’s emphasis on action is in Meeker’s notes).

hearing from Justice Department and State Department lawyers, that adeclaration of war was not needed in order to impose a blockade and that,under the U.N. Charter, the U.S. could obtain authorization for this fromthe OAS. Martin predicted that OAS approval could be obtained. RobertKennedy stressed how crucial this judgment was, since a failed attempt togain approval would be disastrous. Martin stood by his estimate.

After hours of discussion within and among the working groups,McNamara emerged as the chief advocate of a more diplomatic option thatenvisioned a blockade as a prelude to negotiations. McNamara thoughtthat the United States would at least have to give up its missile bases inItaly and Turkey, probably more.

As the blockade option became dominant, its advocates split againinto two factions. One, led by McNamara, emphasized a blockade accom-panied by diplomacy and proffered concessions. The other faction wouldcouple the blockade with a stern ultimatum demanding removal of themissiles. The previous day, when this version of the blockade was articu-lated by Llewellyn Thompson, McNamara had called it “the more dan-gerous form of the blockade.”

During a sobering discussion of the danger of war, Robert Kennedyargued that the time for confrontation had arrived. “[I]n looking into thefuture it would be better for our children and grandchildren if we decidedto face the Soviet threat, stand up to it, and eliminate it, now. The circum-stances for doing so at some future time were bound to be more unfavor-able, the risks would be greater, the chances of success less good.”

As the afternoon waned, Rusk said there needed to be a plannedaction, then a pause to consider other steps. Advocates of a blockadecould not support any military action unless the Soviets were given somechance to back out. Advocates of a strike insisted on doing somethingabout the missiles already in Cuba. Dillon stressed that a blockade couldbe a first step, effectively conveying an ultimatum, with further pressureor military action following on. To some, this tougher version of theblockade seemed to combine the virtues of both the blockade and the airstrike options.

So when McNamara and other military representatives commentedthat a strike might still be effective after a blockade (though Taylor hadhis doubts), Robert Kennedy “took particular note of this shift.” Towardthe end of the day, Robert Kennedy began portraying the blockade asonly a first step that would not preclude other action. “He thought it wasnow pretty clear what the decision should be.”

Sorensen had begun to draft a presidential speech. After reviewing thedraft on Saturday morning, October 20, Robert Kennedy called his brother

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962600

and asked him to come back to Washington.2 Feigning a cold, PresidentKennedy left Chicago on Saturday morning and arrived back at the WhiteHouse at about 1:30 P.M. He read the draft speech as his advisers sneakedby various routes into the Oval Room on the second floor of the ExecutiveMansion. Just as on the night of October 18, the meeting was held in theMansion rather than in the West Wing business area of the White House.Therefore the meeting could not be tape-recorded. We include a record ofit here because this was the decision meeting that completes the delibera-tions detailed and recorded of the preceding four days. Also, the documen-tary record of this meeting is unusually good.3

2:30 –5:10 P.M.

The Attorney General said that, in his opinion, a combinationof the blockade route and the air strike route was very attrac-tive to him. . . . The President said he was ready to go aheadwith the blockade and to take actions necessary to put us in aposition to undertake an air strike on the missiles and missilesites by Monday or Tuesday.

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Four general approaches had emerged by the time of the meeting. Onewas that of Taylor and Bundy, who wanted to start with an air strike. Asecond was that of Robert Kennedy, Dillon, Thompson, and McCone, who

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 601

2. The timing of the call is based on Sorensen’s account. Much later, however, Lundahl told DinoBrugioni that Robert Kennedy, worried about the tone of the 19 October discussions, called hisbrother on Friday, 19 October, failed to reach him, then called him again on Saturday, got him,and urged him to return [Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban MissileCrisis, ed. Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 303–4].3. The notetaker of the NSC meeting was Bromley Smith. This was the first meeting during themissile crisis which Smith was allowed to attend, because it was the first such meeting styled asa formal meeting of the NSC, of which Smith was the executive secretary. Smith attended andtook notes at every subsequent major meeting during the crisis, because the next two meetingswere also deemed NSC meetings and then, after that, this crisis management body was formallyconstituted as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (or Excom for short).Smith’s notes of this 20 October meeting were more detailed than his notes of subsequent NSCand Excom meetings during the crisis, perhaps because this growing accumulation of work leftSmith less and less time to type up more detailed summaries. Fortunately Kennedy was able totape the subsequent NSC and Excom meetings during the crisis, from 22 October on.

preferred to start with a blockade but to treat it as a kind of ultimatumthat might soon be followed by a strike. A third approach, advocated byRusk, was to start with a blockade, try to freeze the Soviet action ratherthan reverse it, and then decide what to do. A fourth approach, supportedchiefly by McNamara and Stevenson, and apparently also by Sorensen,would start with a blockade but treat the blockade as an opening to nego-tiations, including the offer of a summit meeting, at which trades would beoffered to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

It was, officially, a meeting of the National Security Council. McConeled off and asked Ray Cline, deputy director of intelligence at the CIA, tobegin the intelligence briefing. Cline followed his marked-up script,which was as follows:4

Mr. President: We want to bring you up to date very briefly on thedeployment of Soviet military weapons systems to Cuba. You havebeen briefed many times on the major buildup of equipment in Cubaprior to mid-October.

In the past week we have discovered unmistakable evidence of thedeployment to Cuba of medium range ballistic missiles (i.e., 1020NM range) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (i.e., 2200 NMrange). These ranges imply coverage of targets from Dallas throughCincinnati and Washington, D.C. (by MRBMs) and practically all ofthe continental United States (by IRBMs).

There are 4 and possibly 5 MRBM sites deployed in field-typeinstallations, 4 launchers at each site. Two of these sites are in a stateof at least limited operational readiness at this time. All of the sitesare in a state of continuous construction and improvement and wewould expect the remaining MRBM sites to become operational inabout one week’s time.

In addition 2 fixed IRBM sites (with 4 launch pads at each site andpermanent storage facilities) are being constructed near Havana. Oneof these sites appears to be in a stage of construction that leads to anestimate of operational readiness of 6 weeks from now, i.e. about 1December and the other in a stage indicating operational readinessbetween 15 December and the end of the year.

We have not seen nuclear warheads for any of these missiles, butwe do not rely on ever seeing them in our photography. [Small exci-sion of classified information.] We have found what appears to be a

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962602

4. The briefing notes, with Cline’s handwritten annotations, are reproduced in CIA Documents onthe Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary McAuliffe, (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992), pp. 221–26.

nuclear warhead storage facility at one of the IRBM sites at Guanajay,near Havana. It will probably be completed about 1 December alongwith the missile site itself.

Since the missile systems in question are relatively ineffectivewithout them, we believe warheads either are or will be available.They could be in temporary storage prior to completion of the stor-age facility we have seen. The Poltava, a Soviet ship which we think isthe most likely carrier of security-sensitive military cargoes into thetightly guarded port of Mariel, has made 2 trips to Cuba and is dueback in about 10 days.

In summary, we believe the evidence indicates the probabilitythat 8 MRBM missiles can be fired from Cuba today. Naturally oper-ational readiness is likely to be degraded by many factors, but if all 8missiles could be launched with nuclear warheads, they could delivera total load of 16–24 megatons (2 to 3 MT per warhead). If able torefire, they could theoretically deliver the same load approximately5 hours later.

When the full installation of missile sites we now see under con-struction is completed at the end of the year, the initial salvo capabilityif all missiles on launchers were to reach target would be 56–88 MT.Lundahl then went through the photographs. When he had finished, heturned to the President and said, “Mr. President, gentlemen, this sum-marizes the totality of the missile and other threats as we’ve been able todetermine it from aerial photography. During the past week we wereable to achieve coverage of over 95 percent of the island and we are con-vinced that because of the terrain in the remaining 5 percent, no addi-tional threat will be found there.” 5

According to someone who talked to Lundahl, “The President wason his feet the moment Lundahl finished. He crossed the room directlytoward Lundahl and said, ‘I want to extend to your organization mygratitude for a job very well done.’ Lundahl, rather embarrassed, hesi-tantly thanked the President.” 6

Nonverbatim minutes, taken by NSC executive secretary BromleySmith, pick up at this point. 7

The President summarized the discussion of the intelligence material

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 603

5. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 314.6. Ibid. About two hours earlier Robert Kennedy and McNamara had visited NPIC (NationalPhotographic Interpretation Center), escorted by John McCone, and reviewed its operations.7. Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council, 20 October 1962, FRUS,11: 126–36.

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962604

as follows. There is something to destroy in Cuba now and, if it isdestroyed, a strategic missile capability would be difficult to restore. . . .

Secretary [Robert] McNamara explained to the President that therewere differences among his advisers which had resulted in the drafting ofalternative courses of action. He added that the military planners are atwork on measures to carry out all recommended courses of action inorder that, following a presidential decision, fast action could be taken.

Secretary McNamara described his view as the “blockade route.”This route is aimed at preventing any addition to the strategic missilesalready deployed in Cuba and eventually to eliminate these missiles. Hesaid to do this we should institute a blockade and be prepared to takearmed action in specified instances.

(The President was handed a copy of Ted Sorensen’s “blockaderoute” draft of a presidential message, which he read.)8

Secretary McNamara concluded by explaining that following theblockade, the United States would negotiate for the removal of thestrategic missiles from Turkey and Italy and possibly agreement to limitour use of Guantánamo to a specified limited time. He added that wecould obtain the removal of the missiles from Cuba only if we were pre-pared to offer something in return during negotiations. He opposed astoo risky the suggestion that we should issue an ultimatum to the effectthat we would order an air attack on Cuba if the missiles were notremoved.9 He said he was prepared to tell Khrushchev we consider themissiles in Cuba as Soviet missiles and that if they were used against us,we would retaliate by launching missiles against the U.S.S.R.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that SNIE 11-19-62, dated October20, 1962, estimates that the Russians will not use force to push their shipsthrough our blockade.10 He cited Ambassador [Charles] Bohlen’s viewthat the U.S.S.R. would not take military action, but would limit its reac-tion to political measures in the United Nations.

Secretary McNamara listed the disadvantages of the blockade routeas follows:

8. No copy of this draft has been found: ibid., p. 128, note 3.9. Afterward, McNamara recalled in some detail the arguments that he had made at this meet-ing for and against a blockade, but he appeared to have no recollection of taking thisStevenson-like position with regard to possible negotiations with the Soviets. Interview withRobert McNamara conducted by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., John F. Kennedy Library OralHistory Project, 1964, pp. 23–25.10. “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” in CIA Documents,McAuliffe, pp. 211–20.

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 605

1. It would take a long time to achieve the objective of eliminat-ing strategic missiles from Cuba.

2. It would result in serious political trouble in the United States.3. The world position of the United States might appear to be

weakening.

The advantages which Secretary McNamara cited are:

1. It would cause us the least trouble with our allies.2. It avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba, which is contrary to

our tradition.3. It is the only military course of action compatible with our

position as a leader of the free world.4. It avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a

response from the U.S.S.R. which could result in escalatingactions leading to general war.

The President pointed out that during a blockade, more missileswould become operational, and upon the completion of sites and launch-ing pads, the threat would increase. He asked General Taylor how manymissiles we could destroy by air action on Monday.

General [Maxwell] Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favoran air strike on Tuesday when United States forces could be in a state ofreadiness. He said he did not share Secretary McNamara’s fear that if weused nuclear weapons in Cuba, nuclear weapons would be used against us.

Secretary [Dean] Rusk asked General Taylor whether we dared toattack operational missile sites in Cuba.

General Taylor responded that the risk of these missiles being usedagainst us was less than if we permitted the missiles to remain there.

The President pointed out that on the basis of the intelligence esti-mate there would be some 50 strategic missiles operational in mid-December, if we went the blockade route and took no action to destroythe sites being developed.

General Taylor said that the principal argument he wished to makewas that now was the time to act because this would be the last chancewe would have to destroy these missiles. If we did not act now, the mis-siles would be camouflaged in such a way as to make it impossible for usto find them. Therefore, if they were not destroyed, we would have tolive with them with all the consequent problems for the defense of theUnited States.

The President agreed that the missile threat became worse each day,

adding that we might wish, looking back, that we had done earlier whatwe are now preparing to do.

Secretary Rusk said that a blockade would serious affect the Cubanmissile capability in that the Soviets would be unable to deploy to Cubaany missiles in addition to those now there.

Under Secretary [George] Ball said that if an effective blockade wasestablished, it was possible that our photographic intelligence wouldreveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba; hence, none of themissiles now there would be made operational.

General Taylor indicated his doubt that it would be possible to pre-vent the Russians from deploying warheads to Cuba by means of a block-ade because of the great difficulty of setting up an effective air blockade.

Secretary McNamara stated that if we knew that a plane was flyingnuclear warheads to Cuba, we should immediately shoot it down.Parenthetically, he pointed out that there are now 6,000 to 8,000 Sovietpersonnel in Cuba.

The President asked whether the institution of a blockade wouldappear to the free world as a strong response to the Soviet action. He isparticularly concerned about whether the Latin American countrieswould think that the blockade was an appropriate response to the Sovietchallenge.

The Attorney General [Robert Kennedy] returned to the pointmade by General Taylor, i.e., that now is the last chance we will have todestroy Castro and the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba.

Mr. [Theodore] Sorensen said he did not agree with the AttorneyGeneral or with General Taylor that this was our last chance. He said amissile buildup would end if, as everyone seemed to agree, the Russianswould not use force to penetrate the United States blockade.

Air Strike Route

Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy handed to the President the “air strikealternative,” which the President read. It was also referred to as theBundy plan.

The Attorney General told the President that this plan was supportedby Mr. Bundy, General Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with minorvariations, by Secretary [Douglas] Dillon and Director [John] McCone.

General Taylor emphasized the opportunity available now to takeout not only all the missiles, but all the Soviet medium bombers (IL-28)which were neatly lined up in the open on airbases in Cuba.

Mr. McNamara cautioned that an air strike would not destroy all themissiles and launchers in Cuba, and, at best, we could knock out two-thirds

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962606

of these missiles. Those missiles not destroyed could be fired from mobilelaunchers not destroyed. General Taylor said he was unable to explain whythe IL-28 bombers had been left completely exposed on two airfields. Theonly way to explain this, he concluded, was on the ground that the Cubansand the Russians did not anticipate [a] United States air strike.

Secretary Rusk said he hesitated to ask the question but he wonderedwhether these planes were decoys. He also wondered whether the Russianswere trying to entice us into a trap. Secretary McNamara stated hisstrong doubt that these planes were decoys. Director McCone addedthat the Russians would not have sent one hundred shiploads of equip-ment to Cuba solely to play a “trick.” General Taylor returned to thepoint he had made earlier, namely, that if we do not destroy the missilesand the bombers, we will have to change our entire military way of deal-ing with external threats.

The President raised the question of advance warning prior to mili-tary action—whether we should give a minimum of two hours notice ofan air strike to permit Soviet personnel to leave the area to be attacked.

General Taylor said that the military would be prepared to live witha 24-hour advance notice or grace period if such advance notice wasworthwhile politically. The President expressed his doubt that anynotice beyond seven hours had any political value.

There was a brief discussion of the usefulness of sending a draft mes-sage to Castro, and a copy of such a message was circulated.11

The President stated flatly that the Soviet planes in Cuba did notconcern him particularly. He said we must be prepared to live with theSoviet threat as represented by Soviet bombers. However, the existenceof strategic missiles in Cuba had an entirely different impact throughoutLatin America. In his view the existence of 50 planes in Cuba did notaffect the balance of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were anentirely different matter.

The Attorney General said that in his opinion a combination of theblockade route and the air strike route was very attractive to him. He feltthat we should first institute the blockade. In the event that the Sovietscontinued to build up the missile capability in Cuba, then we should informthe Russians that we would destroy the missiles, the launchers, and the mis-sile sites. He said he favored a short wait during which time the Russianscould react to the blockade. If the Russians did not halt the development ofthe missile capability, then we would proceed to make an air strike. The

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 607

11. Not found. FRUS, 11: 131, note 6.

advantage of proceeding in this way, he added, was that we would get awayfrom the Pearl Harbor surprise attack aspect of the air strike route.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a risk that we would act in such asway as to get Khrushchev to commit himself fully to the support of Castro.

Secretary Rusk doubted that a delay of 24 hours in initiating an airstrike was of any value. He said he now favored proceeding on the block-ade track.

Secretary Dillon mentioned 72 hours as the time between institutingthe blockade and initiating an air strike in the event we receive noresponse to our initial action.

Director McCone stated his opposition to an air strike, but admittedthat in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we shouldinstitute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were notdismantled within 72 hours, the United States would destroy the missilesby air attack. He called attention to the risk involved in a long drawn-outperiod during which the Cubans could, at will, launch the missiles againstthe United States. Secretary Dillon said the existence of strategic missilesin Cuba was, in his opinion, not negotiable. He believed that any effort tonegotiate the removal of the missiles would involve a price so high thatthe United States could not accept it. If the missiles are not removed oreliminated, he continued, the United States will lose all of its friends inLatin America, who will become convinced that our fear is such that wecannot act. He admitted that the limited use of force involved in a block-ade would make the military task much harder and would involve thegreat danger of the launching of these missiles by the Cubans.

Sorensen recalled later that these presentations by McCone and Dillon,taking direct issue with McNamara’s proposal for negotiations, resultedin “a brief awkward silence,” which was then broken by Gilpatric, “nor-mally a man of few words in meetings with the President when theDefense Secretary was present.” 12

Bromley Smith’s minutes continue.Deputy Secretary [Roswell] Gilpatric saw the choice as involving

the use of limited force or of unlimited force. He was prepared to face theprospect of an air strike against Cuba later, but he opposed the initial useof all-out military force such as a surprise air attack. He defined a block-ade as being the application of the limited use of force and doubted thatsuch limited use could be combined with an air strike.

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962608

12. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 694.

General Taylor argued that a blockade would not solve our problemor end the Cuban missile threat. He said that eventually we would haveto use military force and, if we waited, the use of military force would bemuch more costly.

Secretary McNamara noted that the air strike planned by the JointChiefs involved 800 sorties. Such a strike would result in several thou-sand Russians being killed, chaos in Cuba, and efforts to overthrow theCastro government. In his view the probability was high that an airstrike would lead inevitably to an invasion. He doubted that the Sovietswould take an air strike on Cuba without resorting to a very majorresponse. In such an event, the United States would lose control of thesituation which could escalate to general war.

The President agreed that a United States air strike would lead to amajor Soviet response, such as blockading Berlin. He agreed that at anappropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing totake strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised bythe Russians. He felt that implementation of a blockade would also resultin Soviet reprisals, possibly the blockade of Berlin. If we instituted a block-ade on Sunday, then by Monday or Tuesday we would know whether themissile development had ceased or whether it was continuing. Thus, wewould be in a better position to know what move to make next.

Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that even if the Russiansagreed to dismantle the missiles now in Cuba, continuing inspectionwould be required to ensure that the missiles were not again made ready.

The President said that if it was decided to go the Bundy route, hewould favor an air strike which would destroy only missiles. He repeatedthis view that we would have to live with this threat arising out of thestationing in Cuba of Soviet bombers.

Secretary Rusk referred to an air strike as chapter two. He did notthink we should initiate such a strike because of the risk of escalatingactions leading to general war. He doubted that we should act withoutconsultation of our allies. He said a sudden air strike had no support inlaw or morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out. Reading from notes,he urged that we start the blockade and only go on to an air attack whenwe knew the reaction of the Russians and of our allies.

At this point Director McCone acknowledged that we did not knowpositively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actuallyarrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of stor-age places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have beensent to Cuba.

The President asked what we would say to those whose reaction to

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 609

our instituting a blockade now would be to ask why we had not block-aded last July.

Both Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Ball made the point that we did not insti-tute a blockade in July because we did not then know of the existence ofstrategic missiles in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk suggested that our objective was an immediate freezeof the strategic missile capability in Cuba to be inspected by UnitedNations observation teams stationed at the missile sites. He referred toour bases in Turkey, Spain and Greece as being involved in any negotia-tion covering foreign bases. He said a United Nations group might besent to Cuba to reassure those who might fear that the United Stateswas planning an invasion.

Ambassador Stevenson stated his flat opposition to a surprise airstrike, which he felt would ultimately lead to a United States invasionof Cuba. He supported the institution of the blockade and predictedthat such action would reduce the chance of Soviet retaliation of anature which would inevitably escalate. In his view our aim is to endthe existing missile threat in Cuba without casualties and withoutescalation. He urged that we offer the Russians a settlement involvingthe withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and our evacuation ofGuantánamo base.

The President sharply rejected the thought of surrendering our baseat Guantánamo in the present situation. He felt that such action wouldconvey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning ourposition. He was not opposed to discussing withdrawal of our missilesfrom Turkey and Greece [sic], but he was firm in saying we should onlymake such a proposal in the future.

The Attorney General thought we should convey our firm intentionsto the Russians clearly and suggested that we might tell the Russiansthat we were turning over nuclear weapons and missiles to the WestGermans.13

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962610

13. To reassure the German allies but also to discourage any thoughts on their part of an inde-pendent nuclear deterrent, the United States in the late 1950s had begun to equip Luftwaffe air-craft with “tactical” nuclear bombs and missiles. The nuclear devices remained under U.S.control. The proposed multilateral nuclear force [MLF] was supposed to include Germansamong the multinational crews whose ships would carry nuclear-armed missiles, but authorityfor the release of the weapons remained exclusively with the U.S. President. Champions of theMLF in the United States, mostly in the State Department and sometimes referred to as the“cabal,” hoped that it would not only dampen any German interest in nuclear weapons butwould lead the French and perhaps the British to abandon their own independent nuclear forces[see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New

Ambassador [Llewellyn] Thompson stated his view that our firstaction should be the institution of a blockade. Following this, he thoughtwe should launch an air strike to destroy the missiles and sites, after giv-ing sufficient warning so that Russian nationals could leave the area tobe attacked.

The President said he was ready to go ahead with the blockade andto take actions necessary to put us in a position to undertake an air strikeon the missiles and missile sites by Monday or Tuesday.

General Taylor summarized the military actions already under way,including the quiet reinforcement of Guantánamo by infiltrating marinesand the positioning of ships to take out United States dependents fromGuantánamo on extremely short notice.

The Attorney General said we could implement a blockade veryquickly and prepare for an air strike to be launched later if we so decided.

The President said he was prepared to authorize the military to takethose preparatory actions which they would have to take in anticipationof the military invasion of Cuba. He suggested that we inform the Turksand the Italians that they should not fire the strategic missiles they haveeven if attacked. The warheads for missiles in Turkey and Italy could bedismantled. He agreed that we should move to institute a blockade asquickly as we possibly can.

In response to a question about further photographic surveillance ofCuba, Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed,that no low level photographic reconnaissance should be undertakennow because we have decided to institute a blockade.

Secretary Rusk recommended that a blockade not be instituted beforeMonday in order to provide time required to consult our allies.

Mr. Bundy said the pressure from the press was becoming intenseand suggested that one way of dealing with it was to announce shortlythat we had obtained photographic evidence of the existence of strategicmissiles in Cuba. The announcement would hold the press until thePresident made his television speech.

The President acknowledged that the domestic political heat follow-ing his television appearance would be terrific. He said he had opposedan invasion of Cuba but that now we were confronted with the possibil-

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 611

York: Random House, 1988), pp. 487–90]. Some Western officials interpreted Khrushchev’sposition regarding Berlin as traceable chiefly to Soviet concern lest Germany acquire nuclearweapons [see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1991), pp. 169–234]. Robert Kennedy’s suggestion here must have been startling to theState Department contingent, especially to Ball, who was active in the cabal.

ity that by December there would be fifty strategic missiles deployedthere. In explanation as to why we have not acted sooner to deal withthe threat from Cuba, he pointed out that only now do we have the kindof evidence which we can make available to our allies in order to con-vince them of the necessity of acting. Only now do we have a way ofavoiding a split with our allies.

It is possible that we may have to make an early strike with or with-out warning next week. He stressed again the difference between theconventional military buildup in Cuba and the psychological impactthroughout the world of the Russian deployment of strategic missiles toCuba. General Taylor repeated his recommendation that any air strike inCuba included attacks on the MIGs and medium bombers.

The President repeated his view that our world position would bemuch better if we attack only the missiles. He directed that air strikeplans include only missiles and missile sites, preparations to be readythree days from now.

Under Secretary Ball expressed his view that a blockade shouldinclude all shipments of POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] to Cuba.Secretary Rusk thought that POL should not now be included becausesuch a decision would break down the distinction which we want tomake between elimination of strategic missiles and the downfall of theCastro government. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that our objectiveis to destroy the offensive capability of the missiles in Cuba, not, at thistime, seeking to overthrow Castro!

The President acknowledged that the issue was whether POL shouldbe included from the beginning or added at a later time. He preferred todelay possibly as long as a week.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the problem involved in referringto our action as a blockade. He preferred the use of the word quarantine.

Parenthetically, the President asked Secretary Rusk to reconsider thepresent policy of refusing to give nuclear weapons assistance to France.He expressed the view that in light of present circumstances a refusal tohelp the French was not worthwhile. He thought that in the days aheadwe might be able to gain the needed support of France if we stoppedrefusing to help them with their nuclear weapons project.14

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962612

14. Like Eisenhower before him, Kennedy had never been an all-out opponent of France’s hav-ing independent nuclear forces. He had gone along, however, with the MLF scheme and hadapproved public statements by McNamara that described such forces as “dangerous, expen-sive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.” He had also drawn upon

There followed a discussion of several sentences in the “blockaderoute” draft of the President’s speech. It was agreed that the Presidentshould define our objective in terms of halting “offensive missile prepa-rations in Cuba.” Reference to economic pressures on Cuba would not bemade in this context.

The President made clear that in the United Nations we shouldemphasize the subterranean nature of the missile buildup in Cuba. Onlyif we were asked would we respond that we were prepared to talk aboutthe withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey. In such an eventuality,the President pointed out that we would have to make clear to theItalians and the Turks that withdrawing strategic missiles was not aretreat and that we would be prepared to replace these missiles by pro-viding a more effective deterrent, such as the assignment of Polaris sub-marines. The President asked Mr. Nitze to study the problems arisingout of the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey, with particularreference to complications which would arise in NATO. The Presidentmade clear that our emphasis should be on the missile threat from Cuba.

Ambassador [Adlai] Stevenson reiterated his belief that we must bemore forthcoming about giving up our missile bases in Turkey and Italy.He stated again his belief that the present situation required that weoffer to give up such bases in order to induce the Russians to remove thestrategic missiles from Cuba.

Mr. [Paul] Nitze flatly opposed making any such offer, but said hewould not object to discussing this question in the event that negotia-tions developed from our institution of a blockade.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that we should beready to meet criticism of our deployment of missiles abroad but weshould not initiate negotiations with a base withdrawal proposal.

During the 2 hours and 40 minutes of this meeting, lines had beenclearly drawn between the groups that would later be labeled doves andhawks.15 It is a pity that Kennedy held the meeting outside the reach of

National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 613

himself strong French criticism because of a loosely worded press conference remark whichseemed to single out French nuclear forces, not British, as “inimical to the community interestof the Atlantic alliance.” (see Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 484–86).15. The terminology may have been Kennedy’s own. It achieved popularity through a post-mortem on the crisis: Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, “In Time of Crisis,” SaturdayEvening Post, 8 December 1962, for which Kennedy was a source [see Michael Beschloss, TheCrisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960 –1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 569].

his microphones, for not even the anodyne vocabulary of an official note-taker conceals the intensity of the exchanges. McNamara seems evenmore emphatic than usual in describing the possible consequences of notfollowing a blockade and negotiate strategy. Stevenson pleads for sucha strategy even after the President has “sharply rejected” negotiationsabout Guantánamo and has declared that the United States will not initi-ate talks about trading away the IRBMs in Turkey and Italy. Nitze has“flatly opposed” Stevenson. Dillon has come down hard in saying thatthe missiles in Cuba are “not negotiable.” Taylor has intervened time andagain to argue for an air strike and against a blockade, while Rusk hassaid categorically that “a sudden air strike had no support in the law ormorality, and, therefore, must be ruled out.”

President Kennedy has emerged from the meeting midway betweenthe hawks and the doves. He has rejected making any offer to negotiate,at least for the time being. He has come down in favor of a blockade, nowto be labeled a quarantine. The blockade is to be coupled with a demandthat Khrushchev remove the missiles, with at least an air strike (a nar-row one, President Kennedy hopes) readied if Khrushchev does not com-ply. This was the option pressed by Thompson, Dillon, and McCone,vitally backed by Robert Kennedy. After the meeting McCone followedup with Robert Kennedy to nail down this outcome. Later in the eveningPresident Kennedy called to reassure McCone that “he had made up hismind to pursue the course which I had recommended and he agreed withthe views I expressed in the afternoon meeting.”16

When Taylor returned to the Pentagon, he told the Chiefs, “This wasnot one of our better days.” He added that President Kennedy had said,“I know you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but Itrust that you will support me in this decision.” Taylor said he hadassured the President they would. General Wheeler remarked, “I neverthought I’d live to see the day when I would want to go to war.”17

S AT U R DAY, O C TO B E R 20, 1962614

16. McCone to File, 20 October 1962, in FRUS, 11:137–38.17. Notes taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October–November1962, p. 13, National Security Archive, Washington, DC. These notes must be used with somecaution, but we rely on passages that the original notetaker marked as direct quotations.

ABC, 394Abel, Rudolf (William Fisher), 364Abrams, Creighton W., xxxi

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 228,265, 280, 310–13

JFK’s conversation with, 312–13RFK’s conversation with, 310–11

Acheson, Dean, 513–14, 572, 599–600Ackley, H. Gardner, xxxi

at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n,326–28, 333–34, 347

Adenauer, Konrad, xxxi, 118–24, 131–33,190n–91n

on Berlin, 187, 205, 470–71Common Market and, 121–22, 131–32Cuban missile crisis and, 421Eisenhower’s meeting with, 112, 118–19,

121–26, 131–32, 143–44on French-West German relations, 121, 125,

131on Hallstein Doctrine, 191JFK-Eisenhower letter to, 133and nuclear weapons for West Germany, 218on relief of Norstad, 122on Taylor, 122–24on U.S.-West German relations, 470, 497–98on West German defense budget, 126

administrative budget, 323nAdzhubei, Aleksei I., 264AEC, see Atomic Energy Commissionaerial reconnaissance, see photoreconnaissance

of Cuba; U-2 reconnaissance flightsAFL-CIO, xxxvii, 110, 178agriculture, 335, 347n, 371, 376, 502

in South Vietnam, 165–69Agriculture Appropriations Act, 383n–84nAgriculture Department, U.S., 502, 505airdrop nuclear weapons testing, 94–95, 96n,

103–4, 110nAir Force, U.S., 446n, 579

and call-up of reserve and guard units,75–76, 78–79

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 319Cuban missile crisis and, 435, 596and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,

348–49

nuclear weapons testing and, 88nTaylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 163–64and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 5n, 6, 8–9, 16see also Strategic Air Command

Alabama, University of, Lucy’s registration at,269n–70n

Albert, Carl, 52nAlexander, Henry, xxxiAlexander, Sir Harold, 122Alexander Hamilton, USS, 330nAlgeria, French war with, 129n, 144, 495–96Allen, Ward P., xxxiAlliance for Progress, 116nAlphand, Hervé, 125, 129Alsop, Joseph, 111, 468

Berlin and, 186, 201America’s Cup Challenge, 111, 154–55Andersen, Elmer Lee, 378Anderson, George W., xxxi, 217

on Cuban missile crisis, 578n, 579, 584–85,588, 590–95

on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 50, 588,590–91

on naval blockade of Cuba, 584, 588Andreotti, Giulio, 216nANDROSCOGGIN test, 110nAP (Associated Press), 286Apollo program, 83nArends, Leslie C., 52nArgentina, 59, 65, 115nArkansas, University of, Schola Cantorum choir

of, 16–19, 54Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 93nArmy, U.S.:

ABM system of, 108nand call-up of reserve and guard units, 75–76and crisis at University of Mississippi, 223,

225, 228, 254n, 256, 260–62, 265–67,270–72, 278, 279n, 280, 282–83, 284n,287n, 293–96, 298–302, 304–6, 310–13,317–19, 352–57, 388–90, 579

Cuban missile crisis and, 463Little Rock crisis and, 316nracial composition of, 388–90

Army Signal Corps, U.S., xvii

Index

Associated Press (AP), 286Atkinson, Sam, 248–49Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 215

and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330,343

on nuclear weapons testing, 82–83, 85, 90,97–98

Attwood, William, 390Ausland, John C., xxxiAustria, 131nAyub Khan, Mohammed, 155, 177

Baker, Bobby, 362, 367balanced-budget policy, 340, 370nBaldwin, Hanson, 153–54Ball, George W., xxxi–xxxii, 153n, 155, 205,

319, 380Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 425–26, 427n,

430, 444, 448, 450–52, 457–61, 463–68,512n–13n, 515, 516n, 533–34, 537,539–40, 542–44, 546–47, 554–56, 560,563, 576, 599, 606, 610, 612

on Laos, 178n, 179on naval blockade of Cuba, 465–66, 515,

542–43, 606, 610, 612on non-Soviet bloc trade with Cuba, 320

Barbour, Walworth, xxxiiBarnett, Ross R., Jr., 256Barnett, Ross R., Sr., xxxii

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 181,223–27, 229, 232–37, 239–47, 249–52,255–56, 258–59, 266–67, 269–70, 284,288–91, 295, 300, 303, 305–9, 314–16,351, 354, 385

JFK’s conversations with, 232–36, 239–47,252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15, 351

JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237popularity of, 250proposed arrest of, 315–17

Batista, Fulgencio, 406Bator, Francis, 599nBay of Pigs invasion, 178, 198, 200, 251, 257,

274, 442, 573prisoners taken in, 364, 381, 383, 453–54

Belgium, 122nBerlin and, 204–5NATO and, 137–38

Bell, David E., xxxii, 317and JFK’s budget and tax cut proposal, 321n,

323–33, 335–51, 368, 369n, 371–77,499n, 500–507, 509–11

Bennett, Philip, xxBERCON/MARCON plans, 135–36, 140

Berlin, 26, 110–12, 118–19, 134–49, 154n, 156,355, 469–98

Bohlen on, 185–90, 193–98, 200–206, 219,221, 513

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 32, 52, 62–63, 72

call for withdrawal of Western troops from,489–91, 573

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, 53,73–74, 76, 146–47

Cuba press statement and, 42economy of, 483–84, 488–89Eisenhower on, 119, 129–31German unification and, 205–6, 394Gromyko and, 361, 471, 489, 491–92, 497,

573, 581–82, 594JFK and, xxiv, 13, 22, 110–12, 119, 127, 129,

135, 137–46, 161–62, 183, 185–86,191–97, 200–207, 219, 221, 265, 335,380, 391, 394, 469–98, 532–33, 538–40,581–83, 585, 589–90, 592–93, 598, 609

Khrushchev on, 64n, 110–12, 129–30, 147,183, 185–87, 190, 193–98, 201–6, 219,265, 394, 411, 439n, 449, 451, 469–72,485–86, 489–92, 497, 513, 535, 538n,539–40, 544, 548, 553, 581, 590, 598,611n

meetings on, 135–49, 459, 469, 472–98military contingency planning for, 135–41,

380, 393n, 469, 471, 476, 486–87Norstad and, 127, 135–36, 139n, 143–45,

189, 495npolitical, diplomatic, and psychological impli-

cations of, 478, 485–87public opinion on, 477, 483–86Schroeder and, 459, 469, 472–98Soviet harassment of commercial aircraft en

route to, 81, 188–89Soviet restriction of access to, 62, 470–71,

472n, 473–88, 493–94, 497, 535, 541,544, 582, 593, 609

Soviet War Memorial in, 65–66, 81strategic linkage of Cuba and, xxiv, 22, 84,

190–93, 197–98, 207, 396, 405, 411–12,418, 433, 441, 449, 451, 467, 469–70,512–13, 522, 525, 532–35, 539–41, 544,548, 552–53, 576–77, 581–85, 587,589–90, 593–94, 598–99, 609

Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 161–62U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 4, 5n, 6,

12–13Berlin airlift, 124n, 130nBerlin blockade, 456, 458

I N D E X616

Berlin Wall, 201, 206casualties at, 65n, 361

Billings, LeMoyne “Lem,” xxxii, 229JFK’s conversation with, 238–39

Billingslea, Charles, 228, 262, 265, 280, 299,311–12

Birdsong, T. B., 309Black, Hugo, 224Blough, Roger, xxxii, 326–27BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics), 506BLUEGILL tests, 95–96, 99–100, 103–5, 107,

110nBoard of National Estimates, 393, 466, 537nBoeschenstein, Harold, xxxiiBoggs, Thomas Hale, xxxii, 52nBohlen, Avis, 5, 395Bohlen, Celestine, 5nBohlen, Charles E. “Chip”, xxxii, 5–7, 146,

395–96on Berlin, 185–90, 193–98, 200–206, 219,

221, 513on call-up of reserve and guard units, 199,

221on China, 198Cuban missile crisis and, 422, 428, 455, 459,

513–15, 524–25, 530, 533–34, 604Cuba press statement and, 34nfarewell dinner for, 468on German unification, 205–7on Hallstein Doctrine, 190–91Khrushchev and, 182–83, 187–88, 190–91,

193, 195–98, 200–201, 203–4, 207, 214,513

on naval blockade of Cuba, 199, 534on nuclear weapons for France, 214, 216–18,

220–21and nuclear weapons for West Germany, 218nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182–85,

188, 198, 208–13on Soviet Union, 4n, 6–7, 9–15, 19–20, 192,

197–98, 208, 515, 525, 604Bolivia:

Cuban missile crisis and, 434and naval blockade of Cuba, 543

Boston Globe, xixn, xxBoston Post, 303Bouck, Robert, xvii–xviiiBrandt, Willy, 470Brazil:

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 59, 65

Graham in, 115n, 116and naval blockade of Cuba, 543

Brosio, Manlio, 216Brown, Harold, 95nBrugioni, Dino, 601nbudget:

JFK’s proposal on, 317, 321–51, 355–56,365–66, 368–78, 499–511

Self-employed Pension Bill and, 365–66budget deficits, 323–24, 329, 340–42, 349, 369,

500, 502, 511Bullard, Sir Edward, 208–9Bundy, McGeorge, xxxii, 132, 182n, 188, 207,

380Bay of Pigs prisoners and, 364on Berlin, 135, 137, 139–44, 470, 576–77and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 32on buildup of conventional forces in Europe,

145on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80and Cuban aggression in Latin America, 23,

31Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 402–3,

410–16, 418–26, 427n, 429, 432–33,437, 439–42, 444–47, 451–69,512n–13n, 520, 529, 531–32, 534,537–47, 549, 553–58, 560–74, 576–77,598–99, 601, 606, 608–9, 611

Cuba press statement and, 24–25, 29, 31–37,40–47, 50–52

on foreign aid, 147–48on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 47JFK-Schroeder meeting and, 472non NATO, 137, 139–41, 144on naval blockade of Cuba, 84, 465–66,

541–42, 565, 567–68on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 85, 89–97,

99–100, 102–6, 142on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 16, 49,

134, 361, 395, 402–3, 423–24, 429, 520on Rio Pact, 37Skybolt and, 345nand Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n,

21–27, 29, 31–33, 35, 41–43, 391,394–96

on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36space program and, 93–94, 96, 104on Thorneycroft meeting, 145–46and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum

choir, 18on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 4n, 7–8, 10–12, 14–15Bundy, William P., xxxii

on Laos, 178n

Index 617

Bundy, William P. (continued)on nuclear weapons, 160on South Vietnam, 168–69Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 160–61,

167–69Bunker, Ellsworth, 157Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 501Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 506Bureau of the Budget, 333n, 336, 343–44,

346–47, 350–51, 373, 507–8Burgess, General, 75Burke, Richard, xixBurma, 172Bush, Prescott, 152nByrd, Harry F., Sr., 133

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 321,328, 334n, 339, 345, 506n

C1 transport planes, 348Cambodia, 170–73

Laotian relations with, 178Taylor’s visit to, 156, 170–72U.S. military aid to, 171

Cameron, Ben, 224Canada:

Cuban missile crisis and, 405Cuban trade with, 60–61NATO and, 138

Capehart, Homer, 392Cardona, Miro, 406Caribbean:

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 59, 68

Cuban aggression in, 22–23, 31Cuban missile crisis and, 442, 538Cuba press statement and, 30n, 31–32Monroe Doctrine and, 29nand Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 153Soviet submarines in, 58see also Latin America

Carroll, Joseph, 431, 597Carter, Marshall S., xxxii, 126n, 132–33

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 32, 50, 52n, 54–58, 61, 66–67, 70

Cuban missile crisis and, 397–98, 401–3,414–15, 419, 424–26, 427n, 429–33,439–41, 444, 451–52, 456–60, 463,465–68

on Cuban missile sites, 55, 57, 61, 66–67, 132Cuba press statement and, 34n, 35–36, 40, 47,

50on naval blockade of Cuba, 466on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 48–50

and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n, 20,25–27, 29, 54–56

on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36,55–56, 70

on Soviet submarines, 58Carver, John A., Jr., 506nCary, John B., 160–61Castro, Raul, 531Castro Ruz, Fidel, xxxii, 391

Bay of Pigs invasion and, 178, 257n,364, 381, 383, 453

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 59, 62–66, 68–69, 71

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 80covert actions against, xx, 391, 428, 454Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 410, 433–34,

436, 438, 442–43, 449, 451–52, 467,512, 515, 531, 536, 544, 548–51, 565,567–69, 590, 598, 606–9, 612

Graham on, 114, 116and naval blockade of Cuba, 62, 515, 536,

544, 565, 568popularity of, 64, 66and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20Soviet support for, 63, 66, 69, 192–93Thompson on, 192–93

CEA, see Council of Economic AdvisersCelebrezze, Anthony J., xxxii, 347

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,502

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 50, 67n,126n, 132, 154–55, 179n, 537n

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 54

Cuban missile crisis and, 397, 401n, 414,420n, 425, 441n, 462, 469, 537n, 560,597, 602

Cuba press statement and, 47journalists and officials investigated by, xxiv,

134, 154on Laos, 176and leaks of classified information, 154NPIC of, 395, 397, 401n, 516, 578, 579n,

603n,nuclear weapons testing and, 88nOperation Mongoose and, 428and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,

393U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 3–4, 5n, 14,

16, 134, 380–81, 394–95, 397, 398n,401n, 403n–4n, 414, 441n, 462, 516, 578,579n, 597, 603n

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 555

I N D E X618

CHAMA test, 96n, 110nChamber of Commerce, U.S., 341–42, 344Charyk, Joseph V., xxxiiCHECKMATE test, 110nChilds, Marquis, 175Chile, 115n

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 61, 65

Cuban missile crisis and, 434Cuban trade with, 61and naval blockade of Cuba, 543

China, Nationalist, see TaiwanChina, People’s Republic of (Communist China),

167, 442, 458, 590crop destruction program in, 168Quemoy and Matsu shelled by, 591nSoviet relations with, 198Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156–61, 163U-2 reconnaissance flights over, 110, 134,

395Chiperfield, Robert B., 52nChoate, xxxii, 238Church, Frank, 362CIA, see Central Intelligence AgencyCINCLANT (Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces,

Atlantic), 414, 428, 446ncivil rights, 223

and crisis at University of Mississippi, seeMississippi, University of, crisis at

Little Rock crisis and, 181, 226, 237, 250,316n

at University of Alabama, 269n–70nClark, Joseph, 369Clark, Ramsey, xxxii

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 252,276n–80n, 280–81, 286–87, 292, 301,302n, 305, 310n

Clay, Lucius D., xxxii, 124, 129–30, 189Cleveland, J. Harlan, xxxiiClifford, Clark, xxxii–xxxiii, 133–34, 153Clifton, Chester V., 320Cline, Ray S., xxxiii, 43, 395

Cuban missile crisis and, 602–3Cuba press statement and, 34n, 36–38, 43on Laos, 178n, 179–80on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 49on Rio Pact, 37–38on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 36

Cold War, 3Colombia, 68, 115–16Committee on overhead Reconnaissance

(COMOR), 134, 402Common Market:

Eisenhower on, 121–22, 131–32France and, 121, 131–32, 206, 218

Communications Satellite Act, 388Communists, communism, 316n, 392n

Berlin and, 489, 584and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 59, 63–64, 66–69, 71and call-up of reserve and guard units, 80Cuban missile crisis and, 434, 589Cuba press statement and, 38, 45n, 46Graham on, 115–16Laos and, 179–81, 458nand Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 153Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165, 174Thompson on, 192–93see also China, People’s Republic of; Cuba;

German Democratic Republic; SovietUnion

COMOR (Committee on overheadReconnaissance), 134, 402

Comsat proposal, 363nCongo, 320Congress, U.S., 134n, 182–83, 191–92, 349n,

383n–84nbriefing on Cuba for, 32–33, 50–73and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24,

52–53, 73–81, 110, 147n, 150, 199Cuban missile crisis and, 408, 414–15, 438,

439n, 444, 524, 534, 542, 545–46, 563,571

on foreign aid, 111, 159n, 192, 358–59and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,

321–22, 325, 328–29, 331, 334–35, 339,351, 355–56, 372n, 375–76, 499–501,503, 505, 506n, 507–8

JFK’s relationship with, 319–20JFK’s secret recordings and, xix, xxiiion nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217nuclear weapons negotiations and, 214Self-employed Pension Bill and, 111–14,

365–66, 382and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3–4, 20,

22, 24, 26–27, 32, 74Watergate hearings of, xii–xiiisee also House of Representatives, U.S.;

Senate, U.S.Constitution, U.S., 214

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 233,235, 243

conventional forces:in Europe, 119, 121, 125, 145, 216nTaylor on, 156, 158–60, 162, 164

Cooper, John Sherman, 53

Index 619

Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 509and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,

321n, 322, 338n–39n, 341, 350, 369Couve de Murville, Maurice, 186, 380, 470, 498Cox, Archibald, xxxiii, 133

and crisis at University of Mississippi,315–17

Crider, William, 286ncrop destruction programs, 165n, 166–69Cuba, 154n, 380–84

Bay of Pigs invasion of, see Bay of Pigs inva-sion

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24,51–53, 73–81, 110, 150–53, 199, 221

congressional leadership briefed on, 32–33,50–73

government-in-exile of, 31Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and, see

Guantánamo Bay Naval BaseJFK-Smathers conversation on, 382–84Khrushchev on, 190–92, 197–98, 207–8, 394,

469Latin American and Caribbean aggression of,

22–23, 31missile sites in, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16, 19–34,

39–40, 42–43, 47–49, 51, 55–57, 61–62,64, 66–67, 69–72, 74, 80, 132, 134, 153,320, 361–62, 364, 381, 391–95,397–416, 418–20, 422–23, 428–38,443–52, 455, 460–62, 466–69, 471–72,512–20, 524–34, 536–37, 539, 541, 543,545–50, 552, 555–56, 558–59, 565,568–69, 576–95, 598, 600–606, 608–14

naval blockade of, 22, 25, 27, 45, 52, 62, 76,83–84, 199, 406, 408–10, 416, 437, 450,454, 464–66, 513–15, 525, 532–36,540–44, 550, 557, 563–69, 574–77,579–80, 582–86, 588, 593, 595–96,598–602, 604–14

photoreconnaissance of, 3, 6, 13, 16, 20,48–50, 67n, 110, 134, 320, 361–62, 364,380–81, 394–95, 397–405, 408–9, 414,419, 420n, 421, 423–24, 427–31, 434,436–37, 443, 446–47, 453, 463–65,516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537, 545,556, 558–59, 566, 571, 574–75, 578–79,583, 588, 592, 594–97, 602–3, 606, 611

press statement on, 3, 24–52, 71–72, 83, 149proposed air strike against, 395, 407–10, 413,

416–23, 425, 427–28, 435–39, 442,445–49, 460–61, 463, 466–68, 512–14,516, 520, 523–27, 529–30, 532–33,535–36, 538, 545–50, 552, 557–59,

565–66, 568–69, 572, 575–76, 579–81,586, 588–93, 595–602, 604–14

proposed declaration of war against, 514,524–25, 532, 534, 536, 541–43, 552,557, 567, 600

proposed invasion of, 25–26, 47–48, 62,70–72, 391, 395, 408, 413, 416–19, 422,424–25, 427–28, 435–39, 442, 445, 449,453, 463, 513–14, 525–27, 529, 532, 535,542, 544–45, 550–53, 557, 566, 573,575, 579, 586, 589–90, 593–94, 609–11

refugees from, 31, 54, 414–15, 556, 560Soviet arms shipments to, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16,

19–52, 54–56, 59, 62–65, 67–68, 70–72,74, 80–81, 83, 149, 153, 156, 207, 320,361, 381–82, 391–96, 400–401, 411,415–16, 420n, 440–41, 455, 457, 462,464, 513, 528, 530, 536, 543–54, 573,588, 602–3, 606–7, 609, 612

Soviet military personnel in, 35–36, 55–56,64–66, 69–70, 80, 549, 552, 569, 606–7,609

Spanish rule in, 452nstrategic linkage of Berlin and, xxiv, 22, 84,

190–93, 197–98, 207, 396, 405, 411–12,418, 433, 441, 449, 451, 467, 469–70,512–13, 522, 525, 532–35, 539–41, 544,548, 552–53, 576–77, 581–85, 587,589–90, 593–94, 598–99, 609

trade relations of, 60–62, 320Cuban missile crisis, xiii, 120n, 134n, 397–472,

499JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 472JFK’s meetings with JCS on, 578–99JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii–xix,

xxii–xxivJFK’s summary of late-night meeting on,

572, 576–77meetings of advisers on, 397–469, 512–614military contingency planning in, 199, 393,

395, 406–10, 412–13, 416–25, 427–28,435–38, 442–50, 452–54, 459–64,466–69, 512–16, 520, 522–29, 532–36,538–41, 544–52, 557–60, 562–69,574–76, 579–80, 583–602, 604–14

NSC meeting on, 601–14potential casualties in, 416, 524, 526, 532,

536, 538–39, 547, 550, 566, 569,584–85, 590, 609

proposed declaration of national emergencyin, 524, 536

proposed political courses of action in, 405,412, 415, 422–23, 434, 436–38, 443–45,

I N D E X620

451–52, 463–64, 466, 512–15, 521–25,529–30, 533–39, 542–43, 549, 553–55,566–68, 580, 583–84, 586–87, 589, 591,593–94, 598, 600, 602, 604, 607–8,610–14

public opinion and, 412–13, 417, 523–24,528–29, 539, 548, 555, 558, 561,586–87, 611

secrecy concerns in, 413–14, 422–23, 453,560–61, 571, 576–77, 592

Czechoslovakia, 207, 490–91

Daily Bond Buyer, 325n, 326Dale, Bill, 386nDalton, George, xviii–xxDay, J. Edward, xxxiii

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,505–6

Dean, Arthur H., xxxiiidebt limit, 334Declaration on Solidarity for the Preservation

of the Political Integrity of theAmerican States Against InternationalCommunist Intervention, 37–38

Defense Department, U.S. (DOD), 197, 579on Berlin, 135, 201and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 57on call-up of reserve and guard units, 74and crisis at University of Mississippi, 293Cuban missile crisis and, 414, 422–23,

427–28, 441n, 450, 521, 525, 528,560–61, 563, 599–600

on foreign aid, 147–48and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 323,

329–30, 332–34, 339, 343–45, 347–49,505

and leaks of classified information, 154and military contingency planning on Cuba,

393on nuclear weapons for France, 215nuclear weapons testing and, 82, 95n, 98,

101–2, 105, 109Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165–66on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 4, 13Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 431n, 597deficit spending, 369, 500de Gaulle, Charles, xxxiii, 216n, 497

Berlin and, 186–88, 195–96, 205Common Market and, 131nCuban missile crisis and, 421, 443–44Eisenhower on, 119, 125, 128–29

French-West German relations and, 121, 218NATO and, 119on nuclear weapons, 128n, 215

Democratic Congressional CampaignCommittee, 379

Democratic National Committee, 501nDemocrats, Democratic party, 266, 387

on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 349nmidterm election campaigning of, 321,

395–96Self-employed Pension Bill and, 365–67and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 24

Denmark, 131n, 490–91Dennison, Robert S., xxxiii, 414n, 446nDepartment of State Bulletin, 38n–39ndesalinization projects, 331nDIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), 431n, 597Diem, Ngo Dinh, 166, 172Dillon, C. Douglas, xxxiii

at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n,323–25, 327–28, 334–40, 344–51,369–78, 499n, 506, 508–11

Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 412–13, 421,427n, 440, 442, 444–45, 456–57, 512n,514–15, 536, 538–41, 544–45, 553–54,558, 560–67, 599–602, 606, 608–9,613–14

Cuba press statement and, 34, 37, 39–44on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 565, 567,

600–602, 608on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–14

Dirksen, Everett M., xxxiii, 114nbriefing on Cuba for, 52n, 53, 60, 66on call-up of reserve and guard units, 53, 73n,

76–78, 110on Cuban missile sites, 66on Cuban trade, 60

Doar, John, 224–25, 273nDobrynin, Anatoly, xxxiii

Cuban missile crisis and, 455–57, 531,553–54

nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182, 184n,188, 193, 214

proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit and, 264RFK’s meeting with, 12, 33–34and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 34n,

392on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 11–12, 15DOD, see Defense Department, U.S.Dolan, Joseph P., 258, 281Dominican Republic, 68

Index 621

DOMINIC nuclear test series, 82–83, 85–110,360, 364

Donovan, James B., 178, 364, 381, 383, 453nDouglas, Paul H., 53, 113n, 349, 351, 355, 365nDouglass, Frederick, 82Dowling, Walter C., xxxiii, 470nDresser Industries, 341nDrummond, Nelson Cornelius, 230–32Dryfoos, Orvil, 153–54Duke, Angie Biddle, 17Dulles, Allen, 274Dulles, John Foster, 126Duncan, John P., xxxiiiDungan, Ralph A., 319, 380Duvalier, François, xxxiii, 68

East Coast Railway, 386nEastland, James O., xxxiiieconomy, economics:

of Berlin, 483–84, 488–89Interior Appropriations Bill and, 362–64,

379, 386–87international gold reserves and, xxiv, 155and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 317,

321–51, 355–56, 365–66, 368–78,499–511

Self-employed Pension Bill and, 111–14,365–68, 382–83, 387–88

Ecuador, 115n, 543education, 331, 337, 372, 375–76EFTA (European Free Trade Association),

131nEgypt, 43, 545n, 581, 589Eighth Army, U.S., 162Eisenhower, Dwight D., xxxiii, 151n, 332n

Adenauer’s meeting with, 112, 118–19,121–26, 131–32, 143–44

on Berlin, 119, 129–31on budget, 369–70, 504on conventional ground forces in Europe,

121Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 426, 460, 469,

514, 535–36on Cuban missile sites, 132on de Gaulle, 119, 125, 128–29and Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West

Irian, 157on French-West German relations, 121, 125,

131JFK’s meeting with, 111–12, 114–16,

118–33, 143–44JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237on Latin America, 116

Little Rock crisis and, 226n, 237, 250midterm election campaigning of, 369on nuclear weapons, 123, 128, 130, 613non relief of Norstad, 122, 124, 126–27secret recordings by, xii–xiiion Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396on Taylor, 122–24, 126U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 4, 6n, 398n,

548non West German defense budget, 120–21,

125–26West German trip of, 112, 118–26, 131

employment, and JFK’s budget and tax cutsproposal, 321–22, 504–5

Erhard, Ludwig, 120Ervin, Samuel J., Jr., 384Escalante, Anibal, 66nEurope:

conventional ground force buildup in, 119,121, 125, 145

Taylor’s Far East trip and, 160–62European Advisory Council, 130European Atomic Energy Commission

(EURATOM), 121n–22nEuropean Economic Community, see Common

MarketEuropean Free Trade Association (EFTA),

131nEvers, Medgar, 223Executive Committee (Excom), 601nExner, Judith, xixExperiment in International Living program,

82

F4H fighters, 330F8U reconnaissance planes, 403nF-84 fighter-bombers, 78–79F-101 reconnaissance planes, 49–50, 403nFair Deal, 362Falkner, Murry, 302, 310Far East, Taylor’s trip to, 155–76Farley, Jim, 501Faubus, Orval, 226nFaulkner, William, 302Fawcett, Stephanie, xxiFechter, Peter, 65nFederal Aviation Administration (FAA), 331Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 142, 266,

360and crisis at University of Mississippi,

270–73, 276, 278n, 307Drummond spy case and, 230

Feldman, Myer, xxxiii

I N D E X622

Fenoaltea, Sergio, 16–17Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S., 224–25,

235Finletter, Thomas, 143, 146First National Bank of Orlando, 386nfiscal austerity, 500Fisher, Adrian “Butch,” xxxiii

on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 93Fisher, William (Rudolf Abel), 364FitzGerald, Desmond, xxxiiiFlorida:

Cuban missile crisis and, 439and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 27

Fluvio test, 93Food Stamp Program, 503Ford Motor Company, xxxviiforeign aid, 111, 159n, 192, 320, 356–60, 364

Cuban missile crisis and, 522DOD budget for, 147–48and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 343,

347, 356, 375McCormack-JFK conversation on, 357–59Mansfield-JFK conversation on, 378O’Brien-JFK conversation on, 357, 359–60in post-World War II Europe, 128see also military aid

Foreign Aid Bill, 320, 356foreign exchange, 60–61Forrestal, James, 181Forrestal, Michael V., xxxiii, 135n, 156n, 176,

181Fosdick, Dorothy, 573nFoster, William, xxxiiiFowler, Henry H., xxxiii, 369nFowler, James R., xxxiiiFrance, 122n, 205

Algerian war with, 129n, 144, 495–96Berlin and, 136, 139, 141n, 144, 146, 186–87,

189–90, 195–96, 203, 492, 494–98Common Market and, 121, 131–32, 206, 218NATO and, 119, 125, 129, 139–40nuclear weapons and, 124, 128, 214–21,

611n, 612, 613nSuez crisis and, 522, 545nsupersonic jet transport program of, 331–32U.S. postwar aid to, 128West German relations with, 119–21, 125,

129, 131, 215, 218, 494–97Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 494–95Fraser, Donald M., 378nFreeman, Orville L., xxxiii, 347Frondizi, Arturo, 59Frost, Robert, 111, 204, 394

Fulbright, J. William, xxxiiibriefing on Cuba for, 52n, 54, 69, 72and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum

choir, 16–17, 54

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 335, 508Gavin, James, 124, 146n, 320

on nuclear weapons for France, 214–15, 217,220

Gemini program, 83n, 149, 348General Dynamics Corporation, 342nGeneral Services Administration (GSA), 373Geneva:

meetings on Berlin in, 489–91nuclear weapons negotiations in, 83, 212, 537

Geneva Declaration on Laos, 176n, 178–80Geoghegan, William A., 276, 304–5, 310German Democratic Republic (GDR) (East

Germany), 81Berlin and, 64n, 111, 193–95, 201–3, 206,

470, 474, 477–78, 485–88, 541, 593Bohlen on, 205–7Hallstein Doctrine on, 191nJFK-Schroeder meeting on, 474, 477–78,

485–88as Soviet surrogate, 487n

Germany, Federal Republic of (West Germany),130

Berlin and, 136, 139, 141n, 142, 146, 189–90,195–96, 204, 206, 412, 469–71, 481,487–88, 492, 494–95, 498, 581

Common Market and, 121, 131–32Cuban missile crisis and, 412, 610Cuban trade with, 61defense budget of, 120–21, 125–26Eisenhower’s trip to, 112, 118–26, 131French relations with, 119–21, 125, 129, 131,

215, 218, 494–97and JFK-Eisenhower letter to Adenauer, 133NATO and, 120, 125, 139–40nuclear weapons and, 12n, 218, 611nU.S. postwar aid to, 128U.S. relations with, 470, 497–98, 581

Germany, unification of, 205–7, 394, 470, 581Gerrity, John, 325–26Gilpatric, Roswell L., xxxiii, 178n, 368, 380

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 319Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 420, 425,

427n, 429, 444, 456–57, 464, 512n,513–14, 555–56, 564–66, 576, 580n, 608

on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 533, 564, 566on nuclear weapons for France, 215–16, 219Skybolt and, 345n

Index 623

Globke, Hans, 120GMAIC, see Guided Missile and Astronautics

Intelligence CommitteeGNP (gross national product), 321n, 322,

509–10gold, xxiv, 155Goldberg, Arthur J., xxxiv, 110, 133

Supreme Court swearing in of, 315, 316n,317

Goodrich, Alan, xxGoodwin, Richard N., xxxivGordon, A. Lincoln, xxxivGordon, Kermit, xxxiv, 341nGore, Al, 149Gore, Albert, Sr., xxxiv, 145, 149, 386

on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80JFK’s conversation with, 365–68on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112n–13n,

365–68, 387Gore, Nancy, 149Gorky, Maxim, 394Goulart, João, xxxivGraham, Philip, 200Graham, William Franklin, Jr. “Billy,” xxxiv

JFK’s meeting with, 114–18Latin American tour of, 114–16

Grant, Ulysses S., 250Graybeal, Sydney N., xxxiv, 397n, 399–400,

403, 465Great Britain:

Berlin and, 136, 139, 141n, 144, 146, 189–90,195, 202–3, 361, 492, 495n, 498

Common Market and, 131–32Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 416Cuban trade with, 60Malayan crop destruction and, 167NATO and, 137, 139–40nuclear weapons and, 82–83, 96–97, 208n,

209, 451, 611n, 613nSkybolt project and, 332, 345Suez crisis and, 522, 545n, 581supersonic jet transport program of,

331–32U.S. postwar aid to, 128

Greece, 60, 610Green, Edith, 363Greenewalt, Crawford H., xxxivGretel, 155Grewe, Wilheim, 190Gromyko, Andrei, A., xxxiv, 575

Berlin and, 361, 471, 489, 491–92, 497, 573,581–82, 594

Cuban missile crisis and, 409, 411, 455, 457,

537, 547, 554–56, 560–64, 572–74,581–82

JFK’s meeting with, 572–73, 576, 594on Laos, 180nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12, 492,

497, 573and U.S. nuclear aid for France, 220

gross national product (GNP), 321n, 322,509–10

Gruenther, Alfred, 127GSA (General Services Administration), 373Guantánamo Bay Naval Base:

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 50, 57–58, 71

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 80Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 408–9, 452,

521, 526, 536, 545, 550–52, 588–91,596, 604, 610, 613

Cuba press statement and, 28, 47proposed evacuation of, 591, 610U-2 reconnaissance flights over, 320

Guatemala:and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 68–69Cuban missile crisis and, 434

Guevara, Ernesto “Che,” 192, 531Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence

Committee (GMAIC), 432, 520, 579nGuihard, Paul, 298nGuns of August, The (Tuchman), 523nGunther, John, 390Guthman, Edwin, 252–53, 267, 277–78, 286,

291, 303–5

Haiti, 68–69Halaby, Najeeb E., xxxiv

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,507

Halleck, Charles A., xxxivbriefing on Cuba for, 52n, 54, 57–58on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 58

Hallstein, Walter, 190n–91nHallstein Doctrine, 190–91Hamburg, 130Harkins, Paul D., 166, 169, 172Harriman, W. Averell, xxxiv

on Indonesia, 174–75on Laos, 178n, 179on South Vietnam, 167–69Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 167–69,

172, 174–75Harrington, Frank, xix–xxHart, Philip A., xxxiv

I N D E X624

Hartington, Marquis of, xxxviiHarvard University, xxxv, 335n, 508n

Graduate School of Public Administration at,xxxii

student riots at, 268–69Hatcher, Andrew, 249Haworth, Leland, J., xxxiv

on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 90, 92nHAYMAKER tests, 95, 99, 109Health, Education, and Welfare Department,

U.S. (HEW), 502, 505and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 329,

336–37, 347health care, health research, 337, 339, 371Heller, Walter W., xxxiv, 149

at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n,322, 325–28, 336, 338–41, 344, 350–51,369–70, 375, 378, 499n, 509–11

Helms, Richard M., xxxiv, 428Herlong, A. Sydney, Jr., 385HHFA (Housing and Home Finance Agency),

336–37, 371, 373Hickenlooper, Bourke B., xxxiv

briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 56–58, 63–65, 68on Castro, 64–65on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 57and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 63–64on Soviet military presence in West Berlin,

65on Soviet submarines, 58

Hillenbrand, Martin J., xxxivon Berlin, 135n, 141, 146Cuba press statement and, 34non U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 4n, 7–10, 13–14Hilsman, Roger, xxxiv, 168, 178n, 462Hitch, Charles, 148Hitler, Adolf, 123, 523Hodges, Luther H., xxxiv, 133

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,504–5

Home, Lord, 250Honey Fitz, 386nHoover, Herbert H., xxxivHoover, J. Edgar, 360HOUSATONIC test, 110nHouse of Representatives, U.S., 285

Appropriations Committee of, 347, 357–58,360n, 362, 364, 375, 379, 381, 383n–85n

Armed Services Committee of, 150, 152Bay of Pigs prisoners and, 381on call-up of reserve and guard units, 75,

147, 150–53

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 385Foreign Affairs Committee of, 150, 152, 221non foreign aid, 192, 320, 356–58, 378on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362, 363n,

364, 386on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,

321–22, 324n, 345, 347, 356, 375on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–14, 365,

367–68, 387–88on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 392Veterans Affairs Committee of, 374nWays and Means Committee of, 322, 324n,

345, 375, 388see also Congress, U.S.

Housing Act of 1961, 337Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA),

336–37, 371, 373Howze, Hamilton, 352–53Humphrey, Hubert H., xxxiv, 52n, 378

on Self-employed Pension Bill, 366–67Hungary, Soviet invasion of, 72, 208, 411, 545,

549, 554, 581, 589

IL-28 bombers:in Cuba, 381, 393Cuban missile crisis and, 420, 436, 445, 462,

512, 518–19, 583–84, 606–7, 612IMF (International Monetary Fund), 175, 374Immigration and Naturalization Service, 282India, 170Indian projects, 506Indonesia:

SAMs sent to, 43Taylor’s visit to, 156–57, 174–76

infrastructure, 506nInter-American Conference, 38n, 509, 562Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance, see Rio PactInterior and Other Agencies Appropriations

Bill, 362–64, 379JFK-Smathers conversation on, 386–87

Interior Department, U.S., 331, 372Internal Revenue Service, 324nInternational Control Commission, 181International Milling Company, 342nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), 175, 374investment, 370Iran, 28, 64, 72, 200, 202, 208, 416, 467, 550Iraq, 43IRONBARK, 432Israel, 545nIssues and Answers, 394Italy, 60, 122n, 216n, 451n

Index 625

Cuban missile crisis and, 411, 525, 532, 539,567–68, 600, 604, 609, 612–13

Izvestia, 81, 264n

Jackson, Henry “Scoop,” 182non nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217–20

Jackson State University, 223JAEIC (Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence

Committee), 217n, 401, 579nJapan:

Cuban missile crisis and, 411Pearl Harbor attack and, 515, 523, 539,

545–46, 607Taylor’s visit to, 156, 163–64and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 9Javits, Jacob, 381JCS, see Joint Chiefs of StaffJohn F. Kennedy Presidential Library, xix–xxiiJohnson, Lyndon B., xxxiv, 367n, 371n

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 52

Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 415–16, 427,454

economic policy of, 321n–22nJFK’s assassination and, xviiiand JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 500secret recordings by, xii–xiiion Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 415–16

Johnson, Paul, 224–25, 243, 246Johnson, U. Alexis, xxxiv–xxxv

on Berlin, 534–35Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 413, 427n,

430, 444, 449, 451, 457, 461, 512n–13n,533–35, 538–40, 542, 544, 547–48, 551,558, 564–67, 570, 576, 599n

on naval blockade of Cuba, 534–35, 540, 542,544, 565–66, 599n

on South Vietnam and Cambodia, 171–73Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 171–74

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee(JAEIC), 217n, 401, 579n

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 126, 143, 319, 460on Berlin, 135Cuban missile crisis and, 407, 420n, 425, 428,

435–37, 440, 445, 448–49, 463, 512–13,516, 526, 528, 530, 578–99, 605–6, 608,614

JFK’s meetings with, 578–99in military contingency planning on Cuba,

393n, 395on naval blockade of Cuba, 513, 579, 585,

588, 593, 595, 598

on nuclear weapons for France, 215on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 382Taylor’s appointment to chairmanship of,

119, 122, 123n, 156Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 159–61, 165

Joint Committee on Armed Services andForeign Relations, 151

Joint Committee on Reduction of FederalExpenditures, 328n

Joint Economic Committee, 349n, 351Joint Reconnaissance Group (JRG), 597Jordan report, 22Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., USS, 155Judd, Walter H., 378Justice Department, U.S., xviii

and crisis at University of Mississippi,223–24, 246, 247n, 249, 251–52, 253n,258n, 273n, 276n–77n, 280n–81n, 298n,299, 301n–4n, 310n, 313

Cuba press statement and, 41and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 331Tax Division of, 281n

Kahn, Herman, xviiiKaiser, Edgar, 325nKaiser Steel Company, 325–27Kamchatka, nuclear weapons negotiations and,

212–13Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., xxxv

and crisis at University of Mississippi,251–52, 261–63, 265, 267–69, 276n,277, 279–81, 286–87, 291–93, 297–98,390

on racial composition of troops at Universityof Mississippi, 390

Kaysen, Carl, xxxv, xxxviii, 155, 319Cuba press statement and, 34n, 40on Laos, 176on non-Soviet bloc trade with Cuba, 320on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 89–90, 92,

96, 99, 101on South Vietnam, 176Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n

Kearsage, USS, 360Keating, Kenneth:

Cuban missile crisis and, 414–15, 421, 556,560

on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,391–92, 396

Keeny, Spurgeon, xxxvKefauver, Estes, 386Kennedy, Caroline, 397Kennedy, Edward M., xix–xx

I N D E X626

Kennedy, Jacqueline, xix, 142n, 155, 177, 232,263–65

Kennedy, John F.:on ABM system, 108–9Abrams’s conversation with, 312–13assassination of, xviii, xxiiBarnett’s conversations with, 232–36,

239–47, 252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15,351

Berlin and, xxiv, 13, 22, 110–12, 119, 127,129, 135, 137–46, 161–62, 183, 185–86,191–97, 200–207, 219, 221, 265, 335,380, 391, 394, 469–98, 532–33, 538–40,581–83, 585, 589–90, 592–93, 598, 609

Billings’s conversation with, 238–39and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 32–33, 50, 52n, 53–54, 56–57, 59,61–64, 67–72

on budget and tax cuts, 317, 321–51, 355–56,365–66, 368–78, 499–511

on buildup of conventional forces in Europe,145

on call-up of reserve and guard units, 51–52,73–76, 78, 80–81, 146–47, 150–53, 199

on Cambodia, 171–72on China, 160–61, 163on Common Market, 132Congress’s relations with, 319–20Cox’s conversation with, 316–17and crisis at University of Mississippi, xxiv,

222–23, 225–30, 232–47, 249–58,260–82, 284–88, 290–93, 295, 297–98,301–2, 305–10, 312–19, 351–57,383–85, 388–90, 579

and Cuban aggression in Latin America, 23,31

Cuban missile crisis and, xxiii–xxiv,397–400, 402–4, 406–10, 412–27,429–31, 433–36, 438–61, 469–72,512–15, 517–21, 523, 525–43, 545–53,555–64, 571–614

on Cuban missile sites, 3, 47–48, 61–62, 67,69, 71–72, 134

on Cuban trade, 61–62, 320Cuba press statement and, 24–26, 28–48,

50–52, 71–72, 83, 149on Drummond spy case, 231–32Eisenhower’s meeting with, 111–12, 114–16,

118–33, 143–44on foreign aid, 111, 147–48, 159n, 320,

356–60, 364, 378on French-West German relations, 125, 129,

494–97

on German unification, 205Gore’s conversation with, 365–68Graham’s meeting with, 114–18Gromyko’s meeting with, 572–73, 576, 594on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 47, 50,

57–58, 80on Hallstein Doctrine, 190illnesses of, 360Indonesia and, 157, 174–76on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63,

386–87invited to summit by Khrushchev, 263–65on Japan, 163–64JCS meetings of, 578–99Keogh’s conversation with, 388Kirwan’s conversation with, 379–80on Laos, 176, 178–81late-night meeting summarized by, 572,

576–77on Latin America, 116on leaks of classified information, 153–54McCormack’s conversations with, 150–52,

357–59MacDonald’s conversation with, 247–49Mansfield’s conversations with, 362–64,

378–80midterm election campaigning of, 155, 178,

182–83, 321, 361–62, 369, 376n, 383n,390, 395–96, 499, 560–62, 577–78, 599

on military aid, 163–64, 171, 343on missiles in Far East, 158on missiles in Turkey, 63–64Morgan’s conversation with, 150–52on NATO, 118–19, 125, 129, 137–40, 144on naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 45, 62, 83–84,

533–34, 541–43, 557, 574–77, 579,582–83, 593, 598, 601, 605–6, 609–12,614

on Norstad, 124, 126–28, 130on nuclear weapons, 12–13, 82–83, 85–109,

119, 124, 128–30, 135, 140–42, 144,160–62, 182–85, 188, 198, 207–11,213–21, 218–19, 364, 485, 487, 489, 492,495, 497, 573, 612, 613n

O’Brien’s conversation with, 357, 359–60O’Donnell’s conversation with, 351–52,

354–55on proposed invasion of Cuba, 47–48, 62,

70–72, 391on racial composition of troops at University

of Mississippi, 388–90and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 16,

48–50, 134, 364, 380–81, 395

Index 627

Kennedy, John F. (continued)reelection campaign of, 321–22on Rio Pact, 37–39, 61Schroeder’s meeting with, 469, 472–98secret recordings by, xii–xiii, xvii–xxivon Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–14,

365–68, 382–83, 387–88Smathers’s conversation with, 382–88Sorensen’s conversation with, 237on South Vietnam, 165–70and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba,

xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16, 19n, 20–37, 40–43,50, 59, 71, 74, 80–81, 153, 207, 320,381, 391–93, 395–96, 573, 588, 612

on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36,69–70, 80

on Soviet military presence in West Berlin,65–66

space program and, 83, 86–87, 93, 96, 103–5,149, 329–30, 333–34, 336, 343, 347–49,505

Taylor and, 119, 124, 155–56, 347Thorneycroft meeting and, 142, 146and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum

choir, 17–19, 54on U.S.-West German relations, 470, 498and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 3–15, 81Vance’s conversations with, 317–19, 351,

353–57Vinson’s conversation with, 150–53on West German defense budget, 120,

125–26Kennedy, Robert F., xxxv, 51, 133–34, 155, 380

Abrams’s conversation with, 310–11assassination of, xixBerlin and, 13and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 32and crisis at University of Mississippi, 181,

222n, 223–25, 227, 229, 232–36, 239n,240–47, 249–50, 251n, 252–82, 284,286–88, 290–99, 301–6, 310–13, 357

Cuban missile crisis and, xviii–xix, 397n,416–18, 421, 424, 426, 427n,428, 442, 445, 450, 452, 454–58,512n–13n, 514, 515n, 526, 531, 533–36,540–41, 543, 546–47, 550–60, 565,568–70, 574–76, 595, 599–602, 606–7,610–11, 614

on Cuban missile sites, 134Cuba press statement and, 25–27, 29, 32–36,

38–39, 41–42, 44, 46–47

Dobrynin’s meeting with, 12, 33–34on Drummond spy case, 230–32on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 47JFK-Barnett conversations and, 232–36,

239n, 240–47on JFK’s relationship with Eisenhower, 118JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii–xixon naval blockade of Cuba, 25, 27, 533–35,

543, 565, 568–69, 574–75, 600–602,607, 611

nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12–13, 34,182, 184

Operation Mongoose and, 428on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 134, 395on Rio Pact, 38–39and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n, 20,

25–27, 29, 32–34, 392, 396on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 36on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 4n, 7, 12–14Vance’s conversation with, 299

Kennedy Tapes, The: Inside the White House duringthe Cuban Missile Crisis (Zelikow andMay), xiii, xxii

Kennefick, Mary, xxiKeogh, Eugene J., xxxv

on Communications Satellite Act, 388JFK’s conversation with, 388Self-employed Pension Bill and, 112

Keogh-Smathers Bill, see Self-employed PensionBill

Kerr, Robert S., 133, 363–64, 379on Self-employed Pension Bill, 366–67

Kevu, Benjamin, 155Keyhole document, 154Khrushchev, Nikita S., xxxv, 20, 181–83, 189n,

300, 393–94Berlin and, xxiv, 64n, 110–12, 129–30, 147,

183, 185–87, 190, 193–98, 201–6, 219,265, 394, 411, 439n, 449, 451, 469–72,485–86, 489–92, 497, 513, 535, 538n,539–40, 544, 548, 553, 581, 590, 598,611n

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 73–74on Cuba, 190–92, 197–98, 207–8, 394, 469Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 410–11, 423,

433, 436, 438–39, 449–52, 454–55, 457,465, 467, 469, 470, 512–15, 523, 525,528, 530–35, 536–40, 542–49, 551–57,562, 573, 586–87, 590, 598, 604, 608,614

on German unification, 205Indonesia and, 175

I N D E X628

JFK-Dobrynin meeting and, 34JFK invited to summit by, 263–65JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 485–86, 489–92,

497and naval blockade of Cuba, 535, 540,

543–44, 557nuclear weapons negotiations and, 34,

182–84, 188, 207, 210n, 213–14, 218,492, 497

U.S. communications with, 182, 531, 537,552–53

and U-2 reconnaissance flights over SovietUnion, 6, 9, 11

Killian, James R., xxxvKing, Coretta Scott, 266nKing, J. C., xxxvKing, Martin Luther, Jr., 266nKINGFISH test, 95–98, 100–101, 103–8, 110Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., xxxvKirwan, Mike “Big Mike,” xxxv

on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–64, 379,386–87

JFK’s conversation with, 379–80Knebel, Fletcher, 272nKohler, Foy D., xxxv, 51, 191

on Berlin, 471Cuban missile crisis and, 439, 537, 552–53,

556nuclear weapons negotiations and, 188, 492on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 4n, 8Komar-type missile-launching motor torpedo

boats, 55–57Komer, Robert:

on Cambodia, 171on South Vietnam, 167–71Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 166n,

167–70Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of (North

Korea), 207, 587Cuban missile crisis and, 522Korean War and, 523Taylor on, 159–63

Korea, Republic of (South Korea), 156, 467,587

Cuban missile crisis and, 522Taylor on, 158–59, 161, 163–64, 174and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 9Korean War, 469, 504, 523, 584Korth, Fred, 133Kreer, Robert G., xxxvKuchel, Thomas H., xxxv, 52n

Kuril Isles, nuclear weapons negotiations on,212–13

Kusterer (translator), 469nsee also Schroeder, Gerhard

Kuznetsov, Vasiliy, 206Kwajalein, 108

Labor Department, U.S., 178, 373Lafayette, USS, 330nlaissez-faire, 500Laloy, Jean, 186Land, Edwin, xxxvLandsdale, Edward, 134, 199Laos, 173, 450

JFK on, 176, 178–81meeting on, 178–81neutralizing of, 178–79, 458Soviet Union and, 178, 180, 202, 458

Latin America, 116and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 57–59, 61, 63–65, 67n, 68–69Cuban aggression in, 22–23, 31Cuban missile crisis and, 428, 434, 442–44,

451, 529, 539, 561n, 580n, 586, 588,606–8

Cuba press statement and, 29n, 30, 40–42, 44Graham on, 114–16Monroe Doctrine and, 30and naval blockade of Cuba, 565, 580n, 606and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 63–64,

320see also Caribbean

Lawford, Peter, 258Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 90, 98Lebanon, 585Leddy, John M., xxxv–xxxviLeMay, Curtis E., xxxvi, 67

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 50, 52n, 57, 62, 70–71

on Cuban missile crisis, 578n, 579, 582–85,588–89, 591–92, 594–98

on Cuban missile sites, 47–49, 70Cuba press statement and, 34, 47–48on invasion of Cuba, 47–48, 70–72on naval blockade of Cuba, 583–84on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 48–49

Lemnitzer, Lyman, xxxvi, 124, 146–48, 285awards and honors of, 317, 318n, 319on Berlin, 135n, 137–39, 141, 143–47on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n,

78–79, 146–47on Laos, 178non missiles in Far East, 158

Index 629

Lemnitzer, Lyman (continued)on NATO, 137–39, 141, 160as Norstad’s replacement, 119, 122, 126–28on nuclear weapons, 160on South Vietnam and Cambodia, 171Taylor as replacement of, 156Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 158,

160, 162Lenin, Vladimir, 200Leningrad, Soviet ABM system and, 109Life, 226Lightner, Allan E., Jr., 355Lincoln, Evelyn, xiv, xxxvi, 16–19, 78–79, 115n,

247, 266–67, 269, 359, 468, 511, 574and crisis at University of Mississippi, 227,

229–30, 258, 260, 273, 276–78, 280–81,283, 287, 291–94, 297, 304, 312, 316,353

JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii, xx–xxiand University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum

choir, 17–18Little Rock Central High School, desegregation

of, 181, 226, 237, 250, 316nLive Oak operations, 139, 494–95Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 116Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport planes,

348nLoeb, James, xxxviLondon Daily Sketch, 298nLong, Franklin, xxxviLong, Russell, 113nLook, xxxixLos Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 98, 109Lovett, Robert A., xxxvi

Cuban missile crisis and, 553, 564, 572–76on naval blockade of Cuba, 574–75

Lucy, Autherine, 269–70Lundahl, Arthur C., xxxvi, 395

Cuban missile crisis and, 397–403, 512n,516–21, 601n, 603

Luxembourg, 122n

MAAG, see Military Assistance AdvisoryGroup

MacArthur, Douglas, xxxviMcCarthy, Eugene J., 113nMcCloy, John J., xxxviMcConaughy, Walter P., 177McCone, John A., xxxvi, 20, 54, 154–55, 177,

380–81, 467–69Bay of Pigs prisoners and, 364, 381on Berlin, 535Cuban missile crisis and, 410–11, 420n,

425–26, 440–41, 460, 468–69, 512n,513–14, 516, 520–21, 527, 531–32,535–37, 544, 549, 554–56, 560–61, 572,599, 601–2, 606–9, 614

and leaks of classified information, 154on naval blockade of Cuba, 544, 601–2, 608on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 361–62,

364, 394–95on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 381–82,

392–95, 440–41, 609and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 14, 16nMcCormack, John W., xxxvi

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 52–53

on call-up of reserve and guard units, 53,150–51

on foreign aid, 357–60JFK’s conversations with, 150–52, 357–59

McDermott, Edward A., 354–55McDonald, David, xxxviMacDonald, Torbert, xxxvi, 229

JFK’s conversation with, 247–49McDonnell Douglas, 149McDonnell RF-101 Voodoo photoreconnais-

sance planes, 49–50, 403nMcGhee, George, 155McMahon Act, 215Macmillan, M. Harold, xxxvi–xxxvii, 131n

on Berlin, 187, 204–5Cuban missile crisis and, 443–44

McNamara, Pat, 113nMcNamara, Robert S., xxxiii, xxxvi–xxxvii,

50–51, 81, 132–33on ABM system, 108–9on Berlin, 135n, 138, 140–41, 145–47, 201,

203, 469, 493and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 50–52, 58, 71on call-up of reserve and guard units, 24,

51–53, 73, 73–79, 146–47, 152on Cambodia, 171on China, 161and crisis at University of Mississippi,

318–19Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 399–403,

407–12, 414, 416–20, 423, 425–31, 433,435–40, 442–44, 446–50, 453–55,459–68, 512n, 513, 516, 520–21,525–31, 537–41, 545, 547, 551–52, 555,557–60, 563–72, 576, 578n, 579–92,595–97, 599–601, 603n, 604–8, 611, 613

Cuba press statement and, 29, 31, 34n

I N D E X630

on foreign aid, 147–48on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 50, 58and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 332,

347on Korea, 161–63on Laos, 178n, 179and leaks of classified information, 154on military aid, 160–63, 171, 177in military contingency planning on Cuba,

393n, 395on NATO, 138, 140on naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 76, 84,

464–66, 557, 563, 565–69, 595–96, 600,604–5, 611, 613

on nuclear weapons, 82n, 94–95, 97,100–103, 106–8, 161, 163

on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 49Skybolt and, 345non South Vietnam, 166–68and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n,

21–23, 26–29, 31, 400–401on space program, 106–7Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 159–63,

166–68, 171, 173on Thorneycroft meeting, 145–46on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 4n, 7, 13on West German defense budget, 126

McShane, James, 224–25, 257, 281McSweeney, John M., 15Maine, USS, 452Malaya, crop destruction in, 167Mallon, Henry Neil, 341Malraux, André, 218Manhattan Project, 330nManning, Robert J., 13–14Mansfield, Michael J., xxxvi

briefing on Cuba for, 52, 71–72and call-up of reserve and guard units, 110Cuba press statement and, 71on foreign aid, 378on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–64, 379JFK’s conversations with, 362–64, 378–80on Self-employed Pension Bill, 366–68

Marine Corps, U.S., 579Cuban missile crisis and, 418, 551–52

Markham, Dean P., 255–56, 259, 261, 288,303–4

Marshall, Burke, xxxviand crisis at University of Mississippi, 222n,

224, 227, 237, 246, 247n, 251n, 252–63,265–77, 279–87, 292, 296–98, 300–302,304–6, 313

JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii–xx

Marshall, George C., xxxviiiMarshall Plan, 128Marshall Space Flight Center, 149Martin, Colonel, 228Martin, Edwin M., xxxvi, 380

Cuban missile crisis and, 427n, 428, 433–34,442–43, 445, 449, 458, 461–62, 465–66,512n–13n, 514, 524, 534, 543, 561,565–68, 576, 600

Cuba press statement and, 34, 37–38, 41–42,44–45

on naval blockade of Cuba, 465, 514, 534,543, 565, 567, 600

Martin, William McChesney, xxxviMarxism-Leninism, see Communists, commu-

nismmass transit, 337–38, 343, 503Matsu, 156, 158, 161, 591nMay, Ernest, xiii, xxii, 599nMeany, George, xxxvii, 178media, see pressMedicare and Medicaid, 371nMeeker, Leonard, 575Menzies, Robert G., 155Meo, 180Mercury space program, 149, 508n

nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 93–94, 96,103–4, 106–7, 110

Meredith, James H., xxxvii, 579false voter registration conviction of, 235nJFK’s conversations on, 233, 239–41, 245,

383, 384n, 385, 388–90on racial composition of troops at University

of Mississippi, 389and rioting at University of Mississippi, 281,

283, 287–92, 294n, 295–96, 297n, 298University of Mississippi application of,

222–24University of Mississippi registration of, 181,

224–26, 239–42, 245–47, 250–52, 273Messmer, Pierre, 497Mexico, 509

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 59, 61, 68–69

Cuban aid to, 22Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 434on naval blockade of Cuba, 543

MiGs:Berlin incidents with, 81, 188–89and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 62

Index 631

MiGs (continued)in Cuba, 21, 26–27, 56, 62, 70–71Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 410, 420,

435–37, 440, 460, 462, 512, 526,529–30, 583–84, 588, 612

military aid, 177for France, 214–21JFK on, 163–64, 171, 343Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156, 159–64,

171see also foreign aid

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG):Cambodian-South Vietnamese relations and,

172–73in Laos, 176

“Military Buildup in Cuba, The,” 440nMiller, Chester, xviiiMills, Wilbur D., xxxvii

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,321–22, 324, 328

Minneapolis Grain Exchange, 342nMinnesota, University of, 378nmissile boats, 55–57, 513missiles, missile sites:

antiballistic (ABMs), 82–83, 108–9Berlin and, 138–39, 144, 202–3and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 51, 55–57, 61–62, 64, 66–67,69–72

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 74, 80Chinese-Soviet relations and, 198cruise-type, 441, 513, 518–19, 588in Cuba, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16, 19–34, 39–40,

42–43, 47–49, 51, 55–57, 61–62, 64,66–67, 69–72, 74, 80, 132, 134, 153,320, 361–62, 364, 381, 391–95,397–416, 418–20, 422–23, 428–38,443–52, 455, 460–62, 466–69, 471–72,512–20, 524–34, 536–37, 539, 541, 543,545–50, 552, 555–56, 558–59, 565,568–69, 576–95, 598, 600–606, 608–14

Cuba press statement and, 24–25, 71Eisenhower on, 123, 128, 130, 613nHawk, 158intercontinental ballistic (ICBMs), 198, 202,

409, 441, 451, 586, 588, 590intermediate-range ballistic (IRBMs), 392,

395, 440n–41n, 516–17, 521, 529–30,533n, 576, 578–79, 582, 583n, 585,602–3, 613

Jupiter, 410, 451n, 538leaks of classified information on, 154medium-range ballistic (MRBMs), 120, 144,

395, 397–98, 403, 411–12, 414, 428, 431,433, 438, 440, 441n, 443, 451, 513,515–17, 519, 521, 524–26, 529–30,533n, 536, 558, 578, 583n, 585, 591,602–3

Minuteman, 109Mobile Minuteman, 332Nike, 80Nike Ajax, 55Nike Hercules, 55, 93, 100–102, 106, 108–9,

158Nike-X, 108nNike Zeus, 108–9nuclear weapons negotiations and, 213in nuclear weapons testing, 85–86, 93, 95n,

100–102, 106, 108, 398nPolaris, 215, 330, 538, 549, 613SA-2, 55short-range, 409, 518Skybolt, 332, 344–45of Soviet Union, 55, 198, 202, 399, 578, 583nSS-3, 399SS-4, 578, 583nSS-5, 578, 583nsurface-to-air (SAMs), 3, 20–25, 27, 43,

47–48, 51, 55, 57, 61–62, 67n, 71, 74,80, 132, 134, 138–39, 158, 320, 361, 381,393, 395, 403, 406, 413, 416, 437, 441,445–47, 449, 460, 462, 513, 519–20,527, 588, 590, 595, 598

surface-to-surface, 25–29, 40, 63, 66, 72, 80,320, 332, 395, 433, 519, 521, 589

Taylor on, 158–59Thor, 95n, 451nTitan III, 348in Turkey, 63–64, 410, 451, 532, 534, 538–39,

545, 549–50, 554–55, 567–69, 600, 604,609–13

water-to-water, 56–57see also Cuban missile crisis; nuclear weapons

Mississippi, University of (Ole Miss), crisis at,xxiv, xxxvii, 222–30, 232–47, 249–319,351–57

Abrams-JFK conversation on, 312–13Abrams-RFK conversation on, 310–11Air Force and, 319Barnett-JFK conversations on, 232–36,

239–47, 252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15, 351Cox-JFK conversation on, 316–17and Meredith’s registration, 181, 224–26,

239–42, 245–47, 250–52, 273O’Donnell-JFK conversation on, 351–52,

354–55

I N D E X632

presidential investigation of, 357racial composition of troops in, 388–90riots in, 252–53, 255, 262–63, 267–68,

270–71, 276–78, 280–81, 283–84,286–98, 302–13, 316n, 317–18, 354,385n, 579

Smathers-JFK conversation on, 383–85Sorensen-JKF conversation on, 237Vance-JFK conversations on, 317–19, 351,

353–57Vance-RFK conversation on, 299

Mississippi National Guard, 225–27, 249, 253,256, 267n, 270n, 275, 279, 281, 282n,284–85, 293, 298, 300, 302, 310, 319,351–52

MLF (multilateral nuclear force), 144n, 611n,613n

Mongoose, Operation, 391, 428Monroe, James, 29n, 151Monroe, Marilyn, xixMonroe Doctrine:

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 61, 69

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 152nCuba press statement and, 25, 29–30, 36–38and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 25,

29–30, 36–37Montagnards, 165–66, 168Morgan, Thomas E. “Doc,” xxxvii, 52n

JFK’s conversation with, 150–52Morgan Guaranty Trust, xxxiMorgenthau, Robert, 178Morse, Wayne, 113n

on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–64, 379,386

Moscoso, Teodoro, xxxviiMotley, Constance Baker, 223Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 178Mr. President, 177multilateral nuclear force (MLF), 144n, 611n,

613nMurrow, Edward R., xxxvii

NAC (North Atlantic Council), 128, 135–36,141, 143

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, xxxviiNasution, Abdul, 174National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), 149and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,

329–30, 333–34, 336, 348–49nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 87, 94,

103–4

National Aquarium, 362–63, 379National Archives, xv, xviii–xix, xxiNational Association for the Advancement of

Colored People (NAACP), 223National Day of Prayer, 498–99national debt, 369National Guard, U.S.:

call-up of, 24, 51–53, 73–81, 110, 146–47,149–53, 199, 221

of Mississippi, 225–27, 249, 253, 256, 267n,270n, 275, 279, 281, 282n, 284–85, 293,298, 300, 302, 310, 319, 351–52

national income and product accounts, 322–23,340n, 341, 342n, 349, 509n–10n, 510

National Institutes of Health (NIH), 337National Photographic Intelligence Center

(NPIC), 395, 397, 401n, 516, 578, 579n,603n

National Reconnaissance Office, 597National Security Council (NSC), 181, 354n

Executive Committee of, 601nmeeting on Cuban missile crisis of, 601–14on nuclear weapons testing, 85, 109–10

National Theater, 177NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNaval Photographic Intelligence Center, 401Navy, U.S., 579

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 75–76Cuban missile crisis and, 420n, 435, 518, 551,

591, 596Drummond spy case and, 230and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 163–64

Ness, Norman, 342Netherlands, 122n

Berlin and, 490–91Cuban missile crisis and, 406NATO and, 138Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156–57,

174–76Neustadt, Richard E., xxxi, 332nNew Deal, 362New Economics, 500New York Times, 5n, 152n, 493–94

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 352Cuban missile crisis and, 405and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,

349–50and leaks of classified information, 153–54on proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit,

263–64on racial composition of troops at University

of Mississippi, 389n

Index 633

New York Times (continued)on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396

Ngo Dinh Diem, 166, 172Nguyen Dinh Thuan, 155, 165nNIH (National Institutes of Health), 337Nikolayev, Andrian, 86nNitze, Paul H., xxxvii, 50–51, 148

on Berlin, 135n, 136–44, 146on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n,

78–79Cuban missile crisis and, 513n, 570, 613Cuba press statement and, 34n, 43on NATO, 137–42on naval blockade of Cuba, 613on nuclear weapons, 142

Nixon, Richard, 6, 115secret recordings by, xii–xiii, xix

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., 173nontransfer of nuclear weapons agreement,

12–13Norodom Sihanouk, Prince, 156, 170–72Norstad, Lauris, xxxvii, 130, 421n

Berlin and, 127, 135–36, 139n, 143–45, 189,495n

on buildup of conventional forces in Europe,145

on nuclear weapons, 143relief of, 119–20, 122, 124, 126–28

North Atlantic Council (NAC), 128, 135–36,141, 143

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),55, 128, 205–6, 216n, 410n, 420n–21n

Berlin and, 119, 135–44, 149, 196, 471,483–84, 487, 494–95

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 59–60

change in direction of, 119–20, 122Cuban missile crisis and, 412, 422, 434, 443,

554–55, 613France and, 119, 125, 129, 139–40JFK on, 118–19, 125, 129, 137–40, 144JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 483–84, 487,

494–95nuclear weapons and, 12n, 119–20, 143and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 50Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 157, 160West Germany and, 120, 125, 139–40

Norway, 60, 131nNOUGAT series, 91n, 95nNovaya Zemlya, Soviet nuclear weapons testing

in, 85–86Novello, Angie, xviii, 246n–47n

NPIC, see National Photographic IntelligenceCenter

NSC, see National Security Councilnuclear weapons, 28, 81–83, 118–19, 128–30,

192agreement on transfer of, 12–13all-fusion, 92Berlin and, xxiv, 119, 129–30, 135–36,

140–44, 186, 485, 487, 489, 495Bohlen on, 203Cuban missile crisis and, 399–401, 409–13,

420, 428, 430, 435–37, 440, 447–48,451, 457–58, 460, 465, 512, 525–26, 528,533–34, 538, 541, 547, 555, 558–59, 569,578–79, 581–82, 584, 587, 593–94,602–3, 605–6, 609–10

Eisenhower on, 128, 130, 613nFrance and, 124, 128, 214–21, 611n, 612,

613nJapan and, 163n, 164and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330,

332–33, 344–45, 348JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 485, 487, 489,

495on MiGs, 21NATO and, 12n, 119–20, 143ripple, 88–90, 94–95, 102–3, 109, 110nand Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 153, 391,

393–94Taylor on, 122n, 123–24, 156, 159–63see also missiles, missile sites

nuclear weapons testing, 82–83, 85–110, 142,360, 364, 398n

airdrop, 94–95, 96n, 103–4, 110natmospheric, 183n, 184ban on, 34, 83, 102n, 105, 182–85, 188, 193,

198, 207–14, 217n, 218–19, 492, 497,537, 573

high-altitude, 82–83, 85–110, 360, 364on-site inspection of, 13underground, 34, 90–92, 95n, 182–84,

208–14, 218–19

OAS, see Organization of American StatesOberdorfer, Louis F., 246, 277n, 280–81O’Brien, Lawrence F., xxxvii

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 251n,254–55, 257, 263, 268, 271–72, 275–76,281–87, 291–98, 300–303

on foreign aid, 357–60and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 368,

371

I N D E X634

JFK’s conversation with, 357, 359–60occupational safety legislation, 372–73O’Donnell, Kenneth, xxxvii, 153n

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 52n

at budget and tax cut meetings, 368and crisis at University of Mississippi, 251n,

253–54, 257, 268, 282–85, 287–88, 291,293–94, 299–300, 302–3, 351–52,354–55

Drummond spy case and, 232JFK’s conversation with, 351–52, 354–55JFK’s secret recordings and, xviiion Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396

Office of Emergency Planning, 354nOffice of Legal Counsel, 249Okinawa, 411Okun, Arthur, xxxvii, 321nOkun’s law, 321nOld Age Survivors Insurance, 505Operation Mongoose, 391, 428Operation STORAX, 91nOrganization of American States (OAS), 23n,

63, 65and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 59, 67–68Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 412, 415, 422,

542–43, 566–67, 600Cuba press statement and, 30nand naval blockade of Cuba, 542–43, 600

Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, xxxvii, 145, 155

Pace, Frank, Jr., 342Pakistan, 64, 170, 177n, 535Panofsky, Wolfgang, 97Paraguay, 115nParis Summit, 183, 548Passman, Otto, 357–60Pathet Lao, 179“Pay Bill,” 329, 333, 339, 344, 506–7Peace Corps, 371Pearl Harbor attack, 515, 523, 539, 545–46, 607Pearson, Drew, 383, 386Penkovsky, Oleg, 395, 432n, 578Penney, Sir William, 208–9Pentagon, see Defense Department, U.S.Pérez Godoy, Ricardo Pío, xxxviiPeru, 115nPFIAB (President’s Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board), 153photoreconnaissance of Cuba, 3, 6, 13, 16, 20,

48–50, 67n, 110, 134, 320, 361–62, 364,

380–81, 394–95, 397–405, 408–9, 414,419, 420n, 421, 423–24, 427–31, 434,436–37, 443, 446–47, 453, 463–65,516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537, 545,556, 558–59, 566, 571, 574–75, 578–79,583, 588, 592, 594–97, 602–3, 606, 611

see also U-2 reconnaissance flightsPigott, Paul, 425n–26n, 426Pittman, Steuart, xxxviiPlumley, H. Ladd, 341Point Reyes seashore, 149Poland, 206–7

Berlin and, 490–91Policy Planning Council, 368Poltava, 603Portugal, 60, 82Post Office, U.S., 505–6Powers, Dave, xviii–xixPowers, Francis Gary, 4, 6n, 364, 395, 398nPrado y Ugarteche, Manuel, xxxvii“Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the

Berlin Conflict,” 135President’s Committee to Appraise

Employment and UnemploymentStatistics, 178

President’s Foreign Intelligence AdvisoryBoard (PFIAB), 153

press, 125and Bay of Pigs prisoners, 381Berlin and, 111, 394, 469and call-up of reserve and guard units, 74,

80–81, 152nCIA investigation of, xxiv, 134, 154and crisis at University of Mississippi,

250–51, 286, 298–99, 303, 305, 352, 354on Cuba, 394, 396, 411, 414, 424, 438–39,

441, 456–58, 547, 556, 558, 561, 571,576, 592, 611

on French-West German relations, 494and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,

349–51, 506, 510and leaks of classified information, 153–54on proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit,

263–65on racial composition of troops at University

of Mississippi, 389non Self-employed Pension Bill, 383and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,

24–52, 71–72, 83, 149, 391on U.S.-West German relations, 470on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 11, 13–15, 81

Index 635

Princeton University, xxxii, 274Public Health Service, 355public opinion:

on Berlin, 477, 483–86on Cuban missile crisis, 412–13, 417, 523–24,

528–29, 539, 548, 555, 558, 561,586–87, 611

in Soviet Union, 197public works:

Interior Appropriations Bill and, 362–64,379, 386–87

JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 507Pugwash Conference on Science and World

Affairs, 185, 208n, 209–11, 219Punta del Este Conference, 23, 59, 63, 65

Quemoy, 156, 158, 161, 591

RAINIER test, 91nRay, Manuel, 406Rayburn, Sam, 500–501REA (Rural Electrification Administration),

371Reber, James, 134, 402nrecession, 325–26, 328Records Administration, xxirecreational land purchase program, 503repayable loans, 340–41Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective

(Neustadt), xxxiRepublic, 79nRepublican National Convention, 378nRepublicans, Republican party, 266

Berlin and, 394and call-up of reserve and guard units, 110,

152n–53nand JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 334,

339, 349n, 500midterm election campaigning of, 369on Self-employed Pension Bill, 367and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 23–24,

391–93Reston, James, 263–65, 349nReuters, 11Reuther, Walter, xxxvii, 110Reynolds, John, 82Rice, E. E., 168Rickover, Hyman G., 220Ridgway, Matthew, 127Riley, Herbert D., 460Rio Pact (Rio Treaty of 1947) (Inter-American

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), 30

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 61

Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 524, 542,554–55

Cuba press statement and, 37–39, 41and naval blockade of Cuba, 542

ripple nuclear weapons, 88–90, 94–95, 102–3,109, 110n

Ripple II experiment, 90, 95, 102–3, 109, 110nRipple III experiment, 90, 99, 103, 109Rockefeller Foundation, 197Rogers, Paul G., 385Rome, Treaty of, 121n–22n, 131nRoosa, Robert V., xxxviiRoosevelt, Franklin D., 129n, 349n, 501n

Eisenhower on, 130–31secret recordings by, xii–xiii

Roosevelt, Theodore, 29nRosenthal, Jack, 298nRosenthal, Jacob, xxxviiiRostow, Walt W., xxxviii, 3Rural Electrification Administration (REA),

371Rusk, Dean, xxxviii, 50–51, 81, 126n, 132–34,

508, 576non Berlin, 13, 135–38, 140, 142–45, 148–49,

190n, 361, 469, 471, 491n, 498and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 52n, 58–63, 65–69, 72on buildup of conventional forces in Europe,

145on call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, 73n,

76, 147on Castro, 66and Cuban aggression in Latin America,

22–23Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 400–402,

404–7, 409–12, 414, 417, 421–22,425–28, 431–36, 438–40, 455, 461, 468,512n–13n, 514–16, 521–25, 528, 531,534–36, 538, 541–44, 546–56, 558–67,570, 572–75, 599–600, 602, 603n,605–14

on Cuban missile sites, 48, 134on Cuban trade, 60–61Cuba press statement and, 25, 29–32, 34–47on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 58, 71on JFK-Eisenhower letter to Adenauer, 133Khrushchev on, 197on Laos, 180on NATO, 137–38, 140, 142–43, 149on naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 27, 83–84,

I N D E X636

542–43, 565–67, 574, 599, 602, 605–6,608–9, 611–12

on nuclear weapons for France, 216n, 220,612

and nuclear weapons for West Germany, 218nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12–13on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 87, 90,

95–98, 102, 104, 107and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 16,

134, 394–95on Rio Pact, 30, 37–38, 542, 554–55Schroeder’s meetings with, 471, 497and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n,

21–22, 24–32, 35, 40, 50, 59, 65, 67–68,395

on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36,65–66, 70

on Soviet submarines, 58on space program, 95–96, 102on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 4n, 5–16Russell, Richard B., xxxviii, 4n, 71–73, 383–84

briefing on Cuba for, 52–54, 56–58, 61, 65,67–69, 71–72

on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n, 75,77–78, 147

on Castro, 66on Cuban missile sites, 67, 69on Cuban trade, 61on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 57–58on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 69–70on Soviet military presence in West Berlin,

66“Russians Scorn U-2 Note; Call the Flight

Aggressive,” 81n

SAC, see Strategic Air CommandSACEUR, see Supreme Allied Commander,

EuropeSt. Matthew’s Cathedral, National Day of

Prayer at, 498–99Salinger, Pierre E. G., xxxviii

Berlin and, 110–11on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80Cuba press statement and, 24, 33, 47non proposed invasion of Cuba, 391and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum

choir, 17and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 14–15Saltonstall, Leverett, xxxviii, 52nSame, Graham E., 286n

SAMOS satellite, 4–5Samuelson, Paul A., xxxviiiSarit, Thanarat, 156, 170–72Sato, Eisaku, 572Schaetzel, J. Robert, xxxviiiSchirra, Walter M. “Wally,” 360, 364, 396, 508n

nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 93, 96,103–4, 110

Schlei, Norbert, 249–50Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., xxxviii, 604n

and crisis at University of Mississippi,229–30

JFK-Barnett conversations and, 232Schroeder, Gerhard, xxxviii, 455, 467

Berlin and, 459, 469, 472–98Cuban missile crisis and, 459–60, 472on French-West German relations, 494–97JFK’s meeting with, 469, 472–98Rusk’s meetings with, 471, 497

Schultze, Charles L., xxxviiiat budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, 324,

326–28, 338, 340, 342, 345–46, 350,369n

Seaborg, Glenn T., xxxviiion ABM system, 108and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330,

347nuclear weapons testing and, 82n, 85–92,

95–100, 105–6, 108–9, 110nSeamans, Robert, 82n, 93SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization),

555“Seattle: The Mood of the Country and

President Kennedy” (Reston), 349nSecret Service, U.S.:

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 249JFK’s secret recordings and, xvii, xx, xxii

Selden, Armistead, 52n, 63Self-employed Pension Bill, 111–14

Gore on, 112n–13n, 365–68, 387Smathers on, 112, 365, 382–83, 387–88

Semipalatinsk, 212Senate, U.S., xviii–xix, 178, 192, 383n–84n

Armed Services Committee of, 23, 81, 123non call-up of reserve and guard units, 110,

146–47, 151, 152n–53nCuban missile crisis and, 414–15, 422–23Finance Committee of, 133, 321, 328n, 363n,

365, 366n, 370n, 375, 506non foreign aid, 192, 320, 356, 358, 378Foreign Relations Committee of, 23, 153non Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63

Index 637

Senate, U.S. (continued)on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 321,

339, 356, 375Judiciary Committee of, xixon Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–13,

365–68, 382and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 23,

391–92Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 159see also Congress, U.S.

Seven Days in May (Knebel), 272Shapley, Willis, 333Shoup, David M., xxviii

on Cuban missile crisis, 578n, 579, 586–87,589–91, 594, 597–98

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 156, 170–72Sikes, Robert L. F., 385Skipjack nuclear submarine, 215–17, 220nSkybolt missiles, 332, 344–45Sloan, Frank K., xxxviiiSmathers, George A., xxxviii, 52n

on crisis at University of Mississippi, 383–85on Cuba, 382–84on Interior Appropriations Bill, 386–87JFK’s conversation with, 382–88on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112, 365,

382–83, 387–88Smith, Bromley, 601n, 603, 608Smith, Joseph, 130Smith, Steven, xixSNIEs, see Special National Intelligence

EstimatesSocial Security, 323n, 371, 510nSolow, Robert M., xxxviiiSorensen, Theodore C., xxxviii, 133

Berlin and, 110–11at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, 323,

326, 335–36, 339, 343, 346, 350, 368,369n, 372–74, 376–78, 499n, 504–5,507–8

on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80and crisis at University of Mississippi, 229,

237, 249, 251n, 253–55, 257–59, 267–74,278, 280, 282–86, 291–92, 294–96,300–301, 303

Cuban missile crisis and, 400, 427n, 448–49,453–56, 512n–13n, 514–15, 527,547–49, 554–56, 560, 562, 569–71, 576,599–600, 601n, 602, 604, 606, 608, 610

Cuba press statement and, 32, 34nJFK’s conversation with, 237JFK’s secret recordings and, xviiion naval blockade of Cuba, 569, 602, 610

on nuclear weapons testing, 82nproposed JFK-Khrushchev summit and,

264–65and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n

South America, see Latin AmericaSoutheast Asia, 26, 129, 181

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 62

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24,53

Cuba press statement and, 42partition nature of, 172Taylor on, 158–59, 165, 172–73

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),555

Souvanna Phouma, 180Soviet Union, xxxii, 118, 360, 583n

ABM system of, 108–9Adenauer on, 123arms shipments to Cuba from, xxiii–xxiv,

3–4, 16, 19–52, 54–56, 59, 62–65,67–68, 70–72, 74, 80–81, 83, 149, 153,156, 207, 320, 361, 381–82, 391–96,400–401, 411, 415–16, 420n, 440–41,455, 457, 462, 464, 513, 528, 530, 536,543–54, 573, 588, 602–3, 606–7, 609,612

Berlin and, 62, 65–66, 81, 129–30, 131n,138–39, 141n–42n, 148–49, 183,185–90, 194, 200–202, 361, 391, 394,433, 441, 449, 456, 458, 469–94, 497,535, 540–41, 544, 548, 573, 576–77,581–82, 584–85, 593–94, 609

Bohlen on, 4n, 6–7, 9–15, 19–20, 192,197–98, 208, 515, 525, 604

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 54–56, 58–64, 66–67, 69, 72

and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, 74,76, 80, 149, 199

Castro’s support from, 63, 66, 69, 192–93Chinese relations with, 198Cuban missile crisis and, 398–400, 403n–4n,

409–12, 415–16, 418, 420–21, 428,430–34, 436–59, 462, 465, 467–69, 471,513–15, 517, 520–23, 525, 528–40,542–45, 547–50, 552–56, 559, 563–64,567–69, 572–78, 581, 584–87, 589–90,593–94, 599–600, 602, 604–9, 612

Cuban trade with, 60–61Cuba press statement and, 24–32, 34–37,

39–43, 45–46, 149Drummond spy case and, 230–32East Germany as surrogate for, 487n

I N D E X638

Hungary invaded by, 72, 208, 411, 545, 549,554, 581, 589

Indonesian relations with, 157, 174–75JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 472–93, 498JFK’s meeting with Soviet experts on,

182–221Laos and, 178, 180, 202, 458leaks of classified information on, 154military presence of, in Cuba, 35–36, 55–56,

64–66, 69–70, 80, 549, 552, 569, 606–7,609

and naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 62, 84, 450,532, 534–35, 540, 543–44, 564–65, 567,575, 577, 584, 602, 606–10

nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12–13, 83,182–85, 188, 193, 198, 207–14, 492, 497

nuclear weapons testing of, 82, 85–89, 91n,93–94, 101–2, 103n, 104, 106–7, 398n

public opinion in, 197and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 395space program of, 86n, 108, 451nTaylor on, 157and U.S. nuclear aid for France, 217, 220–21U-2 reconnaissance flights over, 3–16, 19–20,

81, 88n, 134, 364, 395, 398–99, 548see also U.S.-Soviet relations

soybeans, 371Spaak, Paul-Henri, 216nspace, space program, 508n

JFK and, 83, 86–87, 93, 96, 103–5, 149,329–30, 333–34, 336, 343, 347–49, 505

military use of, 105moon landing in, 149nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 86–87,

93–96, 102–8, 110, 360Spain, 452n, 610Spanish-American War, 452nSparkman, John, 52nSpecial Group, 16Special Group-Augmented, 454Special National Intelligence Estimates

(SNIEs), 393, 440n, 441, 537n, 604Sproul, Alan, xxxviiiSputnik, 451nStaats, Elmer B., xxxviii, 317

at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n,322–23, 325–27, 330, 332–33, 337, 346,369n, 371, 376–77

Stalin, Joseph, 131, 187, 555STARFISH test, 83, 97, 98n, 105State Department, U.S., 144n, 368, 460–63,

576non Berlin, 135, 189, 190n, 194n, 204

Cuban missile crisis and, 407, 417, 422,427–28, 441n, 450, 454, 461–63, 468,514, 533, 563, 572, 575, 599–600, 611n

Cuba press statement and, 3and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 371,

503, 505, 508in military contingency planning on Cuba,

393on naval blockade of Cuba, 599–600on nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 20–21,

396on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 70Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165–66on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 3–4, 9, 13n, 14State Department Bulletin, 415State Mutual Life Assurance Company of

America, 341nsteel industry, 325–27, 349nStennis, John, 229Stevenson, Adlai E., xxxi–xxxii, xxxix, 82

Cuban missile crisis and, 428, 512, 553, 604n,610, 613

on naval blockade of Cuba, 610on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 392

Stikker, Dirk, 205Stimson, Henry, xxxiistock market, 326–27, 349n, 350STORAX, Operation, 91nStrategic Air Command (SAC), 129, 394, 579

Cuban missile crisis and, 401, 414, 428, 438and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 5nStrauss, Franz Josef, 120, 493–95, 497Strong, Robert C., xxxixSubandrio, 174–75submarines, 590

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 58

Cuban missile crisis and, 409, 450, 534, 538,594

Polaris missile-firing, 215, 330, 538, 613Skipjack nuclear, 215–17, 220n

Suez crisis, 72, 411, 434–35, 522, 545n, 581Sukarno, Achmed, 156–57, 174Sullivan, William H., xxxix

on Indonesia, 174Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 164

supersonic jet transports, 331–32Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 387Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

(SACEUR), 119–20, 122n, 127n

Index 639

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe(SACEUR) (continued)

on Berlin, 135–36, 139nCuban missile crisis and, 421

Supreme Court, U.S., 224Goldberg’s swearing in at, 315, 316n, 317

Sweden, 131nSweeney, Walter C., xxxix

Cuban missile crisis and, 446–47, 463, 558Switzerland, 131nSyria, 43

Taber, John, xxxixTactical Air Command (TAC), 428, 446nTaiwan (Nationalist China), 72, 458n

China’s threats to invade, 591nmilitary aid to, 163Taylor on, 158–59, 164and U-2 reconnaissance flights over China,

16, 110, 134, 395Talbot, Phillips, xxxixTarawa, battle of, 579Task Force Alpha, 254n, 262n, 267n, 279n, 282n,

284n, 287n, 293, 296n, 298, 305n, 310,312

TASS statement, 191nCuban missile crisis and, 411, 439, 441,

457–58, 547Tax Cut bill, 321ntaxes:

JFK’s proposal on, 317, 321–51, 355–56,365–66, 368–78, 499–511

meetings on, 321–51, 369–78Self-employed Pension Bill and, 112–13,

365–66Taylor, Maxwell D., xxxix, 181, 380

Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 400, 407–10,413–14, 417–20, 424, 426–27, 429, 433,435–37, 439–50, 452–53, 458–59, 469,512n, 513–14, 516, 520, 527–30, 533–34,536–37, 540–41, 544–47, 550–52,554–56, 558–60, 564–66, 568–71, 576,578n, 579–80, 582–83, 585, 588–97,599–601, 605–8, 610, 612–14

Cuba press statement and, 34nEisenhower on, 122–24, 126Far Eastern trip of, 155–76JCS chairmanship appointment of, 119, 122,

123n, 156JCS chairmanship swearing in of, 319JFK and, 119, 124, 155–76, 347on Laos, 178n, 179

on naval blockade of Cuba, 534, 544, 565–66,579–80, 588, 600, 606, 608

Teague, Olin E. “Tiger,” 373–74Texas Christian University (TCU), 255–56Thailand:

Cambodian relations with, 170n, 171–72Laotian relations with, 178, 181military aid to, 163, 171Taylor’s visit to, 156, 170–74

Thant, U, xxxix, 149, 172, 411Thirteen Days (R. Kennedy), xviii–xixThompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., xxxix, 51n,

191–94, 207–8, 576non Berlin, 187–90, 193–98, 200, 202–4, 206,

219, 491n, 513, 535, 540, 544, 548, 552Cuban missile crisis and, 422, 428, 459,

461–62, 468–69, 512n, 513–14, 515n,531–38, 540, 543–45, 547–50, 552–54,561, 563, 565–66, 568–70, 572–75,600–602, 610, 614

on German unification, 205–6Khrushchev and, 182–83, 187, 189n, 191n,

193–94, 196–97, 203–5, 207, 513, 553on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 532–36, 550,

565, 568, 574, 600–602, 610on nuclear weapons for France, 216nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182–83,

185, 193, 213–14on Soviet Union, 198, 531–35, 540, 543, 548,

552–53, 575on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 11Thompson, William “Bill,” 386Thorneycroft, Peter, 142n, 145–46Thuan, Nguyen Dinh, 155, 165nTHUMBELINA nuclear device test, 96,

99–100, 105, 109, 110nTIGHTROPE test, 110nTobin, James, xxxix, 341nTolstoy, Leo, 394trade:

Berlin and, 483–84of Cuba, 60–62, 320

Trade Bill, 390Trading with the Enemy Act, 60Treasury Department, U.S.:

and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 328,336, 344, 346, 350, 369

on Self-employed Pension Bill, 113, 365Tretick, Stanley, xxxixTroutman, Robert, xxxixTruman, Harry S., xxxii, 120, 127–28

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secret recordings by, xii–xiiitrust funds, 323n, 342, 510nTshombe, Moise Kapenda, xxxixTuchman, Barbara, 523nTucker, Ralph, 18Tucker and Baker, 367nTurkey, 28, 63–64, 72, 208

Cuban missile crisis and, 410–11, 416, 451,467, 512, 525, 532–35, 538–39, 545,549–50, 554–55, 567–69, 600, 604,609–13

Turner, Robert C., xxxixTyler, William R., xxxixTyuratam missile test range, 85–86, 398n

Udall, Stewart L., 110–11, 147, 192n, 204, 264,394, 506n

Ulbricht, Walter, 206U.N. Bond Act, 320Uncertain Trumpet, The (Taylor), 122n, 123underground nuclear weapons testing, 34,

90–92, 95n, 182–84, 208–14, 218–19United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria

(U.A.R.), 43, 585nUnited Auto Workers (UAW), xxxvii, 110United Nations (U.N.), 127n, 190, 512, 555, 573,

585and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 67, 71Charter of, 39nand Cuban aggression in Latin America, 22Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 450, 457, 548,

604, 610, 612Cuba press statement and, 30nDrummond spy case and, 230–32and Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West

Irian, 157General Assembly of, 30n, 67, 149, 191n,

439non Japan, 164Korean War and, 523and naval blockade of Cuba, 575, 600on South Vietnam and Cambodia, 171–72and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 30n, 392Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 162

United States Information Agency (USIA), 371United States Intelligence Board (USIB), 179,

401n–2n, 432nUrban Renewal program, 337URRACA tests, 95–97, 98n, 99, 104–5, 107, 109Uruguay, 115nU.S. News and World Report, 506

U.S.-Soviet relations, 81and briefing of congressional leadership on

Cuba, 60Cuba press statement and, 24–32, 34, 41Laos and, 178nuclear weapons testing and, 106–7and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19–34,

393and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet

Union, 3–16, 19–20U.S. Steel Corporation, xxxii, 325n–27nU Thant, xxxix, 149, 172, 411U-2 reconnaissance flights, 3–20

over China, 110, 134, 395over Cuba, 3, 13, 16, 20, 48–50, 67n, 110, 134,

320, 361–62, 364, 380–81, 394–95,397–405, 408–9, 414, 419, 423–24,427–31, 434, 436–37, 443, 446–47, 453,463–65, 516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537,545, 556, 558–59, 571, 578–79, 588, 592,597, 602–3, 606, 611

meeting on, 4–20nuclear weapons testing and, 88nover Soviet Union, 3–16, 19–20, 81, 88n, 134,

364, 395, 398–99, 548see also photoreconnaissance of Cuba

Van Allen, James A., 97Van Allen radiation belt, 97, 98n, 100nVance, Cyrus R., xxxix, 360

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 228,256, 260, 267, 280–82, 284–86, 293–94,298–99, 317–19, 351, 353–57, 389–90

JFK’s conversations with, 317–19, 351, 353–57on racial composition of troops at University

of Mississippi, 389–90RFK’s conversation with, 299

Vaught, John H., 255–56, 259, 273, 275, 277Veatch, Ellis H., 333Venezuela:

and briefing of congressional leadership onCuba, 68–69

Cuban aid to, 22–23Cuban missile crisis and, 434, 442

Veterans Administration, 373–74Vienna Summit, 64n, 73, 538nVietcong:

Cambodia and, 171crop destruction program and, 166, 168–69on Laos, 180

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (NorthVietnam), 178–80, 207

Index 641

Vietnam, Republic of (South Vietnam), 155,176, 207, 587

Cambodian relations with, 170n,171–73

crop destruction program in, 165n, 166–69Laos and, 178, 180Taylor’s visit to, 165–73

Vinson, Carl, xxxixbriefing on Cuba for, 52n, 67on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n, 75,

78, 150, 152–53JFK’s conversation with, 150–53

Virginia, University of, Miller Center of PublicAffairs at, xiii–xv, xviii, xxii

Wagner, Aubrey, xxxixon JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,

507Walker, Edwin A.:

arrest of, 316nand crisis at University of Mississippi,

270–72, 277–78, 284–86, 296, 315–16Little Rock crisis and, 316n

Wall Street Journal, 350Warsaw Pact, 208, 586

Berlin and, 141nCuban application to, 192–93, 531

Washington Ambassadorial Group, 135, 146,148, 492, 498

“Washington Merry-Go-Round, The: Sen.Smathers Puts Up Roadblock”(Pearson), 383n, 386n

Washington Post, 199–200, 383n, 386n, 396Watergate hearings, xii–xiiiWatkins, Thomas H.:

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 225,234–36, 239–40, 242–43, 246, 267n,270, 273–74, 296, 305

JFK-Barnett conversations on, 234–36,239–40, 242–43, 246

Watkins and Eager, 236Watson, Albert, 421nWeatherly, 155Webb, James E., xxxix

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,505, 508

on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 87–89,93–94, 104

on ripple concept, 88–89Wehrley, Roy, xxxixwelfare programs, 505Western European Union, see Common MarketWest Irian, Dutch-Indonesian dispute over,

156–57, 174–76Wheeler, Earle G., xxxix, 360

and crisis at University of Mississippi, 353,357, 390

on Cuban missile crisis, 578–79, 585–86,593–94, 596–98, 614

on naval blockade of Cuba, 598White, Lincoln, xl, 396White House Conference on Narcotics and

Drug Abuse, 262nWhite House Office of Science and Technology,

86nWhitten, Jamie, 383n–84nWiesner, Jerome B., xl

on ABM system, 108–9on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,

505on nuclear weapons for France, 216, 218nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182n,

183–84, 208–14, 218–19on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 85–86, 92,

94–95, 98–103, 105–9, 364Wiley, Alexander, 73

briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 53, 61–63on Cuban missile sites, 61on naval blockade of Cuba, 62

Williams, G. Mennen, xlWilson, Donald M., xlWinnebago County Labor Day picnic, 77Wirtz, W. Willard, xl, 155World War I, 122n, 523nWorld War II, xxxvii, 128, 155, 523, 555, 573,

579

Yani, 174Yarborough, Ralph, 366Young, Kenneth T., 173–74Yugoslavia, 61

Zablocki, Clement J., 221Zelikow, Philip, xiii, xxii, 599nZorin, Valerian A., xlZuckert, Eugene M., xl

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