the relationship between the usa and china/north vietnam/ussr, in light of the vietnam war...

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The Relationship between the USA and China/North Vietnam/USSR, in light of

the Vietnam War Escalation in 1964/1965

By Oleg Nekrassovski

Introduction

“The cold war was a bitter, usually nonmilitary, conflict between the United States and

the Soviet Union that lasted for almost 50 years after World War II.”1 While the “cold war was

not a conventional conflict fought on traditional battlefields,” it affected all aspects of American

and Soviet life. All diplomatic decisions and foreign policy initiatives of both the US and the

USSR were done in the framework of the Cold War.2 Sometimes actual fighting broke out

because the tensions could not be contained, as was the case in the Korean War and the

Vietnam War. The Cold War also fueled a frightening arms race and “caused the growth of

military arsenals on both sides.”3 Moreover, in both the US and the USSR, virtually all national

budget decisions were influenced by the Cold War, which demanded ever greater spending on

military programs; leaving little for civilian reform efforts in the US, and for consumer goods in

the USSR. Finally, the Cold War created an internal climate of fear on both sides, which “in the

1950s even threatened the internal stability of the United States.”4

The roots of the Cold War date back to the Russian Revolution, which started the long-

standing disagreements between the two nations. The Russian Revolution took place in 1917,

when revolutionary Bolsheviks (the radical socialist party) overthrew the democratic

government of Russia, which was just taking root following the fall of the Russian Imperial

Government, and established their own state – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).5

The Americans quickly stated to feel bothered by the existence of USSR, because its ideology

“seemed to challenge the democratic values of the United States,” while being committed to an

anti-capitalist world order led by workers, and to a rejection of organized religion.6

The leader of the Bolsheviks, and hence of the new revolutionary government, was

Vladimir Lenin. Lenin never lost faith in the world socialist revolution.7 Consequently, until

Lenin’s death in 1924,8 USSR’s foreign policy was heavily tied to the idea of ‘revolutionary

internationalism,’ and hence consisted of USSR supporting, in various ways, communist

organizations around the world. Until 1921, this policy mainly consisted of organizing foreign

communist parties for a revolutionary seizure of power. After 1921, the emphasis of this policy

shifted towards building up foreign communist parties.9 After Lenin’s death, Joseph Stalin soon

became the leader of the USSR.10 Unlike Lenin, Stalin was skeptical of the relevance of the

international communist movement to the survival of the USSR. Consequently, he decided to

replace Lenin’s policy of ‘revolutionary internationalism’ with that of ‘socialism in one country.’

‘Socialism in one country’ was actually a much more reasonable policy for improving the

chances of USSR’s survival.11 After all, the USSR was still weak, while ‘socialism in one country’

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stipulated that “Soviet Union could proceed independently to construct socialism” inside its

borders.12 Quite conveniently, this approach allowed “for a flexible diplomacy geared to the

avoidance of international conflicts, an emphasis upon the defensive capacity of the RKKA

[Soviet Army] as an ultimate guarantor against external aggression, and a reduced role for the

Comintern [an international communist organization led and heavily supported by the USSR].”13

Despite a few years of cooperation during World War II, disagreements between the US

and the USSR resurfaced once WWII ended. “The United States emerged from the war strong

and secure, eager to spread its vision of freedom and economic opportunity around the

world.”14 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was devastated by the war, and was mainly

interested in protecting itself from any future European aggression by establishing a wide

buffer zone of friendly territory in Eastern Europe. This, of course, involved establishing

dictatorial, communist regimes, loyal to the Soviet Union, in what formerly were largely

democratic, capitalist countries of Eastern Europe, which the Soviets took away from the Nazis

during the course of WWII. “As Soviet and American aims came into conflict, the cold war

began.”15

Aside from the post-war Europe, one of the first Cold War battlegrounds was China.

Chiang Kai-shek was a nationalist leader of China at the time. However, Chiang had a very shaky

grip on power, because his government was corrupt, unpopular, and “had been fighting Mao

Zedong’s communist forces for political control” of China since 1927.16 So in 1946, the US began

sending military aid to Chiang Kai-shek, “while the Soviets were backing Mao.” But despite

American efforts, Chiang Kai-shek was quickly losing power, while his communist rival, Mao

Zedong, was quickly gaining it, despite receiving little support from Stalin.17 However, many

Americans were convinced that Mao was Stalin’s pawn. Other Americans believed he was

independently fighting for communism in China. Either way, however, Americans viewed Mao

as a part of an international communist movement, which, “if successful in China, could easily

spread to other parts of the world.”18

In the fall of 1949, Mao Zedong’s communists finally defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s forces.

Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters fled to the island of Taiwan, while Mao established firm

communist control over all of China and proclaimed the creation of a new communist state, the

People’s Republic of China (PRC).19 US leaders were greatly alarmed by the Communist victory

in China, and refused to give diplomatic recognition to China’s new government. “The

Communist victory in China’s civil war and the founding of PRC changed the character of the

Cold War.”20 The world’s most populous country was now firmly in the communist camp.

“Washington, and soon the rest of America, would decide that the communist threat must be

stopped.”21

In 1953 Stalin died, and soon Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the new leader of the Soviet

Union. Khrushchev, unlike Stalin, became interested in easing tensions with the United States.22

“He rejected the inevitability of war between the two superpowers and between the capitalist

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and communist systems.”23 In fact, in Khrushchev’s publicly expressed view, peaceful

coexistence and economic cooperation were to be normal aspects of a future relationship

between the US and the USSR. The Cold War, in his view, was just a transition period. However,

despite Khrushchev’s apparent desire to bring about this peaceful coexistence more quickly, he

found it challenging, at least initially.24 His hope was that a new generation of foreign leaders

will acknowledge the USSR’s rightful place in the world. “With this in mind, he made a number

of official visits to different countries to forge personal relationships with other world

leaders.”25 Also, while Stalin created, in 1947, an organization, called the Cominform, for

ensuring the loyalty of the East European communist states to USSR; Khrushchev dissolved it.

Thus, Khrushchev’s actions seemed to show USSR’s new, greater openness to the rest of the

world.26

Vietnam was originally a French colony. But in 1941 an underground militant

organization dedicated to achieving the independence of Vietnam, was formed. The

organization called itself Viet Minh, and despite its nationalistic aims, it was an officially

communist organization.27 Within a few years the Viet Minh started to actively fight the French

colonial forces. Their membership base quickly grew. They started to enjoy popular support;

and after 1949 they began receiving Chinese and Soviet weapons, including heavy artillery.

Around the same time, the French colonial forces in Vietnam started to suffer frequent military

setbacks, despite starting to receive large amounts of military aid from the U.S., which was

determined to oppose Communist expansion in Vietnam.28 In 1954, the French colonial forces

suffered a single, but very serious defeat, at the hands of the Viet Minh, prompting the world’s

leading Western and Communist powers, who happened to be gathered at an international

summit at the time, to force a diplomatic solution to this war. The compromise agreement,

worked out at the summit, gave the Viet Minh complete control of the northern part of

Vietnam, above the 17th parallel, while the non-communists took power in the South.29

The government of the new South Vietnam soon became dominated by U.S.-backed

leaders. But despite the old democratic traditions of their American patrons, the new South

Vietnamese leaders soon started to implement undemocratic, oppressive policies throughout

South Vietnam, leading to strong public opposition, including sporadic acts of armed resistance.

Moreover, a groundwork for a systematic, organized, armed resistance in South Vietnam, was

already in place at that time; because while most of the Viet Minh moved to the North soon

after the partitioning of the country, 8,000 to 10,000 “stay-behinds” secretly remained in South

Vietnam.30 So in 1957, while the North Vietnamese leaders were still in disagreement over

whether starting a revolutionary insurgency in South Vietnam was a worthwhile enterprise, the

“stay-behinds” started a low level guerrilla war against the South Vietnamese government, on

their own initiative. In 1959, North Vietnam began to supply them with significant military aid,

and in 1960 instructed them to adopt a flag and to call themselves the National Liberation Front

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(NLF). The South Vietnamese government, however, decided to refer to them as the Vietcong,

which simply means Vietnamese Communists.31

By 1961, the attacks carried out by the Vietcong became very frequent and destructive;

prompting the Americans to increase their military support to South Vietnamese forces. Until

late 1964, American military support to South Vietnam was largely limited to providing advisory

and logistical support to South Vietnamese forces.32 In 1965, however, the War was rapidly

escalated to attacks by U.S. Air Force on North Vietnam and the sending of U.S. ground troops

to directly fight the Vietcong in South Vietnam.33

While a diplomatic solution to the War in Vietnam was always a possibility, Lyndon B.

Johnson (the President of the United States, at that time) was unwilling to consider it. After all,

he had a strong conviction that such a move would be a show of weakness on the part of the

US.34 Moreover, since a diplomatic solution would inevitably involve a withdrawal of US

forces,35 it would look like a humiliating defeat, and thus severely undermine (or so Johnson

and his advisers thought) USA’s reputation as a reliable protector of other countries.36 Johnson

also believed that aside from leading to a loss of America’s prestige in the international arena, a

diplomatic resolution of the war, would lead to a loss in prestige of his Democratic Party, as

well as his own prestige. More importantly, however, Johnson feared that the withdrawal of US

forces from Vietnam would set into motion the serious events predicted by the domino

theory;37 according to which the rest of Southeast Asia will succumb to Communism if South

Vietnam and Laos came under the control of North Vietnamese Communists.38

The present paper will explore that part of the relationship between the USA, on the

one hand, and the communist countries of China, North Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, on the

other, which was directly related to American decisions to escalate its War in Vietnam, in 1964

and 1965. In particular, it will be shown that this part of their relationship was characterized by

mutual mistrust, fear, anxiety and uncertainty over how to proceed, and mutual attempts at

intimidation and psychological manipulation.

USA - China Relationship

In the spring of 1965, Johnson decided to ask the CIA to ascertain the possibility of

events, predicted by the domino theory, happening in Southeast Asia.39 Surprisingly enough,

CIA’s carefully researched response, on June 9th of the same year, was negative. In fact, they

stated that with the possible exception of Cambodia, no other Southeast Asian country would

turn Communist, any time soon, in the event of the capture of Laos and South Vietnam by the

North Vietnamese.40

However, Johnson and his advisers decided not to take CIA’s response into

consideration. After all, they believed that the real enemy was Communist China. And China,

who they believed was the real source of North Vietnamese aggression, would not stop

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aggressively spreading Communism among its neighbours unless it was aggressively opposed, in

that region, by a pro-capitalist, democratic force, such as the US.41

Johnson administration’s fear of China was not completely baseless. On October 16th,

1964, China successfully tested its first atomic weapon by exploding it in one of its deserts. This

event considerably increased Washington’s fear of aggressive China posing a threat to

Southeast Asian security.42 After all, US officials believed that by becoming the first Asian nation

to develop nuclear weapons, China had greatly strengthened its influence in Southeast Asia,

“which many considered a crucial ideological battleground between Peking and Washington.”43

Moreover, Johnson argued in a public speech on October 18th, 1964, that until this point in

history, only four major powers (USA, USSR, Britain, and France) possessed nuclear weapons.

And while all four were “sober and serious” states that had a lot of experience as major powers

in the modern world, Communist China had no such experience.44

Washington’s fear of China also stemmed from Peking’s own rhetoric. For years,

Chinese Communist leaders had accused the US of engaging in “imperialism,” while dismissing

American power as a bluff threat, by calling it a “paper tiger.”45 Such rhetoric, on the part of

China, was actually intended to be a challenge to USSR with regards to leadership of the

communist bloc. But Americans interpreted this rhetoric far differently. To them it served as a

confirmation of their fear of China being “a hostile power determined to impose its hegemony

over Asia.”46 Moreover, if the US government of 1964 thought it needed to oppose China (as it

did), the US public opinion was firmly on its side. Opinion surveys, conducted in 1964, showed

that Americans considered China to be three times as great a threat to world peace as USSR.47

China, for its part, had similar feelings towards America. And given the American

military involvement in Vietnam (located next to China), at that time, Chinese leaders were

especially “concerned about the American threat from Vietnam.”48 China’s behaviour before

and after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident is particularly illustrative of its anxiety about the presence

of American military near its borders, and uncertainty about how to respond.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to the two events of August 2 and 4, 1964, which

consisted of minor naval action in the Tonkin Gulf. “On July 30 [1964], the U. S. destroyer

Maddox entered the Gulf of Tonkin, the coastal waters that lie alongside North Vietnam,” and

started the electronic gathering of information about the defense capabilities of North

Vietnam, frequently sailing within several miles of North Vietnamese lands.49 On August 2,

Maddox was engaged by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats, in an attempt to drive it out of

North Vietnamese territorial waters.50 In the course of the battle, U. S. planes, from a nearby

aircraft carrier, quickly arrived on the scene and damaged two of the torpedo boats, while shell

fire from the Maddox’s five-inch guns knocked the third one out of commission. Before being

driven off, the torpedo boats managed to fire three torpedoes, but Maddox did not sustain any

damage.51 On August 3, another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, was ordered to join the Maddox

in the Gulf of Tonkin. “On the evening of August 4, sailors aboard the two U. S. destroyers

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began to pick up radar and sonar readings indicating the presence of enemy ships.”52 Over the

next two hours, the sailors operating “sonar equipment reported 26 torpedoes fired at the

Maddox.” In response, “The Maddox and the Turner Joy fired 400 shells in the direction they

thought the attack was coming from.”53 They also called in air support from a nearby aircraft

carrier. However, the US Navy pilot, who “flew to the scene of the battle in his F-8E Crusader

fighter,” did not find anything, yet alone North Vietnamese ships, despite crisscrossing the area

for 90 minutes.54

But President Johnson had no interest in finding out “what exactly happened that night

in the Gulf of Tonkin,” and instead decided to use this alleged attack on US Navy ships as a

pretext for directly attacking North Vietnam.55 Hence, “On August 5, in retaliation for an alleged

attack the previous day … the United States mounted heavy air attacks on three major North

Vietnam coastal bases; the bases were demolished, twenty-five boats were destroyed or

damaged, and, according to Secretary [of Defense] McNamara, the local fuel depots were

almost totally destroyed.”56

While being privately skeptical about the incident on August 4th, Johnson saw that it also

presented a great opportunity to expand Presidential powers. So he decided to follow the script

devised by his advisers earlier in the year, which called on him to go before Congress and ask

for a resolution giving him vast powers over the US military and effectively authorizing him to

expand the War in Vietnam as a much as he saw fit.57, 58 So this was what Johnson did on

August 7th. The resolution, which became known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, passed with a

unanimous vote in the House of Representatives, and with only two opposing votes in the

Senate.59, 60

Not long before the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, China promised North Vietnam, that if the

Americans attacked North Vietnam, China would retaliate against them, whether by air, land, or

sea.61 Yet the Chinese completely failed to retaliate against the Americans, when the latter

bombed North Vietnam on August 5, 1964. Moreover, after August 5, Chinese public rhetoric

on related issues became very subdued.62

However, soon after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Beijing ordered the naval and air force

units stationed in south and southwest China, as well as the forces of Kunming and Guangzhou

Military Regions (they border North Vietnam), to begin a state of combat- readiness. Also,

“Four air divisions and one antiaircraft division were dispatched into areas adjoining Vietnam

and put on a heightened alert status.”63 Moreover, in August 1964, China sent about fifteen

MIG – 15 and MIG – 17 jet fighters to Hanoi (North Vietnamese capital), agreed to take on the

training of North Vietnamese pilots, and began to build new airfields next to the North

Vietnamese border, in order to create a sanctuary, as well as a repair and maintenance

facilities, for jet fighters operated by North Vietnam. All of this was “intended to deter further

US expansion of war in South Vietnam and bombardment against” the North Vietnam.64

Alternatively it has been argued that “the purpose of these preparations was to defend China”

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from a possible American invasion.65 After all, at the time, the Chinese made a “decision to

develop industry in western and southwestern China” in order to “enable the Chinese

communists to retreat westward in the event of an American invasion, an eventuality they now

greatly feared.”66 However, sometime during August and September 1964, an inspection team,

from the Chinese Army, went “to North Vietnam to investigate the situation in case China later

needed to dispatch support troops.67 Also, there are good reasons to believe that China would

“have intervened on a major scale in late 1964 had the United States invaded the North”

Vietnam.68 Moreover, “It is well known” that in May 1965, soon after the US escalated the War,

“Chinese troops began moving into North Vietnam … to assist with logistics and man

antiaircraft weapons.”69

USA - North Vietnam Relationship

In the spring of 1964, US leaders developed an idea of sending an emissary to Hanoi.

This idea and its subsequent execution, throws considerable light on the nature of the

relationship, which existed at the time, between America and North Vietnam. The idea of

sending an emissary to North Vietnam was developed as a corollary to the planned escalation

of the Vietnam War to attacks on the North. The Johnson administration concluded that it

would be useful, before escalating the War, to probe the attitudes of North Vietnamese leaders

regarding the war in the South, and to inform them directly that U. S. leaders were determined

to win the conflict.70 That the idea of diplomatic contact with North Vietnam should arise only

in connection with plans for expanding the War, tells us much about what US leaders were

hoping to accomplish with it. The emissary’s main purpose would be to warn his hosts that

should they fail to end the insurgency in the South, they will face certain punishment. In other

words, his task was not to negotiate but to intimidate; “not to compromise but to coerce.”71

The United States decided to make an overture to North Vietnam through an

interlocutor so as not to suggest either a negotiation or a dialogue.72 After a thorough search

for a country whose representative would be suitable to serve as an interlocutor, only one ally

emerged as a suitable candidate: Canada. After all, Canada was the closest ally of the United

States, which has, over time, proved itself to be most dependable. And when it came to the

choice of the specific Canadian diplomat, US officials saw an ideal emissary in J. Blair Seaborn, a

veteran diplomat who could certainly be trusted to effectively represent the position of the

Johnson administration.73

On April 30, 1964, Dean Rusk (US Secretary of State, at that time) “flew to Ottawa and

broached the idea with Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson and minister of external affairs

Paul Martin.” The two Canadian leaders readily agreed to the idea. So, Rusk next described to

them what the Johnson administration “felt should be the main objectives for the visit.”74 Rusk

stated that Seaborn should attempt to figure out what was on Ho Chi Minh’s (President of

North Vietnam, at that time) mind, in particular whether he saw his forces as “overextended

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and exposed, or whether he felt confident that his Chinese allies would back him to the end.”75

Even more importantly, Seaborn should make it clear to the North Vietnamese leaders that the

U. S. was completely determined to “see this thing through.” Moreover, he should also warn

them that if “they did not put a stop to their operations they would be in trouble.” If North

Vietnam agrees to end the insurgency in the South, it should be assured that the U. S. leaders

will consider facilitating trade between the North Vietnam and the West. The two Canadian

leaders had no trouble agreeing to this agenda for Seaborn’s visit.76

When Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, received a report on the

Rusk-Pearson meeting, he was dissatisfied. “The instructions for Seaborn sounded too timid, he

thought.”77 So he cabled Rusk and President Johnson and urged that Seaborn should tell Ho Chi

Minh that the North Vietnamese can expect an escalation of the War if the U.S. “had to choose

between withdrawal and escalation.” So, unless Hanoi stopped its support of the insurgency in

South Vietnam, it could expect an expansion of the War to the North Vietnam.78 If it did stop it,

then it could expect that some Americans will be withdrawn (in actual fact, according to Lodge’s

advice, only those which were to be removed anyway) from South Vietnam, as well as food and

economic aid for North Vietnam. Lodge also recommended that if prior to Seaborn’s arrival to

North Vietnam there happened to occur a significant Vietcong (communist insurgents operating

in South Vietnam) attack in the South, “a concentrated bombing attack on a target in the

North” should be launched by the U.S. using planes of the South Vietnamese air force.79

Rusk and Johnson evidently welcomed Lodge’s aggressive recommendations for

Seaborn, but in the end the instructions for Seaborn were watered down to those long on

broad generalities and short on specifics, so as to sound less aggressive. The principle reason

for this was that Canadian leaders were unhappy about the possibility of a wider war, and even

urged the U.S. to end the War through negotiations.80 In addition to delivering the message,

Seaborn was also asked, by the Americans, to keep his eyes and ears open while visiting North

Vietnam, in order to assess its morale and war capability.81 Did the North Vietnamese show

signs of frustration and war-weariness? “Were there cliques or factions in the party or

government?” What was the effect of Sino-Soviet split on Hanoi’s thinking? Did the political

cadres and the military group show any signs of disagreement with each other? 82 Thus, while

Seaborn had several things to attend to, while in North Vietnam, the message that he “carried

with him as he flew to North Vietnam in mid June,” 1964, was ambiguous; which made it

neither tempting nor intimidating to the North Vietnamese leadership.83

On June 18, 1964, “Seaborn met with North Vietnamese prime minister Pham Van

Dong.”84 Seaborn quickly got to the issue at hand by stating that Lyndon Johnson was a man of

peace. However, he remained fully committed to making sure Southeast Asia does not come

under the control of communism. And he is determined to keep his promises of protecting

South Vietnam. “Moreover, Johnson’s patience was not limitless. If he had to choose between

withdrawal and escalation, he would choose escalation.”85 Pham Van Dong didn’t seem to be

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impressed, as he responded to Seaborn’s message by stating that Vietcong and their supporters

were determined to continue the struggle regardless of cost. Moreover, he added, that the will

of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese people to resist and to continue the struggle has

astonished even the North Vietnamese leaders.86 However, the North Vietnamese Prime

Minister rejected the claim that North Vietnam was controlling and directing Vietcong activity

in the South. And according to him, North Vietnam had no intentions of provoking the U.S. by

increasing North Vietnamese role in the conflict.87 On the other hand, Pham Van Dong did not

seem concerned about the possibility of the United States starting direct attacks on North

Vietnam. Instead “He assured Seaborn that his people could withstand whatever the Americans

threw their way.”88 In spite of Pham Van Dong’s apparent confidence that the U.S. – South

Vietnam forces would be eventually defeated, he “did not close the door on diplomatic

settlement”; and proceeded to outline to Seaborn what the North Vietnamese leaders

supposedly saw as a just, diplomatic solution to the War.89

Pham Van Dong’s emphasis on Hanoi’s patience and a desire to avoid provoking the U.S.

was aimed at creating a solution which would allow the U.S. a “face-saving exit from the war.”90

In fact, North Vietnamese strategists have long been thinking about creating an opportunity for

such an exit, for the U.S.; because they knew about the great military capabilities of the U.S.

and did not wish to provoke it to escalate the War.91

Seaborn faithfully wrote down, in his reports, everything Pham Van Dong told him

during the meeting. He also wrote down the results of his additional observations; in which he

noted that it seemed to him that the general mood in Hanoi was “one of unyielding

commitment to the war.”92 “There was no evidence of war-weariness,” and all the North

Vietnamese that he met claimed to be determined to continue the struggle as long as necessary

to achieve those objectives, which they claimed “they were bound to achieve in the long run.”93

However, Washington’s senior strategists had little interest in genuinely understanding

Seaborn’s complex message. While Seaborn and other Canadian officials saw both positive and

negative in his description of Hanoi as being “both determined and restrained, both supremely

confident of eventual victory and committed to not provoking the United States,” Washington’s

policymakers saw only the negative.94 In fact, the only thing that mattered to them “was that

their attempt at coercive diplomacy had failed.” In mid 1964, the Johnson administration had

no interest in dialogue with North Vietnam, or in “seeking a face-saving exit from the war.”95

USA – USSR Relationship

In early 1964, the USSR tried to restrain North Vietnam and to warn the US about the

dangers of escalation. However, in February 1964, it was reported by the CIA that the USSR was

reluctant to “undertake major new commitments in unproven territory.” In fact, throughout

1964, the US government generally believed that the USSR’s “desire to build détente [improved

mutual relations] with the US would inhibit … [its] involvement in Vietnam.”96 Moreover, in the

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spring of 1964, the situation in Vietnam seemed to point, at least in the eyes of President

Johnson, towards cooperation between America and the USSR. After all, at the time, Jonson

had the impression that the Soviets “would be more interested in saving Vietnam” than

Americans.97 In July of the same year, the USSR “threatened to resign as co-chairman of the

Geneva conference on Laos unless the US” stopped its military involvement in Southeast Asia.98

Aside from its several other aims, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was also a part of Johnson

administration’s strategy of “resolving crisis by sending clear messages of intent.” By creating a

tenser atmosphere around the Vietnam issue, the US was signaling to USSR that it was time to

bring the out of control North Vietnam to heel.99 The USSR’s official reaction, to America’s

August 5th retaliation against North Vietnam for the alleged incident in the Gulf of Tonkin on

August 4th, “was actually quite moderate.” However, Khrushchev did not hesitate to contact

Johnson and urged “composure and restraint,” while condemning America’s aim of

strengthening the position of South Vietnamese regime, which he called corrupt and rotten.

Johnson replied to this by saying that the United States “reserved the right to respond to

aggression”; but also told Khrushchev that anything he could do to restrain the North Vietnam

“from further reckless action in this area will be most helpful to peace.”100 It was also reported

that the USSR’s foreign minister had stated that the Tonkin Gulf crisis has irritated the USSR by

putting it into an “uncomfortable situation.” And despite the Soviet press issuing strong

warnings to the US, no significant Soviet military response to the crisis took place.101

However, in retrospect, the influence of the Tonkin Gulf crisis on Soviet policy towards

Vietnam seems to have been much more significant. In fact, there was soon a policy shift. The

new Soviet policy towards Vietnam combined more military aid to North Vietnam with efforts

to facilitate an international diplomatic settlement of the problems in Vietnam. This policy

reflected “a variety of Soviet aims and motives.”102 One was clearly “a feeling of duty to a

socialist ally.” Another possible motive may have been the Soviet leaders’ vision of the possible

geopolitical benefits, which would come to the USSR if it started to more forcefully resist

American influence in the whole South Asian region. USSR “certainly did not wish to be seen as

irrelevant to the region’s future.” Moreover, a greater military commitment to Vietnam might

also make the USSR look more intimidating on the international arena, especially to the USA.103

President Johnson and his advisers thought that an American failure to force North

Vietnam to give up its claim to South Vietnam would encourage the Soviet Union to resume its

expansionist behaviour.104 This fear of renewed Soviet expansionism stemmed, at the time,

from the sudden ousting, on October 15, 1964, of Soviet Union’s leader, Nikita Khrushchev, and

his replacement by Leonid Brezhnev (as the new First Secretary of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union) and Alexei Kosygin (as the new Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, i.e. a

Premier of the USSR). This led to some anxiety, among US leaders, as to the course of USSR’s

policy under the new regime.105 After all, US analysts of the time had a poor understanding of

Soviet leadership changes. They knew well, however, that power, in the USSR, had changed

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hands only twice before; and both times this change led to chaotic disruption in Soviet affairs.

Hence, it was unclear to them whether or not this latest change would lead to the

abandonment of Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the US, or to a closer

relationship between the Soviet Union and China.106

On February 3rd, 1965, the CIA had reported recent sightings of Soviet anti-aircraft

weapons in North Vietnam. Soviet aid to North Vietnam was starting to flow, following clear

evidence that the Vietcong were making significant military progress in South Vietnam.107

Moreover, the leadership in Moscow (USSR’s capital) “had just announced a high profile trip” to

Hanoi (North Vietnam’s capital) by the Soviet Premier, Kosygin. All of this led a number of

officials, in the Johnson administration, to believe that the Soviets have decided that the US and

its South Vietnamese allies are already losing the war against the Vietcong. And that as a result,

the Soviets concluded that it would be safe to start supporting the Vietnamese Communists, to

speed up the demise of USA’s power in South Vietnam.108

On February 7th, 1965, the Vietcong launched an artillery attack “against a US marine

compound at Pleiku, in the central highlands” of South Vietnam. Allegedly in retaliation, a few

hours later and despite Kosygin’s presence in Hanoi, the US started a series of bombing attacks

on North Vietnam.109 However, Kosygin’s presence in Hanoi, during the US-ordered bombings

of North Vietnam, caused considerable outrage from the Soviets, as well as anxiety and

disagreement among American leaders. In fact, on February 9th, USSR’s Ambassador to the US,

Anatoly Dobrynin, protested about ‘arbitrary acts’ of retaliation; and later asked, then Vice

President of the US, whether he could imagine USSR bombing another country while President

Johnson was visiting it.110 Dobrynin’s protests were far from being merely political polemics. In

fact, Johnson was very anxious about this matter. “After all, there was always the possibility of

Soviet retaliation in Berlin.”111 (At the end of WWII, Berlin ended up inside the Soviet-controlled

East Germany; but with half of it being controlled by the US and its allies. This Western half of

Berlin has long been considered by the Soviets to be a capitalist ‘sore’ in a ‘healthy’ communist

land, and hence worthy of elimination. In fact, the Soviets have already attempted to do so

during the first few years following WWII.112) Moreover, Johnson was not the only one in the

White House with anxiety over the wisdom of bombing North Vietnam, while Kosygin was in

residence there. In the first White House meeting aimed at addressing this issue, on February

7th, the Johnson Administration was almost evenly split on the issue, with those supporting the

bombing clearly having some doubts about their choice. However, Johnson, believing that

Kosygin was in Hanoi “to give the North Vietnamese substantial help,” sided with the

supporters of the bombing. So on February 8th, the bombing continued despite Kosygin’s

continued presence.113 However, the opinion of the majority, in the Johnson Administration,

seems to have changed considerably in the next few days. In fact, in a similar top-level meeting

on February 10th, most of the former supporters of continued bombing, despite Kosygin’s

presence, were now against the idea of continuing to bomb North Vietnam even while Kosygin

12


was no longer in Hanoi but visiting nearby communist countries. (Kosygin visited China on

February 10th, and North Korea, on February 11th.) However, Johnson decided to side with his

Administration’s minority voice, which argued that basing US actions on the geographic location

of Soviet diplomats, at any particular moment, would be a serious sign of American weakness,

and tantamount to giving the Soviets control over US actions.114

On February 13th, 1965, President Johnson “authorised a programme of ‘measured and

limited’ bombing.” The program was named the Rolling Thunder and officially began on March

2nd. The original plan was to start it a day earlier.115 But March 1st, 1965 happened to be a day

on which an international communist meeting took place in Moscow. Consequently, US

Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, advised President Johnson against starting the Rolling

Thunder on this day, arguing that such a move would “stir up” the Soviets.116

Conclusion

Thus, we have seen that with regards to American decisions to escalate the Vietnam

War in 1964 and 1965, the relationship between the capitalist, democratic USA and the

communist, totalitarian China, North Vietnam, and USSR was one of mutual mistrust, fear,

anxiety and uncertainty over how to proceed, and mutual attempts at intimidation and

psychological manipulation.

In particular, at that time, the leaders of the US feared China because it just developed

an atomic bomb and has long been engaging in anti-American rhetoric. Consequently, they

thought that China was responsible for North Vietnamese aggression. At the same time,

Chinese leaders were experiencing considerable anxiety over American military activities in

nearby Vietnam; and throughout 1964/1965 their directives appeared to show their

uncertainty over whether they should prepare for an American invasion of China, attempt to

intimidate the US by positioning its forces near the Vietnamese border, or help North Vietnam

in the war against Americans.

The relationship between the US and North Vietnam was along similar lines. In fact, as

we have seen, the US attempted to intimidate North Vietnam through diplomatic methods

despite already having plans to expand the war against it. Moreover, the uncertainty and

anxiety of the US over how to best proceed with the War is indicated by the fact that the

emissary they sent to Vietnam was also tasked with assessing the War-related morale and unity

of the North Vietnamese government and the North Vietnamese population. The disagreement

among US leaders over what their emissary should say, points in the same direction. For his

part, the North Vietnamese prime minister, who met with the emissary, sent by the US, showed

considerable skill in psychological manipulation and intimidation. After all, he made a, mostly

false, statement that the North Vietnamese are not afraid of American military power and are

bound to win the War either way; rejected the claim that North Vietnam is directing and

controlling the Vietcong in the South; but still welcomed a diplomatic solution to the war.

13


Unfortunately the complexity of his message only confused already anxious Americans, who

now only saw the need to back up their threats to North Vietnam with a real show of force.

Finally, the relationship between the US and the USSR, over the issue of the Vietnam

War, was the most wide-ranging and diverse with regards to all the negative aspects, outlined

above, of the American relationship with the communist countries. In fact, neither side was

sure of what the other side was willing or unwilling to do to get its point across. At the same

time, neither side felt certain of what it in fact should or should not do in order to promote it

interests. Moreover, the relationship was characterized by a multitude of unfounded

assumptions, variously carried out threats, and considerable internal disagreements (at least

among the US leaders) over how to proceed.

14


Notes

1. Allan M. Winkler, The Cold War: A History in Documents (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2000), 11.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 38.

8. Ibid., 50.

9. Ibid., 52-53.

10. Ibid., 55.

11. Ibid., 58-59.

12. Ibid., 58.

13. Ibid., 59.

14. Winkler, The Cold War, 12.

15. Ibid., 12-13.

16. Britta Bjornlund, The Cold War (San Diego: Lucent Books, 2002), 42.

17. Ibid., 42-43.

18. Ibid., 43.

19. Ibid., 44.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 65, 67-68.

23. Ibid., 68.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Maurice Isserman, Vietnam War, Updated Edition (New York: Facts On File, 2003),

13.

28. Ibid., 13-16.

29. Ibid., 18-19.

30. Ibid., 21-26.

31. Ibid., 26-28.

32. Ibid., 32-40.

33. Ibid., 62-66.

15


34. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War

in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 146.

35. Ibid., 146.

36. Isserman, Vietnam War, 50.

37. Logevall, Choosing War, 146.


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., 49-50.

41. Ibid., 50.

42. Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the

Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 24.

43. Ibid., 25.

44. Ibid., 24.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 24-25.

48. Qiang Zhai, “A One-sided Picture of the Chinese-Vietnamese Ties during the

Vietnam War,” in Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War, ed. Andrew Wiest

and Michael J. Doidge (New York: Routledge, 2010), 52.


50. Franz Schurmann, Peter Dale Scott and Reginald Zelnik, The Politics of Escalation in

Vietnam (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 40.

51. Isserman, Vietnam War, 52-53.

52. Ibid., 53.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., 53-54.

56. Schurmann, Scott and Zelnik, The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam, 41.

57. Isserman, Vietnam War, 54-55.

58. Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons

of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 139.


60. McNamara with VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 139.

61. Mark Moyar, “Section I Response,” in Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the

Vietnam War, ed. Andrew Wiest and Michael J. Doidge (New York: Routledge, 2010), 69.

62. Ibid.

63. Zhai, “A One-sided Picture of the Chinese-Vietnamese Ties during the Vietnam War,”

51-52.

16


64. Ibid., 52.

65. Moyar, “Section I Response,” 69.

66. Ibid.

67. Zhai, “A One-sided Picture of the Chinese-Vietnamese Ties during the Vietnam War,”

52.

68. William Stueck, “What We Still Do Not Know: Moyar’s Treatment of Global

Communism,” in Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War, ed. Andrew Wiest

and Michael J. Doidge (New York: Routledge, 2010), 43-44.

69. Ibid., 43.

70. Logevall, Choosing War, 155.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., 156.

74. Ibid., 157.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., 157-159.

81. Ibid., 159.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., 160-161.

84. Ibid., 161.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., 161-162.

89. Ibid., 162.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., 163.

93. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. John Dumbrell, President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 2004), 92-93.

17


97. Ibid., 94.

98. Ibid., 92.

99. Ibid., 93.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid., 94.

103. Ibid.


105. VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 23-24.

106. Ibid., 24.

107. Dumbrell, President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism, 95-96.

108. Ibid., 96.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Bjornlund, The Cold War, 37.

113. Dumbrell, President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism, 96-97.

114. Ibid., 97.

115. Ibid., 96.

116. Ibid.

18


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