The pursuit of the solution to a Mission-Oriented Grand Challenge: The nonlinear, multidirectional search for the reusable hypersonic spacecraft

Raja Roy Assistant Professor

Martin Tuchman School of Management New Jersey Institute of Technology

Newark, NJ 07102 rroy@njit.edu

Draft dated October 27, 2019 Being revised for resubmission to the Organization Science

Please do not cite or quote with author’s permission

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The pursuit of the solution to a Mission-Oriented Grand Challenge: The nonlinear, multidirectional search for the reusable hypersonic spacecraft

Research Summary

We explore a firm’s search for the solution to a Mission-Oriented Grand Challenge (MOGC). Using NASA’s

search for the reusable hypersonic spacecraft—the Space Shuttle—as the context, we uncover a nonlinear,

multidirectional search process that occurs in phases and precedes the convergence to the solution.

Expanding the organizational search literature, we find that the search for the solution to the MOGC moves

in multiple directions—forward, backward, and sideways—simultaneously. We also uncover that the search

progresses nonlinearly, meandering from solving one bottleneck to another, and often back to the original

bottleneck as the solution to one bottleneck is invalidated by the solution to another. Further, we find that

knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer during the search precedes the identification of technological

bottlenecks, which, in turn, precedes the firm’s convergence to the solution to the MOGC.

Keywords/Phrases: Mission-oriented grand challenge; Organizational search; Firm experimentation; Space Shuttle.

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“….It’s into this situation that I’ve been thrust. Hermann Weidner of the Marshall Space Flight Center asked recently how

this assignment seemed to me. I likened it to putting a ring in a bull’s nose from the wrong end of the animal. This is going to be

a nasty job. But I’m imbued with the conviction that it can be done if we can work our way through the bull.”

--A.O. Tischler (Director, Chemical Propulsion Division, Office of Advanced Research and Technology,

NASA, 1964-1969; Director, Shuttle Technology Office, NASA, 1970-1972) on the challenges of designing

the Space Shuttle at the Space Shuttle Symposium, Smithsonian Museum of Natural History auditorium,

Washington DC, October 16-17, 1969.

1 INTRODUCTION Mission-oriented grand challenge (MOGC), defined by the Nobel Laureate, K.G. Wilson as one “with both

extreme difficulties and extraordinary rewards for success” (Wilson, 1989; p. 173), has recently attracted

significant attention from innovation scholars (Agarwal et al., 2017; Mowery, 2012). This is not surprising

because the solutions to such challenges have led to the emergence of new products such as penicillin that

have radically altered our lives (Klepper, 2016). More recently, MOGCs have created radical innovations such

as the bionic prosthetics (Kim, 2016) and mobile money platforms (Shah et al., 2017). MOGCs that are likely

to affect our lives in the future include NASA’s new grand challenge to radically transform Urban Air

Mobility (NASA, 2017) and the Artemis mission to have the first woman astronaut on the moon by 2024

followed by a sustainable human presence on the moon by 2028 (NASA, 2019).

Researchers note that MOGCs involve “high technical complexity and high uncertainty” (Garaus et

al., 2016; p. 1). They also acknowledge that “experimentation and learning” are critical for finding the solution

to such challenges (Mazzucato, 2018; p. 803). However, despite the importance of MOGC as the driver of

technological change and innovation, researchers are yet to take a deep dive into the processes that help firms

search for the solution to an MOGC. Using NASA’s MOGC to design the Space Shuttle, also referred to as

the “Cathedral to Technology” (Hale, 2010)—the first and only “reusable” hypersonic spacecraft to date

(Jenkins, 2008; p. 187)—as the context of our study, we seek an answer to our research question, “how do firms

search for, and converge to, the solution to a mission-oriented grand challenge in the absence of prior relevant knowledge?”

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A systematic investigation of the processes employed by firms to search for the solution to an

MOGC is critical for innovation, strategy, and entrepreneurship scholars for several reasons. First, extant

literature underscores that in the nascent stages of a new technology, early actors reduce technological

uncertainty by acquiring “related” knowledge from outside (Moeen and Agarwal, 2017; p. 573). A deep dive

into the processes of the early actors can highlight how firms search for, and eventually converge to, the

solution to an MOGC in the absence of prior relevant knowledge.1 Second, an exploration of the process by

which firms search for the solution to an MOGC can expand our understanding of organizational search

where “substantial theoretical and empirical progress [can] be made by taking a process approach” (Posen et

al., 2018; p. 210). Finally, an exploration of the processes that help firms search for the solution to an MOGC

can benefit both academic scholars and entrepreneurial firms searching for the solutions to future MOGCs

without prior relevant knowledge, such as NASA planning for the Artemis mission without prior relevant

knowledge of human habitation on any object in the solar system other than Earth.

In our endeavor to seek an answer to our research question, we treat the period from October 1968

(when NASA sent out Request For Proposal (RFP) to potential contractors) to March 1972 (when NASA

converged to the solution to the design of the reusable hypersonic spacecraft) as the context of our study.

Within the boundary condition of our study—an exploration of a single industry—we identify a process that

is both novel and generalizable to the broader innovation literature. Our study brings together the wisdom

from Agarwal et al. (2017) and Posen et al. (2018) to document a firm’s search for the solution to an MOGC

and uncovers that a nonlinear, multidirectional search precedes the convergence to the solution to such a

challenge. Extending the organizational search literature-- which highlights that a “firm engages in search by

sequentially testing alternatives” (Posen et al., 2018; p. 208; italics added)—we find that the sequential attention

assumption of Cyert and March (1963) may not hold in the case of the search for the solution to an MOGC.

Rather than the “sequential identification of alternatives” (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007; p. 40)—whereby

firms solve problems sequentially and move on as the current problem is solved—we uncover that the search

1 Following Roy and Sarkar (2016; p. 838), we define prior relevant knowledge as one that “later proves advantageous for…..yet unknown applications.”

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progresses nonlinearly, meandering from solving one bottleneck to another, and often back to the original

bottleneck as the solution to one bottleneck is invalidated by the solution to another.2 We also find that the

search for the solution to an MOGC is a multidirectional one that occurs in phases, with subsequent phases

moving the search in multiple directions—forward, backward, and sideways—simultaneously.

In addition to contributing to the organizational search literature, we extend Rosenberg’s seminal

research (1969; 1992) as well. We uncover that the nonlinear, multidirectional search for solution to an

MOGC precedes a firm’s identification of technological bottlenecks. Further, our research reveals that the

identification of bottlenecks antedates the detection of the performance trade-offs associated with each

solution to a bottleneck, which, in turn, predates the firm’s retention of one solution for each bottleneck and

elimination of the rest. We find that the solution to the bottleneck is followed by the identification of the

solution to the MOGC and ending the search. Our finding addresses Posen et al.’s (2018; p. 239) concern that

“empirical research” providing insights to ending a search is “largely absent.” Moreover, our finding

underscores that a firm’s search for the solution to an MOGC is more nuanced than the linear process of

“frequent iteration” and “testing” (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; p. 92) for new product development as

portrayed in the literature. Finally, by augmenting prior research on public policy (e.g., Murray et al., 2012)

that advocates the importance of Grand Innovation Prize to incentivize firms’ seeking the solution to

MOGCs, our deep dive into the black box of a search provides policy makers with the foundation to design

new policies to encourage firms and entrepreneurs to search for the solutions to the future MOGCs.

Next, we review the extant literature and formulate the questions that frame our research.

2 EXTANT LITERATURE AND FRAMING QUESTIONS

Received wisdom # 1: Finding the solution to an MOGC involves firm experimentation.

Agarwal et al. (2017; p. 294) highlights that in the nascent stage of a new technology the early actors focus on

the resolution of technological and demand uncertainties. In his study of the MOGC to mass produce

2 Merriam-Webster defines linear as “relating to, or based or depending on sequential development.” Accordingly, we treat linear and sequential as synonyms and define a nonlinear search as one that progresses non-sequentially from the solution of one bottleneck to another and often back to the solution to an earlier bottleneck. Our finding of the “interdependencies” among the solution to bottlenecks parallels Mindruta et al.’s (2016; p. 207) recent observation of interdependencies among the factors affecting a firm’s choice of alliance partners.

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penicillin during the Second World War, Klepper (2016) noted that despite Fleming’s original discovery of

penicillin in 1928 and the ensuing research by Howard Florey at the University of Oxford with the financial

support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the mass production processes were yet to be developed. Through

experimentation and knowledge transfer, several government agencies, universities, and firms found the

solution to the MOGC (Klepper, 2016). In another exploration of MOGC, Vakili and McGahan (2016)

observed that the World Trade Organization’s 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

Property Rights (TRIPS) encouraged the development of managerial institutions necessary for treating

neglected diseases in the emerging economies.

Despite highlighting that finding a solution to an MOGC involves “concerted channeling of

efforts… with rich information exchange” (Agarwal et al., 2017; p. 295), researchers are yet to take a deep

dive into the processes used by the firms to search for the solution to an MOGC. Relating to Klepper’s

(2016; p. 157) exposition on penicillin, researchers are yet to explore the processes employed by Pfizer to

develop the critical “submerged production” technique to mass produce penicillin in the absence of prior

relevant knowledge. Similarly, Vakili and McGahan’s (2016) thesis provides little insight into the processes

employed by the firms to search for the solution to an MOGC in the absence of prior relevant knowledge of

treating neglected diseases in the emerging economies. Our first framing question below addresses this gap in

the literature and asks:

Framing question # 1: What processes do firms employ to search for the solution to an MOGC in the absence of prior relevant

knowledge?

Received wisdom # 2: Firms engage in problemistic search when performance falls below aspiration.

Organizational search scholars (e.g., Posen et al., 2018) note that a firm’s recognition of performance falling

below its aspiration leads to a search for the solution to the problem. In one of his earlier theses, Simon

(1959; p. 263) observed that when “performance falls short of the level of aspiration, search…is induced.”

The organizational search literature highlights that while seeking new knowledge, firms rely on the availability

of “immediate performance feedback” (Denrell et al., 2004; p. 1366; italics added). However, in the search for the

solution to an MOGC, the feedback may not be available immediately as the firm likely has to navigate a

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nonlinear path—a “labyrinth in which an action takes one to another decision context rather than to some

ultimate end state” (Denrell et al., 2004; p. 1368; italics added). Not surprisingly, Kuhlman and Rip (2018; p.

450) hinted that the search for the solution to an MOGC, rather than being accompanied by immediate

feedback, is likely to involve a meandering process that navigates a labyrinth with “nonlinearity… in

developments.”

Regardless of the prior literature alluding to a nonlinear search process that navigates through a

labyrinth, organizational search scholars are yet to dig deeper and explore how the meandering, nonlinear

search processes help firms converge to the solution to the MOGC, despite the lack of immediate performance

feedback.3 The relative lack of attention in previous research to a nonlinear search for the solution to an

MOGC leads to our second framing question:

Framing question # 2: How does the nonlinear search help firms converge to the solution to an MOGC in the absence of the

immediate feedback?

Received wisdom # 3: Firms rely on fast and frequent prototyping to identify the ‘best outcome.’

A parallel stream of innovation research notes that new product development involves an iterative process of

problem solving (e.g., Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Iansiti and MacCormack, 1997). Researchers in this

stream highlight that “frequent iteration” or “prototyping” (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; p. 92) speeds up

new product development by improving the “chances for a ‘hit’” and “odds of success,” thereby helping the

firms to identify the “best outcome” (Pich et al., 2002; p. 1020).4 One of the assumptions of this stream of

innovation research is that firms rely on “real time information”—relevant market and financial information

3 As opposed to the online (or backward-looking) search discussed above, Gavetti and Levinthal (2000; see also Chen, 2008) proposed the offline (or forward-looking) search in which firms use a “broad set of alternative actions” (p. 115). By contrast, in the backward-looking search, firms explore “only one alternative at a time.” However, similar to the backward-looking search, the forward-looking search also relies on a linear search process with immediate performance feedback. For example, in the forward-looking search, firms identify “the optimal choice of N1 attributes as suggested by their cognitive representation of the fitness landscape…. then explore the remaining N-N1 policy variables experientially” (p.124), while receiving immediate feedback of whether “policy choices increase performance” (p. 123). Similar to the organization search literature, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995; p. 92) also highlights a linear search for the solution to a problem, where “previous designs” lead to feedback from the market, which leads to new prototype and to a higher chance of a “hit” for the firm. 4 In a similar vein, Schilling (2017; see also Stevens and Burley, 1997) observed that raw ideas progress along an innovation funnel prior to firm’s identification of the best outcome.

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of “bookings, scrap, inventory, cash flow…competitive moves” (Eisenhardt, 1989; pp. 549-551)—to reach

“product stabilization” (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; p. 98) and end the search.

During the search for the solution to an MOGC, however, the ‘real time information’ of inventory,

scrap, cash flow, or competitive moves, as well as prior market and technological information, is likely to be

nonexistent. Researchers are yet to investigate how, notwithstanding the absence of real-time information,

firms identify the best outcome for an MOGC, thereby ending the search. In a similar vein, Posen et al. (2018;

p. 234) noted that the organizational search scholars have yet to explore how and when firms “[stop] the

search.” Despite March’s (1994; p. 28; italics added) substantiation that “search continues as long as

achievement is below the target and ends when the target is exceeded,” empirical evidence for ending a search,

however, is “circumstantial” and understanding when a search ends “requires a more process-oriented

perspective” (Posen et al., 2018; p. 230).

Our third framing question below addresses the relatively unexplored mechanism of ending the

search in the absence of real-time information and asks:

Framing question # 3: How and when does the search for the solution to an MOGC end?

Taken together, our framing questions open the black box of a firm’s search for the solution to an

MOGC. Next, to seek answers to our framing questions, we describe the context of our study.

3 CONTEXT: THE SPACE SHUTTLE

3.1 Data and Method

In our pursuit to understand NASA’s efforts to search for the solution to the reusable hypersonic spacecraft,

we followed Rosenberg (1969) and Mowery and Rosenberg (1981) to pursue a historical approach and took a

systematic deep dive into the Space Shuttle’s history. The historical approach helps us explore the black box

of the search for the solution to the reusable hypersonic spacecraft using “real-time observations, rather

than…. retrospective sensemaking” (Kirsch et al., 2014; p. 221). We relied on archival data as well as

published and unpublished accounts by industry insiders, information available at NASA’s History Office in

Washington DC and other locations, and internal memorandum among NASA’s engineers located at various

research centers. We synthesized the data into a comprehensive history of the Shuttle, and obtained missing

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details by seeking more archival information and through follow-up emails or phone calls with industry

experts including Dr. Roger Launius (ex-Chief Historian, NASA), Dr. Reggie Caudill (ex-Teledyne-

Brown/Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA; ex-Dean, School of Management, New Jersey Institute of

Technology), and others. This process enabled us to “present facts,” and ask questions and counter-questions

“about possible explanations of these facts” (Bettis et al., 2014, p. 950).

3.2 The Space Shuttle as an MOGC

On January 5, 1972, President Richard Nixon announced the Federal Government’s commitment of $5.5

billion to the Space Shuttle program to “transform the space frontier… into familiar territory…. from our

present beachhead in the sky to achieve a real working presence in space” (Nixon, 1972). Starting with

February 18, 1977 flight of the Shuttle Enterprise, and ending with the July 21, 2011 touchdown of Shuttle

Atlantis, the Space Shuttles flew 148 missions, lasting a total of 1323 days. The Shuttle is the most

technologically sophisticated reusable complex system ever built to carry humans to space, traveling at about

17500 mph.5 Almost every component of this complex system (see Figure 1) was designed from scratch as no

precedent of a reusable hypersonic spacecraft existed. Additionally, as illustrated in Figure 2, in this complex

system almost every component and subsystem affected every other one.

Insert Figure 1and Figure 2 about here

Although the President's announcement in January 1972 brought to an end a “high-pressure, broad-

based, sometimes confused debate” (Logsdon, 1978, p. 14), there were years of search going back to the

1960s to find the solution to the MOGC to build a reusable spacecraft. Some of the early efforts to design the

Space Shuttle can be traced to the President’s Science Advisory Council report titled The Space Program in the

post-Apollo Period, published in February 1967. This report emphasized the long-term benefits of space

exploration and recommended a grand challenge to develop the Shuttle—an “economical ferrying system,

involving partial or total recovery and reuse” (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. I-61; italics added).

5 The Soviet Shuttle Buran was “built upon the vast open source literature available about NASA's Shuttle…[because the Soviets] saw no need to reinvent the wheel, given the myriad American configuration studies that had been done” (Garber, 2002, p. 5; see also Hale 2010, p. 9). Buran had only one unmanned flight on November 15, 1988 that lasted 3 hours and 25 minutes. In 2002, Buran’s hangar at Baikonur Cosmodrome collapsed, destroying the shuttle.

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3.2.1 NASA and the MOGC of designing a reusable spacecraft

Nine days after Yuri Gagarin’s historic flight on April 12, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced in a

press conference that, “If we can get to the moon before the Russians, then we should.” The next day, NASA

responded that there was "a chance for the U.S. to be the first to land a man on the moon” by 1967 and it

would cost $33 billion (approx. $750 billion in current value). A major part of the anticipated cost was

associated with building the systems that were not reusable (Launius, 2004; pp. 3-4).

The search for the reusable spacecraft received a boost in February 1967 with the President’s Science

Advisory Council recommending a reusable ferrying system. As shown in Figure 3, in the mid-to-late 1960s

NASA’s plan for space exploration included manned space stations around the Earth, Mars, and the Moon, a

shuttle to carry supplies from the Earth’s surface to the Earth space station, and a second shuttle to ferry

supplies from one space station to another.

Insert Figure 3 about here

Encouraged by these developments, NASA embarked on the search for the solution to the reusable

hypersonic spacecraft, which involved “extreme difficulties” but also offered the potential for “extraordinary

rewards for success” (Wilson, 1989; p. 173). In October 1968, NASA’s research centers, the Manned

Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston, TX (now Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center) and Marshall Space Flight

Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, AL,6 sent out the RFP for Integrated Launch and Recovery Vehicle (ILRV or

Phase A) studies. The ‘Guidelines and Assumptions’ of the RFP included criteria such as landing at a

preselected site in the continental U.S., carrying 5,000-50,000 lbs. of cargo and 12 people, and being

operational in the post-1974 (i.e., the post-Apollo mission) time period (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. I-

102). NASA’s Director of the Shuttle Technology Office, A.O. Tischler, underscored the challenge to design

the reusable hypersonic spacecraft without prior relevant knowledge when he noted that X-15, the “rocket

propelled airplane… the last such machine built” prior to the Space Shuttle, had a staging velocity that was

half of what was needed for the shuttle. Moreover, unlike the Space Shuttle, the X-15 did not carry any cargo

6 We list the acronyms used in the paper in Appendix 1.

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or fuel on board and was launched from a B-52 aircraft at the altitude of 45000 feet (instead of being

launched on its own as the shuttle was expected to accomplish) (Tischler, 1969b; pp. 426-427).

3.3 Phase A: Start of the nonlinear search and the identification of technological bottlenecks

On January 31, 1969, NASA awarded four 10-month, $300,000 contracts to Convair, a division of General

Dynamics (GD), Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas (MDD), and North American Rockwell (NAR) to study the

feasibility of the Space Shuttle. Martin Marietta (MM), which participated by using its own funds, was the fifth

contractor. The purpose of these five contracts was to “foster competition” through multiple parallel

experimentations to search for the solution to the MOGC.

3.3.1 Knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer in the absence of prior relevant information and

initiation of the convergence process

Knowledge generation in Phase A was preceded by each contractor proposing several configurations for in-

depth analyses. For example, GD’s ‘Triamese,’ a fully reusable two-stage concept, was a study of two boosters

and an orbiter with “identical basic structure and propulsion system”—to avoid the cost of developing

booster and orbiter with different designs (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. II-109). Additionally, the boosters

and the orbiter in the two designs had retractable wings. GD also studied a two-element ‘Biamese’ concept.

Similarly, Lockheed proposed the ‘Star Clipper’ design, MDD proposed the ‘parallel tankage’ design, and

NAR’s study included “low cost expendable boosters with reusable upper stages” (Jenkins, 2008; pp. 78-79).

Each contractor experimented with the different configurations, generated new knowledge for each

configuration, compared the knowledge generated by experimenting on the different configurations, and

transferred new knowledge to NASA through periodic briefings. For example, in its periodic briefing in early

1969, MM compared the knowledge generated using several design configurations that included the SV-5,

M2-F2, and HL-10 bodies, with each design being a two-stage fully reusable system or a 1½-stage partially

reusable system with LH-LO propellant or a 1½-stage partially reusable system with storable propellant.7

7 Fully reusable configurations could be one of two types. They could either have flyback boosters (the two-stage to orbit configuration or simply, the two-stage configuration) or have boosters that could be jettisoned and reused later (also known as the 1½-stage configuration). The eventual Space Shuttle had a 1½-stage partially reusable configuration where the boosters were jettisoned and reused but the external tank was jettisoned and not reused.

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Further, each design used one of the four alternative heat shields—ablative, radiative, ceramic, and

transpiration (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. II-70). MM’s comparison of the two-stage and 1½-stage

systems revealed that the 1½-stage LO-LH approach enjoyed a significant advantage over the two-stage,

pump-fed approach and an even bigger advantage over the 1½-stage, storable propellant systems (Martin

Marietta, 1969).

Similarly, in the February 1969 briefing, NAR compared the knowledge it had generated using three

different configurations—the Reusable All System (RAS), Reusable Orbital System (ROS), and Reusable

Crew Module (RCM). Within each configuration, NAR considered various booster options such as air-

breathing first stage, drop tanks, and expendable first stage (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. II-90). The

comparison of the RAS system with ROS and RCM revealed that the ROS was the most promising candidate

(NAR, 1969). Lockheed’s interim briefing took place on August 21, 1969, and the final briefing was on Nov.

11, 1969. These briefings included the comparison and transfer of knowledge generated from Lockheed’s

experiments with the Star Clipper 1½-stage configuration and two-stage fully reusable configuration.

Additional examples of knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer included MDD’s

experimentations in the early part of Phase A involving the two-stage, fully reusable HL-10 design and 1½-

stage, partially reusable 176M design with drop tanks. The fully reusable HL-10 design had 19 different

configurations (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. III-186). MDD compared three different 176M designs of

130 ft., 160 ft., and 164 ft. Two of MDD’s briefings for transfer of knowledge occurred in August and

November of 1969.

Knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer preceded NASA’s efforts to strain the knowledge in

order to retain some knowledge and eliminate others, as it sought to converge to the solution to the MOGC.

For example, subsequent to the transfer of knowledge from MDD’s experiments through regular briefings,

NASA terminated MDD’s 1½-stage, partially reusable 176M designs from consideration in August 1969,

thereby retaining the fully-reusable designs and eliminating the partially reusable ones. As we discuss later, the

bottlenecks identified in this phase and the Space Shuttle Task Group (SSTG) report played a significant role

in NASA’s decision to eliminate the partially reusable configurations.

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Yet another example of knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer preceding NASA’s straining

of knowledge is GD’s Phase A studies. Subsequent to GD’s Phase A report submitted in October 1969

(General Dynamics, 1969a), NASA retained the FR-3 two-element (Biamese) system and eliminated the FR-4

three-element (Triamese) system from future experimentation (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. III-150).

NASA’s engineers noted the technical risk associated with the Triamese system and highlighted that it ''gets

all screwed up, so you get a lousy orbiter and a lousy booster, but you don't get one that does well."

Additionally, the FR-4 was heavier than the FR-3, thereby losing “much of the potential cost saving from

design commonality between the three elements” (Heppenheimer, 1999; p. 220).

3.3.2 Identification of bottlenecks, their interdependencies, and potential solutions

The knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer following the multiple parallel experimentations at GD,

MM, NAR, MDD, and Lockheed preceded the identification of the technological bottlenecks such as the

aerothermodynamics/configuration, structure and materials, propulsion subsystem, and power system as well as their

interdependencies (see Love, 1973 and Guilmartin and Mauer 1988, p. III-111 for a detailed discussion of

these bottlenecks).8 For example, the NAR experimentation with the RAS concept as the potential solution to

the aerothermodynamics/ configuration bottleneck revealed that the development of a two-stage, fully reusable

configuration would face the propulsion subsystem bottleneck and require “the development of large, reusable,

high-pressure cryogenic engines and tankage” to mitigate the bottleneck (NAR, 1969). The knowledge

generation, comparison, and transfer also helped NASA realize that the various solutions to the

aerothermodynamics/ configuration bottleneck would need to withstand exposures to temperatures as high as

25000F, which would imply new innovations in thermal protection systems (TPS) to mitigate the structure and

materials bottleneck.

During this phase, NASA and the contractors also identified several potential solutions to each

bottleneck. For example, the potential solutions to the structure and materials bottleneck included various types

of TPS such as the ablative heat shield, nonmetallic heat shield, and metallic re-radiative heat shield. The last

8 Following Ethiraj and Posen (2013), we present the Dependency Structure Matrix of the various bottlenecks in the Space Shuttle in Appendix 2.

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solution, in turn, included various potential alternatives such as Columbium, TDNiCr, Inconel 625, Haynes

188, Rene 41, and Ti 6AL-4V. Knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer helped NASA converge on the

TPS materials that could be “mounted on panels” and “could be easily removed from the vehicle [and]….

refurbished without taking the entire vehicle out of service for a prolonged period” (Launius and Jenkins,

2012; p. 191). Similarly, the experiments in this phase also helped NASA converge to the potential solutions to

the power system bottleneck—fuel cells, turbo-alternators, and primary batteries (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988,

p. II-46, II-151) as well as the potential solutions to the propulsion subsystem bottleneck—radiation cooling,

small LO and LH engines, and monopropellant hydrazine engines. Similarly, the Phase A experiments also

helped NASA converge to deployable rotors, fixed geometry vehicles, and variable geometry vehicles as the

potential solutions to the aerothermodynamics/ configuration bottleneck.

3.3.3 NASA’s convergence to the two-stage fully reusable configuration

Subsequent to knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer through regular briefings that preceded the

identification of the bottlenecks, NASA’s SSTG report published on June 12, 1969 highlighted the convergence

to a solution to the MOGC by retaining the “fully reusable system” that offered “the maximum potential for

a…versatile space shuttle system” (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. III-122) and eliminating the 1½-stage

configurations. Lockheed’s inability to estimate the drop tank production costs for the 1½-stage

configuration preceded the decision (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. III-123).9

In a nutshell, Phase A was the study of “feasibility” (Hirshorn et al., 2017; p.9) of the various

technological concepts to build the Space Shuttle. During this phase, NASA and the contractors generated

new knowledge following the multiple parallel experimentations. The comparisons of configurations often

produced conflicting conclusions. For example, the experimentations at GD revealed that the two-stage, fully

reusable FR-3 Biamese concept could achieve “an order of magnitude reduction” in total costs (General

9 On September 1, 1969, the Joint DoD/NASA STS Study report followed the SSTG report. This report concluded that the proposed shuttle would operate between 30-70 flights every year between 1975 and 1985. The STS report generated the estimated cost for the Space Shuttle system and noted that the system would cost around $4-$6 billion to build and around $2.5 million recurring launch costs per flight (for a fully reusable system; $6 million for a partially reusable system). As Jenkins (2008; p. 82) noted, the SSTG report and the joint DoD/NASA STS report may also have played a role in convincing NASA to “officially abandon looking at partially reusable concepts.”

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Dynamics, 1969b) as compared with the other designs—a finding that contradicted the NAR, Lockheed, and

MM findings. For example, Lockheed’s comparison on May 26, 1969, of the 1½-stage system with its own

two-stage configuration revealed that the former had lower recurring costs and R&D expenses as compared

with the latter (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. II-150).

Subsequently, NASA engineers compared the results of the various Phase A experimentations. One

such meeting occurred on December 3, 1969 in which Edward L. Linsley of the MSFC Aero-Astrodynamics

Laboratory compared some of the orbiter designs from the Phase A experiments. Figure 4 shows the

contents of one of Linsley’s slides. Figure 5 shows the various configurations considered in Phase A, some of

the bottlenecks identified by NASA, and the potential solutions to each bottleneck.

Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here

4 Multidirectional search process: Simultaneously moving forward, backward, and sideways

4.1 Phase B: Moving forward

The purpose of Phase B experimentation was to perform a detailed “study, analysis and preliminary design

directed toward [converging to] a single approach from among the alternatives resulting from Phase A

activities” (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. D-3). Accordingly, on December 15, 1969, NASA released the

“Space Shuttle Phase B Design Study Plan” and defined the objectives of this phase. The requirements for

Phase B studies published by NASA on February 18, 1970 included designing a two-stage, fully reusable

system with both the orbiter and booster being capable of vertical takeoff and horizontal landing, returning to

the launch site, and powered by engines generating 400,000 lbs. of thrust (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. III-

255). The two winners of the Phase B contracts, NAR and MDD, followed NASA’s directive of a team

approach. Consistently, MDD teamed with MM, TRW, Raytheon, Sperry, Pan American Airlines, Norden,

Hamilton Standard, and LTV. NAR, meanwhile, teamed with GD, IBM, American Airlines, and Honeywell.

4.1.1 Main Engine studies: Moving sideways

In addition to the Phase B studies, to converge to a solution to the propulsion subsystem bottleneck, on

December 15, 1969, NASA decided to move sideways and initiate new parallel Phase B experimentations—the

Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Phase B Studies (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. III-83). On April 30,

15

1970, NASA entered into three 11-month contracts with Aerojet, NAR Rocketdyne, and Pratt & Whitney (a

division of United Aircraft). The objective of the SSME Phase B studies was to design a high-pressure engine

that could produce 590,000 lbs. of thrust (Jenkins, 2008; p. 83).

Knowledge generated by the SSME Phase B studies was compared and transferred to NASA through

regular meetings. One such meeting was held on September 22-23, 1970 at MSFC and was attended by

“approximately 100 people” from NASA, the Department of Defense (DoD), and several contractors

(Whalen et al., 1988; p.7).10

4.2 Phase ASSC: Moving backward

Parallel to the Phase B experiments, which were to occur in series with Phase A experiments and move the

process of finding the solution forward, in February 1970, NASA announced plans to simultaneously move

backward. The “alternate Phase A studies” (henceforth referred to as ASSC studies) ran parallel to the Phase

B studies and included 11-month contracts “to study several alternate space shuttle concepts” (Guilmartin

and Mauer, 1988; p. IV-68). The purpose of ASSC experiments were to overcome the aerothermodynamics/

configuration bottleneck by exploring various alternate booster configurations to provide “further economy-

mined analyses of alternative concepts” and ensure that “nothing [was] overlooked… technically and

economically” (MSC, 1970).11

The ASSC studies included three parallel experimentations by Grumman (with Boeing as a major

subcontractor), Lockheed, and Chrysler. The Grumman/Boeing and Lockheed studies examined the

feasibility of the 1½-stage partially reusable configurations. The Grumman/Boeing team also included

Aerojet, AVCO, General Electric, Eastern Airlines, Northrop, and two European companies, Dassault and

Dornier. The contract for Grumman/Boeing specified three configurations—1½-stage with external drop

10 Within the boundary conditions of our study, only the search for the SSME proceeded from Phase B to Phase C/D. On March 1, 1971, NASA issued the guidelines for the SSME studies Phase C/D. These studies were to produce a ‘winner’ to manufacture and deliver 36 functional engines and 14 “dummy engines” for flight tests (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. V-157). Following the knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer, on July 12, 1971, NASA selected NAR Rocketdyne as the winner of the $500 million contract to deliver the engines. However, the contract only came into effect after a 10-month delay in March 1972 because of a protest lodged by Pratt & Whitney (Biggs, 2013, p. 77). 11 We discuss NASA’s goals for the ASSC studies in detail in Appendix 3.

16

tanks, expendable booster with reusable orbiter, and reusable booster and orbiter with J-2S engines (which

used a combination of liquid hydrogen (LH) and liquid oxygen (LO) fuel). Grumman/Boeing submitted their

mid-term report on December 31, 1970 and compared the knowledge generated through their experiments.

Subsequent to the comparison, Grumman/Boeing transferred the knowledge of the ‘thrust augmented 1½-

stage vehicle’-- which formed the basis of the Thrust Augmented Orbiter Shuttle (TAOS) configuration—to

NASA.12 In addition to Grumman/Boeing, Chrysler (along with its partners, Rocketdyne, Detroit Diesel/

General Motors, and AVCO) experimented with an expanded Apollo command module (Jenkins, 2008; p.

123) and Lockheed’s experiments included external hydrogen tanks with air-breathing engines.

Pursuant to knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer in the ASSC studies, in December 1970,

NASA took a step toward the convergence to the TAOS configuration by instructing Grumman/Boeing to

explore “externally mounted orbiter hydrogen tanks” (Guilmartin & Mauer, 1988, p. IV-346; see also V-142).

Subsequently, in March 1971, experimentation at Grumman revealed that the external hydrogen tank

configuration could potentially save $1 billion of the project costs, while meeting NASA’s requirements for

the shuttle.

4.2.1 Nonlinear progress from one bottleneck to another

While helping NASA to converge toward the solution to the aerothermodynamics/configuration bottleneck, the

progress toward the solution to the MOGC in the ASSC and subsequent Phase B extension phases (described

later) was a nonlinear one. Grumman/Boeing’s mid-term report, submitted on December 31, 1970, highlighted

the performance trade-offs involved in the thrust augmented 1½-stage configuration. Whereas the external tank in

this configuration reduced fuel consumption, it increased the sensitivity of the system to engine performance

(measured by specific impulse = thrust/propellant used per second), which, in turn, led to the new propulsion

subsystem bottleneck of designing new boosters (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. 352). As we discuss later in

section 4.4.1, to search for an appropriate booster to mitigate the propulsion subsystem bottleneck, NASA had to

12 The TAOS shuttle configuration that was eventually approved for the Space Shuttle by the White House in early 1972 was derived from Grumman/Boeing’s thrust augmented design.

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move the search forward (Phase B extension studies discussed later) and sideways (to study both liquid- and

solid-fuel boosters).

Subsequently, on January 14, 1971, NASA compared the Grumman/Boeing and Lockheed solutions

for the 1½-stage shuttle concepts. These comparisons revealed yet another propulsion subsystem bottleneck

associated with the thrust augmented 1½-stage configuration—the preferred solution to the

aerothermodynamcis/ configuration bottleneck—namely, the Pogo problems. These problems were “difficult to

solve analytically and would require performance tests before confidence could be placed in the solution”

(Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. IV-360). The process highlighted the necessity for the mitigation of the

propulsion subsystem bottlenecks before the thrust augmented 1½-stage configuration could be adopted as the

solution to the aerothermodynamics/configuration bottleneck.13

4.3 Phase B Extension: Moving sideways

Following the results of the ASSC studies by Grumman/Boeing, on April 1, 1971, NASA transferred the

knowledge from the ASSC studies to the Phase B contractors. Moving the Phase B studies sideways, NASA

instructed both NAR and MDD to concentrate on partially reusable systems with an orbiter and an externally

mounted expendable hydrogen tank. The knowledge of drop tanks generated from the Grumman/Boeing’s

and Lockheed’s experimentations in the ASSC studies were thus retained for the Space Shuttle and the

knowledge of two-stage fully reusable ones generated in the Phase A and B studies were eliminated as NASA

endeavored to converge to the solution to the MOGC.

Similar to the Phase A studies, the knowledge generated by the experimentations of both NAR and

MDD in the Phase B Extension was compared and transferred to NASA through regular meetings. Further,

similar to the Phase A experiments, in a meeting held on May 12, 1971, NAR compared the alternative

configurations of its Phase B Extension studies. Additionally, NASA compared the knowledge generated by the

various experiments in the Phase B Extension studies and ASSC studies. In one such meeting held at the MSC

Space Shuttle Program Office on May 15-21, 1971, NASA compared the gross liftoff weights (GLOW) of the

13 NASA embarked upon a Pogo suppression system for the Space Shuttle. Although information from the Space Shuttle’s flights in the 1980s and 1990s confirmed that the shuttle did not have the Pogo problems, data limitation prevented us from understanding the process by which NASA resolved this bottleneck.

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MDD, NAR, and Grumman/Boeing designs (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. V-184). This meeting revealed

that an orbiter with three engines was preferred to one with four engines for the propulsion subsystem bottleneck

due to lower GLOW.

On May 25, 1971, MDD had its briefing with NASA and compared the knowledge generated through its

experimentations of the 1½-stage partially reusable system (as the solution to the aerothermodynamics/

configuration bottleneck) with parallel burn expendable LH external tank (as the solution to the propulsion

subsystem bottleneck) with the two-stage fully reusable system. The 1½-stage partially reusable system with

parallel burn expendable LH external tank configuration was similar to the thrust assisted configuration

proposed by Grumman/Boeing in the ASSC studies. The report revealed the performance trade-offs associated

with the parallel burn system as compared to the series burn system. The experiments also disclosed that the

former system would reduce the cost of manufacturing by $138 million in the near term, but would add $208

million to the total cost over the shuttle program period. It also offered higher engine reliability, lower

subsystem complexity, lower ascent drag, and lower dry weight. The series burn system, on the other hand,

offered lower GLOW and lower expendable tank costs. The report also noted that as compared to a two-

stage fully reusable system, the 1½-stage partially reusable system with parallel burn expendable LH external

tank would reduce the GLOW from 3.75 million lbs. to 2.1 million lbs. without any adverse effect on the

crossrange or landing speed (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. V-186; p. V-235). Following the transfer of the

knowledge from MDD to NASA, on June 16, 1971, James C. Fletcher, NASA Administrator, identified the

of 1½-stage partially reusable system with parallel burn expendable LH external tank as the “preferred

configuration” (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. V-193).

4.4 Identifying the solution to the MOGC

NASA’s efforts to converge to the solution to each bottleneck and eventually to the solution to the MOGC,

continued in the ASSC and Phase B Extension studies. For example, as we mentioned earlier, the

experiments in Phase A revealed that the power system bottleneck could be potentially mitigated using fuel cells,

turbo-alternators, or batteries. During the Phase B and ASSC studies, NASA chose to move the search

sideways and explore the performance trade-offs associated with each solution to the power system bottleneck.

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The Pratt & Whitney division of United Aircraft and General Electric’s Direct Energy Conversion Business

received cost plus fixed-price contracts for $825,000 each from MSC for conducting experiments with fuel

cells. Eventually, NASA converged to a solution to the power system bottleneck by retaining the fuel cells and

eliminating turbo-alternators and batteries (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988, p. IV-196). Similarly, after exploring

the potential solutions for the propulsion subsystem bottleneck, such as F-1, J-2S, JP-4 (mixture of kerosene and

gasoline), and other fuel (Hallion and Young, 1998, p. 1112), NASA converged to a solution by retaining the LH

and LO combination and eliminating other choices for the SSME (see also section 4.1.1). 14

The process of convergence to a solution of each bottleneck by retaining one solution and eliminating

others continued with the structure and materials bottleneck. During the Phase B and ASSC experiments, NASA

and its contractors subjected one of the potential solutions to the structure and materials bottleneck—the

metallic re-radiative heat shield (discussed in section 3.3.2 earlier)—to various tests to understand the

performance trade-offs associated with these potential solutions, and the new bottlenecks that may have to be

mitigated to converge to a solution. Accordingly, NASA moved the search sideways yet again when MSC

awarded $215,000 fixed- price contracts to LTV Aerospace and MDD to study Reinforced Pyrolized Plastic

(RRP) composite. Additionally, during this phase, researchers at Lockheed developed new materials LI-900

and LI-2200, which could be installed as small tiles and were capable of surviving repeated prolonged

exposures to 2500°F. Eventually, LI-900 and LI-2200 were retained for use in the Shuttle and others were

eliminated, thereby converging to the solution to the structure and materials bottleneck.15

Subsequently, the TAOS design (suggested by both Grumman/Boeing in its ASSC studies and later

by MDD in its Phase B Extension studies) led Mathematica, Inc., an independent agency, to recommend the

14 In addition to the SSME studies and Phase B Extension studies, we came across other evidence of the search for the solution moving sideways at different phases. For example, on June 24, 1971, MSFC chose NAR Rocketdyne for the 16-month, $1.1 million contract to manufacture turbo pump assemblies for the Shuttle’s Auxiliary Propulsion System (Whalen et al., 1988; p.13). Similarly, on April 20, 1971, NASA announced that it had awarded a $1,081,343 contract to Research, Inc., to design, fabricate, and install the electrical heating devices at MSFC for prototype testing at 25000F (p. 11). Additionally, on October 2, 1970, NASA entered into a contract with Ralph M. Parsons Company for engineering services for the Shuttle ground services (p. 8). Appendix 4 chronologically lists some of the events in the search for the solution to the MOGC. 15 NASA organized a “sudden death shootout” and subjected the various potential solutions to the structure and materials bottleneck to 20 cycles of 160 decibel of noise and 23000F temperature. Only LI-900 and LI-1500 survived the test (Heppenheimer 2007; p.178).

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configuration as the basis for the Shuttle in October 1971. Following Mathematica’s recommendation, the

convergence to the solution to the MOGC continued with yet another extension to Phase B—the Phase B

Second Extension—on November 2, 1971. The second extension was a contract for three months and unlike

the first extension, the second included both the Phase B and ASSC contractors, who had to study the orbiter

with single LO/LH external tank with various J-2S SSME and various types of liquid- and solid-fuel boosters

(Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988, p. V-299). Through knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer in this

extension, NASA identified the TAOS configuration—parallel burn, single external tank with LH/LO fuel that

was belly-attached to the orbiter—as the solution to the MOGC, which was approved by the President.

4.4.1 Culminating the search process

Despite the White House announcement on January 5, 1972, to approve the TAOS configuration, NASA was

yet to converge on the solution to the propulsion subsystem bottleneck and decide whether the Space Shuttle

would use solid- or liquid-fuel boosters. About a month earlier, on December 6, 1971, to seek a solution,

NASA awarded two four-month contracts to TRW and Aerojet to generate knowledge of liquid-fuel, water-

recoverable boosters (Baker, 1973a). On January 13, 1972, moving the search sideways, NASA issued two-

month contracts to Aerojet, Lockheed, Thiokol, and United Technology to generate knowledge and compare

two designs of the solid-fuel boosters for the Shuttle—the 120-in. and 156-in. diameter boosters (Baker,

1973b).

Knowledge generation of both liquid- and solid-fuel boosters, and comparison of that knowledge was

followed by the revelation of the performance trade-offs associated with the boosters. The trade-offs

associated with the liquid-fuel boosters included the ability of astronauts to shut-down the booster in case of

a system malfunction, and that the pressure-fed boosters, in particular, were simple to design. Additionally

both NASA and the DoD had extensive experience using the liquid boosters, but NASA was skeptical that

the liquid rocket motors could be reclaimed from ocean water and refurbished “after they had been subjected

to the corrosive action of an ocean bath” (Williamson, 1999; p. 172). Mitigating the performance trade-off

would have meant developing new liquid-fuel motors that were resistant to salt-water corrosion, which, in

turn, meant mitigating several new, yet unknown, technological bottlenecks. On the other hand, the solid

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boosters had never been used before and once ignited, were impossible to stop in case of a system

malfunction. However, they were lighter, more reliable, and simpler to design than the liquid boosters.

Eventually, in March 1972, subsequent to new knowledge generation by the contractors, comparison of

the knowledge, and its transfer, revealed that the solid-fuel booster had “lower technical risk” (Science News,

1972; p. 198), thereby converging to the solution to the propulsion subsystem bottleneck as well as identifying the

solution to the MOGC. NASA retained the 156-in. solid-fuel booster, and eliminated the 120-in. solid-fuel

booster as well as the two types of liquid-fuel boosters (pressure-fed and pump-fed) and announced its choice

on March 15, 1972 (Williamson, 1999), thereby culminating the search. Later that year, the Phase C/D studies

identified the prime contractor for the Space Shuttle and on July 25, 1972, a joint NASA-Air Force Source

Evaluation Board selected NAR to manufacture the Shuttle (Hallion and Young, 1998; p. 1117).16

Next, we discuss novel theoretical insights generated by our study, and present the stylized findings.

5 NOVEL THEORETICAL INSIGHTS AND STYLIZED FINDINGS

We now discuss the empirical evidence provided above and juxtapose our findings with the

theoretical mechanisms in extant literature. Table 1 provides a summary of our findings.

Insert Table 1 about here

Stylized Finding # 1: The search for the solution to an MOGC is a nonlinear, multidirectional process that simultaneously

moves forward, backward, and sideways.

Our Stylized Finding # 1 underscores the nonlinear nature of the search process. As we discuss

earlier, the nonlinearity of the search was evident in the ASSC experimentations when NASA realized that the

TAOS 1½-stage configuration (as the solution to the aerothermodynamics/ configuration bottleneck) would require

solving new propulsion subsystem bottlenecks (such as resolving the Pogo problems and those associated with

the boosters). Additionally, our Stylized Finding # 1 underscores that the search for the solution to an

MOGC is a multidirectional process. As depicted in Figure 6, the multidirectionality of the search is

16 Logsdon (1986; p. 117) presents an additional explanation for NASA’s choice of the solid-fuel booster. He notes that in early 1972, the price of the Shuttle with liquid-fuel booster escalated from “$5.15 billion in January to $6.2 billion in March [of 1972]… [which] put the liquid-fueled option at the upper edge” of the development budget that NASA thought the White House would approve. Although Logsdon (1986) does not mention the reason for the price hike, it is likely that the uncertainties in the oil market in the late-1960s and early-1970s resulted in the hike.

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exemplified in the transition from Phase A to Phase B, ASSC, SSME Phase B, and thereafter the Phase B

Extension, Phase B Second Extension, SSME Phase C/D, the liquid- and solid-fuel booster studies, and

other studies, when the search for the solution to the MOGC moved forward, backward, and sideways,

simultaneously.

Our finding does not fit the predictions of the organizational search literature, which generally

assumes that the search for solutions moves in one direction-- with firms solving problems sequentially and

moving over when the current problem reaches resolution. By contrast, our finding suggests that the

sequential attention assumption of the behavioral theory of the firm—which underscores that a “firm engages

in search by sequentially testing alternatives” (Posen et al., 2018; p. 208)—is unlikely to hold when a firm

searches for the solution to an MOGC. Supporting our finding are Posen et al. (2018) and Siggelkow and

Levinthal (2003) who hinted at the possibility of a nonlinear search process. For example, Posen et al., (2018,

p. 232; see also Amburgey and Miner, 1992) notes that firms often build on their momentum and “repeat the

same activity,” thereby implying the possibility of firms conducting a nonlinear search. Nonetheless, our

investigation is one of the first to provide systematic evidence that the search for the solution to an MOGC is

a nonlinear, multidirectional one.

Additionally, we uncover that the search for the solution to the MOGC is more nuanced than that

theorized in the organizational search literature. For example, Knudsen and Levinthal (2007; p. 41) posit that

during a search, the “perfect evaluator” receives immediate feedback and distinguishes between “inferior and

superior alternatives.” Further, the uncertainty in the organizational search literature stems from the evaluator

being able to distinguish an inferior solution from a superior one (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007; p. 40) and

that the evaluators are “simply assumed to vary in the precision with which they do this.” Such an uncertainty

is different from the technological ones faced by the scientists and engineers searching for the solution to an

MOGC, where it was impossible to distinguish an ‘inferior’ from a ‘superior’ alternative without performing a

myriad of additional experimentations. Instead of immediate performance feedback, we find that the

uncertainties— such as those associated with using LO/LH vs. other propulsion subsystems; three-element

(Triamese) vs. two-element (Biamese) configuration; two- vs. 1½-stage configuration; fully vs. partially

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reusable systems; solid- vs. liquid-fuel boosters—unfolded in stages. This was evident in NASA’s decision in

Phase A to concentrate on only the two-stage, fully reusable configurations and thereafter to shift the focus to

both the 1½-stage partially reusable and two-stage fully reusable configurations in the ASSC and Phase B

studies respectively, and finally to retain only the 1½-stage partially reusable configuration in the Phase B

Second Extension studies.

Further, the ability of an evaluator to distinguish a superior solution from an inferior one assumes the

presence of prior relevant knowledge, which is often lacking when a firm searches for the solution to an

MOGC. Specifically, in our study of NASA’s efforts to find the solution to a reusable hypersonic spacecraft,

the lack of prior relevant knowledge was noted by A.O. Tischler (Director of the Shuttle Technology Office,

NASA) who underscored that X-15, the last rocket-propelled airplane built prior to the Space Shuttle, had a

staging velocity that was half of what was needed for the Shuttle and did not carry either the cargo or fuel that

the Shuttle was expected to carry (Tischler, 1969b).

Moreover, our Stylized Finding # 1 does not match the prediction of the analogous search process.

Gavetti et al. (2005; p. 697) highlighted that a manager’s familiarity “with an industry that matches the target

well along the representational dimensions” drives the analogous search. In the case of NASA’s search for the

solution to the MOGC, none of the prior experiences, such as the X-15 experiments, matched the

requirements of the reusable hypersonic spacecraft that NASA intended to design.

Finally, our Stylized Finding # 1 does not fit the predictions of the parallel stream of innovation

literature that advocates the linear search of product iterations and market testing to identify a solution (see

e.g., Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). Rather, NASA’s effort to search for the solution to the MOGC was a

nonlinear one that often produced conflicting conclusions. As we discuss earlier, the Phase A experimentations at

GD revealed that the two-stage, fully reusable concept would “achieve an order of magnitude reduction” in

total costs (General Dynamics, 1969b) as compared to other designs—a finding that contradicted the NAR and

MM findings discuss above. Such contradictory findings, as we described earlier, would precede the search

that progressed nonlinearly from overcoming one bottleneck (e.g., the 1½-stage, partially reusable design to

overcome the aerothermodynamics/configuration bottleneck) to another (e.g., the Pogo problem associated with

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the propulsion subsystem bottleneck), and often back to the original bottleneck (e.g., the TAOS configuration as

the 1½-stage, partially reusable design to overcome the aerothermodynamics/configuration bottleneck).

Additionally, unlike the findings of prior research (e.g., Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995), we observe that the

search for the solution to the MOGC progressed without feedback from the market, as the possibility for

frequent prototyping and receiving feedback from the market was nonexistent when the Space Shuttle was

being designed.

Stylized Finding # 2: The search for the solution to an MOGC generates new knowledge that precedes the identification of

technological bottlenecks.

As we discuss earlier, knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer in Phase A preceded the

identification of the technological bottlenecks such as the aerothermodynamics/configuration, structure and materials,

propulsion subsystem, and power system. Thereafter, NASA embarked on Phase B to design the two-stage, fully

reusable system. The knowledge of bottlenecks generated from Phase A studies also led to the possibility of

using a different configuration, the 1½- stage partially reusable ones, which formed the basis of the ASSC

studies. Eventually, the knowledge generated by the ASSC studies was transferred to the Phase B studies and

the two subsequent extensions.

Although the strategy and innovation literature has a long tradition of exploring knowledge

generation and transfer to overcome bottlenecks, our finding does not match the predictions of extant

literature for several reasons. First, our Stylized Finding # 2 depicts how firms identify bottlenecks, converge

to a solution for each bottleneck, and eventually converge to a solution to the MOGC. Whereas Rosenberg

(1969; p. 21) observed that bottlenecks help in “forcefully focusing attention in specific directions” and

Mokyr (2008; p. 10) underscored that such focused attention helps scientists and engineers search for the

solutions to “real-world problems,” our exploration of NASA’s search for the solution to an MOGC

uncovers the processes that help firms identify the technological bottlenecks.

Second, our finding differs from prior research on firm’s “systematic experimentation” (Rosenberg

and Birdzell, 1990; p. 48) where researches have underscored the importance of the role of market

experimentation in reducing the downstream, or market, uncertainties (Greenstein, 2007; pp. 59-60). As

25

noted by recent research (e.g., Pillai et al., 2019; p. 7), “economic experimentation is useful when the

interdependence of multiple elements of the market solution are unclear ex-ante,” and interacting with the

market “allows the firm to… identify which product will sell in the marketplace.” In contrast to the

literature’s depiction of experimentation as the downstream or market experimentation, our Stylized Finding

# 2 highlights the role of upstream or technological experimentation, when the prior relevant technological

knowledge to manufacture the product—and consequently, the possibility to seek feedback from the

market—does not yet exist.

Third, our finding also diverges from the recent explorations of upstream firm experimentation (e.g.,

Roy et al., 2019). Whereas Roy et al. (2019), in the context of the CCD sensors, noted a linear process in which

firms searched for the solution to one bottleneck (e.g., the location of the channel—buried channel vs.

surface channel) followed by the search for the solution to another bottleneck (e.g., the direction of

illumination—frontside illuminated vs. backside illuminated), our investigation reveals a search for the

solution to an MOGC in which the solution to one bottleneck affects the solution to another bottleneck,

thereby leading to a nonlinear, multidirectional search to seek the solution to the MOGC.

Stylized Finding # 3: The identification of the bottlenecks precedes the identification of the solution to the MOGC, which

antedates the culmination of the search.

Our Stylized Finding # 3 does not fit the predictions of the existing literature. As Posen et al. (2018;

p. 234) noted, the extant organization search literature does “not predict” when a search stops, thereby

creating a lacuna in the researchers’ understanding of the search process. Moreover, as Posen et al. (2018)

observed, the literature generally conjoins several distinct elements of a search process, such as triggering the

search and stopping the search process. Our deep dive into the history of the Space Shuttle, by contrast,

identifies the trigger for the initiation of the search for the Space Shuttle as the President’s Science Advisory

Council’s report in February 1967, which identified the need for a reusable hypersonic spacecraft. We also

uncover that the trigger for ending the search was NASA identifying the 156-in., solid-fuel booster as being

more suitable for the Shuttle than the other types of boosters in early 1972. Our finding diverges from

March’s (1994; p. 28) observation that “search…..ends when the target is exceeded.” By contrast, we find that

26

the search to the MOGC did not end after the identification of a solution that exceeded the initial trigger.

Rather, we find a more nuanced process in which the search ended subsequent to the generation,

comparison, and transfer of knowledge following a myriad of experimentations that preceded the

identification of the bottlenecks and their potential solutions, as well as the performance trade-offs associated

with the potential solutions. The identification of the performance trade-offs, in turn, antedated NASA’s

realization that between the two solutions to the propulsion subsystem bottleneck, the solid-fuel booster involved

lower technical risk than the liquid-fuel boosters (Science News, 1972).

Viewed holistically, our Stylized Findings #s 1–3 extend Agarwal et al. (2017) and address Posen et

al.’s (2018; p. 231) concern that extant literature has focused “primarily on solution search… [assuming that]

problem is sufficiently well-structured that solution search is likely to be effective without further

consideration of the problem.” Taken together, our three stylized findings extend the organizational search

literature by underscoring that rather than firms receiving “immediate performance feedback” about the

solution (Denrell et al., 2004; p. 1366), the “problem-definition search” (such as the knowledge of

technological bottlenecks) and the “solution search” (such as the solution to each bottleneck) coevolve as the

firm engages in the nonlinear multidirectional search for the solution to the MOGC (Posen et al., 2018; p.

234). Figure 7 depicts a schematic diagram of the search process.

Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7about here

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We were motivated to seek an answer to our research question, “how do firms search for, and converge, to the solution

to a mission-oriented grand challenge in the absence of prior relevant knowledge?” Using the Space Shuttle as the context,

and bringing together the wisdom received from Agarwal et al. (2017) and Posen et al. (2018), our research

highlights the nuanced nature of the search for a solution to an MOGC. We find that the search for the

solution to an MOGC leads to “creative construction” (Agarwal et al., 2007; p. 267)—the creation of

innovative new products using the “knowledge generated by investments made by incumbent organizations.”

We observe that the search process is a nonlinear, multidirectional one in which the convergence to the

solution is preceded by knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer.

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Tracing the intellectual heritage of our paper to Agarwal et al. (2017) and Shah et al. (2017), we

contribute to several streams of the innovation literature. Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of

our research is to the organizational search literature. Our deep dive into search for the solution to an MOGC

contrasts with the extant search literature that treats “the specific internal (sub)processes of problemistic

search as a black box, without directly observing or measuring the process inside” with the black box hiding

“the unfolding and potentially recursive stages of problemistic search” (Posen et al. 2018; p. 233). Although

Fang and Levinthal (2009; p. 540) underscore that “[m]ost real-life contexts… depart from” a linear search

process depicted in the literature, our research provides empirical evidence of a nonlinear, multidirectional

search for the solution to an MOGC, including the trigger to end the search process. While addressing

Knudsen and Levinthal’s (2007; p. 39) concern that the mechanism by which firms evaluate the alternative

solutions during a search is “less clearly developed,” we uncover that the alternative solutions to an MOGC

are evaluated through a myriad of experimentations that occur nonlinearly as the search for the solution

moves in multiple directions simultaneously.

Yet another contribution of our investigation is the extension to Rosenberg’s seminal insights on

economic experimentation as well as bottlenecks. Building on Rosenberg’s (1982, p. 123) observation that

economic experimentations “lead to better understanding of the relation between specific design

characteristics and performance that permit subsequent improvements in design,” we find that the process

that leads to a ‘better understanding’ of the solution to an MOGC is a nonlinear, multidirectional one.

Combining the insights of Rosenberg (1969) with those of Rosenberg (1992), our research highlights that

firm experimentation precedes a nonlinear, multidirectional search for solutions to technological bottlenecks

and involves identifying the performance trade-offs associated with each solution to a bottleneck.

Additionally, we find that the search for the solution acts as the strainer and helps firm retain a solution to a

bottleneck and eliminate other solutions to the bottleneck. For example, the lower technical risk prompted

NASA to retain the Biamese concept and eliminate the Triamese concept as the potential solution to the

aerothermodynamics/ configuration bottleneck in the Phase A studies. Similarly, the lower technical risk associated

with the various choices to overcome the structure and materials bottleneck prompted NASA to retain

28

Lockheed’s LI-900 and LI-1500 and eliminate other choices, prior to converging to the solution to the

MOGC. Yet another example of technical risk driving NASA’s choice was decision to pursue the solid-fuel

over the liquid-fuel booster.

Our research extends the findings of both Moeen and Agarwal (2017) and Kotha (2010). Whereas

Moeen and Agarwal (2017) underscored that in the nascent stages of a new technology early actors reduce

technological uncertainty by acquiring related knowledge from outside and Kotha (2010) observed that in its

search for the jet engine, Boeing was aided by prior relevant knowledge developed by North American and de

Havilland, we explore NASA’s search for the reusable hypersonic spacecraft despite the lack of prior relevant

knowledge that could be acquired from outside the firm. Consistent with the insights of Eggers (2016,

p.1588), we find that the nonlinear, multidirectional search process helped NASA maintain “technological

flexibility.” For example, in the SSME Phase B studies, NASA sponsored research on various types of

propulsion fuel, including F-1 and J-2S, to maintain its flexibility to design the Space Shuttle with various

types of engines and design configurations. Moreover, extending Schilling (2017) and Stevens and Burley

(1997), who predicted the role of an innovation funnel in helping firms focus on the solution to a problem,

we demonstrate that the nonlinear, multidirectional search acts as the strainer that helps firms converge to the

solution to an MOGC.

Our paper contributes to the entrepreneurship literature in two ways. First, we find that NASA

developed the Shuttle “without any formal acknowledgment or evaluation of a commercial opportunity,”

echoing Shah and Tripsas’ (2007; p. 129) thesis that users are likely sources of new entrepreneurial

opportunities. Second, we highlight that the solution to an MOGC, which is critical to creating and capturing

value from a new opportunity, emerges through a nonlinear, multidirectional search process.

Our findings are consistent with recent studies that have predicted the challenges that firms are likely

to face while searching for the solution to an MOGC. For example, our finding parallels that of Grodal and

O’Mahoney (2017; p. 1801) who observed that the MOGCs are “ambitious problems that lack a clear single

solution, and encompass incomplete, contradictory, or changing requirements that often unfold in complex

systems.” This contribution highlights the boundary condition of our theory, which is also one of the

29

limitations of our paper. Our theory is likely applicable to the search for an MOGC involving a

technologically complex system and its applicability to the search for solutions to other MOGCs of social

importance such as reducing poverty or reducing wealth inequality is yet to be determined.

Yet another boundary condition, as well as a limitation, of our theory is the joint effort of both a

government agency (such as NASA) and private enterprises (such as Grumman and NAR) cooperating to

find the solution to the Space Shuttle. It is quite possible that our theory will have limited application in a

situation where only the government agency or only private enterprises are involved in finding the solution to

an MOGC. Additionally, it possible that because of data limitations, we have missed the effects of the U.S.

Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the financial constraints that likely affected

NASA’s search for the solution to the MOGC. Further, it is likely that we have missed several other parallel

experimentations initiated by NASA during the time period of our study that might have been relevant for

the search for the solution to the Shuttle. Moreover, data limitation restricted us to theorize on the search for

the solution to the MOGC to Phases A and B only, and not Phase C/D (except for the SSME studies

described earlier). The last phase, Phase C/D, involved ‘winner-take-all’ contracts (Schilling, 2017) such as

NAR Rocketdyne winning the contract to supply SSME engines and NAR winning the contract to build the

orbiter. Consequently, it is likely that we may have missed several critical aspects of the process such as the

role of competition among the contractors during the ‘winner-take-all’ phases. Finally, despite alluding to the

socio-economic factors (such as the hike in oil prices in early 1972; see section 4.4.1) our theorizing does not

take into account the possible impacts of the socio-economic factors (such as anti-war protests and NASA’s

budget crisis in the early 1970s) on NASA’s search for the solution to the MOGC.

Despite the limitations, our research extends the wisdom received from prior research by Agarwal et

al. (2017) and Posen et al. (2018) to the search for the solution to an MOGC, thereby opening new doors to

future research. One such avenue for future research is a deeper exploration of the nature of knowledge

spillover and the accompanying new entrepreneurial opportunities that arise from a firm’s search for the

solution to the MOGC. Consistent with the knowledge spillover view of strategic entrepreneurship (Agarwal et al.,

2007), the spillovers from NASA’s search for the solution to the MOGC encompassed several technological

30

fields including software (such as the transmission of digitized images) and hardware (such as fuel cells). This

highlights the need for further investigation of the causal mechanisms that make successful partnership

between public agencies and private enterprises possible to seek a solution to an MOGC. Further, extending

the insights of Murray et al. (2012), our study opens the door to future investigations of the role of public-

private collaboration as new ‘space entrepreneurs’—including new entrants (e.g., SpaceX) and diversifying

firms (e.g., Boeing)—seek solutions to future MOGCs, such as the Artemis mission.

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Table 1 Stylized findings and implications for theory

Stylized Findings Factual information Implications for theory Stylized Finding # 1:

The search for the solution to an MOGC is a nonlinear,

multidirectional process that simultaneously moves forward,

backward, and sideways.

In Phase A, NASA and its contractors experimented with overcoming the bottlenecks. These parallel experiments generated new knowledge, which was then compared with and transferred to other firms. For example, the Grumman/Boeing experimentation explored the drop tanks, which knowledge was thereafter compared with the knowledge generated by NAR and other firms, and was eventually transferred to all the other contractors. Subsequently, NASA converged to the solution by retaining the knowledge of drop tanks and eliminating the knowledge of other configurations, such as the two-stage fully reusable ones. Our research reveals that the new knowledge generation-comparison-transfer-convergence process of finding the solution to the MOGC, often produced conflicting results. For example, the Phase A experimentations at GD revealed that the two-stage fully reusable concept would achieve an “order of magnitude reduction” in total costs (General Dynamics, 1969b) as compared with the 1½-stage partially reusable designs. This finding was contradicted by the NAR and MM findings. Such contradictory findings, as we described earlier, would lead the search nonlinearly from overcoming one bottleneck to another, and often back to the original bottleneck to overcome the technological trade-offs. As we depict in Figure 6, the search for the solution to an MOGC is a multidirectional process and occurs in series and parallel simultaneously. The multidirectionality of the search is exemplified in the transition from Phase A to Phase B and ASSC experimentations, when the search for the solution to the MOGC moved simultaneously forward, backward, and sideways.

Our finding suggests that the sequential attention assumption of the behavioral theory of the firm—which underscores that a “firm engages in search by sequentially testing alternatives” (Posen et al., 2018; p. 208)—does not likely hold when a firm searches for the solution to an MOGC. Further, the source of uncertainty in the organizational search literature stems from the evaluator being able to distinguish an inferior solution from a superior one (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007; p. 40) and that the evaluators are “simply assumed to vary in the precision with which they do this.” However, while searching for the solution to an MOGC, it is likely impossible to distinguish an ‘inferior’ from a ‘superior’ alternative because the uncertainties unfold in stages. The knowledge of the superior and inferior alternatives is generated only after a myriad of experimentations. In addition to diverging from the findings of the extant organizational search literature, our Stylized Finding # 1 does not match the prediction of the analogous search process either. Additionally, the finding does not fit the predictions of the parallel stream of innovation literature that advocates the linear search of product iterations and market testing to converge to a solution (see e.g., Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995).

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Stylized Finding # 2: The search for the solution to an MOGC generates new knowledge that precedes the identification of

technological bottlenecks.

The knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer following the multiple parallel experimentations at GD, MM, NAR, MDD, and Lockheed preceded the identification of the technological bottlenecks such as the aerothermodynamics/configuration, structure and materials, propulsion subsystem, and power system. The experimentations in Phase A started with each contractor proposing a different design for in-depth analyses. For example, GD’s ‘Triamese’ concept, a fully reusable two-stage concept, was a study of two boosters and an orbiter with “identical basic structure and propulsion system”—an approach that relied on economies of scope and avoided the cost of developing separate boosters and orbiter (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. II-109). Additionally, the boosters and the orbiter had retractable wings. GD also used a two-element ‘Biamese’ concept. Similarly, Lockheed proposed the ‘StarClipper’ design, MDD proposed the ‘parallel tankage’ design, and NAR’s study included “low cost expendable boosters with reusable upper stages” (Jenkins, 2008; pp. 78-79). In their periodic briefings to NASA, the contractors compared the knowledge generated by the experimentation on the various configurations, and transferred it to NASA. For example, MM in its briefing in January 1969 compared several design configurations, which included the SV-5, M2-F2, and HL-10 bodies; with each design being a two-stage fully reusable system or a 1½-stage partially reusable system with LH-LO propellant or a 1½-stage partially reusable system with storable propellant. Further, each design used one of the four alternative heat shields—ablative, radiative, ceramic, and transpiration (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. II-70). Similarly, in their February 1969 briefing, North American Rockwell (NAR) compared three configurations—Reusable All System (RAS), Reusable Orbital System (ROS), and Reusable Crew Module (RCM).

Our finding does not match the predictions of extant literature for several reasons. First, our Stylized Finding # 2 depicts how firms identify bottlenecks, converge to one solution to mitigate the bottleneck, and eventually converge to a solution to the MOGC. Second, our finding differs from firm’s “systematic experimentation” (Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1990; p. 48), whereby researchers have underscored the importance of market experimentation’s role in the search for the solution that reduces the market uncertainties (Greenstein, 2007; pp. 59-60). Third, our finding also diverges from the recent exploration of upstream firm experimentation (e.g., Roy, Lampert, and Sarkar, 2019), which highlighted a linear process in which firms searched for the solution to one bottleneck.

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Lockheed’s interim technical review with NASA was held on August 21, 1969, and the final oral review was held on Nov. 11, 1969. These briefings included the comparison of Lockheed’s Star Clipper concept (a 1½-stage configuration) and the two-stage fully reusable configuration.

Stylized Finding # 3: The identification of the bottlenecks precedes the

identification of the solution to the MOGC, which antedates the

culmination of the search.

The search for the solution to the MOGC, culminated with NASA’s knowledge generation, comparison, and transfer of solid-fuel booster and two types of liquid-fuel boosters. The performance trade-offs associated with the liquid boosters included the ability of the astronauts to shut-down the booster in case of system malfunction and the pressure-fed boosters, in particular, were simple to design. Additionally both NASA and the DoD had extensive experience using the liquid boosters, but NASA was skeptical that the liquid rocket motors could be refurbished “after they had been subjected to the corrosive action of an ocean bath” (Williamson, 1999; p. 172). The solid boosters, on the other hand, had never been used before and once ignited, they were impossible to stop in the case of a system malfunction prior to launch. However, they were lighter in weight, more reliable, and simpler to design than the liquid boosters. Eventually, NASA decided to converge to the solid-fuel booster and announced its choice of solid boosters on March 15, 1972 (Williamson, 1999; p. 172).

Our finding does not fit the predictions of the existing literature. The extant organization search literature question does not help researchers predict when a search ends (Posen et al., 2018; p. 234). Literature generally conjoins several distinct elements in a search process, triggering search, behavioral consequences of search, and stopping search. Additionally, extant empirical literature in organizational search does not distinguish among these elements of the search process (Posen et al., 2018). We contribute to the organizational search literature by identifying the trigger for ending the search.

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Figure 1 Components and subsystems in the Space Shuttle (Source: https://www.nasa.gov/images/content/108423main_shuttle_cutaway.jpg)

Figure 2 Illustrative effect of some subsystems on other subsystems within the Shuttle (Source: Tischler, 1969a, p. 56; used with permission from AIAA)

38

Figure 3 NASA’s plan for manned space exploration in the late 1960s (Source: https://mix.msfc.nasa.gov/abstracts.php?p=2188)

Figure 4 Space Shuttle orbiter comparisons following the Phase A studies(Source: Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. III-196)

39

Figure 5 Illustrative bottlenecks in Phase A and potential solutions to bottlenecks

Phase A

NAR GD Lockheed MDD MM

RAS ROS RCM

Bottlenecks for each design Potential solutions for each bottleneck

Booster configuration Air-breathing Drop tank Expendable

TPS Columbium TDNiCr Inconel625 Haynes188

Rene41

Ti6Al-4V

Propulsion subsystem Radiation cooling

LO/LH Engine

Hydrazine engine

Power subsystem Battery Fuel cell

Bottlenecks Potential solutions for each bottleneck

Aerothermodynamics/ Configuration

Booster Reusable Recoverable Expendable

Vehicle Geometry

Deployable rotor

Fixed geometry

Variable geometry

Structure and Materials

Heat shield Ablative Nonmetallic Metallic Re-

radiativeMetallic

Re-radiative options

Columbium TDNiCr Inconel625 Haynes188

Rene41

Ti6Al-4V

Propulsion subsystem

SSME Radiation cooling

LO/LH Engine

Hydrazine engine

Booster Solid-fuel156-in.

Solid-fuel120-in.

Liquid pressure-fed

Liquid pump-fed

Power system Battery Fuel cell Turbo-alternators

40

Figure 6 Nonlinear, multidirectional search process used in finding the solution to the reusable hypersonic spacecraft

Figure 7 Schematic diagram of the identification of bottlenecks and the solution to the MOGC

1

Appendix 1: List of Acronyms DoD: Department of Defense. GD: General Dynamics. GLOW: Gross Lift-Off Weight. ILRV: Integrated Launch and Recovery Vehicle. LH: Liquid Hydrogen. LO: Liquid Oxygen. MDD: McDonnell Douglas. MM: Martin Marietta. NAR: North American Rockwell. NASA Research Centers— ARC: Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA. LaRC: Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA. MSC: Manned Space Center (now, the Johnson Space Center), Houston, TX. MSFC: Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL. OMB: Office of Management and Budget. OMSF: Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA. POGO: Instability in rocket engine caused by structural vibrations along the vehicle’s longitudinal axis. These vibrations are referred to as “Pogo.” RFP: Request For Proposal. RRP: Reinforced Pyrolized Plastic. SSME: Space Shuttle Main Engine. SSTG: Space Shuttle Task Group of MSC created on Apr. 5, 1969 under the leadership of LeRoy E. Day at

the Office of Manned Space Flight. STG: Space Task Group created by President Nixon on Feb. 13, 1969. STS: Space Transportation System. TAOS: Thrust-Assisted Orbiter Shuttle. The Grumman/Boeing mid-term review on Dec. 31, 1970, described the “thrust augmented 1½-stage” vehicle as one where solid-rocket motor augmented the core vehicle thrust (Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. IV-129). TPS: Thermal Protection System. USAF: United States Air Force.

2

Appendix 2: Dependency Structure Matrix of the Bottlenecks in Space Shuttle (Sources: Love, 1973; Hale, 2010; Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988; p. IV-346; Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988, p. III-111).

Aerothermodynamics/

Configuration Structure and Materials Propulsion Subsystem

Payload

Bay Door

Payload Bay

Hinges

Wing Design Airframe

Structure

Thermal Protection

System

Rocket Booster SSME

Aerothermodynamics/ Configuration

Payload Bay Door -- x

Payload Bay Hinges x --

Wing Design -- x x Structure and

Materials Airframe Structure x x

-- x x

Thermal

Protection System

x x -- x

Propulsion Subsystem

Rocket Booster x x x -- x

SSME x x x x x --

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Appendix 3: NASA goals for the ASSC studies

The purpose of ASSC experiments were to overcome the aerothermodynamics/ configuration bottleneck by exploring various alternate booster configurations to provide “further economy-mined analyses of alternative concepts” and ensure that “nothing [was] overlooked… technically and economically” (MSC News Release No. 70-67, Jun. 15, 1970). Lockheed’s final report (Lockheed, 1971; p. 1-2) states that the ASSC objectives were main engine with 550K lb. thrust, 1100 nm crossrange, and 65,000 lb. payload. While planning the Phase B studies to eventually find a two-stage fully reusable configuration, NASA simultaneously wanted to – a) design new 1½-stage partially reusable configurations, and b) compare those new configurations with the two-stage fully reusable configurations being designed by the Phase B studies. Accordingly, the Grumman/Boeing ASSC report noted that the ASSC study “was directed toward definition and comparison of promising alternatives to the fully reusable concept, include stage-and-one-half, expendable first stages, and variants of the two-stage reusable system” (Grumman, 1971; p. 1). Grumman/Boeing’s statement is supported by Hallion and Young (1998; p. 1036; italics added) when they noted that during the start of the Phase B studies, NASA and the contractors “were generally unanimous in considering the design of large, two stage fully reusable craft, with fly-back piloted boosters and orbiters that carried both their payload and fuel internally. As a hedge, at the same time that NASA awarded the Phase B contracts, it also awarded two additional [ASSC] studies--to a Grumman-Boeing team, and to Lockheed for examination of partially expendable systems as alternatives to the more elaborate Phase B studies then undergoing evaluation.” A related explanation for starting the ASSC studies was the expected financial constraints that the federal government was about to impose on NASA. The resistance to the Space Shuttle was growing in the society throughout the 1960s and 1970s. For example, at President Nixon’s dinner to celebrate the return of Apollo 11 astronauts on Aug. 13, 1969, held at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles, protestors organized a “F**k Mars” demonstration (Mark, 1987, p. 37). The Space Shuttle, as originally conceived was part of a system that would have a base on Mars and another on Moon (see Figure 3 of the main paper). A few months later, on Nov. 12, 1969, Congressman Joseph E. Karth (D-MN) raised questions about the cost impact of the Shuttle noting that, “planners have… [created]… a fat, over-fed, but still hungry pig” (Guilmartin & Mauer, 1988, p. III-69). On Jan. 31, 1970, NASA informed its employees of severe budget cuts and a reduction in workforce from 200,000 to 144,000; the budget allocated for NASA in FY71 was the lowest since the fiscal year 1962 (FY62) (Guilmartin & Mauer, 1988, p. III-93). The role of expected budget cuts on NASA’s choice to initiate the ASSC studies was noted by Jenkins (2008; p. 123) when he noted that although the two-stage fully reusable systems being developed in Phase B could achieve the “low cost per flight” and have the lowest “total program costs” (i.e., the total costs of R&D, testing, production, and all recurring operating costs), if the peak annual budget for NASA were to be reduced, “consideration should be given to……a reusable orbiter with an expendable booster.”

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Appendix 4: Chronology of events leading to the solution of the MOGC (includes events not discussed in paper due to limited information)

(Sources: Ezell, 1988; Guilmartin and Mauer, 1988)

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REFERENCES Ezell, L. N. (1988). NASA Historical Data Book, Vol. III, Programs and Projects, 1969-1978. NASA Scientific and Technical Information Division, NASA, Washington, DC. Grumman. (1971). Alternate Space Shuttle Concept Study, Volume II (Orbiter Definition), Part II (Technical Summary), Contract: NAS 9-11160, dated July 6, 1971. Grumman Aerospace Corporation. Guilmartin, J. F., & Mauer, J. W. (1988). A shuttle chronology 1964–1973: Abstract concepts to letter contracts (5 volumes). Houston, TX: NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. Hale, W. (2010). Magnificent flying machine: A cathedral to technology. In Wings in orbit: Scientific and engineering legacies of the Space Shuttle 1971- 2010, (pp. 2-9). Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Hallion, R. P. & Young, J. O. (1998). Space Shuttle: Fulfillment of a dream. In R. P. Hallion (Ed.), The hypersonic revolution: Case studies in the history of hypersonic technology, Vol. 2. (pp. 947-1282). Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program. Lockheed. (1971). Final report: Study of alternate Space Shuttle Concepts, Vol. II, Part I, Concept analysis and definition, Contract NAS 8-26362. Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Sunnyvale, CA. Love, Eugene S. (1973). Advanced technology and the space shuttle. Astronautics and Aeronautics, 11(2): 30-66. Mark, H. (1987). The space station: A personal journey. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.