the priority monster

8/21/2019 The Priority Monster

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The Priority Monster1

THERONPUMMER

I would be grateful for any comments sent to tgpummer@gmailcom

Abstract! T"e Priority #iew implies t"at we sometimes "a$e nontri$ially stronger reason to benefit

a person% t"e worse off in absolute terms t"is person would be if s"e did not recei$e t"e benefit in&uestion T"is $iew seems plausible Nonet"eless I will argue t"at it is inconsistent wit" t"e

con'unction of a number of independently intuiti$ely plausible claims One suc" claim is t"at we

s"ould spare a $ery badly off person from many years of intense pain rat"er t"an spare someone else

from a mild "eadac"e% no matter "ow badly off t"e second person is

(e often ma)e et"ically difficult decisions about "ow to allocate scarce resources acrosspersons One factor widely and rig"tly recogni*ed to be rele$ant to suc" decisions is t"e well-

beingt"at would be gained from distributing resources in $arious ways Utilitariansclaim t"att"is is t"e only suc" rele$ant factor+ t"ey say we s"ould act in w"ate$er way would promote t"e

most well,being T"ere are many )inds of non,Utilitarianism% corresponding to t"e many factorst"at could be claimed to be rele$ant% in addition to or instead of the amount of well-beingour act

would bring about In t"is paper I will discuss one suc" non,Utilitarian factor! priority for the

worse off I will argue t"at claiming t"at t"is factor is nontri$ially rele$ant comes wit" asignificant cost t"at "as t"us far gone unnoticed

1. Introduction

-ome stage,setting is necessary .irst% a benefitis an increase in well-being% or w"ate$er ma)es alife go well for t"e indi$idual li$ing it /enefits are t"us distinct from resources% li)e money%

w"ic" are means to benefits or ot"er ends

-econd% I will assume 0as seems plausible1 t"at pain ma)es a life go badly for t"e

indi$idual li$ing it% ot"er t"ings being e&ual Pain relief% t"en% is a benefit+ it is an increase inwell,being in t"at it pre$ents a decrease in well,being T"is is consistent wit" t"e plausible claim

t"at pain relief is not t"e only sort of benefit t"ere is

1I would li)e to t"an) 2raig 3gule% 2"risoula 3ndreou% -aba /a*argan% Nic) /ec)stead% 3my /erg% 4reg /ognar%

Rac"ael /riggs% 5o"n /roome% Tim 2ampbell% 5onat"an 2o"en% (illiam Mac3s)ill% 6ale 6orsey% 3aron Elliott% NirEyal% 4uy .letc"er% 3lan H7'e)% 6an Halliday% Nils Holtug% Mic"ael Huemer% 8ieran 9atty% -et" 9a*ar% 5o"n

McMillan% Per Milam% 3rne Norder"aug% Toby Ord% 3lan Patten% Matt"ew Rendall% Nate Roc)wood% Peter -inger%

5acob -tegenga% 9arry Tem)in% and 8elly #incent% for useful comments or discussions I am especiallyindebted to

6ic) 3rneson% 6a$id /rin)% Roger 2risp% 6ana Nel)in% and 6ere) Parfit% for t"eir e:tensi$e comments and "elp9astly% t"an)s to audiences at New ;or) Uni$ersity% -an 6iego -tate Uni$ersity% Uni$ersity of 2alifornia -an 6iego%

Uni$ersity of Edinburg"% Uni$ersity of Manc"ester% Uni$ersity of Pisa% and Uni$ersity of Uta"% for "elpful and

li$ely < = 3 periods

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mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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T"ird% all of t"e cases presented below are $ery simple in t"at t"ey in$ol$e only a few

potentially rele$ant factors Most of my cases s"ould be understood as instances of t"e

following!

General Schema! (e can eit"er relie$e aofxunits of pain% or we can instead relie$e b

ofyunits of pain If we do not relie$e aof "er pain% s"e will "a$eNunits of paino$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$e bof "er pain% s"e will "a$eM

units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life T"e only t"ing t"at could affect a?s well,

being is "ow muc" pain s"e "as+ t"e same is true of b No one ot"er t"an aor bwould be affected by our act Indi$iduals a and b are persons wit" full moral

standing No special relations"ip "olds between any of us and a% nor between any

of us and b% nor between aand b Neit"er anor bdeser$es pain+ neit"er "as done

anyt"ing blamewort"y or praisewort"y It is not t"e case t"at relie$ing a?s pain orrelie$ing b?s pain would conflict wit" any deontological constraint

.ourt"% let us suppose t"at% weshould do Rrat"er t"an Sif and only if t"ere is more reason

overall to doR t"an S Particular reasons for and against doing R or Scan come in differentstrengt"s% and can weig" up suc" t"at it is true t"at t"ere is more reason overallto doRt"an S

T"e stage is now partly set Ne:t% some $iews3s I "a$e implied% Utilitarians tell us t"at t"e c"oice between relie$ing a of xunits of

pain or instead relie$ing bofyunits of pain depends only on w"et"erxis greater t"an% e&ual to%

or less t"an y Here t"ey tell us we s"ould do w"ate$er relie$es t"e most pain Many peopleregard Utilitarianism to be implausible for its insensiti$ity to priority for the worse off Many

people belie$e t"at% in addition to t"e relati$e si*e of xandy% it is rele$ant "ow well off aand b

would be 0"ow muc" pain t"ey would endure1 o$er t"eir respecti$e li$es 2onsider a

'udiciously,titled case!

Help Penny! If we do not relie$eNumbed Nancyof > units of pain% s"e will "a$e >>

units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$ePained Pennyof > ,xunits of pain% s"e will "a$e >> A yunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life (e

can eit"er relie$e Nancy of > units of pain% or we can instead relie$e Penny of >

,xunits of pain 3nd all ot"er t"ings are e&ualB

2In t"is case and in $ariants of it discussed below% we s"ould regard t"e Call ot"er t"ings are e&ualD clause as

entailing t"e following suppositions 0t"e purpose of w"ic" is to abstract from $arious possibly confounding factors1!

0i1 t"e distributive patternof pain in Nancy?s life perfectly matc"es t"at in Penny?s life 0suppose t"e pain in bot"

li$es is spread e:actly e$enly across all times1+ 0ii1 t"e additional units of pain to Penny come in t"e form of an

increased duration of pain of at least the same intensityasNancy?s pain 0t"is supposition disallows Penny "a$ingmany more units of pain t"an Nancy in $irtue of "a$ing $ery mild pain t"at lasts for a verylong time1+ 0iii1 pain

relief for a person does not ta)e t"e form of a slightdecrease in pain intensity% of t"e sort discussed in Parfit >FG

and 0w"ere t"e decrease in intensity is so slig"t t"at it is imperceptible1% t"oug" t"e differencein pain

relief between Nancy and Penny 0ie%x1 can in$ol$e $ery slig"t differences in pain intensity andor duration+ 0i$1 itis not t"e case t"at pain relief for Nancy or for Penny would mo$e eit"er up past any particularly morally significant

thresholdof well,being 0we can stipulate t"ey are bot" sufficiently distant from any suc" t"res"old for t"is to

"appen1

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-uppose t"at > units of pain is only a moderateamount of pain 0per"aps > units of pain is

comparable to > days of post,appendectomy pain1 It is not an ungodly amount of pain% but it is

substantial3s long as xis sufficiently small andyis sufficiently large% it seems plausible t"at we

s"ould relie$e Penny of > , xunits of pain rat"er t"an relie$e Nancy of > units of pain

Utilitarianism fails to capture t"is intuiti$ely plausible claim!

(1) T"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inHelp Penny% we s"ould "elp Penny

Instead of Utilitarianism% many accept t"e!

Priority View! (e sometimes "a$e nontri$ially stronger reason to benefit a person% t"e

worse off in absolute terms t"is person would be if s"e did not recei$e t"e benefitin &uestionG

3 few words about t"e Priority #iew .irst% as defined% t"e Priority #iew is not a complete $iew

about w"at we s"ould do 0w"ereas Utilitarianism is1 Instead% it claims merely t"at a particularfactor is rele$ant to w"at we s"ould do% or pro$ides us wit" reasons of nontri$ial strengt"

-econd% t"e reasons identified are of nontrivialstrengt" in t"at t"ey are strong enoug" tooutweigh reasons to promote well,being InHelp Penny% we would promote more well,being if

we relie$ed Nancy of > units of pain t"an if we instead relie$ed Penny of > ,xunits of pain

0recall t"e connection between pain relief and well,being I "a$e "ere assumed1 ("ile a $ersionof t"e Priority #iew w"ic" assigns only a tri$ial% Ctie,brea)erD role to considerations of priority

for t"e worse off tec"nically departs from Utilitarianism% it is still inconsistent wit" 0>1 J /ut t"e

Priority #iew as I "a$e "ere construed it is consistent wit"% and is often defended by appealing

to% claims li)e 0>1T"ird% I assume for t"e sa)e of simplicity t"at t"e Priority #iew says t"at t"e basis of

"a$ing nontri$ially stronger reason to benefit a person is how badly off this person is over the

course of her whole existenceK.ourt"% notice t"at t"e Priority #iew is specifically sensiti$e to "ow well off in absolute

terms people are It is not non,deri$ati$ely sensiti$e to "ow well off people are relati$e to

ot"ersL

3Here and elsew"ere% I will assume t"at all $alues arepositive$alues unless specified ot"erwise4-ee Parfit >> 3lso see! Tem)in >F% >% and B% 3rneson B% 2risp B and B>>% Otsu)a and

#oor"oe$e B and B>>% Holtug B>% 3dler B>B% Parfit B>B 0and ot"er articles in t"e -eptember B>B issue of

Utilitas1% and 4rea$es 0Unpublis"ed Manuscript1 Tem)in >F and > referred to t"e Priority #iew as extendedhumanitarianism52f -idgwic) >L% G>K,L6-ome claim it matters for considerations of priority to t"e worse off both"ow well off people are o$er t"e course

of t"eir w"ole li$es as well as "ow well off t"ey are now 0or at ot"er times1 -ee Mc8erlie >F and >L7-uppose we learn e:actly "ow many units of pain Penny "as endured% and "ow many s"e will endure if we do not

"elp "er+ gi$en t"e simplified nature of t"e cases "ere e:plored% learning t"is would amount to learning "ow well off

in absolute terms Pennyis T"e Priority #iew does not imply t"at t"e strengt" of our reasons for relie$ing Penny?spain is sensiti$e to "ow well off Penny is relati$e to ot"ers If t"ere were many people li$ing completely blissful

li$es on a planet in t"e 3lp"a 2entauri system% learning t"is fact s"ould not lead us to belie$e we "ad pre$iously

been underestimating t"e strengt" of our reason to "elp Penny 2ompare t"is feature of t"e Priority #iew wit"


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.ift"% t"e Priority #iew is not only an incomplete $iew 0as mentioned abo$e1% but it is

also an imprecise $iew /y t"is I mean not"ing derogatory% only t"at t"e Priority #iew as stated

lea$es unspecified precise details suc" as how muchour reasons for benefiting a person increase%as a function of "ow badly off in absolute terms t"is person is Nonet"eless% in w"at follows% I

will argue t"at t"e Priority #iew 0referring to a broad family of more precise $iews1 is

inconsistent wit" t"e con'unction of a number of independently intuiti$ely plausible claimsMy argument will appeal to cases w"ic" resemble two e:amples famous in t"e literature

on t"e aggregation of well,being! Robert No*ic)?s Utility MonsterF and 6ere) Parfit?s

Repugnant onclusion Nonet"eless% my cases are importantly different /ot" t"e UtilityMonster and t"e Repugnant 2onclusion t"reaten to generate pu**les for $iews 0li)e

Utilitarianism1 w"ic" recogni*egeneral well-beingas a rele$ant factor /y contrast% my cases

t"reaten to generate distinct pu**les for $iews 0li)e t"e Priority #iew1 w"ic" recogni*e priority

for the worse offas a rele$ant factor

2. The Priority Monster

2onsider a more $ariable scenario in$ol$ing Nancy and Penny

Nancy or Penny! (e can relie$e Nancy ofNunits of pain or we can relie$e Penny ofN ,

x units of pain If we do not relie$e Nancy of "er pain% s"e will be left wit" M

units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$e Penny of "er pain%s"e will be left wit"MAyunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life

3nd consider a claim about t"is scenario

Priority Monster! .or anyN%M% andx%>t"ere is a sufficiently largey suc" t"at we

!galitarianism% according to w"ic" we "a$e nontri$ially strong reason to reduce ine&uality in t"e distribution of

well,being across persons On this $iew% learning of many blissful people on a $ery distant planet would berele$antto t"e strengt" of our reason to "elp people "ere% on t"is planet -ee Tem)in > for an e:ploration of

Egalitarianism% and /uc"a) 0Unpublis"ed Manuscript1 for an e:ploration of a non,traditional $ersion of t"e Priority

#iew w"ic" issensiti$e to "ow well off some are relati$e to ot"ers8No*ic) >LG% G> T"e Utility Monster is a "ypot"etical being t"at eats people but in eating t"em% t"e Monster

gains $astly more well,being 0or utility1 t"an its $ictims could "a$e e$er ac"ie$ed Utilitarianism implies t"at we

s"ould allow t"is monster to eat us all% rat"er t"an non$iolently pre$ent it from doing so9Parfit% >FG T"e Repugnant 2onclusion is t"at% C.or any possible population of at least ten billion people% all wit"

a $ery "ig" &uality of life% t"ere must be some muc" larger imaginable population w"ose e:istence% if ot"er t"ingsare e&ual% would be better% e$en t"oug" its members "a$e li$es t"at are barely wort" li$ingD 0FF1 Parfit t"in)s of

t"e Repugnant 2onclusion as a )ind of Utility Monster w"ere Ct"e greater sum of "appiness comes from a $ast

increase% not in t"e &uality of one person?s life% but in t"e number of li$es li$edD 0F1 Utilitarianism implies t"e

Repugnant 2onclusion10(e can restrict t"is claim slig"tly suc" t"at xcannot be so large t"at relief from N , xunits of pain would

constitute a tri$ial benefit I will assume t"at relief from t"e pain of a s"ort mild "eadac"e is a small but nontri$ial

benefit 3$oiding a barely perceptibly bothersomemos&uito bite% on t"e ot"er "and% mig"t &ualify as a trivialbenefit T"ere mig"t be no s"arp borderline between tri$ial and nontri$ial benefits

("et"er or not we ma)e t"is restriction% we must stipulate t"atxis not greater t"anN0so t"atN,xcannot

be negati$e1

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s"ould relie$e Penny?s pain rat"er t"an Nancy?s

T"is claim seems implausible .or instance% if we could eit"er spare Nancy from >% years ofintense appendicitis,li)e pain% or instead pro$ide Penny wit" an amount of pain relief comparable

to being spared from a s"ort and mild "eadac"e% it would seem t"at we s"ould do t"e former no

matter "ow badly off Penny is More generally% it seems t"at!

(2) 3s long asN%M% andx are sufficiently large% we s"ould "elp Nancy rat"er t"an Penny% no

matter how large yis0no matter "ow badly off Penny is1

Note t"at I am not"ere claiming t"at t"e Priority #iew entailsPriority Monster Indeed it does

not+ t"e Priority #iew refers to a $ery broad family of more precise $iews% some of w"ic" entail

Priority Monster% but many of w"ic" do not 9ater I will argue t"at t"e Priority #iew isinconsistent wit" t"e con'unction of a number of independently intuiti$ely plausible claims%

w"ere one of t"ese claims is 0B1% or t"e denialof Priority Monster

.or now% I aim only to introduce Priority Monster% and to obser$e its intuiti$e

implausibility T"ree &uic) &uestions and responses on t"is front!

"s there a limit on how much pain a person could have#

Priority Monster re&uires t"aty% t"e additional amount of pain t"at Penny would be leftwit" if we did not relie$e "er pain% be Csufficiently largeD /ut if t"ere is a limit on "ow muc"

pain could be "oused wit"in a life% t"en per"aps ywould fail to be large enough 0for it to be t"e

case t"at% on some $iews% we s"ould "elp Penny rat"er t"an Nancy1.irst% I see no reason for t"in)ing t"at t"ere is a limit on t"e amount of intensityt"at a

person?s pain at any gi$en time could be T"ere are limits on t"e amount of pain intensity those

of us with mammalian nervous systemscould e:perience% but it is dubious t"is constitutes anymetap"ysically interesting limit

-econd% e$en if t"ere were a pain more intense t"an w"ic" were metap"ysicallyimpossible% surely Penny?s life would contain more pain units o$erall t"e greater t"e numberof

pains% or t"e greater t"e durationof particular pains% it contains

"s there a limit on how badly off a person could be#

T"oug" one mig"t "a$e no trouble granting my assumption t"at pain is% other things

being e$ual% bad for t"e indi$idual w"o e:periences it% one mig"t complain t"at t"is italici*edclause is not satisfied in t"e case of indi$iduals w"o "a$e already endured a $ery large amount of

pain Per"aps once a person "as endured some ungodly amount of pain% "er life is as bad as it

gets% and no additional pain 0intensity or duration1 could ma)e it go any worse for "erT"is seems implausible It seems t"at% for any number n of units of pain t"at my life

could contain% t"ere is somex suc" t"at my life would be worse for me if it contained nAxunitsof pain+ we would be gi$ing up a significant intuition if we claimed t"at t"ere is no$alue forxsuc" t"at n Axunits would be worse Moreo$er% suppose t"at at some point in t"e past I endured

a million years of misery% t"ereby putting me at t"e limit on t"e badness 0for me1 of pain If t"ere

is suc" a limit% it is difficult to see w"y I s"ould not% at present% be indifferent between "a$ing no

more pain and "a$ing more misery Of course% I s"ould not be indifferent

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Ne:t% one mig"t ob'ect t"at t"ere is a different way in w"ic" t"e other things e$ualclause

is not satisfied One mig"t claim t"at li$es of e:tremely great durations 0and containing

e:tremely intense pains1 lac) an important )ind of psyc"ological unity >> 3nd% t"e ob'ectioncontinues% w"en an indi$idual?s life lac)s t"is )ind of psyc"ological unity% t"e pain in it is less

bad for t"at indi$idual t"an it would be if "er life contained more suc" unity In response to t"is

worry% we can add t"e stipulation t"at Penny?s 0$ery long1 life is "ig"ly psyc"ologically unified(e can suppose t"at Penny undergoes no significant psyc"ological c"anges t"roug"out "er

w"ole life% apart from e:periencing more and more pain

.inally% one mig"t concede t"epossibilityof e:traordinarily 0arbitrarily1 badly off people%but claim t"at% for t"e purposes of testing t"e plausibility of et"ical t"eories% we can ignore t"is

possibility% since it is too outlandis" to e$er actually occur 9i)e many ot"ers%>B I belie$e t"at

w"at a t"eory implies about outlandis" cases is$ery often an appropriate test of its trut" or

plausibility% and can determine w"et"er we s"ould follow t"e t"eory in more realistic% e$erydayconte:ts /ut t"is is a significant met"odological claim w"ic" I cannot defend ade&uately "ere%

so 0if you do not accept it1 please ta)e it on board as an assumption

an we trust our intuitions about this case#(it"out adopting a general s)epticism about t"e epistemic status of intuitions in et"ics%

one mig"t claim t"at our intuitions about Priority Monster in particular are not to be trusted% forwe cannot imagine%ust howe:traordinarily badly off Penny is% w"en y is Csufficiently largeD

T"ere are two distinct ob'ections "ere T"e first is t"at we cannot properly imagine t"e intensity

or duration of pain in Penny?s life% if eit"er were very large> T"e second is t"at e$en if we couldproperly imagine $ery large amounts of pain% it would remain true t"at we cannot imagine everypossible well,being le$el of Penny?s life% corresponding to greater and greater amounts of pain

Penny would be left wit" if we did not "elp "er 3nd yet 0B1% t"e denial of Priority Monster% says

t"at no matter how large yis% we s"ould relie$e Nancy?s pain rat"er t"anPenny?s 0ifN%M% andxare large enoug"1 -o% t"e worry goes% suc" an intuition,based denial of Priority Monster is

unfounded gi$en t"at we cannot intuiti$ely c"ec) all $alues fory>G

T"ese are interesting and important ob'ections% but I belie$e t"ey can be answeredParticularly% it seems dubious t"at we would needto directly intuiti$ely c"ec) $ery large $alues%

or e$ery $alue% fory% to be reasonably confident in t"e claim t"at% no matter how bigy is% we

s"ould relie$e Nancy?s pain rat"er t"an Penny?s 0again% ifN%M% andx are large enoug"1 T"ereis presumably a wide range of $alues fory t"at we can rele$antly and properly imagine If our

intuiti$e appraisal of 0B1 remains in$ariant as we substitute in t"ese $arious imagined $alues fory

0w"ile "olding N% M% and x constant1% t"is would pro$ide some defeasible e$idence t"at we

wouldfind 0B1 intuiti$e% ifwe couldproperly imagine all possible $alues fory>J 0Note t"at t"isresponse simultaneously addresses bot" of t"e ob'ections mentioned abo$e1

11.or seminal discussions of t"e rational and et"ical significance of psyc"ological connectedness and continuity% see

c"apters >G and >J of Parfit >FG12.or e:ample% 6ere) Parfit% .rances 8amm% 5eff McMa"an% 5udit" T"omson% 9arry Tem)in% and -"elly 8agan

Moreo$er% see t"e remar)s offered by No$er and H7'e) against restricting decision t"eory to bounded utility

functions% at t"e end of t"eir BG paper13-ee% for e:ample% Huemer BF and B>14/roome BG% JJ, ma)es t"is point% in t"e conte:t of t"e Repugnant 2onclusion and similar cases15.or t"e first discussion of t"is type of response% see Pummer B>

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T"is is only a s)etc" of "ow t"e abo$e ob'ections to relying on intuitions about large

&uantities mig"t be answered% but I find t"e s)etc" promising 9et us now set t"ese ob'ections

aside 3fter all% my main tas) in t"is paper is to re$eal an inconsistency between some et"icalintuitions% not to establis" w"ic" intuitions "a$e to go T"e central intuition I "a$e identified in

t"is section is t"is! Priority Monster seems false 3n alternate way of stating t"is intuition! 0B1

seems true

3. Generalizin

Recall!

Help Penny! If we do not relie$e Numbed Nancy of > units of pain% s"e will "a$e >>

units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$e Pained Penny of > ,

xunits of pain% s"e will "a$e >> A yunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life (e

can eit"er relie$e Nancy of > units of pain% or we can instead relie$e Penny of >

,xunits of pain

3nd recall!

(1)T"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inHelp Penny% we s"ould "elp Penny

3nd recall t"at t"e Priority #iew claims t"at we sometimes"a$e nontri$ially stronger reason to

benefit a person% t"e worse off in absolute terms t"is person would be if s"e did not recei$e t"e

benefit in &uestion /ecause of t"e intuiti$e plausibility of 0>1% we can plausibly assume t"at in

cases li)e Help Penny t"e Priority #iew entails a nontri$ially stronger reason to benefit t"eperson w"o is worse off in absolute terms Indeed% it is cases li)eHelp Pennyt"at are often cited

as intuiti$e supportfort"e Priority #iew 0since t"e case cleanly isolatespriority for the worse offas a factor rele$ant to t"e strengt" of reasons for "elping1 T"us I will "ere assume!

(3) T"e Priority #iew implies 0>1>K

Ne:t% consider w"et"er t"e intuition t"at we s"ould "elp Penny would c"ange% or disappear% if we

re$isedHelp Pennyin $arious ways -uppose first t"at we ma)e t"e benefits at sta)e $ery large

Help Penny ! "ot! If we do not relie$e Numbed Nancy of >% units of pain% s"e will

"a$e >%> units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$e Pained

Penny of >% ,xunits of pain% s"e will "a$e >%> Ayunits of pain o$er t"e

course of "er life (e can eit"er relie$e Nancy of >% units of pain% or we caninstead relie$e Penny of >% ,xunits of pain

16I recogni*e t"at t"at one could espouse t"e Priority #iew wit"out accepting 0>1 .or e:ample% one could claim

t"at t"e Priority #iew does not applyto li$es 0li)e Nancy?s and Penny?s1 t"at contain not"ing rele$ant to well,beingot"er t"an pain /ut I find suc" restrictions implausible% and will t"us set aside $ersions of t"e Priority #iew t"at

re'ect 0>1 More modestly! it is well wort" e:ploring t"e merits of t"ose 0more standard1 $ersions of t"e Priority

#iew t"at do not ma)e suc" restrictions% and t"at doentail 0>1

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3s inHelp Penny% inHelp Penny & 'ot% as long asxis sufficiently small andyis sufficiently

large% it seems plausible t"at we s"ould relie$e Penny of >% , xunits of pain rat"er t"anrelie$e Nancy of >% units of pain ("ile t"e benefits at sta)e are $ery large% we could

suppose t"at t"e benefit to Penny is only slightlysmaller% w"ilst Penny is muchworse off t"an

Nancy 4i$en t"at >% units of pain was an arbitrarily c"osen amount% it is plausible t"at wecan generali*e% and claim t"at we s"ould "elp Penny in Help Penny & 'ot% w"et"er it is >% or

>%% or >%% or any arbitrarily large number of units of pain from w"ic" we could spare

Nancy 0again assuming t"atxis sufficiently small andyis sufficiently large1 It seems plausiblet"at!

(4) T"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inHelp Penny & 'ot% we s"ould "elp Penny% e$en

if t"e number ( of units of pain Nancy would be relie$ed of is very 0arbitrarily1 large 0andt"us w"ere (,xrefers to t"e number of units of pain Penny would be relie$ed of1

Moreo$er% it seems independently plausible t"at if0>1 is true% t"en 0G1 is true too T"at is% it does

not seem credible t"at re$isingHelp Pennyin t"e abo$e way would c"ange w"et"er we s"ould"elp Penny Ne:t suppose t"at we re$iseHelp Pennyto ma)e t"e benefits at sta)e $ery small

Help Penny ! "ittle! If we do not relie$e Numbed Nancy of > units of pain% s"e will

"a$e >> units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$e Pained

Penny of > ,xunits of pain% s"e will "a$e >> A yunits of pain o$er t"e courseof "er life (e can eit"er relie$e Nancy of > units of pain% or we can instead

relie$e Penny of > ,xunits of pain

9et > units of pain be comparable to a s"ort% mild "eadac"e a small but nontri$ial burden0suppose t"at > units mar)s t"e t"res"old for tri$iality1 3s in pre$ious cases% "ere too it

seems plausible t"at% as long as x is sufficiently small and y is sufficiently large% we s"ould

relie$e Penny?s pain ("ile t"e benefits at sta)e are $ery small% it could be t"at t"e benefit toPenny is onlyslightlysmaller% w"ilst Penny is muchworse off t"an Nancy -ince we maynot

find it intuiti$e t"at we s"ould "elp Penny o$er Nancy w"en t"e benefits become trivially small%

I will not offer t"e fully generali*ed claim t"at we s"ould "elp Penny in Help Penny& 'ittle% nomatter "ow small t"e benefits at sta)e are Instead% I will offer t"e following nearly generali*ed

claim!

(5) T"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inHelp Penny & 'ittle% we s"ould "elp Penny% e$enif t"e number ( of units of pain Nancy would be relie$ed of is very small% but greater t"an

> 0and t"us w"ere (,xrefers to t"e number of units of pain Penny would be relie$ed

of1

Moreo$er% it seems independently plausible t"at if0>1 is true% t"en 0J1 is true too T"at is% it does

not seem credible t"at re$isingHelp Pennyin t"e abo$e way would c"ange w"et"er we s"ould"elp Penny .inally suppose t"at we re$ise Help Pennyto ma)e bot" Nancy and Penny $ery

badly off

F


9/22

Help Penny#$er %nnum&ed Nancy! If we do not relie$e Unnumbed Nancy of > units

of pain% s"e will "a$e >% units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do notrelie$e Preposterously Pained Penny of > ,xunits of pain% s"e will "a$e >%

A yunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life (e can eit"er relie$e Nancy of >

units of pain% or we can instead relie$e Penny of > ,xunits of pain

(e can suppose t"at >% units of pain is an extreme amount of pain 0Per"aps it is

comparable to $ery s"arp appendicitis,li)e pains persisting for two years1 3gain it seemsplausible t"at% as long as x is sufficiently small and yis sufficiently large% we s"ould relie$e

Penny?s pain rat"er t"an Nancy?s ("ile our sympathymig"t not discriminate between Nancy

and Penny 0per"aps once a person "as suffered enoug" we can?t feel any sorrier for "er1% we can

nonet"eless recogni)et"at Penny is muc" worse off% and find it intuiti$ely plausible t"at t"isgenerates a nontri$ially strong reason to "elp "er o$er Nancy 3gain% it is ultimately t"e fact t"at

we could suppose t"e benefit to Penny is only slightlysmaller% w"ilst Penny is muchworse off

t"an Nancy% t"at would ma)e it plausible t"at we s"ould "elp Penny e$en in t"is case w"ere

bot" Nancy and Penny are e:tremely badly off 4i$en t"at >% units of pain was anarbitrarily c"osen amount% it is plausible t"at we can generali*e% and claim t"at!

(6) T"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inHelp Penny *ver Unnumbed Nancy% we s"ould

"elp Penny% no matter "ow large t"e number) of units of pain Nancy would "a$e o$er t"e

course of "er life if we did not "elp "er is 0and t"us w"ere )Ayrefers to t"e number ofunits of pain Penny would "a$e o$er t"e course of "er life if we did not "elp "er1

Moreo$er% it seems independently plausible t"at if0>1 is true% t"en 0K1 is true too T"at is% it does

not seem credible t"at re$isingHelp Pennyin t"e abo$e way would c"ange w"et"er we s"ould"elp Penny

I "a$e now considered t"ree ways we could re$iseHelp Penny! by ma)ing t"e benefits at

sta)e $ery large% by ma)ing t"e benefits at sta)e $ery small% and by ma)ing bot" Nancy andPenny $ery badly off None of t"ese re$isions seem to affect t"e intuition t"at we s"ould "elp

Penny 5ust as 0>1 seems true% so do 0G1% 0J1% and 0K1 9et us now get somew"at more general

still+ reconsider t"e $ariable scenario presented earlier

Nancy or Penny! (e can relie$e Nancy ofNunits of pain or we can relie$e Penny ofN ,

x units of pain If we do not relie$e Nancy of "er pain% s"e will be left wit" M

units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$e Penny of "er pain%s"e will be left wit"MAyunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life

T"e forgoing discussion supports t"egenerali)edclaim!

(7) .or allNgreater t"an >% and for all M% t"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inNancy

or Penny% we s"ould "elp Penny rat"er t"an Nancy


10/22

In particular% it seems we s"ould "elp Penny w"enxis sufficiently small and y is sufficiently

large Moreo$er% it also seems plausible t"at if 0>1 is true% t"en 0L1 is true too

4. 'hy SomeIntuition Must Go

2onsider t"e following spectrum of possible actions t"at% at a gi$en time% we can c"oose from!

(A) (e relie$e NancyAofNunits of pain If we do not do t"is% NancyAwill be left wit"Munits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life

(B) (e relie$e NancyBofN,xunits of pain If we do not do t"is% NancyBwill be left wit"

MAyunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life

(C) (e relie$e NancyCofN, Bxunits of pain If we do not do t"is% NancyCwill be left wit"

M A Byunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life

3nd so on% all t"e way down to

(Y) (e relie$e NancyYof > units of pain 0supposeN, 0n1x >1 If we do not do t"is%

NancyYwill be left wit"M A 0n1yunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life

(Z) (e relie$e Penny of > ,xunits of pain If we do not do t"is% Penny will be left wit"M

A 0nA >1yunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life

In setting up t"is spectrum% we can let Nbe $ery large 0as large as we li)e1% letxbe $ery small

0as small as we li)e1% and let ybe $ery large 0as large as we li)e1 4i$en t"at w"ate$erxis% it is

in$ariant across all t"ese possible actions% we can get from any $ery large si*eN benefit to a

small si*e > benefit in a finite number of steps >L 0Note t"at I c"ose letters 3 t"roug" Q merelyfor con$enience+ t"ere could befar greater t"an BK possible actions in t"e spectrum1

T"e c"oices between 031 and 0/1% 0/1 and 021% and so on% and 0;1 and 0Q1% can eac"plausibly be treated as instances of Nancy or Penny>F T"us t"e generali*ed claim% 0L1% wouldimply t"at we s"ould do 0/1 rat"er t"an 031% 021 rat"er t"an 0/1% and so on% and 0Q1 rat"er t"an

0;1% as long as t"e spectrum is set up suc" t"atxis sufficiently small andyis sufficiently large

3nd gi$en my assumption from earlier about t"e connection between should and reasons% 0L1would imply t"at!

T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0/1 t"an 031T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 021 t"an 0/1


T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0Q1 t"an 0;1

17.or t"is reason we can a$oid worries about a Qeno parado:% as discussed in /inmore and #oor"oe$e B and in

2arlson BJ18.or e:ample% in t"e c"oice between 0/1 and 021% it seems t"at we s"ould do 021 rat"er t"an 0/1 if and only if xis

sufficiently small andyis sufficiently large

>


11/22

4i$en t"e intuiti$ely plausible claim t"at Cmore reason o$erall to do t"an D is a transiti$e

relation%>t"is latest series of claims toget"er imply t"at t"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0Q1t"an 031% or t"at we s"ould do 0Q1 rat"er t"an 031 /ut t"e claim t"at we s"ould do 0Q1 rat"er

t"an 031 is essentially 'ust Priority Monster+ after all% t"e claim is t"at% no matter "ow largeNand

Mare% t"ere is aysuc" t"at we s"ould spare Penny from > , xunits of pain rat"er t"an spareNancyAfromNunits of pain 3gain% t"at seems implausible

-ome people w"o are inclined toward t"e Priority #iew mig"t wis" to a$oid Priority

Monster by adopting an asymptotic priority weighting function On t"is precisification of t"ePriority #iew% t"ere is an upper limit on t"eprioritarian weightt"at can be attac"ed to benefiting

a person 0t"at is% an upper limit on t"e additional weig"t t"at a benefit to someone can recei$e% in

$irtue of "ow badly off in absolute terms s"e is1 T"is $iew is illustrated in t"e figure below! t"e

$ertical a:is refers to "ow muc" prioritarian weig"t is attac"ed to benefiting a gi$en person+ t"e"ori*ontal a:is refers to "ow badly off in absolute terms t"is person is+ and t"e cur$e represents

t"e weig"ting function% w"ic" asymptotically approac"es t"e upper limit'0t"e dotted line1

How much weight

'

How ba!" o##

4i$en t"e finite upper limit '% no benefit to Penny could recei$e a weig"t greater t"an '% no

matter "ow badly off s"e is T"e benefit s"e would recei$e if we did 0Q1 is relief from > , xunits of pain% and it could not "a$e a prioritarian weig"t any greater t"an ' -o let us round up

and say t"at t"e o$erall strengt" of our reason to benefit Penny by doing 0Q1 is >' It is

ob$ious t"at% once we fi:'% t"ere is someNt"at is 0muc"1 larger t"an it% and t"us t"at t"e o$erallstrengt" of our reason to do 031 could be 0arbitrarily1 greater t"an t"e o$erall strengt" of our

reason to do 0Q1 In t"is way% a defender of t"e Priority #iew can indeed a$oid Priority Monster%

or t"e claim t"at we s"ould do 0Q1 rat"er t"an 031

Howe$er% it is important to obser$e t"at precisifications of t"e Priority #iew w"ic" adoptsuc" an asymptotic priority weig"ting function are inconsistent wit" 0L1 If t"e spectrum of

possible actions 031 t"roug" 0Q1 can start wit" an arbitrarily large si*e Nbenefit and end up wit"

a small si*e > benefit% t"e weig"ting function will "a$e to imply t"at% "owe$er small xis andt"us "owe$er small t"e difference in benefits between ad'acent possible actions is t"ere will

come a point at w"ic" t"e difference in t"e prioritarian weig"t t"ose benefits recei$e is too small

to compensatefor t"e difference in benefit si*e ("en t"at point is reac"ed 0say% around 0811 t"e

19 .or ob'ections to t"is claim% see Rac"els >F and Tem)in B>B I agree wit" Rac"els and Tem)in t"at it is

contestable w"et"er C is better t"an all t"ings consideredD and Cmore reason o$erall to do t"an D are

transiti$e relations /ut I will "ere simply "elp myself to t"e claim t"at t"e latter relation is transiti$e+ I discuss anddefend it in my paper Somitted -pectrum arguments structurally li)e mine can be found in t"e wor) of Rac"els and

Tem)in% and are 0to my )nowledge1 ultimately traceable to Parfit?s early wor) in population et"ics Parfit "as more

recently returned to studying t"ese arguments in "is paper CTowards T"eory D

>>


12/22

$iew will imply t"at t"ere is more reason o$erall to do some particular action rat"er t"an t"e

succeeding action in t"e spectrum /ut t"at is inconsistent wit" 0L1% w"ic" implies t"at as long as

xis sufficiently small andyis sufficiently large% t"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0/1 t"an 031%more reason o$erall to do 021 t"an 0/1% and so on% and more reason o$erall to do 0Q1 t"an 0;1

To embrace t"is asymptotic priority weig"ting function would t"erefore be to sacrifice a

significant intuition

Someintuition must go Priority Monster seems false /ut if we deny Priority Monster% t"en we

must deny eit"er 0L1 or t"e transiti$ity of Cmore reason o$erall to do t"an D /ut bot" 0L1and transiti$ity seem true Moreo$er% it seems plausible t"at if 0>1 is true% t"en so is 0L1

Re$isingHelp Penny in t"e $arious ways suggested does not seem to affect t"e plausibility of t"e

claim t"at we s"ould "elp Penny T"us% if we deny 0L1% we must eit"er deny t"e plausible claim

t"at if +, then +.or we must instead deny 0>1 itself 3nd recall t"at it is plausible to assume 01%t"at t"e Priority #iew entails 0>1 -o% denying 0>1 entails denying t"e Priority #iew

I "a$e now establis"ed t"e main result of t"is paper! t"e Priority #iew is inconsistent

wit" con'unction of a number of independently intuiti$ely plausible claims In particular% it is

inconsistent wit" t"e con'unction of!

If Priority #iew% t"en 0>1

If 0>1% t"en 0L1

If 0L1% t"en Priority Monster

0B1% or notPriority Monster

I will ne:t consider some Cpartners in crimeD responses to t"is pu**le about priority T"ese

responses concede t"e main result of t"is paper t"at t"ere is suc" a pu**le surrounding t"ePriority #iew% but downplay its p"ilosop"ical significance 0suggesting it is merely a pu))le of

general type /and s"ould be sol$ed "owe$er type pu**les s"ould be sol$ed1 I will argue

t"ese responses are mista)en

(. Not !ll Monsters !re )*ually Scary

One mig"t claim t"at t"e priority pu**le I "a$e 'ust set up "ere "as some partners in crime .irst%

one mig"t ob'ect t"at my spectrum argument resembles a sorites argument -econd% one mig"tnote t"at t"ere are many ot"er monsters besides priority monsters t"ere are% after all% utilitymonsters I will consider t"ese two sorts of coconspirator in turn

$irst (A!!ege) %art&er i& Crime' Sorites Argume&ts

I offered a spectrum argument from 0L1 to Priority Monster It appealed to a spectrum of

possible actions w"ic" differ only slightly along one dimension 0and differ a lot along anot"erdimension1 One mig"t ob'ect t"at t"is argument is rele$antly li)e a sorites argument

9etting c0n1 refer to a collection cof ngrains of sand t"at are arranged in t"e C"eapiestD

way possible% a standardsorites argumentproceeds as follows!

>B


13/22

If c0>%1 is a "eap% t"en c0%1 is a "eap

If c0%1 is a "eap% t"en c0%F1 is a "eap


If c0B1 is a "eap% t"en c0>1 is a "eap

In addition to t"is spectrum of conditionals% we can add t"at c0>%1 isa "eap T"en repeatedapplications of modus ponensleads us to t"e absurd conclusion t"at c0>1 is a "eap

-e$eral ot"er aut"ors "a$e already considered and responded to t"e ob'ection t"at

arguments structurally li)e my spectrum argument are rele$antly li)e sorites arguments B My

own preferred response to t"is ob'ection is not to insist on some deep structural disanalogybetween t"e two sorts of argument% but instead simply to claim t"at t"e least implausible solution

to t"e sorites argument is different from t"e least implausible solution to my spectrum argument

0and ot"ers? spectrum arguments1 In particular% in t"e case of t"e sorites argument% we are

forcedto gi$e up one of t"e premises of t"e argument% ie% one of t"e conditional claims On t"eot"er "and% for many spectrum arguments% t"e analogous mo$e is not 0as clearly1 t"e least

implausible solutionT"e logic of t"e sorites argument is impeccable 0it is no less logically $alid t"an modus

ponens1% t"e claim t"at c0>%1 is a "eap cannotbe denied% and t"e claim t"at c0>1 is a "eap

mustbe denied ("ile eac" of t"e conditionals in t"e sorites argument is intuiti$ely plausible%none is asindubitable as t"e claim t"at c0>%1 is a "eap or t"e claim t"at c0>1 is not a "eap

T"erefore% w"ile any solution to t"e sorites argument will in$ol$e gi$ing up somet"ing t"at

seems plausible% t"e least implausible solution is to gi$e up 0at least1 one of t"e conditionalsB>

("at would t"e analogous mo$e be% in t"e conte:t of spectrum argumentsVIt may "elp "ere to be reminded &uic)ly of w"at my spectrum argument is Recall t"at I

started wit" t"e claim t"at!

(1) T"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inHelp Penny% we s"ould "elp Penny

I t"en proceeded to gi$e $ariants ofHelp Penny% in order to generali*e from 0>1 to!

(7) .or allNgreater t"an >% and for all M% t"ere are $alues forxandysuc" t"at% inNancy

or Penny% we s"ould "elp Penny rat"er t"an Nancy

I claimed t"at 0L1 seems plausible% and t"at it 0particularly1 seems plausible t"at if0>1 t"en 0L1 I

t"en considered a spectrum of possible actions% 031 t"roug" 0Q1% and argued t"at 0L1 implies t"at

as long asxis sufficiently small andyis sufficiently large!

20.or t"e most t"oroug" discussion% see Tem)in B>B 0c"apter >1 3lso see Parfit >FK 0footnote >1% Norcross

>L 0section I#1% Rac"els >F 0p LG1% and (asserman 0Unpublis"ed Manuscript121I am aware t"at t"ere is a lac) of consensus about w"at t"e least implausible solution to sorites parado:es is% but I

am confident t"at "owe$er t"e details of t"e correct solution are filled in% it will notin$ol$e acceptinge$ery single

one of t"e conditional claims .or some useful discussions of sorites arguments and $agueness% see (illiamson

>G% Raffman >G% and 8eefe B

>


14/22

T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0/1 t"an 031

T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 021 t"an 0/1


T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0Q1 t"an 0;1

.inally% I noted t"at t"is series of claims% toget"er wit" t"e transiti$ity of Cmore reason o$erall todo t"an %D implies Priority Monster T"ere are a $ariety of possible responses to t"is

spectrum argument% and spectrum arguments structurally li)e it!

T"e least implausible solution to t"e sorites argument is to deny 0at least1 one of t"e conditionals+

w"at would t"e analogous solution be% applied to my spectrum argumentV T"e analogoussolution would be to deny 0at least1 one of t"e Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D

claims% t"at is% to offer a type 0i1 solution to t"e spectrum argument /ut it is $ery far from clear

t"at ifdenying one of t"e conditionals is t"e least implausible solution to t"e sorites argument

then0i1 is t"e least implausible solution to my spectrum argument Moreo$er% it is $ery far fromclear t"at 0i1 ist"e least implausible solution to my spectrum argument

.irst% I t"in) t"ere is a lot to be said for 0ii1% gi$en t"e discussion of generali)ingfrom 0>1

to 0L1 3 unifying t"oug"t in t"at discussion was t"at% if we s"ould "elp Penny o$er Nancy insimple cases li)eHelp Penny% t"en we s"ould "elp Penny o$er Nancy% e$en w"en dealing wit"

$ery large benefits% $ery small benefits% or w"en Penny and Nancy are bot" $ery badly off as

long as t"e difference in t"e benefits doled out is sufficiently small and t"e degree to w"ic"Penny is worse off is sufficiently large T"e t"oug"t "ere% t"en% is t"at all of t"ese Ct"ere is more

reason o$erall to do t"an D claims 0t"at t"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0/1 t"an 031%

021 t"an 0/1% and so on and 0Q1 t"an 0;11 would stand or fall toget"er If we s"ould deny one%

t"en we s"ould deny t"em all It would seem implausible and arbitrary to deny some but notall/ut t"e analog of t"is type 0ii1 solution does not seem asplausible in t"e case of t"e conditionals

in$o)ed in t"e sorites argument+ my confidence in t"e claim t"at Cif c0n1 is a "eap% t"en c0n , >1 is

a "eapD variesdepending on "ow big nis In particular% w"en nis suc" t"at it is not clear t"atc0n1 is a "eap% it also seems lessplausible t"at ifc0n1 is a "eap% t"en c0n, >1 is a "eap

-econd% w"ile t"e conclusion of my spectrum argument% Priority Monster% is implausible%

it is not asabsurd as t"e claim t"at one grain of sand is a "eap I )now a few competent users ofEnglis" w"o accept Priority Monster+ I )now no competent user of Englis" w"o accepts t"at a

grain of sand is a "eap

>G

%ossib!e So!utio&s to Sectrum Argume&ts'

(i) 6eny some but not all of t"e Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D claims

(ii) 6eny all of t"e Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D claims

(iii) 6eny t"at Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D is transiti$e

(i) 3ccept t"e argument?s conclusion 0eg% accept Priority Monster1


15/22

I will not "ere defend w"at I belie$e ist"e least implausible solution to my spectrum

argument My point for now is only t"at% w"ile t"e least implausible solution to t"e sorites

argument is to deny one of t"e conditional claims 0t"e analog of a type 0i1 solution1% it is muchless clearw"at t"e least implausible solution to my spectrum argument is 6efensible cases

could be made for type 0ii1% 0iii1% or 0i$1 solutions It is not ob$ious t"at a type 0i1 solution is

correct% and it certainly does notfollowt"at a type 0i1 solution is correct% from t"e claim t"at t"ecorrect solution to sorites arguments is to deny 0at least1 one of t"eir conditionals T"erefore% t"e

similarity between spectrum arguments and sorites arguments is of limited significance% and t"e

former cannot plausibly be dismissed as not"ing but more e:amples of t"e latter

Seco& (A!!ege) %art&er i& Crime' Aggregatie Sectrum Argume&ts

Recall t"at in t"e present section I am considering t"e ob'ection t"at my priority pu**le"as partners in crime I "a$e 'ust discussed sorites arguments Ne:t% one mig"t note t"at t"ere

are many ot"er monsters besides priority monsters 5ust as I set up a spectrum argument t"at

s"ows defenders of t"e Priority #iew must gi$e up some intuiti$ely plausible claim to a$oid

Priority Monster% ot"ers "a$e set up spectrum arguments to s"ow t"at t"ose w"o belie$e generalwell-beingis a rele$ant factor 0or "old ot"er similar seemingly innocuous beliefs1 must li)ewise

gi$e up some intuiti$ely plausible claim to a$oid counterintuiti$e conclusions% suc" as UtilityMonster or Repugnant 2onclusion 0bot" described in footnotes abo$e1 To stic) wit" e:amples

in$ol$ing pain% I will focus on t"e!

+e$erse +epunant ,onclusion! .or anyNand for anyx% t"ere is someMsuc" t"at we

s"ould bring about a population ofNpeople eac" e:periencing not"ing butxunits

of pain% rat"er t"an a population of N 0 Mpeople eac" e:periencing not"ing but

> units of pain 0assuming we must bring about one or t"e ot"er1BB

T"is claim seems implausible It seems t"at% rat"er t"an creating a world full of billions of

people eac" li$ing for t"ousands years in e:traordinary agony% we s"ould instead create a worldfull of many more people w"o eac" e:perience not"ing but a mild "eadac"e% no matter how

many more people t"ere are in t"e second world t"an t"ere are in t"e first world 0assuming we

must bring about one or t"e ot"er1 /ut consider anot"er claim!

(*) .or anyNand for anyx% t"ere is someMand someysuc" t"at we s"ould bring about a

population of N people eac" e:periencing not"ing but x units of pain% rat"er t"an a

population of N 0 Mpeople eac" e:periencing not"ing but x , yunits of pain 0againassuming we must bring about one or t"e ot"er1

Unli)e Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion% 0F1 seems veryplausible 3s long as Mis sufficientlylarge andyis sufficiently small% it seems we s"ould bring about t"e smaller population of people

eac" inslightlymore pain t"an t"e muchlarger population of people eac" in slig"tly less pain

/ut now consider anot"er spectrum of possible actions t"at% at a gi$en time% we canc"oose from!

22-tuart Rac"els 0BG1 notes t"at t"is e:ample was first t"oug"t up by .ran) 5ac)son

>J


16/22

(A+) (e bring about population 3% ofNpeople w"o eac" e:perience not"ing butxunits

of pain

(B+) (e bring about population /% ofNAMpeople w"o eac" e:perience not"ing butx,

y units of pain

(C+) (e bring about population 2% ofNA BMpeople w"o eac" e:perience not"ing butx, By units of pain


(Y+) (e bring about population ;% ofNA nMpeople w"o eac" e:perience not"ing but

> Ay units of pain

(Z+) (e bring about population Q% ofNA 0n A >1Mpeople w"o eac" e:perience not"ingbut > units of pain

2laim 0F1 would imply t"at we s"ould do 03W1 rat"er t"an 0/W1% 0/W1 rat"er t"an 02W1% and so on%

and 0;W1 rat"er t"an 0QW1% as long as t"e spectrum is set up suc" t"at yis sufficiently small andMis sufficiently large 3nd gi$en my assumption from earlier about t"e connection between

shouldand reasons% 0F1 would imply t"at!

T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 03W1 t"an 0/W1

T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0/W1 t"an 02W1


T"ere is more reason o$erall to do 0;W1 t"an 0QW1

4i$en t"e plausible claim t"at Cmore reason o$erall to do t"an D is a transiti$e relation%

t"e latest series of claims toget"er imply t"at t"ere is more reason o$erall to do 03W1 t"an 0QW1% ort"at we s"ould do 03W1 rat"er t"an 0QW1 /ut t"e claim t"at% no matter "ow largeNandxare t"ere

is anM and aysuc" t"at we s"ould do 03W1 rat"er t"an 0QW1% is Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion

3gain% t"at seems implausibleT"e partners in crime ob'ection "ere is t"at% in addition to priority monsters% t"ere are

utility monsters% and repugnant conclusions 5ust as t"ose w"o belie$e giving priority to the

worse offmatters are susceptible to a spectrum,argument,generated pu**le% so too are t"ose w"o

belie$e t"atgeneral well-beingmatters It is "ard to deny t"at t"ere are different dimensions of%or factors rele$ant to% t"e general or o$erall well,being of a possible state of affairs T"ese

different dimensions sometimes tradeoff against eac" ot"er! consider tradeoffs of &uality of

well,being against &uantity% or si*e of benefits against number% or intensity of pain againstduration% or amount of "arm per person against number of people "armed% and so fort" If we

accept tradeoffs among t"ese sorts of dimensions of well,being% we can face a spectrum

argument w"ereby at eac" step one dimension is slig"tly diminis"ed w"ilst anot"er isdramatically increased% generating an o$erlapping c"ain of Cmore reason o$erall to t"an

D claims+ applying transiti$ity and comparing t"e $ery last possible action or outcome wit"

>K


17/22

t"e $ery first% we find our repugnant conclusion (e can call spectrum arguments w"ose steps%

in t"is fas"ion% tradeoff different dimensions of general well,being% aggregativespectrum

arguments -pectrum arguments for Utility Monster% Repugnant 2onclusion% and Re$erseRepugnant 2onclusion would all fall under t"is subcategory

My spectrum argument concerning t"e Priority #iew is not an aggregati$e spectrum

argument T"e steps of t"is argument do not tradeoff different dimensions of well,being% butinstead tradeoff well,being against an entirely separate factor! priority for t"e worse off 5ust as

any solution to t"e sorites argument in$ol$es gi$ing up some intuiti$e claim or ot"er% so too does

any solution to pu**les generated by spectrum arguments% aggregati$e or ot"erwise Nonet"eless and t"is is t"e crucial point t"e least implausible solution to aggregati$e spectrum arguments

may well be different from t"e least implausible solution to my spectrum argument concerning

priority Recall t"e!

.irst% eac" of t"e Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D claims in t"e spectrum

argument for t"e Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion is very "ard to deny If we compare t"ese

claims wit" t"eir counterparts in t"e spectrum argument for Priority Monster% I belie$e many of

us will find t"e former to be considerably more intuiti$ely plausible To many of us% it feelscra)y to deny 0F1% w"ereas it feels merely counterintuitive to deny 0L1% or to deny 0>1 T"is

suggests t"at a type 0i1 or type 0ii1 solution would be lessplausible for an aggregati$e spectrum

argument 0or for t"is particular one for Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion1 t"an it would be for t"espectrum argument for Priority Monster

-econd% compare Priority Monster wit" Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion Here is a

reminder of eac"!

Priority Monster! (e can relie$e Nancy ofNunits of pain or we can relie$e Penny ofN

,x units of pain If we do not relie$e Nancy of "er pain% s"e will be left wit" M

units of pain o$er t"e course of "er life If we do not relie$e Penny of "er pain%s"e will be left wit"MAyunits of pain o$er t"e course of "er life .or anyN%M%

andx% t"ere is a sufficiently large y suc" t"at we s"ould relie$e Penny?s pain

rat"er t"an Nancy?s

3nd!

+e$erse +epunant ,onclusion! .or anyNand for anyx% t"ere is someMsuc" t"at we

>L

%ossib!e So!utio&s to Sectrum Argume&ts'

(i) 6eny some but not all of t"e Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D claims

(ii) 6eny all of t"e Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D claims

(iii) 6eny t"at Ct"ere is more reason o$erall to do t"an D is transiti$e

(i) 3ccept t"e argument?s conclusion 0eg% accept Priority Monster or Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion1


18/22

s"ould bring about a population ofNpeople eac" e:periencing not"ing butxunits

of pain% rat"er t"an a population of N 0 Mpeople eac" e:periencing not"ing but

> units of pain 0assuming we must bring about one or t"e ot"er1

I belie$e many of us will find t"e former to be considerably more intuiti$ely implausible T"is is

enoug" to suggest t"at a type 0i$1 solution would be moreplausible for an aggregati$e spectrumargument 0or for t"is particular one for Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion1 t"an it would be for t"e

spectrum argument for Priority Monster .urt"ermore notice t"at I "a$e not yet stated t"e

scariest $ersion of Priority Monster Using a spectrum argument similar to t"e ones alreadypresented% we can wor) from innocuous,loo)ing claims li)e 0L1 to!

)-tra Scary Priority Monster! (e can relie$e n,million Nancys ofNunits of pain eac"

or we can relie$e Penny ofN ,x units of pain If we do not relie$e t"e Nancys oft"eir pain% t"ey will eac" be left wit"Munits of pain o$er t"e course of t"eir li$es

If we do not relie$e Penny of "er pain% s"e will be left wit" MA yunits of pain

o$er t"e course of "er life .or anyN%M%x% and n% t"ere is a sufficiently largey

suc" t"at we s"ould relie$e Penny?s pain rat"er t"an t"at of t"e Nancys

T"is claim seems very implausible .or instance% if we could eit"er spare a billionNancys from$ery many years of intense pain eac"% or instead spare Penny from a mild "eadac"e% it would

seem t"at we s"ould do t"e former no matter "ow badly off Penny is

2ompare E:tra -cary Priority Monster wit" Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion T"e lattersays we s"ould forgo sparing t"e intense pain of $ery many people in order to spare many morefrom mild pain+ t"e former says we s"ould do so in order to spare oneperson from mild pain If

most of us agree wit" me t"at E:tra -cary Priority Monster is considerably more implausible

t"an Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion% t"en t"is suggests a type 0i$1 solution would be moreplausible for an aggregati$e spectrum argument 0or for t"is particular one for Re$erse Repugnant

2onclusion1 t"an it would be for t"e spectrum argument for E:tra -cary Priority Monster

3gain% I will not "ere speculate on w"at ist"e least implausible solution to my spectrumargument% or to aggregati$e spectrum arguments My point for now is only t"at t"e least

implausible solution to my spectrum argument is% &uite arguably% $ery different from t"e least

implausible solution to aggregati$e spectrum arguments 0suc" as t"e one for Re$erse Repugnant2onclusion1 T"is is because it appears t"at a type 0i1 or type 0ii1 solution would be less

plausible% and a type 0i$1 solution would be more plausible% for an aggregati$e spectrum

argument t"an for my spectrum argument concerning priorityB 3t t"e $ery least% it certainly

does notfollowt"at a type solution to my spectrum argument is correct% from t"e claim t"at atype solution to aggregati$e spectrum arguments is correct .or all of t"e abo$e reasons% t"e

similarity between my spectrum argument and aggregati$e spectrum arguments is of limited

significance% and t"e former cannot plausibly be dismissed as not"ing but anot"er e:ample of t"elatter

233dmittedly t"ere are some conclusions of Caggregati$eD spectrum arguments t"at are moreimplausible t"an eit"er

t"e Repugnant 2onclusion or t"e Re$erse Repugnant 2onclusion! see 3rr"enius?s 1ery Repugnant onclusion

0B>>1

>F


19/22

. 'rappin %p

T"e Priority #iew implies t"at we sometimes "a$e nontri$ially stronger reason to benefit a

person% t"e worse off in absolute terms t"is person would be if s"e did not recei$e t"e benefit in

&uestion T"is $iew seems plausible% especially in cases li)eHelp Penny /ut I argued t"at if weaccept t"at we s"ould "elp Penny o$er Nancy in t"is particular case% t"en we s"ould do so in a lot

of ot"er particular cases too Indeed% we s"ould "elp Penny o$er Nancy% as long as t"e difference

in benefit pro$ided is sufficiently small and t"e difference in "ow muc" worse off Penny wouldbe t"an Nancy is sufficiently large 0again% assuming ot"er t"ings are e&ual1 I t"en appealed to a

spectrum argument to s"ow t"at t"is generali*ed claim% along wit" t"e transiti$ity of Cmore

reason o$erall to do t"an %D implies Priority Monster T"is constitutes an intuiti$e pu**lefor t"e Priority #iew Put anot"er way% t"e Priority #iew is inconsistent wit" t"e con'unction of

t"e following intuiti$ely plausible claims!

If Priority #iew% t"en 0>1

If 0>1% t"en 0L1 If 0L1% t"en Priority Monster

0B1% or notPriority Monster

I "a$e not% in t"is paper% said or defended w"at I t"in) is t"e most plausible 0or least implausible1solution to t"is intuiti$e pu**le I did argue t"at it is not clear we can plausibly sol$e t"e pu**le

by discarding or discounting our intuitions about cases in$ol$ing large &uantities% li)e Priority

Monster I "a$e also suggested w"y% despite some admittedly genuine similarities% t"e spectrum

argument t"at gi$es rise to t"is pu**le is significantly different from sorites arguments and fromaggregati$e spectrum arguments It merits separate% and serious% study Howe$er% I will "a$e to

lea$e a t"oroug" discussion of competing solutions to t"e pu**le for anot"er time

Two final remar)s.irst% Priority Monster in$ol$es t"e dramatic scaling,up of a particular factor! priority for

t"e worse off T"is factor is scaled,up by Cma)ingD a single person e:traordinarily 0arbitrarily1

badly off /ut t"ere are ot"er ways to scale,up t"is factor dramatically% wit"out appealing toe:traordinarily badly off persons Instead% we can appeal to large numbers of persons w"o differ

0only slig"tly1 in "ow badly off t"ey are -ome details are s)etc"ed in t"e footnoteBG

242onsider!

Prioritarian +epunance! for any large group of at least >% badly off people t"at we could pre$ent

from eac" suffering "orribly and dying prematurely% t"ere is a sufficiently large second group ofN

moderately well off people we could only modestly benefit% and a t"ird group of Nslightlyworseoff people we could e&ually benefit% suc" t"at we s"ould "elp t"e t"ird group rat"er t"an t"e first

two% gi$en t"at ot"er t"ings are e&ual and t"at we must "elp eit"er bot" of t"e first two groups or

else 'ust t"e t"ird

T"is claim seems implausible It is not implied immediately by t"e Priority #iew% but a spectrum argument could be

broug"t to s"ow t"at t"e Priority #iew is inconsistent wit" t"e con'unction of a number of ot"er intuiti$ely plausible

claims 0one of w"ic" is t"e denial of Prioritarian Repugnance1

>


20/22

-econd% w"ile my focus "as been on t"e Priority #iew% muc" of w"at I "a$e said would

apply to ot"er distributi$e $iews too T"e problems surrounding Priority Monster apply

straig"tforwardly to Sufficiency 1iewsw"ic" restrict t"e scope of prioritarian concern to t"osew"o are not sufficiently well off 0we can imagine t"at e$eryone in my e:amples falls well below

t"e sufficiency t"res"old1BJ (it" only minor twea)ing% t"e pu**le can also be raised for

!galitarianism% according to w"ic" we "a$e nontri$ially strong reason to reduce ine&uality in t"edistribution of well,being across personsBK I suspect t"at wit" some more ma'or ad'ustments% t"e

sorts of monsterproblems I "a$e raised "ere could be e:plored in t"e conte:t of a $ariety of

ot"er $iews in t"e et"ics of distribution% including $iews about desert% fairness% 0property1 rig"ts%and e$en t"e nature of well,being itself I "ope t"ey will be% because monsters do pro$ide an

important test for et"ical t"eories

,e#ere&ces

3dler% Matt"ew B>B 2ell-3eing and 4air 5istribution6 3eyond ost-3enefit &nalysis New

;or)! O:ford Uni$ersity Press3rr"enius% 4ustaf B>> CT"e Impossibility of a -atisfactory Population Et"icsD In

5escriptive and Normative &pproaches to Human 3ehavior% E 6*"afaro$ and 9 Perry0eds1% (orld -cientific% pp J>KK

3rneson% Ric"ard B C9uc) Egalitarianism and PrioritarianismD !thics>>! G

/inmore% 8en and 3le: #oor"oe$e B C6efending Transiti$ity against Qeno?s Parado:DPhilosophy and Public &ffairs>! BLBL

/rown% 2ampbell BL CPrioritarianism for #ariable PopulationsD Philosophical

Studies>G! BJK>

/roome% 5o"n BG 2eighing 'ives O:ford! O:ford Uni$ersity Press

/uc"a)% 9ara nd CT"e Need for Relati$e PrioritarianismD Unpublis"ed Manuscript

Prioritarian Repugnance is different in )ind from t"e more familiar Utilitarian Repugnance T"e latter

implies t"at enoug" $ery small benefits could outweig" a relati$ely small number of $ery large benefits Prioritarian

Repugnance% "owe$er% does not in$ol$e weig"ing benefits against benefits per se T"e modest benefits to t"e

second and t"ird groups are e:actly t"e same in si*e and number% so w"en loo)ing for a differencebetween "elpingt"e first and second groups% on t"e one "and% and "elping 'ust t"e t"ird group% on t"e ot"er "and% t"is cannot be it

.actoring out t"ese modest benefits% t"e difference we are left wit" is t"is! it is t"e fact t"at t"e modest benefits go

to t"ose in t"e t"ird group rather thant"e people in t"e second group t"at ta)es precedence o$er "elping t"ose in t"e

first group Prioritarian Repugnance specifically in$ol$es t"e idea t"atshiftingbenefits of t"e same si*e and numberfrom one group of people to a group of people eac" only slig"tly worse off would be more important t"an promoting

a lotof well,being% eg% pre$enting >% people from eac" suffering "orribly and dying prematurely Indeed% note

t"at% no matter "ow muc" well,being at sta)e% Prioritarian Repugnance implies it s"ould be foregone to s"ift around

t"e same si*e and number of benefits from one group to anot"er% as long asNis large enoug"Note t"at Prioritarian Repugnance arises in fi:ed population cases .or interesting discussions of w"et"er%

and "ow% t"e Priority #iew s"ould be e:tended to $ariable population cases% see /rown BG% Holtug B>% and

2risp B> 3lso note t"at Prioritarian Repugnance is distinct from a number of ot"er putati$ely similar casesT"oug" I cannot get into all t"e details "ere% it isimportantly distinct from Tem)in?s 0>1Repellent onclusion%

from 2risp?s 0B1Pain Relief7hocolatescase% and from Holtug?s 0B>1 Super-repugnant onclusion25-ee 2risp B26-ee Tem)in >

B


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2arlson% Eri) BJ CIntransiti$ity wit"out Qeno?s Parado:D InRecent 2or( on "ntrinsic

1alue% M Qimmerman and T RXnnow,Rasmussen 0Eds1% 6ordrec"t! -pringer

2risp% Roger B CE&uality% Priority% and 2ompassionD !thics>>! LGJKYYY B> CEt"ics and International En$ironmental 9awD In 8he Philosophy of

"nternational 'aw% eds - /esson and 5 Tasioulas% O:ford! O:ford Uni$ersity Press

YYY B>> CIn 6efence of t"e Priority #iew! 3 Response to Otsu)a and #oor"oe$eDUtilitasB! >JF

4rea$es% Hilary nd C3ntiprioritarianismD Unpublis"ed Manuscript

Holtug% Nils B> Persons9 "nterests9 and :ustice O:ford! O:ford Uni$ersity PressHuemer% Mic"ael BF CIn 6efence of RepugnanceD Mind>>L! F

YYY B> CTransiti$ity% 2omparati$e #alue% and t"e Met"ods of Et"icsD !thics >B!

>FGJ

8eefe% Rosanna B 8heories of 1agueness 2ambridge! 2ambridge Uni$ersity PressMc8erlie% 6ennis >F CE&uality and TimeD !thics! BLGK

YYY >L CPriority and TimeD anadian :ournal of PhilosophyBL! BFL

No$er% Harris and 3lan H7'e) BG C#e:ing E:pectationsD Mind>>! BLBG

Norcross% 3lastair >L C2omparing Harms! Headac"es and Human 9i$esD Philosophy andPublic &ffairs BK! >JKL

No*ic)% Robert >LG &narchy9 State9 and Utopia New ;or)! /asic /oo)sOtsu)a% Mic"ael and 3le: #oor"oe$e B C("y It Matters T"at -ome 3re (orse Off T"an

Ot"ers! 3n 3rgument 3gainst t"e Priority #iewD Philosophy and Public &ffairsL!

>L>YYY B>> CReply to 2rispD UtilitasB! >>>G

Parfit% 6ere) >FG Reasons and Persons O:ford! O:ford Uni$ersity Press

YYY >FK CO$erpopulation and t"e &uality of lifeD In&pplied !thics% ed Peter -inger%

>GJ>KG O:ford! O:ford Uni$ersity PressYYY >> CE&uality or PriorityVD 8he 'indley 'ecture 9awrence! Uni$ersity of

8ansas+ reprinted in B in 8he "deal of !$uality% ed Matt"ew 2layton and 3ndrew

(illiams% F>>BJ 9ondon! MacmillanYYY B>B C3not"er 6efence of t"e Priority #iew%D UtilitasBG! GG

YYY nd CTowards T"eory D Unpublis"ed Manuscript

Pummer% T"eron B> CIntuitions about large number casesD &nalysis L! LGKYYY nd C("at?s (rong wit" 2yclingVD Unpublis"ed Manuscript

CT"e Pu**le of t"e -elf,TorturerD Philosophical StudiesJ! L

Rac"els% -tuart >F C2ountere:amples to t"e Transiti$ity of /etter T"anD &ustralasian

:ournal of Philosophy LK! L>FYYY BG CRepugnance or Intransiti$ity! 3 Repugnant /ut .orced 2"oiceD In 8he

Repugnant onclusion6 !ssays on Population !thics% 5esper Ryberg and Torb'orn

Tanns'o% eds% >K>FK 6ordrec"t% t"e Net"erlands! 8luwer 3cademic Publis"ersRaffman% 6iana >G C#agueness (it"out Parado:D Philosophical Review>! G>LG

-idgwic)% Henry >L 8he Methods of !thics% se$ent" edition 9ondon! Macmillan

Tem)in% 9arry >F P"6 6issertation Princeton Uni$ersityYYY > "ne$uality New ;or)! O:ford Uni$ersity Press

YYY >K C3 2ontinuum 3rgument for Intransiti$ityD Philosophy and Public &ffairsB!

B>


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>LJB>

YYY B CE&uality% Priority% and t"e 9e$elling 6own Ob'ectionD In 8he "deal of

!$uality% ed Matt"ew 2layton and 3ndrew (illiams% >BKK> 9ondon! MacmillanYYY B>B Rethin(ing the ;ood! Moral "deals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning

New ;or)! O:ford Uni$ersity Press

(asserman% Ryan nd CParado:es of Transiti$ityD Unpublis"ed Manuscript(illiamson% Timot"y >G 1agueness New ;or)! Routledge

BB

the priority monster

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