the repertoire of modern revolution 13 may 2008. regimes and repertoires high capacity, non-...
TRANSCRIPT
Regimes and Repertoires
• High capacity, non-democratic regimes– Lots of prescribed and
forbidden performances, few tolerated performances
– “Resistance repertoires”– Medium levels of violence
• Low capacity, non-democratic regimes– Few prescribed or tolerated
performances, lots of forbidden performances
– High levels of violence
• High capacity, democratic regimes– Many tolerated
performances, few prescribed or forbidden performances
– “Social movement repertoire”
– Low levels of violence• Low capacity, democratic
regimes– Few tolerated, prescribed,
or forbidden performances– Medium levels of violence
The Social Movement and its Repertoire
• An invention of the 19th century• Promotes a concerted, generally non-violent
campaign of claim-making performances for particular purposes– Street demonstrations– Letter-writing and petition-signing campaigns– Public lectures, sit-ins, use of the media, etc.
• The disruptive but non-violent character of these performances may keep a problem on the agenda, mobilize supporters, and persuade the persuadable
The social movement and its repertoire
• Generates mobilization through– Forging protest identities by drawing on pre-
existing organizations and networks– Enhancing those identities through public
displays of “Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment”
• It is a “modular repertoire” useful in many places and times– Well adapted to claim-making in democratic or
semi-democratic regimes
An apparent paradox
• Mobilization is required to overthrow a high-capacity, non-democratic regime and create a high-capacity democracy
• Mobilization is apparently easiest where it is least needed
The “Orange Revolutions”
• The “Orange Revolution”– What kind of regime did the Ukraine have in 2004?– What was the occasion for the “revolution”? – What kinds of opportunities did this present for the
opposition?– What sorts of performances did they use to press
their claims? Why these and not others?– What did they signal with these performances? What
did such signaling achieve?– What was the outcome?
The color revolutions
The color revolution: a model
• Occasion: A Stolen Election in a Hybrid Regime• Actors:
– A united opposition– A divided government– Foreign election monitors– Foreign governments supporting pro-democracy movements
• Repertoire: A variation on the “social movement” repertoire– Before the election: radical youth movements delegitimize the
regime using unconventional protest tactics– After the election, but before the signing-in of elected officials:
massive mobilization (using non-violent resistance tactics taken from the work of Gene Sharp)
The Occasion: A Coordination Game
A and B protest, both get their desired outcome of regime change
A protests and gets jailed, B stays warm and cosy at home, the regime stays intact
B protests and gets jailed, A stays warm and cosy at home, the regime stays intact
Neither A nor B protest, both stay warm and cosy at home, the regime stays intact
The Occasion
• Stolen elections provide natural “coordination points” for protest
• Hybrid regimes are especially vulnerable at such points
• But the success of mobilization drops off once elected officials have been sworn in: limited time frame
Foreign actors and their role in a stolen election
• Foreign election monitoring increases the costs of falsification and repression
• Direct monetary support to the opposition may increase their chances of sustaining mobilization
Government actors
• Divisions in government make it harder to decisively prevent the opposition from taking the initiative– E.g., in the Ukraine, divisions within the
security forces made it difficult for the government to order a crackdown
– In many hybrid regimes, the opposition has some political base (e.g., controls legislative seats or local governments)
Learning process: the opposition
• Successful revolution in one case energizes the opposition in countries similarly situated– Similar “hybrid regimes”– Similar cultural context (post-soviet regimes)
• Successful revolution in one case may make people in less-advantageous situations think they have a chance
• Direct learning: techniques of revolution are directly learned from innovators elsewhere
• Adaptations are made to the particular context
Diffusion of Otpor’s tactics
Kmara (Georgia, Rose revolution)
Oborona (Russia)
Otpor (Serbia, Bulldozer Revolution)
Innovations and adaptations to local contexts
• Different symbols and colors (roses in Georgia, Orange clothing in Ukraine) to sustain protest identities
• New performances: violent attacks on government offices in the Tulip revolution in Kyrgystan
Learning processes: the government
• At first, the success of revolution in one case may lead to divisions within similarly-situated regimes
• Then elites learn:– Monitor foreign NGOs or expel them– Prevent or diminish foreign electoral observer
presence– Manipulate electoral campaigns rather than elections
themselves– Arrest activists etc.
Color revolutions: a self-limiting process
• Learning by the government eventually succeeds in coping with the tactics of the revolutionaries
• Later revolutionaries may have fewer advantages to draw from, and the contexts may be too different from the original one for the same techniques to work
Tipping points
Factors making it easier to revolt
• Past history of electoral fraud• Medium level of civil/political rights (i.e., a hybrid regime)• Relatively high levels of income• Opposition representation in the legislature or local
government• Large or growing number of university students• Tradition of large-scale protest• Regional divisions within ruling groups• Divisions within security forces, ties to opposition• No oil• Ties to foreign NGOs
So what happened in Armenia?
• A failed revolution– Not an obviously stolen election (certified by
OSCE)– Large-scale protests, using same tactics as in
the other color revolutions– No divisions within the government: after
some time, the government found a suitable excuse for dispersing the protesters and did so successfully
Other failed opportunities for revolution
• Mexico and Venezuela– Not an obviously stolen election: difficulties in
mobilizing supporters– No divisions within the government– Different context
• Zimbabwe– No foreign observes or support for the opposition– Poverty– Different context
The repertoires and regimes of revolution
• The American revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th century– Seeking republican self-government– Draw on liberal ideas and tactics developed in the
American revolution and refined later– Against colonial states/regimes
• The great revolutions of the 19th and early 20th century– Seeking social transformation– Draw on ideas and tactics developed in the French
revolution and refined later– Against absolutist agrarian monarchies
The repertoires and regimes of revolution
• The “Velvet Revolutions” of 1989– Seeking liberal democracies– Its repertoire draws on home-grown
innovations– Against post-totalitarian regimes
• The “color revolutions” of the early 2000s– Seeking liberal democracies– Against hybrid regimes