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The Psychology of Perpetrators and BystandersAuthor(s): Ervin StaubSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 61-85Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791271 .

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Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985

The Psychology of Perpetratorsand

Bystanders1

Ervin Staub2

Whydo governments or powerful groups in a society foster genocide, mass

murder, and other organized acts of violence against a subgroup? This arti-cle explores psychological sources, social (life) conditions, and cultural

preconditions that contributeto such actions. Difficult life conditions, a com-mon precursor of mistreatmentof a group, createfrustration, threat to, andattack on life, ways of life, and self-concept. In their need to deal with the

psychological effects of difficult life conditions, people often willscapegoat,

and turn to ideologies which offer hope but identify some group as an ene-my. These and other ways of dealing with thepsychological effects of difficultlife conditions frequently give rise to violence. Certain characteristics of aculture- such as a belief in cultural superiority (which is threatened by con-ditions of life), devaluation of, and discrimination against, a group, obe-dience to authority, and others-make this more likely. Once mistreatmenthas started, participation or passivity by many members of society makesits continuation more likely. Reasons for frequent passivity by bystanders,who have great potential influence, are discussed. Thepsychology of direct

perpetrators is explored, including reversal of morality dueto

ideologyand

'The major ideas in this article were presented and further developed in a number of talks:at Harvard University in October, 1981; at a conference on Torture organized by AmnestyInternational and the Institute for the Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the Universityof Massachusetts, Amherst in October, 1981;at an International Conference on Morality and

Moral Development in Miami, Florida, December 1981; at the Meetings of the InternationalAssociation of Political Psychology in Washington, D.C., June 1982, and at a presentationat the University of Winnipeg, December 1982. I am grateful to Seymour Epstein and EdwardTronick for helpful comments. The preparation of this article was facilitated by NIMH Grant23886 to the author.

2Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003.

61

0162-895X/85/0300-0061$04.50/1 ? 1985 International Society of Political Psychology



the assumption of responsibility by leaders. As the conception is presentedit is applied to an examination of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. Thepos-sibility of diminishing such cruelty in the world is also discussed.

KEY WORDS: mistreatment of groups; genocide-mass killing; Holocaust; cultural influence;historical (life) conditions and their psychological effects.

INTRODUCTION

Why do human beings mistreat, torture, and exterminateothers? What

world conditions and what psychological conditions of individuals or groups

lead to acts of great cruelty-as in the Holocaust, the killing of millions ofCambodians by their own people, the many millions killed under Stalin in

the Soviet Union, the disappearances in Argentina, and murders in

Guatemala?The Holocaust, the exterminationof about 6 million Jews by Nazi Ger-

many during World War II, is a horrifying example of human cruelty. The

Nazis also killed millions of other people including Poles and Russians, men-

tally retarded,mentally ill, and homosexual Germans, and persons they con-

sidered enemies of their system.The Holocaust is especially horrifying because of the numbers killed,

because the Nazis meant to exterminate a whole people, because of the im-

personal, technological processes by which the majority of the Jews were

killed, and because of the great brutality. The majority were herdedinto and

transported to camps in overcrowded cattle cars, many dying on the way.Those who were not immediately sent upon arrival to gas chambers were

used as slave labor, given food rations inadequate for survival, deprived of

minimally adequate hygiene, and brutally treated.

A conception will be presented here of how subgroups within a societycome to be mistreated by a more powerful group, by the majority, or bythe government. This conception will be applied to an examination of how

the Holocaust came about: its psychological bases and cultural-societal

origins.The degreeand methods of mistreatment and the motivation can greatly

differ. Even the criteriaby which a collection of individuals,sometimesnatur-

ally constituting a group but at other times relatively heterogeneous, are made

into agroup by

outsiders bent on their mistreatment, cangreatly vary.

In

extreme cases, the killing of all members of a whole racial, religious, or eth-

nic group- what is commonly referred to as genocide- is intended.3In other

3Thereis no complete agreement in the definition of genocide. The term does refer to the kill-

ing of a whole group of people. The American Heritage Dictionarydefines it as "Thesystematic,planned annihilation of a racial, political or cultural group." This definition, relatively broadin including cultural and political groups, is consistent with much current use of the term.

62 Staub



The Psychology of Perpetrators and Bystanders

cases, individuals are grouped together and mistreated due to their political

views, or when for other reasonsthey are perceivedas a threat to the majorityor those in power.

In addition to tremendous differences in the degree and manner ofmistreatment of groups, conditions, such as life circumstances and societal

organization, differ in each country and time. The conception to be present-ed here was initially developed, and in this article will be applied, to helpexamine and understand how the Holocaust came about. I assume,

however, that in spite of the substantial differences, when groups of peopleare severely mistreated and at least some are killed, there is frequently a

degree of communality in the psychological bases of mistreatment, in the

conditions of life thatgive

rise topsychological

reactions which contribute

to mistreatment, and in aspects of the culture than make such psychologicalreactions and ways of dealing with life problems more or less probable.

First, psychological bases of mistreatment that are frequently presentinclude differentiation between ingroup and outgroup (us and them) and

devaluation of the latter; scapegoating, the blaming of the outgroup for

problems or difficulties of life; and ideologies that propagate new (and

"higher")ideals and promise a better way of life while also identifying a

group as a hindrance to the fulfillment of the ideology.

Second, difficult, stressful life conditions that a society faces frequent-ly give rise to psychological reactions that are potential bases of antagonismtoward and mistreatment of outgroups. The nature and degree of the life

difficulties will, of course, vary.Third, elements of a culturewill make it more or less likely that modes

of dealing with difficult life conditions arise that lead to mistreatmentof a

group. A numberof elementsrepresentpreconditions or mistreatment;devalu-

ation of and discriminationagainsta group;the natureof culturalself-concept;

and others. Not necessarily the same ones will be present in every case.Difficult life conditions combine with aspects of the culture to create

psychological reactions which give rise to initial actions taken against a

group. These actions are starting points, each resulting in psychological

changes that make further steps along a continuum of destruction more

likely. The social, cultural, and psychological conditions represent poten-tials that can give rise to mistreatment differing in nature, magnitude, and

moral meaning.There can be accidental and

unique componentsas well. For

example,as most writers agree, without Hitler, the Holocaust most likely would not

have occurred (see Kren and Rappoport, 1980). However, Hitler came to

power as a result of both very difficult life conditions in Germany and

aspects of the culture that led to support for him even though the ideologyhe propagated included violent antisemitism and other components that

presaged future Nazi atrocities.

63



In the following, the conception suggested above will be applied to anexamination of how the Holocaust came about. Some psychological tenden-cies in human beings that predispose to mistreatment of others, the psycho-

logical consequences of certain historical-life conditions, and thecharacteristics of cultures that serve to make aggression or cruelty more

likely will be discussed. The psychology of direct perpetratorswho personal-

ly inflict harm, and the role of bystanders, who by remaining passive or tak-

ing action against destructive behavior can greatly influence events, will alsobe considered. Certain things that can be done to make the mistreatmentof individuals and groups less likely will become apparent. Although a full

discussion is not possible here, the analysis that will be presentedalso seems

to apply to other mass killings, for example, Cambodia in the late 1970s,and the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey during World War I. A num-ber of the influences discussed were present in Turkey: difficult life condi-

tions and frustration and threat arising from the progressive collapse of an

empire and an ongoing war; devaluation of Armenians by Turks partly on

a religious basis and partly as a minority, long subjugated, the object of dis-

crimination and mistreatment; threat to Turkish self-concept from the loss

of empire and military defeat associated with this; an ideology of Pan-

Turkism,the idea of a new

empireto the East to which the

intransigentArmenians were a physical barrier; and others (see Boyajian, 1972).On the other hand, this analysis seems less applicable to certain events,

such as the purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Although life conditions

were very difficult earlier, with much starvation, they greatly improved bythe time the purges started. Moreover, high ranking members of the partywere killed in large numbers. Although ideological factors were involved,the main reason for the purges was apparently paranoid concern about

power by Stalin (Beck and Godin, 1951).

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF THE

MISTREATMENT OF GROUPS

Recent research in psychology has shown that human beings have an

ever-presenttendency to divide the world into ingroups and outgroups, into

us and them. People will use trivial information to create such groupings

and then proceed to discriminate against the members of the outgroup.Henry Tajfel of the University of Bristol, England (Tajfel et al., 1971;

Tajfel, 1982) originated a procedure in which participants took what is

described as an aesthetic preferencetest. Each participantwas told that, ac-

cording to the test, he or she preferredthe modern painter Klee. Other (fic-

tional) participants were described as preferring either Klee or another

64 Staub




modern painter, Kandinsky. When the supposed Klee lovers were to distrib-

ute goods or evaluate other participants, they favored those who also liked

Klee and discriminated against those who liked Kandinsky.In another study, participants estimated the number of dots in clusters

and were told they were either over- or under-estimators (Tajfel et al.,

1971). In distributing money, they gave more to others who were catego-rized as they themselves were. Many others studies with such "minimal"so-

cial categorization show a bias in favor the ingroup (Brewer, 1979;Hornstein, 1976; Tajfel, 1982). Seemingly, people use any available infor-

mation to establish groupings, favoring the ingroup even if the division was

created on a superficial basis. Obviously, people can group themselves in

many ways, and can define those who belong to their nation, political party,religion, profession, neighborhood, or local PTA as us, and consider others

as them, as different and frequently as less worthy.What are the origins of this tendency? Although unlikely to be directly

genetically controlled, it may in part arise out of genetically based humancharacteristics. For example, the capacity to form attachment to caretakersis part of our genetic makeup. Although the quality of attachment varies

(Ainsworth, 1979), only under extreme conditions of lack of caretaking and

stimulation will infants form no attachment to caretakers (Thompson andGrusec, 1970). The process of attachment begins at birth, and, as objectconstancy develops, infants reach the phase of clear-cut attachment tocaretakers. Around this time, stranger anxiety-fear and/or avoidance ofunfamiliar individuals- also appears.

This tendency to differentiate between objects of attachment andother people may be a rudimentarysource of ingroup-outgroup differentia-tion. Socialization can result in very early differences in the extent of suchdifferentiations. Infants who are exposed to a wider variety of people, or

who develop a secure attachment to caretakers, show less stranger anxiety(Shaffer, 1979). Another (related) source of ingroup-outgroup differentia-tion is the response of humans with fear and concern to what is highly un-

usual, unknown, and different (Hebb, 1946; Hunt, 1965). A further sourceis the working of the human mind by categorization; we see and remember

objects and people as green or red, tall or short, beautiful or ugly-us orthem.

In addition to genetically based sources of us/them differentiation, so-

cialization plays a powerful role. Children learn to differentiate betweentheir primarygroup, the family, and the rest of the world, and are frequent-ly taught not to trust those outside the family. Moreover, there is often

specific indoctrination against outgroups, be they religious, ethnic, nation-

al, or political. At a very early age children evaluate their nation, for exam-

ple, in a positive way, while expressing stereotypic and negative views of

65



other nations (Piaget and Weil, 1951). Having learned to make differentia-tions between ingroups and outgroups, people will naturallycreate them un-der novel circumstances.

A separation into us and them has many functions. By defining certain

people as them, we create us, which can result in feelings of harmony and

togetherness. In difficult times, this can be an essential gratification. Lead-ers frequently use a real or imaginary threat to create antagonism towardan "enemy,"hoping thereby to increase internal cohesion and decrease dis-satisfaction with themselves (Becker, 1975; Hornstein, 1976).

Differentiation of us and them usually gives rise to some devaluation

of them (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). In addition, social conditions may

embody stable devaluations: of slaves by slaveowners, of the uneducated bythe educated, or one religion by another. Whatever the source, images orbeliefs that devalue a group often develop and become part of a culture, its

literature, and other products, thereby acquiring substantial stability. Theycome to be taken for granted, as self-evident truths, e.g., that blacks areless intelligent, that Jews are money-hungry, that women are illogical.

Devaluation does not necessarily lead to aggression or mistreatment.

However, under certain conditions, already existing devaluation makes ac-

tions against a group or its members more likely. Bandura et al. (1975) con-ducted an experiment in which each participant was to be a teacher andadminister electric shocks to a learner who made mistakes on a task.

Teachers, who overheard a conversation in which the learnerwas describedas one of a rotten bunch of people, administered much stronger electricshocks than those who overheard no comments. Learners who weredescribed positively received the weakest shocks. Even though massacres ofhuman beings represent a very different level of cruelty from the adminis-tration of moderately painful electric shocks, derogation, devaluation, and

dehumanization of victims appear to contribute to both.

Derogatory labels are often used to create antagonism and preparepeople for action against those so labeled. One writer described the psycho-logical conditions for guilt-free massacre in the following way:

The most general condition for guilt-free massacre is the denial of humanity to thevictim. You call the victims names like gooks, dinks, niggers, pinkos, and japs. Themore you can get high officials in government to use these names and others like

yellow dwarfs with daggers and rotten apples, the more your success. In addition

youallow no human contact. You

preventtravel or

youoversee the nature of the

contact where travel is allowed. You prevent citizens from going to places like Chi-

na, Cuba, and North Vietnam, so that men cannot confront other men. Or on the

homefront, if contact is allowed, or if it cannot be prevented, you indicate that thecontact is not betweenequals; you talk about the disadvantaged, he deprived. (Duster,1971, p. 27)

66 Staub




Another relevant human characteristic that has been examined by psy-

chologists in the last decade may be called just world thinking. Originally

proposed by Melvin Lerner (Lerner, 1980; Lerner and Simmons, 1966), it

is supported by much psychological research. According to this conception,it is important for people to believe that the world is just. When they suffer,it must be due either to their conduct or their character. In some way theyare seen as blameworthy. If they didn't believe that there were good reasons

for the suffering they see, observers would fear that they themselves mightbecome random victims of circumstance. As a result of this belief, however,innocent people who are mistreated are devalued. This can make their later

mistreatment more likely.

While there is substantial evidence that people devalue innocentvictims-for example, tending to believe even nowadays that rape victimsare somehow at fault (Smith et al., 1976)-not everybody does so, and most

people do not devalue victims whose innocence is clearly established (Staub,

1978). Unfortunately, often establishing innocence is not possible. When

blacks were mistreated, accused of morally objectionable character faults

or rumored misdeeds, who could establish that they were really innocent,

particularlyin an existing climate of prejudice?The researchfindings (Lern-

er, 1980; Staub, 1978) suggest, however, that it is important to counteractderogation, to give information that attempts to establish the innocence of

victims. This will make it more difficult for people to assume that the vic-

tims deserved their fate, and to remain passive bystanders.

SOCIETAL (LIFE) CONDITIONS AS SOURCES OFAGGRESSION AND CRUELTY

The human characteristics and tendencies I have described make iteasier or create inclinations to hurt or mistreat others. In addition, psycho-logical theory and research identify several direct sources of aggression:frustration (usually defined as interference with goal-directed behavior orwith the fulfillment of goals), and attack on or threat to one's physical safe-

ty and survival, property, psychological well-being, or conception of one-self (Baron, 1977; Berkowitz, 1962; Buss, 1961). These conditions can giverise to feelings of hostility toward others and a desire to hurt them. Theycan also result in aggression motivated by self-defense, a defense of thephysical self, and of the psychological self (self-esteem, values, way of life,and conception of the world). Hostility and self-defense frequently join in

motivating aggression.

67



Difficult conditions of life can create frustration, the experience of

threat, or attack, or both. For example, in Germany after World War I, in-

flation, revolution, depression, and joblessness, moral and political chaos,

and a pervasive sense of political violence as Communists and Nazis foughteach other at political meetings and in the streets threatened both physicalsurvival and the Germans' conception of themselves as individuals and as

a people.Just as with experimentally produced frustration, threat or attack in

the laboratory, so difficult life conditions can relatively directly give rise to

aggression, in the form of riots, group violence, and mob action (Allport,1954; Milgram and Toch, 1968). The impact of external conditions can be

modified by the characteristicsof individuals, cultures, or existing politicalorganizations. Individuals sometimes respond to chronic inability to fulfill

important goals with progressive hopelessness and depression (Klinger,

1975); groups and societies may also do so. Individuals and groups,however, will seek ways to generate hope. Moreover, the need of human be-

ings to maintain their self-concept (Epstein, 1973, 1980), or when necessaryto revise their self-concept and their conception of the world in a way that

enables them to maintain self-esteem, is profound. Individuals and groupswill search for such renewed

comprehensionof the world.

IDEOLOGY

When difficult life conditions endure for extended periods of time and

threaten existence and self-worth, people often turn to ideologies for solu-

tions or hope. The ideologies, which may arise in response to life conditions

or may already exist, come to be adopted as a result of the motivation aris-

ing from the difficult life conditions. By ideology I mean a system of beliefsabout what the world is like and what ideally it could and should be. Ideolo-

gies usually offer conceptions for how to lead a better life. At a time when

traditional ways stop working, an ideology can offer a renewed comprehen-sion of the world (Platt, 1980), ideals to live by and hope for, a better future

as well as a chance for personal significance. An ideology can give meaningand direction to life.

There is much psychological research showing that attitudes relate to

behavior, particularly when a summary index of behavior is used (Ajzenand Fishbein, 1980). There is also evidence that value orientations that em-

body concern about, and a feeling of personal responsibility for, other peo-

ple's welfare are associated with helpful responses to both physical distress

(Staub, 1974, 1978)and psychological distress (Staub, 1978;Feinberg, 1977;

Grodman, 1979). In general, ways of seeing events, and beliefs and values

68 Staub




that make certain outcomes or events valuable and desired, give rise to

motivation which, when supporting conditions exist, will lead to action

(Staub, 1978, 1980). Ideologies represent interconnected systems of beliefs

and valuations which determine ways of seeing events and can be powerfulsources of motivation to bring about desired outcomes such as a particular

way of life or the general acceptance of the belief system.Historical examples show that ideologies, including religious ones,

powerfully affect human conduct. People will sacrifice themselves in order

to further ideologies. Unfortunately, followers of ideologies often identifysome people as a hindrance-due to their actions, beliefs, or basic nature-

to the ideal state that the ideology embodies, and commit horrifying acts

against these people in the name of creating the better world, of fulfillingthe higher ideal that the ideology offers. Examples include the great blood-

bath after the French Revolution, the Inquisition and other religious perse-cutions, the recent mass killings in Cambodia.

The Nazi ideology is a clear example. Racial purity-and the right,even the obligation, to destroy anything that interfered with racial purity(and with the fulfillment of other aspects of the ideology) - was one of its

basic tenets. The existence of the Jews was defined as a mortal danger to

thepurity

of the race. These and otheraspects

of Hitler'sideology,

such as

the right of Aryans, superior by nature, to take Lebensraum or living spacefrom other countries, were described in Mein Kampf written in 1923 and

later faithfully expressed in the actions of the Third Reich during its exis-

tence from 1933 to 1945.

While ideology is an important source of violence, it is often difficult

for observers to accept that great cruelty can arise from a way of thinkingabout the world. Many people discounted the importance of the ideologydescribed in Mein Kampf, believing that Hitler's antisemitic demagoguery

was simply intended to gain the support of antisemites, without expressinghis real beliefs and intentions. Gordon Allport, in his classic book The Na-

ture of Prejudice, wrote in 1954:

Hitler created the Jewish menace not so much to demolish Jews as to cement theNazi hold over Germany. (p. 40)

It is easier to see the generation of hatred and antagonism toward a groupas "the Machiavellian trick of creating a common enemy in order to cement

an ingroup" (Allport, 1954, p. 40)-to see it as having a pragmatic purposethat leads to commonly understood gain-than to see it as being done forits own sake, out of personal hate or on the basis of ideology. Althoughdetailed analysis is not possible here, some sources of mistreatment dis-cussed so far also seemed present in Argentina and contributed to the disap-pearances, the kidnapping, and the murder of 6,000-15,000 persons who

69



were seen as politically dangerous by the ruling military. Although life con-ditions in Argentina were substantially less difficult than those in Germany,in the decade before the disappearancesArgentina witnessed a great deal of

turmoil. There had been increasing terrorism by left and right wing groupsand by 1975 its level was great, with many people kidnapped and murdered.The insecurity that resulted, together with a declining economy and highlevel of inflation under Isabelle Peron, prepared conditions for the begin-

ning of the continuum of destruction. The military took over with substan-

tial support from the population.The views and actions of the military combined anticommunism,

which clearly reached ideological proportions, with self-interest. Com-

munism was seen as a danger to society, as a wrong, harmful, perhaps evenevil way of life, from which the nation must be protected. The military alsosaw Communism as a direct threat to itself-since Castro had dissolved theCuban army and executed many officers (Potash, 1980, 1981).

To deal with the threat they turned against not only terrorist groupsand against Communists but also any liberal element of society. In theirminds they were all connected to the Communist threat (Amnesty Interna-tional Report, 1980). They all become targets of kidnapping, torture, and

murder.As in Germany, there was an ideological base. As with the Germantreatment of Communists and Social Democrats, a real conflict of both in-terest and ideology was the basis of the mistreatment, the ideology con-

tributing to a tremendous generalization in the definition of "enemy."

SCAPEGOATING

Difficult life conditions can also directly lead to scapegoating (All-port, 1954). Scapegoating can arise from displaced hostility, generated byfrustration or threat and focused on identifiable targets (when the sourceof frustration is unclear) or acceptable targets of aggression (when thesource of frustration is too powerful or for other reasons is an unacceptabletarget). The essence of scapegoating is to accuse certain people of havingcaused one's problems or difficulties. This can also diminish or eliminateone's own responsibility. Scapegoating can lead to economic gain (the

property or jobs of the wrongdoers can be taken over), to psychologicalgain (improved self-esteem), and to political gain, when used by leaders.

Devaluing and scapegoating members of another group allows peopleto feel more important, more worthwhile. Poor southern whites who them-selves led impoverished, humiliating lives could elevate their self-esteem bya feeling of superiority over blacks; Germans could do the-same by their

70 Staub



The Psychologyof PerpetratorsndBystanders

feeling of superiority over Jews. Those who scapegoat can become an in-

group, with a feeling of togetherness and a diminished sense of aloneness

in facing problems. They can achieve a "positive group distinctiveness"

which "servesto protect, enhance, preserveor achieve a positive social iden-

tity for members of the group" (Tajfel, 1982, p. 24).

Scapegoats are usually selected on the basis of already existing devalu-ation. Some are chosen to fit specific occasions, but some are used frequent-

ly and repeatedly. In the third century A.D., the Roman Tertullian wrote:

They take the Christians to be the cause of every disaster to the state, of every mis-fortune to the people. If the Tiber reaches the wall, if the Nile does not reach the

fields, if the sky does not move or if the earth does, if there is a famine, or if there

is a plague, the cry is at once, "The Christians to the Lions."

SOCIETAL CONDITIONS AND CULTURAL

PRECONDITIONS

Difficult life conditions can be starting points for a continuum of des-

truction: actions taken against groups of individuals, arising out of anger,hostility, devaluation, scapegoating, or an ideology, which without counter-reactions make further and more violent actions easier and thus more likely.War, threat of attack by another country, economic hardship, particularlya deterioration of economic conditions, political turmoil, inequality or

deprivation and mistreatment of groups or classes, the existence of violencein a society and the experience of insecurity, all can start the continuum ofdestruction. A powerful ideology that is embedded in the political systemor exerts strong influence on society can in itself be a starting point. Preex-

isting characteristics of a culture will influence initial responses to difficultlife conditions. Together with the existing political organization, which af-fects freedom of expression and opposition, they will influence the probablecourse of subsequent events.

A cultural self-conception is important. For example, the loss ofWorld War I and the events following it resulted in very difficult life condi-tions in Germany, persisting over a long period of time, deeply threateningthe Germans'conception of themselves. The Germans believed in the great-

ness of their nation and their specialness, even in their superiorityover otherpeoples and their right to rule others (Girard, 1980). The loss of the war,the humiliation of the Versailles treaty, the occupation of the Ruhr by theFrench who were dissatisfied with reparation payments, the materialdifficulties of life and the general chaos, all strongly conflicted with theGermans' view of themselves as a powerful, competent, orderly people.

71



Moreover, many Germans holding traditional values saw their inability to

provide for their families as a great dishonor (Abel, 1938; Moore, 1978).

Existing devaluation of a subgroup and/or institutionalized discrimi-

nation make it more likely that such a group will be mistreated when timesare difficult. Real conflicts in self-interest can contribute to victimization

but are not necessary. In Germany, as in some other European countries,there was a long history of antisemitism and persecution of Jews arisingfrom Christian views of the Jews and further evoked by the Jews' different

religious practices and culture. (Dawidowicz, 1975; Girard, 1980; Hilberg,

1961). This antisemitism was expanded by Martin Luther, extremely in-

fluential in Germany, who, after an initial period during which he believed

he would be able to convert Jews, turned against them. He used images indescribing Jews, such as pests, parasites and bloodsuckers, which the Nazis

took over (not necessarily from Luther, but from the German culture which

transmitted these images). During the Napoleonic rule over Germany, and

under the influence of the Enlightenment, Jews were granted legal rightsthey did not enjoy before. However, a basic antisemitism among the masses

remained strong (Craig, 1982), not surprising given the perpetuation by the

culture of the negative images. In the late 19th century, political an-

tisemitismevolved,

with the formation of antisemiticpolitical groups

and

parties, and agitation for anti-Jewish legislation (that was finally adopted

by Hitler after he came to power).One example is the "Anti-Semites' Petition" presented to Bismarck in

1881 with 225,000 signatures, asking in the preamble for "the emancipationof the German people from a form of alien domination which it cannot en-

dure for any length of time" and proposing legal steps to restrict the rightsof Jews (Dawidowicz, 1975, p. 37).

Thus, the consistency between Hitler's antisemitism and the existingculture made it possible for people to accept Hitler's views. The consistencybetween Hitler's concept of Lebensraum, or living space, which he was go-

ing to acquire for Germany, and the previously existing belief in German

superiority, combined with militarism, nationalism, and the desire for ex-

pansion also contributed to Hitler's coming to power. A belief among Ger-

mans in the obligation of obedience to the authority of the state and to

authority in general (Craig, 1982; Girard, 1980)contributed to Hitler's abili-

ty to lead the German people to war and genocide.

In contrast to social differentiation, social cohesion diminishes thelikelihood of a group's mistreatment. Fein (1979) found that the more

solidarity there was in a country before the war among subgroups of the

population, and the more the Jews were accepted and had equal rights, theless successful were the Germans in exterminatingthe Jewish population of

the country. A high degree of SS control was also important, perhaps a

72 Staub




decisive element. In occupied countries under tight SS control, most Jewswere killed, while in countries not administered by the Germans, the other

factors exerted strong influence (see also Kren and Rappoport, 1980).

As individuals vary in their value orientations, so can societies. Theycan differ in the value they place on individual lives and rights, and on thoseof members of different subgroups. The institutions and laws can reflectthis. For example, a state religion and religious fundamentalism usually em-

body inherent devaluation of people with a different religion. Consequencesof the kind currently evidenced in Iran, for example, in the mistreatmentof the Baha'i, are likely to follow.

UNIFORMITY OF VIEWS, LEARNING BY PARTICIPATIONAND THE CONTINUUM OF DESTRUCTION

In a pluralistic society, with varied values and views and the freedomto express them, counterreaction to initial steps along a continuum of des-truction is probable. For example, in the United States, the repressiveviews

of, and repressive measures proposed by, the Moral Majority gave rise to

strong publicreaction and

organized opposition. Perhaps more directlyrelevant, it was the vehement opposition to the Vietman war that altered thecourse of events.

In a totalitarian system counterreaction is much less likely. The

government can mistreat and destroy some segment of the population not

only because the fear that the government inspires inhibits opposition butalso because of the uniformity of views to which the population is exposed.

Adolf Eichmann, in charge of transporting Jews to extermination

camps, noted at his trial-as described by Hannah Arendt (1963)-thatthere were no voices that raised questions about the exterminations, nothingto implant doubt. Bystander response was very limited to the progressivelymore repressive and harmful actions taken against Jews from 1933 on,when Hitler came to power. The earlier the bystander response in the con-

tinuum, the greater its impact might have been (see subsequent discussion).While the final solution, the extermination, was an official secret, Walter

Laqueur's (1980) analysis is convincing that millions of Germans knew.There was a large official apparatus connected to it, and the information

spread through persons in this apparatus, through soldiers, and others whosomehow witnessed the killings.

In a totalitarian system usually no dissenting opinions are publicly ex-

pressed, and any that are tend to come from discredited minorities or politi-cal groups. In addition, power tends to confirm the powerful in the

rightness of their beliefs, even in a society where many views can be ex-

73



pressed. One Nixon tape clearly shows Nixon taking it for granted that it

was right to use just about any means to deal with war protestors. The selec-

tive use of information and the manipulation of public opinion to create

uniform views is a danger in any society, and can greatly diminish the "self-correcting"potential that exists in societies characterizedby freedom of ex-

pression and pluralistic views and values.

In totalitarian systems, the whole society is induced to participate. In

Germany, everybody was to use "Heil Hitler" as a form of greeting. Thereand in the Soviet Union, all members of society were called upon to contrib-ute to the building of a "new"society: to participate in meetings, work pro-grams, study groups. Everyone was expected to take steps against those who

deviated or who weredesignated

for mistreatment. Butparticipation

results

in psychological changes (Bem, 1972; Bettelheim, 1979; Freedman and

Fraser, 1966; Harris, 1972; see Staub, 1978). Human beings learn by doing,by actual participation, perhaps more than by any other way. My own

research shows that children learn to be kinder by engaging in kind actions

(Staub, 1975, 1979). People learn to become perpetratorsof violence by en-

gaging in violent acts or in acts that are not directly violent but are in the

service of such violence and contribute to others' suffering or eventual

murder. In the process they learn to overcome the initial resistancethey may

have to directly or indirectly harm others. A crucial turning point for Eich-mann was when he was exposed to the bodies of massacred Jews: Seeingthe outcome of his contributions, that of gathering Jewish populations and

transporting them to the camps, he reacted with revulsion and distress

(Arendt, 1963). But "higher" deals-such as Nazi ideology and his loyaltyto the Party and the Fuhrer- and the desire to advance his careerall led him

to ignore his distress and continue with his successful efforts to transportJews to extermination camps. As a result of learning by doing, his distress

declined. Wherever they occur, ideological movements, including religiouscults, induce members to participate in rituals and in activities promotingthe group or expressing its beliefs.

THE DIRECT PERPETRATORS

Leaders, thinkers, the man on the street, all can create, help evolve the

spirit for, and engage in the mistreatment of others. Mobs of varied compo-sition can loot, burn, and even tear other human beings to pieces, as hap-pened in the French Revolution. But who are those who, in a regular or

systematic manner, become the direct perpetrators of violence? There hasbeen little opportunity to directly study such individuals. Those tried at

Nuremburg were studied, but they were primarily decision makers.

74 Staub




Moreover, their psychological assessment was based on a hypothesis oftheir mental illness, resulting in a focus on clinical material such as Rohr-schach patterns (Borofsky and Brand, 1980). Certain personal characteris-

tics may enter into self-selection for the role of perpetrator. In addition,being in certain roles, and other influences, can help evolve the psychologi-cal possibility of inflicting extreme forms of cruelty.

Perpetrators can be ordinary individuals who have long filled certain

roles-prison guards, soldiers at war-in which devaluation of other peopleis inherent. If the definition of their role changes, if it comes to include actsof cruelty, most can adapt. In a simulated prison study by Zimbardo andhis associates (Zimbardo et al., 1975), college students were randomly as-

signedto be either

guardsor

prisoners.The individuals selected showed no

pathology, were judged to be "normal-average." Some, given the role of

guards, became extremely punitive and aggressive. Reacting to a "rebel-

lion," they stripped prisoners naked, placed ringleaders in solitary confine-

ment, harassed and intimidated prisoners. They made prisoners gather at

any time of day or night for the "count," the "duration of which they in-creased from the original perfunctory ten minutes to seemingly interminableseveral hours" (Zimbardo et al., 1975, p. 65), recreating a practice used inboth Russian labor and German concentration camps. The mistreatment

became so severe that the experiment had to be discontinued. Guards whodid not themselves engage in such conduct remained passive, not interferingwith their more violent fellow guards.

Roles which grant power can lead to us and them separation,devaluation-and cruelty. This is particularly so when the powerless are

degraded, as they often are. As it is frequently the case in real life, in the

prison study the prisoners were "strippednaked, skin searched, deloused,"had to memorize and follow rules restricting their freedom of speech and

movement, and ask permission for the simplest activities such as writing let-ters or going to the toilet. People so treated must seem inferior not only in

power, but in their basic humanity.A tendency of people to obey authority also enters here. In the famous

experiments of Stanley Milgram (1965, 1974), each participant acted asa teacher who punishes a learner'smistakes. College students at Yale as wellas members of the general community in New Haven administered increas-

ing levels of electric shocks, including extremely intense and dangerous

ones,to the learner

workingon a task in an

adjoining room. They did sosimply in response to the demands of the person in charge of the experi-ment. A substantial portion of participants (62.5%0) administered the

highest levels of shock even when they could hear, through an open door,the victim's distress and complaints. Many (30%o)did so even when the vic-tim was with them and they had to place his hand on the apparatus to ad-minister each shock.

75



Certainpeople, because of their background, experience, and resulting

personality, seem especially inclined to both obedience to authority and pu-nitiveness toward people not in authority. Some psychologists have identi-

fied individuals who have a constellation of these and certain other

intrapsychic characteristics as authoritarian personalities (Adorno et al.,

1950; Cherryand Byrne, 1977). Such individuals were more obedient in the

Milgram studies (Elms and Milgram, 1966). Certain child-rearingpractices

give rise to submissiveness to authority, to the tendency to see authorities

as right because they are the authorities and to devalue those who are

powerless. These practices also result in people not accepting in themselves

impulses or feelings that were defined by parents as negative, such as anger,

hostility, or sexual desires. All human beings possess such feelings. Peoplewho do not see these impulses in themselves often see them in-projectthem onto-others even when they are not present. Regarding such im-

pulses as unacceptable, they experience indignation and hostility which can

lead to acts of cruelty. The child-rearingpractices which have these effects

include lack of expression of love and strict discipline imposed in an

authoritarian fashion, which inhibit the child's own feelings and result in

general feelings of hostility. Such practices can be limited to some families

or may express cultural values and be widespread.There is evidence that such practices were widespread in Germany.Miller (1983) reviews the kind of child-rearingadvice that German parentsreceived in many publications, from the 17th up to the 20th century. Chil-

dren were seen as willful. Their will had to be broken early; otherwise, the

child would be uneducable and develop an evil character. Obedience to par-ents was the highest value. Any means could be used to exact obedience,

including manipulation, threats and severe physical punishment. Miller be-

lieves that such treatment eliminates the psychological freedom necessaryto

experience feelings of one's own. Instead, the wishes and commands ofothers guide the child and, later, the adult. Research after the war suggeststhat German schools have promoted an orientation of obedience to authori-

ty, more so, for example, than American schools (Devereux, 1972).

Studies of actual perpetrators offer further support. Dicks (1972)found in interviews in Germanprisons that SS officers and men servingtime

for their participation in mass killings had had unsatisfactory relations with

authoritarian fathers who believed in and practiced corporal punishment.

We can expect such practices, as Miller suggests, to limit inner life, the con-scious awareness of feelings, while generating hostility, also unconscious.

Hostility toward the parents cannot be recognized by the child, but can easi-

ly be turned to objects deemed appropriate by the social group or those in

authority.

76 Staub




Self-selection for the role of perpetrators is likely among individuals

in whom feelings of hostility toward specific groups of "wrong-doers"exist

or can be easily aroused, who like to exercise power over others and also

tend to obey higher authority. In a study by John Steiner (1980) of formerSS members, some of the apparent reasons for their joining the SS included

(1) attraction to and enjoyment derived from (pseudo) military roles; (2)

pragmatic or mercenary reasons: tangible benefits, to improve their exis-

tence; and (3) identification with the ideology presented to them as part of

the SS.

Subvertingthefeeling of responsibility for the welfare of other human

beings is another important aspect of the psychology of direct perpetrators.

To a greateror lesser extent, most human beings learn that they are respon-sible for the life and welfare of others. A feeling of responsibility is central

to helping and not hurting others (Latane and Darley, 1970; Staub, 1978;

Tilker, 1970). One way to subvert such feeling is to exclude certain peoplefrom the realm of humanity, to define them on various bases as subhuman,or as representingdanger to oneself, to one's way of life and values. At the

extreme, a complete reversal of morality may take place, so that the murder

of some human beings becomes what's morally good, a serviceto humanity.

This is well expressed in a conversation described in his testimony at Nurem-burg by a Nazi who "worked" at Belzec, one of the extermination camps.When asked, "Wouldn't it be more prudent to burn the bodies instead of

burying them? Another generation might take a different view of these

things," he responded:

Gentlemen, if there is ever a generation after us so cowardly, so soft, that it wouldnot understand our work as good and necessary, then, gentlemen, National Social-ism will have been for nothing. On the contrary we should bury bronze tablets say-ing that it was we, we who had the courage to carryout this gigantic task! (Poliakov,

1978, pp. 12-13)

The feeling of responsibility for other humans can also be subverted

through the assumption of responsibility by leaders. Himmler told his SSexecutioners that all the responsibility for their actions was assumed by theFuhrer and Himmler himself-and that they were carryingout a heroic dutyrequiringtremendous sacrifices for the improvement of mankind (Hilberg,1961; Dawidowicz, 1975). In Milgram'sresearch, the experimenterassumedfull responsibility for the consequences of shocking the learner. When par-

ticipants who had observer roles were told that they were responsible for thelearner's welfare, in a variant of this research, they induced "teachers"toadminister weaker shocks (Tilker, 1970). Notably, in Argentina, superiorofficers signed release forms for each kidnapping, relieving the direct per-petrators of responsibility (Amnesty International Report, 1980).

77



THE ROLE OF BYSTANDERS

The behavior of bystanders can have tremendous influence. Even the

Nazis, when they faced substantial opposition, often did not proceed. Theydid not persist when Italy and Bulgaria (where the people protested in the

streets) did not cooperate with their demand that they hand over their Jew-

ish populations. As a result, a large percentage of Jews in those countries

survived (Fein, 1979). Within Germany itself, the Nazis discontinued the

eugenics program, the killing of mentally retarded or ill people, or others

who would not contribute to a racially superiorsociety, because the popula-tion and the churches protested. As noted earlier, public protest in the

United States greatly affected the war in Vietnam, and reduced the in-fluence of the Moral Majority. Amnesty International groups have freed

political prisoners all over the world by writing letters to governments.In spite of great potential effectiveness, bystanders frequently remain

passive, silent, both in countries where people are mistreated and in the rest

of the world. Why?In countries with repressive governments, silence can be the result of

fear, of the danger of dissent. Everywhere, however, people tend to accepta definition of reality provided by "experts,"their government, or common

to their society. They develop a view of reality which justifies cruelty.Research in social psychology strikingly shows that even the perception of

physical reality is affected by others' views (Asch, 1951). For example, peo-

ple come to judge lines of dissimilar sizes as equal, if other people in their

group do so. But even with a single dissident to follow, many are liberated

from the influence of the group.Social reality is much less clear than physical reality, and we accept

others' definition of it even more easily, particularlyif cultural values or an

ideology or devaluation of the persecuted support it. After actual harm isdone to people, just-world thinking can lead bystanders to further devalue

victims and consequently more easily accept the victims' further mistreat-

ment. Moreover, in a repressive dictatorship or totalitarian system, or in a

monolithic society with a uniformity of values, people are not exposed to

divergent views. The existence of varied views that are publicly expressedcan give rise to doubts and counterreactions.

People's views of realityare further affected by their own actions. Even

limited participation in cruelty- such as boycotting Jewish stores in Germa-ny as demanded by the Nazis, or passivity in the face of cruelty, remainingsilent when liberals labeled as "leftists"in anticommunist countries or dissi-

dents in Russia are harmed-can lead to acceptance and justification of,and even direct participation in, the mistreatment of others.

78 Staub



The Psychology of Perpetrators and Bystanders 79

What happens in countries outside those where the mistreatment takes

place? Why do people and governments respond so little? Often they arealso affected by just-world thinking, and assume that the victims must be

deserving of their fate. They are also affected by the propaganda or ideolo-gy that is used to justify mistreatment. Before World War II, for example,there was an increase in antisemitism in many countries (Wyman, 1968).The devaluation of victims and Hitler's propaganda joined with an existingantisemitic base, enabling people, deeply affected by economic woes, to

blame Jews for their own problems.In addition, governments often do not express their views over events

they consider the "internal affairs" of other countries. Although exceptions

exist, governments pursue relations beneficial to their interests, and do notsee themselves as moral agents who would endanger these relations to pro-tect lives and liberty for the sake of human rights. With rare exceptions,they only protest when they see their self-interest endangered.

Individuals and governments also suffer from ideological tilts, and see

cruelty against some groups as more understandableor justifiable. Ideologi-cal conceptions and romantic notions of what is good can mislead us. Veryfew people, in retrospect, glorify the violence that took place during the

"cultural revolution" in China. But, at the time it was occurring, there were

voices in this country which celebrated the fact that the Chinese were re-

juvenating their revolution.

Lack of reaction by people at home and of protest by people in the out-

side world can confirm perpetrators' aith in what they are doing. Hitler took

the limited response, both in Germanyand in the outside world, to his perse-cution of the Jews as evidence that the whole world was in favor-thoughhe was the only one who had the courage to act. Resistance- whether justsilent refusal to cooperate or obey orders, or more loud and forceful, includ-

ing strong protest by governmentsor individuals-can raise questions in theminds of perpetrators.According to Fein (1979), the resistancein Italy and

Bulgariato handingover Jews did raisedoubts in the minds of Nazi function-

aries in those countries. Resistanceor protest can lead perpetratorsto ques-tion their ideology or theory, whether what they are doing is right, and also

whetherthey will get away with it. One of the very important things that we

can do, as individuals and as groups, is to make a response, to take a stand,to expressourselvesto perpetratorsboth at home and in other countries, ear-

ly along the "continuumof destruction."We can also demand that our govern-ment take a stanceagainstthe mistreatmentof humanbeingseverywhere.The

freedomof our democraticsystem placesa specialresponsibility n us. By mak-

ing noise, by raisingwaves, we can raise the consciousnessof bystandersand

affect the perpetrators themselves.



OVERVIEW OF HOW VIOLENCE AGAINST GROUPS

IS FOSTERED

When life conditions are difficult, several motivations arise. Peoplehave a need to maintain their understandingof the world, or to create new

understanding. They need to defend their values and ways of life, or to find

acceptable substitutes. They need to defend their personal and societal self-

concepts, and under extreme conditions to defend their survival. Many of

these needs can be satisfied by experiencing a sense of identity with a groupof people, or by adopting a new world view, an ideology. Frequently, thetwo go together. Identifying with a group can diminish the threat to the in-

dividual self. Enhancing or elevating the group can further strengthen apositive personal identity. Adopting an ideology can provide a new under-

standing of the world, as well as hope for the future and a sense of personal

significance in contributing to a better world. Finally, people frequently ex-

periencefeelings of frustrationand injustice, of hostility and rage, that result

from their difficulties. Scapegoating, or identifying a group that interfereswith the ideology, can diminish one's own responsibility, enhance a feelingof identity with an ingroup, and lead to expressing the hostility and rage in

the form of violent action.Certain characteristics of a culture make violence as a way of satisfy-

ing these motivations more likely. They include ingroup-outgroup differen-

tiation, and the devaluation of and discrimination against some groups(s);a belief in cultural superiority that is threatened by life conditions; strong

respect for and obedience to authority. Monolithic (in contrast to pluralistic)

values, and repression which inhibits the expression of contrary values and

views, also contribute to the initiation and continuation of violence.

Propaganda that identifies the violence as the solution to difficult life con-

ditions can contribute to passive acceptance of it by people desperate forsolutions. Coming to see the destruction of a group as necessary or even

right-a reversal of morality-and abandoning responsibility to leaders,can enable direct perpetrators to act and others to remain passive. The in-

fluence of intrapsychicelements on behavior on the individual level, of lack

of self-acceptance, and the repressionand projection of impulses onto other

people have been noted. Denial of elements in a culture or of inherent con-

tradictions in its organization or in ways of life can probably affect societal

responses to difficult life conditions in ways yet to be specified.Participation in initial acts of violence or in lesser mistreatment, and

even passivity, have psychological consequences which make later resistance

less likely. One of them is the perception of victims as having deserved their

suffering, and their further devaluation. Opposition and resistance have

contrary effects. Opposition, important for those who oppose, also affects

80 Staub




the perpetratorsand can inhibit further violence. Once begun, unless coun-teractions are taken, each act of mistreatment will make other more violent

acts easier, and a progression along a continuum of destruction more likely.

CAN WE DIMINISH CRUELTY IN THE WORLD?

An important component of the mistreatment, torture, and murder ofindividuals because of their membership in some group is a denial of their

humanity. With any people, we can enhance or deny their humanity in our

minds. Obviously, we are capable of identifying with people who are at a

great distance from us, as Irish Americans identify with the Irish in Ireland,American Jews with those in Israel, and as many Germans in America iden-

tified with Hitler's Germany. During the recent Solidarity movement, mostof us identified with the Polish people. If such identification is possible, weare also capable of identifying with human beings anywhere.

In the view presented in this article, violence against a subgroup of so-

ciety has functional value. It can serve self-defense, or produce material

gain, or promote or defend the power of a few. To an important degree,

however,such violence is an outcome of

waysof

dealingwith distress aris-

ing out of difficult, chaotic, or stressful conditions. Can its function be ful-filled in other ways? At times of difficulties and stress, the beneficial

psychological effects of cooperation and mutual help can be great. They can

also produce real, tangible solutions to problems. Even under extreme con-

ditions as in extermination camps, reaching out to others had positive emo-

tional benefits promoting survival (Des Pres, 1976). Can we promote per-spectives on life, values and social organization that encourage the solutionof human problems by cooperation and mutual help?

Frustration, attack, or threat leads to aggression or cruelty-but notinevitably. Frustration can lead to renewed attempts to reach a goal and to

try out new avenues constructively (Davitz, 1952). Groups of children who

develop strong antagonism toward each other as a result of competitive ac-tivities in which one group always loses can establish positive ties by work-

ing together for common goals (Sherif, 1966). The strength of previouslyexisting group identities and success or failure in achieving joint goals affectthe extent to which intergroup cooperation reduces conflict and results in

positive ties (Worchel, 1979). Nonetheless, when groups in conflict join toachieve joint (superordinate) goals, attitudes can change.

Can we promote cultural values, social organization, and individualcharacteristics that diminish the likelihood that groups-social, religious,political or other kinds- will be mistreated? As already noted, in some soci-eties the social organization has traditionally embodied less discrimination,

81



or less division that provides the basis for discrimination, making futuremistreatment of certain groups less likely (Fein, 1979). In addition, culturalvalues embody respectto a greateror lesser extent for the welfare and digni-

ty of all. In most societies there are persons who have acquiredan individualconscience and other characteristics-often one of them is courage-thatare necessary for taking action.

Can we promote the development of such characteristics? Interviewswith rescuers, individuals who risked their lives to save Jews and others in

Nazi Germany, suggest that they had three characteristics: moral concern

(identification with parents who were concerned with right and wrong),courage (as shown by prior activities that involved risk taking), and social

marginality (London, 1970). By not being completely immersed in the

group, by being marginal in some way, it was possible for them to rejectthe explicit or implicit definition by society that the persecution of the Jews

was right.A critical consciousness, a vigilance for and questioning of ideologies

or conceptions in the name of which the mistreatment of people is justified,is necessary. We need not be blind to the danger some persons or groupsmight represent to society or its members, but we can be suspicious of acombination of ideology, devaluation of a group, and representation of it

as a threat to society-a combination often used to justify persecution ofinnocent people.

One of our tasks is to attend to the education of the young in the realmof human relations, so that while appreciating the differences among hu-man beings, they come to recognize the full humanity of others. Parentalsocialization and children'sexperiencesin theirrelationship to their parents,and in schools and in other realms of their lives, can contribute to a proso-cial value orientation (Staub, 1978, 1979) that embodies concern about and

a feeling of personal responsibility for the welfare of others. Personscharacterized by such a value orientation respond more to others' distress

(Staub, 1978); they might also be more resistantto harmingothers. If youngpeople learn, in schools and universities, about differences in customs, ritu-

als, ways of life in different cultures, while coming to appreciatecommonal-ities in needs, hopes, desires, pain, and exultation, the boundaries of"us" the range of people whose welfare is within the universe of concernand responsibility-can be extended.

Inevitably, anybrief discussion of how to diminish the mistreatment

of groups of people is oversimplified. As the preceding analysis indicates,it is a configuration of life conditions, culture, and political organizationthat allows or leads to reactions that are the starting points for steps alonga continuum of destruction. Rather than offering solutions, I have attempt-ed to identify directions for our efforts to eliminate the existence of ele-ments in this configuration or at least to diminish their influence.

82 Staub




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