the report of the advisory committee on retrospective ... ball, linda brown, jim dufresne, roger...

183
The Report of the Advisory Committee on Retrospective Exposure Profiling of the Production Processes at the GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION FACILITY in Peterborough, Ontario 1945-2000 Prepared by Robert DeMaeo, B.A., M.A., D.O.H.S and Dale DeMaeo, B.A., MSc. with GE Reree Members of the Advisory Commiee: John Ball, Linda Brown, Jim Dufresne, Roger Fowler, Marilyn Harding, Sue James, Carl Jenson, Don McConnell, Gordon Terry, Bill Woodbeck, Jim Gill

Upload: phungnga

Post on 15-Jul-2018

212 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

The Report of the Advisory Committee on Retrospective Exposure Profiling of the Production Processes at the

GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION FACILITY in Peterborough, Ontario

1945-2000

Prepared by

Robert DeMatteo, B.A., M.A., D.O.H.S and Dale DeMatteo, B.A., MSc.

with

GE Retiree Members of the Advisory Committee: John Ball, Linda Brown, Jim Dufresne, Roger Fowler, Marilyn Harding, Sue James,

Carl Jenson, Don McConnell, Gordon Terry, Bill Woodbeck, Jim Gill

The Report of the Advisory Committee on Retrospective Exposure Profiling of the Production Processes at the

GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION FACILITY in Peterborough, Ontario

1945-2000

Prepared by

Robert DeMatteo, B.A., M.A., D.O.H.S and Dale DeMatteo, B.A., MSc.

with

GE Retiree Members of the Advisory Committee:John Ball, Linda Brown, Jim Dufresne, Roger Fowler, Marilyn Harding, Sue James,

Carl Jenson, Don McConnell, Gordon Terry, Bill Woodbeck, Jim Gill

Volume 1 - May 15, 2017 lhcope343

Table of ContentsINTRODUCTION 1BACKGROUND TO THE GE PETERBOROUGH PRODUCTION FACILITY 3METHODS 7LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE 10BRIEF OUTLINE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 10HOW THE MAIN BODY OF THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED, AND HOW TO USE IT 16DISCUSSION 16LIST OF GE WORKER/FAMILY PARTICIPANTS 18ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 18EXPOSURE PROFILES BY BUILDING:

BUILDING: #4 DEPARTMENT: CAPACITOR 21

BUILDING: #5 DEPARTMENT: COIL IMPREGNATION 25

BUILDING: #7 DEPARTMENT: ARMATURE 29

BUILDING: #8 DEPARTMENT: MACHINE SHOP 47

BUILDING: #9 DEPARTMENT: FRACTIONAL MOTORS 55

BUILDING: #10 DEPARTMENT: FOUNDRY 61

BUILDING: #12 DEPARTMENT: PUNCH PRESS 69

BUILDING: #14 DEPARTMENT: POWDER PAINT/STRUCTURAL STEEL 75

BUILDING14/14A DEPARTMENT:STRUCTURALSTEEL(66-85) 79

BUILDING: #16 DEPARTMENT: SWITCH GEAR 87

BUILDING #16A TRANSPORTATION/DIESEL EQUIPMENT 95

BUILDING:#17(#21,#18N) DEPARTMENT:CARPENTRY 101

BUILDING: #18 DEPARTMENT: INDUCTION MOTORS 105

BUILDING: #20 DEPARTMENT: DRIVE SYSTEMS 113

BUILDING: #21 DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR 117

BUILDING: #22 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE 123

BUILDING: #22, 24, 26 DEPARTMENT: TRACTION MOTORS 131

BUILDING: #23 DEPARTMENT: ELECTROPLATING 135

BUILDING: #24 DEPARTMENT: FORMEX 141

BUILDING: #26 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE 143

BUILDING: #30 DEPARTMENT: BUS DUCT 147

BUILDING: #34 DEPARTMENT: STEEL CUTTING 151

ADDENDUM1-EXPANDEDDISCUSSIONOFTHEQUALITATIVEMETHODSUSEDINTHEGE RETROSPECTIVE EXPOSURE PROFILE STUDY 154

ADDENDUM2-THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE 162

REFERENCES 168

ABBREVIATIONS:

WSIB- Workplace Safety and Insurance Board

IARC-InternationalAgencyforResearchonCancer

MOL-Ministry of Labour (Ontario)

ACGIH-AmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienist

TLV-Threshold Limit Values

OEL-OccupationalExposureLimits

NTP-NationalToxicologicalProgram

MAC-MaximumAllowableConcentration

EC-European Commission

IARC Carcinogenicity Classifications:

Group 1-HumanCarcinogens

2A-ProbableHumanCarcinogens

2B-PossibleHumanCarcinogen

Group 3-NotClassified

Group 4-ProbablyNotCarcinogenictoHumans

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

1

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RETROSPECTIVE EXPOSURE PROFILING OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESSES AT THE

GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION FACILITY IN PETERBOROUGH, ONTARIO1945-2000

Prepared by

Robert DeMatteo, B.A., M.A., D.O.H.S and Dale DeMatteo, B.A., MSc.

with

GE Retiree Members of the Advisory Committee: John Ball, Linda Brown, Jim Dufresne, Roger Fowler, Marilyn Harding, Sue James,

Carl Jenson, Don McConnell, Gordon Terry, Bill Woodbeck, and Jim Gill (retired Unifor National Health and Safety Director)

INTRODUCTION

ThepurposeofthisresearchprojectwastodevelopretrospectiveexposureprofilesoftheworkprocessesattheGEelectricalproductionfacilityinPeterborough,Ontariobetween1945and2000.Assuch,itinvolvedasystematicefforttocollectandanalyzeempiricalinformationabouthowproductionwascarriedoutinthisverycomplexheavyindustrialoperation.Historically,thisworkplaceisanexampleoftheintersectionof20thcenturyindustrialandchemical“revolutions”.ThisworkwasundertakentodocumenttheextentandnatureofchemicalandphysicalexposuresthatarepossiblylinkedwiththevariouscancersandotherdiseasesthatmanyGEemployeesandtheirfamiliessufferedovertheyears.

Themajorsourceofthisinformationcamefromtheworkersthemselvesthroughaseriesofintensivefocusgroupandkeyinformantinterviewsthatwentonforover8months.Thisinformationwascorroboratedbygovernmentinspectionreportsfrom1945to2000inadditiontojointhealthandsafetycommitteeminutes,internalmemoranda,andindustrialhygieneliterature.

Beforeproceedingtothesubstanceandfindingsoftheretrospectiveexposurestudy,itisimportanttosituatethisstudyinthebroadersocialandscientificcontextthatframestheresultsandhowtheymaybeviewedandusedinOntario’soccupationalhealthsystem.

Thestudywasmeanttoaddressemployees’concernsthattheextentandnatureoftheirexposuresandworkingconditionswerebeingsubjecttomisrepresentation.Indeed,withtheexceptionofaverycomprehensiveexposureprofilestudyoftwodepartmentsatGEbyindustrialhygienist,SonyaLaloftheOccupationalHealthClinicsforOntarioWorker(OHCOW),therewaslittlesystematicempiricalstudyofexposureconditions.

TherewasanuneasysensethatwhatwasperceivedasanextraordinarilyhighincidenceofcanceramongGEemployeeswasnotbeingaddressedtoascertainwhethertherewasaworkplaceconnection.Giventhelargenumberofcarcinogenicchemicalsusedattheplant,theirsuspicionsthattherewasaconnectioncannotbeviewedasunfounded.Itwasalsotheirviewthatthecompany’seffortstostudytheproblemmisrepresentedtheexposureconditionsattheplant,andthatsuchmisrepresentationunder-mindtheirdiseaseclaimsbeforetheWorkplaceSafetyandInsuranceBoard(WSIB).

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

2

Occupationaldiseaseremainsalargelyunder-addressedpublichealthproblem.Onlyasmallfractionofwork-relatedacceptedclaimsareforoccupationallycauseddiseases.And,anevensmallerfractionareforoccupationallycausedcancers(Yassi1981;Ison1989).YassiestimatedinherbackgroundstudyfortheWeilerinquiryintooccupationaldiseaseinOntario,thatatotalof6,000occupationallyrelateddeathsoccurannuallyinOntariofrom3majorsourcesalonethatarerelatedtotoxicexposures,butgounreportedtothegovernmentandtheworkerscompensationsystem.Someofthisisexplainedbytheratherlonglatencyperiodforcancertodevelop…sometimesnotappearinguntilafterretirementandthereforemissedaswork-related.

Overtheyearsseveralinvestigatorshaveidentifiedanumberofthemajorobstaclestoworkplacediseaserecognition(Yassi1981;Ison1989).Someoftheseinclude:

• Burdenofproofrequiringscientificcertainty

• “Legalized”Thresholdrequirementsratherthanguidelines

• Dismissingpatient’sdoctors’assessmentofwork-relatedness

• Over-emphasisonclaimant’smedicalhistoryratherthanworkprocessinteractions

• Lackofexposuredata

• Paucityofoccupationalhealthresearchgenerally

• Lackofoccupationalhealthtrainingforphysicians

Byfar,themostinfluentialobstacletodiseaserecognitionanditsconsequenceshasbeentheonerousburdenofproofplacedontheworkercoupledwithanoutdatedviewofhowdiseasedisproducedbywork,onethatisoutofsyncwithadvancesinoccupationalhealthandcancerresearch(Clappetal.2008;HanahanandWeinberg2011);HanahanandWeinberg2000;Welshonsetal.2003;Kortenkampetal.2011;TroskoandUpham2005;Diamanti-Kandarakisetal.2009;Kortenkamp2008;Ewertzetal.2001;Hardelletal.1997;Senn1991;Yassi1981;ZiemandDavidoff1992)andwhatthelawrequiresforwork-relateddisease(SupremeCourtofCanada[2016]CourtfileNo.36300;Ison1989;LawReformCommissionofCanada1986).Thisobstacletodiseaserecognitionisimposedbysocialpolicyandhasitssourceinthepredominantparadigmof“scientificcertainty”thatrequiresdefinitiveproofthat“X”causes“Y”inaworldthatbynatureiscomplexandmulti-causal.Thisparadigmisimbeddedincurrentscientificresearchandstandardsettingprocessesandisexpressedinourobsessionwithprotectingagainst“falsepositives”withoutthinkingabouttheconsequencesof“falsenegatives”(Scott2005).Unfortunately,thismindsethaspermeatedintoadministrativetribunalsandstandardsettingbodies,whichhasproduceditsownsetofdetrimentalconsequencesincludingunjustdenialofcompensationfordiseasescausedbyworkanddelayedregulatoryactionfordiseaseprevention.

With respect to the issue of burden of proof, it is important to note the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent rulingrenderedonJune24,2016regardingalowercourtrulingonabreastcancerclustercaseamongagroupofhealthtechnologistsworkingataBritishColumbiahealthfacility.Inthisdecision,theSupremeCourtfoundthatthestandardofproofsetbylawsgoverningworkers’compensationssystemsdonotrequireastandardofscientificcertainty,northatimposeduponplaintiffsinaciviltortclaim(i.e.,thebalanceofprobabilities).AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,thesearetoostringentastandardofproof,and“…whollyinapplicabletodeterminingcausationintheworkers’claims…”(SupremeCourtofCanada,Docket:36300,2016).Inessence,inworkercompensationlaw,insufficientevidenceisnot“no”evidence,andinconclusiveevidencemaysufficeindeterminingcausationinthecaseofoccupationaldiseaseclaims.Incontrast,thecurrentapproachextendsthepresumptionofinnocencetochemicalsandphysicalagentsinthelightofscientificuncertainty.Thereal

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

3

questionis“Whatdowedointhefaceofscientificuncertainty?”Thisisnotsimplyascientificquestion,butratherhastodowithsocialvaluesandethics,andtowhatextentwevaluehumanlife.

Thecurrentapproachtooccupationaldiseaserecognitionresultsinadistortedviewoftheextentofoccupationaldiseaseanditscauses.Thishasledtoquestionablepolicyoutcomeswithrespecttolongdelaysinneededregulatoryactionandtheprotectionofworkersfromhazardouschemicalandphysicalagents(Watterson1999;Scott2005).

BACKGROUND TO THE GE PETERBOROUGH PRODUCTION FACILITY

Incontrasttostudyingindustriesassociatedwithasinglemanufacturingprocesswithfewchemicalsandrelativelyfewjobtasksandexposurepatterns,theGEplantinPeterboroughundertookproductiononamassivescalewithacomplexmixofindustrialprocessesutilizinghugequantitiesofsome3000chemicals(Lal2005/6).Someoftheseindustriesincluded:themanufactureofsmalltomassiveelectricmotorsandgenerators;appliancemanufacturing;smallandlargeelectricalcomponentsforurbanelectricalutilities;andanuclearfacilitythatproducednuclearfuelbundlesforCANDUnuclearreactors.Theseinvolvedacomplexmixofindustrialproductsthatincluded:massiveweldingoperationsthroughouttheplant;plasticsandrubberproductionforwireinsulation;production/preparationofcopperwireofvarioussizesandspecifications;andmachiningandpouringmoltenmetalsforlargemotorsandturbinestodrivelocomotives,ships,andlargeelectricalutilities.ThesizeofproductionisillustratedbythefactthatGEPeterborough’sPVCproductionfacilityused40,000poundofleadperweekjustinthePVCpelletizingoperation(Tidey1968),nottomentionmassiveamountsofepoxyandpolyesterresinsusedtocoatandinsulatenearlyeveryproductitproduced.GEwas“product”drivenwithnewchemicalsandworkprocessesintroducedregularly.GEPeterboroughretireesdescribetheplantasachanging“industrialmall”withmanyunitsindependentlyrunandmanaged.

Intheseproductionprocesses,largeamountsofsolventswereusedascleanersanddegreasersincluding:toluene,benzene,trichloroethylene(TCE),1,1,1-Trichloroethane(TCNU),methylethylkeytone(MEK),MEKPeroxide,perchloroethylene,acetone,xylene,naphthagas,carbontetrachloride,amongothers.Forexample,TCEwasusedinlargeheatedvatsthatcouldmeasure8’x10’x6’aswellasappliedbyhandbyhundredsofworkerstowipedownlargesurfaceswithragssoakedinTCEandtoluene.AddingtothischemicalmixwasthegenerationoflargevolumesofweldingfumesfromweldingoperationsgoingonthroughoutthePeterboroughcomplex.Manyoftheseproductsweremassivestructuresthatwouldtakeweekstofabricatewith5to10weldersworkingthreeshiftsdaily.Inaddition,machiningoperationsproducedlargeamountsofmetalworkingfluid(MWF)mistsandaerosolsfromheatedfluidsusedtocoolandlubricatematerialsandcutters.Themachininginvolvedlarge25’and40’boringmachines.Hugevolumesofdust,comprisedofasbestos,fibreglass,epoxy/polyesterresin,andheavymetals,werecontinuallygeneratedfromcutting,grinding,sandingandbuffingtasks.PeterboroughGEadmittedtousingasmuchas500lbs.ofasbestosdaily(Rajhans1971).

Addingtothecomplexmixofchemicalswasaconstantoff-gassingofvolatileorganiccompoundsfromthewoodblockfloors(consistingofcreosote-impregnated3”x4”woodenblockssetonendgrain)throughoutthebuildingcomplex.Thisflooringcontinuallyoozedcreosotes,especiallyduringperiodswhengroundwaterwouldrisethroughthesubfloor.Thesefloorswerere-treatedperiodicallyandsometimescoatedwithglyptolpaint.CreosotesarehighlyvolatileandclassifiedbytheInternationalAgencyforResearchonCancer(IARC)asa2Acarcinogenthatis‘probablycarcinogenictohumans’.Aswell,becauseofthefloor’sstructure,variousotherchemicalsspilled,includingleadandmercury,becametrappedinthecrevicesbetweentheblocks.Giventhewidespreaduseofthisflooringintheplant,suchspillscontributedtothetoxicburdenexperiencedbyworkers.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

4

AsignificantfactorthatconditionedproductionandthesafetycultureatGEPeterboroughwasaworkorganizationalapproachthatincludedthepieceratesystem,inoperationuntil1988,encouragingemployeestoworktotheirphysicaloptimumand,oftencircumventsafeworkpracticestomaintainproductionrates.

AnothervariablecontributingtoGEPeterborough’suniquenessisthephysicalstructureitself.GEmotorproductionwascarriedoutprimarilyinthecenturyold“Edison”buildingthatisapproximately1,030’by1,629’withabuildingareaof38.5acresoccupyingmorethan50acresindowntownPeterborough.Thisisan“openconcept”buildingtypicalofthetimewithsaw-toothwindowsatroofleveltomaximizesunlightandallownaturalventilationoftheintenseheatcreatedbythevariousworkprocesses.AstheseworkprocessesshiftedfromthemanufactureoflightingproductsintheEdisoneratothatofmotorsandgeneratorsduringtheGEera,thisnaturalsourceofventilationwastotallyinadequateforthisenormousproductionmix.Despiteworkareasreferredtoas“buildings”or“departments”theywere,infact,designatedareasseparatedbyindoor-vehicleroadwaysandwalkingaisles.Therewerefewtrulyisolatedstructures,sinceadditionswereconnectedtothemainbuildingbyhugedoorways,toaccommodatetrucksandcranes.Ceilingheightsreachedsome60’to70’hightoallowoverheadcranestopassfromsectiontosection.Ineffect,mostdepartmentssharedthesame,mainlynatural,ventilationsystemandthusthesamecontaminatedatmosphere.Therewasinsufficientmake-upair,whichcreatedanatmosphereofnegativepressurethroughoutthemainbuilding.Consequently,whatwasgeneratedindusts,fumes,orvaporsflowedreadilytoneighboringdepartments.Ineffect,therewasmajorcrosscontaminationbetween,andwithin,departments.

Workforce Considerations:

WhiletheGEPeterboroughworkforcehasremainedpredominantlymale,duringWorldWarIIwomenreplacedmenintheGEworkforceandproductionshiftedtothewareffort.Itwasduringthistimethattheplantbecameunionized.Asthewarended,menreturnedandtheworkforcesettledintoarelativelystableratioof70-75%menand25-30%women–whichhascontinuedtothepresent.(Olderretireesreportedthatintheirearlyyearsattheplanttherewasalsoacategoryofworkdesignated“boyswork”donebyyouths,priortotheintroductionofchildlabourlegislation).

Untilthemid-1990s,womenperformedwhatweregenerallyviewedas“women’swork”oroccupations–withmostworkinginmanufacturingproductionandapproximately1/3workinginofficeorclericaljobs.Women’sworkwasdescribedas“light”workinvolvingdetailed,finerepetitivetasksthatrequiredcloseup,manualwork.Someofthemajorcategoriesofwomen’sjobsincluded:“winders”whomanuallywoundcopperwireforcoils,orcoresforcapacitors;“tapers”whowoundinsulatingtapecomposedofadhesivesandfiberglass/asbestosaroundcoilsandotherelectricalcomponents;spraypaintersinpowderpaintoperations;handworkthatincludedsoldering,brazing,andetchingcircuitcardsandsemi-conductors;theassemblyandproductionofelectriccords(whichinvolvedstrippinginsulatedwirecontainingasbestosandsilversoldering)andworkformingplastic/ceramicplugsandsockets.WindingoperationsinthecapacitordepartmentinvolvedexposurestotoxicadhesivesaswellasexposuretoPCBs.

Women’sjobsweregenerallyperformedatworkbencheswith5to10womeninvolvedinmanuallystrippinganddegreasingwireinpreparationforsolderingandbrazing(whichincurredheavyexposuretoasbestos/fiberglassdusts,andleadandsolventfumes).Theseworkareaswerepoorlyornotventilated.Inaddition,womencouldbesubjecttosignificantby-standerexposuressincemanyofthesetaskswereperformedonmezzaninelevelsindepartmentsdirectlyabovebothintenseweldingoperationsandepoxydipping,baking,andgrindingoperationswheredensefumes,gases,anddustsfromtheseoperationswouldrisetoworkareasabove.Thiswasespeciallyseriousinarmature(bldg.7),busducts(bldg.30),andmachineshop(bldg.8).Officeandclericalpersonneldidnotfaremuchbetter.Toxicdustsgeneratedfrommanyofthemanufacturingoperationsmadeitswayintotheofficesofclericalworkersasevidencedbylargeaccumulationsofdustson

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

5

workers’desksandotherworkstations.Focusgroupparticipantsreportedthatofficeworkerswouldfindtheirdeskscoveredinablanketofdustwhentheyarrivedinthemorning--andfindanotherbuildupofdustwhentheycamebackfromlunch.

Problems Estimating Exposures Using GE Records:

Inthecourseofthisresearch,retireesidentifiedseriousproblemswiththeinformationGEPeterboroughsenttotheWSIBregardingtheirworkhistoriesandworkexposures.Thisincluded:wrongorincompleteinformation,missinghealthreports,andnoconsiderationofovertimeindeterminingworkexposures.Focusgroupdiscussionsidentifiedbroadersystemicproblemsrelatedtothefactthatemployeerecordswerelinkedtothecompany’saccountingsystem--inparticular,timeandproductcosting--ratherthanspecificallytodocumentworkhistories.Workwasrecordedbyemployee(jobcode)andlocation(unit/clock#)classifications.Therewerecategoriesofemployeeswhoseworkdemandedconstantmovementthroughouttheplantincluding:dispatchers,‘chasers’,mobilewelders,labourgangs,andmaintenanceworkers.Withlargemotorproduction,workerswererequiredtomovetothelocationoftheproductthustheirunitdesignationcouldbeinadifferentbuildingordepartmentfromwheretheyactuallyworked.Employeesworkinginsomeareas,suchasfractionalmotors,oronfinalproductionassembly,couldaccumulateasmanyas40tickets(i.e.40differentjobs)performedinaday.Theproduct-drivennatureofproductionrequiredaflexibleworkforceandemployeescouldbe:loanedouttodifferentdepartmentstomeetproductionschedulesordeadlines;shiftedtootherdepartmentsandjobsduringdowntime;andofferedalternative‘cleanup’workduringplantshutdownsorholidays--much,orall,ofwhichwasnotdocumentedinemployeeworkhistories.Relyingoncompanydocumentsasthesolesourcefordeterminingexposuresmaysignificantlyunderestimatethedegreeandnatureofworkerexposures.

What GE Knew About Chemical Hazards:

Companiesoftenattempttoexcusethemselvesfromculpabilityforoccupationaldiseasesbyclaimingthat“wejustdidn’tknowaboutthetoxiceffects”ofthesubstancestheirworkerswereexposedtoatthetime.Thisoft-repeateddefensebyGEfornothavingtakenadequateprecautionsfortheprotectionofitsemployeesisnolongercrediblegivenrecenthistoricalrevelationsofjustwhatGEknewaboutthehazardsofthechemicalsitsemployeesusedwithoutadequateprotection.

Inthecourseofourresearchwecameacrossabookbyrespectedoccupationalhealthresearcher,Dr.BarryCastleman(2005),identifyingthefactthatUSGeneralElectricknewabouttheharmfuleffectsofasbestos,lead,andotherchemicalsusedinitsproductionfacilitiesasfarbackasthe1920sand1930s.Inhisbook,CastlemandocumentstheworkofDr.AliceHamilton,renownedoccupationalhealthscholar,whoconductednumeroushealthsurveysoftheworkingconditionsatGE’splantsintheU.Sfrom1922to1934--includingliteraturereviewsontheharmfulhealtheffectsofindustrialchemicalsinuse.BasedonthisresearchshewarnedGerardSwope,thepresidentofUSGEatthetime,ofthehazardsandhealtheffectsofasbestosandotherindustrialchemicalsaffectingGE’sworkforce.Dr.HamiltoncontinuedtopersonallyadviseSwope(overaperiodof12years)aboutchemicalriskstoworkersaswellasrecommendationsforimprovinghealthconditionsatGEfacilities.InoneofHamilton’sletterstoGEVicePresident,CEEveleth,datedMay9,1929,shereportsmeetingaMr.DaltonoftheGESchenectadyWorks,whosuggestedshevisittwoGEfoundryplantsinCanada,“allofwhich,hesaid,areprettybad.”ShethenasksEveleth:“Doyouwishmetodothis?”(WehavefoundnoevidencethatHamiltonwasgiventheopportunitytovisitGEplantsinCanada).

PublishedlettersandreportskeptattheGEMuseuminSchenectady,NewYork(Castleman2005),documentthatinadditiontoasbestos,Dr.HamiltonidentifiedthehealthimpactofanumberofchemicalsusedbyGEincluding:oilsmoke,gasolineasasolvent,acids,paintspraying,benzene,cyanide,nitrobenzene,

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

6

aniline,formaldehyde,phenol,numeroussilicahazardsincludingsandblasting,mercury,leadcompounds,radium,carbontetrachloride,sulfurdioxide,acetone,kerosene,toluene,hydrogenfluoride,asphalt,x-rays,chromiumandnickelplating,welding,soldering,aswellasissuesrelatedtoeyeandskinirritants,ventilation,ergonomics,lighting,sanitationandmedicalservice.Hamiltonemphasizedtheimportanceofsubstitutingharmfulchemicalsasthefirstlevelofcontrollingharmfulexposures.

Importantly,Dr.Hamiltondescribed‘by-stander’hazardstothoseworkingnearweldersandsandblasterswithoutwearingprotectiveequipment.Whenherbook,“IndustrialPoisonsintheUnitedStates,”waspublishedin1925,copiesweretobesentto10doctorsatGEplantsaroundthecountry.Asearlyas1929,basedonHamilton’srecommendationsforcontrollingleadexposures,oneGEplantprovidedseparatelockersforworkandstreetclothes,bootsandunderwear.Bootswereremovedbeforethemenlefttheworkareathroughawashroomforlunchorbeforeleavingattheendoftheshift.Indescribingconditionsforworkersattheplant,Hamiltonsaid:“Itislikeafirstclassmen’sclubhouse”(Pittsfield,May1929in:Castleman2005).ThereistragicironytothisstorygiventhebattlePeterboroughGEconductedduringthe1980soveraninspector’sordertoinstituteseparatelockerandwashfacilitiesforemployeesworkingwithleadunderthedesignatedleadregulation.GEPeterboroughappealed,andtheorderwasrescinded.

GEwasmadeawareofthehazardsofasbestosby1930whenDr.HamiltondescribedhazardousconditionsatGEplantswheretherewassignificantairbornecontaminationandaccumulatedasbestosfibersonworksurfaces(Castleman2005).USGeneralElectricmadeattemptstocontrolasbestosexposurethroughexhaustventilationandbydistributingliteraturetoemployeesonthesafehandlingofasbestosinthe1930sand1940s.HamiltonalsonotedthatGEreceivedadviceinthe1970sfromasbestosfibreandproductsuppliersonthehazardsofusingasbestosinthemanufactureofphenolicresins(Castleman2005).Otherinvestigatorshavealsoidentifiedanddocumentedhowmajorcorporationshavesuppressedinformationaboutthehazards.(RosnerandMarkowitz2002;Michaels2008).

GiventhatGEofficialsintheU.S.wereadvisedoftheknownhazardsofasbestosintheirU.S.operationsinthe1920sand1930s,andthattheywereawareofthepoorconditionsinCanadianplants,itishighlylikelythatGEofficialsatthePeterboroughplantwouldhavebeenawareofthehazardsofasbestos.Yet,testimonyfromfocusgroupparticipantsandgovernmentinspectionreportsindicatethatworkerswerehandlingasbestosinafriablestatewithoutanyrespiratoryprotection,norwereworkerswarnedaboutthehazards.Thiswasevidencedinvarioustasksthatworkersperformedincluding:“pluckingthegoose”thatinvolvedthemanualremovalofwasteasbestoswithoutprotectionfromholdingbinsinthewireandcabledepartment;thebandsawingofasbestossheetswithoutprotectioninthearmaturedepartment;andthedismantlingoftheasbestoscoveredcompoundingtankwithoutprotectionincoilimpregnation,tomentionafew.Giventheseexposureconditionsitishighlylikelythatthesecontributedsignificantlytotheextentofwork-relateddiseaseattheGEplant.Theyalsoreflectageneralizedlaxsafetyculturethatwouldhavebroadramificationforworkers’health.

Exposure to Carcinogens:

Apartial-listofchemicalsroutinelyusedinGEPeterboroughproductionclassifiedascarcinogens,orstronglysuspectedofbeingcarcinogenic,include(IARC2017):

IARC Group 1-Carcinogenic to humans:woodworking,weldingfumes,asbestos,silica,arsenic,benzene,beryllium,cadmium,chromiumVI,4,4-methylene-bis(2chloroanilene)(a.k.a.MOCA),nickel,trichloroethylene,vinylchloride,formaldehyde,bis-chloromethylether(a.k.a.BCME),polychlorinatedbiphenols(PCB),dieselengineexhaust,rubberproduction,painters,mineraloils,n-ntrosodiethanolamine,inorganicacidmists,uranium,wooddusts,shiftwork.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

7

IARC Group 2A-Probably Carcinogenic to humans:lead,epichlorohydrin,styreneoxide,tungstencarbide,creosotes,1,3butadiene.

IARC Group 2B-Possibley Carcinogenic to humans:Styrene,carbontetrachloride,tungstencobalt,diethanolamine,magneticfields,asphaltfumes,methylethylketone.

Others,notyetclassifiedascarcinogenicbutwhosepropertiesdisrupttheendocrinesystemandcanmimicthehormoneestrogen,includebisphenol-Aandphthalatesusedintheproductionofplasticsandepoxyresins.Inthelattercase,thesearesuspectedofbeingbreastcarcinogensandtumourpromoters.(DeMatteoetal.2012;Keithetal.2015;vomSaalandHughs2005;Diamanti-Kandarakiseta.l2009;Ibarluzeaetal.2004;Ewertzetal.2001;Hardelletal.1997;Crispetal.1998;Kortenkamp2008;Kortenkampetal.2011;Welshonsetal.2003)

ManyofthechemicalsusedinGEproductionprocessesaresubjectedtohighheatstressresultinginthermaldecompositionby-productsthatarehighlytoxicandcarcinogenicaswell.

Insummary,thefactthattherewasacomplexmixofvariouscontaminants,andthatdepartmentssharedthesameatmosphericcontaminantsthatinvolvedsignificantby-standerexposures,presentsmajorchallengesfortheclassificationofindividualexposuresthroughtraditionalmethodsemployedinindustrialhygieneandepidemiologicalresearch.Infact,suchapproachestocomplexexposuresituationsarelargelyresponsibleforthemisclassificationand/ormisrepresentationofexposuresthattendtounderestimatetheextentofexposure(Teschkeetal.2002;dosSantosSilva1999;Flegaletal.1986;Greeenland1982).

METHODS

Qualitative and Participatory Research Methods:

Theresearchteamusedaqualitativeapproachtogatheringandassessinginformationnecessarytodeveloprich,detailed,exposureprofilesoftheindustrialprocessesundertakenatthefacility(MacEachenetal.2016;InstituteforWorkandHealth2011;KiddandParshall2000;NeedlemanandNeedleman1996;LincolnandGuba1985).Qualitativeand“mixed”researchmethodsinindustrialhygieneandepidemiologyhavebeensuccessfullyusedinsimilarindustrialcircumstanceswherethereare:diversegroupsofworkersholdingmultiplejobs,numerous,complexindustrialprocesses,andexposuresthathavechangedovertheyears(McDonaldetal.2004;Maranoetal.2000;Morganetal.1998;Alexanderetal.1996).Ratherthanratingindividualexposures,thisresearchfocusesonprofilingtheproductionprocessesandtheirexposurepoints,alongwithworkplacefactorsthatputworkersatgreater/lessriskofbeingexposed.ThisapproachisbestabletoaddressthechallengespresentedbythenatureofGE’sproductionsystemandlimitationsintheavailabilityandreliabilityof“hard’exposuredatafromindustrialhygienemonitoring.Aswell,detaileddescriptionsofworkerexposuresinmanyoftheseindustriesarelimitedatbest.Publishedresearchseldomcontainsdatareflectingthetypical,day-to-dayconditionsexperiencedbytheworkers,themselves.

Toaddresstheseissuesaparticipatoryresearchapproachwasemployedusingqualitativeresearchmethodsincluding:focusgroupsessionsandkeyinformantinterviews,andreviewsofindustrialhygienedata,governmentinspectionreports,jointcommitteeminutes,andoccupationalhealthliterature.

Thecoreresearchteamconsistedof10retireesfromtheGEfacility,theunion’sformerNationalHealthandSafetyDirectorandtworetiredresearcherswithoccupationalandpublichealthresearchexperience.Thisgroupformeda permanent focus group known as the Advisory Committee on Exposure Profiling at GE.TheactivityofthisAdvisoryCommitteewascoordinatedbyoneoftheretireesandfacilitatedbythetwohealth

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

8

researchers.EachretireeworkedattheGEplantforatleast35yearsprimarilyinthemanufacturingsectors.Allhadworkedatthefacilitybetween1945to2000withmoststartingtheirworkwithGEintheearly1960s.

TheAdvisoryCommitteeplayedadualroleinthisparticipatoryresearchendeavor.ItactedasapermanentfocusgroupconsistingofinformantswithdetailedknowledgeoftheproductionprocessesatGEoveraperiodof35to40years.Italsoservedasanactiveresearchteamwhogathereddetailedinformationandbroughtinkeyinformantswithmorespecializedinformationtofillininformationgapsorexpandthegroup’sknowledgebase.Inthislatterroleallmemberstookanactivepartinleadingtheinterviewprocesswithkeyinformants.

TheAdvisoryCommitteemettwiceaweekfor4to5hourspersessionwheretheCommitteedocumenteddetailedinformationaboutthevariousproductionsprocessesandworkingconditionsdepartmentbydepartment.Thisintenseactivitywentonforover8monthsandthegroupcontinuestomeetregularly.Inthecourseoftheirwork,thegroupwouldseekoutandreviewvariousdocuments,locateprocessesonthehazardmapsoftheentirecomplex,andobtainindustrialhygienereportswhereavailable.Thecommitteeinterviewedanddocumentedinformationfrommorethan75formerGEemployeeswhosenamesarerecordedintheappendix.

Thetworesearchersalongwiththecoordinatorwereresponsiblefordocumentingtheinformationgatheredatmeetingsproviding3setsofdatanotesthatwerecompiledandcheckedforaccuracyandthenreworkedintotheresourcetemplatethatformsthebodyofthisreport.Discussionswereguidedbyasetofbothopenendedandstructuredquestions(foralistofthesequestionsseetheexpandedmethodologysectioninADDENDUM1attheendofthisreport).

Thefocusgroupprocesscanbedescribedasarelaxed,egalitarianatmospherewithasenseofsharedownershipatmeetingsreflectiveoftheretireessharedworkhistoryatGE.Importantly,theoverlapofcommonworkexperiencesamongretireesfacilitatedaquestioning,challenging,confirming,consensusdialoguethatwasbothproductiveandconfirmingofthereliabilityoftheinformationprovided.Forexample,participantswouldoftentellsimilarstoriesindependentofoneanother,servingtoreinforceconfidenceintheaccuracyofindividualrecollections.Moreover,thedialogueamongtheparticipantsandinformantsinvolvedaconsensusbuildingprocessregardingtheaccuracyoftheinformationbeingdiscussed.Thisapproachwasbothproductiveandpersonallysatisfyingduetoastronglysharedcommitmentthatwedothistaskwell(KiddandParshall2000).Discussionswouldcontinueuntilagreementwasreachedabouttheaccuracyandcompletenessoftheinformation.Whereagreementwaslacking,effortsweremadebythecommitteetotrackdownalternativesourcesofinformationincludingotherretireesandindustrialhygieneliteraturereviews.

Risk-Based Approach:

ThisapproachisinlinewiththatofSoniaLal,industrialhygienistwiththeOccupationalHealthClinicsforOntarioWorkers,whoundertookaverythoroughretrospectiveexposureassessmentoftheproductionprocessesintheArmatureandWire&CabledepartmentsattheGEproductionfacilityinPeterboroughfrom2005to2006(Lal2005/6).SimilartoLal’s(2005/6)work,thiscurrentretrospectiveassessmentreliesuponanumberofqualitativeriskfactorsinassessingexposures,comparativetothatusedbyMaranointheaircraftindustry(Marano2000).Inthisregard,weassessedtheproductionprocessesandworkingconditionswithregardtotheirpotentialtohavesignificantlyexposedworkers.Theriskfactorsframeworkincluded:

• Thephysicalstatesofthechemicals(liquid,mist,gas,vapors,solid,dust),• Routeofentry(inhalation,absorption,ingestion),• Thequantityofthechemicalused,e.g.,volumeofchemicals,solvents,resins,etc.,• Sizeofthematerialsandsurfaceareasbeingworkeduponorfabricated,

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

9

• Proximitytothesourceofexposure,• Direct/indirecthandlingofthechemicals,• Durationofexposure,e.g.,useofovertime,• Stateofventilationsystems,e.g.,effectivenessofgeneral,natural,localexhaustventilation,• Provisionofmake-up(freshaircirculation)air,• Provisionofpersonalprotectiveequipment(PPE),e.g.,respiratoryprotection,protective clothing(gloves,coveralls),eyeprotection,• Safeworkpractices/procedures,• Stateofhousekeepingpractices,• Eatinganddrinkingatworkstations,• Workorganizationfactors,e.g.,piece-ratesystem,physicaleffort,impactonsafeworkpractices,• Workersknowledgeofandtrainingre:chemicalsusedincludingaccessto,andunderstanding of,MSDSprecautions.

Inadditiontorelyingonqualitativefindingsbasedontheabove,effortwasmadetoincludequantitativemeasuresavailableincludingthosefoundintheOntarioMinistryofLabour’sGEhygienereports/investigations,GEPeterboroughjointhealthandsafetycommitteeminutes,andworker/uniondocumentationwiththeemployer.Additionally,theIndustrialHygieneliteraturewasreviewedforexposureassessmentsinvolvingsimilarindustries/processes.

Information Sources and Research Process:

Thisprojectrelieduponthreebasicsourcesofinformationonindustrialprocesses,workingconditions,andthenatureandextentofexposuresforthisretrospectiveexposureassessment:

Focus Group (Advisory Committee) Information Source:

FocusGroupmeetingswereorganizedwithreferencetotheindustrialprocessesandworkingconditionsforeachdepartmentwithattentiontodetailson:chemicals,equipmentandmaterialsbeingfabricated,thevolumeofproduction,theworktasksandhowmaterialswerehandled,descriptionsofworkconditions,exposurecontrols,accesstoinformation,workpractices,housekeeping,sensoryexperiences,andadversehealthsymptoms.Additionalinformationwasgeneratedbymembersofthefocusgroupthroughphonecalls,informaldiscussions,andsharingprimary/historicaldocumentsamongthegroup.

Thedynamicassociatedwithfocusgroupmethodsisonethatlendsitselftobothenrichingandchallengingtheveracityofinformationcollectedandprovidingin-depthunderstandingofthecomplexworkenvironmentattheGEfacility.Throughouttheresearchteamappliedthe“constantcomparative”methodassociatedwithqualitativeresearch,whereinformationcollectedisconstantlycontrastedandcomparedforconsistencyandreliability.

Supportive Documentation:

AdditionaldocumentationofexposureconditionsatGEPeterboroughwasobtainedfrom1)theOntarioMinistryofLabour(MOL)Inspectoratereports/investigations1945-2000;2)JointHealthandSafetyCommittee(JHSC)minutes/reports,3)unionoremployee/employercorrespondence,allofwhichprovidedacrosscheckonthereliabilityandvalidityoffocus-groupgeneratedinformationabouttheindustrialprocessesandexposureconditionsatCGE;4)Otherinformationsources,including:TheprevioushazardmappingofGEcarriedoutbyGaryLaneandOCHOW,historicaldocuments,GEproductmaterials,workermedicalreports

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

10

anddocuments,localnewspaperarticles,GEPeterboroughnewsletters,motorproductionprocessvideos,andbroadrangingliteratureandinternetsearches.

Industrial Hygiene, Occupational Health, and other Literature Reviews:

Additionaldocumentationwassoughtthroughreviewsofthescientificliteraturedocumentingindustrialprocessesandobservedexposuresfrompublishedstudiesofsimilarworkenvironmentsaswellasgeneralinformationidentifyinganddescribingvariousindustrialprocesses.

Inthisway,wewereabletocorroboratethedescriptionofworkprocessesandexposureconditionsthroughtheprocessof“triangulation”(LincolnandGuba1985;NeedlemanandNeedleman1996;Patton1990),amajorvalidationtechniqueusedinqualitativeanalysis.Asenseofinformationalreliabilitywasachievedthroughthisuseofdifferentapproachestoinformationgatheringincluding1)Therichnessanddynamicoffocusgroup-baseddiscussionandconsensus;2)Areviewofofficialgovernment(MOL)reports,JHSCminutes,andemployerdocuments;and3)Areviewofindustrialhygiene,occupationalhealth,andotherliteratures.

LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE

Inconsideringtheretrospectiveexposureprofiles,someperspectiveisinorderwithregardtocurrentinterpretationsattachedtonumericalexposurelevelstovariouschemicalsaswellasresultsofepidemiologicalstudies.Firstly,thereistheassumptionthatnoharmshouldhavecometoworkersifexposurelevelswerebelowtheregulatedoccupationalexposurelimitsorThresholdLimitValuessetbytheAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienist(ACGIH).Secondly,thereistheinterpretationofnegativeepidemiologicalstudiesasindicatingthatthereisnoassociationbetweenthediseaseandthechemicalexposuresstudied.

Inresponsetotheseassumptionsitisimportanttorecognizethatthevalidityoftheseapproachesisbeingchallengedbyalargeandgrowingnumberofresearchersinthefieldofoccupationalandenvironmentalmedicine.Inthecaseofexposurestandards,theseresearcheffortshaveprovidedevidencethatexposurestandardsarenothealth-basedlimits.Researchershaveshownthatthestandardsettingprocessandscienceuponwhichthesearebasedaresignificantlycompromisedbyindustryinfluence.Further,theyshowthatthe“science”uponwhichtheselimitsarebasedis,itself,seriouslyflawed.Atbest,theselimitsarewhatindustryhasdeterminedtobeeconomicallyandtechnicallyfeasibleratherthanprotectiveofworkers’health.

Importantly,themisusesofthescienceofepidemiologyandthemisrepresentationofepidemiologicalstudyresultshavecomeunderincreasingcriticalscrutinythatcannolongerbeignored.Hereagainagrowingbodyofcriticalinvestigationhasuncoveredthequestionablemanipulationofdataandanalysisaswellasseriousflawsinresearchdesignshowntobetheresultofindustryinfluenceontheresearchers.Manyepidemiologicalstudiessufferfrominherentlimitationssuchaspoordesign,misclassificationofexposures,andinsufficientstatisticalpowertodetectanelevatedrisktohealth.Theclassicexampleinvolvesconcludingthatthereisnoassociationbetweendiseaseandexposureswhenthestudydidnothavethestatisticalpower,duetosmallsamplesize,todetectariskthatmaybepresent.Theseunacknowledgedlimitationsofsciencehaveseriousconsequencefortheprotectionofoccupationalandpublichealth.

Forafullertreatmentoftheselimitationsanddetailedcitations,pleaseseeADDENDUM2-LIMITATIONSOFTHESCIENCE.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

11

BRIEF OUTLINE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

Informationwasgatheredontheproductionprocessesandextentandnatureofexposuresfor22departments/buildings.Numerousdepartmentsorprocesseswentthroughchangesinlocationovertheyearsandsomewerediscontinuedasaresultofoutsourcingproducts,beingmovedtootherareas,orbeingcloseddownduetotoxiccontamination.Intotal,22GEPeterboroughdepartmentsarereviewedinthedetailedexposureprofilesthatrepresentthebodyofthisreportincluding:

• Building#4:Capacitors• Building#5:CoilImpregnation• Building#7:Armature• Building#8:MachineShop• Building#9:FractionalHorsePowerMotors• Building#10:GeneratorAssembly/Babbitt• Building#12:PunchPress• Building#14A:TankShop• Building#14:StructuralSteel• Building#16:SwitchGear• Building#16A:TransportationEquipment• Building#17:Non-MetallicMachineShop(akaCarpentry)• Building#18:InductionMotors• Building#20:DriveSystems• Building#21:Nuclear• Building#22:Wire&Cable(until1980)• Building#24:Wire&Cable(Formexuntil1980)• Building#26:Wire&Cable(until1980)• Building#22:TractionMotors(1994-2004)• Building#23:PlatingDepartment• Building#30:BusDucts• Building#34:SteelCutting

Itisimpossibletosummarizeallthatiscontainedinthedetailedexposureprofiles.However,itisusefultoidentifysomeofthegeneralconditions,andthenatureandextentofexposuressharedbymostemployees.Thefollowingaremajorworking-conditionfeatures,commonlyexperiencedthroughouttheplant,thatraisethelevelofriskforsignificantchemicalexposures.

Thesecommonconditionswerealsoconfirmedbytheindependentmultiplesourceofdocumentationtheresearchersreviewede.g.MOL,JHSCreports,etc.Inadditiontosupportingthereliabilityofthefocusgroup-baseddata,themultiplesourcesofdocumentationexposedapatternofrecalcitranceonthepartofGEtowardsmakingnecessaryimprovementsandrepairstoprotectworkerhealthand,often,outrightrefusaltoadheretothelawwithregardtoprovidingworkersandtheirunionwithinformationtheyrequestedandtowhichtheywereentitled.TherewasalsoevidenceofanunclearrelationshipbetweentheOntarioMinistryofLabourinspectorateandaverypowerfulmultinationalcorporation,onewithwidespreadinfluencebothlocallyandinternationally.Whatelsecouldexplaintheinspectorate’sseemingreluctancetoissueorderspreferringinsteadtogive“advicetomanagement”orissueunenforceable“recommendations”--ratherthanwrite“orders”wherecomplianceismandatory.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

12

Common Physical and Work Conditions:1. TheGEfacilityhadlittleinthewayofeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Mostventilationwasby

naturalmeansandtherewasnotenoughmake-up(fresh)airprovided.Therewerelocationsinwhichcontaminatedexhaustedairwouldre-enterthebuildingatmospherebecauseofthelocationofexhaustandintakeports.

2. Thelackofadequatereplacementairresultedinnegativeairpressurethroughoutthebuildingleadingtothemigrationofaircontaminantswithinandamongdepartments(Kyselka1979).

3. Asbestosforinsulationsonelectricalwiresandmotorpartswasuseduniversallythroughouttheplant.Thelargesizeofproductsrequiredlargeamountsofasbestosinvariousforms.Muchworkwithasbestoswasdonebyhandandinconfinedspaces.Asbestoswasdrilled,cutwithabandsaw,andmilledbyhand,resultinginthedispersalofasbestosfibres/dust.Overheadpipingthroughouttheplantwascoveredwithfriableasbestosinsulation,contributingtoasbostosaircontamination.ItisdocumentedthatGEemployedover500lbs.ofasbestosperday(Rajhan1971).

4. Inadditiontochemicalexposuresassociatedwithindustrialworkprocesses,workerswereexposedtodiesel,propane,andgasfumesaswellasdustfromtransportationvehicleswithinandoutsidetheplant.Oftenvehicleswereleftidlingforhoursduringloadingandunloading.NumerouscomplaintsaboutthesefumesarecontainedinMOLandJHSCreports.Creasoteimpregnatedwoodblockfloorsthroughoutthebuildingwerealsoacommonsourceofchemicalexposureforworkers.

5. Theabsence,andpoorquality,ofhygieneandhousekeepingpracticeswithintheGEplantaredocumentedincluding:lackofshowersandlockers,theuseofrecycledratherthanpotablewater,non-functioningwaterfountains,inadequatelunchroomfacilities,poorcontainmentandhandlingofdust,dirt,spills,fumes,vapors,andworkersrequiredtoprovidetheirownworkclothes.Retireesreportedthatitwasoncediscoveredthatsoftdrinkandcoffeemachineshadbeenhookeduptoarecycledwatersourceratherthanpotabledrinkingwater.

6. Nearlyeverydepartmentorareahadacuringovenand/orheatedresinorsolventtankresultinginemployeesworkingunderhighheatstressandexposedtoheavysolventandresinvapors.Retireesmadereferencetothe“GEsmell”whichreferredtoadistinctodorcarriedonworkers’bodiesandclothingthatfamily,friendsandhealthprofessionalsdetected.

7. Thelargesizeandsurfaceareasofmaterialsbeingfabricatedrequiredtheuseoflargevolumesofsolvents,paints,andresinsaswellasextensiveweldingwhichtookplaceinopenareas.Thistranslatedintohigherlevelsofvaporsandfumesassociatedwiththeseprocesses.

8. Thelargesizeofproductsfabricatedresultedinemployeesworkingwithchemicalsforprolongedperiodsoftimeincloseproximityandconfinedspaces,forexamplewhiledegreasingandwelding.Somepartswereover40feetindiameter.Atpeak,theseoperationsdemandedhigheruseofovertime.Somepiecestookweeks,sometimesmonths,tocomplete.

Thefollowingconstellationofriskfactorswasidentifiedascontributingtosignificantexposureofworkerstoawidespectrumoftoxicandcarcinogenicchemicals:

• Workingcloselytothesourceofexposure,• Prolongedexposuretothetoxicchemicalsusedorgeneratedduringproduction,• Absenceorinadequacyofexposurecontrolsatthesource,e.g.localexhaustsystem,• Absenceorinadequacyofpersonalprotectiveequipment,• Inadequateprovisionofmake-upairandconsequentnegativeairpressureinthecomplex,• Applicationoflargevolumesofsolvents,resins,PAHs,andpaintsduetolargesizeofproducts,

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

13

• Longdurationofexposurebecauseofsizeandproductionschedulepressure,• Inadequateknowledgeaboutthehealthhazardsandexposurecontrolsforworkerprotection,• Poorenforcementofsafe-workprocedures,• Poorhousekeepingpractices,• Eatinganddrinkingandsmokingatworkstations,• Inadequatehygienefacilities,andgenerallypoorhousekeeping.

Common Chemical Exposures:

Solvents:Nomatterwhatdepartmentoneworkedin,therewasenormoususeofsolventsforcleaninganddegreasingmaterials.Degreaserswereusedinlargevolumesandoftenappliedbybarehandsonlargesurfaceareas.Almosteverydepartmentprovideddegreasersintheformoftrichloroethylene(TCE)inverylargetanksthatmeasuredupwardsof24sq.ft.insurfacearea.Somewerevapordegreasersthatattimesdidnotfunctionproperly.Residuesofdegreasersweredrainedonthefloorproducinglargeamountsofsolventvapor.Routinely,solventvaporswouldmigratetoareaswherearcweldingwasperformedthusproducingHCLgas.Workersroutinelywasheddownlargemetalsurfaceswithragssaturatedwith(TCE)ortolueneinpreparationforfabricationleadingtoinhalationandabsorptionofsolvents.Workersfrequentlyregisteredcomplaintsaboutvaporsand/oradverseeffectssuchaseye,noseandthroatirritationaswellasnarcoticeffects.Othercommonlyusedsolventsincluded:toluene,perchloroethylene,MEK,acetone,trichloroethane,xylene,andnaphthagas.Manysolvents,whenheated,producedthermaldecompositionby-productsthatwereequallytoxic.Some,includingtoluene,werehighlycontaminatedwithbenzene,agroup1carcinogen.

Itisinterestingtonotethatinoneinstance,anMOLinspectorissuedorderstoprotectworkersfromexposuretotoluenedespiteconcentrationsbelowtheTLVandprotestsfrommanagement,becausetheworker’sadversehealthsymptomswereanindicatorthattheworkerwasoverexposedtothesolvent(regardlessoftheTLVreading).Solventswereusedineverydepartmentunderreview(AdvisoryCommitteeMeetingnotes).

Welding Fumes:Everydepartmenthadsomeformofweldingand/orsolderingoperationgoingon.Thesewereusuallylarge-scaleoperationsinvolvingfrom1to8weldersworkingatfabricatingelectricalhousingsandpartsformotorsandgenerators.Mobileweldingoperationswerealsocarriedoutinalmosteveryareaoftheplant.Welding“booths,”containedonlyby(frayedandfriable)asbestoscurtains,hadlittleinthewayofeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Weldingworkareaswerecommonlydescribedas“thickwithweldingsmoke-plumes,”withmanycomplaintsrelatedtoirritatinggasessuchasphosgeneandozone.MOLreportslistmanycomplaintsaboutTCEvaporsmigratingfromdegreasingoperationstoaluminumweldingareas(duetonegativeairpressure)producingphosgenegas.ThesewerereportedinfocusgroupsthenconfirmedinMOLreportsandJHSCminutes,aswellasinternalmemorandumfromGEPeterboroughmanagement.ManagementalsoindicatedthatworkerssufferedsymptomsofCOPDasaresultofweldingexposures.Workersthemselvesdescribedbeing“surroundedbycloudsofbluesmokesothickyoucouldn’tseethepersonworkingnexttoyou”(AdvisoryCommitteemeetingnotes).

Weldingoperationsincludedallformsofweldingincludingoxy-acetylenetorchcuttingandwelding,electricarcweldingsuchasMIG,TIG,CO2,andplasmawelding.Dependingonthetypeofweldingandmaterialsused,bothweldersandby-standerswereexposedto:1)Weldingfumescontainingaluminum,beryllium,cadmiumoxides,chromium,copper,fluorides,ironoxide,lead,manganese,molybdenum,nickel,vanadium,orzincoxides;2)Weldinggasesincludingcarbonmonoxide,hydrogenfluoride,nitrogenoxide,oxygendeficiency,andozone;3)Organicvaporssuchasaldehydes(e.g.formaldehyde),isocyanate,phosgene,phosphineandfrommetalscoatedwithisocyanatepaints,epoxyresins,polyesterresins,solvents,orrustinhibitors.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

14

Asaresultofthelargevolumeofweldinggoingonineveryareaoftheplantandpoorexposurecontrolsandhousekeeping,exposuretoweldingfumeswassignificantthroughouttheplantforbothweldersandby-standers.Significantexposuretoozoneaswellasphosgenegaswasreportedinsomeareasoftheplant.Focusgroupsidentifiedeatingatworkstations,poorhousekeeping,andlittleeffectiveexhaustventilation.Smokeeaterswerereportedto“notbeveryeffective,”thuswithlimitedutilityforcontrollingexposures.Welding,insomeform,wasperformedineverydepartmentunderreview.

Epoxy, Polyester and Asphalt Resins:Epoxyandpolyesterresinswereusedinmorethan70%ofplantoperations.Theresindippingandcuringoperationsinvolveddipping,oftenverylarge,motorcomponents(includinghugecoils,armaturesandstators)inopenvatsofresinorinVacuumPressureImpregnation(VPI)tanks.InthecaseofVPItanks,significantexposuretoepoxyandpolyesterresinvaporsoccurredwhen:tankswereopenfordipping,liftcableswereattachedbyhitchers,andcraneoperatorssittingabovethetanksmanipulatedlargeitemstoandfromcuringovens.Workerswhosqueegeedexcessresinwerealsoexposed.Finally,excesscured/hardenedresinsweregroundoffmotorpartsandtheovensurfacesduringgrindingandcleaningoperations.Retireesdescribed“thickbluesmoke”intheatmosphereduringsuchoperations,and“plumesofsmoke”surroundingthecraneoperator’scage.Workersdescribedthegrindingoperationsasparticularly“dirty”operationswhereworkerswerecoveredindust--andthicklayersofgrindingdustcoveredallsurfaces.Underheat,epoxiesandresinsbreakdownintoconstituentssuchasbisphenol-A(BP-A/endocrinedisrupter)andepichlorohydrin(IARC2A–probablycarcinogenictohumans)andvariousaldehydes.Focusgroupdiscussionsidentified:workersusingcompressedairtoblowoffdust;eatinganddrinkingatworkstations;andpoorhousekeeping.Alsoidentifiedwastheabsenceofeffectivelocalexhaustventilationandlackofrespiratoryprotectionforexposurestoepoxy/resins,whichwascorroboratedbyinspectors’reportsandJHSCminutes.Retireesdescribedan“overheatedVPItankexplodingandcatchingfireaftercityfirefighterssprayedwateronitresultinginhighlytoxic,fumes--theresultofthermaldecomposition--quicklyspreadingthroughtheplantandovercomingworkers(AdvisoryCommitteemeetingsnotes).

Asbestos Exposures:Foryears,asbestoswastheprimarymaterialusedto(electrically)insulatenearlyeverycomponentinthemultitudeofelectricalproductsproducedatGE.AlongwithPVC,lead,andrubbercoverings,asbestos--invariousforms--wasmadeintoelectricalinsulationinstators,armatures,rotors,andvariouswiresandcoils.Asbestoswascarded,braided,cut,sawed,shaved,andembeddedinplasticresinandrubberwirecoatings.TheWireandCabledepartmentwasamajoruserofasbestosfibre.Itspresencewasapparentasairbornedust(“snowstorms”asworkersdescribedthem),onfloorsandmachines,andinstoragebins.Somedepartmentsshavedandorsandedasbestos-impregnatedinsulationfromwiresinpreparationforbrazingandsoldering.Asbestoswasusedasprotectivecurtainsaroundweldingoperationsandovens,andasheatinsulationblanketstoprotectweldersand/orpartsduringwelding.Workersusedasbestosglovesformovinghotmaterialsandparts.Allofthesewerereportedtobeintattered,friableconditionandasignificantsourceofadditionalexposuretoasbestos.TheArmatureDepartmentandCarpenterShopperformedmajorcuttingofasbestosboardswithbandsaws.Thesewerepre-drilledandshapedwithgrindersandsanders,producinglargeamountsofasbestosdust.Asbestoswasubiquitousandfrequentlyblown(offsurfacesandclothing)withcompressedair.WorkersclassifiedaslabourerswereassignedtocleanoutasbestoswastebinsontheroofoftheWireandCabledepartmentwithoutrespiratoryorotherprotection.Thecompanywascavalieraboutthishazardsinceitadvertisedthesaleofwasteasbestosfor13centsapoundas“homeinsulation”(AdvisoryCommitteeMeetingnotesandLocalnewspaperclipping).Exposuresweresignificantforthosedirectlyhandlingasbestosaswellasby-standers.Asmentionedpreviously,negativepressureintheplantcontributedtothemigrationofasbestostootherpartsoftheplant.Giventhelargevolumeusedinproductionandthemannerinwhichitwasused,workerswouldbesignificantlyexposedthroughinhalation.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

15

Polychlorinated Biphenols (PCBs):TheuseofPCBsattheGEplanthasleftalonglastinglegacyaswitnessedbywidespreadcontaminationthroughouttheplantandthesurroundingcommunityofPeterboroughwellafteritsdiscontinuedusein1977.Thishighlytoxic,carcinogenicchemicalwasusedasadielectricfluidintheproductionofcapacitorsinbuilding#4andintransformersandcircuitbreakersinbuilding#16and#10.IntheprocessoffillinganddrainingPCBoilfromtheseverylargetanks,therewasagreatdealofspillageandsplashesonfloorsandonworkers.Thistoxicfluidwasusedinverylargevolumesnotonlyintheproductionofnewelectricaldevicesbutalsointheprocessofdismantlingold,ordamaged,tanksandindrainingthemandwipingdownthetanksbyhandwithsolventssuchastolueneorTCE.PCBwasusedunderthetradenamesofPyranol,Askarel,andInerteen.Workersfromseveralareas(Bldgs#4,#16and#10)reportedheavyexposurestoPCBsduringtheproductionoftransformers,breakersandcapacitors.TheOntarioDepartmentofHealthreportedlevelsrangingfrom70mg/10m³to130mg/10m³(JohnstonJuly20,1945).Theseexposuresincludedothersworkinginthevicinity.Workersintheseshopsindicatedexposuretodecompositionby-products,includingsubstancesknowntobeevenmoretoxicthanPCBitself.Thesehavebeenidentifiedaschlorinateddibenzodioxins(CDD)andchlorinateddibenzofurans(CDF).ResearchindicatesthatPCBisnotonlycarcinogenicbutalsoactsasatumorpromoter,incombinationwithothercarcinogens(IDSP,December1987).

DocumentationofcontaminationlevelsandexposureswasthesubjectofongoingdiscussionatJHSCmeetingsoverthehighlevelsfound,atorabovetheTLV,atthetime(JHSCMinutesOctober,1981).Alsodocumentedwasanincidentofcontractors“failingtofollowprescribedsafetyprocedures”whilehandlingPCBwasteoils(JHSCminutesSeptember26,1985).Aninternalcompanymemorandumidentifiedseveralareasas“highlycontaminated.”Levelsashighas90,600ug/100cm²werereportedinlabtestreports(BakerJanuary,18,1989;BakerDecember1,1986).

Atpresent,thewidespreadcontaminationofPCBwasteoilsisunderthesurveillanceoftheOntarioMinistryoftheEnvironment,sincePCBresiduespersistandhavebeenidentifiedinmanyareasoftheplant--aswellasadjoininglandwherePCBwasteoilswerespreadoverparkinglotsandroadwaysasa“dustsuppressant.”TheMinistryofEnvironment(MOE)hasrecentlyidentifiedthatplantroofdebrisiscontaminated,andsinceroofdrainsrunthroughtheinteriorofthebuilding,chronicallyleakingintoworkareas,workerscontinuetobeexposedtowastePCBs(StephensonMOEmemo,April21,2016).

Metal Working Fluid (MWF) and Machining:AnothermajorpartoftheGEPeterboroughoperationwaslargescalemachiningthatwentoninTractionMotors(Bldg.22),InductionMotors(Bldg.18),SwitchGear(Bldg.16),TransportationEquipment(Bldg.16A),TankShop(Bldg.14A),StructuralSteel(Bldg.14),GeneratorAssembly(Bldg.10),BabbittShop(Bldg.10B),PunchPress(Bldg.12),MachineShop(Bldg.8),FractionalMotors(Bldg.9),BusDuct(Bldg.30)andSteelCutting(Bldg.34).Allofthesemachiningoperationsusedverylargeboring,milling,drilling,andlathingmachines.Somewereaslargeas40feetindiameter.ThesemachiningoperationsusedlargequantitiesofMWFsconsistingofcoolingfluidsandlubricatingoilssprayedonthemachine’scutters.ThereareseveraltypesofMWFsincludingstraightoils,semisyntheticoils,andwater-solublefluids.Manywater-solublefluidsaretreatedwithbiocidesthatcontainarsenic.MWFsareheatedbyfrictiongeneratedincutting,thusproducingmistsandvaporscontainingthermaldecompositionby-productsaswellasunusedcomponentsofthefluids.AdvisoryCommitteemembersdescribemachiningoperationsas“overwhelmedwithbluishsmokeandmists,inadditiontofoulsmellingvapors.”Operatorclothingwouldbesaturatedwithfluids.InadditiontoMWFs’chemicalcomponentsandthermalby-products,theywouldcontaincomponentsofvariousmetalsbeingmachined.Compressedairwasusedtocleansurfaceareas--furtherspreadingMWFresidue.Workersateatworkstations,thuswereexposedtoMWFsthroughinhalation,ingestion,andabsorption.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

16

Beryllium and Uranium Exposures:ThenucleardepartmentlocatedinBuilding21wasthesourceofexposuretoberylliumanduraniumoxide.Themajorsourceofberylliumexposurewastheberylliumroomwhereberylliumpowderwouldbevacuumvapor-fusedtozirconiumsheetsthencutintospacersandpadsforthebundletubes.Intheearlydaysofitsuse,levelsashighas41ug/m³,aredocumentedwhenworkers“handsawed”berylliumblocksintopowderforprocessing(eventhoughaletterfromtheDepartmentofHealthwarnedCGEtopurchaseitsberylliuminpowderedform).Despiteeffortstokeeplevelsaslowasreasonablyachievable,berylliumdiseaseisontherise,evenasstandard-settingbodies,suchastheACGIH,proposelowerTLVs(e.g.,0.05ug/m³).Recentevidenceindicatesthatthisnewstandardis“unachievable,”forcingproducerstoseekasaferalternative(Harmsenetal.2010).

Theidentificationofuraniumriskshasfocusedonmeasuringworkerexposures(withpersonaldosimeters)toalphaparticleemissions,yetindirectevidenceintheformofsuppressedmonocyteproductionisreportedtobeanindicationofworkerexposure.AscientificstudythatincludedGEPeterboroughworkersidentifiedthatfuelbundleworkersreceivesignificantexposurestoalpharadiationfromuraniumoxide(Chase1992).Thesamestudyfoundthat44%ofGEnuclearworkershadreducedmonocytecountsthatwere“abnormally”low--15-20timeslowerthanexpectedinasampleofhealthymenandwomen.AccordingtoDr.Chase“…therefore,therearevalidandpersuasivereasonstosuspectthatworkersarebeingaffectedbytheirexposuretouranium.”

Whatthisdescriptionof“commonexposures”indicatesisthatGEPeterboroughworkerswereroutinelyexposedtoacomplexmixoftoxicchemicalsoccurringthroughouttheplantwith“businessasusual.”

HOW THE MAIN BODY OF THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED, AND HOW TO USE IT

Thebodyofthisreportcontainstwenty-twoindividualbuilding/departmentprofilesidentifyingindetailtheworkprocessescarriedoutandchemicalsassociatedwiththesedifferentprocesses.Theinformationispresentedincolumnformwith“ProductionProcess”listedontheleftcolumnand“ChemicalRiskExposure”listedontheright.

Fromthe“ProductionProcess”descriptionsweformulateanexposureprobabilitythroughidentificationofaconstellationofriskfactorsforeachprocess.Indescribinghowworkwascarriedoutweareabletoinferriskfactorssuchas:wastheworkerdirectlyinvolved,didtheworkerdirectlyhandlethematerials,whatwasthephysicalstateofthematerial(s),whatvolumewasused,whatwastheproductionrate,howmuchtimewasspentonthetasks,wereexposurecontrolsavailableandadequate,andwhatisthetoxicityratingofthematerial?FromAdvisoryCommitteenotes,backedbyMOLandJHSCreports,wewereabletodocumentadversesymptomsandcomplaints.

The“ChemicalExposureRisks”setoutintherighthandcolumnariseoutofhowproductionwascarriedoutforeachoftheworkprocessesdescribedinthelefthandcolumn.Therighthandcolumnreflectsaqualitativeassessmentofwhattheexposureswerelike,giventhewayproductionwascarriedoutbyworkersandtheexistenceoftheriskfactorsidentifiedabove.Theseareaccompaniedbyanexplanationfortheassessmentintermsofthenatureoftheproductionprocess.Wherereliableharddataisavailablethisispresented,butalwaysinconjunctionwiththeexperiencesarisingfromtheproductionprocessitself.

Toinformthereader,eachbuildingprofileisprecededbya“facesheet”identifying(inoutlineform)thedifferentprocessesthatwentonineachbuilding,andlistingof(identifiable)chemicalsassociatedwiththevariousworkprocesses.Readerswillnotetherepetitionofmanyindividualchemicals/chemicalgroupsasonereadsthroughtheseprofiles.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

17

DISCUSSION

GEPeterboroughemployeeswereexposedtoamultiplicityofcarcinogensandothertoxicchemicals.Thechemicalsusedattheplanthavewell-knownadversehealtheffectsandareassociatedwithoccupationalillnesses.Moreover,workerswereexposedtomultiplecarcinogenssimultaneouslywhichfurtherincreasestheriskofdevelopingcancer.

However,fromwhatisidentified,withrespecttosignificantworkerexposurestotoxicchemicalsincludingalargenumberofcarcinogens,itishardnottoconcludethatsuchexposureshaveharmedthehealthofGEemployeesworkingatvariousprocessesthroughouttheplant.Whathasbeendemonstratedintheseexposureprofilesisthatnotonlywerecarcinogenicchemicalspresent,buttheywereusedinlargequantities,incloseproximitytotheworkers,andfrequentlyandforlongdurations—conditionsdictatedbythelargesizeandintricaciesoftheproductsandpartsbeingfabricated.

WhatSoniaLal,ofOHCOW,foundinherretrospectiveexposureprofilesoftheArmatureDepartmentandtheWireandCableDepartmentappliesequallytoallotherdepartmentsandbuildingsthroughouttheGEfacility.Herobservationsareworthrepeatingwithrespecttocurrentfindingsinthisretrospectiveprofilethatincludedanadditional21buildings.

Ms.Lal(inexecutivesummary,OHCOWfile#G884)observed,“Theconstantdipping,baking,curingoftheseproductsandtheexposureforms,i.e.solids,liquids,gasesandtheirdecompositionproductshavebeendemonstratedheretobeofparamountimportancewhentryingtoassessandestablishexposures.Oneprocesscannotbelookedatasstandalone,astheprocessesalloccurredinabuilding,namelyBuilding7-5-8-10,forarmatureemployees.MostbuildingsatGEweresimilarinthattheyallreliedonnaturalventilation.Hencetheabovestatementappliestoallbuildings,asalltheprocesseswithinthebuildingswereclosetooneanother,contaminantswereheavyandaccumulated,(astherewasnoforcedmake-upair)andthusbystanderexposuretodifferentcontaminantsfromseveralprocesseswereincurredbyemployees"(Lal2005/6p.i-a).

ThecurrentfindingsofthismuchextendedexposureprofilecorroboratewhatSoniaLalfoundinhercomprehensive,detailedretrospectiveprofileoftheArmatureandWire&Cabledepartmentsandaredetailedinthebodyofthisreport.

Whilethisprojectdoesnotassignprecisequantitativemeasurestotheextentofexposuresitispossibletoinfertheextentofexposuresfromthenatureoftheproductionprocess,thesizeandintricacyoftheproductionprocess,thetasksperformedbytheworkers,thequantitiesandtypesofchemicalsusedorproduced,theproximitytothematerials,theextentofexposurecontrols,thecharacteristicsoftheventilationssystems,safeworkpracticesandworkorganizationcharacteristics.Hereareafewexamples:extensiveweldingandgrindingoperationsfabricatinghugebreakertanksinconfinedspacesgeneratinglargecloudsofweldingfumesconsistingofacomplexmixtureofgasesandheavymetalfumesintheTankShop;lapping(sanding)largeleadBabbittbearingsbarehandedimmersedintolueneuptotheforearmsinBldg.8andBabbittShop;craneoperatorshoveringoverplumesofvaporsfromdegreasertanksandepoxyresinVPItanksinseveraldepartments;drainingandpouringPCBsinthebuildingofcapacitorsaswellasweldingcapsonintheCapacitordepartment;womendoinghandworkcontinuouslyexposedtosolvents,leadandcadmiumduringsolderingoperations;workersinhalingandbeingsoakedwithMWFsduringmachiningoflargemetalplates,25’to40’indiameter;handwipingoflargecoilsandmetalsurfaceswithragssoakedintoluene;strippingofasbestoscoatedwires;handsqueegeeingepoxyresinfromcoilsafterresinimpregnation;bandsawingasbestosboardsgeneratinglargeamountsofasbestosladendust,tomentionbutafew.Whatisdescribedherewascarriedoutwithouteffectivelocalexhaustventilationoradequateprotectiveequipmentunderintenseproductionschedules.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

18

ThesefindingsarecorroboratedthroughreviewofMinistryofLabourreports,JHSCminutes,employer-recordsavailable,andindustrialhygienestudiesonsimilarproductionprocesses.TheresearchteamhasnohesitationinconcludingthatmostGEworkersweresignificantlyexposedtocarcinogenicandothertoxicchemicals,andthatitishighlylikelythattheseexposureshaveharmed,andcontinuetoharm,theirhealth.GEemployeeslabouredunderverypoorworkingconditionsmarkedbyinadequatetonon-existentexposurecontrolsandlaxenforcement.Additionally,theseworkerswerechronicallyexposedtosubstancesthatarepotentcarcinogens,orstronglysuspectedcarcinogens--aswellasbeingcapableofdisruptingtheendocrinesystem.Thisconditionisaggravatedbythefactthatworkerswereexposedtocomplexmixturesofhazardouschemicalsthathaveadditiveand/orsynergisticeffects.Whatwedon’tknow,andisnotwelldocumentedinthescientificliterature,isthesynergisticeffectsofsuchamultiplicityofexposures.

Inconclusion,itmustbereiteratedthatmanufacturinginthe20thcenturywascharacterizedbyanhistoricintersectionoftheindustrialandchemical“revolutions.“TheGEplantinPeterboroughisaclassicexample,indesignandfunction,ofthatdynamicsocialexperiment.Assuch,workersatGEwerebothparticipantsin,andwitnessesto,thehorrificworkingconditionsassociatedwiththishistoricalpairing–anditssignificanttollonworkersandtheirfamilies.

LIST OF GE WORKER/FAMILY PARTICIPANTS

Retiree Advisory Group:JohnBall,LyndaBrown,JimDufresne,RogerFowler,MarilynHarding,SueJames,CarlJensen,DonMcConnell,GordTerry,BillWoodbeck,JimGill

Invited Retiree Contributors:SharonArmstrong,BillDrain,SteveCasey,MelCrowe,GaryDalton,SteveDeal,PaulEvans,BobGaspari,PaulGraham(Ptbo.Firefighter)JimHeron,JoeKeating,RonLang,GordWatson

Telephone/In Person Retiree Contributors:CherylArmitage,FrankBlakely,EarleneByrne,BarryBunn,FrankChambo,DebbieChute,PaulCorp,DaveDettman,JohnFlannagan,TheresaFlaherty,TeenaFlood,PeterFlood,JoeFraser,JanGoodbody,JimGooley,PeterGooley,RobHayes,NealJames,JoeKeating,DougKirkcaldy,RogerLathangue,JackLewington,WallyMoore,RogerMorton,PeterNewmaster,RickPage,WayneParker,KeithReil,DebReyner,SteveShiels,JimStabler,PercyTraynor,DougWellman,RogerWild,TomWorr,LeeVitarelli,“anonymousx2”

Widow/family member contributors: Diane Carl, Sandra Condon, Steve and Cindy Crossley, Debbie Chute, HigginsFamily,AileenHughes,PatHuzinga,SandyLebeau,JoanMcKinlay,MarcelleO’Connell,ArlenePetrany,Sara Sharpe, Lenore Shiels

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Whileitishardtosingleoutanyoneindividualwhensomuchdependsonthecollectiveactionofworkers,onecannotoverlookthedebtofgratitudetoaverytough,dedicated,WorkerHealth&SafetyRepresentativeatGEPeterboroughwhopassionatelyfoughtformorethan40yearstobetterworkingconditionsattheplant.HemeticulouslysavedeverypieceofcommunicationthatpassedthroughhishandsduringhisyearsatGE.Hewascourageoustoafaultandbothlovedandhated.Ifthereisahero,amongsomanywhoparticipatedinthisproject,itisJohnBall.WeacknowledgealsotheimportantworkofSueJames,ascoordinatoroftheprojectwhokeptusontrack,andwhoseinsights,broadknowledgeoftheplant,andconstant“digging”forinformationwascritical.EssentialandinvaluablewasboththeindividualandgroupcontributionsoftheAdvisoryCommittee“mainstays”including:JohnBall,LindaBrown,JimDufresne,RogerFowler,SueJames,MarilynHarding,CarlJensen,DonMcConnell,GordonTerry,BillWoodbeck,andJimGill.Asretirees,our

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

19

advisorycommitteememberswerebothwillingandabletocommittotheverysignificanttimeandhardworkrequiredtocompletethisproject.

UNIFOR,astheunionrepresentingworkersatGEPeterborough(specificallyJoelCarr,NancyClark,andNationalHealthandSafetyDirector,SariSairanen,andstaffatthenationaloffice)providedmeetingspaceandsupportaswellasundertakingthecreationofadatabaseforthestorageandretrievalofgovernmentinspectionreports,minutesofJHSC,internalcompanycommunicationsandMSDS.UNIFORhasworkedtocoordinateoccupationaldiseaseclaimswiththeOfficeoftheWorkerAdvisorandisassemblingsupportivedocumentation,generatedbythisretrospectivestudy,togobeforetheWSIB.SpecialthankstoLocal599-Oanditsexecutivesforprovidingmeetingspaceforthecommittee'swork.WethankLauraHargroveforherworkinthefinalpreparationofthereport.

ThedetailedchemicalhazardmappingoftheGEplantdonebybothGaryLaneandOHCOWwascriticaltothisprojectprovidingareferencepoint,andsupportivedocumentationforfocusgroupdiscussions.TheworkofSoniaLalandOHCOWidentifyingriskexposuresatGEprovidedastartingpointforthisproject,servingasaguideandinspiration.HerexcellentretrospectiveprofilesonArmatureandWireandCabledepartmentsweresubstantiallyreliedupon,andincorporatedintothisreport.

WethankDr.NoelKerinofOHCOWforhiscommitmenttoGEfamilies,especiallyhissupportformanyclaimantsthroughtheclinicsof2004.

Andfinally,weacknowledgethelongfightforjusticeledbytheOccupationalandEnvironmentalHealthCoalitionofPeterborough(OEHCP)forpromotingtheirvisionof“AhealthyviablecommunityinPeterboroughandforgenerationstocome,”throughtheirongoingcommitmentto,andpracticalsupportfor,GEfamiliescopingwithoccupationallyrelatedillnessanddeath.

Thisbroadcommunityeffort“tosettherecordstraight”reflectsaconcertedcollectiveeffortonthepartofmanycitizensandactiviststogettothebottomofthisoccupationaldiseasecatastrophe.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

21

BUILDING: #4 DEPARTMENT: CAPACITOR

General DescriptionBuilding CapacitorsBuilding Cans for CapacitorsCapacitor Reclaim AreaLaboratory 2nd FloorWelding Operation

Known Chemicals used or produced:

Metals: Cadmium, Silver, Stainless SteelGlyptolHexavant ChromiumMercuryPolychloronated Biphenols (PCBs, Pyranol)TCE, (Roylene)Toluene

Tricholorobenzene

Dioctylpthalate

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

22

Building: #4 Department: CapacitorProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

General Description: ThisdepartmenthadtwolargetankscontainingPolychloronatedBiphenols(PCBs),andalargedegreasingtankfilledwithTCE.Itemployed40peopleworking2shifts.ThedepartmentwasgenerallydevotedtothebuildingandfillingofcapacitorsofvarioussizeswithPCBdielectricfluids.Theserangedinsizesfromafewinchesto2-3feetacross.Thisworkinvolvedconstructionofcanisters,formationofthecoilsandfillingandsealingthecanisterwithleadsolder.Theprocessesalsoentaileddeconstructionoffaultyoroldcapacitorsanddumpingoldfluid.NotethatPCBusewasdiscontinuedin1977.Itwasreplacedwithamixtureoftrichlorobenzeneanddioctylphthalate.

Building Capacitors1. Theprocessbeginswiththeconstruction

ofthecomponents.Thisinvolveswindingaluminumfoiland“treated”papertogethertoformthebodyofthecapacitor.Thealuminum foil formed an anode and cathode withelectrolytepaperlayeredbetweenthetwo;

2. Thiswoundbodythenplacedinatrayonaconveyor;

3. Next,thewindingsareplacedina“canister;”4. Leads for the anode and cathode foils are

attachedwithspotwelding,and/orcrimped;5. Thecanistersarethentakentoa“treatment”

areawheretheyaredippedintankscontainingPolychloronatedBiphenols(PCBupuntil1977)andarefilledbyvacuumimpregnation;(smallcapacitorsarehanddipped);

6. Priortodipping,thePCBfluidispouredintotanksofabout50gallonswithsemilidopeningsandexhaustventilation.Thisfluidiscirculated for about 5 hours then pumped into astoragetank,thenusedtofillimpregnationtankswherecapacitorsarefilledundervacuumpressurefor5hours;

7. CapacitorcapsaresolderedclosedafterairpocketshavebeenfilledwithPCBs.Thisweldingoccurredwhilecapacitorwasstill

General Exposures: Workers in this department werehighlyexposedtodegreaserTCE,PCBs,toluene,andvariousweldingfumesthatlikelycontainedhexavalentchromiumandcadmiumfromextensivestainlesssteelweldingandsilverbrazing.Theseexposurestooktheformofdusts,fumesandvapoursaswellasliquidform.(After1977,PCBwasreplacedbyamixoftrichlorobenzene/dioctyl-phthalate[TCB]asthedielectricfluidincapacitorproduction.HenceexposuretoTCBcommencedaround1977).Thiswashighproductionworkinvolvingdirectcontactwithcontaminantsandveryintensivejobtasks.Therewaslittleornoeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Housekeepingwaspoorandnorespiratoryorskinprotectionwasprovided.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionwerehighlylikelygiventheseriskfactors.Andgiventhatworkersateandsmokedattheirworkstations,andtherewerenowashingfacilities,ingestionofthesetoxinswashighlylikely.

PCB Exposures: WorkerswereindirectcontactwithPCBsandworkedincloseproximitytothismaterial.Workerswerenotprovidedwithappropriateskinprotection.DocumentationofrelativelyhighexposurestoPCBisprovidedthroughaseriesofMOLreportsofsignificantcontaminationinthecapacitordepartmentinbldg.#4.MOLreportsavailablebeginningin1945andupuntil1984documentlevelsofPCBaircontaminationwellabovethecurrentTLVof0.05mg/m³.Thereadingswereasfollows:1. 7/20/45:130mg/10m³(open);

70mg/10m3(closed)“Wellabovetheallowableconcentration”of10mg/10m³;

2. 2/20/48:140-360mg/10m³;3. 5/14/8:7-220mg/10m³(5samples);4. 6/03/54:NewmorevolatileformofPCB

introduced-“Recentchangesinpyranol…hasresulted in increased vapours …over those

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

23

underthePCBliquid.Duringtheprocessagreatdealofcombustionby-productsfromheatingthemetalweregenerated,aswellasthePCBs;

8. Capacitorsarethentakentoatestarea;9. PCBtankswerelocatedinBldg.#4North.

Therewassignedprohibitingentryandentrylimitedtospecializedpersonnelinrecognitionofhighhazard;

10. Afterthesealingoperation,capacitorswereremovedtothetrichloroethylenedegreasingtanks;

11. ThenpaintedwithGlyptolepoxybasedpaint.

Welding and Soldering:Weldingwascarriedoutbyonepersonfortheseoperations.Aperturesoncapacitorsweresolderedclosedwithleadand/orsilversolder.Thisprocesswasfairlyintensive.

LargecapacitorswererolledintoanovenandavacuummanifoldwasconnectedtoaSchradervalveandleftforhours.Afterremovalfromtheovencooloilwasplacedinandthevalveclosedwithleadsolder.

Building of “cans” for capacitors1. 6x12sheetsoflowgradestainlesswereused

toform“cans;”2. Theseweredippedintrichloroethylene

degreaserinanopen6x6x10’tank;3. Capacitorcanswerethenhungtodrainbefore

beingwelded;4. Cansfusion-weldedwithstickwelding

(Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandatmospherewasthickwithfumes).

Capacitor Reclaim Area 1. Damagedunits,orthosenotmeeting

specificationsreturnedtothisareaandthefluidisemptiedintoatank6’x2’x8’highatfloorlevel.(Duringtheoperationsplashesoffluidarescatteredandvapoursaredispersed.LocalexhaustventilationineffectiveasperMOLinspector’suseofsmokedetectortube);

2. Apneumaticpressisusedtobreakthecapacitorcanistersapart.(Localexhaustwas

previouslyused.”5. 6/24/56: Discussion of increased volume of

PCBusedandtheneedforbetterventilationandpersonalhygiene;

6. 4/06/59:inspectorrecommendsimprovingventilationbecausevacuumtanksarerichinpyranol;

7. 5/08/59:“Theseresultsarehigherthanthoseobtainedin1948.Wefeelthesefiguresarerepresentative…andthatavapourproblemexists”;

8. 8/22/60:“Installedventilation…ImprovementshownbutconcentrationsstillabovetheMAC.”Hygienefacilitiesunsatisfactory.

9. 01/11/61:FollowupairconcentrationsmeasuredshowPCBlevels5to11timestheTLV.Inspectorrecommendsmedicalmonitoringtoseeiffurtherimprovementsshouldbemade;

10. 08/27/79:OperatorssamplingTCBfluidfordielectricpropertieswithoutPPE-nogloves,organicvapourrespirator.ContainersfilledwithTCBleftuncoveredandmaycontributetoTCBvapours.SplashesandspillsintheTCBreclaimareadispersingintoair.Localexhaustventilationnoteffectivetocapturevapourandparticulate.Localexhaustforpneumaticbreakuppress“completelyineffectiveandshouldbemodified.”TCEconcentrationlevelsatthedegreaserwere100ppmto150ppm.TCBspillageseenandpapertowelssoakedwithsolventleftinanopenbarrel.“Thiscouldcontributetoorganicvapoursbeingdischargedconstantlyintotheworkroom.”Ordersissueforventilation,isolationandPPE.

11. 4/11/84:TestforseepageofPCBthroughconcretefloorsinbldg.#4N.NoairconcentrationsabovetheoldTLV.Butrecommendencapsulatingthefloors;

12. 8/24/84:Swipesamplesshowveryhighsurfacecontaminations,storedtransformersmustberemovedandworkersadvisedofhazardsandhygienepractices.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

24

ineffectiveasperMOLinspector);3. Chemicalsexposedtoinreclaimprocess

included: Trichloroethylene, Polychloronated Biphenols (Pyronal), Toluene, and trichlorobenzene/dioctylphthalate.

Laboratory 2nd floor:

Mercury(frominstrumentspillsand/orbreakage)routinelysweptupbystaffwithoutprotectionorventilation.Staffwouldcollectspilledmercuryanddipintotrichloroethylenetankstocleanforreuse.Thiswasalldonemanually.

TCE/Cadmium Exposures (MOL reports):1. 8/14/79:highlevelsofTCEvapourin

fillingandreclaimarea.Ventilationfoundineffective.Housekeepingandhygienepracticespoor,e.g.openbucketsofTCE,spillscleanedupbyhandwithpapertowelsandleftonfloor.InspectorrecommendedPPE,adequateventilation,andimprovedhousekeepingandhygiene;

2. 01/27/1982:CadmiuminurinelevelshighandexposuretocadmiumconfirmedbytheMOL.Recommendsnofoodordrinkshouldbeconsumedinthesilversolderingarea.

Mercury Exposure:InhalationandskinabsorptionofmercuryinliquidandvapourstatewithoutprotectiveequipmentaswellasinhalationandabsorptionofTECduringthemercurycleaningprocess.Ingestionalsoanotherlikelyrouteofentrygiveneatingandsmokingattheworkstation.

JHSC report: 10/11/79Re: unexpected test finding: “Ministry of Health conductedtestsinareausingpersonaldosimeters.Chemicalscheckedweretrichlorethylene,trichlorethylane,andtrichlorolenzene.Strangelyenough,D1(2-ethyhexyl)phthalateismajorcomponentofthismixtureandthiswasnotmentionedduringchecks.”

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

25

BUILDING: #5 DEPARTMENT: COIL IMPREGNATION

General DescriptionAsphalt Impregnation ProcessMICA Coil ProcessingMICA/asphalt Tape ProductionMaintenance and Cleaning of Impregnation AreaCompounding Tank Removal (1977)

Known chemicals used or produced:

AsphaltAsbestosBenzeneCoal tarCoal tar pitch Mica dustToluene

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

26

General description: thecoil-impregnatingdepartmentwasattachedtoBuilding7,intheArmaturedepartment,andwaspartofthatproductionsystem,employing10-20people.Thisdepartmenthoused2compounding“tanks”thatwerepartiallyaboveandbelowthefloor.Coilswerevacuumpressureimpregnatedwithasphaltandthenbakedtohardeninanoven.Building5alsocarriedonaMicacoilprocessingoperationandamica/asphalttapeproductionoperationduringthe1960s.

Asphalt impregnation process:

Bothcompoundtankswerepressure-impregnatingtanks.Whenthedoorswereopenedheavyasphaltfumeswouldflowout.Atrayofcoilswouldbeplaceinthetanksanditwouldpressurizefrom4to24hours.Withtwotanks,onewouldalwaysberunningwhiletheotherwasbeingunloadedorloaded.Workersdidnotwearrespiratorprotectionandtherewasnolocalexhaustventilationtoprotectfromfumes.Nogloveswereworn.ThecurrentTLVforasphaltfumesis0.5mg/m³asbenzene-solubleaerosol.Informantsnotedthatfumesfromasphaltwereveryheavywhenthedoorswereopened.Intheasphaltimpregnationprocesstherewasconstantcleaningofpartsandhandswith1500toluene.

MICA Coil Processing:

Coilscomingoutofthecompoundingtankprocessweretapedandbaked.Subsequently,2operatorswouldstripoffsacrificialtapeandtarwithknivesandthengobacktothecoiltapingprocess.Informantsdescribed the tasks as dusty and dirty since the tape wasbrittle.Someworkersworeglovesandfaceshields.

Employeesfrequentlycomplainedthatitwasveryhardtobreathbecauseoftheheavyairbornedust.

Mica/Asphalt Tape Production Process:

Mica/AsphaltTapeconsistedofalayerofMicaflakessandwichedbetweentwostripsoftapecoatedwithblackstickyvarnish(asphalt).

General Exposure risks: highriskofsignificantexposuresofasphalt,toluene,benzene,micadustthroughinhalationgiventhevolumeofusageandabsenceofexposurecontrols.

Risksofinhalation,absorption,andingestionwerepresent.Givenworkers’adversehealthsymptomsanddetectionofstrongodoursfromthechemicalsandheatingofthem,itishighlylikelythatreportsofexposureareconfirmedandthatexposurecontrolswereinadequatetoprotectworkers.

Workersinthisoperationwereheavilyexposedtoasphaltfumesandthermaldecompositionby-products.Coaltarpitchfumesfromtheopenpressuretanksandoven-bakingprocesseswerehighlylikelyinhaled.Alsoworkershandledtheseimpregnatedcoilsbarehandedwhichputthematriskofabsorbingthesechemicalsthroughtheskin.Thiswasevenmorelikelygiventhatworkersusedtoluenetowashthetarofftheirbodies.Toluenewoulddefattheprotectiveoilsfromtheskinthusaidingabsorption.

Workerswerealsolikelyabsorbingacertainamountofbenzene,aknowncontaminantintoluene.

Themica/asphaltcoilprocessingalsoexposedworkerstoasphaltfumes,micadustandsolventvapours.

Thesewereverylikelyinhaled/absorbedinsignificantamountsgiventhehighlevelofproductionaswellasthelikelihoodofabsorptionthroughdefattedskin.Theotherfactorcontributingtotheentryofthischemicalintothebodywasthatworkerswereeatinganddrinkingattheirworkstations.

Themicatapeproductionprocessandtasksalsoputworkersatriskofexposuretoinhalingbothasphaltfumesandmicadustsinadditiontoinhalingandabsorbingthesolventtolueneusedtocleanequipmentandexposedbodyparts,especiallyhands.

Building: #5 Department: Coil ImpregnationProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

27

1. WorkerswouldfeedMicaintoahopper2’square that travelled on a conveyor into a shakerthat“shook”themicaontothestickytape;

2. Asthemachineran,micablackvarnishwasappliedontothetape;

3. Attheendoftheconveyor,aheatingelementcausedtheflakestosticktothetapeandformedaspooloftape;

4. Thiswasthencutinvarioussizesbyaslitter.Thiswasastickyanddustyoperationandtherewasmicaallovertheworkarea.Compressedairwasusedtocleanmicadustoffequipmentandclothing.

Alarge8’x4’steeltankinthearea,whichcontained1500toluene,wasusedtocleanequipmentontheslittingmachine.Thistankwasopenmosttimes.

Employeesroutinelyusedthetoluenetoalsocleantheirhands.Workerswereveryconcernedabouttheirhealthbecausetheyfounditdifficulttobreatheandsufferedfromfrequentcoughing.

Therewasadangeroffireshouldtheconveyorstopandthepaperbegintoburnbecauseoftheheatingelementoperatingatbetween300and400°C.

Maintenance and Cleaning of impregnation:

Maintenanceworkerswereperiodicallysentintoclean up hardened resins and asphalt caked onto to rail tracks, ovens, and other equipment and surfaces.Thisusuallyinvolvedtheuseofgrindersand jackhammers to remove the hardened asphalt andresins.Thiswasaverydustyoperationsandworkerscomplainedabouttheresiduedustandfumes.Workersdidnotwearrespiratoryprotectionandtherewasnolocalexhaust.Thiswasalong-termproceduretocleantheareaofhardenedresidue.

Compounding Tank Removal 1977:

Compounding Tank 1977 incident: Thecompoundingtankwasusedforasphaltcoatingofparts/coilsbyimmersingpartsinasphaltmixture.Thistankstood20’highandwasencasedinlooseasbestos2’thickinafriablestate.Asbestosinsulationwasheldinplace

Thisoperationputworkersathighriskofexposuretodustsandfumesfromasphaltandresinswithoutanyprotectiveequipmentorotherexposurecontrols.

Thiseventexposedtheseworkerstoenormousconcentrationsofasbestosandledtodevelopmentofasbestosrelatedpulmonarydisease.

InthiscaseoneoftheworkerswasdiagnosedwithpleurafibrosisandtheboardsubsequentlyacceptedhisWSIBclaim.

Workerswouldhavebeenexposedtoasbestoslevelsthatwerelikely1000timeshigherthanthecurrentTLVof0.1f/cc.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

28

bya2x4framethatsurroundedthetankandwascoveredwithacanvastarptoholdthelooseasbestosinplace.Whenthetankwasnolongerneededanorderforitsremovalwasmadeleadingtoamajorasbestosexposure.

Removal Process: Workersweredirectedtoremoveanddismantlethetank.Workerscutthecanvasopentogetattheasbestosandbegantoremovetheasbestosmanuallywithshovelsandbuckets.Theasbestoswastakentoalocaldump.Somewasgiventoemployeestoinsulatetheirhomes.

WhenanuppermanagerdiscoveredthisdangerousremovalofasbestostheworkwasshutdownandtheMOLwascalledintoinvestigate.Theworkwashaltedanddidnotresumeuntilprotectprocedureswereputinplacebutbythenamajorexposureeventhadoccurred.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

29

BUILDING: #7 DEPARTMENT: ARMATURE

Processes Armature Upstairs:Sheer StationWinding LathesCoil Forming OperationPunch Press 752 Forming MachineAbove Ground Dip TankCut Off Machine and StripperFlux potsSunken Dip TankBaking OvenTaping MachinesStator Coil Set Up and WrapperBake OvenPole Face Bar Press

Processes Armature Downstairs: (1960s)SubstationCopper StorageCopper LatheCoil Winding LatheTin Pot OperationsSpreaderCoil Taping AreaAsphalt VPI TanksTest AreaAssembly WindersOverhead Crane OperationAssembly WindersBending ProcessWelding AreaAssembly Winders MD-CDAssembly Winders (turbine rotors)

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

30

Assembly winders (induction bar rotors)OvensPortable OvensArmature Dip TankStorage TanksMica Tape ProductionHydro Poles Operation

Processes lower level 1960-1980:Copper Storage AreaAssembly WindersBanding LatheVPI TanksVPI Epoxy resin 6860 DippingSmall VPI TanksIsonol 51 TankXylene TankSin-BinCold FormingCoil ManufacturingFridge Epoxy Storage Facility

Processes Armature lower level 1980-2005:Coil FabricationBake OvensCrane CycleExcitor ProcessIsonel TankWinding LatheShear Station

Known Chemicals used or produced: Asbestos,fiberglass,eponglass,resi-glasscord,“castor”brandasbestosglovesAsphalt1592,asphaltvarnish,“blackvarnish”BCME, CPA BenzeneBisphenol-AChromatap, Chromic acidCopper,copperdust,brazedcopper,gywireDicumylperoxideEpichlorohydrinMethylEthylKeytone(MEK),MEKperoxide,FillersFormaldehydeGlyptolpaint,5105paint,5142epoxy,epoxy74023HydrogencyanideIsonel 51, 9700 Isonel Lead,tin,beeswaxLiquidasphaltbondingagentsspecifications1027and1028MEKMethanolMineral spirits MuriaticacidMWFsNomexOzonePhenolsRosin Royalene, TCEShellac, varnishSilica, silica dust, liquid silica Silver solder, sylphs solderStyrene/styreneoxides,tributylstyrenethinnerTapes:FG/epoxy,FG/mica,Terylene,Kapton,mylar,hydro,permfil,shrink,fiberglassTCE,TCE-1300glue,TCE1500thinnerToluene,xyleneToluene,xylene,methyl,VinyltolueneTrichloroethyleneVinyl tolueneVPIResinmixes:A311,M6860,485(50-50thinner-resin), 9522, 9637, 5918, Isonel 51WeldingfumesMica, mica mat

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

31

Background: Thiswasalargedepartmentemploying200workersover3shifts.Thisdepartmentproducedcoilsformotorsandgenerators,stators,DCmotors,andlargesizearmaturesformotors.Productionprocesstookplaceinbuilding#7measuring350’x100’x70’ht.TherewasamezzaninecoveringhalfthebuildingthatranN/S,opentothelowerfloor.Large-scalearmaturesweretransportedviadedicatedrailwaytobuildings#8and#10wheresameprocessesandchemicalswereused.Henceexposuresinbuildings#8and#10weresimilartothoseinbuilding#7.Inaddition,VPIprocessesofcoatingelectricalcoilswithpolyesterresinsandepoxywerecarriedoutinbuildings#8and#10.Windingassemblywasalsodoneinthesebuildings.Partsweretransportedfromdepartmentto department via dedicated transfer cars on rail tracks.Dependingonvolumeofparts,twoormorecarswereused.Building#10builtlargewater-wheelgeneratorsandbuilding#8processed30-40tonnesofequipment.ProcessestookplacebothinArmatureUpstairs(mezzanine)andDownstairs:

Armature (Upstairs)

(Productioncarriedoutmainlybywomenmaking5coilspershift)1. ShearStation:(replacedbywindinglathes

in1980s).Thiswasalargemachinetocutinsulationforcoils.Anoperatorcutfibreglassandasbestossheetstosizegeneratinglargeamountsofdustresultinginfreefloatingasbestosandfibreglassfibressuspendedintheworkplaceatmosphere.Suspendedfibresweredispersedfurtherduetolarge-standingfansusedtocoolthearea.Alsousedtocutasbestoswedgesandfillersinwindingprocess;

2. WindingLathes(replacedshearstation).Thisoperationconsistedof20’latheswherecopperwirewasrunthroughthemachineand‘taped’withclothinsulationafterthewirewasfirst‘lubricated’withsilicapowder

Summary of toxic chemical exposures: Alargevarietyofchemicalswereusedinthearmaturedepartmentaswellasinbuildings#8and#10.Thesewereusedinlargequantitieswithlittleornolocalexhaustventilation,PPE,inconsistenthousekeeping,andlackofappropriatehygienefacilities(noshowers,nonear-bypotablewaterorwashfacilities).Chemicalcontaminantsaffectedallemployeeswhetherdirectlyhandlingtheseorfromby-standerexposures.Becausetheyweremists,vapours,fumesorliquids,mainroutesofentrywereinhalationandskinabsorption.However,becauseworkeratelunchandsmokedattheirworkstations,chemicalwerelikelyingestedaswell.Chemicalsworkersexposedtoincluded:copper,Isonel 51 (solvent borne polyester resin), formaldehyde, BCME, mineral spirits, shellac, methanol,trichloroethylene,hydrogencyanide,chromicacid,styrene/styreneoxides,dicumylperoxide,asbestos,mica,vinyltoluene,rosincoresolder,royalene,solventmixtures,liquidasphaltbondingagentsspecifications1027and1028,benzene,toluene,xylene,methylethylkeytone(MEK),MEKperoxide,chromatap,Bisphenol-A,epoxyresins*,fillers,phenols,epichlorohydrin,weldingfumes,ozone,fibreglass.VPIResinmixturesworkerswereexposedtoincluded:A311, M6860, 485 (50-50 thinner-resin), 9522, 9637, 5918,andIsonel51bakedat160c.Inhalationofasbestosfibreandfibreglass.Levelspriortotheenactmentoftheoccupationalhealthandsafetyactin1979weremeasuredforasbestosat10fibres/cc.PriortotheAct,littlewasdonetoabateasbestosexposureorprovidepersonalprotectiveequipment.Butevenasasbestoslevelsdeclinedintheplantafter1979,theystillwouldbeatlevelsfarexceedingcurrentexposurelimitsof0.1f/cc.Clothinsulationwaslikelyasbestosandthereisapossibilityofsilicaexposureaswell.

Building: #7 Department: ArmatureSources: Sonya Lal, 2006 (OHCOW retrospective) and Advisory CommitteeProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

32

inlargetubs.Silicawasreleasedintotheworkplaceifthesetubsweredamagedorcracked;

3. Coilformingoperation:Thisinvolvedtheshapingofdieselcoilbyalargehydraulicpressusinglongstripsofcopper.Fibreglassinsulatedwirestripswereformedusingvarioussizewoodenformsormolds.Theinsulationusedwas‘Nomex’,afibreglass,orMicaMat.Thecoilproductwasthendippedinmethanoltosecureafirmmoistwrap.Isopropylalcoholwassometimesuseddependingonspecifications.Thecoilwasnextdippedinagreenbondingsolutionandsentto‘drypress’tobecompressedandbakedinanoven.Duringthebakingcyclethecoilwaswrappedina‘Nomex’wrap.1300Glue(yellowglue)wasbrushedontocoilslotsandcoilwasinsulatedagain;

4. PunchPress:Oneemployeeassignedtothepunchpressusedtoflattencopperleadsandpieceswerepunchedout.Operationdidnotrequireheatingofmetal,butweretreatedwithcuttingoils.Presswasveryloudandnoearprotectionprovided;

5. 752Formingmachine:Flatcopperwirewasshapedintoaloopandpunch-pressedintoaform.Insulationwasaddedtowireconsistingofeithersilica,mica,fibreglass,scotchtape,or2-gauzefibreglasstapewithmicasandwichedbetweenlayers.Wirewasthen dipped in isopropyl alcohol and fed into atapingmachinewherefibreglasswrapwasappliedwithglyptolglue.Liquidsilicawasusedasabondingmaterial.Minimaldustproduced.Otherissues:Nolocalexhaustventilationtocapturefibresreleasedduringtaping.Machineswereusedcontinuouslyon8-hourshifts.Tapewascutinrollswithroughedgesandloosefibres,whichwerenotcontainedduetolackofexposurecontrols;

6. AbovegroundDipTankforglassmeasured3’x4’.TankwasfilledwithIsonel51,(anorangedye)withtolueneadded.Nolocal

RiskofinhalationtofibreglassandMicadustfromfrayedinsulationsheetsandduringtheformingoperation.Alsoinhalationandabsorptionofalcoholvapours,bondingsolutionaswellasthermaldecompositionby-productsduringthebakingandcuringprocess.Additionalinhalationofdustas1300gluefumes.

Punchpressoperationproducedbothcopperdust(possiblycoatedwithmetaltreatmentssuchasdegreasers)andinsulationdusts(fibreglass,mica,asbestos).Riskofinhalationofcopperandinsulationdustlikely.

Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofalcoholandingredientsinglyptolglue.Inhalationofinsulationfibresfromedgesoftapethatwouldbreakoff.Fibreswerenotcontainedwithoutlocalexhaustventilation.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

33

ventilation.ThetankwasusedtodyethetapeinGEcoloursplusaddedtexture.Therewasastrongodourofalcohol.Thelidforthetankwasrarelyusedtocontainvapours.Awirebasketloweredpartsintothetank,andthenemployeesremovedthedippedwettapewithbarehands.Nogloveswereworn.Workershandsandarmswerefrequentlyinthediptank.Someworkersreporteddis-colorationofhairandfingernails;

7. Cutoffmachineandstripper:This10”machinewasusedtostraighten,strip,andcutfibreglass-coveredwire.Copperdustwasgeneratedduringthecuttingprocess.Theendsofwireweresentthroughbrushesthatstrippedofffibreglassinsulationandthewirethencuttolength.Muchofthewirewasinsulatedwithasbestos,alsoreleasedintheprocess.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Machineusedbyoneemployeefor8-hourshift.Thebrushesstrippedoffagreatdealofinsulation,generatingalargeamountofasbestos/fibreglassfibreincludingKaptonGlass;

8. Lead,flux,andtinpots:Leadpot(sizeofacrockpot)washeatedtomeltbarsofleadat621F.Theleadsofcopperwire,aswellasGywire,weredippedintheleadpot.Thewirewasplacedonaracktocool.Whiletherewassomeventilationabovethepot,therewassplashing,bubblingandvapourspresentintheair.Noprotectiveequipmentwasprovided.FluxPotcontainingabrown,stickysubstanceingallonpailsusedtocleancopperleadsforsoldering.Thefluxcontainedmuriaticacid.Whenfluxedwirehitthemoltenlead,theleadwouldsplashupproducingfumeswithastrongodour.Astandingfanwasusedtodispersefumes,butwasnotalwaysavailablesinceitwassharedwithothers;

9. Diptank(4’x4’)sunkeninfloorcontainingepoxyvarnishthinnedwithtolueneandxylene.MEKperoxidewasaddedasan

InhalationoffumesandvapoursfromdiptankscontainingIsonel51.ExposuretoformaldehydeandtheformationofBCME,BPA.AlsoexposuretoYellowdyeandbothinhalationandskinabsorptionofdyeandalcoholduetoextensivedirectskincontactwiththesechemicals.

Riskofinhalationtocopperdustsgeneratedduringcuttingprocessaswellasriskofinhalationofinsulationdustscontainingfibreglassduringstrippingprocess.Riskofinhalationofinsulationdustveryhigh,giventhestrippingprocessandlackoflocalventilation.

RiskofInhalationofleadmoltenleadfumeshighlylikely.SupportedbywhatweknowabouttheindustrialprocessaswellasMOLandmedicalmonitoringreportsexceedingacceptablelead/urine/bloodlevels.Aswell,ventilationwasinadequateandprocessproducedsplashesandbubbling,increasingthepotentialforexposure.Alsoriskofinhalationandskinabsorptionofacid-basedflux.

MOL:03/26/68: re:lead/tinpotspoorhousekeeping,potsnotcleaned,notprovidedwithclearcompositionoftinningprocess.Local“exhaustinadequateandrequirecompleteoverhaul.”

MOL:03/26/68: followingpreviousreportonleadpots.Ventilationinadequateinarmature.Ordersissued:medicalsurveillance,leadsignage,noeating,drinkingsmoking,housekeeping,hygienepractices,PPE

MOL:08/04/71: Followupofresinexplosiontopreventfurthercontamination;Cleanupofphenolic

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

34

accelerator.Partsweredippedanddrip-driedoverthetank,thenbakedinanoven.Thisareawasfullofheavyfumesfromthetankanddrippingpartsaswellasovenbakinganddryingparts.Tankwasusedtoapplyvarnishtoarmaturesorrotor-typecoilsinmanysizesupto7to8feet.Duetodripping,varnishaccumulatedonfloors.Therewasaheavychemicalodourfromtankanddryingcoils.Employeesinadjacentareasalsoexposedtostrongfumes.Fansused,dispersingthefumes to other areas of the department aswellasotherdepartments.Employeeworkstationswerenearthedippingtanks.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationforthedippingoperation;

10. BakingOvenusedfordippingwasnotproperlyventilated.Itwas8’-10’insize.Employeescouldseeandsmellsmoke.Ovenheated by electric heaters that forced air downthecoils.Fumeswereveryheavy,consistingof:varnishes,lead,flux,andthermaldecompositionby-productsfromthebakingprocess.Employeesexperiencedheavysolventodoursoftenreportingsymptomsofeyes,nose,andthroatirritations;

11. TapingMachines(seeMOLreport)5machinesusedwith5or6employeesassigned.Reportsdescribeheavyfibresinairlikea“snowstorm.”ProcessinvolvedtheuseofMica-Mat,Fibreglass,andKaptontape.Allproductionitemsweretapedhere.Processgeneratedheavyfibres.Employeescouldnotwearglovesduetofinenatureofthework,hencehaddirectskincontactwithtreatedtapes.Alcoholin5-gallonpailsusedtomoistentapes.Thealcoholsconsistedofisopropyl,MEK,Xylene,toluene,causingskintogowhite,aswellascauseburnsandskinrashes.Machineswerecleanedwithsolventsonceperweekwithalcohol.EmployeeswouldgetcoveredinglueanduseMEKtocleanitoffwithvigorousscrubbing.When

resinvapourizedandcondenseonstructures.Instituteadequatemeasurestoavoidskinandinhalation.MOL:06/7/73:dermatitisasaresultofepoxyimpregnatedtapesthataresoakedintolueneandusedinthewindingoperation.Glovesdifficulttoperformtaskswith.Improvedhygieneandlatexglovesprovided.MOL:06/26/73: Testresultsnotreportedbutepoxytapeissoakedintoluene.Threetypesoftapesused:FG/epoxy,FG/mica/epoxy,terylene.Companyfailedtotakeproperprotectivemeasurebecauseitwastoldbythemanufacturerthatepoxywas“mild”.

MOL:06/19/74: Highexposuretoresinwhilecoatingstatorwithresinusingahose.Workerwassoakedinepoxyresin.Highsolventandepoxyexposure.‘”…companyhasrecognizedthehazardinvolvedinthismethod…andtakenstepstodiscontinuetheoperation.Noordersissued.MOL: 11/24/76: Investigateasbestosexposuresinarmaturedept.—workersusingbandsawstocutasbestoswithoutlocalexhaust;ventilationshouldnotallowfibrestore-enterworkarea.Airsamplingsuggested.Orderissuedforadequateventilation.Riskofinhalationandskinabsorptionofepoxyresin,MEKperoxidewasverylikelygiventheamountsandsurface areas of covered material and temperatures ofoven.Thermaldecompositionby-products.Reports of heavy fumes and odours from the dip tankandovenbakingoperation.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.

Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofresinfumes,lead,fluxesandthermaldecompositionby-productsishighlylikelygiventheriskfactorsandobservationsofheavyfumesdocumentedinthisarea.

Riskofinhalationofinsulationfibreshighlylikelyduringthisoperationgivenobservationaboutvisiblefibredustcontainingmica,fibreglass,andKaptontapedusts.ThisisconfirmedbyMOLreports.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

35

workingondieselcomponents,workersdippedtheirhandsinalcoholcontinuouslytopositioninsulation,whichledtomanycasesofdermatitis.Workersreportedskinpeelingoffinsheetswhenshoweringathomeduetosolventexposure;

12. Statorcoilsetupandwrapper:TCE-1300glueusedinthisprocesshadaveryheavyodour.ItwasappliedbybrushandMEKwasusedtoremoveandcleanup;

13. Oven(5’x6’)usedtoheatcoilspriortomovingtodiepress.The761,Gysand581epoxieswerebakedinoventomakeslotssolid.Workersoftenheattheirfoodintheovensandateatworkstationsbecauseofdistancetocafeteriaandlimitedseating;

14. Polefacebarpress.Solidpieceofcopperinsulatedwithlayersoftape,e.g.hydrotape,shrinkMylar,terrylene,tedlartape,permfiltape,alldonebyhand.Varnishalsousedforadhesive(anepoxyresin)brushedonasaverystickypaste.Aheatedpressheatedboththecopperwireandepoxyresinstocuretapeontothewire.Therewasnolocalexhaust.MEKwasusedtocleanpressesandremoveepoxybrownvarnishes.RagsdippedinMEKusedtowipedownpresseswhilestillhot,thusemittingheavyfumes.“FreeCoat”spraywasappliedtothepresstoactasanon-stick,whichcontainedMEK.Employeesateandsmokedattheirworkstations.Fibresweresignificantatthemezzaninelevel.Theairbornefibresandfumesweredispersedtootherareasofthebuildingaswell.

Armature Downstairs (1960s)1. Asubstationconsistingof2-3transformers

werelocatedinthisarea,usedbymaintenanceandfencedofffromtherestofarmaturedepartment.Itincludedadegreasingtankmeasuring16’x4’x6’deep.Thetankwashalfin,andhalfabove,ground.Itcontained#10000Royalene(TCE).Thiswasavapourdegreaseroperationheatedto200F.

Inhalationandabsorptionoftreatmentsfortapesaswellasseveralsolventshandledbarehanded.TheseincludedIsopropylalcohol,MEK,xylene,toluene.UseofMEKtocleanglueoffhands.Exposuresconfirmedbytheincidenceofdermatitisandothersymptoms.

RiskofinhalationandskinabsorptionofingredientsinbothTCE1300glueandMEK.

Riskofexposuretoepoxiesthroughinhalationandabsorptionhighlylikely.Ingestionalsopossiblegiveneatingatworkstations.

Riskofinhalationoftapefibresaswellastheirchemicaltreatments.Alsoreportsofheavydustaccumulationatmezzaninelevelwouldsupportthisassessment.Alsoriskofinhalationofepoxyresinsandthermaldecompositionproducts.InhalationandskinabsorptionofMEKhighlylikelygivenuseforcleaninghandsandarms.

JHSC: 1/15/80re:smokeGrievancefiledonmatterofenclosureofuppergalleryandmethodofpaymentwhenfumesforceworkerstoevacuatearea.Althoughseveralcorrectionsmade,problemstillthere.Situationunderinvestigationforlongtime(firstbroughttoattention10/79).

Riskofinhalationandskinabsorptionoftrichloroethyleneexposureswashighgiven:proximitytothechemical,itsforminhighvapourstatefrombeingheated,directhandling,lackoflocalexhaustventilation,andworkerobservationandexperienceofhealthsymptomsofexposure.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

36

Partswereloweredinabasketcontainingcopper and steel components by an overhead hoist.Thedegreasingprocesswasmonitoredfor10-15minutes.Vapourwasverystrongwithworkersstatingthatit“clearedtheirsinuses”.Therewasnoeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Awatertankofthesamesizewasheatedwithanexhaustoverthetop.Brazedcopperpartsfromotheroperationsweredippedintothistankforrinsing;

2. Therewasacopperstorageareawhereworkerswearingcottonglovespickedupcopperwireonreelstobemadeintocoils.Somewirewasinsulatedwithasbestosfromthecardingoperations;

3. Copperlathemachineformedcopperwireintoaflatplate2”x1/2”thick;

4. Coilwindinglathesoperatedona2-3-shiftbasis.Thiswasadryoperation.Copperwirewasfedintoalathe,whichtensionedthewireandcreatedcoils.Micaorfibreglassandasbestostapewereappliedautomaticallycreatingairbornefibrevisibleintheatmosphere.Ifthewirecamefromwireandcable,itwaslikelyasbestos.TherewasnolocalexhaustorPPEprovided.Motorizedsweeperscleanedthemainaisle.Workerssweptotherareas.Dustaccumulationonallsurfacesandairbornefibreswerevisibleinsunlight.Nochangeroomswereprovidedandworkclotheswerebroughthome.Workerscomplainedaboutitchinganddermatitis.EmployerprovidedSBS30andPLY-geltorelieveitchingaswellastimeforthesetobeapplied;

5. TinPotoperations/stripperflux.Tin/leadmixture(beeswaxaddedasreleaseagent)heatedto449F.Wirewasmechanicallystrippedofinsulation.Fluxmadeofrosinandalcoholappliedtocleancopperinpreparationoftinning.Significantamountsofvapourandfumesdetectedbythoseworkingon

Potentialexposuretoasbestosdependentonconditionofasbestosladeninsulationandwhetherthiswasstripped.

Riskofinhalationofcopperdustaswellasdustsconsistingofmica,asbestosandfibreglass.Inthelattercase,thewindingmachineapplyingtheinsulationtapesdidgeneratefibresbyabradingtheinsulationasitwasbeingapplied.Workersreportsofhighfibreintheworkplaceatmospherethatwasclearlyvisible.Riskofasbestosmorelikelyifwirecamefromwireandcabledepartment.

Notethattherewasnolocalexhaustventilation,norPPE.Dustaccumulation,clearsignthattheatmospherewasladenwithfibres--aswellasworkers’symptomsofdermatitisanditching.Latterisconfirmedbytheemployer’sattempttoaddresstheadversehealtheffect.

Highriskofinhalationandskinabsorptionoftinandleadfumesfromheatedmoltenpotsaswellasthealcoholbasedresin,giventhatthepotswereopenandworkershandledmaterialsdirectlywithouteffectivelocalexhaustventilationandrespiratoryprotection.“Sap-like”odoursarealsoasignthatworkerswereexposedtothesefumes.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

37

lathesadjacenttothepotoperation(whichproducedsap-likefumes).Odourswereheavyfromtin/flux.Ventilationsysteminadequate,despiteroofexhaustsystem.Moltentinwasmadeof60/40solderlead/tin.Workersmanuallyfedpotswithbarsofleadandtin.Asbestosgloveswereworn(brandname“Castor”);

6. Spreader:(usedwithhighvoltagecoils)Machine spread the coils into the shape requiredforinsertioninstator/rotor.Thespreadingoperationgeneratedanddispersedasbestosfibres;

7. Coiltapingarea:(30workerspershifton3shifts)Coilswereplacedinclampsandleadtapedwithmicatape,thenvoltageappliedtodetermineamountoftaperequired.Eachroundoftapingrequiredtheapplicationofblackvarnish(45gallondrums).Requiredtheapplicationof9layersoftapeandvarnish.Fibreglasscordusetotightencoilsbackintoposition.Coilswerethenair-dried.Glovesnotwornbecausedetailedmovementsrequired.Consequentlyworkersdippedtheir hands in 1500 (TCE) thinner to facilitate tighteningofcord.Handsoftenbrokeoutinblistersanddryskin.Theworkareawascharacterizedbytheaccumulationofblackvarnish, mica dust, and talc and considered tobe‘oneofthedirtiestjobs’intheplant.Workersatelunchatworkstationswithwindowsopenedorfansprovidedinsummer.Areafilledwithheavyfumesandvapoursduetolargenumberofworkersandlargeproductionruns;

8. TwoasphaltVPIcompoundtanksmeasuring25’deepx10’diameterand12’deepx8’diameter.Thiswasavacuumpressureimpregnationprocesstocoatcoils,etal.Oneoperator/shiftandtwotofillandempty.Tankfirstfilledwithasphalt,thencoilstobecoatedplaced on trays and heated in tank for three 24-hourperiodstoallowasphalttohardenthemicaandfittosize.Onetankrunning

Riskofinhalationofasbestosfibrehighlylikelygiventhegenerationofasbestosdustduringthespreaderoperation.

Inhalationofmicadustandinhalationandabsorptionoffumesfrom‘blackvarnish’aswellasdirecthandlingofthismaterial.

AlsoinhalationandabsorptionofTCEwhiledirecthandlingandcleanskinwiththischemical.Thisisconfirmedbyadversehealtheffectsonskin.

Thereportedaccumulationofblackvarnish,micadustandtalcindicatesthatworkershighlyexposedgivenreportsofheavyfumes,volumeofproductionandnumberofworkersemployedintheoperation.

Riskofinhalationofasphaltfumes(likelycontainingTCE)washighlylikely.Skinabsorptionrisk,givendirecthandlingofthecoatedparts.Alsorisksofinhalationofbothglyptolpaintfumesanddustfrominsulationtapescontaininggraphiteandasbestos(whichwasinafriablestate).Confirmationofexposurefromworkers’adversehealthsymptoms.*NOTE: See also Building #5 report regarding compounding “tanks”.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

38

continuously.Bakedcoilsandcardboardseparatorsremovedbyhand.Paperdustmaskswereworn.Asbestostapeusetotapetheleadscameina1”widereelwithloosefibressecuredwithgraphitetape.Theremainingwirewaspaintedwithredglyptolpaint.Exposuretoresinsbecameworseovertimewithworkersexperiencingburningsorethroats.Fumesheaviestwhenlidswereopened;

9. Testarea:Processinvolvedhighpotentialtestingof30to40thousandvolts.Forlargecoils,testtook60tests.Ozonewasemittedinprocess,burningworkers’nosesandsinuses.Ozoneodoursweredetectedattheupperlevelaswell;

10. Assemblywinders:(alsoconductedinbuildings8and10)Processinvolved20to30workershandlingasphaltcoatedwiretobesetupinthestators.Coilsfirstplacedintoslotsinstatorthenheldinplacewithasbestoswedges.Varnishplacedineachslot(1592asphaltvarnish),whichheldtheasbestosintact.Additionalwedgesofleatheredcardboardandwoodusedtosecurecoilsinplace.Varnishedfibreglasscordfurthersecuredeverythinginplace.Coilswereconnected individually, and then soldered inplacewithrosincoresolderbyacetylene/oxygentorch.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Coilleadswereinsulatedwithafibreglasstapealsocoatedwith1592asphaltvarnish.Thisprocesswasrepeated10-15timesperpairofcoilleads.Workerswerecoveredinblackasphaltvarnish;someworesafetyglasses;

Note:Generalenvironmentcanbecharacterizedassimilartoaroadtarringoperationwithaheavysmelloftarandbluehaze.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandlittle,ifany,PPE.Workpracticesincludedusingcompressedairtocleandustoffsurfacesandsolventstocleantheirbodies.Smokingandeatingatworkstationswerepermittedthroughoutthedepartment.Theotherimportant

Riskofinhalationofozonegasgeneratedbyapplicationofhighvoltageswasverylikelygivenworkers’experienceofodours(evenintheupperlevel)andadversehealthsymptoms.Ozoneisconsideredalungcarcinogen.

HighriskofinhalationofasphaltfumesaswellasTCEusedtothinasphalt.

Highriskofskinabsorptionofasphaltgiventheamountofdirecthandlingofcoatedmaterials.

Highriskofinhalationofasbestosandfibreglassdust.

Highriskofinhalationofsolderfumesandthermaldecompositionby-products.

Theseexposureswouldbeintensegiventhevolumeofproductionandtherepetitivenessoftheprocessandthefactthattherewasnolocalexhaustventilationandlittleppe.

Environmentalconditionsaresupportiveindicationsthathighexposureswereverylikelywithweakexposurecontrolstoprotectworkersfromthesetoxicchemicals.Theseconditionswereaggravatedbythepieceworksystemthatwasinplaceuntil1988.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

39

aspectofworkatGEwastheinstitutionofthepieceratesystem,whichtendedtoexacerbatetoxicexposure;11. Overheadcraneoperation:Armaturesand

otherparts,weretransportedfromoneendofthebuildingtoanotherbymobileand overhead cranes driven by operators in wiremeshcabsmeasuring5’x5’.Hitchersworkedwithcraneoperators,guidingthemfromthegroundandattachinganddetachingpartstobemoved,dipped,etc.OverheadcraneswerenotenclosedandtheoperatorwassubjecttolargeamountsoffumesandvapoursfromthedegreasingtankscontainingheatedTCEaswellastheresinsfumesfromtheVPItanksandbakingovens.Thisincludedasphalt,epoxyresinsanddegreasers.Observersindicatethatthecranecabwasengulfedincloudsofsmokeandfumes.Theoperatorwouldtakepartsinandoutofthedippingandbakingcycle3to4timesormoredaily,rangingindurationfrom5minutestohoursdependingontheprocess.Theoperatorhitcherswerealsoatsignificantexposureriskindirectingthecraneoperatorandleaningovertanksandovensto hook and unhook parts and monitor the process.Bothoperatorshadnoprotectiveequipmentandtherewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Accordingtoobservationsofother employees, the crane cab and operator wouldbeengulfedinbluesmoke.Alsoobservedwerelargeamountofresindustoncranecabsurfaces;

12. AssemblyWinders(MultiCircuitFieldArmaturesMCF)tasksincludedsecuringcopperwiretothearmature1’to5’inlength.Thisinvolvedinserting3”to4”sheetsofvarnishedasbestos(wedges)intheslotsofthestatoraswellassheetsofMicaandvarnish.Eponglasswedgeswerealsoused;

13. BandingProcessrequiredtheuseofabandingmachinelocatednearthemagneticframedepartment.Herethemachinewouldapply

Craneoperatorsweresubjecttoratherhighrisksofinhalingresinfumes,degreasersandvariousdustscontainingasbestos,fibreglass,andmica.Fumeswouldalsoincludethermaldecompositionby-productsresultingfromheatingandbakingresinsandcuringagents.Hitcherstooweresubjecttohighrisksofinhalingfumes,oftenbendingovertankstohookandunhookproductsbeingtransported.

Riskofinhalationofmicaandasbestosdustfromabraidedwedgesbeinginsertedintoslots.Thiswouldalsoincludeabsorptionofresinsfromdirectlyhandlingthesecoatedproducts.

Riskofexposuretofibreglassbreakoffandtaperesins.Inhalationoffibresandresinfumesand/orbyproducts.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

40

avarnishedfibreglasstapecalledResi-Glasscord;

14. Weldingarea:TIGweldingandbrazingwasmainlyusedtoattachleadstotheinsulatedbarsofthecommutatorsriser.Thisusuallyinvolvedcopper-to-copperweldingwithnofiller.Italsoinvolvedweldingresinsonthewires.Thisoperationgeneratedcopperandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromburningresins.Theseoperationstook3-4dayswith2-4welders.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandnoproperrespiratoryequipment.Silphoswasalsousedtosolderleads.Fumesweredenseandrosetothemezzaninelevel.Thiswasalengthyprocessandproducedaheavyaccumulationoffumesandduststhroughoutthebuilding;

15. AssemblywindersMD-CD:SameasMCF.Leadscutbylathe,dippedintinpotheatedat500-600c.Hoistedbycranetothetinpotfor10to15minutes.WipeddownwithTCEcoatedragsmanuallyandthentakenforcutting,smoothingandsanding.Partwasthenplacedinawalk-inoven,dippedin9700Isonel,dipped,bakedandcooled2to3times.Fumeswereheavyandwouldirritateeyes,noseandthroat.Uncuredresinwouldreactinthe2nddipandproduceachemicalreactionthatwasstronger.Thetrappeduncuredresinswouldbereleasedwhencooledandorgrinded;

16. Assembly Winders (turbine rotors): Insulation-blocksofmicaandfibreglassand/or asbestos inserted into the slots and repeatedseveraltimebetweenhighpotentialtesting.Thelargesteelringwasheatedtoshrinkintotherotorwithwoodenblockscontinuallysandedtocreateaproperfit.Finallyapieceofinsulationwasaddedwithasteelwedge;

17. Assemblywinders(InductionBarRotors):Thisprocessinvolvedbarecopperwireandmica-mattapelinedwithMylarorNomex.LineristhendippedinIsonelvarnish.Additional

Riskofinhalationofweldingfumesincludingthermaldecompositionby-productsfromweldingresins.

Riskofinhalationoffumesfromsolderingsilphos,asilver-basedsolder.

Thesefumeswereheavyandpermeatedotherpartsofthebuildingsuchastheupperlevel.

Highriskofinhalationandabsorptionoftinandleadfumes.Fumeswerequitedenseandworkersdirectlyhandledthecoatedpartwithbarehands.

Also,inhalationofmetalandresindustsfromsandingandgrindingexcessresinsinadditiontoinhalationofuncuredresinstrappedinmaterialsreleasedwhencooled.

Riskofinhalationofmica,fibreglassandasbestoswheninsertingtheseblocksintoslots.

RiskofinhalationofdustsandresinfumesfromMylar,Nomexandisonelvarnishhigh.Riskofinhalationofasbestosdustfrompaper.RiskofinhalationofTIGweldingandSylphssolder.Inhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsfrombakingresinsseveraltimespercycle.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

41

insulationprovidedbyasbestospapervarnished(with#1592)betweenbars36’wide.ConnectionsTIGweldedwithSylphs.Allcoilstiedwithresi-glasscord.Producttested,banded,andcure-baked.Theprocessofdipping,bakingetc.repeated2-3times.

Note: the above process involved close and intricate workwithdirectcontactwithmaterialsandchemicalprocessesincludingasbestosandchemicalreactionsassociatedwithresincoating,curing,andweldingetc.;18. Ovens:typicalovenwas15’deep10’high

and10’door,heatedto160c.Workerswalkedinandoutwithpartsandwouldbeexposedtohightemperaturesandintensefumes.Doorswouldbeopenedquiteoftenbecauseofthepiecerateoperation.Odourswerelikeburntdieselfumesorvarnish.Ventilationwasinadequate;

19. Portableovens;(inbuildings8and10also)Ovenswere20’x20’x15’equippedwithCalrodheaters.Productswerecoveredinanasbestoscloththatwasgreasytothetouch.Workershandledthisclothintensely,manipulatingitrepeatedly,e.g.,byremovingitanddroppingitfromheights.Workerscameoutcoveredinfibres,whichwerevisibleintheair;

20. Armature dip in Isonel 9700: Armatures dippedintank7’x7’containing9700Signalandtoluenethinner.TheArmaturewasmanuallyhosedwithvarnish.Armaturerotatedasitwascoveredbyvarnishasectionatatime.WorkerrepeatedlyaddedtoluenethinnertotheIsonel5gallonpail.Therewasapproximately150-180gallonofIsonelandabout20gallonsoftolueneinthemix.This process produced heavy fumes that smelledlikediesel.Workersexperiencedburningeyesandupperrespiratoryirritation.Varnish applied manually, then brush used to removeexcess.Thistook8hourstocomplete.Armaturemovedtobakingovenwhereitdrip-driedwhilerotatingasitbakedtocure.

JHSC: 2/12/80 Re: #3 oven ventilation system: Padlock to ensure vent remains open not properly installed.Switchcanbeknockedoffwithpadlockinplace.Becomeobviousthatcarefulmonitoringof requested repairs necessary to ensure proper compliance.

Riskofinhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsinandoutsideoftheovens.Thesewouldbequiteintenseintheovenswhereworkerswereintheovenitself.Ventilationwasnotadequatetocontrolexposures.MOL: 10/04/82: Investigationofheavyfumesandordersfromcuringoven.Reportsuggestsodorsmaybeduetocresolformaldehyde,hexaldehyde,acetaldehyde,propeanaldehyde,andphenol.MOL: 10/25/82: followuponcuringoven.Workerscomplainingofirritation,odors,andnausea.Leakdetected.Employerconcludesnohazardaftertesting.However,inspectornotes—fumescontainalargevarietyofthermaldecompositionproductsthatatlowconcentrationscanbeirritants;exhaustsystemislikelycompromisedbyroofexhaustandoverloadingofoven.Noordersissued,justadvice:don’toverloadovenandencloseupperend.

Highriskofinhalationofresinfumesaswellasasbestosdustfromhandlingtheovenblanket,whichwasfrayingandhandledcontinuously.

HighriskofinhalationofIsonelfumesandtoluene,handleddirectlyandincloseproximitytothedippingoperation.Largevolumeofchemicalscontributedtoaheavyexposureoveralongperiodoftime.Resinandtoluenewereusedinlargequantitiesandhandledmanually.

Riskofinhalationofasbestosfibrefromcuttingasbestosblanketstosizeandmanipulatingovercoatedandheatedparts.Processtookagreatdealoftimeandwasrepeatedseveraltimespercycleresultinginalongdurationofexposure.

Nolocalexhaustandhighfumeconcentrationconfirmedby1982MOLinvestigation.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

42

Afterthis,anasbestosblanketcoveredthearmature.Thiswascuttosizeandputinplace by an overhead crane and manipulated bythecraneoperatorandworker.Thiswasahighfibreoperationandtheworkerdirectlyhandled and manipulated the asbestos blanket.Processalsomonitoredbyoperatorwhowasrequiredtogointotheoventoread/recordtemperatures.Exposurestohighheat(160c)aswellasasbestosfibres.Processrepeated2-3times.See1982MOLreportregardingtrappedfumes.Nolocalexhaustventilation;

21. StorageTanks:Tin,varnish,Isonel.Three-storeystoragetankforasphalt;

22. Micatapeproductiontookplaceinaroom30’x60’x30’whereflakedmicaparticleswereappliedtoatapecoatedinwarmedvarnish.Micawasthrownintoahopperandtraveledup and over into a shaker that deposited micaparticlesontothevarnishedstickytapethatcapturedtheflakes.Asmachineran,micablackvarnishwasappliedontothetape(asphalttarvarnish).Thiswasheatedtokeepitsoftandsticky.Largeamountsofvarnishonflooranddustfrommica.Taperollscutwithaslittermachine.An8x4’toluenetankusedtocleantheslitterbladesandworker’shands.Compressedairusedtoblowdustfrommachinesandclothes;

23. HydroPolesoperation:Tosecurecopperwiretopoles,insulatedwireswereattachedtosteelframesthenvarnishedandbaked.Workerscleanedpoleswithragsdippedintolueneandnoglovesforabout30minutesforasmallitem.Toluenevapourwasoverwhelming.Polethenpaintedwithblackvarnish/shellacalcoholbased.Micawasapplied,heatedandpaintedwithshellacandbaked3timesfor8hours.Workersgroundoffexcesscuredresingeneratinglotsofdust.Nolocalexhaustventilationduringthisbecauseovensshutoff;

Riskexposuresduringfillingandcleaning.Exposuretobothresinandsolventswhentankdooropened.Aftertankisdrainedforcleaningoftenhadtogrindoutdriedspotsofvarnishthusexposedtogrindingdustaswellasanyfumescreatedbyfrictionheat)

Riskofinhalationofmicadustandfumesfromblackvarnishandtoluenewashighgiventheopenprocessingofflakesandvarnishcoatedtapes.

Riskofskinabsorptionofvarnishaswellastoluenehighgivenextentthatvarnishgotonworkers’skinanduseoftoluenetocleanitoff.

Thevolumeofwastevarnishaccumulationwouldconfirmthehighriskofexposurefromseveralroutesofentry.

Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofvarnishfumesandtolueneasaresultofdirecthandling;workerreportsofheavyconcentrationoffumes.

Riskofinhalationofmicadustsaswellascuredresindustfromgrindingexcessresinfromcoatedparts.

Lackoflocalexhaustventilationelevatedriskofsignificantexposures.

HighriskofinhalationofTCEfumes,copperdust,andsolderresiduesgiventhevolumeofmaterials,directhandling,andlackofexposurecontrolsforlongperiodsoftime.

Exposuresconfirmedbyreportedacuteadversehealtheffectsbyworkers.

JHSC: 5/20/80 re: armature stacks

Recentlyinstalledexhauststackscreatingheavysmokeandacridfumesinwholeeastofplantarea

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

43

includinginsidebldgs.nowthatwarmweatherishere.

JHSC: 3/23/82 re: fumes - Polyurethane tent used tocoverareawheretoluenethinnersusedtocleancoils.Workrefusalbecauseoffumes.Tenttobeused temporarily but the special job is done and tent stillinuse.Tentisnotvented,alsoafirehazardwithtoluenefumes.

Highriskofinhalationofbrazingfumesaswellasresinfumes,intenseenoughtoaffectthecraneoperator.Thesewerelargeleadsandbrazingandresultingfumesweresubstantial.

HighriskofinhalationofresinfumesandIsonelfumesfromthebandinganddippingprocess.

HighriskofbothinhalationanddermalexposuresassociatedwithVPItanks.Workersthroughouttheplantcomplainedoffumesfromthesetanks.

VPIdippingandcuringoperationinvolvedextensiveinhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromdippingandovencuringwhichwouldgoonextensivelyinrepeatedcycles.

Inhalationofresinandcopperdustsfromgrindingexcessresinsafterbaking.

Riskofbothinhalationanddermalexposuretoresinfumesanddecompositionby-products.

MOL:06/24/83: Lab test by MOL re: Workers concern abouthazardsfromthermaldecompositionbyproductsfromburningureaformaldehydefoams.Testindicatedthefollowingby-products:p-dioxane,

Armature Department: 1960-1980s:24. CopperStorageArea:Taskscarriedout

includedaTCEdegreasingareaandgrindingexcessivecopper.Nolocalexhaustventilation.Generatedagreatdealofcopperdustandresiduesofsolderfor3-8hours/shift.TheTCEoperationinvolvedbathingpartsinTCEforanhour,andthenbathinginwater.Thisproducedaviolentchemicalreactionofsmoke,producingrashesandirritationsofeyes,noseandthroat;

25. Assemblywinders:WorkersinthisareapreparedandattachedlargecopperleadsforlargeDCandACstators.Thebrazingproducedthickbluesmoke,affectingcraneoperatoraswell.Workersreportedburningresinsoftheleads.Inlate1980ssmokehogswereinstalled,butnotviewedaseffective;

26. BandingLathe:Resi-glassappliedtoarmaturesproducingfumesfromheatinginsulatedparts,resinsandotherthinners.Armatures then dipped in Isonel for 10-15 minutesandliftedanddrainedovertankfor½hour,producingheavyfumesandvapours;

27. VPITanks:Twotanksinstalledin1967-68plusothersaddedlatter.LargeVPIaddedin1990(10’partlyunderground).Smalltanks100’’x116”x152”deep.Materialsheatedinclude:catalyzedepoxy74023,Tributylstyrenethinner,andresinM6860.Reportsofrashesfromthinnersandresins.Tanksremovedin1994-95;

28. VPIEpoxyresin68608-hr.dippingcycleswenton24/7.Whenlidraisedheavyfumesemittedwithadverseeffectsfeltwithin10-15minuteofliftingorplacingarmatureinoroutoftank.Tankoperatorsusedsqueegeestoremoveexcessresinwheninovenanddrippingovertank.Otheractivitiesincludedgrindingexcesscuredepoxyresin.Leadswerealsogroundandbrazed.Theseactivitiesgeneratedheavyfumesfromresins,andcopperandresindusts;

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

44

vinyl chloride, 2-chlorethanol, cyclopentanone, and isocyanatesfound.

MOL:06/02/87: Investigationofexcessiveemissionsfromcuringoven.GEepoxyresinGE74023coveredbaffle.Excessiveamountofepoxyonbafflesuspectedassourceoffumesaffectingworkersandresidents.MSDSnoestablishedTLV,butindicatesthattoxicgasesmaybegenerated.Stopworkorderissueduntiladequateprecautionsdevelopedandinstituted.Highriskofinhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsduringthedippingandbakingoperationintheIsonelcoatingprocess.Inhalationofresinandcopperdustsfromgrindingoperationsonleads.DirectdermalexposuretoXylenein“washing”ofhandsaswellasinhalationofxylenevapourswithoutlocalexhaustventilation.

Riskofinhalationofvarioussandingdustshighlylikely.

Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumesfromcoatingsandpaint.

Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumes.

RiskofinhalationofNomexinsulation,solderfumes.

29. SmallVPItanksinvolveddippingsmallpartsinVPItankresinfor1½hours,generatingresinfumeswhichwouldbedrawnbackintotheroomwhendoorsopened.Ovenbakedat160°Cfor8hours;

30. Isonel51tankusedtocoatcoilwithinsulatingvarnish.Partsweredippedintotankuntilbubblesstopped.Varnishthinnedwithxyleneandtoluene.Thenliftedandlefttodrainfor½hourwhichwouldreleasevapours.Partsthenplacedinanovenat160°Cfor4-8hours.Aftercooling,thedippingprocesswasrepeated.Sincethepartswerestillwarmfromthefirstdip,theseconddipwouldproducemorevapourandheat.Leadsweregroundtoremoveexcessresincreatinglotsofdustinadditiontofumes.SeeJHSCMinutesre:aninspectioninthisregard;

31. Xylenetank:Duringthe70stank(32’x12’x8’)usedtocleanresinoffbarehands.Sometimessoakedhandsfor5-10minutes.Producedheavyvapours.Noexhaustventilation;

32. Sin-Bin:Asandingareathatproducedandaccumulatedgreatdealofdust.Noexhaustventilation;

33. Coilforming:Coilcut,madehollowandthenepoxied,paintedandheated.Productionofvapoursfromepoxyandpaint;

34. Coilmanufacturing(BruceGenerating)Hydrocoilbarforming.Coilwasformed,thenepoxiedandheated.Verysticky;

35. Fridge:(Epoxystoragefacility)30x40x20’.Epoxyodourdetected,staffcouldstayinthereforalongperiod;

Armature 1980s to 2005:1. Coilfabrication:Producedcoilforarmature.

Involvedwindingenamelwire,tying(armature)legswithstring.Thenstrippedandtinnedupstairs.Nomexplacedinslots,leadssoldered,thenbrazedwithrosincoredsolder.Emittedfumesduringthesolderingoperation.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

45

Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofcopperdusts,silphossolder,MEK,acetoneandtoluene.Riskofinhalationofasbestosandotherinsulatingmaterialsincludingmica.JHSC: 5/20/80 Re: toluene incidentEmployeeworkingfor2hrs.onarmaturebarsusing1500thinnersinlargeamountsresultedinlossofconsciousnessandtakentoPeterboroughHealthCentre(toluenerecentlysubstitutedforacetoneandworkershadnotbeeneducatedonuseofchemicalandheathrisks).

Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumes,toluene,Isonel,thermaldecompositionby-products.

Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsgeneratedbyheatingandcuring.JHSC: 10/27/81: Pole windingAnumberofnewemployeeshavesincemovedfromthisworkareabecauseofepoxyrash.In1/12/82reportitstates“rashesincreasing.”

Producttiedwithresi-glass,banded,andshippedtooven;

2. Ovenswereat160°Cmeasuring6’x8’.Partscarted in and out, pot tested and then process repeated2-3times;

3. Crane cycle involved 3 cycles at 6 hours per cycle;

Brazing Operations:Extensivebrazingwascarriedoutinthisdepartment.Armaturedownstairstorchbrazedcoppersegmentswithsilversolderthenpowersanded.Whitepastefluxfumesfromsolderandflux.SilphosbrazingrodsusedcontainingcadmiumOxyacetyleneandnaturalgas.VPI,degreaserTCE,andcuringoven.4. ExcitorProcessforinsertingcoilsinstators:

1.Bandinglathe(see#26above);2.Punchpresstoflattencopper,blankoutcorners,pressflat,andpushtogether,thenbrazecorners,cleanwithwater;thiscouldtaketwoweekswithcopperdustallover;copperstripsusedsilphossolder,airgrindinggeneratingcopperandsilphosdust.WashedwithMEK,acetonewipedbyhandwithrags(workersreportbeingovercomebysolventfumes);insulationcouldinvolveasbestos,quinogo,quintax,Nomex;cuttosizewithshears,slitter,userectifiertobondeverythingat135°Cinpress,coolto40°Candcleancoil.InsulationofpolewithMicaM5680epoxyonwindinglathe.RotorPole5105redepoxytopolewithinsulationusingMicaeponglass,paintwith5105paintthenredepoxybetweeneachlayer;bakeat160°Cfor8hours;(warmingup5105paintproducesfumes);apply5142epoxytwice.CleanupwithToluene1500.Workersateatworkstation;

5. IsonelTank:Partsweredippedfor10minutesinIsonelthenexcessbrushedmanually.LowvoltagecoilspreppedanddippedintoVPItanktwice.Resinandfluxthensolderedandtapedwithfibreglasstape.Partsdippedagainandplacedinoven.Afterbakingandcooling,excesscuredresinair-chiselledoff,leadsburnedbybrazing,generatingfumesanddust;

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

46

JHSC: 12/8/81: rotor pole area

“Areaverysmokyanddusty.Requestcheckforventilation.”

See above

Riskofinhalationofairbornefibresgeneratedfromcuttingoperation.

6. Windinglathe:RotorPole#5105redepoxypiecedpolesinsulatedwithcoil;wetwindingprocess;reelwireupandinsulatewithMica.Eponglasspaintwith5105tobondfirstlayer,paintallotherlayerswithredepoxy,thenbakeinovenat160°Cfor8hours;5105warmedto60°Cthenbacktovarnish.HeavyfumesgeneratedbyIsonelat160°C;

7. Shearstation:noexhaustventilation.Materialsshearedtosizetofillslots.Thereweretwomachinesrunningproducinglotsofairbornefibres.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Airfromopenwindowwoulddispersefibresfurther.

Note: Thehydropolesreferredtointhistextisapartofthearmatureandnottobeconfusedwithwoodenhydropolesfoundontheroadside.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

47

BUILDING: #8 DEPARTMENT: MACHINE SHOP

General Description South West Area South East Area North West Area North East Area Gallery North and SouthWork Processes/MachinesBalancing Machine/Welding and Brazing Phosgene Gas Tread Cutting in 8ADegreasers MWF (Metal Working Fluids)Babbitt Fitting (Midway in South End of Building)Machining Process (Concentrated in South End of the Building)Green Layout PaintGrinding and De-burring OperationsCuring and Annealing Ovens

Known chemicals used or produced:EpoxyResinsFormationofnewchemicalsthroughdecompositionormixing(phosgene,BPA,formaldehyde)MetalDusts(Brass,Bronze,StainlessSteel,Steel,Nickel,Chromium,Cadmium,Zinc)MWFs(SteelKut,TrimSol,Cimcool,DascoTap,Benzeneincludingadditives:ArsenicChlorine, Sulphur, Mineral Oils)Solvents (Toluene, Xylene, Acetone, MEK)WeldingFlux(Tin,Lead)Brazing

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

48

Workerswereexposedtoavarietyoftoxicchemicalthatcouldbeinhaled,absorbedthroughskin,and/oringested.TheseincludedvariousdegreaserssuchasTCE,MWFsuchas‘SteelKut’,dustssuchasasbestos,micaandmetalssuchascopper,tin,cadmium,andchromate.

JHSC: 8/23/83: re: thinners:“Largegluingoperation,operatorsusingthinnerstogetglueofftheirhands.Recommendusinggreenglovestopreventcontactwithglue.”

ThelackofadequatelocalexhaustventilationandPPEcertainlyaggravatedexposurerisks.

InhalationandabsorptionofMWFaswellasheavilyuseddegreaserswereinthehigh-riskcategorybecauseofshearvolume.

WorkersareexposedtothroughinhalationvariousvapoursfromdegreasingfluidssuchasTCE,MEK,acetone,xyleneaswellasphosgenegaswhenthesesolventscomeincontactwithweldingoperations.

Workersinmostmachiningoperationsinhaleandabsorbthroughtheskin,largeamountsofMWF.Onesuchcuttingoilcalled‘SteelKut’isparticularlyusedinlargequantitiesandisresponsibleforvariousadverserespiratoryanddermalreactionsindicatingthatworkersareexposedsignificantly.

ExposuresthroughinhalationandskinabsorptionwereevidencedbyobservationsfromtheMOLindicatingthatworkersweresoakedwiththisoilandthatrespiratorswouldclogduringmachining.Thisproductcontainsmineraloil,sulphurandchlorine.Thelattertwodecomposeintosulphurdioxideandphosgene.(MOL:Sept10,1982–fouroperatorsidentifiedwithdermatitisinpast5years).

MOL: June 25,1990 –reportofsolderingnearfurnacehood.Solventsinlargecoveredbeakersbesidelappingmachine.

General Description: Thisdepartmentwasprimarilyengagedintheproductionofpartsforverylargemotors.Thiswasahighvolumedepartment.Therewereapproximately250employeesinthemachineshop.Workerscarriedoutmajormachiningprocessesincludingcutting,boring,milling,grinding,polishingandsanding.Thesevariousprocessesproducedsubstantialamountsoffumes,dusts,vapours,mistsandgases.

Partsproductioninvolvedtheuseofalargenumberofmetalmachines(approximately35inthesouthendandapproximately20inthenorthend).WiththislargenumberofmachiningoperationsgoingontherewereextremelylargeamountsofMWFswhichincluded:‘SteelKut’,‘Trimsol’,‘Cimcool’,DascoTap,andseveralotherwatersolublefluidscontainingarsenicasabiocide.Mostoperationsalsoappliedsolventdegreaserstocleanandpreparemetalsformachining,weldingandfinishing.Therewere3degreasingtankscontainingvariousdegreasingagentsincludingRoyalene(TCE),Toluene,xylene,acetone,andMEK.Tankswererefilledandcleanedmanuallyduringslackperiods.Largesurfaceareaswerehandwipedbyemployeeswithragsheavilysoakedintoluene,TCEorMEK.

South West Area of the Building:

Therewere6largeverticalboringmachines,4millingmachines,severalradialdrills.Thisareaalsoincluded:2slotL&S,planer,degreaserpowerwash,balancemachineandweldingbooth.

South East Area of the Building:

Therewere2horizontalboringmachines,oneofwhichwasa25’machineinadditiontothelarge“RedGilbert,”theKozmamachine,fourgrindingoperationsandsmallandlargelathesbesidetheforeman’soffice.Thisareaalsoincluded:apaintbooth,cleanandgrindoperation,NCverticalboringmill,radialdrill,andthreehorizontalboringmills.

Building: #8 Department: Machine Shop ProductionProcess Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

49

WorkersareexposedtothroughinhalationvariousvapoursfromdegreasingfluidssuchasTCE,MEK,acetone,xyleneaswellasphosgenegaswhenthesesolventscomeincontactwithweldingoperations.

MOL: Dec 6,1982 - Micadustbuild-uponflooroflathe machine noted in Internal Responsibility System CyclicalReview.

MOL: Dec 6, 1982 – exhaustventilationatpaintsprayboothinadequateairvelocity(signsofoverspraynotedonsurroundingarea).

Significantriskofinhalationofweldingfumescontainingresidualdegreasersandheavymetals.

Gallery South/West:

Spindledrills,2layouttables,drill,2millingmachines,2MonarchNCmachinesandhorizontalboringmill.

Gallery South/East:

3enginelathes,NClatheandshaftgrinder.

North West Area of the Building:

JustbelowtheMainAisletherewasasmallmachiningarea,3horizontalboringmills,aspiderandshaftassemblyareaandaverylargeopendegreasingtanknexttotheweldingoperationacrossthemainAisle.AlargedegreasingtankwaslocatedintheNWcorner.Thisareaalsoincludedshaftshrinkingoperationwithdryice,horizontallathe,largeNClathe,LargeWotanLathe.

North East:

Largelathe.

Gallery North:

Assemblyandshipping.

North East Area of the Building:

Therewere5lathesand4NCboringmills,de-burringboothandapaintbooth.Northofthemainaisle,ashaft-balancingmachinewaslocatedaswellasaweldingarea,asmallassemblyarea,amachiningarea,atin-platingarea,apaintshop,andashippingarea.TheareaalsocontainedalargeovenusedtocureepoxiedpartsandarmaturesfromtheArmatureDept.acrosstheoutsidedriveway.

Balancing Machine/Welding and Brazing:

Thisprocessinvolvedbalancingofspinningmotorpartssuchasshafts.Thisrequiredagreatdealofbrazingbythewelderswhoattachedcounterweightstotheshafttoreducewobbleandfriction.Thebrazingoperationproducelargeamountsofweldingfumeaswellasresiduesofdegreasersandothermetalpre-treatments.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

50

JHSC: 11/4/80 re: TCE exposure:

“(Companydoctor)feels(worker’s)medicalproblemsprobablyrelatedtocloseproximityofhisworkstationtoBldg.#8degreaser(asarea)stillconsidereda‘troublespot’andnumberofotherpeoplehavecomplainedofdiscomfortaswell.”(Workercurrentlyonlayoff).

SeeinhalationandabsorptionofMWFandthermaldecompositionby-products.

Theriskofinhalationoffinedustcontainingvariousmetalalloysincludingbronze,brass,stainlesssteel,mildsteel,combinedwithcuttingoilfumes/vapours.

MOL inspector observations, Sept. 29, 1982: The chlorineandsulphurisbondedtothealiphaticchainintheoilandwilldecomposeathightemperatureandproducesulphurdioxideandphosgenegas.

JHSC: 8/24/82 re: cutting oils: Fourworkersexperiencingskinproblems,somemoreseverethanothers.

Phosgene Gas:

Sincethebrazing/weldingoperationwasveryclosetothelargeopendegreasingtankcontainingTCE,fumesfromthetankwouldcomeincontactwiththeweldingoperationproducingahighlytoxicgas--phosgene.Thisgasisreferredtoaspoisongas.

Tread Cutting in 8A:

AmajorboltthreadingoperationwasconductedinBldg.#8Areferredtoasthe‘holeinthewall’.Duringthisprocess‘Steel-Kut’cuttingoilconsistingofmineraloilsmixedwithsulphurandchlorine,wassprayedliberallyduringthethreadcuttingoperationonthelathe.‘DascoTap’wasusedduringthisthreadcuttingoperation.Theboltstobecutwereaslargeas3-4”diameterand12”long.

Degreasers:

This department manufactured various components ofmotorandgeneratorproduction.Duringtheprocessofmachining,cutting,milling,grinding,buffingandweldingtherewasasubstantialuseofdegreasers,e.g.2tanksofRoyalene(TCE)andotherdegreaserssuchasacetone,MEK,toluene,andxylene.

MWF (Metal Working Fluids):

ThevariousmachiningoperationemployedtheconstantandheavyuseofMWF.Thedepartmentused“SteelKut”MWF,whichwasthesubjectofahealthimpactstudyduringthe1990sbecauseof reported health complaints and adverse effectsexperiencedbytheoperatorsandotherpersonnel.OthermachiningoperationswouldapplylargeamountsofMWFthatwouldbesprayedoncontinuouslyduringthemachining.AirinthebuildingwouldbefilledwithMWFmistandbluishsmokefromheatingoffluidsduringmachining.Workers’clothingwouldbesaturatedwithfluid.Dermatitis,skinburnsandirritation,irritatedeyes,noseandthroatwerecommoncomplaints.

Aftermachining,operatorsusedcompressedairtoclearcuttingsandcoolantandoils.Thiswasfollowed

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

51

Babbittfittersexperiencedmajorexposuresboththroughskinabsorptionandinhalation.Ingestionwasalsoafactorbecauseworkersateandsmokedattheirworkstations.

Workingwithbarehandsinaslurrycontainingleadalloyandtoluenewouldinvolvedmajorabsorptionofbothleadalloyandtoluene,particularlysincethetoluenewoulddefattheskinandmakeabsorptionmorelikely.Aswell,sincethetoluenevolatilizes,vapourconsistingofbenzene-contaminatedtoluenewouldbeinhaledreadily.(MOL:May23,1986–airtestingidentifiedsignificantleadexposurewhichcompanyattributedtouseofcompressedair.Practiceterminated.Urinelevelsbelowalertlevel).

Thetinningoperationwouldgenerateheavymetalandcyanideacidvapourswouldbeinhaledandabsorbedthroughskincontactduringmixinganddippingandretrievingtinnedparts.

Significantriskofcopperdustinhalationdustaswellasabsorptionthroughtheskin.Sinceworkersate

byamanualwashdownwithragssoakedintoluene,and/orTCE.

MWFs:Inbuilding8I,Bay15measuringabout30x60x60feettwoHerbertTurretlatheswereoperated.Theseweremostlyusedforcuttingthreadonbrass,bronze,stainlessandmildsteel.ThisoperationusedSteelKutoilforover20yearsattheplantbeginninginthe1960s.Thisoilisamineraloilcontainingsulphurandchlorine.Themachinesused4gperweekandaredrippedfromapipeontotheworkpiece.Mostoftheoilisdissipatedbybeingthrownoutbycentrifugalforceintheformofdropletsormistsaswellasthermaldecompositiononthehotmetalchips.Occasionallyoperatorsuserespiratorbutwhenitissoakedwithoilitisimpossibletobreathethrough.Attimesthehotchipswillcausetheoiltoflareupandproduceirritatingsmoke.Operator’sshirtsandtrousersareroutinelysoakedwithoilaswellasonoperators’faces.

Babbitt Fitting (Midway in South End of Building):

Babbittfittingwascarriedoutinbothbuildings#8and#10.Thisoperationinvolvedfitterssandingandsmoothingimperfectionsinthebabbittbearingswithbarehandsinatroughoftoluene.Thisprocesswouldtakeseveralhoursdependingonthesizeofthebearing(Seebuilding#10profile).

Tin Plating (South of Paint Booth in North East Section of Building):

Thisdepartmentcarriedouttin-platingintheNEsectionofthebuilding.Theplatingprocessinvolvedcyanideacidandtin/leadsalts.Thisprocessproducedsignificantamountsofvapoursasaresultoftheelectroplatingprocess.Thesevapourcontainedcyanidesaltsandtin/leadconstituents.

Machining of Commutators (Concentrated in South End of the Building):

SomeofthemachininginvolvedtheapplicationofMWFwhileotherswouldbeconducted‘dry.’Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.MachiningofCommutatorsinvolvedthegenerationofcopper,asbestosandmicadusts.Retireesdescribedthearea

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

52

attheirworkstationsitishighlylikelythatworkersingestedthesedusts.Workers’skinandhairwerereportedtoturngreenfromtheoxidationprocess.

Vapoursfromapplyinglayoutpaintarereadilyinhaledandwouldbehighlyconcentratedonlargesurfaceareas.Sincethisprocesswasbyhand,absorptionthroughtheskinwouldalsooccur.JHSC: 8/30/83: re: paint fumes: Test-meninhighpotentialtestingthreatenworkstoppageifpainterscontinuetopaintlargejobsoutsidebooth.“(Unionrep)disregardednotescirculatingpumpforwaterexhaustisnotworkingproperly.”

JHSC: 12/17/84: re: paint fumes: “jobsstillbeingpaintedoutsidethebooth.Thisproblemexistedbeforethenewmodernboothinstalled.However,allthat has been accomplished is more material is in the boothandwhenfull,workispaintedoutside…lotsofexcuses…butverylittleiseverresolved.”

Theriskofinhalationoffinedustcontaininggrit/resin, metal dust contains various metal alloys such as nickel,chromium,cadmium,zinc.Thermaldecompositionby-productswouldbereadilyavailabletobeinhaledinthisbakingandannealingprocess.Thiswouldincludevapourizedoilsduringannealingaswellasdecomposedcuringresinsintheformoffumesandvapours.JHSC: 2/21/83: re: V-100 epoxy grout:“Largequantitiesusedforbaseofamachine.Producthashighlytoxicfumes.Workerscomplainingaboutfumes.Actionoffered:Tonotifyworkersinareanexttimeproductisused.”JHSC: 12/16/77 re: diesel exhaust fume incident: Whilecraneoperatorloadingatransporttruck,thedriverstartedthedieselengineand“revved”it.Heavysmokeandfumesblanketedcraneoperator.Shortlyafterwardhecomplainedofheadachesandseverenausea.Nextdayfeltpoorlybutreportedforworkandineveningsufferedaheartattackandrushedtohospital(doctorcouldn’tconfirmthe

ascoveredwithwasteparticles/dustsixinchesdeep.Workers’clothingandskinwouldbeencasedinmetaldusts.Thisdustconsistedoffinecopperandsilicaparticulate.

Green Layout Paint:

GreenLayoutPaintcontainingleadandsolventswasusedtooutlinecutsandboringstobemadeonsteelplates.Thispaintwasappliedwithnaphthagas,whichishighlyvolatile.

Grinding and De-burring Operations:

Allmachinedandweldedpartsneededtobede-burredofsharpedgesandroughness.Thesegrinding,de-burring,andbuffingoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmetaldustthatcontainedresiduesofMWF,degreasersandothercontaminants.TheuseofChromac,acuttingandgrindingoilwasnoted.

Curing and Annealing Ovens:

Machiningoperationsrequiredmetalstobeannealed(heated)priortomachining.Aswell,largeepoxycoatedmotorpartssuchasarmaturesweretransportedfromthearmaturedepartmenttobebakedandcured.Thisgeneratedagreatdealofresindecompositionby-productsincludingBPA,formaldehyde,andotheradditivesintheresinmixes.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

53

causebecausehedidn’tknowabouthisexposuretoexhaustandrequiredbloodtestsweren’tdone”).

JHSC: 4/27/82 re: pigeon droppings:Workersin#8havingproblemwithpigeondroppingsinwaterfountainandontheirlunchtables.”JHSC: 12/13/82: re: drinking fountains: watertestsshowpipesleadingtodrinkingfountainsin#8and#10“rustingaway.”JHSC: 12/13/82: re: Imron Paint: (This is a special for acustomer).Warninglabelisverystrictonventilationandairsupplyrespirators(unionrepworriedaboutIsocyanatesinpaint).Questionishowpaintgotontothefloorwithoutsafetyunitknowingofhazard?JHSC: 5/27/83: re: solder fumes: “Solder fumes from capacitorstravelalongwalltofemalebenchworkerinbalconycausinghertofeelill.”

JHSC: 1/22/85: re: hygiene station in rotor area: “Workerhasdevelopedarashandneedsthehygienestation.Theareahygienestationisnotmaintained.”

JHSC: 1/22/85 re: eye wash station: “(In paint booth)aneyewashstationisneededinthisworkstation.”

JHSC: 12/10/85 re: lead assessment for rotor and bearing booth areas: “Assessment(legaldocument)recommendationsincludedthatworkersbeprovidedwithpropershoweringfacility.(Thiswas)rejectedbycompany.”

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

55

BUILDING: #9 DEPARTMENT: FRACTIONAL MOTORS

General Description

General Working Conditions

Work Regime

Production Machinery/Processes:

1. Punch Press Operation

2. Die Cast Operation

3. Grinding & Cleaning Operation

4. Machining Operation

5. Winding Operation

6. Degreasing

7. Asbestos Glove Repair

8. Brazing

Known chemicals used or produced:

Aluminum AlloyAsbestosfiberanddustCopper and other metal dustsEpoxy(Formex)MEKReleaseAgentsTCE (Royalene)ThermalDecomposition(annealingandcuringprocesses)Silversolder(30%cadmium)Silphos (cadmium)

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

56

LowceilinginFractionalMotorscontributedtotheconcentrationofmist,vapours,andfumes,gasesandsmokeinthegeneralatmosphereofthisoperation.Thistoxicatmospherewasmoreavailableattheworkers’breathingzone.

Additionally,workerswereexposedtothegreatnumber of contaminants from the Armature operation.NotonlydidworkershavetowalkthroughArmaturetogettotheirjob,buttheywerealsoexposedtotoxicsthatmigratedfromtheArmaturedepartment.

TheworkregimeinFractionalwasintensewitheverythingconditionedbythepieceratesystem.Thismeantthatworkersworkedmoreintenselyforlongperiodsthusconditioningtheamountoftoxinsthatwouldbeinhaledandmetabolizedbythebody.Thiswasmostexhibitedonthespeedoftheproductionassemblylines;punchingoperations,anddiecasts.Itmeantworkerswouldshortcutsafeworkprocedurestomaintainpayrates.

JHSC: 2/23/j83: re: Cosmo furnace: “ExcessfumesreportedintheCosmoarea.Areaispoorlyexhausted.When Feseco is sprayed on products the area is full of mist.”MOLhaswrittendirectiveonproblem.

JHSC: 8/23/83: re: Kozmo furnace: “Problem has risenagainregardingpoorventilationaround2furnacesinFractional.Althoughmanagementhadindicated to Floor Safety members that both units wouldnotbeused,thisinfactwasnotso.Bothunitswereinoperationtheweekofthismeetingandfumeswereveryheavy.”

Averycomplexmixtureofchemicalswasgeneratedfromalltheseoperationscombined.Mostoperationswerenotequippedwithlocalexhaustventilationandlittleinthewayofprotectiveequipment.Thismixturewouldincludeexposuretoacombinationofsolvents,resins,MWF,thermaldecompositionproducts,variousdustsfromgrindingoperations.Theseweremostlyinhaledbutalsoabsorbedbybare

General Description: FractionalMotorsproducedelectricmotorsthatwerefractionsofafullhorsepowermotor.TheproductionprocesseswerehousedinalowceilingbuildingattachedtotheArmaturedepartmentinBuilding#7.Infact,workershadtowalkthroughtheArmaturedepartmenttoenterFractionalMotors.Theceilingwasapproximately16’highandafloorspaceofabout500’x250’.Thisistheonlydepartmentintheplantwithamovingassemblyline(i.e.,smallsizeofproductparts).

Work Regime: Thiswasahighproduction,labourintensive,operationemployingapproximately80to100staffon2-3shiftswithagreatdealofovertimeona24/7basis.Productionwasonthepieceratesysteminvolvingbuildingthevariouscomponentsofinductionmotorsofdifferentsizes.Allmotorpartsweremadefromscratch—handwoundfieldcoils;machinedrotors,armatures,andstators;diecasts;punchplating;grindingandcleaning;degreasing;resincoating;baking;welding,solderingandbrazing.Twocuringovens(CosmoandKozma)werelocatedinthelowceilingbuilding.

Motorpartswereassembledfromstarttofinishbyemployeesworkingonamovingassemblyline.“Thepaceofworkwaspunishing,butthisiswhereyoumadegoodmoney”(Worker).

Production machinery/process included: Twopunchpresses,threediecastoperations,openresindippingtank,VPItank,twoovens,openpotdegreasingcontainingMEKandRoyalene(TCE)tank,boringmachines,keyingmachines,rotorlathe,and2parallelassemblylines.

General Working Conditions:Duetolowceilingsandinadequategeneralandlocalexhaustventilation,thebuildingairqualitywaspoorandcontaminatedwithamixtureofverytoxicchemicalsfumes,vapoursandmistsgeneratedfrompunching,machining,casting,resindippingandbakingoperations,aswellasgrit,metalandresindustsfromcleanandgrindoperations.Sinceproductionwasintense--intermsofpaceofworkandvolumeofmaterialsused--the

Building: #9 Department: Fractional Motors Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

57

handhandlingandingestedbecauseofsmokingandeatingattheworkstation.

Thismetalpunchingoperationgeneratedlargeamountsofoilmistsandvapours.Giventhevolumeandspeedofproductionthisgeneratedahighconcentrationofoilmistsandvapourthatwouldbeinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin.

Sincetheseweredeburredbygrindingandsandingthisoperationwouldproducelargeamountsofmetalduststhatwouldbeinhaledbythosedirectlycarryingouttheprocessaswellasby-standersgiventheproximityofotherworkers.

Moltenaluminumvapoursandfumeswerereadilyinhaledatthisoperation.Thiswasaverysmokyenvironment.Reportsofsinusproblemswouldconfirmtheroutineexposuretothesefumesandvapours.

Inhalationofmetaldustscontainingresiduesofreleaseagents.Nolocalexhaustwasprovidedandnorespiratoryprotectionworn.

Exposure to MWF: ThemachiningoperationsproducelargeamountsofvariousMWFsthatwereinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin.Thesealsocontainedbiocidescontainingarsenicinadditiontothechemicalconstituentsoftheoilsandcoolantsandmetals.MOLinvestigationofworkrefusalin1976indicatedthatasignificantamountofoversprayfromoilmistfromgrindingmachiningwashavingadverseeffectsonworkersusingChromac2213.Inspectornoted this should be corrected because of risk of dermatitis(OHB#6L-111-7A-74;January8,1976).In1983aninvestigationintoaworkerillnessfromMWFexposuretoCimcoolusedinthesamegrindingprocessnotedinthe1976refusalinvestigation.Inspectornoted‘trampoil’intheMWFandsmallamountsof‘thiol’.Metalchipswereblownoffwithcompressedair,whichwouldaerosolizethecuttingoilsandcoolantcalledCimcool5Star40.Contaminants included small amounts of oil mist, ethanolamine,formaldehydethatwere0.69mg/m³(TLV=5mg/m³),0.07ppm(TLV=1ppm)and<2.0ppm(TLV=3ppm)respectively.Thesearenotinsignificant

atmospherewashighlycontaminated.Inaddition,theseoperationswerelabourintensive,e.g.workershandledallaspectsofproductiondirectlybyhandincloseproximitywitheachother.Localexhaustventilationandpersonalprotectiveequipmentwasnotprovided.Workersateandsmokedattheirworkstations.Housekeepingwaspoor.

Specific Processes:

Punch Press Operation: Oil-lubricated and annealed steelsheetswerepunchedatarapidpaceatabout100/minute.Thisoperationproducedlargeamountsofoilmistsandvapour.

Thesepunchingwerethenstackedonspindlesandpressedtogetherona‘capton’machine.These“pilings”werethengroundanddeburredandbuffedwithhandgrindersandbuffers,producinglargeamountsofdusts.Asimilarprocesswascarriedoutfortherotorsaswell;

Die Cast Operation:Thiswasasemi-automatic,aluminum,die-castingoperationwithmoltenaluminumalloy(2400°F)producingendshieldsandendcaps.Therewerethreediecastoperations,simultaneouslyproducingapproximately1000perhour.Threediecastoperatorsworkedonpiece-ratefor3shifts.Theseoperationscreatedveryheavyfumes and vapours from molten aluminum alloys andmold/diereleaseagents.Operatorsandthoseworkingnearbydevelopedmajorsinusproblems;

Grinding and Cleaning: Castingswerethenmachined,groundanddeburredbeforegoingintoasoapwashandthenintoheatedopendegreasingtanks;

Machining Operations: Inmachiningprocesses,largeamountsofMWFwereusedduringtheboring,milling,drilling,andkeyingoperationsaswellasinturningshaftsonlathes.Thesevariousmetalmachiningoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmetal dusts and mists and vapour from the heated MWF,whichalsocontainedbiocidescontainingarsenic.Diecastsweremachinedaftercomingoutofmolds.MachiningwithMWFgeneratedlargeamountsofcoolantandcuttingoilswouldproduce

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

58

amounts for Formaldehyde and Ethanolamine sincetheselevelsrepresent70%and60%oftheirrespectiveTLVs.Nolocalexhaustprovided.Coolantchangedonly3timesayear.(SeeMOL/OHB# 1183HMOW; 08/23/1983.)

InadditiontohandlingtheFormexwirecoilsthatcontainresinsthatwouldbeabsorbedthroughtheskin,thedegreasingprocessandresincoatingexposedworkersthroughinhalationofheavyconcentrationsofdegreasersolventsaswellasresinvapoursandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromovenbaking.

ThelargedegreasingtankscontributedheavilytotheinhalationofsolventvapourscontainingTCEandMEK.

Workerswerealsoexposedtosignificantamountsofasbestosdustfromovencurtainsaswellasasbestosinsulationusedinthemotors.Thesewerecutandpressedintomotorsandsuchactionwouldreleasefibresintotheatmosphere.

JHSC: 12/14/78: asbestos exposure: “Onroutinecheck(JB)foundasbestosmittsbeingrepairedinlargequantities(hundredspernight).Obviousthatthewomanwhorepairsmittsissubjecttomuchfibrewhenhandlingandcutting.”

JHSC: 1/25/79: asbestos exposures: “(Company doctor and Company H&S rep) are supposed to surveyuseofasbestosinplant.Sofarwestillhavea good deal of it in use and control is, at best, very lax.”

JHSC: 2/23/78: fibrosis diagnosis: “Worker(woman)diagnosedwithfibrosisofbothlungs.Herdoctorsaysitcouldbecausedbyworkenvironment.”

JHSC: 4/6/78: fibrosis diagnosis: (Company doctor) visittoinvestigateareawhere(womandiagnosedwithfibrosis)worked.SafetyCommitteenotinformedeventhoughwemadetheinitialrequestfortheconsultation.Hemadeacursoryinspectionofendshield area then called in several (union) members formeeting.NorepfromSafetyCommitteeorshop

significantamountsofoverspray.Excellomachinesneartheshaftgrindingareahadnolocalexhaustventilation.Approximately800endplatesweremachinedperday;

Winding Operation: Coilswerehand-woundbyabatteryoftworowsofwomenwindingformexcoatedcopperwireintocoilsthatwerethencutandshapedandpressedintostators/rotors.AftercuttingtheywerefirstdippedindegreaserMEKandthendipped into the resin tanks (about 100 coils per dip), takenoutandallowedtodripdry.Thecoilswerethenplacedintobakingovensforcuring.Frayingasbestoscurtainswerehungatbothendsofthebelt-drivenoven.Aftercuring,thecoilswerecleaned,ground,andpressedintothestators/rotorsalongwithinsulationcontainingasbestos/fibreglass.Thepressingandtappingofinsulationreleasedasbestosandfibreglassfibresintotheatmosphere.Thisreleasewassubstantialgivethevolumeofcoilsandinsulationbeingpressed;

Degreasing: Therewere2largedegreasingtankscontainingTCEandMEK.Motorcomponentsweredegreasedinvapourdegreasers.Degreaserfumeswereveryheavyandmigratedtootherareasoftheoperation.

Theseaboveoperationsproducedlargeamountsofsmoke,mists,vapours,anddustsfrommachining,grinding,degreasing,epoxydippingandbakingincuringovens.Workersdescribetheworkatmosphereas‘athickhazeofbluishsmoke24/7’;

Brazing Operations: ExtensivebrazingwascarriedoutinthisdepartmentutilizingsilversolderandsilphosbrazingrodsaswellasleadsolderwithwhitepastefluxdegreaserTCE,andcuringoven;

Spot Welding: Themotorshellswerespotwelded,producingagreatamountofweldfumes.Notethatthisdepartmentwaspushingout1000motorsaday.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

59

stewardwaspresent.Todatenoreportonfindingsoropiniononmatter.

JHSC: 5/4/78: fibrosis diagnosis: “Test results onfeltusedinworkunderTLVinbothsamples,suggestingthatfeltis‘probablysafe’.Wefeelfurtherinvestigationisindicated.”

JHSC: 2/17/81: failed clean up: “Hydraulic oil clean-uporiginallydroppedfromminuteswithunderstandingeverythingwastoberepaired.Sinceproblemstillexists(from’79)checkingwhythiswasnotcompleted?OurconcernisthatismaycontainPCSs.”

JHSC: 6/30/83: re: Cimcool: “Work refusal due to cimcool.”

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

61

BUILDING: #10 DEPARTMENT: FOUNDRY

General descriptionBabbitt production in the Babbitt ShopRotor AreaLapping ProcessGarlock GasketsMachining and BoringMWFGrinding and Deburring Welding OperationPaintingLayoff ProcessTemporary Oven 1980sGrinding and chiseling Testing ProcessMOCA in Mining Hoist

Known Chemicals used or produced:ArsenicDegreasers(Toluene,Benzene,MEK,TCE)EMFsEpoxyResins(Glyptol,MOCA)FluxLead Paint, Lead AlloyMetals (Cadmium, Tin, Copper, Nickel, Chromium, Beryllium, Silver, Lead)MWFs (Steel Kut, Cimcool, Dasko Tap)Naptha GasOzonePolyurethane Foams and AdhesivesReleaseAgents

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

62

General Exposures: Inhalationandabsorption(throughtheskin)oftolueneanditsconstituents(e.g.benzene)wasendemictomachiningprocesses.Absorptionwasfurtherenhancedbytoluene’sdestructionoftheskin’sprotectiveoil,thusincreasingriskexposure.Bothtypesofexposureinvolvedlongandclosecontactwiththesetoxicchemicals,resultinginheavyexposuretothesesubstances.InhalationandskinabsorptionofMWFmistsandspraysarecontinuousthroughoutthemachiningprocess.Machiningwouldinvolveexposuresthatcouldlastforhours,daily.Alsosincetheoperator’sclothingwassaturated,theexposurewouldoccurbeyondtheendoftheprocess.MWFhavebeenratedbyseveralinternationalagenciesascarcinogenic.Inhalationofvariousmetaldustandparticlesishighlylikelygiventheextentofmachining,particularlywhenmachiningisconductedwithoutfluidsandwettingagents.Addedtoinhalationandabsorptionexposureswastheriskofingestionoftoxicchemicalsasaresultofworkerssmokingandeatingattheirworkstations.Lead alloy fume exposure: TheBabbittfoundryoperationinvolvedmajorinhalationofleadalloyandreleaseagentthermaldecompositionproducts.Theseweresignificantbecauseofthelargevolumeofleadalloyusedinamoltenformwhereleadfumeswouldbeproducedduringthemeltingandpouringoperationwithoperatorsdirectlyinvolved.TherewasalsosignificantstandbyexposuretoworkersinadjacentdepartmentsnotisolatedfromtheBabbittformingoperation.

Exposuretoleadwasconfirmedbythefactthatworkerswouldexceedtheregulatedbodyburdenforleadunderthedesignatedsubstancesregulationoflead.E.g.SeeMOLreportonDougTwist.Companymonitoringshowedairconcentrationlevelsofleadat0.02TWAEduringtinningandbabbittingandurinesamplesrangingbetween0.24and0.34umol/lovera2-yearperiod.TheOELsatthetimewas0.15mg/m3and0.72umol/l.Arethesereadingsreliableandvalid?Weretheconditions

General description:Building10wasapproximately800’longandemployedover60workersoneachshift.Ithousedamajormachining,boring,milling,turning,andweldingoperationaswellasassemblyandresincuringoperations.Thebuildingisequippedwith25’and40’largeboringmachinesaswellassmallerboringandmillingmachines.Italsoincludedlargedrillsandlathes.Thebuildinghadlargebakingovensandresindippingtanksusedtoresin-coatandcure-bakelargearmaturesthatweredeliveredfromthearmaturedepartment.Thiswasahighproductiondepartmentinvolvingthemanufactureofverylargemotors(someaslargeas400metrictonswhenfinallyshippedoutoftheplant).General Working Conditions: Theworkenvironmentwasheavilycontaminatedwithalargevarietyoffumes,smoke,vapoursanddusts.Inmostcasesitwasnotonlytheoperatorwhowasexposedbuttherewasagreatdealofby-standerexposure.Thiswasparticularlytrueinwelding,Babbittmolding,andresincuringoperations.Ventilationwaspoorandlocalexhaustventilationmanytimeswasnotworking,ifitwasprovided.

Manytasksrequiredbare-handhandlingoftoxicsthatenhancedriskofexposure.JHSCreportsindicatethathousekeepingwaspoorandworkpracticesinvolvedsmokingandeatingatworkstations.Babbitt production in the Babbitt Shop: Building10Bwasusedforthemanufactureof‘Babbitt’bearingscomposedofaleadalloycalledarsine—88%to100%lead.Priortopouringleadintothetinnedbearing,onehalfofthesteelbearingisheatedinanovento220c.Thehotbearingisremovedandloweredbycraneintoamoltenmetalbath(60%tin/40%lead)for10minutes.Thisisrepeated1ortwotimes.Themeltingpotwasabout4’-5’indiameterandapproximately4’deepandraisedupseveralfeetofftheground.2’x6”Leadalloyingotswerefedbyhandintothemoltenleadpot.Themoltenalloywasgravityfedthroughachutethatdirectedthemoltenleadintolargecastmoldstreatedwithareleaseagent-‘CML’or‘CKL’.Thisprocessgeneratedagreatdealofsmokecontainingleadalloyfumesand

Building #10, 10A, 10B, 10C Department: Generator Assembly/BabbittProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

63

sampledrepresentativeofnormalconditions?Didanaccreditedlabanalyzetheresults?WhiletheairsamplesdonotindicatetheTLVstandardwasexceeded,theresultsoftheurinesamplesdoindicateleaduptakeandpotentialforharm.

Rotor Area Exposures: TheMOLoriginallyissuedanordertoplacetheRotorareasolderingunderthedesignatedleadregulationrequiringmorestringenthygienecontrols.ThisorderwassuccessfullyappealedonthegroundsthatairconcentrationandurineconcentrationswerebelowtheOELs.Wehavenowayofdeterminingthevalidityandreliabilityoftheemployer’sairandbiologicalmonitoring.However,itwastheprofessionalopinionofthehealthandsafetyinspectorthatmorestringentexposurecontrolswerenecessarysincetherewasnolocalexhaustventilationanditwasnotedthatcompressedairforcleaningwascondonedbyemployer.

Babbitt Fitting exposures: The emersion of bare skin inthebearingtroughde-fattedtheskinincreasingtheriskofabsorptionforbothleadandbenzenecontainingtoluene.Workersreportedgetting‘high’whileperformingthistask.Itwasn’tuntilthelate1980sthattheOntarioleadregulationwasappliedtothisworktask,requiringmedicalsurveillance.Thisprocesswascarriedoutinthenorthendofbuilding#10.Itwasalsocarriedoutina‘bearingbooth’inbuilding#8.

Thecompanyattributedtherelativelyhighleadairconcentrationsofbetween0.17and0.16mg/m³intheBabbittshoptothepracticeofblowingoffleaddustwithcompressedair.ThispracticewasfinallyreplacedbyusingaShopVacwithaHEPAfilter.DuringthisperiodtheMinistryofLabourissuedorderstoplacetheseleadoperationsundertheleadregulationthatrequiredmorestringentprotections.Theemployersuccessfullyappealedthisorder.SeeOHB86E049MOAR,March18,1986.

Garlock Gaskets:ThecuttingandshapingofgasketsfromrollsofGarlockmaterialexposedworkerstoasbestosfibres.Asbestoswasreleasedasthematerial

releasingagents.Ahugeplumeofsmokewouldriseviolentlywhenthemoltenleadcontactedthereleaseagentwhichwassodensethatsmokeandfumeswouldmigratetobuilding#12,adverselyaffectingworkersinthepunchpressoperation.TheseBabbittbearingscouldweighupto2tonswithaverylargesurfacearea.

Afterdipping,thesurfaceofthepouredmetalistorchedtopreventhardening.Thenleadsolderandpastewereusedtofillinremainingcavities.Thesecoatingandpouringoperationstookanestimated3.5to6hours.

Thebabbittswerethenmachinedanddrysanded.Theworkerswouldsandscrapeandfilethebearinginpreparationtobefittedontoashaftandruntoallowthebearingtowearin.Until1986,dustsfromsandingbabbitswereblownoffsurfacesandclothingwithcompressedair,dispersingleaddustintothegeneralatmosphere.Jointcommitteeminutesfromthe1980sindicatethattheventilationsystemintheBabbittshopwasnotworking.

Rotor Area: Thiswasaleadsolderingoperationthatinvolved4workersinhandsoldering0.5”copperbarconnectorsontorotors.Thefitterheatedthecopperbarsto235°Ccausingtheappliedleadsoldertomeltandrunontoconnections.Workersspentabout10hoursadaydoingthis.

Lapping Process: (Babbitt Fitting Process Carried out in the ‘bearing booth’ in Building #8 and in #10): AftertheBabbittswerereleasedfromthemoldtheyweremachinedtosizeandtestrunonashaftfollowedbyalappingprocess.Thelappingprocesstookabout½day.Thiswascarriedoutbya‘fitter’whosandedtheinsideofthebearingwithhisbarehandsimmersedintoluene--using400gritsandpaperand‘scotchpad’.Asluryofleadalloyandtoluenewouldresult.

Garlock Gaskets:Fittersalsoperformedthetaskofcuttinggasketsfrom3’x4’sheetsofGarlockgasketmaterial.Garlockwasanasbestosfibreimpregnatedrubbermaterial.Thiswasdoneeithermanuallywithasharporpunchedoutonthepunchpress.This

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

64

wascutandmanipulated.Thecloseupworkwouldalsoplaceworkersatsignificantriskofinhalingthesefibres.Theremightbefurtherasbestosdispersionasworkerscleanedtheirworkareawithcompressedair.

MWF Exposures and Machining and Boring: Exposuretometalworkingfluids,bothcoolantsandcuttingoilswassignificant.TheseexposuresinvolvedlargeamountsofmistsandfumesfromMWFsbrokendownbyhightemperaturesgeneratedduringhighvolumemachiningonlargesurfaceareas.Exposureswerethroughinhalationandabsorptionthroughtheskin.DermalexposureswereconfirmedbyreportsofskinirritationanddermatitisaswellasmajorinvestigationintotheseproblemswithMWFs.

JHSC: 9/21/78: re: drilling in 10C: Complaints of headache,nauseafromoperators.SampletakenofvapourproducedidentifiedDascoTap#2.Testtubesatfaceareaofmethylchloroformregisteredexcessof650ppm(whereasshorttermexposurelevelis450ppmfor15minutes).Unionrepcalledforoperationtoceaseuntilcorrectionsmade.Facemasksobtained to remove contaminant but union asked for ventilationtobeinstalledsinceotherpersonsinareaarebeingaffectedaswell.”

JHSC: 11/16/78: drilling update: “We have asked for acompletiondatefromengineering(re:ventilation).Todatewehavehadnoluckonthis.Itmaybenecessarytotakefurtheraction.”

couldbean8-hour/dayoperationdependingonthedemandfromotherdepartments.Theprocessofcuttingand/orstampingoutgasketsfromtheGarlockproducedasbestosdusttogetherwithothercompositionmaterial.

Machining and Boring:TheseoperationsinvolvedagreatdealofMWFincludingcuttingoils,fluidsandcoolants.Theworkincludedmilling,machining,boring,metalcutting,metalturningonlathesforshafts,andshaping.TheseprocessesinvolvedmajoruseofMWFs,alsoreferredtoascuttingandcoolingoils.Somearesyntheticwhileothersarenaturalproducts.Manyhavetoxicadditivestopreventspoilage,suchasarseniccompounds.

MWF: Metalworkingfluidsweresprayedoncontinuouslyduringmachiningwithcoolingfluidssprayedfromalargetankofrecycledcoolantandoperatorsapplyingcuttingoilsmanually.Thesewouldgeneratelargeamountsofmists,vapourandsmokeproducebyheatgenerateduringcutting.Theatmospherewouldbewetwithmistandvapourandworkerswouldbesoakedwiththesefluids.OneoftheseMWFcalled“Steel-Kut”wasparticularlyreactiveandworkerswouldoftendevelopdermatitisaswellasrespiratoryirritationandsensitization.Steel-Kutwastheobjectofamajorstudyinthe1990sinbuilding#8and#10.TheMSDSforthiscuttingoilindicatedthatitcontainedmineraloil,sulfurandchlorine.SeelistofvariousMWFusedintheseprocesses.CimcoolandDascoTapwerealsousedinmachiningoperations.

Themachiningprocesswouldalsoproducelargeamountsofmetaldusts.Someareaswouldaccumulateseveralinchesofdust/particles.Somemachiningwouldbeconducteddryandthiswouldincreasetheamountofairbornemetaldust.Operatorswouldcleanoffoilsandparticleswithacompressedairgun,thusdispersingthesecontaminantsfurther.Withthenegativeairpressurethesecomplexcontaminantswerespreadtootherareas,producingcrosscontamination.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

65

Exposures During Grinding Operations:Thegrindingandcleaningoperationsgeneratedgreatquantitiesofinhalablemetalandresindusts.Therewasnoeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.

Exposure to Various Welding Fumes: Weldingwascarriedoutextensivelythroughoutthedepartmentcreatingagreatdealofby-standerexposure.Themainrouteofexposurewasinhalationofweldingfumesincludinggasessuchasozone,residuesfromdegreasersandvariousmetalandfluxfumes.Asignificantamountofweldinginvolvedoilysurfaces,generatinglargeamountsofsmokeinthegeneralatmosphere.Metalssuchascadmium,chromium,silver,copperandberylliumwerepresentinthesefumes.

Welderswerealsoexposedtoasbestosfibresfromusingasbestosblanketstoprotectpartsandthemselvesduringweldingoperation.Workerslaidontheseblanketsthatwereinfriableconditionfromheavyusage.

Solvent Exposures: WeldingoperationsinvolvedriskofinhalationofvariousdegreasersincludingTCE,toluene,xyleneandMEK.Workersreportedbeingovercomebytolueneandexhibitingneurologicalsymptoms.Investigationconfirmedthatworkerswerehandwipingtheinsulationoffstatorcoilswithragssoakedintoluene.Theonlyventilationwasby“naturalmeans”withnolocalexhaustventilation.SeeMOLReport:OHB05890GMOW;08/12/1980re:Bldg.#10Bays21to29.

Paint Exposures: Highriskofinhalationofglyptolpaintingredientsincludingsolventsandepoxyresinsandpigments.Thiswasparticularlyevidentwhenpaintwassprayedinopenareas.SeeJHSCreport

Grinding and Deburring: (Aftermachining,milling,drilling,turning,cuttingandwelding)Materialswerethengroundanddeburredwithairdrivenwirebrushes,andbuffed.Thesetasksproducealargeamountofgrit/resindust,andmetaldustcontaminatedwithresiduesofMWFanddegreasers.

Welding Operations: This department contained a fairlylargeweldingoperationlocatedsouthofthemainaisle.Thisinvolvednumeroustypesofweldinganduseofvarioustypesoffluxesandweldingrods for mild steel, stainless steel, cast iron, and aluminum.WeldersoperatedMIG,TIG,submergedwelding,brazing,oxy/acetylene.Thisgeneratedlargeamountsofweldingfumescontainingmetalssuch as cadmium, nickel, chromium, beryllium, silver, copper,tomentionafewoftheroutineby-productsofweldinginadditiontoresiduesofdegreasersandMWF.Weldingwasalsoconductedwithportableunitscarriedtovariouslocations.

Sincetherewasagreatdealofoilonmetalsurfaces,weldingoperationswouldproduceagreatamountofsmokethatwascarriedthroughoutthedepartment.Thearcairweldingwhichinvolvedacarbonrodcoatedwithcopperwouldbeusedtocutplates3”thickandproducegreatamountofweldingsmoke.Alsowelderswouldperformweldsonsurfacesthatwerecoatedwithepoxiesand/orpolyurethanefoamsandadhesives.Theassemblyandshippingareaswouldalsoinvolveagreatdealofweldingtofitmotorparts,aswellassecuringtheseverylargemotorstoflatbedrailcars.Securinga400-tonmotorwascomplexandinvolvedalargeamountofweldingtotherailcar,whichcouldtakeoveraweektocomplete.

Degreasers: Motorpartswereregularlydippedorhandwipedwithdegreasersasapre-treatmentpriortoweldingorpaintingand/ortocleanoffMWFfromthemachiningprocesses.ThedegreaserofchoicewasusuallyTCE,orMEK,toluene,andacetone.

Painting: MotorsandpartswereregularlypaintedwithwhatwascalledGlyptol.Therewerefrequentcomplaints about the vapours and odors from this

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

66

regardingaworkrefusalthatoccurredbecauseofspraypaintinginBayN-26.

Exposure to lead and naphtha gas: Riskofinhalationsignificanttoveryvolatilenaphthagasandfumesfromvolatizedlead.

Exposure to Asbestos and Resin vapours: Significantworkerandbystanderriskofinhalationofasbestosdustfromcurtains,whichwereinfriableconditionasaresultofwearandtearfromworkactivity.Thiscombinedwithriskofinhalationofpolyesterepoxyresinsandthermaldecompositionby-productsduringovenbakingmadeworsebylackofappropriateventilationanddispersalofcontaminantsthroughairmovementandworkactivities.Workersexperiencedfrequent headaches and eye, nose and throat irritationfrominhalationandabsorptionoftheresinfumesandgases.

application,particularlywhenitwassprayedonintheopen.GlyptolwasaGEproductcomposedofagroupofAlkydpolymers.Amongitsconstituentswerepigmentscontainingmagnesiumsilicate(asbestos),titaniumdioxide,calciumcarbonateaswellasvolatilessuchasalkydresins,butylcellosolire,paropasal“P”,andammonia.

Layoff Process:Thisprocessinvolvedpaintingsteelplateswithleadpaintmixedwithnaphthagas.Thiswasmanuallypaintedontheplatessothatdirectcontactwouldbemadewithpaint.Thisprocesswasalsocarriedoutinbuilding#34.Thisprocessproducednaphthalenevapoursaswellasleadfumes.

Temporary Oven 1980s: Inthe1980sa‘temporarytent’curingovenwasconstructedinBay24NofBldg.#10toaccommodatecoatingverylargearmatures.ItwasconstructedagainstthewestwallofBldg.#10.Thisovenwas25’highand40’x40’square.Itwaslinedwithaverythick asbestos curtain, which surroundedall4sidesoftheoventokeeptheheatin.Atinroofwasalsoconstructedtokeepheatinwhichwasequippedwithaverticalexhaustduct.Activityintheoveninvolvedrotatinglargearmatures(ferris-wheelstyle)inaresin-filledepoxy(vinyltoluene)trough,12’x15’insize.AsthearmatureswerebeingcoatedwiththeresintheKelroheaterswouldbakethecoatedarmaturetohardentheepoxyresins.Duringthisprocessworkerswouldalsosqueegeetheresintoensureuniformcoverage.WorkerswerenotedinJHSCminutestohavemadecomplaintsabouthowtheywererequiredtohandletheresinsduringthisprocess,anddemandedthehygienistcometoviewtheworkwithrespecttoitshealthimpact.

Armatureswerebakedforapproximately72hours.

Thisresindipping/bakingprocessproducedlargeamountsofthickbluishsmokethroughoutthedepartment.Theresinswereusedingreatvolumesgiventhesizeofthearmaturesbeingcoated.HealthandsafetyJHSCcommentthatventilationinthisovendidnotworkconsistently.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

67

Exposure to Resin Dusts: Inhalationofsignificantquantitiesofcuredhardenedresindustsduringgrindingandcleaningoperationstoremove(bakedon)excessresinsaswellascleaningtheoventrough.Generateddustswouldalsobedepositedonandabsorbedthroughtheskin.

Exposure to Electromagnetic fieldsduringelectricaltestingatveryhighvoltages.WorkerswerechronicallyexposedtoEMFsatveryhighamperages.EMFsareclassifiedasahumancarcinogen.

MOCA Exposures: ThisprocessgeneratedlargeamountsofMOCAdustinhaledbyworkershandlingthesubstancebygrinding,cutting,filingandhammeringtomakeitfit,aswellasthoseincloseproximity.MOCA,4,4’-methylenebis(2chloroanilineisclassifiedbyIARCasaGroup1carcinogen-carcinogenictohumans,IARCMonographVol.100F,2012).

JHSC: 11/3/77: re: Tar epoxy exposures: “CrownDiamondtarepoxyissprayedinunventilatedarea.Thisjobquestionedasfarbackas2yearsbutnoactiontakentocorrectit.”

JHSC: 8/14/79: re: Asbestos dust: “Largearmaturewasbeingprocessed(epoxybake)andlargesheetsofasbestosclothandblanketsofKaowooldrapedoverit.WhencyclefinishedtheasbestosandKaowoolwasdraggedoffarmaturecreatingcloudsofdustandfibreinlargeareaof#10bldg.Uponcheckingoutsituationitwasbadlycontaminatedsoinstructionsgiventousezerodischargevacuumcleanerstocleanupparticles.”

JHSC: 12/8/81 re: spray paint:Painterspainting25footkeybarsoutsidepaintbooth.Alsogoinginsidestatorstospraypaint.Chemicalsinpaintare

Grinding and chiseling: Aftertheepoxyhardenedworkerswouldgrindand/orchiseloffexcessresinandhardenedresininthetroughproducinggreatamountsofgritandresindustssincethese(40-ton)armatureswereverylarge.

Pershift,40to50motorsweredippedandbakedinthismanner.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Fumeswereheavyandprevalent.Therewerefrequentworkstoppagesthroughoutthe1980sasaresultofworkersconcernsabouttheseexposures.

Testing Process:Largemotorsthatwouldrunatbetween20,000and30,000horsepowerwereregularlytestedandrunatextremepower.Gasesgeneratedduringtheprocessincludedozoneandnitrogendioxide.ThisoperationalsoproducedstrongmagneticfieldsintheELFfrequencyrange.

MOCA in Mining Hoist:Mininghoistswerebuiltin10S.ThisinvolvedfittingMOCApucksintheslotsofverylargehoistdrums.Thesewerefittedinslotsaroundtheentirecircumferenceofthehoistdrumwherethe2”-3”diametercablewould“ride”onthem.The6”MOCApuckswerehandmachined,filed,sandedandthencutwithachainsawandhammeredintotheslotsbutt-joined.Thisinvolvedhand-fittinglargenumberspucksaroundthedrum,producingsignificantMOCAdustthatwouldcoverthesolesofworkers’shoes.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

68

ammoniamagnesiumsilica(aformofasbestos).Managementtogetmoreinformationonpaint.

JHSC: 8/24/82: re: hydrogen leak: “Hydrogenleakledtoevacuationof#8,#10,#10C,#12.Workerscomplainedthatevacuationroutetookthemrightpasthydrogentankertruck.”

JHSC: 10/19/82: re: asbestos refusal: “Workers in10Cwereaskedtoheatanasbestosboard.Laboratoryworkerhadnoworkorderforjobandnoauthoritytogivemenworkwithoutfirstcontactingforeman.”

JHSC: 12/13/82: re: drinking fountains: “Water tests showedpipestowaterfountainrustingaway.”

JHSC: 9/26/85: re: removing PCBs: On Saturday, transformerswerebeingdrainedofpyranolwhichcontainsPCBs.Theprescribedprocedureswerenotfollowedandasaresultofthepoorhandlingtherewasaworkrefusalbyemployeesinthesurroundingarea.”

JHSC: 12/86: re: showers for lead workers:

(AsperrecommendationinLeadAssessmentdonein#10)“…companyisnotpreparedtosupplyshowersforleadworkersinBabbittshop,LeadRotor,andBearingFitareas.”TobeappealedtoMOLbyunion.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

69

BUILDING: #12 DEPARTMENT: PUNCH PRESS

Punch Press OperationGeneral DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsPunching/MachiningWeldingGrinding/DeburringAnnealing and Enameling OvensEnamelingAnnealingCopper Coil AnnealingCommutator MachiningCoil StrippingCutting with Carborundum SawDegreasing TanksRebuilding Old Motors

Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCausticSoda:sodiumnitrite/nitrateGasses:C0₂,helium,ozone,phosgene,Decompositionby-products:formaldyhyde,benzene,PAHsDegreasers:TCE,TolueneDetergentsFibers/Dust:Asbestos,Fibreglass,Insulationproducts,MicaMetals: steel, copper, stainless steelMWFs: Steel Kut, Dasco TapResins/Resinfumes:Glyptol,others?

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

70

Thiswasahighvolumeshopthatinadditiontowhatthepunchpressandmachiningoperationsgenerated,thisdepartmentwassubjectedtocontaminantsfromtheweldingandgrindingoperationsinbuilding14AandleadandmoldreleasefumesfromtheBabbittshop.

Thesecontaminantswerehighlylikelytobeinhaled.Thecomplaintsfromworkersconcerningthesefumesaswellassymptomsattesttotheseoverexposures.

JHSC: 2/23/78: re: degreasers: Whendegreaserscheduledforcleanout,air-lineputdowntoexhaustfumesanddryoutresidue.Thisprocesstendsto1.Blowstrongvapoursinawideareacreatingrealhazardtootherpersonneland2.Createsadangerousenvironmentforworkerdoingthecleaning.

Ingestionalsolikelygiventhatworkersateanddrankattheworkstationanddidnothavewashingfacilities.

Inhalation,absorptionandingestionsofseveralMWF,solventandoilmistsproducedbypunchingandmachininghighlylikelyinlargesurfaceareaandhighvolumeproductionprocess.

Punch Press Operation:

General Description: The Punch Press shop ran northsouthbetweenbuildings#14and#10.Itemployed100-150workerson3shifts.Itwasabout1000’x200’x60’high.Itwasawide-openoperationinthenorthsectionandpartiallyenclosedinthesouth.Itwasamajorpunchingandmachiningoperationthat provided punched out parts and punched sheets ofsteelaswellasmachinedpartsthroughouttheGEoperation.Ithadverylargepunchpressandalargeshearingmachine,smalllathes,2largeboringmills,abatteryofsmallpunchpressesoperatedbywomenintheSEaisleandalaseroperatedpress.Verylargedegreaserswerelocatedinthearea.The‘RimPlate’areacontainedaverylargepunchpressthatpunchedlargeplatesforwatergenerators.Finally,thisdepartmentwasheavilyengagedinthe‘re-manufacturing’ofdieselmotorsthatweretorndown,cleaned,rebuiltasnecessary,andpainted.

General Working Conditions:Inadditiontocontaminantsgeneratedinbldg.12operations,contaminantsfromtheTankShopinbldg.14wouldmigratetobuilding12punchpressoperators.Thisincludedlargeamountsofweldingfumes,degreaservapours,andgrindingdusts.Aswell,fumesandgaseswouldmigratefromtheBabbittShopinbldg.10Bconsistingofleadalloyfumesandreleaseagents.Thisinfiltrationwasduetothenegativepressureandlackoflocalexhaustventilationsinthesetwoareas.

Punching/machining operation and use of solvents and MWF: Thiswasamajormetalmachiningandpunchingoperation,punchingoutlargeandsmallpartsthroughout,aswellasshearinglargeheavygaugesheetsofsteelwithalargeshearingmachine.Metalsbroughtinwerecoatedwithvarsolpriortoshearingandpunching.Theshearingandpunchingoperationwouldgeneratelargeamountsofmistandvapourfromthevarsolcoatingbeingstampedandheated,fromimpact.Thestampingprocesscouldproduce 100s of parts per minute, so that the rapid punchingprocesswouldproducelargeamountsofmistandvapour.

Building #12 Department: Punch Press Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

71

Attimes,weldingactivitywouldgeneratesmallfiresandexplosionsasaresultofTCEresiduetrappedinsmallcavitieswithinthemotorcastings.Workersreportedseverenosebleedsandsinusinjury.Weldersalsousedasbestoswovenblanketsduringweldingoperationstoprotectcertainpartsfromtheweldingsplatter.

Grindinganddeburringoperationsproducedlargeamountsofdustcontainingsolventsresidues,heavymetalsandepoxyresindusts.InhalationhighlylikelygiventhelackofadequatelocalexhaustventilationandPPE.

JHSC: 11/15/82: re: radiation: “Queryradiationcheckssincex-rayroombesidethisworkareahasbeenincreased.Workersupsetthisproblemhaspersistedforoverayear.”

Annealingandenamelingovensgeneratedamixtureofthermaldecompositionbyproductsthatwerereadilyinhaled.Thesewouldincludeoilandsolventresiduesthatwereheatedtohightemperatures.Thiswouldalsoincludeepoxyresinfumesandbreakdownbyproductsfromthecuringprocess.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionofavarietyofthermaldecompositionbyproductsfrompolyesterandepoxyresins.

Inhalationofasbestosfibresfromfrayingasbestoscurtains,degreaserandMWFresiduesanddecompositionby-products.

TheRimPlateoperationwouldinvolvepunchingasteelplatethatcouldbe8’x5’x1/4thick.Theplatewasmoppedwith‘SteelKut’machineoilinpreparationforpunching.Duringtheimpactagreatdealofmistandvapourwasproduced.

Welding:Asubstantialamountofweldingwascarriedonfabricatingpartswhichwerethengroundanddeburred.

Grinding/Deburring: Afterpunchingandmachining,partshadtobedeburredbygrinding,sandingandbuffing.Thiswasusuallydonewithcompressedairdrivengrindersandmetalrotatingbrushes,aswellasbeltsandersusing400gritsandpaper.Thedeburringoperationproducedagreatamountofairbornedustcontaininggrit/resin,metalparticulatewithresiduesofMWF.

Annealing and Enameling Ovens: Thereweretwoovenslocatedonthewestwallnorthofthemainaisle.Thesewereenclosedexceptforanentryandexitportswithasbestoscurtains.

Enameling: Afterbeingdeburred,punchingswereplacedonaconveyorbeltthattravelledthroughtheoven.Thesewereheatedtoburnoffoilsandthensprayedwithbrownepoxyandbakedforabout15minutesthentakenoffthelineandstacked.ThisprocessgeneratedagreatamountofbluishsmokethatpermeatedtheatmospherewithacomplexmixtureofepoxythermaldecompositionbyproductssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzene,etc.Whilethereweremanytypesofepoxiesused,thiswasmostlikelyIsonal.

Annealing Process: Duringtheannealingprocesspunchingswerebakedathightemperaturestotemperthesteelparts.Thisalsogeneratedagreatdealofsmokecontainingthermaldecompositionby-productsfromtheburningoffofvariousoils,degreasersandMWF.Thisprocesswouldalsogenerateasbestosfibresfromthecurtainsbeingbrushingagainstthepunchingsastheyenteredandexited.Thesecurtainswerereplacedoftenasaresultofthewearandtear.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

72

ExposuretoTCEvapours,nitrite/nitratesalts,andpossiblyNO₂.WhilethiswasnotmeasuredthelikelihoodofNO₂beingformedandinhaledisentirelypossible.

Machiningcommutatorsgeneratedcopper,micaandasbestosdustwhicharehighlylikelyinhaledandingested

Inhalationofinsulationdustscontainingresins,asbestos,fibreglassfibreshighlylikely.

Asabove.

Inhalationofgritandresindustsgeneratedbysaw.

See MOL report dated August 26, 1964addressingemployersconcernsaboutthehandlingofwastesodiumnitrite/nitrate.Firebrokeoutwhenmaterialsspilledonwoodenpallet.Asbestospapersubsequentlyusedtopreventfirewhenstoredonwoodenpallets.

Thelikelihoodofinhalationofcausticsodasaltvapourandasbestosaswellasdegreaservapours.Inspectornotesthepossibilityforcausticsaltstobecarriedinthevapourandsteam.

Copper Coil Annealing Process: Flat copper coils are hoisted by an overhead crane and dipped into a vat of TCE, then dipped into a tank of molten sodium nitrite/sodium nitrate, and then soaked in a cold waterrinse.Periodically,thecaustictankhastobe replenished and the old material taken out and dispensed.There is a possibility that this solution can react with an acid and produce nitrogen dioxide gas. This might be possible if there is insufficient time for the TCE to be completely dripped off before entering the caustic bath. Because of the piece rate systemoperatorswerenotallowingsufficienttimetoelapsebetweenthetwodips.

Commutator machining:LargecommutatorsweremachinedonlathesinthisareaaswellasinBuilding#8.Thisproducedlargeamountsofmica,asbestosandcopperdustsfromthemachiningprocess.

Duringthisprocess,asbestosboards2”x16”x1/4weremachinedforcommutators.

Coil Stripping: Thisinvolvedstrippingcopperandinsulationofcoilrings,whichwerethenground,sandedandchiseledandthendippedincausticsoda.ThesewerethensenttoBldg.16Atobere-woundandre-insulatedinandasphaltdip.

Cutting with carborundum saw: Constantcuttingwithacarborundumsawwasanightanddayoperationthatgeneratedlargeamountofmetalandgrinderdusts.Workersdescribeareaas‘coatedindust’.

Degreasing Tanks: Thisdepartmenthad3degreasingtanks.TCE,causticsoda,possiblyxylene.Thesewereusedextensivelyduringthere-manufacturingprocess.Routinely,partsweredippedfromTCEtocausticsodawithoutallowingtheresiduestodripdrysufficiently.Thiswouldcausesomeseverereactionsandnoxiousfumesthatworkerscomplainedabout.MOLreportsnotedthispracticeand‘recommended’thatatleast15minuteselapsebetweendips.Despitethisrecommendationthedepartmentcontinuedthepractice.(SeeMOLreports)

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

73

Exposuretoheavymistofdetergent,solvents,andunknownresiduesfrommotors.

Steps4and5generatedheavyfumesfromthedippinginTCEandcausticsoda.

Steamcleaninggeneratedheavymistofdetergentandsolventresidues.

Frequentexposurestolooseasbestosfiberfallingonworkersandfloatingintheair.

Craneoperatorsexposedtomistsandfumesfromdegreasingoperationscarriedoutbelowthem.Describedas“cloudsofdustandfumes.”

A“toxicsoup”ofchemicalsandfumesgeneratedinaprocessthatwentonfor12hourspershift,aroundtheclockformanyyears.(Producing3-4remanufacturedunitsperday).

This“toxicsoup”included:weldingfumesandgasses,MWFs,degreaserfumes(TCE),heavymetals,toluene,insulationdusts/vapours,resinfumes,whichworkerswouldbeexposedtofor12-hourshifts.

Welders’ Health Issues:Workers made frequent complaints of irritated nose, eyesandthroat.Workerscomplainedandfiledworkers’compensationclaimsfornosebleeds.Theseweldingoperationscangeneratesignificantquantitiesofozonegasthatisaknownrespiratoryirritantaswellasaprobablehumancarcinogen.Aswell,in

Re-manufacturing used Motors:

There-manufacturingofuseddieselmotorswasdoneinsouthendofbldg12and16A.ThesewerereconditionedlocomotiveenginesforCN.Theoperationcontinued24/7formanyyears.Areameasuresabout30x20x60high.

Manual Disassembly Process: 1. Entiremotorsweresteamcleanedwithhigh-

pressurenozzles;2. Bolts manually removed from frames to

releaserotors,stators,castingparts;3. Thedisassembledpartsweresteamcleaned;4. Newlycleanedpartsfirstdippedina(10’x12’)

vatofheatedTCE;5. Partswerethendippedina(5’x6’)vatof

causticsoda;6. Partsthensteamcleanedunderhigh

pressure;7. Theseheavypartsweremaneuveredby

overheadcranes,whichwouldattimeshitasbestosinsulatedpipesthusdislodginglargeamountsoffriableasbestos.Thesewouldfallonweldingoperationsandcauseflash-fireswhenignited;

8. Craneoperatorsworkedinopencabswithnobuildingexhaustsystem;

9. Weldingoperationsgoingonsimultaneouswiththemanualdisassemblyoperationaddingweldingfumestotheotherchemicalfumesandmistsgeneratedinthedisassemblyprocess.Approximately3weldersintheareacarryingoutMIGandCO₂weldingintheareaofaTCEdegreasingtankandoperation;

10. Locatedbetweenthedisassemblybuilding(12)andremanufacturingbuilding(16A)wasamajorweldingoperation.ThegassesusedwereCO₂,helium,andfumesfrommoltenmetal,whichwouldbecarriedintobuildings12and16Aasallofthesebuildingswerenotphysicallyisolated,ratherdividedbylowpartitionsthatdidnotpreventfumesfromreachingotherpartsofthecomplex;

11. Armaturesofheavycoppercoilsweremade

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

74

contactwithTCE,phosgenegascanalsobeproduced.Thisgasishighlytoxicandamajorrespiratoryirritant.MeasurementviaDraegerTubesofTCEintheareawherethenosebleedoccurredwas25ppm.Report # IE-67; June 5, 1970. These tubes have an error rate +/- 25-35%.

WeldersmadefrequentcomplaintsaboutozonegasandweldingfumesfromarcMIGandstickwelding.ThereportnotesthatoneworkerwaswellonhiswaytodevelopingCOPDandshouldfindotherworkthanwelding--particularlyMIGandTIGweldingwhichgeneratesignificantamountsofozonegaswhichisamajorirritant.

Crane operator health issues:Department of Health report dated April 1, 1970 concerningacraneoperatorwhofiledaworkrelatedillnessclaimasaresultofexposuretotheannealingchemicalwhilehewasdippingthecoilsinthesesolutions.Nosebleeds,swellingoftheankles,rashesandafever.

Whiletheinvestigatorsconcludedthatthiscouldn’thavebeenwork-related,thereisapossibilitythatnitrogendioxidecouldhavebeenformedasaresultofacidbeingformedfromtheTCEdegreasingoperationbeingneartheweldingoperations.ItispossiblethatNO₂wasformedbyreactionofthesaltbathandtheacidmists.

Department of Health report dated April 6, 1970 indicated that a field visit on March 23, 1970 found a number of problems with the operation:

Poorhousekeeping;“visualinspection.…Indicatedthattheexhaustsystemwascompletelyineffective”;andtherewerenoeyewashfountainsnearcausticsodatanks.Craneoperatorexperiencedadversehealtheffectswhiledippingcoilsincausticsodaaswellassteamgeneratedbyquenchtanks.

in the shop, then cleaned and annealed beforeusing.CleaningwasdoneinavapourdegreaserofTCEtank7x5x9’deepfittedwithexhaustslots.Degreasingtakesabout20minuteswithcraneoperatorhandlingthebasket.Thencraneoperatorplacesthebasketnexttoasaltbathofsodiumnitrite/nitrateina8’x4’tankofmoltensalts(DrawTemp-275°F).Bathismaintainedat800°F.Theparts soak for 6 hours in the salt bath then are soakedinarinsingtankat200°F.Considerablesteamisgeneratedduringtherinsephase.Thecraneoperatorisabovethesetankswhilevapourandsteamisgeneratedupward.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

75

BUILDING: #14 DEPARTMENT: POWDER PAINT/STRUCTURAL STEEL

General Description Powder PaintSteps in Powder Paint ProcessGeneral Description Structural SteelTank ShopSpecific Operations: WeldingAirBlastTanks Stainless Steel Tanks 102”andFGKBreakers EvidureTorchandAluminumWelding BertramVerticalBoringMill RadialDrilling HorizontalBoringMill Grind and Clean GritBlasting Paint Booth Welding WeldingFumesandDust Electro-MagneticFields Asbestos Solvent Vapour and Fumes Machining MetalWorking Metal Grit and Dusts

Known Chemicals used or produced:AntiSplatterPaintCausticAcidChromates, CadmiumEpoxyResinPaintandDustGritsHCLMetal Fumes (Cadmium, Zinc, Chromium, NickelMetalParticulatesMetalWorkingFluids(coolantsandoils)Silica DustStainless Steel

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

76

Workersexposedtoepoxyresinpaintdustingreatquantitieswithnothingmorethanpapermasksandpaintoveralls.Theyworkedinanelectricallychargedenvironmentandwereexposedtoextremeheatandelectricalshocks.Chemicalsusedintheproductionprocessincluded:epoxyresin,causticsodaandacid.

Workerscomplainedofexcessivedustexposures;MOLtestsidentifieddustlevelsclosetoTLVasventilationinadequate.MOL, 14A, March 17, 1981.

JHSC: 9/27/79: re: heavy dust: “We have recurrence ofthisproblem.(unionrep)reportsthecollectorbagshavenotbeencleanedinalmosttwoyears.Theyprobablyneedreplacing.Thereisheavydustaccumulationinthearea.”JHSC: 10/11/79: re: collector bags: Thebagshavenotbeencleanedorreplacedinalongtime.Alsowetriedtogetinfoonepoxypaintdustfromengineeringlabbutnewpolicyguidehasshort-circuitedthatsourceofinformation.”JHSC: 12/20/79: re: epoxy paint dust: “Stillwaitingforresearchonpossiblehazardsofepoxypaintdust.”JHSC: 2/12/80: re: epoxy paint dust: “Problem here issevereandhealthofworkersseemstobereflectingthoseproblemsmoreandmoreastimeprogresses.”Notesoneworkeronleavewithsevererash,anotherexperiencingbadcoughandtraceofbloodinsputum,anotherworkerremovedfromjobwithsevererash.DustescapingispollutingnotonlytheimmediateworkplacebutalsostructuralsteelandpartsofGPC.Theonlyprocessinvolvingachemicalexposureonfirstfloorwastheuseofcausticacidtocleanthehooksfollowingtheiruse.Workersworeglovesandglassesbutdescribedtheacidas“stinging”whensplashedonthem.Anyexposuresduringthe3-washstagecouldoccurwhenproductsmovedoutofthewashtunnel,whichwasself-contained.

Largeamountofepoxypaintoversprayduetoelectrostaticcharge.Workerssubjecttoelectricalshocksduetoelectrostaticenvironment.

Background for Powder Paint Operation:

Powderpaintoperationinvolvedthesprayingofelectrostaticionizedpowderedepoxypaintonmetal(steel and some aluminum) products that involved twofloorsinbuilding14.Thisprocesswasusedspecificallytocoathousingsofelectricalpanelsforswitchgearbetween1977-1985.Theentireprocesswascontrolledviaconveyorbeltsystem.Therewereverylowceilingsonsecondfloorwithtemperaturesoftenashighasthatofthebakeovensused(105°F).Steps in the Process:1. Partspreppedandhungonhooksattachedto

aconveyorbeltonfirstfloortakingproductsuptothe2ndfloor;

2. Hangingpartstravelthrougha3-washopentunnel:hotwash,hotcausticsodabath,hotrinse;

3. Partstraveltosemi-enclosedautomaticpowdersprayareaforpainting;

4. Edgesandanyareasmissedinsprayareapaintedmanuallybyworkersusinghand-heldwands;

5. Newlypaintedpartsentera50’bakeovenfor2½hours;

6. Afterbaking,partstravelbackdownto1stfloortobeunloadedandshippedtovariousdepartments;

7. Hooksusedtocarrypartstakenoffconveyorandsoakedinan(uncovered)“acid”bathtoremoveanysprayedpowderpaint.Tankwaslocatedatgroundlevelandoriginallyhadnobarrierstopreventfalls(barriersaddedafterworkerfellin);

8. Responsibilityforcleaningacidtankwaslefttothepainters.

Observation: Theprocessgeneratedagreatdealoffloatingpaintdustthatcoveredworkers.Operatorsreportedelectricshocksfromspraywandstouchingchargedmetal.Aluminumproductswerebakedfor24hourspriortopainting,whichmeantcomingtoworkatallhourstomeettheproductionschedule.Runwiththreeshiftsof5workerspershift.Thegeneral

Building #14 Department: Powder Paint (upper) Structural Steel (main floor)Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

77

Employeesworepaperfacemasksandwhiteoveralls–norespirators.

Onlyexposureduringbakingprocesswouldoccurasproductsmovedoutsidetheovens.

Workersexposedtofumesfromnewlypaintedpartsandproducts.Workersexposedtoacidresidueanddirtparticleswhenscrapingandwipingtank.

Afteraseriousincidentwhenaworkerfellintotankwithsevereburnsonhislegs(anddiedtwoyearslater),abarrierwasinstalled.

Workersexposedtohighlevelofpaintdust,possibilityofelectricalshocks,highlevelsofheat(105°F),paintandcleaningfumesandadditionalchemicalsandfumesrelatedtoweldingtakingplacenear-by.By-standerexposuretoweldingfumeswassignificant.

Inspectornotedsignificantescapeofdustfrompaintenclosureandindicatedthatthepaintoperationwasnotsufficientlyenclosedandventilated.(MOL Report # 41181CEAA; Building 14, April 14, 1981). Inspector: “It appears because of inadequate enclosures and airvelocityintotheenclosure,significantamountofdustmayescapefromthebooths.”Concernofunioncommitteememberswhennewfiltersinstalleddustescapedandsettledonmachines100’away.Aworkrefusalinitiatedandthensettledwhentoldnewfilterswouldbeinstalledonnextshift.Inspectororderedthatworkersbeprovidedwithapprovedrespirators.

areawasnearstructuralsteelwhereagreatdealofweldingandmachiningtookplace.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

79

Exposures in Structural Steel involved the following:

MachininginvolvestheriskofinhalationandabsorptionofvariousMWFsincludinglargeamountsofcoolantslikelycontainingarsenicasabiocideaswellasvariouscuttingoilsthatcouldincludesulfur,mineraloilandchlorine.TheseMWFwouldbreakdownasaresultoftheheatproducedduringthemachiningprocessexposingworkerstoothertoxiccompounds.Aswell,metalswouldbreakdownintovariousmetalcompoundsthatwouldfurthercontaminatethefluids.Metalscouldinclude:chromium,nickel,zinc,mildsteel,cadmiumandcopper.Theseinhalationandabsorptionexposureswouldaffectotherworkersinthearea.

Weldingoperationswouldexposeworkersthroughinhalationtovariousweldingfumesandgasesthatwouldbeproducedthroughtheweldingprocess;e.g.,heavymetalssuchasmildsteel,chromium,nickel,cadmium,zinc,copper,aluminium--aswellasvariousgasesproducedduringtheweldingprocess,e.g.,ozone,phosgenefromresidualsofdegreasers--orvapoursfromotherareascontainingsubstancessuchastrichloroethylene.

JHSC: 3/23/78: re: fumes and dust: Fumes and dust stillaprobleminthisarea.ThedustisrisingintoPowderPaint,causingproblemsthere.Wehaveencounteredproblemsgettingtesttubesforcheckingfumesandgassesbuthopetofindsomeshortly.”

JHSC: 12/2/80: re: Oil coating fumes: “There are peoplewithdermatitisontheirforearms.CheckforphosgenegasandcarbonmonoxidegasatBldg.#14,spotweldingwhereoilcoatingisheated.”

MOL order regarding poor housekeeping and over exposures.Thebreakdownofsomefluxesthatwereusedintheweldingprocesswouldlikelybeinhaledalso.MOLorderthatallweldingareasinbldg.14shallbecleanedup,indicatingthathousekeepingwasvery poor (MOL, Building 14,Nov. 27, 1989).

Structural Steel Department:

GeneralDescription:Inadditiontothepowderpaintoperation,building14containedthemajoroperationsoftheStructuralSteeldepartmentinvolving:largescalemachining;cutting,rolling,welding,grinding,fabricationandde-burring;coatingandpaintingoflargesteel(102”+dia.x1”-2”thick)sheets.Inadditiontosupplyingmetalsheetstootherdepartments,thisdepartmentfabricatedlargehousingsfortheswitchgeardepartmentinwhatwascalledtheTankShop,northofthemainaisle.AShaftovenusedtoheatshaftsinpreparationforassemblywasalsolocatedNorthofthemainaisle.Southofthemainaislemajormachining,welding,fabricating,cleanandgrindoperationstookplace.

Theseoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofenvironmentalcontaminantsincluding:weldingfumes,metalandgritdusts,degreaserfumesandvapours,mistsandfumesfrommetalworkingfluids,aswellaslargeamountsof“whitedust”containingfibreglassandresin(frommachining,drilling,boringandgrindinglargeepoxiedfibreglassinterruptertubes).

Workersalsousedgreenlayoutpaintthatcontainedwhitelead,kerosene,trichloroethane,blackoilandnaphthagas.

AccordingtoreportsofGEretirees,respiratoryprotectionandlocalexhaustventilationwasnotprovided.Tank Shop (North End Bldg. 14)

MuchoftheproductionintheTankShoplocatedinthenorthendofBuilding#14wasfortheSwitchGeardepartment(building#16).Theshopwasequippedwith:

• Threelargeboringmillsandalargeradialdrill;• Apaintbooth;• Threelargeweldingtables;• Analuminumweldingoperation;• Threegritblastingoperations.Thismulti-processoperationemployedapproximately65workersonthreeshifts.Theoperationsconsisted

Building 14/14A Department: Structural Steel (66-85)Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

80

Inaddition,workerswereatriskofexposuretovariousdustsproducedduringthegrindingandcleaningoperations.Inthiscaseworkerswereatriskofinhalingfinedustparticulatecontainingresingrits,various metal dusts such as mild steel, aluminum, chromium,cadmium,nickel,epoxyresins,andpaintcoatings.

primarilyoffabricatingverylargecircuitbreakersranginginsizefrom28”to102”andtheevenlargerFGKbreakers.

Thisoperationinvolvedcutting,rolling,welding,grinding,gritblasting,buffingandmachining,boring,andfinallypaintinglargeplatesofsteelandstainlesssteel.

Theoperationusedlargeamountsofmetalworkingfluids(MWFs)lacedwithbiocidescontainingarseniccompoundstokillbacteriaandfungusthatgrowsinthefluids.ThisgeneratedlargeamountsofMWFmistsandvapours.

Workersdescribea“bluishsmoke”thatpermeatedtheatmosphereintheentireshop(“After15minutesonthejob,theworkareawasfilledwithbluesmokethatlastedtherestoftheshift”–GEretiree).

Weldingoperationsintheareageneratedlargeamountsofweldingfumesaswellasthermaldecompositionby-productsfromdegreasers,appliedbyhand(withaclothorbrush)inpreparationfortheweldingoperation.Theseincluded:trichloroethylene,xyleneandacetone.

Weldingoperationsinvolvedseveraltypesofweldingincluding:submergedarcweldingemployingblackgranulatedflux;andstainlesssteelweldingoflargetankswhichgeneratedheavymetalfumescontainingcadmium,hexavalentchromium,andnickelalloys.

Muchoftheweldingtookplaceinsidethelargetanksbeingconstructed,inconfinedspace.Workersreportedbeingovercomebythefumesfromthedegreasersandweldingfumes.Workers(especiallycleaners)alsodescribedbecoming“high”fromthefumes.Insidewelderswerenotprovidedwithair-suppliedhoodswhenperforminginsidewelds.And,thesupplyairwasofquestionablequalitygiventhattheaircamefromacompressorpumpingairfromtheshop.Thesteelsupplylineswereequippedwithoilsedimentbowlstopreventlinesfromrusting.

Afterwelding,workerswouldperform“grindandclean”operationsontheweldsaswellasfurthermachiningusingtheboringmills.Thisprocess

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

81

Inhalationofweldingfumescontainingmildsteelandfumesfromblackgranulatedfluxuse.

Inhalationofstainlesssteelweldingby-productssuchascadmiumandhexavalentchromium

Sameasabovewithrespecttoinhalationofweldingfumesandresiduesofdegreasers.

generatedagreatdealofblackdustthatworkerswererequiredtoremoveanddiscard.Workerswoulddrysweepandshovellargeamountsofdustanddiscardintoatotebox.Thisprocessgeneratedairbornedustthroughoutthisarea.Dustwasblownoffworksurfaces(andclothes)usingcompressedair--apracticethatwaswidespread,furthercontributingtotheairbornecontamination.Workerswerenotprovidedwithadequaterespiratoryprotectionandtherewasnolocalexhaustventilation.

Cleanandgrindoperatorsweresuppliedwithair-suppliedhoodsinsidethetankwhilecleaningwelds.

Thegrindingoperationinvolvedusinganairpoweredwirerotatingbrushaswellasabay-flexstonegrindingwheelforbuffingandsmoothingwelds.Thistaskalsoremovedanti-splatterpaintfurthercontributingtothemixofdustsgeneratedintheprocess.Grindandcleanoperationstook8to9hourstocompleteonthelargebreakers.

Aftergrindandclean,breakerswereagainwipeddownwithdegreasersinpreparationforpaintingandtheapplicationofundercoating.Thesepaintscontainedisocyanatesand/orepoxy.DegreaserswereeitherTCEorToluene.

Specific Operations:

Welding air-blast tank:Mildsteelweldingofinsideseamsusingstickelectrodesbyaninsidewelderwhileoutsideseamswerearcweldedwithairedcarbonrodsbyoutsidewelder.Endflangeswereweldedwithsubmergedweldingusingblackgranulatedflux.

Stainless Steel Tanks:Allflanges(solidstainless)andseamswereweldedwithstainlesssteelstickelectrodesandoutsideseamsarcairedwithcarbon rod electrodes to prepare the seam for full penetrationtotheinsideweld.Insideseamswerestainlessstickwelded.Buttheshellwasmadeofmildsteelandstickweldedaccordingly.

102” and FGK Breakers: Outsideseamsweresubmergedarcweldedusingblackgranulatedflux.Insideseamsandpartswerestickrodwelded.All

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

82

Sameasabove.

Exposuretoionizingradiation(fromx-rays)aknowncarcinogen.

Sameasabove.

InhalationandexposuretoMWFcontainingcoolantsandcuttingoils.Ingredientslikelyincludebiocidescontainingarsenic.

Inhalationoffineresindusts(epoxyorpolyestervinyltolueneaswellasfibreglassdust.

JHSC: 4/5/79: re: smoke hazard spot welding: “Complaints from operators indicate minor to severe discomfort.Onemanoutofworkwithsuspectedlaryngealcancerhasotheroperatorsconcerned.”JHSC: 3/25/80: fume hazard spot welding: “StrangelyenoughnotabletogetMSDSonoilusedaspreservativeonsteel.LawsayswecandemandMSDS.Sincesupplierclaimstheydon’tknowoilused,wesimplycan’tacceptthat,sinceweknowcompanieshavedisposedofchemicalssuchasPCBs.Wecan’triskthatthisanti-rustpreparationcouldcontainverydangerousproducts.”

threesizesofbreakerswerepreppedwithdegreasersandanti-splatterpaintbyhand.TheFGKswerestickweldedinsideandoutside.

Evidure torch (TIG) and aluminum welding (MIG): Asbestosblanketswereusedtocoversomejobstoprolongcoolingandpreventdamagetothematerialsduringweldingoperations.Asbestoscurtainswerehungaroundtheperimeteroftheseweldingoperations.

Afterwelding,alltanksweregritblasted,x-rayed,cleanedandgrinded,horizontallymachined,subjectedtohydrostatictesting,thenpainted/coatedandshippedtoSwitchGearforassembly.

Machining process: BertramVerticalBoringMillusedformachiningweldprepsandtrepanningplatesforbreakerstoaccommodategaskets.Whitecoolant(MWF)appliedwithasquirtbottleorblackoilasacuttingfluidwerebothusedresultinginMWFmistsandvapoursduringthemachiningprocessduetohighheatwhichcausedthefluidstovapourizeandmist.

Machine’stables,slotsandwayswerecleanedwithkerosene,naphtha,soakedragsbybarehandandcompressedairwasusedtoblowoffdust.

Radial Drilling Process—Angleiron3/8to5/8thickweredrilled,tapped,andspot-faced.Platesteel11/4thickforbreakerdomes28”to54”weredrilled.Greenlayoutpaintusedwithnaphthagasasdegreaser;whiteleadpastemixedwithblackoilusedfortappingandwhiteMWF(lacedwithbiocidewafers)usedfordrilling.Thisprocessgeneratedvapour and mist from all three chemicals because of heatgeneratedduringdrilling.

Horizontal Boring Mill: Machinedfibreglassinterruptertubeswerebored,tapped,drilledandspot-faced,generatinglargeamountsoffibreglassandresindusts.Workerswereprovidedwithpaperpants and shirts, but not adequate respiratory protection.AirBlasttankpartswerealsomachinedusingblackmachiningoilfromasquirtbottlewhichcreatedgreatamountsoffumes--especiallywhen

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

83

Inhalationoffinemetaldustsandresingritsfromgrindingwheels.

Anti rust residues: Inspector notes that in Bay 68 –spotweldingarea--weldedpartshaveresiduesofrustpreventativesandthatitsevapourationduringweldingiscausingeyeandupperrespiratoryirritationatlevelsbelowtheTLVof5mg/m³.“Nomechanicalexhaust.Thefirmstateditwasnotrequired.Theyhavesuppliedabenchfantoblowthesmokeaway…Operatorstatedhisthroatissore.”(MOL:Building14,March17,1981).

Itwasnotedthat:“Orderissuedtowearrespiratoruntiltheinspector’svisit.”

JHSC: 2/12/80: re: fume hazard: “Steel supplier does notknowwhatthetemporaryoilcoatingconsistsofso(JL)willtrytogetsampleofoilforanalysis.Goodluck(JL).

Sameasabove.

machiningontheinsideofthetank.Blackoilmixedwithkerosenewasusedtopolishsurfacesusingdifferentgradesofemerypaper.Whitecoolantwithbiocidewasalsoused.

Thecleanupofthe(horizontalboringmill)machinewasdonewithkeroseneandacompressedairguncausingdustandvapourstobecomeairborneandmigratetootherareas.Operatorsusedoilsquirtcansforvelocitywhenmachiningvariouspartsforallmetalbreakers.

Thisgeneratedlargeamountsoffibreglassdustcontainingvariousresins(curedanduncured).

Grind and Clean Operation: Workersusedbay-flexbuffers,stonegrinders,beltsandersandvibratorsthatwereair-poweredtoremoveandsmoothweld“grapes”,weldsplatter,andanti-splatterpaint.The102”andFGKtankswererotatedwhilebeinggroundand cleaned simultaneously by both inside and outsideworkers.Theseoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmetaldustsandweldingby-products.

102”tankswererotatedonlargerollerswhileFGKswererotatedbycraneforcleanandgrind.Insidegrindersweresuppliedwithairsupplyhoodsandwererequiredtosweepdustanddebrisoutofthemanholeopeningontotheshopfloor.

Grit Blasting Operations: Gritblastingtookplaceinenclosedboothsthatairpropelledalloypellets.Whilethesewereenclosed,theworkerhadtoperiodicallycleanthedustholdingchambers.Whentheleverswereopenedlargeamountsofdustswouldbereleasedintotheenvironment.Workersdescribedthisasacontinuouslydustyjobwithnorespiratoryprotectionorlocalexhaustventilation.

Somegritblastoperationsweredonebyworkersusingahand-heldblastingnozzleandwearingprotectiveclothingincludinganair-suppliedhoodwithquestionableairquality.Gritswouldhavetoberetrievedforre-usewhichinvolvedshovelingoutthealloypellets,generatinglargeamountsofdustduringrecapture.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

84

Inhalationandabsorptionofpaintparticulatesandvapourscontainingisocyanates,epoxy,andvarioussolventsandthinners.

Sameasabovewithregardtoinhalationofweldingfumes.Thesewerehighvolumeoperationsthatgeneratedlargeamountsoffumesandgaseswithoutadequateexhaustventilationorprotectiveequipment.Thereforeriskofinhalationveryhigh.

Sameasaboveaswellaslargeamountsofweldingdustssettledonfloorsandsurfaces.

Thisoperationutilizeda‘wheelabrator’ontwoshiftsusingsmallalloypelletspropelledbyasteelimpeller.

Therewasabuildupofblackdustthatwasreleasedfromtherapperwithleversintoasteeltotebox.Workersdescribedthisoperationasadry,dustyanddirtyjobwithlotsofexposuretothedust.

Smallgritblasterwasusedon3shiftsusinglargepellets.Theseoperatorsworeairsuppliedhoods.

Paint Booth Operation:Boothwasequippedwithawatercapturesystem.Allsteelproductsweredegreasedwithvariousthinnersthenprimedwith‘redprimer’.Thesewereappliedbyhandandbrushedorsprayed.

Structural Steel - Building #14 South

General Description: ThatportionofBldg.14southofthemainaislecontainedverylargeboringandmillingmachines,lathes,metalcuttingandweldingoperations.Thiswasaveryintensiveoperationinvolvinglargevolumesofproduct.

Welding Operations:

Thewestsideandsouthendofthebuildinghousedmajorweldingoperations.Thiswasanareaapproximately600feetlongfromtheaisletotheendofbldg.#14.Duringthe1980sthisdepartmentalsooperatedaverylarge‘burner’usedtocutlargeplatesofstructuralsteelintovariouspatterns.ThisburneralsoinBldg.34.Weldingoperationswereintensive,running3,sometimes4,12-hourshifts.Weldingtookplaceon4’x4’x6”thickweldingtableswhosesurfacewasgratedsoweldingwastecouldfallthrough.ThesetablesweresupportedbyHframesabout18”offthefloor.

Therewasalsoalargertableavailableatthesouthendofbuilding#14.It’simportanttonotethatweldersregularlygroundthesurfaceofthesetablestoremoveweldspatterand'grapes'sothatnewmaterialslaidtrue.

Retireesreportedmorethanonehundredofthesetablesusedbyweldersinthisarea,withfrom30to

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

85

ElectricweldinginvolvesveryhighamperagesandproduceveryhighEMFintheELFfrequencyranges.IARChasclassifiedEMFsasaprobablehumancarcinogen.

Inhalationofasbestosfibresverylikelygiventhefriableconditionsofasbestoscurtainsandmannerinwhichasbestosblanketswereusedbytheworkers.

Inhalationofsolventfumeswasroutineandchronic.Thesevapoursandfumesfromsolventswereubiquitous.

SameasabovewithrespecttoinhalationandabsorptionofMWFduringmachiningoperations.

50+weldersweldingatonetime.Suchheavyweldingintheareaproducedverylargeamountsofweldingfumes:“theweldingfumesweresodensethatsometimesyoucouldn’tseeyourworkmateatthenexttable”Retiree.

Welding fumes and dusts: Verylargeamountsofweldingdebrisanddustwouldbuildupundereachtable.Thisdustwouldbecomeairborneduringcleaninganddrysweeping,aswellasfromtrafficmovementfromvehiclesandemployees.

Electro-magnetic fields (EMFs): Agreatdealoftheweldingwaselectricarcwelding.Theweldingmachines could operate at 600 amperes and producedverystrongmagneticfields.Weldersworkedincloseproximitytotheseweldingunitswhileothersnearbyworkedinby-standerpositionstothesefields.

Asbestos:Asbestoscurtainswerehungaroundtheentireweldingareaofabout550feet.Theseasbestoscurtainswereinfriableconditionduetotheamountofwearandtearandabrasionfromproductmovement.Asbestosblanketswerealsousedtocoverproductthatwastobewelded--eithertoprotecttheproductorkeepitwarmduringtheweldingprocess.Forexample,largeshaftswereheatedtobetween300and500degreeFinanelectricovenandthencoveredwithathickblanketofasbestostokeepthetemperatureconsistentduringwelding.Welderwouldlayontopofanasbestosblanketthatwasinfriablecondition.Whentheyweredone,thefrontoftheirclothingwouldhaveacoatingofasbestosfibres.

Solvent vapour and fumes: Inpreparationforweldingormachiningtheselargesteelplatesweretypicallycoatedwithresiduesofcuttingoils/degreasers/rustinhibitors.

Machining Operations:Machiningoperationswerelocatedalongthelengthoftheeasternpartofthebuilding.Itcontainedseverallargeverticalandhorizontalboringmachines,millingmachines,radialdrills,grindersandlathes.Thisdepartmentalsoused

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

86

Sameasabovere:inhalationofMWF

JHSC: 6/1/78: re: scorched fumes: “Safety Committeewascalledre:averybadworkingcondition,highambienttemperaturesduetoatmosphericconditionsandlargerthanusualshaftinoven,whichinfactwastoolargefortheunitandasaresultwascausingaterrificheatlossintotheworkarea.Alsotheasbestosclothstillbeingusedtocovertheovenduringheatingwasemittingascorchingstenchthatrangedoverhalfthebuilding.”

JHSC: 2/26/80: re: air pollution problem: Sincefire,doorsbetween#14and#16havebeenkeptclosedbecauseofTCEproblems;anewsituationhasarisenin#14assmokeandfumesfromweldingnowbeingtrappedinNorthpartofbldg.Ceilingventswillnotsolveproblem.

JHSC: 11/28/83: re: pigeon droppings: “Complaint receivedonpigeondroppingsoninspectiontable,lunchtable,andstoredsteelarea.”

a40’boringmachine.Machiningoperationsinvolvedlargevolumesandsizesofproduct.

Metal Working Fluids (MWF):AllmachiningoperationsinvolvedtheuseoflargequantitiesofMWFtoprotecttheequipment.MWFweredrawnfrom tanks and sprayed on metals surfaces and cuttingblades.Theseoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmists,vapoursandfumes.Workersdescribed“largecloudsofbluesmokerisingandhangingintheatmosphere.”Theuseof“Steel-Kut”machiningoilwasassociatedwithmanyemployeecomplaintsof:dermatitis,breathingproblems,skinrashes/burns.Itwasthoughttocontainmineraloil,sulphur,andchlorine.(TypesofMWF:mineraloil,watersoluble,semi-synthetic,synthetic,additivessuchassulfurandbiocidescontainingarsenic).

WD-40wasappliedwithasquirtbottletothehighspeedtoolbitswhenturningonthe25’verticalboringmill,

Solvents used to clean: Tableswerecleanedwithvarioussolvents,whichincludedragssoakedin:MIK,1500thinner,toluene,roylene,naphtha,andalcohol.

Metal Grit Dusts:Workersdescribeexcessivedustbuilduponfloorsandsurfacesasaresultofmachining/grinding.

Compressed Air:participantsnotedthatcompressedairwasuseduniversallytocleandustsoffsurfacesandclothing.Thispracticecontinuedtobeusedduringthelate2000s.

Balconies on 2nd and 3rd floors: Workers performingworkonthebalconieslocatedabovetheseoperationsonthegroundfloorweresubjectedtoallthefumes,dusts,vaporsgeneratedonthegroundfloor.Theoperationsonthebalconiesonthe2ndand3rdfloorswereengagedinwindingofsmallcoils,assemblyofswitchesandmagneticswitches.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

87

BUILDING: #16 DEPARTMENT: SWITCH GEAR

General Description General Working Conditions Production processes/MachinesAssembling Breakers Disassembling/Refurbishing old or damaged BreakersMetal Clad assemblySulphur Pot AreaOther componentsMagna Blast BreakersMachining OperationExposure controls

Known Chemicals used or produced:

Aluminum,iron,copper,brass,magnesium,stainlesssteel,particlesanddustAsbestosandFiberglassdustandfibersBrominatedfireretardantsEpoxyresinsanddust(Glyptol)MWFs(Cimcool.TimSol,SteelKut,Roco,DascoTap,ChromaTap,Kerosene)OzonePCBsSolvents (TCE, Royalene, Acetone, MEK, Toluene, Naptha GasSulphur, lead, tar,

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

88

General Risk Exposures:Therewasaveryhighriskofinhalingandabsorbingvarioussolventsusedinthedegreasingandcleaningtasks.Notonlywerefumesintensefromthedegreasingtanksinthisareaandelsewherebutalsoworkerswereapplyingdegreasersbybarehandwithragsoverlargesurfaceareas.Someofthesecontaincontainedthecontaminantbenzene.

MWFandcoolantmistweregeneratedduringmachiningoperationswithoperatorsclothingsoakedwiththesefluids.Allthreeroutesofentrywereinvolved:inhalation,absorptionandingestionsinceworkersroutinelyateanddrankattheirworkstations.

Skinabsorptionandinhalationofsolventshighlylikely.

Becausethesemigratingfumescameincontactwithweldingoperations,therewasahighriskofinhalingphosgenegas.

Theuseofglyptolpaintalsogeneratedvapoursfromthevolatilescontainedinthepaints.Thesewerereadilyinhaledandworkersfrequentlycomplainedaboutthefumesparticularlywherethepaintwasbeingsprayed.

SincethisoperationalsoinvolvedfillingbreakersandtransformerswithlargeamountsofthePCBoiltherewasahighriskofinhalingandabsorbingthistoxinduringfillingandemptyingprocedures.PCBspillswouldinvolvecleanupaswellasresiduesleftbehind.

Fittersarealsoexposedtoinhalabledustsfromgrindinganddeburringoperations.Workerswouldinhalemetalandgritandresindustsduringtheseoperations.Thesewereperformedwithoutrespiratoryprotectionorlocalexhaustventilations.

Machiningoperationswouldinvolvethehighriskofinhalationandabsorptionofcoolantscontainingarsenicandcuttingoils.Soakedclothingaswellassymptomsofadverseskinreactionsandfoulodoursevidencedthis.

General Description: SwitchGearDepartmentwaslocatedinBuilding16northofthemainaislebetweenBuildings18and14.Therewerenowallsbetweenthesethreebuilding.Itwasentirelyopen.Atitspeak,employeesnumberedbetween100and150employeeswith3to4shifts.Thiswasanintenseproduction,highvolumeoperationconditionedbythepiece-ratesystem.

Theproductionprocessesconsistedoftheassemblyandfittingofverylargecircuitbreakers,limitamps,metalclads,rectifiers,exciters,GPCrelaysaswellasdrivesystems.

Theassemblyoperation,carriedoutbyassemblersandfitters,involvedmachiningandmillinginternalelectricalandmechanicalpartsbothmetalandfibreglass,aswellasdrilling.Assemblyalsoinvolvedvarioustypesofweldingoperationsincludingaluminum and stainless steel, arc MIG and TIG welding.Grindingandcleaningofweldswerealsocarriedoutinvolvinggrindingandbuffingmachines.Thesenumerousmachiningoperationsrequiredtheuseofvariousmetalworkingfluidscontainingarsenicbiocideagents.

Weldingoperationinvolvedmetalpreparationwithsolvents,includingtrichloroethylene,acetone,naphthagas,MEK,toluene,amongothers.ThecentralareaofthebuildingwasequippedwithatankofRoyalene(TCE)degreaserthatmeasured8’x12’x6’andwasheated.

Breakerswerefirstpreppedwithprimersandglyptolpaints,thenfilledwithPCBdielectricoil,andtested,drained,adjusted,refilled,re-testeduntilthebreakerwasfullyfunctional.TheeastsideoftheshopcontainedthreetanksofPCBoils.

Thehighvoltagepotentialtest(usedforqualitycontrol)involvedtheapplicationofveryhighamperagebetween0and3,000amp.

General Working Conditions:Thiswasaverysmokyanddustyenvironmentwithverystrongodoursofsolvent,metalworkingfluidmistsandvapours,andheavyweldingfumesfromvariouswelding

Building: #16 Department: Switch GearProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

89

Therewasalsoahighriskofingestingthesecontaminantsbecauseworkersregularlyateandsmokedattheirworkstations.

Theriskoftheseexposureswashighgiventhevolumeofworkandproductuse,theclosecontactwiththecontaminants,thedirecthandlingandintricaciesoftheworktasksandfinallythelackofadequateexposurecontrols.

Riskofexposuretoveryhighmagneticfieldwasveryhighgiventheproximityandstrengthofthesemagneticfieldsbasedontheveryhighamperage.

Inhalationandabsorptionofcuttingoils,inhalationofsolventvapours,inhalationandabsorptionofPCBoilswasprevalent.

ExposuretoPCBswhiledrainingoldbreakertanks.WashdownofPCBresidueswithsolvents—TCE,toluene,MEK.EvaporationofPCBsenhancedduringhandwipedown.

JHSC: 11/16/78: re: Ozone from welding: “Ventilationisinusebutsituationstillverybad.Thereisaconglomerateoffumespresentinthebuildinganditisobviousthatabroadercontrolisonlyanswer.”JHSC:1/25/79: re: Ozone build-up: “No improvement inthisarea.Infact,problemseemstobemoreintense.Notonlythatmeninareafeelingchronicproblems from it but it seems to be much more

operations.Thelargenumbersofoperationsgoingonatthesametimecontributedgreatlytoveryhighconcentrationsofcontaminantmixtures.Theseoperationsalsoproducedgreatamountsofwelding,grinding,andmillingdusts.ThemachiningandmillingwithMWFproducedlargeamountsofvisiblebluesmoke.Workerssaidthattherewasalwaysabluehazeintheair.Housekeepingwaspooranddustandspillsaccumulatedintheworkenvironment.

Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationonlynaturalventilation,andnoadequatemake-upair,sothatatmosphereintheGEbuildingwasundernegativepressureresultingincontaminantsfromotherareasbedrawnintobuilding16(atthecentreoftheplantwhereceilingheightwasthehighest)whichexacerbatedthetoxicatmosphere.(SeeH&Smanagementmemoregardingthesenegativeairpressureconditions,aswellasMOLinspectionreports).

Eatingandsmokingattheworkstationwasroutineandpermittedbythemanagement.Thiswasaresultofaworkregimedefinedbythepiece-ratesystemwithitsindividualisticcultureandlackofsufficienteatingfacilities.

Detailed production processes:

Assembling Breakers: Breaker assembly involved several“fitters”whowouldcarryoutanumberoftaskstobuildacompletebreaker.Thebreakersvariedinsizefrom28”,36”,48”,54”,102”aswellasthelargerFGKbreaker.Completingthesewouldinvolveseveraldaystoaweek.Thesetaskswerecarriedoutwiththefitterinsidethebreakershell.Fitterswould:1. Degreasethebreakershellbyhandwithrags

soakedinTCE;2. Fit and install various parts that had to be

machinedorgroundtofit,includingthebushings,weldedstuds,andotherpartsspotweldedonthewalls—someofwhichweremadeofasbestosandweremachinedtofit;

3. Preparebreakersforpainting,whichinvolvedbuffingandhandwipingwithTCE;

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

90

concentrated(asreportedbypeoplecomingintothearea).AskedHealthDept.tomakechecksonceagain.”

JHSC:2/15/79: re: Noxious fumes:“Areadingof6-16ppmofTCEinweldingarea.AlthoughwellbelowTLV,whenpresentinweldingitbecomesadifferentproblem.TeststhenmadeforHCLandTVAof5ppmwasexceededtoalargedegree.Readingwentoffscalecompletely.”

JHSC: 9/27/79: re: Noxious Fumes: “About three timesaweekthis(HCL)pollutantbecomesveryapparent.OnSept27,areadingof4.5-5ppmwasrecorded.ThisoriginatedfromTCEinacoldprocesstank.(DM)awelderinareaisonsickbenefitsafterathroatoperation.Hehascomplainedofrespiratoryproblemsforsomeperiod.Othersaresufferingdiscomfortaswell.Taskoperatorwillbetoldtokeeplidclosedtocontrolfumes.”

JHSC: 12/20/79: re: Asbestos dust: “Diesel poles usingasbestossheetsarebeinggroundandcut,ventilationistotallyinadequate.Newmaterialbeingslated from armature is also asbestos under another name.Althoughsaferinitsoriginalform,hazarddoesn’timprovewhencutorground.”

Inhalationofmetal,paintandresiduedustsfromgrindingandcleaningoperationsduringrefurbishing.Alsoexposuretovolatilesfrompaintfumes.

4. Paintingthebreakerswithepoxyglyptolpaintinside(gray)andoutside(green);

5. FillingthecompletedbreakerwithPCBoildispensedfromthePCBstoragetanks;

6. TestingthefilledBreakersatthe‘highpotential”testingareawhereaveryhighvoltagewasapplied--atupto3000amperes.Highmagneticfieldsareproducedduringtestingatextremevoltagesinthehighbayareaofthebuilding.(Notedduringdiscussionsthatthereseemedtobeahighdeathrateamongtesters);

7. Dependingontestresults,Breakerscouldbedrainedofoil,adjusted,refilledandretestedseveraltimesover.

Thisassemblyoperationproducedanumberofatmosphericcontaminants:weldingfumes,cuttingoil mists, solvent vapours, paint fumes, metal and gritdusts.By-standeremployeeswouldbeaffectedaswellasthefitterswhodirectlyhandledthesecontaminants.Aswell,PCBspillageduringdispensinganddrainingwouldalsocontributetothemixtureofcontaminants.PCBleakagealsooccurredduringthetestingphase.AirblastbreakerswerefilledwithSF-6gasasaninsulatorinthistypeofbreaker.

Disassembling and refurbishing old or damaged Breakers: ThisinvolveddrainingusedPCBoilsfromthetanks,whichexposedworkerstospillageaswellashandlingleakytanks.Oncedrained,electricalandmechanicalcomponentsweredisassembledandsurfaceswerehandwipedwithTCEsoakedragsproducinglargeamountsofsolventvapours.Tanksweregroundandbuffed,preppedwithTCE,andpaintedwithglyptolpriortorefitting.Tankswouldalsohavetobehydrostaticallytestedforleakage.

Metal Clad assembly: Thisinvolvedfittersassemblingwhatwereactuallymetalshedsusedtoholdelectricalequipment.Thesewerepreparedinbuilding14andthenequippedwithhingesandothercomponentsthathadtobeassembled.Fitterswouldperformdrilling,grindingandmachiningtofitpartstogether.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

91

Inhalationofsulphur,leadandtarfumeswashighgiventhestateofthechemicals,theconfinedareatoworkinandthedirecthandlingofmaterials.

MOL Report May 28, 1982. Order 0123, Bay 327, Bldg. 16re:pouringleadsulphurwithoutexhaust;also Order 0126 re: silver solder booth, inadequate ventilation.

Inhalationoffibreglassandresindustsaswellasparticulatefrommaterialscontainingbrominatedfireretardantswasverylikelyduringthisoperation.

Inhalationofasbestosfibreslikelyduringthisoperationsinceworkershadtofitandworkasbestosbafflesinplace.

Exposuretoasbestosdustlikelyinhaledgivendirectcontact.

InhalationandexposuretoMWFverylikelygiventheamountoffluidsusedduringthesemachiningoperations.

Workersreportthatthereweredensecloudsofbluishsmokeovertheseoperationsaswellasmistssurroundingthegeneralatmosphere.

JHSC: 2/12/80: re: Noxious fumes: “Itwasnotedbyall present that heavy fumes reached the aluminum weldingareaabout3minutesafterVPItankatsouthendwasopened,eventhoughtankwascoldandhadnoloadinitforsometime.Wearehopingthatmake-upairventswillreducethenegativepressureandperhapsbettercontrolofairmovementinbldg.”

JHSC: 3/25/80: re: Noxious fumes: “Despitetwomake-upairsystemsinplacetoreducenegativepressurefactor,problemfumesstilloccurring.(e.g.,complaintsofozoneat3ppmvs.TLVof1ppminnorthendweldingarea).”

JHSC: 4/8/80: re: Noxious fumes: “Checks as requirednotbeingdoneonregularbasis.(Unionrep)asksthatmorepeopleonfloorbetrainedtotake

Sulphur Pot Area: This area included the use of hot openpotsofsulphur,leadandtarwithnoexhaustventilation.Amixtureoflead,sulphurandtarwereappliedtosealjointstopreventleakage.Thesemixtureswerecontainedinaheatedliquidstateandappliedtothemetalcladjoints.Moltenleadwashand ladled onto the part, then sulphur, and then itwascoveredwithtar.Workersindicatethatverystrongpungentodoursemanatedfromthevariouspotsduringapplication.Localexhaustwasintroducedmuchlaterinthedepartment’shistory.

Other components: Connectingmetalcladstobreakersalsoinvolvedfibreglasstubingusedasinsulatorsthatweresecuredoverbusbarsthentapedwithblackurethanetape,bolted,sealedwithductsealputty,coveredwithfibreglasstapeandpaintedwithafireretardantpaint.Thesefiberglassinsulatorswerefirsttapedwithbrowninsulation,thentapedwithblackurethaneandfinallysealedwithductsealcontainingasbestosandhasaputty-likeconsistency.Thiswasagaintapedoverandpaintedwithabrownfireretardantpaintthatcameingallontubes.MSDSlikelyabrominatedfireretardant.Theoutsideofthemetalcladwasinsulatedwithfibreglass.

Otherproductssuchasrectifiers,exciterswereassembledutilizingaluminumarcweldingproducinghighlevelsofozonegasaswellasothermetalandchemicalby-productsassociatedwithaluminumweldingoperations.Preparationforaluminumweldingincludedtheuseofnaphthagas.

Magna Blast Breakers: These mechanical breakers arespring-loaded,motor-drivenbreakersreferredtoaselectricalimpactdrivers.Thebearingarespringloadedand8”x11”bafflesmadeofmachinedasbestos,thengluedandboltedonbyfitters.Thisdisturbedtheasbestosfibres,whichweredispersedinthegeneralatmosphere.

Machining Operation: Themachiningoperationwasquiteextensive,employingapproximately40to50workersandutilizing35largeboring,milling,drilling,andlathingmachines,inadditiontomanysmallerpiecesofmachiningequipment.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

92

(air)samples.(Name)loggedreadingsof3ppm,butneglectedtowarnworkersofdangerouslevels.”

JHSC: 11/28/83: re: Xylol complaint: “ Xylol fumes made(worker)dizzyandgavehimaheadachewhilewashinghistoolsinatankofxylol.Jobisdonefor15to20minutes,1-2timesperweek.”

JHSC: 10/21/86: re: Asbestos: “Workers not been includedonassessmentforasbestosinthisarea.They should be instructed on proper procedures forhandlingasbestosandincludedinthecontrolprogram.”

MOL:06/27/76:OzoneTLVexceededduringaluminumwelding.

MOL:2/13/78: Ozoneexposureduringweldingoperationinbldgs.16and30.Workercomplaintsirritatedupperrespiratorytractandeyes.MOL:03/1/79: HydrogenChlorideGashigherthantheTLVduringMIG/argongasweldingincombinationwithTCEdegreaservapoursfromtank.EmployerrefusedtoreplicateconditionsforMOLtests.

MOL:03/17/79: HCLconcentrationMOLtestunrepresentative.

MOL:03/17/81:ToolRoom-tungstencarbidedustescapingduringcarballoytoolgrinding.Dustaccumulationhigh.

MOL:04/2/81: carballoygrindingdustrevisited.Highweldingfumes.

MOL:05/20/82;05/28/82;06/2/82: Lead/sulphur/chlorinepouringoperation.Inspectorindicatedthatworkershowsallsymptomsofoverexposure.Issuesstopworkorder.MOL:05/8/86: Order for lead assessment under designatedsubstanceregulationforlead.

Verylargemotorsbuiltinbldgs.8and10weremachinedwithaMazakmillingmachineinbldg.16.ImportanttonoteisthattheMazakmachine,locatedinBuilding16,wasoperatedbyBuilding8/10employees.

Machiningalsoincludedlargeamountsoftappingoflargemachinedboltsaswellasamajorcleaningandgrindingoperationutilizinglargegritblaster,grinding,deburringandpolishingmachines.Thisoperationmilled, bored, drilled and turned steel, cast iron, copper,aluminum,brass,magnesium,stainlesssteel,andfibreglassstructures.

Inthelattercase,workerswouldmill,boreanddrilllargefibreglasstubes3’x4’x12”dia.1/4”thick.Thisoperationgeneratedlargeamountsofresin/fibreglassdustthatworkerscomplainedaboutbecauseitcauseddermatitisandskinirritations.

Whenmachiningandrefurbishingused102”breakers,workerswouldencounterasbestosinsulationoriginallyusedintheolderbreakers.Themachiningprocesswouldgeneratesignificantamountsofasbestosdustduringtherefurbishingoperation.Allmachiningoperations,includingtapping,usedlargeamountsofMWFthatwerebothautomaticallyormanuallyappliedbytheoperators.MWFincluded:TrimSol,Cimcool,BlackOil(containingsulphur compounds), Steel Kut, Roca, kerosene, and bothDascoandchromaTapfortapping.Thiswasaveryhighvolumeareathatgeneratedlargeamountsofsolventvapours,MWFmistsandsmokeaswellasdustconsistingofmetal,fibreglass,andgritandresindustsfromalloperations.MWFwererecycled,andmanytimesthefluidswouldbecomebiologicallycontaminated.

AluminumWeldinginBay319usedveryhighamperagesexposingworkerstoveryhighEMFs.Also,phosgenegasfrommigrationofTCE.

MOCA: ExposedtoMOCAproducedandfitted.

Exposure controls: Upuntilthe1980’stherewaslittleornolocalexhaustventilationandnoadequaterespiratoryprotectionprovidedtothesemachine

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

93

MOL:11/27/89: MWF/coolant mist clouds heavily emittedduringmachining;orderedtocleanupthepaintshop,whichshowedpoorhousekeeping.

workers.Itwascommonpracticeforworkerstoeat,smokeanddrinkattheirwork-stations.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

95

BUILDING #16A TRANSPORTATION/DIESEL EQUIPMENT

General DescriptionGeneral Work ConditionsProduction Areas

Diesel Production:

Diesel ControlCircuit BoardsResistersMachining AreaWelding AreasWinding AreaAssembling AreaEpoxy Dipping and BakingPainting OperationDiesel Offices

Diesel Rebuilding:

Rebuilding CoilsRe-machiningAssembling Rotors and StatorsTestingPainting

Known Chemicals used or produced: Aluminum,iron,copper,brass,magnesium,stainlesssteel,particlesanddustAsbestosandFiberglassdustandfibersBrominatedfireretardantsEpoxyresinsanddust(Glyptol)MWFs(Cimcook.TimSol,SteelKut,Roco,DascoTap,ChromaTap,Kerosene)ThermaldecompositionOzonePCBsSolvents: TCE, Royalene, Acetone, MEK, Toluene, Naphtha GasSulphurLeadtar

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

96

Negative Air Pressure Impact on Exposures: Due tonegativepressureinthebuildingcomplex,contaminantsfromotherareasandoperationsweredrawnintothisarea.ThiswasnotedbytheGESafetyUnitmanagementinmemosdated:

October2,1979fromA.K.Faggetter,Hygienist;andOctober29,1979fromP.J.Kyselka,ManagerPlantFacilitiesSection.

ThiswasparticularlytrueforthemigrationofTCEvapourmakingcontactwiththealuminumweldingoperationinbldg.16A.

Inhalationofphosgenegasaswellasheavyozoneexposures.Workerreportedsymptomsofnosebleedsandirritatedeyes,noseandthroatindicatingoverexposuretobothcontaminants

General Description: Thisdepartmentbuiltlargemotorsandgeneratorsfortransportationvehicles,miningequipmentsuchashoistelevators,crushingequipmentetc.Thisincludedvariouscontroldevicesandcircuitrytocontrolthefunctioningofthismachinery.Thedepartmentwaslocatedbetweentheinductionmotorsandstructuralsteeldepartmentandsouthoftheswitchgearareas(bldg16).

Open to adjacent departments: Thesebuildingwerenotseparatedbywallsandessentiallysharedthesameairspace.Workin16Ainvolvedseveraloperationsthatincluded:assemblyofmotors,buildingcircuitboardsandwiringconfigurationsforcontrols,producingthevariouspartsformotors.Theseprocessesincludedmachining,drilling,grinding,cleaning,andvarioustypesofwelding.Thisoperationinvolvedtheuseofboringandmillingmachines,lathes,radialdrills,spindledrills,gritblastingunits,burringboothsandwindingmachines.Theseprocessesusedvariouschemicalsincluding:solventsanddegreasersincludingTCE,toluene,MEK,acetone,andnaphthagas;avarietyofMWF,epoxyresinsandcatalysts,asbestos,fibreglass,moca,andpaints.

Thelargemotorsdepartmentemployedapproximately200to250workerson3shifts,mostlyondayshift.Thiswasahighvolumeproductionoperationthatran24/7.Allchemicalswereusedroutinelyanddirectly,andinlargequantities.

General Work Conditions:

Negative Air Pressure:Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandlittle if any make up air.Asaresult,theentireareawasunder negative pressure and majorbuild-upofheat.Accordingtoaworker:”Itwasaterriblyhotbuilding.”Consequently,crosscontaminationoccurredregularlywithcontaminants from other areas drawn into the area. The use of largeoscillatingfanstodealwithhightemperatures,furtherdisturbedanddistributedcontaminants.Theatmospherewasverysmoky,withaconstantbluishhazeovervariousworkareas.Thiswasparticularlytrueinareaswithweldingfumes,MWFmists,and

Building #16A Department Transportation/Diesel EquipmentProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

97

InhalationofMOCAvapoursanddustsduringmixingandmoldingoperationswashighsincethiswaswithoutanycontrolsorrespiratoryprotection.TheMOCAwasmanuallymixedandpouredintomolds.Vapourduringthemixingandcuringprocesswouldexposeworkerstotheriskofinhalation.Furtherinhalationandskinabsorptionwouldoccurduringtheprocessoffiling,sandingandcuttingthecuredresin.

Workerswereexposeddailytolargeamountsofasbestosfibersanddustwithnopersonalprotection.

JHSC: 2/21/83: re: fumes in varnish area: “Complaints of fume problem since air replacement bags(forventilationsystem)outofcommission.”

JHSC: 8/28/85: re: varnish spray: “Crane operators concernedaboutvarnishspraywhilestatorssuspendedfromcrane.”

Chemical names and/or MSDS needed of machine fluids,cuttingoils,varnishes,degreasers,aswellascompositionofweldingfumes.

grindingoperations.Housekeepingwasverypooranddustbuild-upwasveryhigh.Personnelintheofficelocatedintheeasternareaoftheplantwouldneed to clean their desks and other surfaces of settledsootanddustseachmorningandafterlunch.

Workersalsosmokedandatelunchatworkstationsandwashingfacilitieswerenoteasilyaccessible.

Production Areas:

Diesel Control: This area made control mechanisms andswitchboards,circuitcards,rectifiers,reversersandresistersfordieselelectricmotors.Thisworkinvolvedanextensiveuseofepoxy resins and catalyst identified as MOCA in hand buckets that weremixedandappliedbyhandintomolds,whichwerethenplacedinVPItankstoensureuniformcoverageforapproximately2hours.TheseMOCAmoldswerethenbakedinovens.

Circuitboardswerealsoformedusingasbestos fiber and concrete,aswellasepoxyresins.Thesewerealsoplacedinovensforcuringandhardening.

MOCA,asyntheticchemicalusedtomakeurethaneandacatalystforepoxyresin,wasalsomixedinmoldstoformpartsforhighforce/frictionoperations.Workerswouldsaw,grind,file,andshapethisproductinitssolidstatethuscausinglargeamountsofdust.MOCA (methylenebis[2-chloroanaline] ) is recognized as a group 1 carcinogen.

Resistersweremadebyassembling8tiersofasbestosboardstackedinalayeredgrid,framedbyheavygaugesteeldividers,containedina2’x2’frame.Coppercoilswereplacedbetweentheasbestosboards(boardsservedasinsulators).Workerswereindirectcontactwithasbestosandotherbi-productswhengrindingandfittingtheseboards.Thecompletedresisterswerethensoakedinlinseedoilandbaked.

Machining Area: Themachiningareautilized2largehorizontalboringmachines,1largeverticalboringmachine,largeradialdrills,millingmachinesandlathes.Large2”thickcastironframesaswellasplatesteelweremachined,milled,boredanddrilled

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

98

Weldersexposeddermallytolargeamountsofmachinefluids.Whileprotectedfromweldingfumesbypersonalexhaustventilation,capturedfumeswereventedintotheworkspace,puttingotherworkersatrisk.Duetocontinualfrictionandfrayingofasbestoscurtainsandblankets,workerswereexposedtosignificantamountsofasbestosdustandfiber.Insunlight,theairappearedtobefilledwithsnowflake-likeparticles.

Ozonegasisclassifiedascarcinogenicandalsocausesanarcoticeffectanddamagetothemucusmembraneofeyes,earsandthroat.Manycomplaintsofeyeandthroatirritations.EMFsclassifiedascarcinogenicandalsoanendocrinedisrupterandcanaffectcentralnervoussystem.

Negativepressurein16Aaredrawingfumesinfromlongdistancesinotherdepartments.IncontactwithweldingoperationsTCEproducesphosgenegasthatworkersareexposedto.SeeMgt.memosdate:October29,1979fromP.J.Kyselkaregardingdegreaserfumesandnegativepressure;October2,1979forA.K.FaggetterregardingheavyconcentrationofTCEescapingandtheformationofHCLgas.

JHSC: 1/22/81: re: aluminum welding:“airtestingshows2ppmand3ppmofTCEatdoorwayofdegreaser.”

Workerswereathighriskofinhalingepoxyfumesduringdippingandbakingoperations.Workers

onlargeboringandmillingmachines,lathesanddrills.ThemachiningoperationutilizedlargeamountofMWFthatwassprayedonbothmanuallyandautomatically.

MachininggeneratedlargeamountsofMWFmistsandbluishsmokeaswellaslargeamountsofmetalparticulateintheformofdusts.Machiningalsoinvolvedtapping,deburring,grinding,buffingofmachinedproductsproducingmoregritandmetalduststhatwerecontaminatedwithepoxyresinsanddegreasingandMWFresidues.

Welding Area:Theweldingareawaslocatenexttothemachiningareaandwassurroundedbyasbestoscurtains,whichwereinfriablecondition.Metalstobeweldedweredegreasedbyover-headcranesdippingthemetalsina12’x12’degreasingtankcontainingRoyalene(TCE).ThetankwasnotcoveredandthedegreaserproducedlargeamountsofTCEvapour.InadditiontoTCEvapours,theairwasfilledwithvariousweldingfumesanddusts.Negativepressurepromoteslongdistancemigrationofvapoursandothercontaminantstootherdepartments.

Aluminum Welding Area 16A, Bay 319: The aluminumweldingareaemployed8to10weldersinvolvedinelectricarcMIG/TIGweldingonvariousaluminumalloysheetspretreatedwithxylenedegreaser.Thiswasahighproductionareaproducinglargeamountsofaluminumfumesaswellasothermetalalloys,ozonegas,andphosgeneasaresultoftheultravioletlightcomingincontactwithsolventvapours from nearby TCE tanks and/or similar degreaserresiduesonthemetalbeingwelded.Somealuminumalloysweldedalsocontainedberyllium.

NOTE: SeereportbyA.K.Faggetter,hygienistforGEdatedOct.2,1979documentingaheavyconcentrationofTCEescapingfromTCEtankandfindingitswayto16AaluminumweldinginBay319andproducinghydrogen-chloridegaswhenarcweldingcameincontactwithTCE.AlsominutesofmeetingOct.29,1979indicatingthatnegativeairpressureinbuildings16Aand18wasdrawinginTCEvapoursfromTCEtanks.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

99

describetheintensefumesandodorsduringtheseoperations.

Exposurestoresindustalsooccurredduringgrindingandcleaningoperations.

Inhalationofpaintandtoluenevapourswashighlylikely.Exposuretosignificantamountsoftolueneandepoxyresinduetothesizeofengineandmotorparts.

Inhalationofasbestosdustfromthecuttingofasbestossheetshighlylikely.

JHSC: 8/27/79 re: epoxy fumes: “Westillhavenowordre:thischemical.Todatewehavenoideawhatsubstancetotestfor…peopleworkinginareaarebecomingsickfromthefumes.”

JHSC: 9/27/79: re: epoxy fumes: “(Managementrep)wassupposedtogetinformationontheepoxyproductbeingusedbuthegothisbuildingsmixedup.Noreportasaresult.”

Inhalationofvapourfromsolventsandpaintslikely.

By-standerexposuretodieselfumeslikely.Severalworkersinanadjacentofficetakentohospitalwithdizzinesswerefoundtohavehighlevelsofcarbonmonoxideintheirblood.Workersthroughoutareaexposedtolargeamountsofdieselfumesfromidlingvehicles.JHSC: 2/17/81: re: mica dust:(needtoaddress)longstandingreportsofmicadust.JHSC: 3/28/83: Noise test: “Request for noise test in DieselGrindingarea.”

Winding area: Involved the manual and mechanical processofwindingofcopperwirecoatedwithepoxyandinsulatedwithasbestoscalled‘deltabeston’copperwire.Approximately50woundcoilswerepressed into appropriate shapes and dipped in 2 VPItankscontainingepoxy.Thedippedcoilswerehandsqueegeedandbakedintheoven.Followingthis,coilsweregroundandcleanedofanyexcesshardenedepoxyresin.Coilswerethenassembledintomotorsbyapproximately10assemblers.

Assembling area:Assemblersfirstinsertedasbestoswedgesintothecoilsandthenintothemotorframes.Asbestoswedgeshadtobefittedandpoundedintothecoilsandframes.Theselargepieceswerethenmovedbyhoistorcranetothe10’x10’heateddegreasertankanddippedwherevapourscondensedon frames and drip dried almost immediately due to hightemperatures.

Epoxy dipping and baking operation: Assembled Motorsweredippedbyahoistperson(forlessthan2tons)orcraneoperation(ifover2tons).

InthesamemannermotorsweredippedinVPItanksfor2hours,thenbroughttothebakingovensforcuring.Subsequently,workerswouldhandgrindexcesshardenedepoxyresin.Thebakeovenswereregularlymaintainedbygrindingandsweepinghardenedepoxyspillsfromovensurfaces.

Painting Operation: Thiswasanopen4’x4’areawhereoneperson,pershiftspray-paintedeachmotorwithepoxybasedblackenamelpaintoveragratecontainingflowingwater.Thepainterpretreatedthemotorsforpaintingbyhandwipingthemdownwithtoluene.

Diesel offices: Staffedby(mainlyfemale)employeeswhoconductedclericalandotherduties.Theairintheseofficeswasverydustyduetomigrationofdustsandfumesandgasesfromvariousoperationsmachining,grinding,welding,degreasingandpaintingconductedinthisdepartment.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

100

HeavyuseofMWFwouldhighlylikelyinvolvetheinhalationandabsorptionoffluidmistsandsmoke.Inhalationofweldingfumesandasbestosfibrelikely.Exposuretomagneticfieldslikelygivenstrengthoffieldsandproximitytothem.Alsoinhalationofozonegaslikely.JHSC: 8/24/82: re: toxic fumes: “Workers in test areaofdieselreportirritationfromVPItanks.(unionsafetyrepreportsfumesas‘extremelyharsh’.”MOL Reports:04/06/59:Grindingareanotlocallyexhausted.Highconcentrationofgritresinsdustsandmetaldusts.06/4/70: Workersufferingnosebleedsandupperrespiratoryirritationduringweldingaluminum—TCE,ozone,HCLgasexposurespossible.01/25/79:Aluminumweldingassemblyinvolving6welders.Workercomplaintseyeirritation.OzoneandHCLgasgeneratefromTCEvapourandarcweldingandozonegasproducingHCLgas.Ozonelevelsat0.1ppm;companyrecordsonHCL0to0.4in1978.06/26/81:Kozmafurnacenotadequatelyexhausted.Poorhousekeepingnoted.BansawcuttingMicageneratinglotsofmicadustinBays405,414.05/8/86: Order issued for lead, silica, mercury benzene,andisocyanateassessmentunderrespectivedesignatedsubstanceregulations.JHSC: 4/18/83: re: insulation fire: 200hpdestructiontesthadgrayfoaminsulationstuffedinducts.Whenarmatureburntout,insulationcaughtfire.Fumesfromfirewerehigh.

Rebuilding Diesel Motors:Background: Afterdisassemblyofuseddieselmotorsinbuilding12thepartsweremovedtobuilding16Aforrebuildingand/orreassembly.Theworkprocessesincluded:1. RebuildingtheCoils:Solidasbestossheets

werecutbysheersintostrips3’x1/2’usedtoprotectelectriccoilsfromexcessiveheat.Thestripsweredrivenbetweenenginecomponentsmanuallygeneratingsubstantialamountsofasbestosdust.

2. Re-machiningofoldcastingsbyweldingonadditionsteeltoattainpropersize.Thesepartswerethenre-boredusinglargeboringmachines,whichproducedlargeamountsofweldingfumes.Thesemachiningprocessesinvolvedtheextensiveuseofmachinefluidsandcuttingoils(Onlyidentifiedwascimcool).Weldingfumeswerecapturedbypersonalexhaustventilationwornbyweldersbutfumeswerethenblownoutintogeneralworkarea.

3. Statorsandframesassembledmanuallywithfinalclosuresweldedshutbywelderlyingonasbestosblankets.

4. TestingProcesses:Testingwentonthroughoutthere-manufacturingprocesstoensureproduct met performance standards for qualitycontrol.Motorswererunwithhighvoltagescalledheatruns.ThisproducedhighEMFsandOzonegas.

5. Paint Area: Finished motor sent to paint shop whereitwaswipeddownmanuallywithtolueneinpreparationforpainting.Afterthisdegreasing,engineswerespraypaintedwithglyptol,awaterproofpaintmanufacturedbyGE(PortUnionplant).

6. Afterfinalperformancetest,engineswerepreparedforshipping,thenloadedontotrucksortrainsparkedwithmotorsrunning.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

101

BUILDING: #17 (#21, #18N) DEPARTMENT: CARPENTRY

General DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsProduction Process:

Building Structures and Fiberglass Molds Cutting and DrillingFiberglass Operation

Known Chemicals used or produced:AcetoneBeeswaxBenzeneBPACabasylEpoxiesFibreglassFormaldehydeMEKPeroxideStyreneTCEThinners(e.g.,1500andPartal)TolueneVinyl ester resinsXylene

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

102

FromthedescriptionsofthevariousworktasksperformedintheCarpentryShop,workerswerelikelyexposedtoanumberoftoxicchemicalsusedinproductionthroughinhalation,absorptionandingestion.1. Therewasagreatdealofinhalable/respirable

dustsgeneratedwithoutadequatelocalexhaustventilation.Thesedustscontainedvariouswoodparticlesthatwouldcontainformaldehydefromgluedwoodlaminates,epoxyandpolyesterresindustsfromsandingandgrindingfibreglassmolds.Alsoincluded,weremineraldustsfromcuttingasbestosandfibreglasssheetsandcloth.AsbestosandcompositeslikeTextalitewerefrequentlycutwithsawsandthendrilled,planedandshapedgeneratinglotsofdusts;

2. Therewasagreatdealofsolventandresinvapoursgeneratedfromlayingupepoxyandpolyesterresins,andcuringtheseinovens.Theuseofepoxyandisocyanatepaintsthatweresprayedorrolledonaddedtothevapourmix.Largesurfaceareasrequiredgreatamountofpaint/solvent,thusproducinglargeamountsofvapour/mists;

3. Thecuringovengeneratedagreatdealoffumesandvapourasaresultofheatingvariouscoatings.Thisprocessproducedanumberofthermaldecompositionby-productswhenepoxiesandpolyesterresinswereheatedincludingBPA,Formaldehyde,andbenzene;

4. AlsocontributingtotheseroutesofexposurewasalackoflocalexhaustventilationandPPE;

5. Housekeepingwaspooranddustsandothervolatileswerenotlookedafter;

6. WorkersusedagreatdealofsolventsforcleaninguppaintsandresinswhichweremostlyappliedbyhandwithragssoakedwithTCE,MEK,toluene,xylene,andacetone.ManyofthesearePAHs,containingbenzene.Workersalsohandledmold-releaseagents.

General Description of Carpenter Shop: The shopwasoriginallylocatedonthegroundfloorofBldg.21,andthenmovedtoBldg.18.ThenitwassubsequentlymovedtoaseparatebuildinglocatedatthenorthendoftheGEsiteanddesignatedasBldg.#17.Thebuildingwascladwithwhatwascalled‘ASBESTOSLUMBER’anicknameforasbestossheetsforexternalsiding.

Theshopwasanopenconceptbuildingapproximately200’X300’with20’ceilingheight.Thebuildingcontainedapproximately40–50non-metallic/woodworkingmachines,lathes,drillpresses,bandsaws,tablesaws,planers,joiners,sanders,andgrinders,etc.

Carpentryemployedapproximately80–90workerson3shifts.Themajorityofworkerswereondayshift,aswasmostoftheplant.

Theshopalsohada10’x10’ovenwithdoubledoorentryof5’x6’inheighttoaccommodateproductsthatneededtobeheatedorcured.Thecarpentryshopalsohadaspecializedareaforlayingupfibreglassmoldsorhousings.Somewerehuge,producedforthelargemotorsarea.Theareaalsohadasmalldegreasertank.

General Working Conditions: The shop had poor ventilation,withlittleornolocalexhaustventilationandwasalsoaffectedbypoorreplacementair,whichcreatednegativepressure.Workerswerenotprovidedwithadequateppeincludingrubberglovesforhandlingacetoneorrespiratorsforsprayingvariousresinsonfibreglass.Itwasn’tuntilthe1980swiththeenforcementofthenewOHSAthatprotectiveequipmentbegantobeprovided.Priorto1980sprotectiveequipmentwasnotmadeavailable.

Theatmosphereintheshopwasgenerallyverysmokyanddustyandheavilycontaminatedwithsolvents(acetone,MEK,xyleneandresinfumessuchasstyreneandformaldehyde).Housekeepingintheshopwaspoorwithlargeamountsofdustsfromsawing,sandingandgrindingoperationsonequipmentandfloors.

Building: 17 (21, 18 N) Department: Carpentry ShopProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

103

Thesewouldbeinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin;

7. Thechemical,styrene,wasusedextensivelyasacomponentofresinsandgel-coatsasathinner.Thiswasinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin;

8. Mixingresinsbyhandalsoproducedagreatdealofchemicalvapourfromoffgassingresinsandcatalysts;

9. Workersateandsmokedattheirwork-stations,increasingtheriskofingestingchemicalstheywereusingorwereintheirworkarea.

Dustsweregeneratedinlargeamountswithoutrespiratoryprotectionandlocalexhaustventilation,wereinhaledroutinely.Operatorsworkeddirectlyandclosely,carryingoutdetailedtasksusingsubstancesinlargequantities.

JHSC: 9/9/80: re: Dust sampling: “Non-metallic machineshopreportidentified20%ofdustsamplechecksindicatedhigherthanTLVondustandfibres.”

MOL: 04/26/79: Investigationofasbestosexposureconcludesconfirmedriskofexposureforcarpentersandveryhighriskofexposureformaintenancepersonnel.Recommendationsre:controllingasbestosexposure:wetasbestoswhenremoving,enclose area, use respirators, clean up area, launder clothesinplant.Noordersissued.

MOL: 06/7/79:Asbestosconcentrationstested.FoundinexcessoftheTLV.

MOL: 11/16/82: Investigationofworkercomplaintofillness,e.g.tiredness,headache,feelingsickduringsilversoldering.Inspectorindicatedthatexposurelikelytocadmiumoxide,butnoairsamplingwerecarriedout.Suggestionsmadeforlocalexhaustventilation.Noordersissued.

Thesechemicalswereroutinelyanddirectlyusedandappliedbyhand.Theywereinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskinroutinely,andinlargequantities.

Typesofrawmaterialsworkedonincluded:AsbestosLumberandboards,fibreglass,variouswoodssuchasmaple,cherry,oak,etc.andcompositessuchasTextolite.Workerswouldalsocutvariousmetalssuchassteelandaluminum.Thisshopusedlargeamountsofplywoodsheetsforconstructionofpartsandstructures.Plywoodlaminatesusedcontainmanytypesofgluetreatedwithformaldehydecompounds.

Chemicals used: AcetoneandMEK(forcleaningequipment) and Styrene, Thinners such as 1500 thinner,Partal,andbeeswax,whichwereusedasmoldreleaseagents.Cabasyl,aspraywasalsoused.Variousresinswereusedinlargequantitiesinliquidorpowderform.Thesewerebothepoxiesandvinylesterresins.Workersusedagreatdealoffibreglassclothofdifferentgradesinmoldingprocess.Thesechemicalswerehandledin5-gallonpails.

Production processes:Workerswereengagedinbuildingvariouswoodenstructures,buildingmoldsforfibreglasspartsandmolds,andlayingupfibreglassandresinsinthemolds.Mixingofresins,fillers,andadditivesforlayupswasdone;aswascuttingofcompositeasbestoslumber,other composite materials and pressure treated materials.Thesematerialsweredrycutwithoutdustsuppressionmeasurestaken.Thesawsutilizedstonecuttingblades,whichwerechangedtodiamondsawbladesafter1980.Asbestosboardwasgreyincolourandwouldproducelargeamountsofwhitedustwhencut.Asbestosdustandcuttingswouldfallunderthelargesawtable,andsometimesintothesewagesystemthroughdraingratesinthefloor.AftercuttingCarpenterswouldmovetodrillingandbevelingtheedges,dependingonwheretheproductwasgoing.Alloftheseproductsweresuppliedtootherareasoftheplantforuseinmotorsandgenerators.Thisheldtrueforallrawmaterialsbroughtintothecarpentershop.Withcuttingasbestos,woodandtextolite--andhavingafibreglassmoldingoperation--thedustfactorwashuge,especiallywiththepoorventilationsystem.Workersspokeofsmells,coughs,andeyeirritationsexperienced.Asbestosandfibreglassdustwerepartoftheoveralldebris.Partswerelayedoff(scribedontothematerial)andcutbyhandusing

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

104

Inadditiontovariouswooddustsinhaled,workersroutinelyinhaleasbestosfibrefromcuttingandsawingasbestosboardandsheetsfornon-metalfabrication.Thesewerehandleddirectlyandroutinelywithdetailedtasksbyhand.

Workersdirectlyhandledlargeamountsoffibreglassandpolyesterandepoxyresinsandhardenersdirectlyandroutinely.Theyinhaledandabsorbedvariousfumesfromresinssuchasstyrene,MEKperoxide,BPA,formaldehydeinlargevolumesgivenproductsizeandthedetailedworkperformed.

Theyalsoinhaledfibreglassresindustsduringsandingandgrindingtasksoncuredfibreglassandresins.

handsawsorsabresaws,andalsodrilledonsmalldrillpresses.Someproductshadrubbersealspop-rivetedon.

Fibreglass operation: Spraynozzlescontainingrazorbladesinthetipwereusedtocutfibreglassstrandthatwouldfeedintothenozzle.Aspartofthisprocesstherewouldbetwo45-gallondrums--onecontainingaresin,theotherahardener.Theresinandthehardenerwouldbepumpedtogetherfromthedrumsintothesprayhosealongwiththefiberstrand.Whensprayedontothemoldtherazorsinthenozzleofthesprayerwouldcutthestrandtocreatethefibreglassproduct.Couldbesprayedwithseveralcoatstoreachdesiredthickness.Twoorthreepeoplewouldbewaitingtorolltheproductdownwithrollerstomakesurefibreglassadheredtoallareasofthemold.Thissameprocessisusedextensivelyintheboatbuildingindustryusingsimilarchoppedfibre/resinsprays.Atmospherewasheavilycontaminatedwithstyrene.LocalexhaustventilationandPPEinadequatefortheseoperations.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

105

BUILDING: #18 DEPARTMENT: INDUCTION MOTORS

General DescriptionDie Cast Rotor Production: 140, 180 210 motorsSpin Cast Production for 520 and 580 motorsMachining and metal cuttingCoil and winding processCoating parts with epoxy shellacAdditional Factors associated with exposure risksAssembly of medium size motors

Chemicals used or produced:aluminium,leadandsteelparticles/dustarsenicasbestos“blackpaste”brominatedfireretardantsdasco-tapdecompositionbyproducts(BPA,PAHs,formaldehyde,benzene)duct sealdusts(mica,coppersolder,metals,fibreglass,asbestos,epoxies)EpoxiesFormaldehydeglyptol/shellacMEKMWFsTCEtoluenevarsol

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

106

Summary of Chemical Exposures: Oil mists and vapoursfromvarioustypesofchemicalsincludingmanydifferentMWF;dustsandresiduesfromtreatedpapersandtapesthatcontainedbrominatedfireretardants;fumesfromheavymetalssuchasheatedaluminumandlead;heavyconcentrationofheavymetaldustsfromgrinding,sandingandbuffingmetalcastings;dustandfumesfromepoxycoatingsthatwereheatedandbaked;dustsfromfibreglassandasbestosusedasreinforcementandinsulation;MWFandmetalparticulatefrommachiningoperations;variousepoxypaintsandcoatings;degreasersandsolventssuchasTCE,MEK,andvarsol.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionofoilmistsandvarsol.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandnoadequaterespiratorequipmentandworkershandledthesedirectly.Thiswouldalsoinvolveingestionbecauseworkersateandsmokedattheirworkstations.

Inhalationoffumesfromresiduesonmetalsurfacesduringtheannealingprocessinvolvingheatingbetween300and400degreesF.Thermaldecompositionby-productssuchasPAHs.Workerswouldincurexposuresbecausethesewerehandleddirectlyingreatvolumes,e.g.10sheetspersecond.Workersindicateheavyfumes/odoursduringannealing.Nolocalexhaustventilation.

General Description:InductionMotors(referredtoassmallmotors)werebuiltinbuilding#18.Thefollowingisadescriptionofthebuildingofonecomponentofinductionmotors—theproductionof‘diecast’and‘spincast’rotors.Thisinvolvedtheproductionofpunchsheetsusingalargepunchpressaswellasthemachiningofspaceblocks.Intheearlydaysthiswasdoneinbuilding18,butlaterpunchingandspaceblockmachiningwascarriedoutinbuilding#12 and plates delivered to this department in building18.Withdiecastrotorsfor#140,180and210motors,steelsheetswerepunchedtocreatepredetermined holes and then annealed in an annealingoven.Whenpartiallyassembledacastingwasmadebypouringmoltenaluminumintotheform.Thiswasfurthergroundandmachinedandfittedwithashaftandinstalledinthestator.Therotorsforthe580motorswereproducedusingspincastprocessincludingtheuseofasbestosandKozmafurnaceintheproduction.

Die-cast Rotor Production of 140, 180, 210 Motors:

Punch Press operation:3’widesteelsheetscoatedwithoilweresprayedwithvarsolandsentthroughahighpoweredpunchpresstocutoutpredeterminedholesinthesheets.Duringthepunchingprocesstheimpactofthepresswouldcausetheresiduesontheplatestovaporize.Steelsheetswerefedmanuallybytheoperator,atarateof10sheetspersecond.Thiscreateddensemistoilresiduesthatwouldcoattheoperatorandhisclothes.

Annealing the plates:Thepunchedplatesweremanuallyplacedonaconveyor,whichcarriedtheplatesintoanannealingovenrunatatemperatureof300to400degreesFahrenheit.Theovenopeningateachendwasapproximately3’x4’.Annealingwouldtake5minutes.Annealedplatesthentakenoffconveyoratexitendbyoperatorwearingasbestosglovestohandlethehotplates.Participantsindicatethatfumeswerestrongatbothendsoftheovenandpermeatedthearea.Anasbestosblankethungovereachendbutdidnotprovideaseal.Theasbestosblanketwaswornandfrayedfromcontactwithplatesandbeltwhenpassingthrough.

Building: #18 Department: Induction MotorsProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

107

Inhalationandskinabsorptionofchemicaltreated(flameretardants—brominatedretardants)paperappliedbyoperatoraroundthecasting.Alsoexposuretofibreglassparticlesfromfibreglasspaper.

Inhalationofaluminumandleadfumesfromheatedvatandpouringoperationhandleddirectlybytheworkersathighvolumewithnolocalexhaustventilation.Productionvolumewashighandwouldinfluencetheconcentrationsofalloyfumesworkerswouldbeexposedto.

Furtherinhalationofaluminumandleadfumesduringmaintenanceoperation.Thiswouldinvolvehigherconcentrationbecausetheworkersweredealingwithremovalofslagforanintenseperiod.

Inhalationofvapoursfrom‘blackpaste’DuctSealaswellasskinabsorptionwhenincontactwithskin.

Inhalationandabsorptionoflargeamountsofair-borneparticulatecontainingheavymetals,epoxypaints,fibreglass,treatedpaperwithfireretardantsasaresultofgrinding,sandingandbuffing.

Exposuressameasabovefordiecast.

Die Cast operation:Punchsheetswereplacedonastationaryarbourwheretheywerestackedandseparatedwithspacersbetweeneachsheet.Oncestackedthesheetswerecoveredwithfibreglasspaper,whichformedabarrierforthepouringofaluminum/lead alloy into the cast to form the structureoftherotor.Priortothepouringoperation,a“blackpaste”wasappliedtothebottomofthecast.

Aluminum/lead pouring operation: An open furnace containingatroughofmoltenAl/Pbsuppliedtheoperatorwithmoltenmix(60:40).Theoperatorsmanuallyscoopedthemixoutwithladlesandthenpoured its contents into the die formed by the stackedsheetsandfibreglasspaperwrap.Operatorsproduced 40 to 50 die-casts per day for the 140, 180 and210motors.OperatorsreportedheavyfumesduringthisprocessofpouringmoltenAl/Pb.

Aluminum oven maintenance:Regularmaintenancewasmanuallyundertaken2-3timesperweektoremoveslagfromthemoltentroughwithrakes.Operatorswereprovidedwithheatshields,butnorespiratoryprotection.Operatorsreportheavyfumesduringmaintenance.Nolocalexhaustventilationprovidedforovens.

Shaft placement into rotors:Shaftswerepressedintotherotorswithapressingmachine.Operatorsappliedanasbestosbased‘blackpaste’calledDuctSealontotherotors.Therotorswerethenplacedinatoteboxtoanotherstationwhereitwasturnedandbalancedinpreparationforinstallationintothestator.

Grinding, sanding and buffing of die cast for fitting: Operatorswouldmanuallygrindandsandtosmoothcastingsurfaceswhichproducedlotsoffinedust.

Machining: Rotorswouldalsobemachinedtopropersizeforinstallationofcoilsandplacementinstator.Machineoilscouldbeusedinthisoperation.

Spin Cast Production for 520 AND 580 Motors:1. Plateswerepunchedinsamemanneras‘die

cast’processandplacedonarbour;2. Spaceblockswereinsertedbetweenplates

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

108

Inhalationofasbestosfibresfromtearingandstuffingasbestosinrotorspaces.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionofepoxypaintsandasbestosfibresfromasbestostapes.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionoffumesandvapoursofepoxycoatingsandthermaldecompositionby-productssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzene.

Inhalationoffumesandvapoursfromaluminumandleadaswellasresiduesofcoatings.

Inhalationofheavymetaldusts,epoxypaintdusts,fibreglasstapesfrompowergrindingoveran8to10hourdaywithoutlocalexhaustand/oradequaterespiratoryprotection.

InhalationandskinabsorptiontomistsandaerosolsofvariousmetalworkingfluidssuchasDasco-Tapandotherstreatedwithbiocidesandotheringredients.

Descriptionsbyworkersof“cloudsofmist”andaerosolshangingintheatmosphereaswellasreports

andanasbestosinsulationcalled‘fibrefax’waspressedwithbarehandintothespacescreatedbyspaceblocks.Thisrequiredthattheworkerstearoffchunksfromalargesheetofasbestos.Thetearingandstuffingofasbestoschunkscreatedasubstantialamountofdust.Workersdidnotuserespiratorsnorwasthereanylocalexhaustventilation;

3. Next,asbestostapewasusedtowrapandsealtherotorcast,whichwassubsequentlypaintedwith‘glyptol’epoxypaintinpreparationforovencuring;

4. Therotorcastwasthenplacedinacastingovenwheretherotorwasbakedovernight;

5. Afterbaking,themoltenAl/PbmixwaspouredintothecastandspuninaKozmaaluminum-castingfurnace.HerethemixwaspouredinmechanicallyandthroughcentrifugalforcepenetratedallcavitiesinthecastingthusproducingasignificantamountofAl/Pbfumesinthevicinityofworkers;

6. Thecompletedrotorwasthencleanedwithspinningwirebrushpoweredbycompressedairtocleanofftheglyptolpaintandasbestostape.Anairchiselwasusedtoremoveexcessaluminumcasting.Theprocesswouldtake1to1½days.Thiscleaningprocessgeneratedagreatdealofdustcontainingepoxy,Al/Pb,andasbestosfibres.Localexhaustwasnotfunctioningatmosttimes.

Machining and Metal Cutting:

Shaftsweremachinedandpreparedonmetallathes,cuttingmachines,andkeyingmachines.ThesemachinesusedlargequantitiesofMWFincludingtradenameDasco-tap,acuttingfluidcontainingmethylchloroform.Therewereinstanceswhereworkerswereovercomebythefumesfromthissubstance.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.

Redcuttingoilsusedcreatedcloudsofmistandaerosol that surrounded the operators and those standingbyinthevicinity.SomeoftheMWFscontainedtoxicbiocides(e.g.,arsenic)tocontrol

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

109

ofirritatedeyes,nosesandthroats,anddermatitiswouldsupportrelativelyhighexposures.

Inhalationofweldingfumesaswellasresiduesofdegreasersandthermaldecompositionby-products.Thiswouldinvolve:PAHs,heavymetals,etal.By-standerexposurestoMWFandmetalparticulates.Handlingcoatedwiresinthewindingprocess.

Inhalationandabsorptionofingredientsintreatedtapes—e.g.fibreglass,flame-retardants,etal.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionofheatedepoxyshellac.Likelihoodofhighexposureduetosprayingoperationandheatingofshellac.

JHSC: 8/24/82: re: thinner fumes: Largepainttankinnorthendof#18hasveryhigh(level)ofthinnerfumebysmellofit.Workershavecomplainedtheyget“highfromfumeswhenmixingthepaintwiththelargepaddles.”

Inadequateventilationbothlocalexhaustandgeneralinadditiontotheworkorganizationbasedonthepiece-ratesystemaswellaspoorhousekeeping,hygienepracticessuchaseatingandsmokingattheworkstationandcircumventingexposurecontrolmeasureswhereavailable,supportsthevalidityoftheconclusionthattheriskofexposurewashighintheseoperations.

JHSC: 8/20/84: drinking fountain: “There has been alongdelayinrespecttocorrectingthedistasteful

bacterialandfungalgrowth,whichwouldbeincludedinthemistandaerosolgeneratedbymachining.

Weldingtookplaceonaregularbasisinthemachiningprocessproducinglargeamountsofweldingfumes.

DegreasingwasalsoapartofthisprocessandutilizedseveraltypesofdegreasersincludingTCE,MEK,etal.

Coils and Winding Process Production:

Windingprocessperformedbywomenworkingnearthemachiningareafortheproductionofcoilstobeinsertedinthestatorslots.SeveraltapeswereusedinthisprocesscontainingfibreglassandMylarasseparatorsandstifffibreglasswedgeswerealsoinsertedintothecoils.

Coating Parts with Epoxy Shellac:

Partswereslowlyrotatedabovea20gallontrough3’deepwithacontrolledsprayofshellaccoatingthepartsfortenminutes.Thisprocessproducesagreatdealoffumesandoverspray.Note:Ventilationwasaseriousprobleminthisandotherbuildingsbecauseofthebuildingconfiguration,theuseofcompressedairforcleaningandremovingdustfromworksurfaces,partsandworkers’clothingaswellascoolingtheirbodies.Thewholeventilationsystemwasundernegativepressurethatcreatedatendencyfortoxicfumesanddusttobetransportedtootherareas.Also,ceiling-highwallsdidnotseparatebuildings--atmost,therewerelowpartitionsseparatingworkarea.

Additional Factors Associated with Exposure Risks:

WorkOrganization:workorganizationwascharacterizedbythe‘pieceratesystem’.Thisresultedinintenseworkactivity,circumventionofexposurecontrolmeasuresbymanagementandworkerstomeetproductionquotas.

PracticesandHygiene:AsinmanyotherpartsoftheentireGEoperationworkersatetheirlunchesandsometimessmokedattheirworkstations.Thiswasconditionedbythepieceratesystemandthe

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

110

wateratfountaininBay523.ThisCommitteehasreceivednumerouscomplaints.”

Exposures risk during assembly:

Thisoperationinvolvedexposuretoseveraltoxicchemicals in the form of dusts, liquids and fumes vapoursormists.

Thelikelihoodofinhalationandabsorptionofthesechemicalswasrelativelyhighgiventheirphysicalstate,theproximitytothework,theintensityofthework,thelackoflocalexhaustventilationorppe.Theseworkersinhaledvariousfibres(asbestos/fibreglass)fromcuttingandshapingwedgesandseparators,pressingmaterialsinslotsandgeneralhandling.Alsoinhaledmetalfumesfrombrazingleads,resinapplicationsandbaking,andapplicationofsolvents(TCE,MEK,Toluene).

MOL Reports:

MOL:09/17/75:Investigationregardingzincchromatepaints.Exposureidentifiedaslowbecauseitdriedquicklyandhard.Ordersissuedforbetterhousekeepingandnoeating,drinkingorsmoking.Recommends:adequateexhaustventilationandgoodhygienepractices.

MOL:06/30/81: HozmaandKozmafurnacesgeneratinglargeamountofsmokeandfumesescapingfromunderthecanopy.Ordersissuedforlocalexhaustventilation.GEmanagementrequest‘minimumexhaustrequired’.

MOL:09/30/81: AluminumfumesfromKozmafurnace.Priorordersissuedtoaddressescapingfumesintoplant.Suggestiontoredesignthefumehoodtopropersize.

MOL:03/31/82: Paintandsolventvapouraffectingworkerwhoisstirringpaintintoadiptank.Order

unavailabilityofsafeeatingfacilities.Therewasalsoaproblemwiththeavailabilityofpotabledrinkingwater.

Theuseofcompressedairtocleanworksurfaces,parts,clothing,andtocoolworkers’bodieswasprevalentinthisbuildingandthroughouttheentireGEfacility.

Assembling Medium Size Motors: This process involvedapproximately100to150employeesontwoshifts.

The processes involved:

Parts received from Punch Press

CoilWinding

Coilinsertionintostators:

Cuttingasbestos(orfibreglass,mica)wedgesandseparators

Insertionofasbestos/fibreglasswedgeswithasbestos‘felt’backing:

Insertionofseparatorscomposedoftreatedpaper,fibreglass,asbestos:

Assemblingpunchsheetsandpilingsheets:

ConnectingleadsbybrazingwithatorchappliedtoSilPhos solder:

Lacingwithcottonorfibreglasscordtoholdcoilsinplace

Testingconnections:

Dippingassembledmotorinadiptank(largeandsmalltubs)filledwithepoxyresin:

Then baked in oven:

Grindingexcesscuredresin:

Chemicals/Material by-products produced by processes:

Productionofdusts(asbestos,fibreglass,mica,epoxyresins,(copper/solderdust)fromcutting,inserting

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

111

issueto“reconnectthelocalexhaustinstitutedtogreatlyreduceexposures.”

wedges,separators,grindingresins,andbrazingleads.

Productionoffumesandvapoursfrombrazingcopperandsolder,andtheapplicationandbakingofepoxyresins.

TherewasnolocalexhaustventilationnorwasPPEprovided.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

113

BUILDING: #20 DEPARTMENT: DRIVE SYSTEMS

General Description

Printed Circuit Board Production

Work processes:

Etching: Rotating Track Flow-Solder Solder Benches

Semi-Conductor Production

Work processes:

Degreasing and etching Metal fusion and cleaning Assembly

Known Chemicals used or produced:

Acids: ferric chloride, HSC, sulfuric acidDegreasers:Acetone,TCE,MEKHeavyMetals:lead,cadmium,chromium,mercury,copper,gold,tungstenThermal by-products: Polymers: PVC, VCM Phthalates: DEAP, BBP, DBP, DIBP Brominatedfireretardants

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

114

Major exposures: GiventhequantityofproductionandlackofPPEandothereffectiveexposurecontrolsoperatorswerelikelyexposedsignificantlytoanumberofverytoxicchemicals,chronically.Theseexposuresincludedacidmists,solventssuchasacetone,TCE,MEK,andheavymetalsincluding:lead,cadmium,chromium,mercury,copper,andgold.Otherexposureswerepolymers,suchasPVC,VCM,phthalates,andbrominatefireretardants.

Riskofexposuretoacidmistsgeneratedbyacidsinteractingwithsubstratesandcopper.Copperfumesfromremoval/breakdownofcopper.Thepotentialofinhalationsignificant.

Workers handled components barehanded thus wereexposedtoresiduesofmetalsandpolymercontaminantsfromtheacidbath.Riskofslightinhalationandabsorptionthroughskin.Alsolikelihoodofingestionfromworkerseatinganddrinkingattheirworkstations.

Workersarelikelyexposedtoleadsolderfumescontaininglead,cadmiumandflux.Inadditiontheseworkersareexposedtothesolventvapoursindicatedaboveaswellasresins.Thislikelythroughbothskinabsorptionandinhalation.Overexposureindicatedbycomplaintsofphysicalsymptomsaswellasthevolumeofproductioncarriedoutby4to6womensolderingtheprintedcircuitboards.

General Description:DriveSystemswaslocatedinbuilding#20andconsistedoftwoelectronicsproductiondepartments:ElectricCircuitBoardproductionandSemi-conductorproduction.Theserelatedproductionfacilitiesusedsignificantamountsofdegreasers,acids,andheavymetalsincluding:leadmercury,cadmium,andchromium6.Exceptforspecializedareasinsemi-conductors,thesedepartmentslackedadequatelocalexhaustventilation.Workerswerealsoexposedtochemicalsthatwerecontainedinthepartstheyhandledincluding:PVC,VCM,fireretardantssuchasPBBP,PBDP and phthalates (DEHP, BBP, DBP, DIBP) these latterwereimbeddedinthelaminatedinsulatedsubstratesoftheboards.

Printed Circuit Board Production:

Thisproductionprocessemployedapproximately25to30workerswhoweremainlyfemale.

Workerswereprovidedwithpre-printedcircuitboardsthatwerelaminatedfibreglassepoxyinsulatedsubstratewithathinlayerofcopperfoillaminatedononeortwosides.

Etching: Laminatedboardwasetchedinanacidmixofferricchloridebathcreatingtracksinaccordwiththepre-printedcircuit.Amaletechniciandidtheetchinginanetchingroom,whichwasequippedwithgeneralventilationandafumehoodoverasink.

Rotating Track: Afteretching,theetchedboardsweresenttotherotatingtrackwhere4-6operatorsinserted the various electronic components (diodes, capacitors,resistors)inthecircuitboards.

Flow-Solder: Aftertherotatingtrackprocess,theboardsweresenttotheflowsolderroomwhereamaletechnicianwouldoperatetheflowsoldermachinewhichwasinadequatelyventilatedandsubjectofhealthcomplaintsandMOLinvestigationsandissuanceoforders.

Solder Benches: A number of female operators (5or6)equippedwithsolderingironsengagedintouchupsolderingofthesolderedboardsto

Building: 20 Department: Drive SystemsProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

115

TheFlowSolderoperationaswellasthebenchsolderingwasamajorsourceofheavymetal(silver,lead,cadmium),solventfumesandvapours,withahighriskofexposure.

ThiswasrecognizedintheOctober 7, 1981 MOL inspection report. Inspector noted that the local exhaustventilationwasineffectiveandcouldbeinterferedwithbyrandomaircurrents.Theinspectornoted that the complaints of eye, nose and throat irritationwereindicativeof“overexposure”andorderedtheemployertoconductaleadexposureassessmenttodeterminelevelofskinabsorptionaswellasexposuretoisopropylalcoholfromsolvent.Workersreportedfrequentheadachesduringtheflowsolderoperation.Twoworkerswerereportedtohavehadepilepticseizuresaswell.Workerscomplainedaboutstrongsolventandresinodoursasreported in MOL: December 30, 1981investigatingworkercomplaintsanddetectingisopropanolandtolueneintheworkatmospherethroughairmonitoring.

JHSC:6/30/81:Workersinvicinityofdeep-wavesolderingmachinecomplainofdizzinessfromfumes.Hoodreadingapprox..50-75F.A.M.(usingKesterflux#1571andKesterfluxthinner#104.

Althoughthereseemedtobeeffectiveengineeringcontrolsmeanttoprovideanextramodicumofprotectionto“products”beingmade,therewereconditionsthatwouldallowexposureoftheoperatorto the acid mist, solvents, and possible heavy metal residues.Etchingwascarriedoutintheopenbutwithafumehoodoverthesinkwheretheetchingwasperformed.

Sinceworkerscoulddetectprominentacidodors,itislikelythatworkerswerebeingexposed.Thiscouldoccurwherematerialswerehandlewithoutprotection.Inareaswherematerialswerecleanedwithacidsorsolventsintheopen,thelikelihoodofexposurewouldoccurduringtheshakingprocesswithsolvents.

Therewereanumberofcancersinbldg.#20includingseveralwomenemployedineachofthe

ensureproperconnections.ThisareawasfilledwithheavyleadsolderandotherbreakdownproductsfromapplyingheattothePVCboards.Thesecouldhave lead, cadmium, chromium, VCM, brominated fireretardantsandphthalates.TheareahadnoventilationandnoPPEwasprovided.Therewereonlyportablefanstoblowfumesawayfromoperators.Aftertouchup,solderingboardsweredegreasedwithisopropanol alcohol and toluene and then dipped in poly-butyl-methacrylateresin.

Note: Frequentcomplaintsofrespiratoryirritationanddifficultybreathing.MOLinvestigation

Semi-conductor Production:

Thisdepartmentemployedapproximately15to25,mainlywomen,workersintheproductionofvarious semi-conductors such as diodes and Silicon ControlledRectifiers(SCR).Thisproductionusedtungsten,gold,amixtureofacidsandsolventsincluding:acetone,TCE,MEKandceramiccoverings.Theoperationinvolved1)etchingthesurfacesofgold,tungstenandsilicondiscsinpreparationforconstructionoftheelectroniccomponents;2)thefusionofgoldleafonthetungstendiscand3)thelayeringoftheseandplacementintoaceramiccovering.

Degrease and Etch:Operatorwouldfirstdegreaseandetchthegoldflakeandtungstendiscwithacetone/TCE and then bathe these in acid usually ferricchloride,HCL,sulfuricacidoramixtureofthiswithothercompatibleacids.Thiswascarriedoutoverasinkequippedwithafumehood.

Fusing of Discs: Afteretching,theoperatorplacedatungstendiscontoahotplate.Thiswasfollowedbyplacingagoldleafonthetungsteninordertofusethetwometals.Oncefusedthesewereremovedquicklytoabeakerinordertocool.

Disc cleaning: Afterfusion,thediscsweretransferredtoabeakerwithacetoneandtolueneforcleaninginanultrasonicshakermachinewhichmeasuredabout4’x3’.Thiswascarriedoutintheopen.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

116

twooperations,whichshouldbeinvestigated.Theseincludedseveralcasesoflung,breast,andbraincancers,aswellaslymphoma.

Sincethisworkwascarriedoutintheopenareawithoutlocalexhaustventilation,itishighlylikelythatworkerswereexposedtosolventvapours.

Likelyexposuresviainhalationandabsorptiontosolventvapoursandresiduesfrommanualassembly.

Alternative layering of discs:Thesediscswerethentransferredtoanassemblyareawherethegoldfusedtungstendiscswerealternativelylayeredwiththesilicondiscandthenplacedinaceramiccontainer.

Diode assembly:Someofthelargerdiodeswereassembledonanaluminumheatsink.

Theonlyprotectiveequipmentprovidedwasforthoseworkingwithacidsinthecleanroomincludingapairofyellowrubbergloves,apolyestersmock,andafumehoodoverthesinkswhereacidsweremixed.Therewerenoticeableodoursfromtheacidfumesaswellasfromsolventssuchasacetone.Workersreported acid burns and eyes, nose, and throat irritationfromacidmistsandsolventvapours.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

117

BUILDING: #21 DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR

General DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsExposure ControlsNuclear Bundle

Work Processes:

Sand BlastingBeryllium DepositionOther Procedures

Chemicals used or produced:

BerylliumDegreasersDetergents(causticsoda)GraphiteSilicaUraniumOxidesZirconium (Nickel Zinc, Tin)

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

118

Beryllium Exposure: Accordingtoapaperdeliveredatthe11thInternationalConferenceonCANDUFuel,currentfuelbundleproductionusingBerylliumwouldnotbeabletomeetthenewTLVof0.05ug/m³proposedbytheACGIH.ThepaperalsoindicatesthatcurrenthealthresearchonBeexposuresshowsthat Chronic Be Disease (CBD) is on the rise despite exposuresbeingbelowthecurrent2ug/m³TLVandprovincialOELforBe.ThishasadirectbearingontheGEnuclearfacilityinPeterborough.(seeJ.G.Harmsen*,etal,‘BerylliumBrazingConsiderationsinCANDUFuelBundleManufacture’11thInternationalConferenceonCANDUFuel,NiagaraFalls,Ontario,October17-20,2010).IARCclassifiedBerylliumasaGroup1carcinogen.

JHSC: 8/23/83 re: degreaser urine test results: “UrinetestsonfullandparttimedegreaseroperatorsshowedthatallhadtracesofTCEintheirurine.Dr(C)explainedifTCEisshowingupinurinethenoperatorisbeingoverexposed.(Foreman?)toldgrouphewassatisfiedthatoperatorswereworkingsafelyandproblemisnotcausedbymethodofoperating.”

JHSC: 8/18/84: re: graphite oven: “When ovens are beingcleanedworkersarebeingexposedtoheavyconcentrationoffumes.”

JHSC: 11/18/86: Be air sampling: “Sample results indicatehigherthannormallevelsofBefor1stand2ndquartersof’86.Thelatestquartershowslevelsnowbacktonormal.Employeesworerespiratorsforatime.SinceearlyOctober,nolongerneeded.Employeeswouldlikethisreportedontheirchartsandalsorecordedwiththeirfamilyphysicians.”

Exposure Risk to Be:ThroughouttheBecoatingprocess,therearemanyopportunitiesforBedusttobecomeairborneandinhaledbyworkers.MeasuringouttheBepowder,placingitinthecrucibles,placingthecruciblesintheBefurnace,openingthefurnacedoorstoremoveoradjustthestripsshouldtheycomelooseduringtheprocess,punchingtheseparatorsandbearingpads,and

General Description: This department is dedicated totheproductionofnuclearfuelbundlestructuresandloadingofthesebundletubeswithuraniumpelletsforCANDUnuclearreactors.Thenucleardivisionislocatedinitsownseparatebuilding#21onMonaghanRoadatthewestentrancetotheGEcomplex.

From the mid 1960s to the present, the department hasemployed120to150workerson4shifts,24/7,producing18to20fuelbundlespershiftoraround3bundlesperhour.Theworkistediousandstressfulbecause of the precision required and fear of radiationandberyllium.

General Working Conditions: ThisisviewedasthecleanestworkenvironmentintheGEcomplex.Butatthesametimethetoxicityofthematerials,namelyuraniumoxideandberyllium,presentahighhazard.Inadditiontohandlinguraniumoxidesandthepotentialforexposuretoberyllium,thereareotherpotentialexposurese.g.,tosilica,graphite,degreasers,anddetergentsofconcern.

Exposure Controls:Localexhaustventilationhasbeenprovidedandairseemsclean.Radiationandberylliumexposuresweremonitoredandfederalandprovincialregulationswereapplied.Workershavebeenprovidedwithlabcoatsandcottongloves,butnorespiratoryequipmentexceptduringmaintenanceandcleaningoperations.Inthelattercircumstance,airsuppliedrespiratorsareprovided.Ashowerisprovidedoutsidetheberylliumroom.

Nuclear Bundle: The nuclear bundle produced iscomprisedofbetween26and36nuclearfueltubesmadeofanalloyoftin-zirconium.Fueltubesare held in parallel to one another by a pair of end plateframes.Intheassemblyofthebundles,smallzirconiumspacersarebrazedtothesurfaceofthezirconiumtubes.Thespacersareappliedtothetubesbyabrazingprocess.Thesespacersandpadsarecoatedwithberyllium.

Building: #21 Department: NuclearProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

119

tackingandbrazingthesetothetubes.AlloftheseprocedurescangenerateBedusts.AndthepotentialfortheseeventualitiestoberealizedisreflectedinthemonitoringresultsundertakenbytheMOL.

ThroughouttheyearsoftheGEBerylliumcoatingoperationtherehavebeenseveralinstanceswhereberyllium-monitoringlevelsexceededtheold2.0ug/m³.Notealso,thatmostofthesereportedlevelsexceedthenew,currentlyproposed,TLVof0.05ug/m³.SeeMOLinspectionreportsaswellasworkrefusalinvestigations.ReportbyH.M.Nelson,IndustrialHygieneBranchindicatespersonalsampleresultsof41.5ug/m³ofBeinthebreathingzoneduringhandsawingofBebartoobtainberylliumdustforcoating.ThishandsawingwascontrarytowhattheregulatoryagencyrecommendedforthesafehandlingofBe.Accordingly,theinspectornotes:“Thesawingofbarstockisaverycrudeoperation.ItwouldbebettertoeitherpurchasecorrectsizebarstockorobtainpowderedBeryllium”.(MOL reports: Building 21, March 23,1965)Besamplingresultsobtainedthenextyearwerestillnotsatisfactory.TestconductedbyGESafetyUnitshowedlevelsof1.97ug/m³and1.95ug/m³veryclosetotheTLVof2.0ug/m³.In1964,priortoGEopeningthenuclearunit, the Department of Health recommended threeprecautionsbetakentominimizeexposureto“beryllium…consideredtobeaboutthemosttoxicmaterialhandledindustrially”including:1)purchaseBeinapowderedformtoreducedirectcontact;2)placeBerylliumroomundernegativepressuretopreventBecontaminationofotherareas;3)separatedlockerandcleaningareas.(MOL: Building 21, April 11,1964).TheserecommendationswereignoredresultinginexcessiveBeaircontaminationof41.5ug/m³in1965,demonstratingGE’scallousdisregardforthehealthofworkersanditspoorsafetyculture.

Note also that these reports indicate that in some instancesthesemeasurementsweretakenwhenthecoatingprocesswasnotinoperation.BevapourscanescapewhenBecoatingovenisopenedorbeingcleaned.SmallamountsofBeinhaledorabsorbedthroughtheskincancauseseriousdisease,including

PROCESS Sand Blasting: Zirconium metal sheets used to make spacersaredegreased,thensandblastedinthesandblastingroomandwashedindetergent.

Beryllium (Be) Deposition: Nextberylliumisappliedtothesheets’surfacebyvacuumvapourplatingdepositionundernegativepressureconditionsintheberylliumfurnacelocatedinthe‘berylliumroom’.Theberylliumispurchasedin2lbtubsinpowderform.Thepowderishandweighedintoacruciblein5to10gbatchesinafumehood.ThecruciblesareusedinavacuumplatingsystemtodepositathinlayerofBeonzirconiumalloystrips.Theoperatorwearsasmock,shoecoversandahalffacerespiratorwithahighefficiencydustfilter(NIOSHTC-21c-135).Amaximumof4batchesareprocessedperday.Duringmaintenanceafull-faceairsuppliedrespiratorisworn.Coatingoperatorscanspendfrom1to4hoursperday.Longerhoursarerequiredduringequipmentmaintenance.

Beplatedstripsarethenprocessedontwosmallautomaticpunchpresses.Thespacersarestampedononemachineandbearingpadsarestampedontheother.Bothprocessesareenclosedandlocallyexhausted.Punchingsarecollectedinaplasticbag.Thereareupto4operatorsinthisroomatatime.Punchingsaretakenbycarttothecoiningroomtobecontouredtotubeshapebytwooperators.TheseoperationsgenerateBe/Zrdusts.

Spacersandpadsaretackandbrazedtothetubeson4tackandbrazeunits.ThisisdoneusingsmallRFinductionfurnacesinenclosedandlocallyexhaustedunits.

Other Procedures: Ultrasoundtestingtoensuretheintegrityofthetubes;Sandblastinginpreparationforcoating;Roughcuttingthelengthofthebundles;Applyingliquidgraphitetotheinsideofthetubes;Bakingthegraphitecoatedbundlesinoven;

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

120

cancer.Exposureusuallypeakedduringmaintenanceoperationsinberylliumcoatingoperations.AirborneBeflakesnotedbyworkersduringbrazingoperationledtoaworkrefusalin1983.TestsconductedbytheSafetyUnitindicatedthatlevelofBewashighbutbelowTLV(MOL: Building 21, February 15, 1983).

Duringpunchingofthespacerfromtheberylliumcoatedsheets,berylliumdust/vapourisgenerated,potentiallyexposingworkerstoaverypotentcarcinogenandsensitizingagent.Whilethemainrouteofentrywouldlikelybeinhalation,skinabsorptionshouldnotberuledoutgiventhewearingofcottonsmocksandgloves.

Uranium Oxide Exposure:

Monocyte Suppression:AlpharadiationexposurefromUraniumoxideislikelytooccurthroughinhalationgiventhedirectclosehandlingofuraniumpelletsduringtheloadingprocess.Thisislikelyevidencedbythelowmonocytecountsforworkerswhoworkedinthenucleardepartment.ThiswasindicatedinthereportpreparedbyDr.R.ChaseattheL.A.M.POccupationalHealthProgramfortheUnitedElectricalWorkers,entitledTheCGENuclearProject:ReportontheInvestigationintoPossibleMonocyteSuppressioninUranium-ExposedWorkers.Itisproposedthatreducedmonocyteproductionisameasureableeffectofradiationexposuresasheavymetaluraniumsettlesintheboneandemitsalphaparticles.

Thatstudyfoundthat44%ofGEnuclearworkershadreducedmonocytecountsthatwereabnormallylow—15-20timeslowerthanexpectedinasampleofhealthymenandwomen.Whencomparedwiththoraxburdencountstheprevalenceoflowcountswasacrossallexposurecategories.ThissuggeststhatmonocyteproductionissensitivetolevelsofradioisotopeabsorptionlowerthanthoseexperiencedbyCGEworkers.Thisevidenceconfirmedthehypothesisthatabsorbedradioactiveparticleshasadetectableeffectonthewhitebloodcells(monocytes).AccordingtoDr.Chase…”Therefore,there are valid and persuasive reasons to suspect

Cuttingthebundleoftubestolength;

Fillingtubeswithuraniumpellets(whilenotenrichedpelletsstillemitalphaparticles);

Executefinalcut,thenweldendcapstothebundledtubes.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

121

thatworkersarebeingaffectedbytheirexposuretouranium.”

Uranium over exposures:InspectionreportsfromtheDepartmentofHealthindicateinstanceswherebiometricmonitoringresultsforuraniuminurinefarexceededtheallowableconcentrationof16.0ug/L.Inonecase,workerlevelswere1.5,1.5,10.6and195.0ug/Lfor4employees(MOL: Building 21, June 16, 1965).

Beryllium dust over exposures: MOL reports in 1979,reportedhighberylliumdustreadingsintheberylliumroomrequiringremediationanduseofrespiratorsuntildustreadingswerewithinTLVlimits(MOL: March 1, March 9, and June 1, 1979).

Otherconsiderations:Inperformingtheabovetasks,workerspositionthebundlesatgroinlevel.

Someoftheotherprocedurespotentiallyexposeworkerstootherhazardousdustfrommetalcuttingzirconiumtubingandsilicafromsandblasting.

Participantsdescribedanincidentwhereanexplosionoccurredduringbrazing,resultinginheavyberylliumcontamination.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

123

BUILDING: #22 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE

General DescriptionBanbury Mixer OperationTuber Operation3 inch Lead PressCotton BraidersLacquer ProcessesOpen Saturation TankTar PotsCarding MachinesAsbestos, Water and Enamel Carding MachineGlass MachinesWinding Area

Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCoalTarvolatilesCreasol,BenzolDromus OilDusts/fibres:Asbestos,Mica,Cotton,Jute,EpoxyResins:VinylChloride,“lacquer,”“varnish”Metals:lead,mercury,copper,antimony,MWFsOkumRubberingredients:clay,silica,lampblack,fattyacids,redlead,Vulkene,ThermalDecompositionBy-products:lead,phthalates,benzene,formaldehyde,BPA,butylperbenzoate,dibutylphlthalate,dimethylanline,methylmethacrylate,trichlorahexane,cyclohexanone,styrene,Thinners: TCE, Toluene, Acetone, Xylene, varsolVinyl ester resins

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

124

Exposure sources: dermal/lungexposurestovariousingredients.Fumesfromhotmix.Reportsofhealthissues:heartattacks,cancers,COPD.Fumestraveledsouththroughoutbuildingthenre-circulated.Noexhaustsystemsofumestrappedwithinbldg.area(allwindowsrequiredtobeclosedduetofumecomplaintstootherareas/buildings,e.g.,cafeteria).

1,3butadieneusedinrubberproductionprocess.

Significantexposurestofumesfrombothheatedingredientsandthermaldecompositionby-products.

Forrubber,ingredientsincluded:clay,silica,lampblack,fattyacids,andredlead.Forby-products,query1,3butadiene?

JHSC: 8/24/78: re: Banbury mixer: “The present ventilationisnexttouseless.Astrongsuggestionhasbeenmadetooperatorstowearfiltermasks.Thismeansahotanduncomfortableworkenvironmentandwehopetoexpediteinstallationofventilationtoremovethepollutionatsource.”JHSC: 8/10/78: Banbury mixer: “Dust samples (MercaptoImidazoline?)weretakenandregisteredveryhigh.”JHSC: 8/24/78: re: Banbury mixer: “Hazardisreduced(rechemicalMercaptoImidazoline)byhavingmaterialinsolidformratherthanpowderbuttherearestilldangersinvolvedifprecautionsnotfollowed.Operatorshavebeenaskedtoavoidbarehandcontactatalltimesyettheydon’tseemtorecognizetheimportanceofthisprecaution.”JHSC: 9/21/78: Banbury mixer:“MercaptoImidazalinestillbeingused.Itisimperativewegetaresolveimmediately.”MOL:06/2/77: Workersignoringsafetyprecautions.

General Description: The Wire and Cable department (1945-80)builtconductorscapableofcarryingheaviercurrentsatincreasedvoltages.Itwasalargedepartmentemployingbetween200-300peopleworking4shifts.Formex,amagnetwire,wasalsobuilttosupportinsulatedwireforthewindingsofmotorsandnumerousoutsideclients.Itisimportanttonotethatbetween1957-1960manyGEemployeestransferredbetweentheWireandCableandArmatureDepartmentsasanalternativetolayoffs.(Source: Lal, 2005 OCHOW report)

Production Processes:

Banbury Mixer Operation: This machine produces semi-liquidrubberforexternalcoatings.Ingredientsinclude:clay,silica,lampblack,fattyacids,andredlead(OCHOWhasdetailedlist).Itoperatesat400degreesCfor20-30minutesperbatch.Ingredientsmanuallyaddedtohopperbyworkersfromplatform(70to80lb.bagsofthedifferentingredientsareopenedwithaknifethenpouredin).Ithasanexhaustcanopybutisoftennotused.

Tuber Operations: Thereweretwotypesoftuberproduction:RubbertubersandPVCtubers.40employees(plus12onstrandingmachines)workedbetweenthetwooperationsloadingsemi-softrubberorPVCpelletsintohoppers.1.RubberTubers:Finishedproductactedasextruderstoinsulatecableswhichconsistedofthreecoatedwirescoveredwitharubbertube.Insulationbetweenwiresincluded:fiberglassto50s,asbestosto60sandjutefillerswithoakumin70s.Exhaustfansinareaoftenturnedoffbyworkersbecauseitinterferedwithpiecework2.PVCTubers:Therewere7PBCextrudingmachines.PVCpelletswerepouredintohopperofmachine,strandedthenvinylchlorideinsulation(Vulkene)usedasinsulationincables.

3-Inch Lead Press:(locatedalongsidetubingarea):Copperwireisrunthroughtroughsofmoltenlead(upto20’inlength)heatedto1300degreescentigrade.Oneworkeroperatedpressthatpulledwirethroughdiesinlead-filledtroughwhileasecond

Building #22 Department: Wire and CableSources: Sonya Lal, 2006 (OHCOW retrospective) and Advisory CommitteeProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

125

ForPVC,breakdownproductsincluded:lead,phthalates,vinylchloride,benzene,formaldehyde.

Sameasabove.

Bothworkersexposedtoleadfumes,withdermalandinhalationroutesofexposure.

Additionalexposures:Thestrippedoffpiecesofoilcoatedleadwerereturnedtopotwhereoilwouldreact,creatingheavyfumes.

Workersatetheirlunchesinareawithlead-coveredhands.Itwasdifficultforworkerstowashtheirhandsduringthedayforanumberofreasons:1.Theywerepaidbypiecework,thustakingtimeoffthefloorcouldsignificantlycuttheirpay.2.Washroomsandcafeteriawerebothlocatedasignificantdistanceaway(only20minuteswereallottedforlunch).3.Foranumberofyearswateravailabletoworkerswasrecycled(graywaterfromtheplantandlaterfromwellontheplantproperty.Signagethroughoutstatedwaterwasnotpotable).

Dusty,noisyworkarea.Asbestoswasrawmaterial,noprotectiveequipmenttopreventinhalationofdust.Workershandledasbestosdaily.Compressedairsystemusedtoblowdustoffequipment,causingasbestostobeairborneandtotravelthroughoutbuildingandotherdepartmentsbecauseofnegativeairpressure.

Bakeovenemittedheavyfumesoflacquerplusfumes from varsol and toluene (added to thin the lacquer).

workerwoundthewire(1/2”coatingofleadonwire)ontoreels.Winderworeasbestosgloves,breakingoffexcesslead.Dromusoiloftenappliedtoavoidstickinginwindingprocess.LeadPotsmanuallyfed80lb.ingotswithbarehands.Exhaustfansusuallykeptoffduetocoolingeffect,whichsloweddowntheprocess(thuswascostlytopieceworkers).Beforewindingontoreel,wirewentthroughwaterbaththatproducedsteamandmist.

Cotton Braiders:(10workerspershift,3shifts):Theseincluded80cottonand18asbestosbraidingmachines,thepurposeofwhichwastospindlebraidsofcottonorasbestosoverwire.Workerfirstdippedasbestosfibersintoisopropylalcoholtoeasethroughmachine(eachworkerhadown5-gallonpailofisopropylalcoholatworkspace).Aftercottonorasbestoswasbraided,hotwaxwasappliedtopreventfrayingofbraid.

Lacquer processes: Newlybraided(cotton,asbestos)wireswereheatedinoventhenrunthroughrubberdiesandcoatedwithlacquer,thenbaked.Exhaustsystem used consistently as aided in process (unlike otherareaswhereitwasconsideredanimpediment).

Open Saturation Tank:Thiscontainedcreosolmixtosoakcottonusedforbraidingwhichwasthenallowedtodrip-dry(theareawasheavywithfumes).

Tar Pots (molten tar):Therewerefourpots,withoneworkerperpot.Cottonwire(Braidex)wasdippedinhottar(byhandormachine?)thenrunthroughdie,sprayedwithwaxandrolledontoreel.

Carding Machines (#31, #32): Employed rolls of asbestosonreel-to-reelmachines(25ftlong,5ftapart).Aten-inchrollofasbestoscovered600ft.ofwire.Speedvariedbetween30and40feetperminute,dependingonwire.Carding#31:wassetuplikebunkbedswith2linesmovingatthesametime.ProcessinvolvedWiretakenoffreelandrunthroughballofasbestos(6ftlongx8ft.wide).Combsrunacrossballofasbestosspreadingthefibersovermovingwire.(ExcessFibersfromtoplineexhaustedintobinsonroofwhileexcessfibersfromlowerlinedroppedintobinsunderneath).Fibercoatedwire

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

126

Areaheavywithfumesfromthecreosolmixcomingfromopentank.Inhalation(andpossiblydermalexposuretochemicals)exposurerisktofumeswhichcouldincludecreosol,varsol,treatedwax,andcoaltarvolatiles.

Airwasfilledwithfibers,exposuresfurtherexacerbatedby:largeoverheadcranesandmachinesshakingdustloose,openwindowsandlargeamountofpedestrianandtrucktraffic.

Maintenanceworkersemptied(throughdoorsonsideofbins)thelooseasbestosfiberintobagsbyhandwithnoprotection.(Sometimestheyhad“snowball”fights;thecompanysoldbagsoflooseasbestostoworkersorthebroadercommunityas“insulation”).

Lunganddermalexposuretoasbestosandcottonfibers.Samemaintenanceprocedureasabove.4-6workers,usuallyonweekends,wouldcleantheasbestosbinswithnoprotectiveequipment.Entirecleaningof8’x8’bintookentireshift.Asbestosfiberhandledbyhandandstuffedintobagsorboxes.Observationbyasupervisorwasthattheseworkers“lookedlikesnowmen.”Noshowerorchangeroomavailable, asbestos likely taken home in cars, on clothesandcarriedthroughouttheplant.

Asbestosexposure;machineventedtoroof.Additionalexposuretofumesfromheatedvarnish(likelyaresin-basedproductanditsby-products).

Fumesfromthermaldecompositionby-products.Workers used compressed air to disperse dust, also dryswept,shoveledfiberwasteintobarrels,thendumpedinlandfillsites.

Workers exposed to various types of fibers -- but fibers also further dispersed by them.

MOL reports:MOL: 12/27/45:Introductionofsyntheticresinwithformaldehyde as a major component for electrical insulation.Alsonotedplanstoexpandporcelain

wasthenrunthroughwaxpotandonto2ndreel.(Theparaffinwaxprocesswasexhaustedtoroof).Carding#32:consistedof2“dryrun”machines(nowaxingprocess)consistingofonelinewhichcarded10to12inchballsofasbestosinonelineoperationwithexcessfibersventedtoroofbins.Thesebinventsoftengotpluggedduetotheamountoffiberscausingmorefiberstobedispersedattheprocesslevel.(The10”rollofasbestoscovered6000ftofwire).

Asbestos, water and enamel carding machine: This machinecoatedwirewithasbestos,thenacoatingofvarnish.Combsspreadasbestosonwirethenwiressentthroughheatedpotofvarnish,thenbakedat80°Fanddrawnthroughwaterpottocool.Thewirewasthendrawnontoareel.

Glass Machines: Varnishtreatedfiberglassrollswrappedaroundcopper,runthroughheatedpotofvarnish,thenbaked.

Winding Area:Threeshifts:26-dayworkers;15inafternoon;15atnight.Finishedandtestedcopperwireputonrollstomeetproductorders.Doorsleftofteninsummer(acrossfromasbestosfilledcardingarea).

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

127

manufacturing.Needtochangeventilationtohandlesilicadustexposure.

MOL:5/11/53:Identifieduseofbenzol,butylperbenzoate,dibutylphthalate,dimethylaniline,methylmethacrylate,styrene,trichlorohexane,cyclohexanone,andphosphate.Inspectornotesthesearehazardous.

MOL:3/24/68:Housekeepingverypoor.Thicklayersofdustnoted.Workerseatinganddrinkingandsmokingatworkstation;overfilleddrossbucket.8meltingunitswithnoexhaust.

MOL:01/5-6/71:”asbestoshandlingconsideredtobeworstintheentireplant.Itwasrealizedthatthecompanynotfullyawareofhazardassociatedwithasbestosdust”“Workersin22SWcornerareunnecessarilyexposedtoasbestosfibresproducedinthisarea.”Suggestedarea…”shouldbesegregatedfromtherestofthebuilding.”

MOL:03/27/71:PyraxsamplesareabovetheTLV.Inspectorrecommendsworkerswearrespirators.

MOL:07/7/71:FollowupvisitonasbestosinSWcorner.Levelsatoneofthecardingmachineswastheworstrecordedatthelaboratory.Whilehousekeepingimprovedtherewerestilllargeamountsoffibreonthemachinesandfloors.

MOL:07/19/72:FiveofsixAsbestosfibrecountsareabovetheTLV.

MOL:09/20/72: Mica dust from machines is very high.TheonlymachinewithexhaustIsabovetheTLV.Soonecan“expecthigherlevelatmachinesnotexhausted.Orderissuedforproperenclosureandadequateexhaust.

MOL:02/6/73:leadconcentrationsatleadpotsandextrudersabovetheTLVof0.15mg/m³.Housekeepinginleadhandlingareapoor.Workersnotwearingrespirators.Exposuresneedtobeassessed.

MOL:06/7/73:Inspectionre:mercury,leadandepoxyuse.Mercuryspillsareapparent;leadlevelsabove

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

128

TLV/inadequateexhaustventilation;workershandlingepoxyresinswithoutglovesorrespirators.Evidenceofepoxyrelateddermatitisnoted.

MOL:08/13/73:airsamplingandvisualinspection“demonstratethatasignificantexposuretomercurystillexists.”Asbestoscleanupnotcompleteandareanotfullyenclosed.

MOL:08/8/75:Unioncomplaintconcerningexposuretovinylchlorideandthedeathof6workerswhoworkedwiththePVCproductionandextruding.Samplestaken,butnoexposureriskfound.Unionquestionedsampling,e.g.accuracyofdraegertubes,nottestforthermaldecompositionby-products.

MOL:09/17/75:Asbestosandmercury—exhaustsystemforasbestosnotworking.AsbestosfibrecountsclosetotheTLV.Allmercuryareasare“….heavilycontaminatedwithmercury.”

MOL:10/16/75: Asbestos levels in drive systems exceedtheTLV.MOL:05/4/77: Asbestosclaiminvestigated.Asbestosexposureminimizedbythewcbbecausetheclaimantwasanofficeworkeratthetimehebecameill.However,hisemploymentrecordsshowhehadsignificantexposuresattheplantindepartmentsheavilycontaminatedwithasbestos.

MOL:06/2/77:Investigationofexposurestodusts,solventvaporsandgases.Inspectornotesheavyodorsaroundblisterpackmachine;needtoadviseworkersofhazardofantimonyandleadintheBanburyarea;preventivemaintenanceonmachinesusingtoxicsubstances;practicegoodhygiene.

MOL:05/11/79: Workers’ complaint of eye and throat irritation.ThenewCEECOmachineworksatfasterspeedandincreaseinexposuretooilmistduringmachineoperationandpossibleexposureconfirmed.

MOL:09/6/79:airsamplingforoilmistsabortedbecauseofmachinebreakdown.InspectorconcludesalltestsunderTLV.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

129

MOL:06/22/80:Asbestosassessment;possibleexposureconfirmed.Seecommentsmaderegardingnumerousasbestosexposuresobserved.

MOL:03/25/80:Asbestospaperusedasinsulationbeingremovedwithwirebrushexposesworkerstoasbestosfibre.

MOL:08/12/80:LeadexposureconfirmedinthePVCcompoundingarea.Althoughurinelead-levelsdidnotexceedtheTLV,inspectornotesneedforbetterhousekeepingforcleaningupthecompoundingareawithavacuumcleanerratherthansweeping.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

131

BUILDING: #22, 24, 26 DEPARTMENT: TRACTION MOTORS

General DescriptionMetal MachiningResin CoatingBaking Resin Coated PartsBrazing and WeldingCleaning and DegreasingCleaning and GrindingSand BlastingPower WashingPowder PaintingInduction Brazing

Known Chemicals used or produced:ArsenicDecompositionby-products:BPAs,benzene,formaldehydeResins:vinyltoluene,glyptolDetergentsWelding/Brazingfumes:fluxcore,hardwire,lead,silver,steel,silflexDegreasers:MEK,TCESilica, sandDust/particles:asbestos,resins,metals,epoxypaint,silica,sand,

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

132

Summary:InhalationandabsorptionofMWF(biocides)mists,metaldusts,degreasers,epoxyresinsandthermaldecompositionby-productssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzene,complexmixturesinweldingfumes,brazingfumessuchaslead,silver,silicadust,detergents,epoxypowderpaints.

InhalationandskinabsorptionofMWFmistsandaerosols(somewithbiocide).

Inhalationofmetaldustsoffineairbornemetalparticulate.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionofdegreaserfumes.

Riskfactorsinclude:poorlocalexhaust,heavyproductionschedule,poorPPE,poorPM.

Symptoms:workercomplaintsandtreatmentforirritatedeye,noseandthroat,dermatitis.

Atmospherevisiblysaturatedwithmistandaerosol.

InhalationofuncuredepoxyresinfumesduringdippingprocesseventhoughlocalexhaustprovidedatthelidlipoftheVPItanks.Fumesfromwetpartsbeingtransportedtotheovensforcuringandbaking.Odourswereverystrongfromthisoperationandcouldbedetectedinotherareasofthebuildingaswellasbuilding22.Thestrongodoursweredetectedasfarasbuildings14and16,indicatingthatfumes

General Description:Tractionmotorsisessentiallyanassemblyoperationoftractionmotorsusedtorunlocomotivesandheavyequipmentinminingoperations.

Theoperationran24/7with3shifts,employingmanyemployees.Theoperationproduced2motorsperhour—approximately80perweek.

Thiswasaveryintenseoperationthatranfrom1995to2013(18years).

Theoperationoccupiedthethreebuildings#s22,24,26thathousedthewireandcableoperationuntil1980,anddrivesystemsuntil1994.

The operation involved:largescalemachining,epoxyresincoatingandovencuring,brazingandwelding,cleaning,degreasingandgrindingofparts,sandblasting,powerwashingandepoxypainting.

Metal Machining:Metalmachininginvolvedlargescaledrilling,boring,machining,cuttingutilizinglargeamountsofcuttingoils,coolingfluidscollectivelyknownasMetalWorkingFluids(MWF).Thesevaryincomposition,e.g.somecontaintoxicbiocidestopreventbacterialgrowth.ThemachiningprocessgenerateslargeamountsofmetalparticulateaswellasaerosolsandmistsofMWF.Heatedfluidswillalsoproducethermaldecompositionby-productsintheformofsmoke.Focusgroupparticipantsconfirmthattheseweretheconditionsduringthemachineoperations.

Resin Coating:VinylTolueneResincoatingofpartsinVacuumPressureInfusionTanks.Thesetankswereequippedwithautomatedlidsthatslowlyopenedwhenprocesswascompleteandwasprovidedwithalipexhaustsystemtocapturevapoursandfumesfromtheresintanks.Whileanimprovementovertheoldermodels,workersindistantdepartmentswouldcomplainaboutthefumesfromFractionalMotorsreachingasfarasbuildings16and14.WorkersinFractionalfrequentlycomplainedandexperiencedsymptoms—headache,eye,noseandthroatirritationsignexposuretakingplace.

Building #22 ( CIR. 1994-2004 ) Department: Traction Motor ProductionProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

133

wereverydenseduringthedippingandcuringoperations.Exposureriskwashigh.

Inhalationofresinsandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromthebakingprocess,e.g.BPA,formaldehyde,benzene,etall.BoththeMOLandMOEinvestigatedthisoperationfrequentlybecauseofcomplaints.Workerssymptoms:irritatedeye,nosethroat,dermatitis.

Inhalationofweldingfumesfrombrazing.Inconsistentlocalexhaustventilation.Poorgeneralventilation.Buildingwasundernegativepressureandlowceilingswhich,incombinationwithnegativeair pressure, tended to disperse contaminants to otherareas.

Inhalationandskinabsorptionofdegreaserfumesandvapoursaswellasthermaldecompositionby-products.Frequentcomplaintsbyworkersofthisdegreasingoperation.

Inhalationoflargeamountsofbrazingandweldingprocessfumes.Likelihoodofexposurehighgiventheamountofbrazingandweldingandthelackofadequatelocalexhaustventilationandgeneralventilation.Whilesomeventilationhoodswereprovidedtheywerenotadequatetodrawthefumesawayfromthewelders.Consequently,theMOLwascalledinmanytimestoinvestigatethe“BrazingTower”operations.

Inhalationofveryfinepowderedresindustfromgrinding,sandingandbuffingofbores,surfaces,andtapholes.Powderedresinswouldalsobeingestedandabsorbedthroughtheskin.Therewasnoadequateexhaustventilation.Workerswereprovidedwithpaperdustmasks.Overtheyearsworkersatetheirlunchattheworkstations.

Baking resin-coated parts:Resin-coatedpartswerebakedinovensfor7.5hourstwice.Thesewerelargeovensthatwerenottotallyenclosed.Duringthebakingprocessworkerswouldsqueegeeresinaroundthepartstoensureresinpenetratedthoroughlyandevenly.

Brazing and Welding:Bothbrazingandweldingwereextensive.Welderswouldbraze20”longbarsofcopperusingsilversolder—“Silflex”.Thisproducedlargeamountsofsolderfumesthroughoutthearea.Inductionbrazingwouldproducelargeamountsoffumesandsmoke.

Cleaning and Degreasing:CableswerecleanedanddegreasedwithMEKandTCE.Residueswouldproducevariousdecompositionby-productsduringthebrazingprocess.Therewasthepossibilityoftheformationofphosgenegas.Greatamountsofvapour,fumes,andstrongsolventodoursreportedbyworkersduringcleaningprocess.

Welding:Therewasextensiveweldingofvarioustypesintractionproduction.ThisinvolvedMIG,TIG,Flux-Core,Hardwire,torchcuttingofheavysteel.Theweldingareainbuilding22involvedweldingbracestostatorsandbalancingweightstorotorsbeforemachining.Cuttingtorchesusedtoremovebridgesfromstatorsbeforemachining.Extensive“torchbrazing”wascarriedoutatthe“BrazingTower.”Theseareashadheavyweldingfumesandinadequateexhaustventilationandfrequentcomplaints.Safetyinspectorsconductednumerousinvestigationsofworkercomplaints.

Cleaning and Grinding of Parts:Borecleaningoperationsweresubjectofconcernandcomplaintsfromworkersaboutexposurestofinecuredresindustproducedbythegrindingandbuffingoperationtoreducehighspotscausedbyexcesscuredresininthebores.Workerswouldalsosandandbuff“spigots”and“tapholes.”Thisprocessproducedgreatamountsof“brownpowder”dustfromcuredresins.Workerswereonlyprovidedpaperdustmasks.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

134

Inhalationoffinesilicadustandothercontaminantsinthecontaminatedsilica.Likelihoodofinhalationandexposureishighgiventhevolumeofsilicaused,lackofexposurecontrolandtheuseofcompressedairtoblowofdustonparts,machinesandclothing,andthelackofadequatePPE.

Inhalation,absorptionandingestionofaerosolscontainingdetergentsandotherdegreasingagentshigh.

Inhalation,absorptionandingestionofpowderedepoxypaintparticulateaswellasthermaldecompositionby-productsfromthebakingprocess.ThislatterissuemightinvolveBPA,formaldehydeandbenzene,etal.

Inhalationofsolderfumesandotherdegreasingresiduesonparts.Workersreportfrequentsymptoms and complaints of irritated eye, nose and throatandheadache.

Workersalsoreportedbadtasteinmouthwhencleaning‘smokeeater’filters.

Sand Blasting:SandblastingwithSilicaofpartsinenclosedcabinetwastopreppartsforfitting.Partswereplacedinautomatedblastingcabinet.Whenblastwascompletetheworkerswouldopenthedoortoremovethepart.Theworkerswouldusecompressedairtoblowoffdustfromthepartandsurroundingsurfacesandclothing.Workersdescribethisasaverymessyprocesswithgritanddustallover.Thiswasdifficulttomaintainandtheywouldhavetocontinuallyaddsilicatokeeptheoperationworkingassandwouldbecomecontaminatedwithothersubstancesontheparts.

Power Washing:Powerwashingofpartswithamixofdetergentwasdoneaftermachiningandfitting.Thisproducedagreatdealofaerosolofdetergentanddegreasers.Thisworkwasdoneinpreparationforpowderpaintingwithepoxy.

Powder Painting:Partswerepaintedwithepoxypowderedpaint.Powderedepoxypaintwassprayedonheatedparts(rotors)andthenbakedinanoven.Thisproducedgreatamountofpaintparticulateaswellasfumesfromthebakingprocess—thermaldecompositionby-productsfromepoxypaints.Workersdidnothaveadequaterespiratoryprotectionorlocalexhaustventilation.

Induction Brazing:Inductionbrazinginthe“windingarea”involvedelectricalfusingofsolderwithaninductioncurrent.Thisoperationproducedagreatamountofsmokefromthemeltedsolder.While“smokeeaters”wereprovidedtheywerefraughtwithfrequentproblemswithcloggedfilters.Cleaningthesmokeeaterfiltersexposedworkerstolargeamountsofresiduesfromthesmokeproducedbythebrazingprocess.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

135

BUILDING: #23 DEPARTMENT: ELECTROPLATING

General Description

General Work Tasks:

1. Preparation of Tanks

2. Dipping and Racking

3. Periodic Monitoring

Specific Process:

1. Metal Pre-Treatment

2. Electroplating

3. De-plating or Stripping Process

4. Plating, Cleaning and Maintenance

State of Industrial Hygiene Controls

Known Chemicals used or produced:

BerylliumDegreasersDetergents(causticsoda)GraphiteSilicaUraniumOxidesZirconium (Nickel Zinc, Tin)

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

136

General Description of Exposure Risks in the Plating Operation:

Pre-Plating Stages:

Exposurerisksintheplatingdepartmentwerehigh,bothdailyandroutinelygiventhefollowingriskfactors:Workersdirectlyhandledtoxicsolutioningredientsinlargecontainerspouringandmixingintheplatingtanks(variousformsofcyanideacids,mixedwithvariousmetalsalts,formedtheplatingsolutions).Theriskofinhalingdusts,whilepouringandmakingskincontactwithpowdersandliquidsduringmixingandfromspillswashigh.

Eatingandsmokingattheworkstationputworkersatriskofingestingvarioustoxins.

Workers also handled solvents, acids and alkaline solutionsforpre-treatmentsofmetals.Thereisriskofinhalationandskinabsorptionaswellasingestionduetothepracticeofeatingandsmokingattheworkstation.Nothavingaccesstowashingfacilitiesincreasestheriskofingestionofthesetoxins(SeeMOLinspectionreports,1986).

Workerswerealsoexposedthroughinhalationandabsorption,whenleaningoverplatingtankswhileretrievingbasketsandrackswithpartsbeingplated.

Finally,itisimportanttoconsiderthelargevolumeshandledbytheseworkersandthefrequencyofthesemixingtasksaswellastheprovisionofinadequateprotectiveequipment(Audit,1984,wearingofcottonnotrubbergloves,notwearingeyeprotection).

Exposures During Plating

Thefollowingroutineexposuresarehighlylikelygiventheriskfactorsconcerninginadequatelocalexhaustventilationreported,thebuild-upofvarioussaltscakedonsurfacesandexhaustsystems,routinedirectcontactwiththeplatingtanksandsolutionandidentifiedpoorhousekeepingpractices:1. Metalsaltmistsgeneratedabovethe

electroplatingbathscontainingchromium,nickel,zinc,silver,brasscompounds;

General Description: GE operated several electroplatingoperations(1950-95)overtheyears.Initially,platingtookplaceattheNEcornerofbuilding16(25years)thenin1974movedto#23,anewlyconstructedbuildingwhichwasseparatefromthemainGEbuildings.Electroplatingwascloseddownin1995.

Thebuilding(#23)wasapproximately25,000sq.ft.withabasementwastetreatmentfacilityof6000sq.ft.Thedepartmentemployed10-12employeesononeshift,5daysperweek.

Therewerebetween5and6largeplatinglinesdependingonclientdemand.Theseplatinglinesutilizedapproximately85dippingtankswithplatingsolutionsofcyanideacidandvariousmetalsalts--includingtwolargevapourdegreasingtankscontainingtrichloroethyleneforvariousmetals,andtrichloroethaneforaluminum.Additionally,theprocessincludedseveralacidandcausticsodabathsforcleaningandetching,aswellasrinsingtanks.

Eachplatinglineusedtanksof100to300galloncapacity.Thesmallautomaticplatinglinehadeleven30-gallontanksandone200-gallontank.Theautomaticlinesdidnotrequireoperatorstoapproachthecyanidetanks.

Duringitsearlyoperation,theplatingdepartmentprovidedin-houseplatingservicestoGE’svariousdepartments.Inthelatterperiod,productionincreasedastheplatingdepartmentservedavarietyofcustomersrequiringspecializedplatingfortheirproducts.

Thevariouslinesincluded:brassplating,zincplating,chromeplating,nickelplating,andsilverplating.Platingsolutionscontainvariousmetalsaltsandacids,alkalinematerials,andotheradditivestoimpartstabilityorfunctionalpropertiestothesolutions.

General Work Tasks:

1.Preparationoftanks:

Building #23/16N Department: ElectroplatingProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

137

2. Acid/alkalinemistsgeneratedinthepre-treatmentphasewereverymuchpresentintheatmosphereasviewedaslikelycauseofsevere corrosion of structural beams in the buildingitself.Thesewerealsoindicatedbyworkers’symptomsofeye,noseandthroatirritation;

3. Cyanide mists, both cyanide salt mists and hydrogencyanidemists,werelikelyaircontaminants,giventhatbothwerenaturallygeneratedbytheelectrolysisprocess;

4. OrganicSolventvapoursandmistswerehighlylikelygiventhatbothsolventswerecontainedinverylarge(8’x6’x4’)vapourdegreasingtanks.Bothtrichloroethyleneandtrichloroethanewerepresentintheatmosphere.

Inassessingexposureonemustconsidernotonlyairconcentrations,butalsothefactthatthesesolventswillbedepositedontheskinandclothing,thusabsorbedthroughtheskin.Andsinceworkersweresmokingandeatingattheworkstation,theyalsoingestedthesecontaminants.Onemustlookatthetotalburdenandthechronicityoftheseexposures.

Giventheconditionsofworkplace,theroutinenessofexposures,thedirecthandlingandvolumehandleddaily,thentoxicexposuresmustbeconsideredhighfromanindustrialhygieneperspective.

Theothercontributingfactorre:exposureriskshastodowiththeseriousissuesofpoorhousekeepingandmaintenance,theimproperstorageofacidsandcyanide,leakingtanksanddrumsofcyanideandacids,andimproperlabeling.The1984auditnotes:“Allowingchemicalsaltstobuild-upontanks,sideshields,andinexhaustductsopenings.ThisaccumulationofmaterialsaddstotheinternalenvironmentandincreasesemployeeexposuretohazardoussubstancesSeeP.4,consultants“Audit”,1984.(See:Briggs,1984below).

Maintenanceandcleaningtasksincreasedtheriskofexposure.Removingcakedonmetalandacidsaltsinvolvesscrapingandgrindingwhichincreases

directhandlingandpreparationofdegreaserandacidsolutionsforpre-plating;preparationofplatingsolutionstobedispensedfromlargedrumsintothetanks;

2.Dippingandracking:Thisinvolvedmanualloadingandunloadingofracksorbaskets;movingthe(racked)partsfromtanktotank--usuallywiththehelpofanoverheadhoist;

3.Periodicmonitoringofoperation:Employeeswererequiredtoentertheplatingtankareatocheckonoperatingconditionsoftheplatingbathsandmaintainlevelofsolutionsasrequired.

Note:Cyanideswerepurchasedin10to100kgcontainers,(e.g.silvercyanidein10kg,zincandsodiumin100kg).Thesechemicalswerehandledmanuallybyworkerswhilepouringintotankstomake,ormaintain,platingsolutions.

Dustandsplashesduringmanualhandlingofpowderfrequentlyoccurresultingincontaminationonskinandclothing.

Note: several MOL reports and environmental assessmentsavailableidentifythisrisk.Workersatelunchandsmokedatwork-stations.Noeasilyaccessiblewashingfacilitieswereavailableandnolockerstochangeclothing.

Specific Processes:

1. Metal Pre-treatment:Priortoplating,basemetalswerethoroughlycleanedtoensureadherence.Thisinvolveduseofsolvents,acids,andalkalinesolutions.Degreasingsolventswereusedtoremovegrease,oils,etc.Theplatingshophadtwolargevapourdegreasingtanks8’x4’x6’,onefortrichloroethyleneandonefortrichloroethane.AccordingtoGEretirees,benzenewasusedtodegreaseintheplatinglaboratoryarea.Acidsolutionsusedtoremovemetaloxideswerereferredtoaspickling.Alkalinesolutionswereusedtoremoveoilsandsolidsoilsthroughdetergentaction.Theseweresometimesagitatedbytheinfusionofgasbubbles.Thesepre-treatmentsolutionswereusuallylocatedatthebeginningoftheplatinglines.Water

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

138

dispersionofcontaminantsandriskofinhalation,absorption,andingestion.

Potentialexposuretocadmium,tungstenandcobaltnotedbyinspector(MOL:8/5/81).Recommendationsmadeforgoodhousekeepingandlocalexhaustventilationand/orappropriaterespiratoryprotection.

MOL:5/28/82:Toxicinhalation/absorptionhazardsnotedandordersissued.Order#119notedbuildupofcyanidewasteoverdykeundermerry-go-round.

GiventhelackoflocalexhaustventilationnotedintheMOLreportcitedbelow,itishighlylikelythattheworkersinhaledcadmiumfumesfromthesilverbrazingoperation.

Furtherevidenceofexposureistherespiratorysymptoms reported to the Ministry of Labour in 1981 and the subsequent issuance of orders to protect the workerfromexposuretoatoxicsubstancei.e.silversolderfumesandcadmium(SeeMOL:4/15/81).

Giventhedeficientstateofengineeringcontrolsandthefrequencyanddurationofexposureintendingtoplatingtanks,e.g.,samplingsolutions,dippingandremovingplatedmaterialsfromplatingtanks,therewassignificantriskofinhalationandabsorptionofcontaminants.

rinse-tankswereusuallylocatedbetweenthevariouspre-treatmenttanks.

Vapours and mists from the various treatment tankswerereadilyapparent,includingatoxicmixofsolvent vapours and both acid and alkaline mists and vapours.Workersreportedheavyodoursofsolvents.Accordingtoworkers,eye,noseandthroatirritationswereprevalentinthedepartment.

Note:Anengineeringreportindicatedthatstructuralbeamsinthebuildingweresignificantlycorrodedfromexposuretothevariousacidandalkalinevapoursgeneratedbyboththepre-treatmentandplatingprocesses(reasonforclosureofplating).

2. Electroplating Process:Duringtheelectroplatingprocess,anelectriccurrentpassesthroughtheplatingsolutionresultinginthedepositionoftheplatedmetalonthecathode.

Theelectroplatingprocessresultsinthereleaseofhydrogenandoxygengasbubbles,which,astheyrise,entrainplatingsolutiondroplets.Theseare carried into the atmosphere and form a mist containing:cyanide;metalsaltssuchaschromium,nickel,zinc,arsenicandcadmium;andacids,includinghydrochloricacid,nitricacid,sulfuricacid,andchromicacidmists.

Thegenerationandemissionofthesecontaminantsintheatmospheredependonthecurrentefficiencyassociatedwiththedifferentplatingsolution,e.g.chromiumplatingislowefficiencyof12to15%resultinginseveremisting,whilenickelplatingishighefficiencyresultinginmuchlessmisting.Solventemissionsarealsopartoftheenvironmentalmix,particularlytrichloroethylenebelowtheTLV(SeeMOLreport).

Asbestos:InsulationonCrownplatesfrayedinsomeareas.Likelyexposuretoasbestos.3. De-plating or Stripping Process: This involves strippingthebasemetalofpreviouscoatingsbydippingthemetalsinsolutionsofcyanideacid.This

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

139

isahazardousprocesssinceitcanreadilygeneratehydrogen-cyanidegas(HCN).

4. Plating Cleaning and Maintenance: Maintenancetasksincludedcleaningoutslurryfromclarifiers,removingvariouscakedonplatingsaltsfromtanksandexhaustsystems.Thesetaskswereasignificantsourceofexposure.SinceanAuditcalledforincreasedcleaningandmaintenance,theriskofexposureincreasedsubstantially.

5. Silver Brazing:ThesilverbrazingareawaslocatedintheSWcornerofBldg.#23andmeasuredabout20’x12’x20’andsharedthegeneralventilationsystemofelectroplatingdepartment.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Apedestalfanwasusedtoblowthefumesawayfromtheworker.

Oneemployeeworked40hrs/wk.Theworkconsistedofjoiningvariousmetalparts(stainlesssteel,copper,brass,bronze,elkonite,etc.)withanaturalgastorchattemperaturesbetween1300to1800°F.Mostcommonlyusedsolderswere:easyflow45(silver,copper,zinc,nickelandcadmium[24%])andEasyFlow3(silver,copper,zinc,nickelandcadmium[17%]).Upto50’of1/16thusedpershift.Fluxesincluded:HandyFluxA1andJohnsonMattheyFluxandMattiflux3A.Theformercontainsfluoridesandzincchloridewhilethelattercontainsfluorides.

State of Industrial Hygiene Controls:

1. Engineering Controls: Localexhaustventilationwasprovided,butanenvironmentalassessmentindicatedseriousdeficienciesinexhaustventilationincludinginadequatecapturevelocitiesandinsufficientmake-upair,starvingexhaustfromextractingcontaminants.

Note:Seeseveralplatingdepartmentreportsidentifyingdeficienciesinthelocalexhaustsystems.

Examplesinclude:NitrousOxidefumesfromnitricacidbecausenitricacidtankexhaustnotfunctioningproperly;platingchemicalsleachingoutofexhaustducts;exhaustductspluggedwithchemicalsalts;exhaustductspartiallyblockedbychemicalsalts

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

140

resultinginplatingfumesandmiststocontaminatethearea(HarveyBriggs,AssociatedEnvironmentalConsultants, “Environmental, Health and Safety Audit,PeterboroughPlatingShop,CanadianGeneralElectricCompany,Peterborough,Canada,1984).

2. PPE/Housekeeping: Reports indicate that housekeepingandcleaningwerenotroutinelyperformed.Evidenceofimproperstorageofhazardousmaterials;staffwearingcotton,insteadofrubber,gloves;notwearingsafetyglasses;employeessmokingandeatinginplatingshop;workersleaningoverplatingtankstoremoveplatingbasketsorrackswhilemistarebeingemittedallindicatepoorhousekeepingandsafetypractices.Briggsstates:“HousekeepingandpreventivemaintenanceatplatingfacilityisafulltimejobandwillrequiremorethanaFridayafternoonwashdown”(P.9,Briggs,1984).

(HarveyBriggs,AssociatedEnvironmentalConsultants, “Environmental, Health and Safety Audit,PeterboroughPlatingShop,CanadianGeneralElectricCompany,Peterborough,Canada,1984).

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

141

BUILDING: #24 DEPARTMENT: FORMEX

Formex Operation

Process:

Steps: 1-6

Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosAcetoneEnamels:Alkenex,Formex,Formes,FormexA1,HLM,ML,MLRFumes:enamel,degreasers,copper/enamelDegreasers/Thinners:Toluene,MEK,Varsol,AcetoneMetals: copperThermalDecompositionBy-Products:BPA,formaldehyde,benzene

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

142

Inhalationofpotentfumeslinkedtoanumberofbrandepoxy“varnishes”includinguncuredepoxyfumesanddecompositionby-productssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzeneetal.

Inhalationofcopperfumeslinkedtoheatinganddrawingthroughdies.

JHSC: 8/14/79: re: asbestos: “Asbestos is used tostuffopeningsonannealingoveninformex.Alternativematerialsavailable!”

Inhalationofbothcopperandvarnishfumesduringdippingandheatingoperations.

Inhalationanddermal(face,eyes,arms,hands)exposurestovarnish,varsol,acetone,andmuriaticacid,andperhapsotherchemicalsduringmaintenanceactivities.

Formex Operation:Referstoapplyingenamelcoatingoncopperwire.EndproductisFormexwirewithvarnish(enamel)onit.NoMSDSavailableon“varnish”epoxieswhichincluded:StraightFormexenamel,Alkenex,FormexA1,MLR,Formes,ML,andHLMwhichwerecontainedin45galloncontainersandthinnedwithTolueneorMEK.“Alkenex”describedas“theworst”wassuppliedbyDavenport(likelytheGEplantinTorontoonDavenportAve).Operationinvolves26machinesand16reels.

Process:1. Copperwiredrawnthroughgasconverter,

whichcreatesatmosphereofcarbonmonoxidecirculationuntilproperthickness(diameter)isachieved.

2. Next,wiregoesthroughannealingoventosoftenwirepriortocoatingstage.Gascomingoffannealingisexhaustedoutside(systemchangedfromwaterexhausttocatalyticconverterduetoneighbor’scomplaintsofbrownfilmontheirwindows).

3. Wirethengoesthroughverticaldippingprocess.Pumpplacedin45gallondrumcontainingheated(30°F)varnishwhichtravelsupanddownaseriesofloopswhilecoatingcopperwire--excessvarnishdripsintolargetroughs.

4. Wiresthentravelalongverticalovensat3differenttemperatures(150,175,and200degrees).Three-inchgapbetweenverticalovensallowsfumestodisperse.

5. Workersregularlymaintainedsheaves(partofmachine)fromacatwalkabovethevarnishcoatingoperation,byscrapingexcessvarnishoffthevertical“sheaves”10-12timespershiftapplyingvarsolandacetonebybrushtocleanthem.Theywould“troubleshoot”bycleaningsheaves1-3timesperhourwithoutpersonalprotection.

6. Involveddippingsheavesinmuriaticacidbathin6’x5’opentroughs,thendrip-dryingthesheavesfor5-6hours.Thislaterprocesscreated heavy vapours and led to frequent complaintsofsevereeyeirritation.

Building # 24 Department: Wire and Cable (Formex) Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

143

BUILDING: #26 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE

Shaved Mill OperationButt WeldingTin Pot OperationTar Pot OperationMercury Test Area5-Inch Lead PressHassel Machine PVC Mixing Operation

Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCoal TarDegreasers:TCEDromus OilDusts:copper,asbestos,silica,flameretardants,Fumes:brominated/chlorinatedflameretardants,welding,degreaserGranulated resinMetals: Copper, Tin, Lead, Mercury, other heavy metalsMuriaticAcidPigmentsThermalDecompositionBy-Products:phthalates

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

144

Riskofdailyexposureofworkerstoexhaustfromlifttrucks.Finecopperdustvisible(fromshavingprocess)thatwassweptorblownwithcompressedair.Workersnoteddustupto2”thick.ShavedmillandcraneoperatorsbothexposedtocopperdustandTCEsolution.Bodiesandclothescoveredincopperdustthatturnedgreen.Complaintsofburningskinandeyes.Workersoftenateinworkarea.

Dailyexposuretoweldingfumes,andcopperfumes.Butt-weldinggeneratedsignificantsmokeandfumes.Vapourresidueofdegreasersonwirebeingfused.

Significantchemicalexposuresfromfumesfromacidbathandtinningpots.Exhaustsystemshutdownmostofthetimefor“moreefficient”cooling.

Exposuretocoaltarvolatiles(moltentarpots).Exhaustsystemusuallyshutoff(interferedwithmaintainingtemperatureofcoalpots).Workersidentifiedthat“norespiratoryequipmentwasprovided.”Numerousemployeescomplainedof,andwerediagnosedwith,lungcomplicationsinthisworkarea(likelyrelatedtomuriaticacidexposuresandcoaltarfumes).Lackofventilationresultedinheavyaccumulationofodorsthroughoutthearea.

Biologicalmonitoringcarriedoutonworkersinmercurytestarea.Thosewithhighlevelsofmercurytransferredtootherdepartments.

MOL:06/7/73:“largemercuryglobulesnoticedundermachines.”Mercuryvapourmeasuredat0.04to0.05mg/m³atbreathingzone;0.01to0.02mg/m³atfloorlevel.TLV=0.05mg/m³.Urineanalysislittleornoabsorption.Ordersissuedfor:noeating,housekeeping,personalhygieneandurinetestevery3months.

MOL:09/17/75:Highmercuryconcentrations—0.06,0.08,0.05,0.08,0.04mg/m³exceededTLV.Employerfailedtocomplywithpreviousorderregardingmercuryexposure.Recommendtore-issueorder3-monthcompliancedeadline.Nochargesfiledfornon-compliance.

Shaved Mill Operations: Wire reels delivered to shavedmills(#131and#132)bycraneandlifttrucks.ThenDegreasing/cleaningofwirepriortoandduringshavingdoneinsolutionofTCEand“soap.”Pailsofsolutionispouredintolargetroughsandhandledwithcottongloves.

Butt Welding:Weldersspot-weldendofonereelofcopperwiretoanothercreatingan“endless”reel.Processinvolvedfusingofwireendswithelectricalinjection.Weldersfusedbetween60and3000lbs.ofcopperdaily.

Tin Pot Operations:Tinningofwireemployedthreepotsoftin,with6copperwirereelsoneachsideofpot.Wirewasrunthroughmuriaticacidandadieandthenrunthroughawaterbathtocool(donebymachine).Processranat300’perminute.Note:whenfumesexhaustedthroughroof,treesinsurroundingareaweredamagedasreportedbysupervisorinOCHOWreport.

Tar Pot Operations:(oneemployeepershiftdedicatedtothisjob)Coaltarpitchappliedtominingcables(cablesusedinminingoperations).BXarmourwrappedaroundcabletheninterlocked.Juteburlaptreatedwithcoaltarpitchappliedandwrappedaroundthewires.Cableswere4”-5”indiameter.10,000feetoftarredcableproducedperyear.

Mercury Test Area:4-5operatorspershifttestedFormexwireforcontinuity.Wirewasrunthroughopenmercuryfilledtrough(10”x12”x1½).Workersusedbarehandstodrawhotwirethroughtrough(wirewasslippery).Notedneurologicalsymptomsandthickeningofnailsinworkerssignsofmercurypoisoning.

5 Inch Lead Press:Copperwireisrunthroughtroughsofmoltenlead(upto20’inlength)heatedto1300degreesCentigrade.Oneworker-operatedpressthatpulledwirethroughdiesinleadfilledtroughwhileasecondworkerwindsthewire(1/2coatingofleadonwire)ontoreels.Winderworeasbestosgloves,breakingoffexcesslead.Dromusoilappliedtoavoidstickinginwindingprocess.Leadpotsmanuallyfed

Building # 26 Department: Wire and CableProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

145

MOL:06/7/73:Inspectionre:mercury,leadandepoxyuse.Mercuryspillsareapparent;leadlevelsaboveTLV/inadequateexhaustventilation;workershandlingepoxyresinswithoutglovesorrespirators.Evidenceofepoxyrelateddermatitisnoted.

MOL:08/13/73:Airsamplingandvisualinspection“demonstratethatasignificantexposuretomercurystillexists.”Asbestoscleanupnotcompleteandareanotfullyenclosed.

(Re:5inchleadpress)Bothworkersexposedtoleadfumes.Dermalandinhalationroutesofexposure.ExposureNotes:Thestrippedoffpiecesofoilcoatedleadreturnedtopotwhereoilwouldreact,creatingheavyfumes.Workersatetheirlunchinareawithlead-coveredhands.

Exposuretochemicalfumesanddustincluding:PVCfumes,VCfumes,phthalatefumes,silica,lead,flame-retardants,asbestos(upto20ormoreingredientsdependingonproductspecifications).Dicerproducedalotofdust,asdidloadingthehopper.Workersexposedtoheavyfumesduringmixingprocess.Accumulateddustdry-sweptand/orblownbycompressedair.Exhaustsystemusuallyturnedoff.Nogloves,safetyglassesusedbyworkerswhooftenateattheirworkstations.Exposurerisksoccurredduringingredienthandlingbyopeningbags,handlingmaterial,pouringmaterialintohoppers,andduringmixingandheatingphase,duringtheextrusionphase,andduringthepurgingandmaintenanceprocedures.

JHSC: 12/1/78: re: PVC mixer malfunction: Mixerunitoverheatedcausingrapiddecompositionofmaterialsinprocess.ReactiongaveoffHCLacidfumes,whichengulfed(worker)andpartiallyincapacitatedhim.Hemanagedtoevacuateareaandsentoutfortreatment.Lettersenttomanufacturerre:installingofbackupsystemtosenseexcessivetemperaturebuild-upwithautomaticcutoffs.

MOL:01/21/47:“GirlFettlingArea”-locatedatwestendofbldg.#26notedhighsilicadustcountsapproachingTLV.Also,8of9airsamplesabovethemercuryTLV.

80lb.ingotswithbarehands.Exhaustusuallykeptoffduetocoolingwhichsloweddowntheprocess(whichwascostlytopieceworkers).Beforewindingontoreel,wirewentthroughwaterbaththatproducedsteamandmist.

Hansel Machine (1975) PVC Mixing Operation: Ninedifferentcoloursandmixesused.Hopper(4’-5’)manuallyfilledwithgranulatedresin.MachineextrudedstripsofPVCthatweredicedtoformpellets.Dicerproducedalotofdustwithheavyfumescreatedduringthemixingprocess.ThiswasaheavyPVCproductionarea.Inadditiontovinyl chloride monomer this process used several tonsofleadpermonthaswellasphthalates,pigments,asbestos,silica,brominated/chlorinatedflame-retardants,andvariousotherheavymetalsdependingonthespecifiedrecipes

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

146

MOL:01/27/47:Overdueexamsregardingemployeeexaminationforleadpoisoning.Levelsatleadpots:1.0and0.3mg/10m³notedtobelowerthanTLV.

MOL:05/05/47:“ideally,testingshouldbeenclosedboothasspraypainting.”Needtokeepclosecheckonamountofmercuryused.Highloss(ofmercury)indicatesfurthercheckingnecessary.

MOL:10/31/47: Update on company’s clean up of mercury:“someprogresshasbeenmade”.RequestfortoxicityinformationonPCBsbutnoinformation“found”.

MOL:02/24/49:Pyranolsampling:“amountfoundishigherinspotsthatwelike.”09/12/55:reviewofvarnishcoatingprocessduringtheFormexprocess.Smokingintheworkplaceacceptable10and20feetfromthevarnisharea.Nameofvarnishesdifficulttoreaderodedprint—‘formex,invarek’.

MOL:06/04/63:Mercuryexposuresincondensercheckingareaandformextestingarea.Globulesofmercuryonswitchboxesandfloor.Evidenceofcontinuedmercuryproblem.

MOL:12/16/68:Fluoridefumesfromweldingfluxinbrazingareausingsilversolder.Recommendationtotesttheairforfluoridefumes.

MOL:05/31/68:LeadinthePVCpelletizingarea.Testforleadfumes,butnotresultsshowninbuilding26.

MOL:10/16/69:AnalysisofepoxypaintbyMOLidentifieditcontaineduncuredepoxyresin,pigmentandsolvent.Catalystconsistedofepoxyresinmodifiedwithamineandsolvent.Epoxypaintcontents:toluene,xylene,ethylcellosolve,andunidentifiedkeytone.Catalystcontents:normalbutylalcohol,tolueneandxylene.

MOL:08/12/80:Tinningsectionidentifiedasaconfirmedareaforleadexposure.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

147

BUILDING: #30 DEPARTMENT: BUS DUCT

General DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsCutting and Rolling Aluminum SheetsBus Duct AssemblyMOCA Production

Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosChromate paintFibreglassWeldingfumesMIG,TIGMWFOzoneFire retardants EtchingchemicalsVinylwash,YellowzincchromatesGreenzincchromatesDasco tapEpoxies:greenandorangeepoxyenamels,MOCAFumes:enamelpaint,degreasers,aluminum/stainlesssteel/copperweldingMetalDusts:aluminum,stainlesssteel,copper,tungstenSolvents: TCE, 1,1,1-Trichloroethane, tolueneThermaldecompositionby-products:aluminumalloy,tungsten,magnesium,hexavalentchromiumBlackfibreglasstapeirathenetape

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

148

Workersinthisdepartmentwereregularlyexposeddirectlyorasby-standerstotheweldingprocesses.Thisledtoinhalationofaluminumandstainlesssteelweldingfumesaswellasfumesfromcopperbrazingoperationsandvapoursfromsolvents.

Welding Fumes and Gases: The aluminum arc weldingoperationinvolvedTIGandMIGweldingthatproducedheavyconcentrationsofaluminumalloyaswellastungstenandmagnesiumby-productsfromtheintenseheat.Aluminumalsoproducedheavyconcentrationsofozonegas.TheseemissionswerenotwellcontrolledsincetherewasalackoflocalexhaustventilationandnoadequatePPE.Ozonegasisclassifiedasagroup1carcinogenbyIARC.Theoperationof20”fanstoaddresstheozonegasonlydispersed fumes and other contaminants to other areasofthebuildingtobeinhaledbyotherworkers.Exposuretoozonegaswasafrequentcomplaintfromby-standerworkersandwelders.Consequently,weldingfumesandozonewereblownaroundthebuildingandsuckedintothepaintshop.

JHSC: 3/19/81: re: ozone:“Extremelyhighozonereading.[Ittook]onepullwhenusually5pullsondrageur[testtube]andozonereadingwentoffthescale.”

JHSC: 3/23/82: re: ozone fumes:“Airfilteringsystemwasinstalledbutnotenoughmasksforallworkers.Airflowinbldg.causesheavyconcentrationofozoneateastendofbldg.wherepaintboothlocated.Oneworkerconstantlywearsanairsupplymaskwhenweldingisbeingdone,eventhoughhehimselfdoesn’tworkonwelding,saying‘hefeelsbettersincehestartedwearingit’.”

Solvent Exposures:Workerswerealsoexposedtovarioussolventsthatwereusedtodegreaseinpreparationforweldingorpainting.Thesesolventssuchas1,1,1-Trichloroethane,toluenewereappliedbyhandwithsoakedrags.Thesewereinhaledinclosequartersaswellasbeingabsorbedthroughtheskinsincetheywereappliedwithbarehands.

General Description: The Bus Duct department wasessentiallydevotedtotheconstructionof‘busducts’whichwereelectricalconduitshousingcopperbusbarconductorsforhighvoltagetransmissionconstructedwithelectricalgradealuminumalloyandcopperbars.Itemployed15to20workerspershift.

Thisinvolvedprimarilyaluminumweldingandcopperbrazingaswellassomestainlesssteelwelding.Italsorequiredmetalgrinding,sanding,andplaning--aswellasdegreasinginpreparationforpainting.Upperlevelsofthebuildingcontained:machining,painting,degreasing,MOCAproduction,aluminumcutting,sawing,drillingandrolling.

General Working Conditions:Therewaslittlelocalexhaustventilationparticularlyinthealuminumweldingoperation.Atmospherewasdusty,smokyandcontainedsolventodoursandvapour.Housekeepingwasdescribedaspoor.MWFusewashighduringaluminummachiningandplaning.MOCAproductionprocesswaspoorlyventilated.VentilationwasblowndownwardandwasalsoaffectedbythenegativepressureintheGEcomplex.Fumes(MOCA,MWF,welding)fromtheoperationonthe3rdfloorweresuckeddowntheelevatorshafttothegroundfloor.

Cutting and rolling aluminum sheets: Aluminum plateswerecuttosizeusingbandsawsandhandheldcircularsaws.AluminumwastreatedwithMWF.Thecutsheetswerethenrolledwithlargerollingmachinesshapingthemintobusducts.Thesheetswerenextdeburred,bevelledandsanded.Aftercuttingandshaping,aluminumwasdegreasedbyhandandpreparedforwelding.

Bus Duct Assembly:weldingindividualductstogether,usingTIGandMIGelectricarcweldingassembledthebusducts.5to6weldersoneachshiftcarriedthisout.Thisworkproducedlargeamountsofaluminumweldingfumesaswellashighconcentrationsofozonegasandresiduesfromdegreasers.Welderswereprovidedwith20”oscillatingfanstoblowtheozoneawayfromthewelders.Thiswasproblematicbecauseitcauseddust

Building: #30 Department: Bus DuctsProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

149

Paint Exposures:Theseworkersalsopaintedbusductswithchromateyellowandgreenpaintsalongwithpre-treatmentswithsolvents.Chromatepaintscontainhexavalentchromium,whichishighlytoxicandclassifiedbyIARCasagroup1carcinogen.

Exposuretoasbestosdustwasalsoapartofregularweldingactivitysinceasbestosblanketswereusedtoprotectplatedpartsfromweldingsplatter.Welderexposedtoasbestosfibrefromlyingontheblanketsduringweldingprocess.

Metal Dusts:Exposuretoaluminumandothermetaldustswasalsoprevalentbecauseofthemajorsawingandgrindingofaluminumsheetsforcreatingbusductstructures.Theprocessofcutting,machiningandgrindingproducedinhalablemetalduststhroughoutthedepartment.

MOCA Exposure:TheMOCAmixingandcuringprocessexposedworkerstoahighlytoxicpolymerthatisclassifiedbyIARCasagroup1carcinogen.Thiswasmixedwithoutanyexposurecontrols.Mixersaswellasby-standerswereexposedtothishighlytoxicmaterial.Becausetheywerehandlingthissointimately,mixerswouldbeatgreaterriskofexposures.Managementpersonnelwereeitherunawareofitstoxicityorweregivingfalseinformationtoemployees.OneworkerdescribedhowaforemantookahandfulofMOCApowderandstuckitinhisfaceandsaying,“youcouldputthisonyourbreakfastcerealinthemorning,anditwouldn’tdoyouanyharm.”

JHSC: 10/11/79: re: MOCA hazards: “In an instructionsheetfromOGWhite,IndustrialHygienistofGESchenectady,(MOCA)workersareinstructedtoshowerbeforechangingtostreetclothes.Also,companytosupplyfreshlylaunderedclothingforworkerseachshift.ItisobviousthatourfearsregardingMOCAdangerswerewellfounded.”

MOL: 12/13/78:WorkercomplaintsregardingthegenerationofozonegasduringtheMIG/TIGweldingofaluminum.Ozonelevelsdetectedat0.3ppmexceededtheTLVforozonegas.MOL:05/28/82:Noexhaustventilationduringpouringofmoltenmetaloperationon3rdfloor.

andozonetomigratetootherworkers.Respiratorswereoptionalandwererarelywornbywelders.

Asbestosblanketswereusedduringweldingtoprotectplatedpartsfromweldingsplatter.Welderslayontheseblanketsduringweldingandwouldbecoveredwithasbestosfibresuponcompletion.

Solventdegreasersweretrichloroethane,1,1,1-trichloroethane, and toluene applied by hand cloth.

AfterweldingbusductswerecleanedinaVinylwashcontainingacid.Thesewerethenpaintedwithzincchromateyelloworgreenenamelpaintasafinishcoating.Paintspraygeneratedheavypaintodoursandvapours.Averticalexhaustfanwasprovided.

The paint booth used 5-gallon pails of acetone, lacquer thinner, naphtha gas, MEK and isocyanate paints.

Itwasnotedinplantdocumentsthatthewestendloadingbayofbldg.#30containedunlabeled45gdrumsofPCBsstoredforshippingtoMontreal.

Work conditions:Ventilationwaspoor.Duringwinter,theairwasheavilycontaminatedbecausenaturalventilationfromwindowsanddoorswassealedshut.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.

MOCA Production:MOCAwasmixedandproducedonthethirdfloorofbldg.#30.ThisinvolvedmixingtheMOCAepoxycatalystbyhandinsmallbatchestoproduce6”x4”rectangularpucks.TheMOCAcatalystcameindrumsinpowderedgranuleform,whichproduceddustinthemixingprocess.ThesepuckswereusedandfashionedbyhandtofitontomininghoistdrumsinBldg.#10south.MOCAisclassifiedbyIARCasagroup1carcinogen.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

151

BUILDING: #34 DEPARTMENT: STEEL CUTTING

General DescriptionSteel CuttingSteel WeldingLayoff Painting

Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCuttingOilsGlyptolwhiteleadpaintFumes:metallicsilicatefluride(fromflux),leadoxide(leadprimerpaint)ozone,carbondioxide/monoxide(welding)varsol,cuttingoils(MWFs)Degreasers:TCE,TolueneDust:Metals:carbon,magnesium,sulphur,phosphorus,iron,silica,lead;Other:epoxyRust InhibitorsThermalDecompositionBy-Products:phosgene,silicatefluride,zincoxideVarsol

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

152

Workersinthisdepartmentwerechronicallyexposedtovariousweldingfumes,primarilythroughinhalation.

Sinceworkersateattheirworkstations,dustscontainingvariousmetalcompoundswerealsoingested.Evidenceofaccumulateddustonsurfacesintheworkareaandonadjacentworksurfacesinofficeswouldindicatewidespreadcontaminationandexposuretoweldingdustsandfumes.

Upper respiratory tract symptoms reported by workersindicatemajorinhalationofweldingfumesanddusts.Thisisalsosupportedbythefactthatworkersdidnotwearrespiratoryprotectionandthathousekeepingwaspoor.

Localexhaustwithsmokeeatersprovidedlimitedprotectionandsimplydispersedweldingfumesintothegeneralatmosphereoftheworkplace.

Mildsteelalloysincludecarbon,magnesium,suphur,phosphorus,iron,andsilicawhicharecontainedinbothweldingfumesanddustsinadditiontoby-productsrelatedtodegreasers(TCE)andMWFs(e.g.,varsol,cuttingoil)used.Additionalmaterialsthatcreate by-product fumes/vapours/dusts are linked to epoxyproductssuchastheleadoxideprimerpaintusedinlayoffpainting.Thereisstrongevidenceofsignificantexposurestotheseproductsbecauseofthelargesizeofmaterialsused,thuslargeamountsofchemicalproductsused/producedinworkprocessesasthefollowingMOLreportssubstantiate.Participantsrecalledaclusterofheartattacksamongpersonnel.

MOL:09/03/82:investigationofworkercomplaintregardingupperrespiratorytractirritationfromweldingfumes.Inspectorconfirmedoverexposuretoweldingfumesbutnospecificcomponentidentified.COtestperformedbutnoweldingfumestested.Recommendedconsistentuseofportablelocalexhaust.

General description:Thisdepartment,employing50-100peopleworking2or3shifts,wasdedicatedtocuttingmild-steelplateswithoxy-acetylenetorches,whichwerethenfitbygrindingandassembledusingelectricwelding.Platescouldvaryindimensionbutwereanywherefrom¾”to4”thickandaslargeas10’x20’.Aswell,thesesheetswerepressedintoshape.Thedepartmenthadverylargeshears,a100-tonpressandalargerollingmillusedtorollsteel.Thisoperationwasmovedintobldg.34in1984frombldg.14.

Steel Cutting:Thesteelwascutwithlargeshearsandaseriesofverylargeoxy–acetylenecuttingtorches(referredtoasburners)thatweremechanicallymaneuveredinapre-determinedpattern.Cuttingoil,varsol, and rust inhibitors could be used in the shear cuttingprocessresultinginchemicalexposuresintheformofvapours,fumes,anddust.

Thebuildingmeasuredabout400x100x30feetandwasventilatedbydoorsandwindowsandapoweredrooffan.Approximately30productionworkerswereemployedfor40hoursperweek.

Steel Welding:Theweldingareameasuredabout30x40x25feet.Itisnotseparatedfrombuilding34bywallsandsharesthegeneralventilationwiththisbuilding.Smokeeaterswereprovidedforweldersbutdonotprovidecompleteweldingfumeextraction.

Stickweldingusingflux-coatedmildsteelrodandshieldedarcweldingusinguncoatedsteelwireand75-25argon-carbondioxideareweldingmethodsused.Inthelattermethod,aflowof30to45cubicfeetperhourofshieldinggasisused.

Eightworkersworkedinthisareaandweldingcomprisedatleasthalfoftheirday.Norespiratoryprotectionwasworn.

Withuptothreeweldingoperationsgoingoninadditiontothelargeoxy-acetylenecutting,veryheavyweldingfumesweregeneratedthroughoutthedepartment.Thesefumeswouldmigratetootherareasoftheplant.Degreasingwasalsoextensiveforthepreparationofsheetsforassemblywelding.

Building: # 34 Department: Steel CuttingProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

153

MOL: 11/18/82:Investigationofworkercomplaintregardingweldingfumes.AirconcentrationforweldingfumesexceededtheTLVof5mg/m³.Concentrationsrangedfrom1.2to6.5mg/m³.

MOL: 12/6/82:Investigationofexcessivesmokeandfumesfromlargeburnerscuttingsteel.Nolocalexhaustventilation.Infact,thesmokewasnotexhaustedatall.Noordersissued.Employerindicateditwouldprovidesmokeeatersinfuture.

Workerhealthsymptomsindicativeofproblemsofover-exposuretoweldingdustsandfumeswereidentifiedinJointHealthandSafetyMinutesInadditiontherewasevidenceofsignificantdermalexposuretoleadpaintandfumes,aslargeamountsofleadprimerwasusedonsteelpiecesthatcouldbeupwardsof25-40ft.insize.

JHSC: 12/8/81: Re: dust control in burner area: “Writealettertomanagerandaskhimtoexperimentwithnextprecipitatorthatcomesinandseeifwecancomeupwithsomesortofexhaustforburnersarea.”

JHSC: 12/8/81: Re: dermatitis: “Report that employeeworkingatlayofftablehasseriousdermatitisfromworkingwithwhiteleadpaint.NotesGlyptolpaintcontains2%lead.”

Significant stand by exposures through inhalation.

Therewasinadequatelocalexhaustventilationwithsmokeeatersprovidinglimitedexhaustventilation;necessaryrespiratoryequipmentwasnotprovided.

Workers reported irritated eyes, nose and throat aswellasheadaches.Agreatmanyvisitstothecompanyhospitalbytheworkerswereforsevereheadaches.

Therewasnoventilationinthisbuilding.Itwasalwayssmoky,dependingonthenumberofwelders.FumeswouldtraveltotheGPCarea.Thiswasa200’longbuildingwithweldingandcuttingsootonallsurfaces.Theofficedesksintheareawouldbecoveredinsootthroughouttheday.

Layoff Painting:Leadpaintwasusedtomarksteelpieceswherecuttingwastobedone.Paintingwasdonebyhandonlayofftables.Leadpaintwasthinnedwithnaphtha.

Thereweregreatquantitiesofleadpaint,burnerscreatingfumes,andmajorweldingwithMIGand‘stick’weldinginbldg.34.

Asbestosblanketsusedwherepartsneededprotectionfromweldingoperations.

Balcony 2nd floor: This area carried out assembly andwiring,packingandshippingaswellithadasmallpaintbooth.Fumesanddustsfromtheoperationsbelowwouldmigrateuptothisareathuscreatingseriousbystanderexposurestothesecontaminants.ThistogetherwithpaintfumesfromthepaintboothandtheproductionofFlamonalandotherwirescontributedsignificantlytothesebystanderexposures.

Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

154

ADDENDUM 1

EXPANDED DISCUSSION OF THE QUALITATIVE METHODS USED IN THE GE RETROSPECTIVE EXPOSURE PROFILE STUDY

ThepurposeofthisstudywastodevelopretrospectiveexposureprofilesofproductionprocessesattheGEplantinPeterborough,Ontario.ThiswaspromptedbywhatwasperceivedasanextraordinarilyhighrateofcanceramongGEemployeesandtheconcernsoftheformerGEworkersthattheinformationgatheredtodateaboutexposureswasnotcomprehensiveanddidnotreflectthetrueextentofexposuresandactualworkconditionsattheplantduringtheirtenureattheplant.WiththeexceptionofaverycomprehensiveretrospectiveexposureprofilestudyoftwodepartmentsbyOccupationalHealthClinicsforOntarioWorkers(OHCOW)industrialhygienist,SonyaLal,therewaslittleinformationaboutexposureconditions.Uptothatpointwhatwasrelieduponwerecompanyworkrecords,somecompanyhygienedataandanarrowlybasedexposurematrixdevelopedbythecompanyindustrialhygienestaff.Ineffect,therewaslittleornoinformationgatheredinacomprehensivemannertogetanaccuratepictureofthedaytodayoperationsofthevariousproductionprocessesandtheextentofexposures.

Itwastheviewoftheresearchersthatacomprehensiveretrospectiveexposureprofileoftheplant’smajorproductionactivitycouldbecarriedoututilizingamixedqualitativeresearchmethodology.Theresearcherschosequalitativeresearchdesignandmethodologiesbecausethisapproachwouldbestprovideadeepandrichunderstandingofthedaytodayoperationsbyreconstructingthemajorproductionprocessesasexperiencedbytheemployeesthemselves(Brown2003).

Inessence,byreconstructingtheproductionprocesses/productbeingproduced,materials/chemicalsused,detailedtaskscarriedout,andavailableexposurecontrolsa“measure”oftheextentofexposurecouldbedevelopedviainferencesbasedonidentifiedriskfactorsforexposure(Brown2003;Brophyetal.2012).Increasingly,researchersinpublicandoccupationalhealthareturningtoqualitativemethodseitherontheirown,orinconjunctionwithquantitativemethods,todeterminetheimpactofenvironmentalandworkplacecontaminationonhumanhealth(Brown2003;Brownetal.2006).

Thisoptionismostappropriatebecauseitisabletoaccountforthecomplexcontextinwhichexposurestakeplaceintheworkenvironmentsuchasworkorganization,workregimes,andpowerrelationsatthepointofproduction,exposurestocomplexchemicalmixturesandrecognitionofallroutesofentry,andthefunctioningandavailabilityofexposurecontrols(Keithetal.2015;DeMatteoetal.2012;Simcoxetal.2012;Boiceetal.1999;Stewardetal.1991).Incontrast,muchoftheexposurecontextisleftoutofquantitativedatarelatedtotheextentandprobabilityofexposures.

Thepublishedworksofmanyenvironmentalandoccupationalhealthresearchersusingqualitativemethodsofferacompellingargumentforthevalidityofqualitativeapproachesinhealthresearch.Qualitativeresearchiscontext-dependentandup-closewiththepeopleandthephenomenabeingstudied;itusesexpositorytechniquesandworkstocreateaninteractivedialoguebetween,andamong,theparticipants,whichactsasacheckagainstbiasanderror.Inthissense,theon-goingsocialdialoguewithparticipantsprovidesaself-correctingprocessleadingtoverifiedknowledge(Brown,2003).Additionalrelevantreferencesconsultedonqualitativemethodsinclude:MacEachenetal.2016;Maranoetal.2000;McDonaldetal.2004;Morganetal.1998;NeedlemanandNeedleman1996;andPatton1990.

Verification Methods Used in Qualitative Research:

ThisretrospectiveexposureprofilestudywasdesignedandconductedinaccordwithvalidatedqualitativeresearchmethodstoensurethegenerationofreliableandcredibleinformationabouttheGEproduction

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

155

process--andtheinteractionofworkerswiththoseprocesses.Thiswasundertakeninanefforttoconstructexposureprofilesformajorproductionprocessesineachdepartment.

Thestrength,or“rigor”ofscientificresearchisachievedbymeetingtheconditionsofbothreliabilityandvalidity.Thisistrueinbothquantitativeandqualitativeresearch,buttherouteeachtakesisdifferent(Kvale1989).Inquantitativeresearchthisisprimarilyachievedposthocthroughstatisticalanalysisofstudyresults(i.e.,calculating“p-values”).Incontrast,qualitativeresearchreliesonthecontinualuseofverificationstrategiesfrombeginningtoendbecauseofthedynamic,interactivenatureofthistypeofresearch.Inpracticethisrequiresresearcherstocontinuallymovebetweenresearch“designandimplementationtoensurecongruence[i.e.,a“goodfit”]amongquestionformation,recruitment,datacollectionstrategies,andanalysis”(Morseetal.2002p.10).Notsurprisingly“investigatorresponsiveness”isviewedasessential,ifnotthemostimportantstrategytoensurereliabilityandvaliditybecauseitisthemechanismbywhichresearchersidentifyandcorrecterrorsbeforetheyarebuiltintoadevelopingmodel.Othersignificantverificationstrategiesormechanismsusedinqualitativeresearchinclude:methodologicalcohesion,anactiveanalyticalstance,adequatesampling,andsaturation(Cresswell1997;Morseetal.2002).

Participant Recruitment Process and the Formation of a Permanent Focus Group: The GE Retiree Advisory Committee:

Anexampleoftheinvestigators’effortstoachievecongruenceamongthevariouscomponentsofmethodologymentionedaboveisreflectedintheshiftfromtheoriginalresearchdesignofconducting15ormore“oneoff”focusgroupstoapermanent,on-goingworkingfocusgroupandpurposefulrecruitmentofotherGEworkerswithspecialknowledgeandexperience.Basedonpre-testingofthefocusgroupapproach,theinvestigatorsrecognizedtheneedtomakeadjustmentstoensurethatgroupcompositionandstructurewereappropriateinthecontextofacomplexindustrialoperationaswellasthenatureofourinformationsources,andtheoreticalframework.Throughouttheresearchersweremindfuloftheneedtofollowaresponsive/”iterative”process(LincolnandGuba1985).

InMarch2016,aninitialattempttodeveloparetrospectiveexposureprofilestudyoftheGEplantwasundertakenbyagroupofGEretireesandresearchersusingfocusgroupmethodsorganizedaroundindividualdepartmentsorareas.Inanefforttorecruitinformants,theresearchersandresearchcoordinatormadenumerouspresentationstoretireesgroupsandprovidedsignuppostersthatweredisplayedatcommunityandretireemeetingstorecruitGEworkersaccordingtothedepartmentorareawheretheyhadworked.Twotrialor“pre-test”focusgroupsessionswereheldtotestthequestionnaireanddatacollectionsheet.Itwasimmediatelyevidentthatthis“one-off”methodoffocusgroupinterviewswouldnotleadtoanaccurateanddetaileddocumentationofworkexposuresintheGEplantduetothecomplexityandnumberofproductsdevelopedandworkprocessesemployedovertime.

SeveralmeetingsensuedamongtheGEretiree/researchteamtodiscussproblemsencounteredandwhethertherewereotherwaystoconductamorein-depthanddetailedexposureprofilestudy.Afterconsiderablediscussion,aconsensuswasreachedthata“permanentfocusgroup”beformedmadeupofretireesandresearcherswhowouldcommittothetimerequiredtoretrospectivelydocumenttheworkprocesses,chemicalsandphysicalexposures,departmentbydepartment,withtheintentionofinvitingotherGEretirees,withsignificantandadditionalinformation,tothesegroupmeetings.

Itwasalsodecidedthatalternatesourcesofinformationwouldberequiredinadditiontowhatwastobeprovidedbythefocusgroupandkeyinformants.ThesesourcesincludedMinistryofLabour(MOL)healthandsafetyinspectionreports,jointhealthandsafetycommitteeminutes,internalhealthandsafetyreports,materialsafetydatasheets(MSDSs),technicalproductionmanuals.Manyofthesewereprovidedbythe

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

156

formerLocal524unionhealthandsafetycommitteerepresentative,JohnBall,andsupplementedbyadditionalMOLreportsviaaFreedomofInformationrequest.Subsequently,theuniondeconstructedthesereportsandplacedtheoriginaldocumentsandsummaryinformationonadatabasefortheseandotherdocuments.Thisalsoincludedjointhealthandsafetycommitteereports,MSDSsandinternalmemorandaandreport.TheprocesswasaidedbyasetofhazardmapsthatweredevelopedbyOHCOWafewyearspriorandthosedevelopedbydeceasedretiree,GaryLaneandhiscolleagues,JimDufresneandRogerFowler.Thesevariousdocumentswouldplayacrucialroleintheprocessoftriangulationofthedifferentsourcesofinformationinconfirmingtheaccuracyandreliabilityofinformantinformation.

SecuringameetingspacewheretheAdvisoryCommitteewasfreetosetitsownhoursanddisplaythelargeGEdepartmentalreferencemaps(andothermaterialsassociatedwiththeproject)wasamajorbreakthrough.Oncealocalmeetingsitewasestablished,thecommitmentwasmadetomeettwiceaweekonMondaysandThursdaysfrom1-4pm(andasitturnedoutoftenaslateas6pm)forthepurposeofcarefullydocumenting,buildingbybuilding,theworkprocessesandexposureriskfactorsatPeterboroughGE.

Initially,theretireecomponentconsistedof3womenand5men,whohadeachworkedatGEbetween35and45years.Asagroup,theywerehighlyknowledgeableaboutmany,andforsome,nearlyalldepartments(severalasmobilewelders,oneasajobdispatcherwhomovedthroughouttheplant,anotheraspartofarovinglabourgang,andmosthavingworkedatmultiplejobcategoriesthroughouttheGEfacilityovertheirworklives).InadditiontotheseeightGEretirees,tworetiredhealthresearchersactedasfacilitatorsandquicklybecameimmersedinthe“GEenvironment”themselves.Oneoftheretireemembersservedasstudycoordinator,takingresponsibilityforcommunicationsandminutes.

Theframeworkforthegroup’sfunctioningwasthatitbeopentootherretireesorcommunitymemberswhomightexpressinterestandthatasweprogressedinourworkwewouldseekoutretireeswithexpertiseinparticulardepartmentsand/orworkprocessestoensureascompleteandaccurateinformationaspossiblewouldbedocumented.Atoneoftheearlymeetings,anumber(4)ofGEretireeswhohadworkedinthemaintenancedepartmentwereinvitedspecificallybecauseoftheirplant-wideexperienceandknowledgeofnumerousworkprocessesaswellasvariousmaintenanceprocessesthatwererelevanttoexposures.DuringtheprocessadditionalretireesjoinedtheAdvisoryCommittee.

Forthefirstmonthorso,meetingsbecame“educationalsessions”forthetworesearcherstoestablisha“commonknowledge”aboutGE,asretireespatientlydescribedthebasicsofmotorandelectricalcomponentsproduction;introducedresearcherstothephysicalandculturalenvironmentoftheGEplantthroughpictures,stories,andGEdocuments;sharedgenericvideosofspecificworkprocesses;andsensitizedresearcherstothetremendousvariationandnumberofmotor/electrical-relatedproductsthatwereproducedatGEovertheperiodoftimetheyworkedthere.

Atthesametime,retireesreceivedanorientationintothebasicprinciplesofindustrialhygiene,toensureacommonmeaningtothestructuredandopen-endedquestionsthatguidedthediscussionsoffocusgroupmeetings.Thisincludedconceptsof(chemical)routesofentryintothebody,thebasicbodysystemsandpointsofvulnerabilitytotoxicchemicalsandphysicalagents,andthehierarchyofexposurecontrols.

Overtime,our“mainstay”AdvisoryCommitteegrewto13peopleasseveralotherretireesjoined.Duringthecourseof8monthsspentdocumentingworkexposuresattheGEplant,themeetingswereattendedbynolessthan8andasmanyas15participantsforspecialsessions.Mostmeetingsincluded8-10Advisorycommitteemembers.InadditiontoinvitingotherGEworkerstomeetings,informationwasobtainedfromretireesonaperson-to-personbasisandbyphone.Meetingswerefocused,lively,andparticipatoryandwhilethereweresomewithgreaterscientificknowledgeorexperiencerelatedtothetopicathand,discussionswereinclusivebasedonthehighlevelofsharedworkexperienceamongretirees.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

157

PerhapsthemostimportantcharacteristicofallwhocomprisedtheresearchteamwasasharedcommitmenttotakewhatevertimewasrequiredtoproduceahighqualityandaccuraterepresentationofGEworkprocessesandtheexposureriskstheseposedtoemployees.WiththissenseofdedicationtoaccuratelydepictingtheproductionprocessatGE,theAdvisoryCommitteebecameahighlyfunctioningresearchteam.Teammemberssoonbecameproficientinthemethodsofqualitativeresearch--intheirmodeofquestioning,attentiontodetail,doggednessingettingthecompletepicture,sensitivitytonegativeorcontradictoryinformation,andimportanceofpursuinginformationthroughavarietyofavenues.Inall,morethan75GEworkersand/orfamilymemberscontributedtothisproject.TheirnamesarelistedinAppendix1.Weapproximatethattogether,thosewhoparticipatedrepresentbetween2000and2500workyearsatPeterboroughGE.Thiswastrulyparticipatoryresearchinaction.

Theoretical Framework and Concepts:

Thisresearchdesignwasguidedbyatheoreticalframeworkthatwasbasedonconceptsderivedfromthedisciplineofindustrialhygienewithparticularemphasisonriskfactorsaffectingexposures.Ourapproachwasarisk-basedapproach.Thatis,alleffortsweredirectedtodetermining:theprobabilityorriskofexposuregiventhemannerinwhichproductionwascarriedoutattheplant;stepsortasksinvolvedintheproductionprocess;thematerialsused,howtheywereused;thequantityused,itsphysicalstate(s);thesizeoftheproductsbeingproduced;theexistenceandfunctioningofexposurecontrols;odours/smoke,symptoms;workpractices;housekeeping;provisionofprotectiveequipment;healthandsafetytraining;knowledgeofthehazards;workorganization;thegeneralatmosphereandworkregimes.Allofthesefactorscontributetotheriskandprobabilityofexposure.

Inconjunctionwiththelimitedhygienedataavailable,theseriskfactorsprovidedindirectmeasuresinoureffortstoreconstructtheexposurehistoriesoftheindustrialprocesses.By“indirect”ismeantthatinferencesabouttheextentofexposurecouldbemadefromdetaileddescriptiveinformationabouttheinteractionbetweentheworkerandtheworkprocessandtheidentificationofriskfactors.Theresearchersalsotookmeasurestoaccountforthelonglatencyperiodforcancerrangingfromseveralyearstoseveraldecadesbetweenfirstexposureanddiagnosis.Thisinvolvedprofilingexposuresdatingbackthirtyormoreyearsbyexploringprocessesastheyexistedmanyyearsagoandtracingtheirevolutionovertime.Inthislatterregard,theinvestigatorswerefortunatebecausetheGEworkexperienceoftheparticipantsrangedbetween35and45years.

Conduct of Advisory Group Discussions:

Focusgroupdiscussionswereguidedbyaseriesofbothstructuredandopen-endedquestionsonadepartment-by-departmentbasis–whichinturnwerealsoguidedby,andconsistentwith,thetheoreticalframeworkthatinformedthestudydesign.Astimewentondiscussionbecamelessformalizedaseveryoneknewwhatinformationwasrequiredandamorenaturalisticdialoguetookplace,unlesswehadavisitingparticipantandthenwerevertedtothemorestructuredapproach.Thisprocessofgroupdiscussionwentontwiceaweekfornearly8months,usuallywiththeadditionofotherinvitedretireesbecauseoftheirin-depthexperiencewithcertainprocesseswithinadepartment.Thegeneralsetofquestionsaskedofretireeinformants included:

HowmanyyearsdidyouworkatGE?

Howmanyyearsdidyouworkinthisdepartment?

Whatwasproducedinyourdepartment?

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

158

Describethemajorproductionactivitiesinthisdepartment?

Giveusabreakdownoftheprocessesrequiredtocompleteeachoftheseproducts?

Whatmaterialsandchemicalwereusedinproduction?

Whatformdidthesetake,e.g.liquid,mist,vapor,gas,dustorsolid?

Howmuchofthechemicalwasused,e.g.pint,quart,gallon(s),tanks?

Howwasthechemicalapplied,directlyhandled,byhand,closeby,confinedspace,isolation?

Howlongdidyouusethischemical?

Describehowtheproductwasapplied?

Werethereanyodors,fumesorsmoke?

Didworkershowanyadversesymptoms?

Wasthegovernmentinspectorcalledin,workrefusal,complaints?

Wasprotectiveequipmentprovided,whattype,wasitused?

Wastherelocalexhaustventilationprovided?

Ifso,wasitworkingtoremovecontaminants?

Whatwasthestateofhousekeeping?

Whatwasthegeneralimpressionoftheworkenvironment?

Whatweresomeoftheobstaclestogettingsafetyproblemsaddressed?

Didworkerseat,drinkorsmokeattheirworkstation?

INFORMATION GATHERING, DATA ANALYSIS, VERIFICATION METHODS

Advisorygroupdiscussionsweredocumentedthroughwrittennotestakenbytworesearchersandthe(GEworker)projectcoordinator.Thiswasapracticaldecisionduetoeconomicandtimeconstraintsbutwasfoundtobeadvantageous.Thenotesgeneratedwereregularlycomparedforaccuracyandclarificationaftercommitteemeetings;oftenthiswouldbedonethroughphoneconferencing.Discussionsontheinformationgatheredwouldfocusonaccuracyandwhatwerefelttobegapsorinconsistenciesintheaccounts.Theseissueswouldbenotedandbroughtupatthebeginningofthenextmeetingforclarification,ortheprojectcoordinatorwouldemailmembersrequestingfurtherinformationorareviewofrelevantindustrialhygieneliteraturepriortothenextmeeting.Uponreflectionbothresearchfacilitatorsfoundthenotetakingtobevaluablesinceitrequiredactiveandfocusedlisteningatalltimes,andreinforcedthroughrepetitionandsensoryinputcomplicatedanddetailedinformationaboutGEproductionprocessestowhichthefacilitatorshadonlyrecentlybeenintroduced.Inthecourseofdocumentingthemeetingsthereemergedagrowing“parallel”listofexposurerisksthatcametobeviewedas“common”toallGEworkers.

Thedynamicoffocusgroupdiscussionswaslivelyandargumentativeattimes,withmembersoftenraisingquestionaboutfactualaccuracy.Discussionswereopen,frankbutrespectful.Thetenorofdiscussionproducedacrosscheckingoffactsandeventualagreementandconsensus.Thiswasamajorstrengthof

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

159

thefocusgroupdynamicinthatitwasacheckagainsterrorandpersonalbias—animportantpartoftheverificationprocessthatwentonthroughout.AsharedcommitmenttoproduceanaccuratereportontheworkconditionsintheGEplantunderlieandtemperedthedesiretoachieveconsensus.

Attribution:

Thedescriptionsoftheproductionprocessesandworkconditionsarenotattributedtoanyoneindividual.Theinformationgleanedfromthefocusgroupprocessisattributedtothefocusgroupasawholeincludingthosewhoparticipatedfromtimetotime.ThenamesofallparticipantsarelistedinAppendix1.

Dynamic Interaction and Verification:

Thenatureofthedynamicinteractionamongparticipantscontaineditsownverificationprocesswhichactedasacheckforaccuracyandbias.Therewereoccasionsinwhichparticipantsdisagreedwithanother’saccountwhichwouldbringforwardalengthydiscussionuntiltheissuewasresolvedleadingtoconsensus.Also,theresearchersfoundthatdifferentparticipantsoftendescribedsimilaraccountsofexposureconditionsoreventsindependentofoneanother,servingtoreinforceconfidenceintheaccuracyofparticipants’recollectionsanddescriptionsofproductionprocesses.

Hazard Mapping Process:

Theresearchmethodsincorporatedhazardmappingtechniques(Keith2001;Keith2004)intheutilizationofseverallarge3’x4’blockdiagrammapswithafloorplanofthelocationsofalldepartments.Thesemapsdepictedthelayoutoftheplant,identifyingvariousproductionprocessesandthelocationanduseofvariouschemicalsandotherhazardousmaterials.Theywerepostedonthewallsaroundtheroomwithtwoothersplacedontheconferencetablewhereweworked.Threetypesofmapswereusedtoaiddiscussion.Theseincluded:AmaplocatingmajorcarcinogensusedatGE,whichwasdevelopedbyOHCOWviaparticipatorymappingsessionsaround2004.TwoothermapsproducedundertheleadershipofGEemployee,GaryLanewithRogerFowlerandJimDufresnein2015-16identifyingthedepartmentalorarealocationofchemicalsused,includingsolventandresintanksandcertainproductionworkstations.Theselatter(GaryLane)mapsrepresentedtwodifferentperiodsoftimeandprovidedthelocationofmajorchemicalsusedindifferentproductionprocessesforthesedifferenttimeperiods.Thesemapswerevitaltodiscussionanddocumentationthroughouttheconductofthestudy.

Withthesemapsasbackdropweaskedfocusgroupparticipantstodescribetheworkflow,jobtasks,chemicalsusedandhowtheyusedthem,thequantitiesused,thesourcesofventilation,etc.(Seeresearchquestionsabove).Importantly,theresearchersfoundthatthegraphicrepresentationhelpedparticipantsrecalldetailsandmoreclearlydescribeconditions.

Other Sources of Verification:

Anotherelementoftheresearchprocessthatassistedindataverificationwastheadditionofavailabledocumentationofconditionsintheplantfromexternalandinternalsources.Includedamongthese,wasacollectionofofficialGEreports,minutesandinternalmemosthatweredeconstructedforidentificationpurposesandtheninputtedintoUnifor’sRAWCdatabase.Documentsincluded:over700MinistryofLabour/DepartmentofHealthinspectionreports,JointHealthandSafetyCommitteeMinutes,internalcompanycorrespondences,MSDSs,allofwhichhavebeenenteredintostorageandretrievaldatabasebyUNIFOR,theunionrepresentingGEworkers.Thesedocumentswereusedtoprovideadditionalinformationabouttheproductionprocessandtoconfirmorchallengeconditionsdescribedbymeetingparticipants.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

160

AdvisoryCommitteemembersalsoconsultedtheindustrialhygieneliteratureforadditionalinformationonspecificindustrialprocesses.Forexample,wereviewed,indepth,thescientificindustrialhygieneliteratureonelectroplatingprocesses,plasticsproductionandweldingoperations.ThiscouldformthebasisfordiscussionofsimilarprocessesintheGEplanttonotesimilaritiesanddifferences.Despiteclaimsbythecompanythatchemicalswerecontainedwithin“departments”,memosfromthecompanysafetymanagersrevealedandconfirmedthattheventilationsystemwasundernegativepressure,causingsubstantialcrosscontaminationbetweendepartmentsandprocesses.MOLinspectionreportsconfirmedconsistentlypoorhousekeeping,andpoortonon-existentlocalexhaustventilation.Thesearenotedinthemainbodyofthereportandthefullinspectionreports,memos,orMSDScanbeeasilyretrievedfromtheUniforRAWCdatabase.

Issues Related to Adequate Sampling and Saturation:

Despitelimitedresources,otherthanAdvisoryCommitteemembersthemselves,arobustandmethodologicallystrongresourceforassessingworkplaceexposureswasproduced.Thebreadthanddepthoftheworkliesinthefactthattherewerenottworesearchersonthecommitteebutthirteen.Ineffect,theAdvisoryCommittee“livedandbreathed”thisprojectformonths,withindividualmembersspendingmanyadditionalhoursonthephone,visitingpeople,searchingtheInternet,visitinglocallibraries,trackingdownknownsourcesofinformationthatothersheldormighthaveaccessto,alltoensurethattheinformationgeneratedwasasaccurateandcompleteaspossible--giventhecomplicatedandcontinuallychangingworkplacethatwasGE.

Duringthemonthsspentwritingupthereport,theauthorswouldoftensendoutarequesttothecoordinatorforconfirmationoradditionalinformationandshewouldimmediatelyemailourrequesttoothercommitteemembers.Wewereneverdisappointedandusuallyreceivedmoreinformationordocumentationthanweaskedfor.Forthemostpartthosewhoparticipatedwerefront-lineworkers;afewmanagers/leadersparticipated(thoughmorewereasked)andhadfirstworkedmanyyearsatGEoutsideoftheirmanagementroles.Therewereareasanddepartmentswithfeweremployeeswhereitwasdifficulttolocatepastworkers;theyhaddied,moved,wereill,ornotableorwanttocometoameeting--thoughsomeconsentedtophoneinterviews.Amongcommitteemembersandinvitedparticipantswereanumberofworkerswithin-depthknowledgeoftheGEplantthroughtheirworkexperienceswhowereintegraltoworkdevelopingriskprofiles.

TheresearchfacilitatorswerecontinuallyamazedatthehighlevelofdiscussionandsophisticatedknowledgeexhibitedbyGEworkers.TheyallviewedtheiryearsatGEashavingbeenatremendouseducationandknewtheyhadbeeninvolvedinworkthatreflectedthe“cuttingedge”ofthemodernelectricalage.Asworkers,theyproudlydescribedbeing“troubleshooters”thatworkedoutproblemsinproductionorevendevelopednewtechniquesthatthenservedasatemplateforworkprocessesatotherGEplants.

Theparticipantswerescientificallyastuteandtookpersonalinterestintheworktheyandtheirco-workersdidandcoulddiscusstheworkprocessesofmostotherdepartmentsfromaplaceofknowledgeandinterest.Thework“ticket”systematGEallowed,andevenencouraged,traininginotherdepartments,asapersonalinsurancepolicyagainstunemploymentorastheopportunitytotrysomethingnew,orseekhigherpay.Themajoritytookadvantagebyobtainingtheseadditional“tickets”andtheirworkrecordsreflectedpositionsthroughouttheplant.

Thereisamistakentendencytoview“bluecollar”workersaslessinformedandlessthoughtfulthantheprofessionalizedsectorofsociety.Whilethiscouldbenofurtherfromthetruthgiventhedynamicencounterexperiencedinthisstudy,thisprejudiceremainsamajorimpedimentforhavingtheirworkplacehealthconcernsaddressedbygovernmentandcompanyofficials.Giventhehumanandtemporallimitationsassociatedwiththisproject,otherthanhavingaccesstoGE’sowndetailedinformationonthePeterborough

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

161

plant,theadvisorycommitteebelievestheyhavedoneallthatwaspossibletomeettherequirementsof“samplingadequacy”anddata“saturation.”

SampleAdequacy:Intotal,over75participantscontributedinformationaboutplantoperationsgenerally,anddetailsaboutindividualdepartmentsorworkprocesses.TheyrepresentedeverypartoftheGEfacilityandrepresentedworkexperiencesspanning35to45yearsandwerethusabletogiveadynamicpictureoftheplantovertheyears.Thisisamorethanadequatesampletoprovideacomprehensiveandaccurateaccountoftheproductionoperations.

Saturation:Theinvestigativegroupprocesseswhichtookplaceoverapproximately3yearsandintenselyfor8monthsprovidedexceptionallyrich,comprehensiveanddetailedinformationaboutthemajorproductionprocessesatGE.Researcherswillalwaysdesiremoreinformationandneverfeelsatisfiedthattheyhave“everything.”However,itiswithouthesitationthattheauthorsassertthattheinformationgleanedfromallsources—focusgroups,oneononeinterviews,reviewsofrecords,reports,etc.providedthisinvestigationwithsufficientinformationtoprovideareliableandvalidatedpictureoftheexposureconditionsattheGEfacilitybetween1945and2000.

Issues Related to Methodological Coherence:

Methodologicalcoherencereferstothefitofthevariouscomponentsofqualitativeresearch(sampling,interviewquestions,analyticalprocedures,specificaudienceorpurpose)withthedata.Morseetal.(2002p.12)notethat“tomeetanalyticalgoals,thefitofthesedifferentcomponentsmustbecoherent,witheachverifyingthepreviouscomponentandthemethodologicalassumptionsasawhole.”ThroughoutthisworktheinvestigatorsremainedsensitivetothefitbetweenthevariousaspectsofdatacollectionandthepurposeofthisworkwhichwastoprovideanalternativesourceofinformationontheriskofexposuretochemicalandphysicalagentsforworkersattheGEfacility(1945-2000).Inaddition,considerationwasgiventohowthisinformationcouldbestbepresentedtoprovideadetailedbutaccessibleexposureassessmentthatwouldprovideamorerealisticpictureofworkplaceconditions.Thefinalreportanditsstructurecanbeviewedasan“organic”resultofthemethodsofinquiryemployedandindustrialhygienescienceviewedthroughabroad,historical,socialsciencelens.Bycontextualizingworkandworkprocesses,webelievearicherandmorerobustpictureemergesoftheactualworkexperienceofthoseemployedatPeterboroughGEduringtheyears1945-2000.

(March29,2017)RobertDeMatteoandDaleDeMatteo

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

162

ADDENDUM 2

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE

Inconsideringtheretrospectiveexposureprofilessomeperspectiveisinorderwithregardtocurrentinterpretationsattachedtonumericalexposurelevelstovariouschemicalsaswellastheresultsofepidemiologicalstudies.Firstly,thereistheassumptionthatnoharmshouldhavecometoworkersifexposurelevelswerebelowtheregulatedoccupationalexposurelimitsorThresholdLimitValuessetbytheAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienist(ACGIH).Secondly,therecanbetheinterpretationofnegativeepidemiologicalstudiesasindicatingthatthereisnoassociationbetweenthediseaseandthechemicalexposuresstudied.

Inresponsetotheseassumptionsitisimportanttorecognizethatthevalidityoftheseapproachesisbeingchallengedbyalargeandgrowingnumberofresearchersinthefieldofoccupationalandenvironmentalmedicine.InwhatfollowstheauthorspresentasummaryofthosecriticalfindingsthatraiseseriousquestionsaboutthereliabilityofoccupationalexposurelimitsandTLVsforassessingexposuresaswellasthemisusesandmisinterpretationofepidemiologicalfindings.Whileepidemiologicalstudyisapowerfultoolinstudyingtherelationshipbetweendiseaseanditscauses,itsmethodsmustbecarefullyscrutinizedtoavoidmisinterpretationoftheresults.

ARE THE OELS/TLVS PROTECTIVE?

General Background on ACGIH TLVs:

TheAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienists(ACGIH)wasestablishedin1938atameetinginWashington,D.C.ThisorganizationisknownworldwidefortheannualpublicationofitslistofThresholdLimitValuesforChemicalSubstances(TLV-CS),developedbytheTLV-CSCommittee.ManygovernmentshaveadoptedtheseTLVguidelinesaslegalexposurelimits.

Briefly,TLVs“refertoairborneconcentrationsofchemicalsubstancesandrepresentconditionsunderwhichitisbelievedthatnearlyallworkersmayberepeatedlyexposed,dayafterday,overaworkinglifetime,withoutadverseeffects.TLVsaredevelopedtoprotect“workerswhoarenormal,healthyadults”(ACGIH2016).AccordingtotheACGIH,TLVsare“developedasguidelinestoassistinthecontrolofhealthhazards”(ACGIH2016).TheyareclaimedtobetheresultofreviewsofscientificliteraturebytheTLV-CSCommittee.Whiletheyarenotlegallimits,manyhavebeenadoptedassuchbygovernmentsaroundtheworld,includingOntario.

Early Criticism of the ACGIH/TLVs:

Inastudypublishedin1988,BarryCastlemanandGraceZiemdescribedthecorporateinfluenceonthedevelopmentofTLVs.Theyexploredtheincentivesforthechemicalindustry’spromotionofhigherTLVsallowingthemtoreduceregulatoryandliabilitycosts.TheirresearchshowedthattheTLVsfornumeroussubstancesdependedlargely,andinsomeinstancesentirely,onunpublishedcorporatecommunicationsandreportswhichcontainedscientificallyunreliableorunsoundinformation.TheirstudiesalsodocumenttheindustryconnectionsofTLVcommitteemembers(CastlemanandZiem1988;ZiemandCastleman1989;CastlemanandZiem1994).

RoachandRappaporthavealsocriticizedthevalidityoftheassertionthatTLVsarehealth-basedlimits.Inreviewingtheannual(1976and1986)DocumentationoftheTLVs,producedbytheTLV-CSCommittee,only

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

163

aminorityofstudiesshowednoadverseeffectsbelowtheTLV.Theauthorsobservedthat,tosomeextent,manyTLVsrepresentwhatindustryperceivestobetechnicallyfeasibleratherthanhealthrelated(RoachandRappaport1990).

Ina1993follow-uparticle,RappaportarguedthattheOccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministration(OSHA)shouldadoptaspeedierpermissibleexposurelimit(PEL)approvalprocess,sothatunreliable/invalidACGIHTLVsneednotberelieduponasdefaultlimits.TheauthornotedthattheACGIHTLVsareslowlybeinglowered,butmoreforcarcinogensthanchemicalsthatcauseotherserioushealtheffects(Rappaport1993).

Additional Studies:

AdditionalstudieshavebeenpublishedthatbuildonthethemesputforwardbyCastleman,Ziem,Rappaport,andRoach.Whatfollowsisasmallsampleofthefindingoftheseworks:AquantitativeinternationalcomparativestudyofexposurelimitsbyLindaSchenketal,identifiedthetendencyforlimitstodecreaseovertime,butnotedthewidevariabilitybetweenlimitsforthesamechemicalindifferentcountries(Schenketal.2008).AnotherarticledescribedtheNetherland’sreassessmentofexposurelimitsinthemid-2000s.WhileoriginallyhavingadoptedtheACGIHTLVs,thegovernment’sreassessmentdeterminedthatoverhalfthevalueswereeithertoohigh--ornotscientificallysupportedasahealth-basedlimit(Stoutenetal.2008).

Rappaportalsoidentifiedthatmanyoccupationalexposurestudieshaveverysmallsizesordonotincludeexposuremeasurementsatall.Heidentifiedthatexposuremeasurementsweremostoftenincludedinstudiesthatdatedfromthe1920stothe1960s(Rappaport2009).Anotherarticle,co-authoredbythesameauthor(RappaportandKupper2008),discussestheoriginsof,anddebatessurrounding,occupationalexposureassessments,includingtheACGIHTLVsandtheUSfederalgovernment’sOSHAstandards.TheauthorsnotedthatfollowingthecriticalarticlesofCastlemanandZiem,andRoachandRappaport,theACGIHchangeditsapproachtoTLVs,applying“morestringenthealthcriteriaasevidencedbytheincreasedrateofreductionofTLVs,especiallyforcarcinogens"(RappaportandKupper2008).Forexample,theTLVforBenzenedecreased2.5foldfrom1957to1974,andthen20foldfrom1974-1997.TheauthorsremaincriticaloftheOSHAstandardsettingprocessonthegroundsthatitisinterpretedasanaverageandnotalimit,andthatfeasibilityissometimesjudgedbythestandardsofheavilypollutingindustries,eventhoughthemajorityofindustrycouldfeasiblyachieveamuchlowerPEL(RappaportandKupper2008).

AshortarticlebyCastleman(2006)reviewedtheadoptionoftheTLVfortrichloroethylene(TCE).IllustratingalegacyofcorporateinfluenceonTLVdevelopment,henotedthattheminutesofa1981meetingregardingtheTLVforTCEwererecordedonDOWstationary--andthatDOWwasamajormanufacturerofTCE(Castleman2006).Importantly,withrespecttoreformoftheACGIH,Castlemanfurtherarguesthat:“evenwiththebestmotivations,itissimplybeyondtheresourcesofavolunteercommittee,withlittlefinancialsupport…torepairtheaccumulateddamageofsomanyyearsofflawedTLVsonthelist”(Castleman2006p.308).

TheotheraspectoftheimpactofcorporateinfluenceiswhatrenownedendocrinologistsFrederickvomSaalcalledthe“fundingeffect.”Inanextensivereviewof115invivoandinvitrostudiesoftheeffectsofBisphenolA,94studiesfoundsignificanteffects.Thirty-onefoundsignificanteffectsatdosesbelowthe“safe”threshold.Whilenoindustry-fundedstudieshavereportedsignificanteffects,over90%ofgovernmentfundedstudiesdidreportsignificanteffects.AccordingtovomSaalandHughes,someindustry-fundedstudiesusedexperimentalratsthatwerenotappropriateforstudyingestrogenicresponseandothersignoredtheresultsofpositivecontrols(vomSaalandHughes2005).Nonetheless,chemicalmanufacturerscontinuetodiscountthesepublishedfindingofpositivestudiesbecausenoindustrystudieshavereportedsignificanteffects.Similarly,theworkofGennaroandTomaticexplores“businessbias”inepidemiologicalstudiesanditsinfluenceonstudyoutcomes(GennaroandTomatic2005).

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

164

LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY TOXICOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT ON STANDARD SETTING

Regulatorytoxicologysufferssimilartendenciestounderstateadverseeffectsasaresultofquestionableparadigmsusedfortestingforadverseeffects--andisalsovulnerabletocorporateinfluence.Thisisplayedoutinthecurrentriftinthescientificcommunitybetweenregulatorytoxicologistswhorelyoncomputersimulationscalled“physiologicallybasedpharmacokinetics”(PBPK)modelingandhealtheffectsresearchers,includingendocrinologists,developmentalbiologistsandepidemiologists,whodrawtheirconclusionsfromdirectobservationsofhowchemicalsactuallyaffectlivingthings.Whilethedebatemayseemesoteric,theoutcomewillhaveasignificantimpactonenvironmentalandoccupationalhealth.Itisshapinghowgovernmentregulatesenvironmentalandoccupationalhealthandhowworkersareprotected(ornot)fromtoxicexposures--aswellashowweassessdiseasecausationfromtheseexposures(BrownandGrossman2015;Huff2007;RappaportandKupper2008).

TheoriginsofthePBPKtestingparadigm(thatusescomputersimulationstotrackhowchemicalsmovethroughthebody)beganinthemid-1980amongscientistsattheWright-PattersonToxicHazardsResearchUnit(aDepartmentofDefensefacility)attheWright-PattersonU.S.AirforceBaseinDayton,Ohio.Knownasinsilico,thesecomputermodelsarepresentedasanalternativetotestingchemicalinvivo(inliveanimals)orinvitro(inatesttube).Theyallowscientiststoestimatewhatconcentrationsofachemical(oritsbreakdownproducts)endupinparticularorgansortissue,andhowlongtheytaketoexitthebody.Thisinformationcanbecorrelatedwithexperimentaldata,butsometimesisnot.Thesimulationmodeltestingisfasterandcheaperforbothindustryandregulators,butithasseriousdrawbacks.Amajorproblemisthat,byitself,PBPKtestingdoesnotprovideapictureofthehealthimpact.Incontrast,biologicalstudiesandexperimentsaredesignedtodiscoverhowchemicalsinteractandaffectbiologicalprocesses.SupportersofPBPKacknowledgethatthemethodisalwayslimitedbythequalityofthedatathatgoesintothemodel.Theproblemisthatmodellingisvulnerabletothemanipulationofdatainputaswellasthefinalriskassessment,asbotharesubjecttoinfluencebecauseoffinancialorothertiestoxicologistsmayhavewithindustry(BrownandGrossman2015).

TheliteratureisrepletewithinstanceswherePBPKstudieswereusedtomakechemicalsappearsafer.Forexample,industryfunded/associatedresearchinstitutessuchasCIIT/Hamner,utilizingPBPKmodellingmethods,havedownplayedtheriskanddelayedregulationorimplementationofmorerigorousexposurelimitsforanumberofwidelyusedandcommerciallylucrativechemicals.Theseincludeformaldehyde,trichloroethylene,BPA,methylenechloride,styrene,acrylonitrile,andthepesticidechlorpyrifos(BrownandGrossman2015).

Studiessomewhatcriticalofcurrentpracticesinoccupationalmedicineandpublichealthwerepublishedina2008issueofNewSolutions:AJournalofEnvironmentalandOccupationalHealthPolicy.IncludedwasanarticlebyBohme-RankinandEgilmanidentifyingthat“corporatescience”isbecomingmorewidespread,characterizedby“manipulationofevidence,dataandanalysis[and],ultimatelydesignedtomaintainfavourableconditionsforindustry”(Bohme-RankinandEgilman2008).Inasimilarexpose/advocacypieceentitled“IndustryInfluenceonOccupationalandEnvironmentalPublicHealth,”JamesHuffprovidesnumerousexamplesoftheimpactofindustryinfluenceonoccupationalandenvironmentalandpublichealthresearchbynotonlyfundingresearch,butincreatingitsowninfrastructureforhealthresearch(Huff2007).Similarobservationshavebeenmadeinmedicinewithrespecttothepharmaceuticalandmedicaltechnologyindustries(Angell2009;Lexchinetal.2003).

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

165

LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY EPIDEMIOLOGY

Inconsideringthesedifferentapproachestoacomprehensiveunderstandingofthehealthimpactofexposuresincomplexindustrialprocesses,awordabouttheinherentlimitationsofepidemiologyandtoxicologyisinorder.Forexample,epidemiologicalstudiesoftensufferfrompoorresearchdesign,misclassificationofexposuresandinsufficientstatisticalpowertodetectarisktohealth.Togetherthesefactorsarelargelyresponsibleforunderstatingtheextentofriskandprematureconclusionsforlackofassociation.Forexample,numerousstudiesreviewedbyGoldbergandLebrechtfoundnon-significantexcessriskbecausetherewasinsufficientstatisticalpowertodetectariskofaparticularmagnitude.Intheirreviewof115occupationalbreastcancerstudies,theseauthorsfoundthatthemediannumberofbreastcancercaseswas19withanaverageofonly64cases.Onlyfivestudieshadmorethan100cases.Theynotethateventhough75%ofstudieshadstatisticalpowerabove80%thesmallnumberofcasesseriouslylimitedtheabilitytodetectrisksinsubgroupsandtestforexposuretrends(GoldbergandLebrecht1996).Thechallengeforresearchersliesinovercomingtheinherentlimitationsofthedominantscientificparadigmforestablishingcausation.

The Case of the Peterborough GE Health Study:

ThesesamescientificproblemsareassociatedwiththePeterboroughGEHealthStudybyHoseinandGhiculete,whichinits“PhaseII”casecontrolexploration,concludedthattherewasnoassociationbetweenthelungcancersidentifiedamongGEworkersandthetoxicchemicalexposuresattheplant,whenintruththestudylackedthestatisticalpowertodetectsuchanincreasedrisk.Inthisstudytheauthorsadmitonpage47:

“Fromthetablebelowweseethatforanexposurevariablewithaprevalenceofabout45%,inthisstudywouldhavemorethan80%powerofdetectingarelativeriskof2orgreater.

However,foranexposurevariablewithprevalenceintherangeof5to10percentwewouldhave80%powerofdetectingrelativeriskintherangeof2.5to3.0”.(HoseinandGhiculete2003)

Thusoneoftheseriousproblemswiththeabovestudyisitssmallsamplessize.Althoughtheauthorsstatethelackofstatisticalpoweraccuratelyintheabovequote,theydonotidentifythisseriouslimitationintheirconclusions.Ineffect,atruerelativeriskoflessthan2couldnotbedetectedasstatisticallysignificant.Todetectarisklowerthantwofoldthestudywouldrequireaconsiderablelargersamplesize.

Theauthorsconclusiononpage78statingthat“…therewasnoassociationbetweenlungcancerdeathsandanyofthecarcinogens…”ismisleading(HoseinandGhiculete2003).Itwouldbemorecorrecttostatethattherewasnostatisticallysignificantassociationobservedbetweenlungcancerandanyofthecarcinogens.Anditshouldfurtherbeexplainedthatthisresultcouldarisebecause,infact,therewasnoassociationorbecausetherewasanassociationthatcouldnotbedetectedduetothesmallsamplesize.Thisiswhat,inepidemiologyisreferredtoasanegativeerror—astudythat(bydesign)cannotfindanelevatedriskthatis,infact,present.

Also,theGEhealthstudylikelysuffersfromseriousmisclassificationofexposures,whichisamajorsourceofsystematicerrorthatcanbiasthestudytowardsthenullhypothesis.Thisassessmentisbasedontheresultingretrospectiveexposureprofilesofworkprocessesandexposureconditionsconstructedinourstudy.Thismethodologicalproblemhasbeenexploredintheepidemiologicalliteratureindicatingthatsucherrorscanseriouslyunderstatethetruerelativerisk(Dosemicietal.1990;dosSantos1999).

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

166

Making Cancer Clusters Disappear:

MakingcancerclustersdisappearisnotuniquetothePeterboroughGEcancercluster.Asimilarsituationarosein1979whentheU.S.OccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministrationdiscoveredaclusterof23primarybraincancerscalledglioblastomasamongworkerswhoworkedatvinylchlorideplantownedbyUnionCarbide/DowChemicalinTexasCity,Texas.Themainsuspectwasvinylchloride(VC).AccordingtoOSHA,afterinvestigatingtheclusterfor3years,thiswasthelargestclusterofbraincancerseverreported.Duringthistime,industrystudieswerefindinghigherthanexpectedoccurrencesofbraincancersatvinylchlorideplants,andin1979theInternationalAgencyofResearchonCancerhadtakentheunequivocalpositionthatvinylchloridecausesbraincancer(Heath2016).

Yettoday,accordingtotheCenterforPublicIntegrity,“thescientificliteraturelargelyexoneratesvinylchloride.”AfterasecondIARCreviewin1987whichsupportedthebrain/VCconnection(IARC1987),theChemicalManufacturersAssociation(CMA)commissionedSirRichardDolltoreviewpublishedVCepidemiologicalstudies(Doll1988).WhileDollfoundanelevatedrateofbraincancers,hereportedthatthesewerenotstatisticallysignificant,butdidnotreporttheconfidenceintervals(Doll1988).AlsoDolldidnotacknowledgehisfundingsource,whichwastheChemicalManufacturersAssociation(Sassetal.2005).Itisimportanttonotethatpriortothis,evidenceofabraincancerassociationwithvinylchlorideexposurecontinuedtomountafter1988.Forexample,a1991studybyindustryresearcherOttoWongreportedsignificantexcessdeathsfrombraincancerandconcludedthat“thisupdateconfirmstheexcessincancerofthebrainand[centralnervoussystem]”(Wongetal.1991).Wong’sstudywasamongfoursuchstudiestofindexcessofbraincancersamongvinylchlorideworkers(Doll1988;TabershawandGaffey1974;Mundtetal.2000;Wongetal.1991).

However,twoyearslaterWongpublishedaretractionsaying,“weconcludethatourfindingofanexcessofbraincanceramongU.S.vinylchlorideworkersreportedearlierwasnotlikelyrelatedtothechemical”(WongandWhorton1993).ItwasnotedthatWongwasunderheavypressurefromtheChemicalManufacturersAssociationtorecantsincehehadnotreceivedpermissiontopublishthestudyfromtheCMA(Sassetal.2005).

Tocastfurtherdoubtonthebraincancerconnection,a2000industryreviewofbraincancerdeathsatvinylchlorideplantsfoundthattherelationshipbetweenbraincancerandvinylchloride“remainsunclear”(Mundtetal.2000).Basedonthatindustrystudyandothers,IARCreverseditspositiononvinylchlorideandbraincancerin2008.Itwasapparentthatmisclassificationofexposureplayedasignificantroleinsuppressingthetrueelevatedwork-relatedmortalityratebymanipulatingtheexposurecriteriathusexcludingmostofthebraincancerdeaths(Sassetal.2005;dosSantos1999).

AccordingtoDavidHeathoftheCenterforPublicIntegrity,“aCenterforPublicIntegrityreviewofthousandsofonce-confidentialdocumentsshowsthattheindustrystudycitedbyIARCwasflawed,ifnotrigged"(Heath2016).Accordingtotheirreview,thestudyrelieduponbyIARCdidnotreportallbraincancerdeaths.Infact,theyonlyincludedoneofthe23braincancersintheoriginalTexasCitycluster,thuseliminatingthecluster.

Theseflawedindustry-sponsoredstudies,aswellastheuseofindustrysupportedPBPKmodellingfortheU.S.EPAriskassessmentprocess,playedalargeroleinloweringthecancerriskfromvinylchlorideexposures.TheindustrysupportedPBPKmodelestimatedthattheVCriskwas150-foldlessthanoriginallysetbytheEPA.Inthefinalanalysis,industrypressureandtheintrusionofindustryfundedresearchaswellasindustry’sparticipationinbothriskassessmentandpeerreviewprocesseswaslargelyresponsiblefortheloweringoftheVCcancerriskassessmentandeliminationoftheEPAregulatoryprotectiveadjustmentfactor(Sassetal.2005).

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

167

EgilmanandHowedemonstrate,throughacriticalreviewofanumberofcrucialindustryfundedstudies,thevulnerabilityofepidemiologicalstudytopurposefulmanipulationthroughsystematicmisclassificationofexposures,questionablestatisticalanalysis,andthemisinterpretationofepidemiologicalresults.Theyalsonotehowtheovervaluationandrelianceonepidemiologyindeterminingcausationhasbeenattheexpenseofothertypesofscientificinformationsuchascasereports,analogyandpathology.TheypointoutthatbothBradfordHillguidelinesandKoch’spostulatesdonotmake“….epidemiologyarequisitecomponentintheprocessofdeterminingthatthereisarisk”andneitherespousesthesuperiorityofepidemiology(EgilmanandHowe2007).

Accordingtothesesameauthors,“Epidemiologicalstudiesoftensufferfromdesignlimitationsthatdonotaccountfortheinconstantnatureofworkplaceconditionsandexposurelevels,theoftendelayedexpressionofdisease,whichcanremainlatentfor50yearsorlonger,andthefactthatstudiesoftenomitminoritiesandwomen”(EgilmanandHowe2007).Theauthorswarnthatindustryinsistencethatepidemiologicalevidencebeparamountindetermininghealthrisk,andthusregulatoryinitiativesaswellastortandworkers’compensationlitigation,wouldrepresentamajorsetbackforpublicandoccupationalhealth.

Itisessentialforthoseinvolvedintheapplicationofsciencetobesensitivetotheethicalandmethodologicalproblemswithscienceaswellasitslimitations.Science,atitsbest,isonlyasgoodasthecurrentknowledgeavailableandthequalityandindependenceofresearchthatinformsthatknowledge.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

168

REFERENCESAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienists(ACGIH).2016.Documentationofthresholdlimitvaluesforchemicalsubstances,7thedition.Cincinnati,OH,ACGIHWorldwide.

AlexanderBH,CheckowayH,WechslerL,HeyerNJ,MuhmJ,O’KeeffeM,ThomasP.1996.Lungcancerinchromate-exposedaerospaceworkers.JofOccupEnvironMed.38(12):1253-1258.

AngellM.2009,January15.Drugcompaniesanddoctors:astoryofcorruption.TheNewYorkReviewofBooks.56.

BakerR(Jan18,1989andDec1,1986).UNIFORRAWCdatabase.

Bohme-RankinSandEgilmanD.2008.Beyondreputation:debateontheroleofcorporateinfluenceinoccupationalandenvironmentalmedicine.NewSolutions:AJournalofEnvironmentalandOccupationalHealthPolicy.18(3):317-324.

Boice,JD,MaranoDE,FryzekJP,SadlerC,MclaughlinJK.1999.Mortalityamongaircraftmanufacturingworkers.OccupEnvironMed.56(9):581-597.

BrophyJ,KeithM,WattersonA,ParkR,GilbertsonM,Maticka-Tyndale,BeckM,Abu-SahraH,SchneiderK,ReinhartzA.2012.Breastcancerriskinrelationtoexposuretocarcinogensandendocrinedisruptors:aCanadiancase-controlstudy.EnvironHealth.11(87):1-17.

BrownP(2003).Qualitativemethodsinenvironmentalhealthresearch.EnvironHealthPersp.111(14):1789-1798.

BrownP,McCormackS,MayerB,ZarestoskiS,Morelo-FroschR,Altman,RG,SenierL.2006.Alabofourown:Environmentalcausationofbreastcancerandchallengestothedominantepidemiologicalparadigm.SciTechnolHumVal.31(5):499-536.

BrownVandGrossmanE.2015.Whatwedon’tknowiskillingus.InTheseTimes,November2015:18-27.

CastlemanB.2005.Asbestos:medicalandlegalaspects.5thEd.AspenPublishers.

CastlemanB.2006.LegacyofcorporateinfluenceonthresholdlimitvaluesandEuropeanresponse.AmJIndMed.49(4):307-309.

CastlemanBandZiemG.1988.Corporateinfluenceonthresholdlimitvalues.AmJIndMed.13(5):531-559.

CastlemanBandZiemG.1994.Americanconferenceofgovernmentalindustrialhygienists:lowthresholdofcredibility.AmJIndMed.26(1):133-43.

ChaseR.1992.Thecgenuclearproject:reportontheinvestigationintopossiblemonocytesuppressioninuranium-exposedworkers,L.A.M.P.OccupationalHealthProgramfortheUnitedElectricalWorkers.

ClappR,JacobsM,LoechlerE.2008.Environmentalandoccupationalcausesofcancer:newevidence2003-2007.RevEnvironHealth.23(1):1-37.

CresswellJ.1997.Qualitativeinquiryandresearchdesign:choosingamongfivetraditions.ThousandOaks,CA.Sage.

CrispT,CleggE,CooperR,WoodWP,AndersonDG,BaetckeKP,HoffmanJL,MorrowMS,FodierDJ,SchaefferJE,TouartLW,ZeemanMG,PatelYM.1998.Environmentalendocrinedisruption:aneffectsassessmentandanalysis.EnvironHealthPersp.106(sup.1):11-56.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

169

DeMatteoR,KeithM,BrophyJ,WordworthA,WattersonA,BeckM,FordA,GilbertsonM,PharityalJ,RoothamM,ScottD.2012.Chemicalexposuresofwomenworkersintheplasticsindustrywithparticularreferencetobreastcancerandreproductivehazards.NewSolutions:JournalofOccupationalandEnvironmentalHealthPolicy.22(4):427-448.

Diamanti-KandarakisE,BourguignonJP,GiudiceL,HauserR,PrinsG,SotoAM,ZoellerT,GoreA.2009.Endocrine-disruptingchemicals:anendocrinesocietyscientificstatement.EndocrineReviews.30(4):293-342.

DollR.1988.Effectsofexposuretovinylchloride:anassessmentofevidence.ScandJWorkEnvHea.14(2):61-78.

dosSantosSilva.1999.Cancerepidemiologyprinciplesandmethods.Chapter13.Lyon,France:IARC.

DosemeciMandWacholderS.1990.Doesnondifferentialmisclassificationofexposurealwaysbiasatrueeffecttowardthenullvalue.AmJEpidemiol132(4):746-748.

EgilmanDandHoweS.2007.Againstanti-healthepidemiology:corporateobstructionofpublichealth.IntJOccupEnvHeal.13(1):118-124.

EwertzM,HolmbergL,TretliS,KristensenA.2001.Riskfactorsformalebreastcancer:acase-controlstudy.Scandinavia.ActaOncologica40(4):467-471.

FlegalKM,BrownieC,HassJ.1986.Effectofexposuremisclassificationonestimatesofrisk.AmJEpidemiol.123(4):736-751.

GennaroVandTomaticL.2005.Businessbias:howepidemiologicstudiesmayunderestimateorfailtodetectincreaseriskofcancerandotherdiseases.IntJOccupEnvironHealth.11(4):356-359.

GoldbergMandLebrecheF.1996.Occupationalriskfactorsforfemalebreastcancer:areview.OccupEnvironMed.53(3):145-156.

GreenlandS.1982.Theeffectofmisclassificationinmatchedpaircase-controlstudies.AmJEpidemiol.116(2):402-406.

HanahanLandWeinbergR.2000.Thehallmarksofcancer.Cell.100(1):57-70.

HanahanLandWeinbergR.2011.Thehallmarksofcancer:thenextgeneration.Cell.144(5):646-674.

HardellL,OhlsonCG,FredriksonM.1997.Occupationalexposuretopolyvinylchlorideasariskfactorfortesticularcancerevaluatedinacase-controlstudy.IntJCancer.73(6):828-830.

HarmsenJG,LewisBJ,PantA,ThompsonWT.2010.Berylliumbrazingconsiderationsincandufuelbundlemanufacture.11thInternationalConferenceonCANDUfuel.2010October17;NiagaraFalls,Ontario.

HeathD.2016.Makingacancerclusterdisappear.CentreforPublicIntegrity.HTTPS://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/02/10/19265/making-cancer-cluster-disappear.

HoseinRandGhiculeteD.2003.PeterboroughHealthStudyGECanada.FinalReport.

HuffJ.2007.Industryinfluenceonoccupationalandenvironmentalpublichealth.JOccupEnvironHealth.13(1):107-117.

IARC(1979).Vinylchlorideandvinylchlorideacetatecopolymers.IARCEvaluationofCarcinogenicChemicalRiskinHumans.19:377-438.

IARC.1987.VinylChlorideMonographEvaluationofCarcinogenicChemicalRisksinHumansSupplement.7:373.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

170

IARC.2017.IARCmonographsontheevaluationofcarcinogenicriskstohumans:listofclassifications.volumes1-118.Lyon,France:InternationalAgencyforResearchonCancer.

IberluzaJ,Fernandez,Santa-MarinaL,Olea-SerranoMF,RivasAM,AurrkoetxeaJJ,EspositoJ,LorenzoM,TorneP,VillalabosM.2004.Breastcancerriskandthecombinedeffectsofenvironmentalestrogens.CancerCausesandControl15(6):591-600.

IDSP(Dec.1987).UNIFORRAWCdatabase.

InstituteforWork&Health,Toronto(2011).Whatresearchersmeanbyqualitativeresearch.AtWork,Issue64:spring.

IsonTG.1989.Compensationforindustrialdiseaseundertheworkers’compensationactofOntario.IndustrialDiseaseStandardsPanel.BoundDiscussionPaper.

JHSCminutes.1985September26and1981October.UNIFORRAWCdatabase.

JohnsonJH.1945July20.UNIFORRAWCdatabase.

KeithMandBrophyJ.2004.ParticipatorymappingofoccupationalhazardsanddiseaseamongasbestosexposedworkersfromafoundryandinsulationcomplexinCanada.IntJOccupEnvironHealth.10(2):144-153.

KeithM,BrophyJ,DeMatteoR,GilbertsonM,WattersonA,BeckM.2015.Plasticsindustryworkersandbreastcancerrisk:Areweheedingthewarnings?In:ScottD,Editor.OurChemicalSelves:Gender,Toxics,andEnvironmentalHealth.UBCPress.p.334-363.

KeithM,CannB,BrophyJ,HellyerD,DayM,EganS,MayvilleK,WattersonA.2001.Identifyingandprioritizinggamingworkers’healthandsafetyconcernsusingmappingfordatacollection.AmJIndMed.39(1):42-51.

KiddPandParshallM.2000.Gettingthefocusandthegroup.qualitativehealthresearch.May.

KortenkampA.2008.Lowdosemixtureeffectsofendocrinedisruptors:implicationsforriskassessmentandepidemiology.IntJAndrol.31(2):233-240.

KortenkampA,MartinO,FaustM,EvansR,McKinlay,OrtonF,RosivatzE.2011.StateoftheArtAssessmentofEndocrineDisruptors:FinalReport.http://ec.Europa.eu/environment/chemicals/endocrine/pdf/sota_edc_final_report.pdf.

KvaleS.1989.Issuesofvalidityinqualitativeresearch,Lund,Sweden.ChartwellBratt.

KyselkaPJ.1979.InternalMemore:degreasers.1979October29.UNIFORRAWGdatabase.

LalS.2005/6.Departmentwideretrospectiveexposureprofiles-generalelectricarmatureandwireandcabledepartments.OHCOWFileG884.

LawReformCommissionofCanada.1986.Workplacepollution:workingpaper.53:51-54.

LexchinJ,BeroLA,DjulbegovicB,ClarkO.2003.Pharmaceuticalindustrysponsorshipandresearchoutcomeandquality:asystematicreview.BritMedJ.326(7400):1167-1170.

LincolnYandGubaE.1985.Naturalisticinquiry,BeverleyHills,CA.Sage.

MacEachenE,KosnyA,StahlC,O’HaganF,RedgriftL,SanfordS,CarrascoC,TompaE,MahoodQ.2016.Systematicreviewofqualitativeliteratureonoccupationalhealthandsafetylegislationandregulatoryenforcementplanningandimplementation.ScandJWorkEnvHea,42(1):3-16.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

171

MaranoDE,BoiceJD,FryzekJP,MorrisonK,SadlerC,MclaughlinJ.2000.Exposureassessmentforalargeepidemiologicalstudyofaircraftmanufacturingworkers.ApplOccupEnvironHyg.15(8):644-656.

McDonald,MA,LoomisD,KuceraKL.2004.Useofqualitativemethodstomapjobtasksandexposurestooccupationalhazardsforcommercialfishermen.AmJIndMed.46(1):23-31.

MichaelsD.2008.Doubtistheirproduct:howindustry’sassaultonsciencethreatensyourhealth.OxfordUniversityPress.

MorganRW,KelshMA,ZhaoK,HeringerS.1998.Mortalityofaerospaceworkersexposedtotrichlorethylene.Epidemiology,9(4):424-431.

MorseJ,BarretM,MayanM,OlsenK,SpiersJ.2002.Verificationstrategiesforestablishingreliabilityandvalidityinqualitativeresearch.IntJQualMethods,1(2),Article2.RetrievedDATEfromhttp://www.ualberta.ca/~ijqm/.

MundtK,DellL,LuippoldR,NoesR,BigelowC.2000.Historicalcohortstudyof10,109meninnorthAmericanvinylchlorideindustry,1942-72:updateofcancermortalityto31December1995.OccupEnvironHealth.57(11):774-781.

NeedlemanCandNeedlemanM.1996.Qualitativemethodsforinterventionresearch.AmJIndMed.29(4):329-337.

PattonM.1990.QualitativeEvaluationandResearchMethods.2nded.NewburyPk.Ca.Sage.

RajhansGS.1971.Ontariodepartmentofhealth,File#1F-19:1971January18.UNIFORRAWCdatabase.

RappaportSM.1993.Thresholdlimitvalues,permissibleexposurelimitsandfeasibility:thebasisforexposurelimits.AmJIndMed.23(5):683-694.

RappaportSMandKupperL.2008.Quantitativeexposureassessment,ElCrritoCa.StephenRappaport,c2.

RoachSAandRappaportSM.1990.Buttheyarenotthresholds:Acriticalanalysisofthedocumentationofthresholdlimitvalues.AmJIndMed.17(6):727-753.

RosnerDandMarkowitzD.2002.Deceitanddenial:thedeadlypoliticsofindustrialpollution.UniversityofCaliforniaPress/MilbankFund.

SassJ,Castleman,B,WallingaD.2005.Vinylchloride:acasestudyofdatasuppressionandmisrepresentation.EnvironHealthPersp.113(7):809-812.

ScottD.2005.Shiftingtheburdenofproof:theprecautionaryprincipleanditspotentialforthedemocratizationofrisk.lawandrisk,editedbytheLawCommissionofCanada.50-86,Vancouver,BC,UBCPress.

SennTarlauE.1991.Playingtheindustrialhygienegametowin.NewSolutions:JournalofOccupationalandEnvironmentalHealthPolicy.9(1):72-80.

SchenkL,HansenSO,RudenC,GlekM.2008.Areoccupationalexposurelimitsbecomingmorealikewithintheeuropeanunion?JApplToxicol.28:858-866.

SiemiatyckiJ,1991.Riskfactorsforcancerintheworkplace.BocaRaton,Florida.CRCPress.

SimcoxN,WakaiS,WelshL,WestinghouseC,MorseT.2012.Transitioningfromtraditionaltogreencleaners:Ananalysisofcustodianandmanagerfocusgroups.NewSolutions:JournalofOccupationalandEnvironmentalHealthPolicy.22(4):449-471.

THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

February 5, 2017

172

StephensonK.2016April21.UNIFORRAWC.

StewardPA,LeeJS,MaranoDE,BlairA.1991.Retrospectivecohortmortalitystudyofworkersatanaircraftmaintenancefacility:11exposuresandtheirassessment.BritJIndMed.48:541-537.

StoutenH,OttH,BouwmanC,WardenbachP.2008.Reassessmentofoccupationalexposurelimits.AmJIndMed.51(6):407-418.

SupremeCourtofCanada.2016.CourtFileNo.36300.

TabershawIandGaffeyW.1974.Mortalitystudyofworkersinthemanufactureofvinylchlorideanditspolymers.JOccupMed.16(8):509-518.

TeschkeK,OlshanAF,DanielsJL,DeRoosAJ,ParksCG,SchultzM,VaughnTL.2002.Occupationalexposuresassessmentincase-controlstudies;opportunitiesforimprovement.OccupEnvironMed,59(9):575-594.

TidyVL.1968.MOLReport:1968April23.UNIFORRAWCdatabase.

TroskoJandUphamB.2005.Theemperorwearsnoclothesinthefieldofcarcinogenriskassessment:ignoredconceptsincancerriskassessment.Mutagenesis20(2):81-92.

vomSaalFandHughesC.2005.Anextensivenewliteratureconcerninglow-doseeffectsofbisphenolthatshowstheneedforanewriskassessment.EnvironHealthPersp.113(8):926-933.

WattersonA.1999.Whywestillhave“old”epidemicsinoccupationalhealth:policyandpracticefailuresandsomepossiblesolutions.In:DaykinMandDoyleL,Editors.Health&Work:CriticalPerspectives.London:MacmillanPress.p.107-126.

WelshonsW,ThayerK,JudyB,TaylorJ,CurranE,vomSaalF.2003.Largeeffectsfromsmallexposures:mechanismsforendocrine-disruptingchemicalswithestrogenicactivity.EnvironHealthPersp.111(8):994-1006.

WongO,WhortonM,FoliartD,Ragland,D.1991.Anindustry-wideepidemiologicalstudyofvinylchlorideworkers,1942-1982.AmJIndMed20(3):317-334.

Wong,OandWhorton,M.1993.Diagnosticbiasinoccupationalepidemiologicalstudies:anexamplebasedonthevinylchlorideliterature.AmJIndMed.24:251-256.

Yassi,A.1981.Occupationaldiseaseandworkers’compensationinontario.Reportpreparedfor:ProfPaulC.WeilerinhisstudyofWorkers’CompensationinOntario.

ZahmSandBlairA.2003.Occupationalcanceramongwomen:wherehavewebeenandwherearewegoing?AmJIndMed.44(6):563-575.

ZiemGandCastlemanB.1989.Thresholdlimitvalues:historicalperspectivesandcurrentpractice.JOccupMed.31(11):910-918.

ZiemGandDavidoffL.1992.Illnessfromchemical“odors”:Isthehealthsignificanceunderstood?ArchivesinEnvironmentalHealth:AnInternationalJournal.47(1):89-91.

ZoellerR,BrownTR,DoanLL,GoreC,SkakkebaekAM,SotoAM,WoodruffTJ,vomSaalF.2012.Endocrinedisruptingchemicalsandpublichealthprotection:astatementofprinciplesfortheendocrinesociety.Endocrinology.153(9):1-14.

Inta

ke C

linic

Haz

ard

Map

: 201

4

Notes:

UniforNationalHealthandSafetyDepartment

205 Placer Court l Toronto ON M2H 3H9

T: 416-497-4110 | 1-800-268-5763 | F: 416-495-6552

@UniforTheUnion|@SyndicatUnifor|facebook.comUniforCanada|facebook.com/SyndicatUnifor|www.unifor.org

lhcope343