the processes, principles and goals of c onstitutional design
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The processes, principles and goals of c onstitutional design. Class #2 - Gov 1109 . Class Structure. Why are constitutions important? Processes of constitutional design Inclusive or elite-driven (Ginsburg, Samuels) Principles of constitutional design - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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The processes, principles and goals of constitutional design
Class #2 - Gov 1109
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Lijphart 2
Class Structure
I. Why are constitutions important?II. Processes of constitutional design
Inclusive or elite-driven (Ginsburg, Samuels)
III. Principles of constitutional design Power-concentrating or power-sharing? (Lijphart) Nine choices
IV. Contrasting case-studies Majoritarian democracy: Case study of the UK May 2005 and 2010 elections Consensus democracy: Case study of the Swiss 2003 election
V. Discussion What would be the arguments for adopting either type of constitutions in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nepal?
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Lijphart 3
Questions
In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?
What would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?
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Lijphart 4
Required readings
PROCESSES: Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and Justin Blount. 2009. ’Does the Process of
Constitution-Making Matter?’ Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5: 201-223
PRINCIPLES: Arend Lijphart. 2004. ‘Constitutional design for divided societies.’ Journal of
Democracy 15(2): 96-109
CASE STUDIES: Kirsti Samuels. 2007
Constitution building processes and democratization: A discussion of twelve case studies. International IDEA
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Lijphart 5
Additional useful resources
Comparative Constitutions Projecthttp://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions
International Constitutional Law Documentshttp://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/index.html
International IDEA www.IDEA.int
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Lijphart 6
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Lijphart 7
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Lijphart 8
1. Why are constitutions important?
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Lijphart 9
I: Why are constitutions important?
1. Constitutions structure patterns of legitimate authority within nation-states e.g.
Electoral rules determine the number of parties in parliament and in government
Executive-legislative relations influence capacity for effective governance Federalism determines vertical power-sharing
2. Constitutions embody symbolic national goals and aspirations
3. Negotiated constitutional settlements integral to peace-building and reconciliation process
In Bosnia, Cambodia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan
4. Potential for practical policy reforms e.g. Electoral reforms in Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Venezuela Constitutional change in Bolivia, UK, Turkey
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Lijphart 10
What are constitutions?
The body of highest-order legal rules and principles that specify how other laws are to be produced, applied, enforced and interpreted
What counts? A single Constitutional document Supplementary charters of human rights Or a series of basic laws and unwritten conventions
Major contrasts can exist between de jure Constitutions and de facto constitutions
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Lijphart 11
“In any given year…some 4 or 5 constitutions will be replaced, 10-15 will be amended, and another 20 or so proposals for revision will be under consideration.”
Worldwide, the average lifespan of a constitution is 17 years
Ginsberg, Elkins and Blount 2009 p202
Constitutional Change
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Lijphart 12
Lifespan Duration of Constitutions0
24
68
10Pe
rcen
t
0 50 100 150 200Lifespan
Source: Comparative Constitutions Project
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Lijphart 13
Types of Constitutional Change
State building Post-conflict peace settlements
E.g. Afghanistan constitution
State reform Transition from autocracy
Eg Choice of electoral system in post-Communist states Common in established democracies
Revision or amendment of existing arrangements within a limited set of parameters/options
eg UK green paper “The Governance of Britain” (2007)
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Lijphart 14
Who decides?
Executiv
eExpert commissions
and international advisors
Legislative bodies and committees
Special constituent assemblies
Inclusive constitutional referendums
Parti
cipat
ion
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Lijphart 15
Used to be elites; trend is growing use of public participation in constitution making (Ginsburg et al Fig 1 p207)
Processes involving a referendum produce constitutions that are more likely to have virtually every category of right..more likely to ensure universal suffrage, secret ballot, use of referenda.
More inclusive processes may produce more democratic outcomes Source: Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount (2009) p218
Does inclusion matter?
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Lijphart 16
2. Principles of constitutional design
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Lijphart 17
II: Principles of constitutional design
Arend Lijphart The Politics of Accommodation (1968)Democracy in Plural Society (1979)Democracies (1984)Electoral systems and party systems (1994) Institutional design in new democracies (1996)Patterns of Democracy (1999)“Constitutional design for divided societies” (2004)Thinking about Democracy (2008)
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Lijphart 18
1. Legislative electoral systemProportional representation eg party listMixed eg mixed member proportionalMajoritarian – eg Single member pluralityPros and cons?
2. Within PR Open or closed lists Size of multimember districts Degree of proportionality Pros and cons?
Choices for divided societies
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Lijphart 19
3. Parliamentary or presidential government?Parliamentary executives have collegial executiveAvoid zero-sum majoritarian electionsAvoid executive-legislative stalemateAvoid rigidityPros and cons?
Choices
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Lijphart 20
4. Power-sharing executiveCollegial cabinetsMandates specific group representation
Eg BelgiumParty ministers on proportional basis for those
with 5%+ seatsE.g. South Africa
Choices
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Lijphart 21
5. Cabinet stabilityNo-confidence voteFixed term parliamentsConstructive vote of no-confidence
6. Head of stateCeremonial role eg monarchy If selected
Limited powers Appointed by multiple actors
Choices
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Lijphart 22
7. Federalism and decentralizationSecond federal chamber over-represents less
populous unitsFederal boundaries?Size of federal states?
8. Non-territorial autonomyEg minority rights over education
9. Power-sharing in appointed positionsCivil service, judiciary, police
Choices
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Lijphart 23
Types of democratic constitutionsS o u rce : L ijp h a rt D e m o c ra cie s (1 9 9 9)
egU K ?
N e w Z e a la n d?B a rba d os
M a jo rita rian(W e s tm in s te r)
egU S A
C o s ta R icaF ra n ce
M ixed
egE U
B e lg iumS w itze rla nd
C o n se n sus(C o n so cia tio n a l)
Democracies
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Lijphart 24
Consociational democracy
Lijphart (1968) The Politics of Accommodation Netherlands exemplified ‘pillorized’ divided society Yet there was stable democracy and elite consensus Why? Constitutional arrangements
Executive power-sharing/grand coalition Minority veto in government Proportional representation of all major groups in elected/appointed
office Cultural autonomy for groups
Model for other divided (plural) societies? E.g.Belgium, Switzerland, Lebanon, Cyprus
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Lijphart 25
Normative values
Majoritarian democracy Goals…
government accountability and transparency of decision-making
single-party executives, effective opposition parties, vigorous parliamentary debate, and decisive elections.
Yet dangers of elective dictatorship, permanent majorities, lack of checks and balances.
Consociational democracy
Goals… consensual decision-making,
bargaining and compromise multiple parliamentary parties,
each with a stake in coalition government, and
dispersed decision-making processes.
Yet dangers of ineffective governance, extreme multiparty
fragmentation, lack of accountability.
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Ref: Arend Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999
‘Majoritarian’ ModelPower-concentrating
Effective and accountable
‘Consensus’ ModelPower-sharing
Inclusive &representative Exec-Parties One-party cabinet Coalition government
Executive Executive dominant Balanced exec-legislature
Party system Two-party Multi-party
Electoral system Majoritarian Proportional Representation
Interest groups Pluralist Corporatist
Federal-Unitary
Government Centralized-unitary Decentralized-federal
Parliament Unicameral Balanced Bicameral
Constitution Flexible More Rigid
Judiciary Parlt. sovereign Judicial review
Central Bank Dependent Independent
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Lijphart 29Typology of DemocraciesRef: Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 1999
Executive-Parties
2.01.00.0-1.0-2.0
Uni
tary
-Fed
eral
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
VEN
US
UK
TRI
SWI
SWE
SPA
POR
PNG
NOR
NZ
NET
MAU
MAL
JPN
JAM ITA
ISR
IRE
ICE
GRE
GER
FRA
FIN
DENCR
CAN
BOT
BEL
BAR
BAH
AUT
AUL
Majoritarian
Consensual
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Lijphart 30
Consensus democracy matters
For the inclusion of minority partiesFor the protection of minority interestsFor women’s representationFor public policy, economic outcomes, and
welfare states
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Lijphart 31
The logical sequence of consociational theory
PR electoral systems or
reserved seats
Federalism & decentralization
Election ofethnic minority
partiesPeaceful
democratic consolidation
Election ofethnic minority
parties
Greater support within minority communities
Does the logic make sense? Criticisms?
Plural societies
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Lijphart 32
Potential criticisms?
For constructivists, ethnic divisions have meanings shaped by political structures and elites. Power-sharing regimes can thereby freeze/reinforce ethnic cleavages (Donald Horowitz)
Eg Bosnia-Herzegovina By contrast, majoritarian elections force vote-pooling
across groups and bridging appeals (Ben Reilly)
Not the only outcome: some peace settlements are negotiated, others result from outright victory
Majoritarian solutions may be more effective in restoring fragile states. Sequencing process in peace settlements? (Mansfield and Snyder)
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III: Majoritarian institutions
Case study: UK May 2005 and 2010 general elections
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Lijphart 34
Institutions: UK 1945-1997
Unwritten constitution – Magna Carta etc. One-party cabinet government since 1945
Collective responsibility, primus inter pares Two-party parliamentary competition
Labour and Conservative in govnt and opposition Programmatic & disciplined parties
Mass-branch party organizations, few independents, few backbench rebellions, manifesto program
Parliamentary sovereignty (no Supreme Court) Unitary state (local government administration) Bicameral parliament but Commons predominant Plurality FPTP elections – exaggerates votes: seats for
winner
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Lijphart 35
UK Ballot paper
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Lijphart 36
2005 UK election resultJune 2005 % of Votes % of seats Ratio Number of
seatsLabour 35.2 54.9 1.56 355
Conservative 32.3 30.4 0.94 197
Lib Dem 22.0 9.5 0.43 62
SNP 1.5 0.9 0.60 6
PC 0.6 0.5 0.83 3
Other 8.4 3.4 0.40 23
Labour Maj. 2.9 24.5 66
Total 100 100 659
Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
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Lijphart 37
2010 UK election resultParty Seats Gain Loss Net Votes % +/-%
Conservative 306 100 3 +97 10,706,647 36.1 +3.8
Labour 258 3 94 -91 8,604,358 29.0 -6.2
Liberal Democrat 57 8 13 -5 6,827,938 23.0 +1.0
Democratic Unionist Party 8 0 1 -1 168,216 0.6 -0.3
Scottish National Party 6 0 0 0 491,386 1.7 +0.1
Sinn Fein 5 0 0 0 171,942 0.6 -0.1
Plaid Cymru 3 1 0 +1 165,394 0.6 -0.1
Social Democratic & Labour Party 3 0 0 0 110,970 0.4 -0.1
Green 1 1 0 +1 285,616 1.0 -0.1
Alliance Party 1 1 0 +1 42,762 0.1 +0.0
UK Independence Party 0 0 0 0 917,832 3.1 +0.9
British National Party 0 0 0 0 563,743 1.9 +1.2
Ulster Conservatives and Unionists - New Force 0 0 1 -1 102,361 0.3 -0.1
English Democrats 0 0 0 0 64,826 0.2 +0.2
Respect-Unity Coalition 0 0 1 -1 33,251 0.1 -0.1
Traditional Unionist Voice 0 0 0 0 26,300 0.1
Christian Party 0 0 0 0 18,623 0.1
Independent Community and Health Concern 0 0 1 -1 16,150 0.1 +0.0
Trade Unionist and Socialist Coalition 0 0 0 0 12,275 0.0
Scottish Socialist Party 0 0 0 0 3,157 0.0 -0.1
Others 1 1 1 0 319,891 1.1 0.0
Turnout 29,653,638 65.1 4.0
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Lijphart 38
UK House of Commons 1900-2010 Overall Maj Govnt
1900 135 Con Salisbury/Balfour1906 129 Lib Campbell Bannerman1910 None Asquith1910 None Asquith1918 283 Coalition Lloyd George1922 74 Con Bonar Law1923 None Baldwin1924 210 Con MacDonald1929 None MacDonald1931 492 Nat MacDonald1935 242 Nat Baldwin/Chamberlain/Churchill1945 147 Lab Attlee1950 6 Lab Attlee1951 16 Con Churchill1955 59 Con Eden/Macmillan1959 99 Con Macmillan/Douglas-Home1964 5 Lab Wilson1966 97 Lab Wilson1970 31 Con Heath1974 0 Lab Wilson 1974 4 Lab Wilson/Callaghan1979 44 Con Thatcher1983 144 Con Thatcher1987 101 Con Thatcher1992 21 Con Major1997 178 Lab Blair2001 167 Lab Blair2005 66 Lab Blair/Brown2010 None Cameron?
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Lijphart 39
‘Winner’s bonus’ UK
Note: The votes-seats ratio is calculated as the percentage of UK seats divided into the percentage of UK votes for the governing party. A ratio of 1.0 would indicate no electoral bias for the government. Source: Pippa Norris & Chris Wlezien Ed. Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 20101.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.28
1.091.07
1.10
1.171.14
1.20
1.13
1.27 1.28
1.22
1.44
1.37
1.23
1.46
1.541.56
1.30
Vot
es: s
eats
rat
io
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Lijphart 40
UK % Vote 1900-2010
Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated
1900
1906
1910
1910
1918
1922
1923
1924
1929
1931
1935
1945
1950
1951
1955
1959
1964
1966
1970
1974
1974
1979
1983
1987
1992
1997
2001
2005
2010
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Con
Lab
LD
Other% o
f UK
vote
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Lijphart 41
UK % Seats 1900-2010
Source: Pippa Norris ‘Elections & public Opinion’ The Blair Effect II: The Labour Government 2001-2005Edited by Anthony Seldon and Denis Kavanagh Cambridge University Press Updated
19001906191019101918192219231924192919311935194519501951195519591964196619701974197419791983198719921997200120052010
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Con
Lab
LD
OtherNum
ber o
f MPs
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Lijphart 42
Why exaggerative bias for winner?
1. Malapportionment Unequal size of electorates in each seat Decline of urban pop/Labour constituency Delayed effect of boundary changes
2. Differential turnout Lowest in safe Labour seats
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Lijphart 43
Geography also matters:UK 2005 Election Seats
Source: Pippa Norris Britain Votes 2005 (OUP 2005)
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Lijphart 44
Simulated seats GB 2010
FPTP STV AV PR List0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
306
246
281
234
258
207
262
188
57
162
79
150
2835
28
78
ConLabLDOther
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Lijphart 45
Moderate party competition
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project/ Judith Bara EPOP 2005
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Lijphart 46
Breakdown of classic ideal type since 1997
Federalism: Devolution for Scotland and Wales Northern Ireland assembly Elected Mayor/Assembly for London
Electoral reform: Party list PR for Europe AMS for Scotland/Wales STV for Scottish local elections May 2011 referendum on AV for Commons
House of Lords reform Written Bill of Rights- Euro. Convention Use of referendums
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Advantages and disadvantages?
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IV: Consensus democracy
Switzerland
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Lijphart 49
Swiss democracy
Pop 7.4m Plural cleavages
Religion (46% Catholic, 40% Protestant) Language
(65%German, 10% Italian, 18% French), Region/canton Class ($32,800 per capita PPP 2003)
Social divisions, yet elite consensus? Stable power-sharing coalition but lack of
accountability?
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Lijphart 50
Swiss democracy
Since 1848, Switzerland has been a confederation, currently with 26 cantons and 2873 communes.
The Government (Federal Council) has 7 members elected by parliament for 4 years
From 1959-2003, ‘magic formula’ 2 seats each for the FDP, CVP, and SPS, and 1 seat for the SVP.
October 2003, 2 seats given to SVP, 1 CVPAnnual president rotates as primus inter pares
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Lijphart 51
Swiss parliament
Bicameral Federal Assembly: Direct elections PR List elections w. high proportionality votes : seats The National Council (popular representation, 200 seats, based
on population size per canton) and The Council of States (cantonal representation, 46 seats, 2 per
canton) Eight party factions in Federal Assembly and 13 parties in total.
Federal Supreme Court Many popular initiatives and referendums.
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Lijphart 52
October 2003 Election resultsNationalrat and Ständerat: 19 october 2003 (%) %Vote 200 %Seats 46
Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 26.6 55 27.5% 8
Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz SPS 23.4 52 26.0% 9
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei der Schweiz FDP 17.3 36 18.0% 14
Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz CVP 14.4 28 14.0% 15
Grüne Partei der Schweiz GPS 7.4 13 6.5% -
Liberale Partei der Schweiz LPS 2.2 4 2.0% -
Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz EVP 2.3 3 1.5% -
Eidgenössische Demokratische Union EDU 1.3 2 1.0% -
Schweizer Demokraten SD 1.0 1 0.5% -
Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz PdA 0.7 2 1.0% -
Lega dei Ticinese LdT 0.4 1 0.5% -
Solidarités Sol 0.5 1 0.5% -
Christlich-Soziale Partei CSP 0.4 1 0.5% -
Alternative Liste AL 0.5 1 0.5% -
- Sozialistisch Grüne Alternative Zug SGAZ 1
Freiheitspartei der Schweiz FPS 0.2 - -
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Swiss party competition
European Liberal
Conservative
RightLeft
SVP Radical right
SP Social Democratic
Green Party
Free Democrats
CVP Christian Democrats
Note: Legislative voting patterns 1999-2003
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Advantages and disadvantages?
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V: Discussion
In designing new constitutions for Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Nepal, what are the pros and cons of each type of democracy?
What would be the major consequences of these institutional choices for stability and effectiveness?
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Conclusions
Useful classification of democratic institutions From ideal types to continuous measures Clarifies values and normative debates Systematic comparisons Consequences of institutional design?
Next class: Electoral Systems
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