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The Report of the Advisory Committee on Retrospective Exposure Profiling of the Production Processes at the
GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION FACILITY in Peterborough, Ontario
1945-2000
Prepared by
Robert DeMatteo, B.A., M.A., D.O.H.S and Dale DeMatteo, B.A., MSc.
with
GE Retiree Members of the Advisory Committee: John Ball, Linda Brown, Jim Dufresne, Roger Fowler, Marilyn Harding, Sue James,
Carl Jenson, Don McConnell, Gordon Terry, Bill Woodbeck, Jim Gill
The Report of the Advisory Committee on Retrospective Exposure Profiling of the Production Processes at the
GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION FACILITY in Peterborough, Ontario
1945-2000
Prepared by
Robert DeMatteo, B.A., M.A., D.O.H.S and Dale DeMatteo, B.A., MSc.
with
GE Retiree Members of the Advisory Committee:John Ball, Linda Brown, Jim Dufresne, Roger Fowler, Marilyn Harding, Sue James,
Carl Jenson, Don McConnell, Gordon Terry, Bill Woodbeck, Jim Gill
Volume 1 - May 15, 2017 lhcope343
Table of ContentsINTRODUCTION 1BACKGROUND TO THE GE PETERBOROUGH PRODUCTION FACILITY 3METHODS 7LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE 10BRIEF OUTLINE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 10HOW THE MAIN BODY OF THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED, AND HOW TO USE IT 16DISCUSSION 16LIST OF GE WORKER/FAMILY PARTICIPANTS 18ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 18EXPOSURE PROFILES BY BUILDING:
BUILDING: #4 DEPARTMENT: CAPACITOR 21
BUILDING: #5 DEPARTMENT: COIL IMPREGNATION 25
BUILDING: #7 DEPARTMENT: ARMATURE 29
BUILDING: #8 DEPARTMENT: MACHINE SHOP 47
BUILDING: #9 DEPARTMENT: FRACTIONAL MOTORS 55
BUILDING: #10 DEPARTMENT: FOUNDRY 61
BUILDING: #12 DEPARTMENT: PUNCH PRESS 69
BUILDING: #14 DEPARTMENT: POWDER PAINT/STRUCTURAL STEEL 75
BUILDING14/14A DEPARTMENT:STRUCTURALSTEEL(66-85) 79
BUILDING: #16 DEPARTMENT: SWITCH GEAR 87
BUILDING #16A TRANSPORTATION/DIESEL EQUIPMENT 95
BUILDING:#17(#21,#18N) DEPARTMENT:CARPENTRY 101
BUILDING: #18 DEPARTMENT: INDUCTION MOTORS 105
BUILDING: #20 DEPARTMENT: DRIVE SYSTEMS 113
BUILDING: #21 DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR 117
BUILDING: #22 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE 123
BUILDING: #22, 24, 26 DEPARTMENT: TRACTION MOTORS 131
BUILDING: #23 DEPARTMENT: ELECTROPLATING 135
BUILDING: #24 DEPARTMENT: FORMEX 141
BUILDING: #26 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE 143
BUILDING: #30 DEPARTMENT: BUS DUCT 147
BUILDING: #34 DEPARTMENT: STEEL CUTTING 151
ADDENDUM1-EXPANDEDDISCUSSIONOFTHEQUALITATIVEMETHODSUSEDINTHEGE RETROSPECTIVE EXPOSURE PROFILE STUDY 154
ADDENDUM2-THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE 162
REFERENCES 168
ABBREVIATIONS:
WSIB- Workplace Safety and Insurance Board
IARC-InternationalAgencyforResearchonCancer
MOL-Ministry of Labour (Ontario)
ACGIH-AmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienist
TLV-Threshold Limit Values
OEL-OccupationalExposureLimits
NTP-NationalToxicologicalProgram
MAC-MaximumAllowableConcentration
EC-European Commission
IARC Carcinogenicity Classifications:
Group 1-HumanCarcinogens
2A-ProbableHumanCarcinogens
2B-PossibleHumanCarcinogen
Group 3-NotClassified
Group 4-ProbablyNotCarcinogenictoHumans
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THE REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RETROSPECTIVE EXPOSURE PROFILING OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESSES AT THE
GENERAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTION FACILITY IN PETERBOROUGH, ONTARIO1945-2000
Prepared by
Robert DeMatteo, B.A., M.A., D.O.H.S and Dale DeMatteo, B.A., MSc.
with
GE Retiree Members of the Advisory Committee: John Ball, Linda Brown, Jim Dufresne, Roger Fowler, Marilyn Harding, Sue James,
Carl Jenson, Don McConnell, Gordon Terry, Bill Woodbeck, and Jim Gill (retired Unifor National Health and Safety Director)
INTRODUCTION
ThepurposeofthisresearchprojectwastodevelopretrospectiveexposureprofilesoftheworkprocessesattheGEelectricalproductionfacilityinPeterborough,Ontariobetween1945and2000.Assuch,itinvolvedasystematicefforttocollectandanalyzeempiricalinformationabouthowproductionwascarriedoutinthisverycomplexheavyindustrialoperation.Historically,thisworkplaceisanexampleoftheintersectionof20thcenturyindustrialandchemical“revolutions”.ThisworkwasundertakentodocumenttheextentandnatureofchemicalandphysicalexposuresthatarepossiblylinkedwiththevariouscancersandotherdiseasesthatmanyGEemployeesandtheirfamiliessufferedovertheyears.
Themajorsourceofthisinformationcamefromtheworkersthemselvesthroughaseriesofintensivefocusgroupandkeyinformantinterviewsthatwentonforover8months.Thisinformationwascorroboratedbygovernmentinspectionreportsfrom1945to2000inadditiontojointhealthandsafetycommitteeminutes,internalmemoranda,andindustrialhygieneliterature.
Beforeproceedingtothesubstanceandfindingsoftheretrospectiveexposurestudy,itisimportanttosituatethisstudyinthebroadersocialandscientificcontextthatframestheresultsandhowtheymaybeviewedandusedinOntario’soccupationalhealthsystem.
Thestudywasmeanttoaddressemployees’concernsthattheextentandnatureoftheirexposuresandworkingconditionswerebeingsubjecttomisrepresentation.Indeed,withtheexceptionofaverycomprehensiveexposureprofilestudyoftwodepartmentsatGEbyindustrialhygienist,SonyaLaloftheOccupationalHealthClinicsforOntarioWorker(OHCOW),therewaslittlesystematicempiricalstudyofexposureconditions.
TherewasanuneasysensethatwhatwasperceivedasanextraordinarilyhighincidenceofcanceramongGEemployeeswasnotbeingaddressedtoascertainwhethertherewasaworkplaceconnection.Giventhelargenumberofcarcinogenicchemicalsusedattheplant,theirsuspicionsthattherewasaconnectioncannotbeviewedasunfounded.Itwasalsotheirviewthatthecompany’seffortstostudytheproblemmisrepresentedtheexposureconditionsattheplant,andthatsuchmisrepresentationunder-mindtheirdiseaseclaimsbeforetheWorkplaceSafetyandInsuranceBoard(WSIB).
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Occupationaldiseaseremainsalargelyunder-addressedpublichealthproblem.Onlyasmallfractionofwork-relatedacceptedclaimsareforoccupationallycauseddiseases.And,anevensmallerfractionareforoccupationallycausedcancers(Yassi1981;Ison1989).YassiestimatedinherbackgroundstudyfortheWeilerinquiryintooccupationaldiseaseinOntario,thatatotalof6,000occupationallyrelateddeathsoccurannuallyinOntariofrom3majorsourcesalonethatarerelatedtotoxicexposures,butgounreportedtothegovernmentandtheworkerscompensationsystem.Someofthisisexplainedbytheratherlonglatencyperiodforcancertodevelop…sometimesnotappearinguntilafterretirementandthereforemissedaswork-related.
Overtheyearsseveralinvestigatorshaveidentifiedanumberofthemajorobstaclestoworkplacediseaserecognition(Yassi1981;Ison1989).Someoftheseinclude:
• Burdenofproofrequiringscientificcertainty
• “Legalized”Thresholdrequirementsratherthanguidelines
• Dismissingpatient’sdoctors’assessmentofwork-relatedness
• Over-emphasisonclaimant’smedicalhistoryratherthanworkprocessinteractions
• Lackofexposuredata
• Paucityofoccupationalhealthresearchgenerally
• Lackofoccupationalhealthtrainingforphysicians
Byfar,themostinfluentialobstacletodiseaserecognitionanditsconsequenceshasbeentheonerousburdenofproofplacedontheworkercoupledwithanoutdatedviewofhowdiseasedisproducedbywork,onethatisoutofsyncwithadvancesinoccupationalhealthandcancerresearch(Clappetal.2008;HanahanandWeinberg2011);HanahanandWeinberg2000;Welshonsetal.2003;Kortenkampetal.2011;TroskoandUpham2005;Diamanti-Kandarakisetal.2009;Kortenkamp2008;Ewertzetal.2001;Hardelletal.1997;Senn1991;Yassi1981;ZiemandDavidoff1992)andwhatthelawrequiresforwork-relateddisease(SupremeCourtofCanada[2016]CourtfileNo.36300;Ison1989;LawReformCommissionofCanada1986).Thisobstacletodiseaserecognitionisimposedbysocialpolicyandhasitssourceinthepredominantparadigmof“scientificcertainty”thatrequiresdefinitiveproofthat“X”causes“Y”inaworldthatbynatureiscomplexandmulti-causal.Thisparadigmisimbeddedincurrentscientificresearchandstandardsettingprocessesandisexpressedinourobsessionwithprotectingagainst“falsepositives”withoutthinkingabouttheconsequencesof“falsenegatives”(Scott2005).Unfortunately,thismindsethaspermeatedintoadministrativetribunalsandstandardsettingbodies,whichhasproduceditsownsetofdetrimentalconsequencesincludingunjustdenialofcompensationfordiseasescausedbyworkanddelayedregulatoryactionfordiseaseprevention.
With respect to the issue of burden of proof, it is important to note the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent rulingrenderedonJune24,2016regardingalowercourtrulingonabreastcancerclustercaseamongagroupofhealthtechnologistsworkingataBritishColumbiahealthfacility.Inthisdecision,theSupremeCourtfoundthatthestandardofproofsetbylawsgoverningworkers’compensationssystemsdonotrequireastandardofscientificcertainty,northatimposeduponplaintiffsinaciviltortclaim(i.e.,thebalanceofprobabilities).AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,thesearetoostringentastandardofproof,and“…whollyinapplicabletodeterminingcausationintheworkers’claims…”(SupremeCourtofCanada,Docket:36300,2016).Inessence,inworkercompensationlaw,insufficientevidenceisnot“no”evidence,andinconclusiveevidencemaysufficeindeterminingcausationinthecaseofoccupationaldiseaseclaims.Incontrast,thecurrentapproachextendsthepresumptionofinnocencetochemicalsandphysicalagentsinthelightofscientificuncertainty.Thereal
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questionis“Whatdowedointhefaceofscientificuncertainty?”Thisisnotsimplyascientificquestion,butratherhastodowithsocialvaluesandethics,andtowhatextentwevaluehumanlife.
Thecurrentapproachtooccupationaldiseaserecognitionresultsinadistortedviewoftheextentofoccupationaldiseaseanditscauses.Thishasledtoquestionablepolicyoutcomeswithrespecttolongdelaysinneededregulatoryactionandtheprotectionofworkersfromhazardouschemicalandphysicalagents(Watterson1999;Scott2005).
BACKGROUND TO THE GE PETERBOROUGH PRODUCTION FACILITY
Incontrasttostudyingindustriesassociatedwithasinglemanufacturingprocesswithfewchemicalsandrelativelyfewjobtasksandexposurepatterns,theGEplantinPeterboroughundertookproductiononamassivescalewithacomplexmixofindustrialprocessesutilizinghugequantitiesofsome3000chemicals(Lal2005/6).Someoftheseindustriesincluded:themanufactureofsmalltomassiveelectricmotorsandgenerators;appliancemanufacturing;smallandlargeelectricalcomponentsforurbanelectricalutilities;andanuclearfacilitythatproducednuclearfuelbundlesforCANDUnuclearreactors.Theseinvolvedacomplexmixofindustrialproductsthatincluded:massiveweldingoperationsthroughouttheplant;plasticsandrubberproductionforwireinsulation;production/preparationofcopperwireofvarioussizesandspecifications;andmachiningandpouringmoltenmetalsforlargemotorsandturbinestodrivelocomotives,ships,andlargeelectricalutilities.ThesizeofproductionisillustratedbythefactthatGEPeterborough’sPVCproductionfacilityused40,000poundofleadperweekjustinthePVCpelletizingoperation(Tidey1968),nottomentionmassiveamountsofepoxyandpolyesterresinsusedtocoatandinsulatenearlyeveryproductitproduced.GEwas“product”drivenwithnewchemicalsandworkprocessesintroducedregularly.GEPeterboroughretireesdescribetheplantasachanging“industrialmall”withmanyunitsindependentlyrunandmanaged.
Intheseproductionprocesses,largeamountsofsolventswereusedascleanersanddegreasersincluding:toluene,benzene,trichloroethylene(TCE),1,1,1-Trichloroethane(TCNU),methylethylkeytone(MEK),MEKPeroxide,perchloroethylene,acetone,xylene,naphthagas,carbontetrachloride,amongothers.Forexample,TCEwasusedinlargeheatedvatsthatcouldmeasure8’x10’x6’aswellasappliedbyhandbyhundredsofworkerstowipedownlargesurfaceswithragssoakedinTCEandtoluene.AddingtothischemicalmixwasthegenerationoflargevolumesofweldingfumesfromweldingoperationsgoingonthroughoutthePeterboroughcomplex.Manyoftheseproductsweremassivestructuresthatwouldtakeweekstofabricatewith5to10weldersworkingthreeshiftsdaily.Inaddition,machiningoperationsproducedlargeamountsofmetalworkingfluid(MWF)mistsandaerosolsfromheatedfluidsusedtocoolandlubricatematerialsandcutters.Themachininginvolvedlarge25’and40’boringmachines.Hugevolumesofdust,comprisedofasbestos,fibreglass,epoxy/polyesterresin,andheavymetals,werecontinuallygeneratedfromcutting,grinding,sandingandbuffingtasks.PeterboroughGEadmittedtousingasmuchas500lbs.ofasbestosdaily(Rajhans1971).
Addingtothecomplexmixofchemicalswasaconstantoff-gassingofvolatileorganiccompoundsfromthewoodblockfloors(consistingofcreosote-impregnated3”x4”woodenblockssetonendgrain)throughoutthebuildingcomplex.Thisflooringcontinuallyoozedcreosotes,especiallyduringperiodswhengroundwaterwouldrisethroughthesubfloor.Thesefloorswerere-treatedperiodicallyandsometimescoatedwithglyptolpaint.CreosotesarehighlyvolatileandclassifiedbytheInternationalAgencyforResearchonCancer(IARC)asa2Acarcinogenthatis‘probablycarcinogenictohumans’.Aswell,becauseofthefloor’sstructure,variousotherchemicalsspilled,includingleadandmercury,becametrappedinthecrevicesbetweentheblocks.Giventhewidespreaduseofthisflooringintheplant,suchspillscontributedtothetoxicburdenexperiencedbyworkers.
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AsignificantfactorthatconditionedproductionandthesafetycultureatGEPeterboroughwasaworkorganizationalapproachthatincludedthepieceratesystem,inoperationuntil1988,encouragingemployeestoworktotheirphysicaloptimumand,oftencircumventsafeworkpracticestomaintainproductionrates.
AnothervariablecontributingtoGEPeterborough’suniquenessisthephysicalstructureitself.GEmotorproductionwascarriedoutprimarilyinthecenturyold“Edison”buildingthatisapproximately1,030’by1,629’withabuildingareaof38.5acresoccupyingmorethan50acresindowntownPeterborough.Thisisan“openconcept”buildingtypicalofthetimewithsaw-toothwindowsatroofleveltomaximizesunlightandallownaturalventilationoftheintenseheatcreatedbythevariousworkprocesses.AstheseworkprocessesshiftedfromthemanufactureoflightingproductsintheEdisoneratothatofmotorsandgeneratorsduringtheGEera,thisnaturalsourceofventilationwastotallyinadequateforthisenormousproductionmix.Despiteworkareasreferredtoas“buildings”or“departments”theywere,infact,designatedareasseparatedbyindoor-vehicleroadwaysandwalkingaisles.Therewerefewtrulyisolatedstructures,sinceadditionswereconnectedtothemainbuildingbyhugedoorways,toaccommodatetrucksandcranes.Ceilingheightsreachedsome60’to70’hightoallowoverheadcranestopassfromsectiontosection.Ineffect,mostdepartmentssharedthesame,mainlynatural,ventilationsystemandthusthesamecontaminatedatmosphere.Therewasinsufficientmake-upair,whichcreatedanatmosphereofnegativepressurethroughoutthemainbuilding.Consequently,whatwasgeneratedindusts,fumes,orvaporsflowedreadilytoneighboringdepartments.Ineffect,therewasmajorcrosscontaminationbetween,andwithin,departments.
Workforce Considerations:
WhiletheGEPeterboroughworkforcehasremainedpredominantlymale,duringWorldWarIIwomenreplacedmenintheGEworkforceandproductionshiftedtothewareffort.Itwasduringthistimethattheplantbecameunionized.Asthewarended,menreturnedandtheworkforcesettledintoarelativelystableratioof70-75%menand25-30%women–whichhascontinuedtothepresent.(Olderretireesreportedthatintheirearlyyearsattheplanttherewasalsoacategoryofworkdesignated“boyswork”donebyyouths,priortotheintroductionofchildlabourlegislation).
Untilthemid-1990s,womenperformedwhatweregenerallyviewedas“women’swork”oroccupations–withmostworkinginmanufacturingproductionandapproximately1/3workinginofficeorclericaljobs.Women’sworkwasdescribedas“light”workinvolvingdetailed,finerepetitivetasksthatrequiredcloseup,manualwork.Someofthemajorcategoriesofwomen’sjobsincluded:“winders”whomanuallywoundcopperwireforcoils,orcoresforcapacitors;“tapers”whowoundinsulatingtapecomposedofadhesivesandfiberglass/asbestosaroundcoilsandotherelectricalcomponents;spraypaintersinpowderpaintoperations;handworkthatincludedsoldering,brazing,andetchingcircuitcardsandsemi-conductors;theassemblyandproductionofelectriccords(whichinvolvedstrippinginsulatedwirecontainingasbestosandsilversoldering)andworkformingplastic/ceramicplugsandsockets.WindingoperationsinthecapacitordepartmentinvolvedexposurestotoxicadhesivesaswellasexposuretoPCBs.
Women’sjobsweregenerallyperformedatworkbencheswith5to10womeninvolvedinmanuallystrippinganddegreasingwireinpreparationforsolderingandbrazing(whichincurredheavyexposuretoasbestos/fiberglassdusts,andleadandsolventfumes).Theseworkareaswerepoorlyornotventilated.Inaddition,womencouldbesubjecttosignificantby-standerexposuressincemanyofthesetaskswereperformedonmezzaninelevelsindepartmentsdirectlyabovebothintenseweldingoperationsandepoxydipping,baking,andgrindingoperationswheredensefumes,gases,anddustsfromtheseoperationswouldrisetoworkareasabove.Thiswasespeciallyseriousinarmature(bldg.7),busducts(bldg.30),andmachineshop(bldg.8).Officeandclericalpersonneldidnotfaremuchbetter.Toxicdustsgeneratedfrommanyofthemanufacturingoperationsmadeitswayintotheofficesofclericalworkersasevidencedbylargeaccumulationsofdustson
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workers’desksandotherworkstations.Focusgroupparticipantsreportedthatofficeworkerswouldfindtheirdeskscoveredinablanketofdustwhentheyarrivedinthemorning--andfindanotherbuildupofdustwhentheycamebackfromlunch.
Problems Estimating Exposures Using GE Records:
Inthecourseofthisresearch,retireesidentifiedseriousproblemswiththeinformationGEPeterboroughsenttotheWSIBregardingtheirworkhistoriesandworkexposures.Thisincluded:wrongorincompleteinformation,missinghealthreports,andnoconsiderationofovertimeindeterminingworkexposures.Focusgroupdiscussionsidentifiedbroadersystemicproblemsrelatedtothefactthatemployeerecordswerelinkedtothecompany’saccountingsystem--inparticular,timeandproductcosting--ratherthanspecificallytodocumentworkhistories.Workwasrecordedbyemployee(jobcode)andlocation(unit/clock#)classifications.Therewerecategoriesofemployeeswhoseworkdemandedconstantmovementthroughouttheplantincluding:dispatchers,‘chasers’,mobilewelders,labourgangs,andmaintenanceworkers.Withlargemotorproduction,workerswererequiredtomovetothelocationoftheproductthustheirunitdesignationcouldbeinadifferentbuildingordepartmentfromwheretheyactuallyworked.Employeesworkinginsomeareas,suchasfractionalmotors,oronfinalproductionassembly,couldaccumulateasmanyas40tickets(i.e.40differentjobs)performedinaday.Theproduct-drivennatureofproductionrequiredaflexibleworkforceandemployeescouldbe:loanedouttodifferentdepartmentstomeetproductionschedulesordeadlines;shiftedtootherdepartmentsandjobsduringdowntime;andofferedalternative‘cleanup’workduringplantshutdownsorholidays--much,orall,ofwhichwasnotdocumentedinemployeeworkhistories.Relyingoncompanydocumentsasthesolesourcefordeterminingexposuresmaysignificantlyunderestimatethedegreeandnatureofworkerexposures.
What GE Knew About Chemical Hazards:
Companiesoftenattempttoexcusethemselvesfromculpabilityforoccupationaldiseasesbyclaimingthat“wejustdidn’tknowaboutthetoxiceffects”ofthesubstancestheirworkerswereexposedtoatthetime.Thisoft-repeateddefensebyGEfornothavingtakenadequateprecautionsfortheprotectionofitsemployeesisnolongercrediblegivenrecenthistoricalrevelationsofjustwhatGEknewaboutthehazardsofthechemicalsitsemployeesusedwithoutadequateprotection.
Inthecourseofourresearchwecameacrossabookbyrespectedoccupationalhealthresearcher,Dr.BarryCastleman(2005),identifyingthefactthatUSGeneralElectricknewabouttheharmfuleffectsofasbestos,lead,andotherchemicalsusedinitsproductionfacilitiesasfarbackasthe1920sand1930s.Inhisbook,CastlemandocumentstheworkofDr.AliceHamilton,renownedoccupationalhealthscholar,whoconductednumeroushealthsurveysoftheworkingconditionsatGE’splantsintheU.Sfrom1922to1934--includingliteraturereviewsontheharmfulhealtheffectsofindustrialchemicalsinuse.BasedonthisresearchshewarnedGerardSwope,thepresidentofUSGEatthetime,ofthehazardsandhealtheffectsofasbestosandotherindustrialchemicalsaffectingGE’sworkforce.Dr.HamiltoncontinuedtopersonallyadviseSwope(overaperiodof12years)aboutchemicalriskstoworkersaswellasrecommendationsforimprovinghealthconditionsatGEfacilities.InoneofHamilton’sletterstoGEVicePresident,CEEveleth,datedMay9,1929,shereportsmeetingaMr.DaltonoftheGESchenectadyWorks,whosuggestedshevisittwoGEfoundryplantsinCanada,“allofwhich,hesaid,areprettybad.”ShethenasksEveleth:“Doyouwishmetodothis?”(WehavefoundnoevidencethatHamiltonwasgiventheopportunitytovisitGEplantsinCanada).
PublishedlettersandreportskeptattheGEMuseuminSchenectady,NewYork(Castleman2005),documentthatinadditiontoasbestos,Dr.HamiltonidentifiedthehealthimpactofanumberofchemicalsusedbyGEincluding:oilsmoke,gasolineasasolvent,acids,paintspraying,benzene,cyanide,nitrobenzene,
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aniline,formaldehyde,phenol,numeroussilicahazardsincludingsandblasting,mercury,leadcompounds,radium,carbontetrachloride,sulfurdioxide,acetone,kerosene,toluene,hydrogenfluoride,asphalt,x-rays,chromiumandnickelplating,welding,soldering,aswellasissuesrelatedtoeyeandskinirritants,ventilation,ergonomics,lighting,sanitationandmedicalservice.Hamiltonemphasizedtheimportanceofsubstitutingharmfulchemicalsasthefirstlevelofcontrollingharmfulexposures.
Importantly,Dr.Hamiltondescribed‘by-stander’hazardstothoseworkingnearweldersandsandblasterswithoutwearingprotectiveequipment.Whenherbook,“IndustrialPoisonsintheUnitedStates,”waspublishedin1925,copiesweretobesentto10doctorsatGEplantsaroundthecountry.Asearlyas1929,basedonHamilton’srecommendationsforcontrollingleadexposures,oneGEplantprovidedseparatelockersforworkandstreetclothes,bootsandunderwear.Bootswereremovedbeforethemenlefttheworkareathroughawashroomforlunchorbeforeleavingattheendoftheshift.Indescribingconditionsforworkersattheplant,Hamiltonsaid:“Itislikeafirstclassmen’sclubhouse”(Pittsfield,May1929in:Castleman2005).ThereistragicironytothisstorygiventhebattlePeterboroughGEconductedduringthe1980soveraninspector’sordertoinstituteseparatelockerandwashfacilitiesforemployeesworkingwithleadunderthedesignatedleadregulation.GEPeterboroughappealed,andtheorderwasrescinded.
GEwasmadeawareofthehazardsofasbestosby1930whenDr.HamiltondescribedhazardousconditionsatGEplantswheretherewassignificantairbornecontaminationandaccumulatedasbestosfibersonworksurfaces(Castleman2005).USGeneralElectricmadeattemptstocontrolasbestosexposurethroughexhaustventilationandbydistributingliteraturetoemployeesonthesafehandlingofasbestosinthe1930sand1940s.HamiltonalsonotedthatGEreceivedadviceinthe1970sfromasbestosfibreandproductsuppliersonthehazardsofusingasbestosinthemanufactureofphenolicresins(Castleman2005).Otherinvestigatorshavealsoidentifiedanddocumentedhowmajorcorporationshavesuppressedinformationaboutthehazards.(RosnerandMarkowitz2002;Michaels2008).
GiventhatGEofficialsintheU.S.wereadvisedoftheknownhazardsofasbestosintheirU.S.operationsinthe1920sand1930s,andthattheywereawareofthepoorconditionsinCanadianplants,itishighlylikelythatGEofficialsatthePeterboroughplantwouldhavebeenawareofthehazardsofasbestos.Yet,testimonyfromfocusgroupparticipantsandgovernmentinspectionreportsindicatethatworkerswerehandlingasbestosinafriablestatewithoutanyrespiratoryprotection,norwereworkerswarnedaboutthehazards.Thiswasevidencedinvarioustasksthatworkersperformedincluding:“pluckingthegoose”thatinvolvedthemanualremovalofwasteasbestoswithoutprotectionfromholdingbinsinthewireandcabledepartment;thebandsawingofasbestossheetswithoutprotectioninthearmaturedepartment;andthedismantlingoftheasbestoscoveredcompoundingtankwithoutprotectionincoilimpregnation,tomentionafew.Giventheseexposureconditionsitishighlylikelythatthesecontributedsignificantlytotheextentofwork-relateddiseaseattheGEplant.Theyalsoreflectageneralizedlaxsafetyculturethatwouldhavebroadramificationforworkers’health.
Exposure to Carcinogens:
Apartial-listofchemicalsroutinelyusedinGEPeterboroughproductionclassifiedascarcinogens,orstronglysuspectedofbeingcarcinogenic,include(IARC2017):
IARC Group 1-Carcinogenic to humans:woodworking,weldingfumes,asbestos,silica,arsenic,benzene,beryllium,cadmium,chromiumVI,4,4-methylene-bis(2chloroanilene)(a.k.a.MOCA),nickel,trichloroethylene,vinylchloride,formaldehyde,bis-chloromethylether(a.k.a.BCME),polychlorinatedbiphenols(PCB),dieselengineexhaust,rubberproduction,painters,mineraloils,n-ntrosodiethanolamine,inorganicacidmists,uranium,wooddusts,shiftwork.
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IARC Group 2A-Probably Carcinogenic to humans:lead,epichlorohydrin,styreneoxide,tungstencarbide,creosotes,1,3butadiene.
IARC Group 2B-Possibley Carcinogenic to humans:Styrene,carbontetrachloride,tungstencobalt,diethanolamine,magneticfields,asphaltfumes,methylethylketone.
Others,notyetclassifiedascarcinogenicbutwhosepropertiesdisrupttheendocrinesystemandcanmimicthehormoneestrogen,includebisphenol-Aandphthalatesusedintheproductionofplasticsandepoxyresins.Inthelattercase,thesearesuspectedofbeingbreastcarcinogensandtumourpromoters.(DeMatteoetal.2012;Keithetal.2015;vomSaalandHughs2005;Diamanti-Kandarakiseta.l2009;Ibarluzeaetal.2004;Ewertzetal.2001;Hardelletal.1997;Crispetal.1998;Kortenkamp2008;Kortenkampetal.2011;Welshonsetal.2003)
ManyofthechemicalsusedinGEproductionprocessesaresubjectedtohighheatstressresultinginthermaldecompositionby-productsthatarehighlytoxicandcarcinogenicaswell.
Insummary,thefactthattherewasacomplexmixofvariouscontaminants,andthatdepartmentssharedthesameatmosphericcontaminantsthatinvolvedsignificantby-standerexposures,presentsmajorchallengesfortheclassificationofindividualexposuresthroughtraditionalmethodsemployedinindustrialhygieneandepidemiologicalresearch.Infact,suchapproachestocomplexexposuresituationsarelargelyresponsibleforthemisclassificationand/ormisrepresentationofexposuresthattendtounderestimatetheextentofexposure(Teschkeetal.2002;dosSantosSilva1999;Flegaletal.1986;Greeenland1982).
METHODS
Qualitative and Participatory Research Methods:
Theresearchteamusedaqualitativeapproachtogatheringandassessinginformationnecessarytodeveloprich,detailed,exposureprofilesoftheindustrialprocessesundertakenatthefacility(MacEachenetal.2016;InstituteforWorkandHealth2011;KiddandParshall2000;NeedlemanandNeedleman1996;LincolnandGuba1985).Qualitativeand“mixed”researchmethodsinindustrialhygieneandepidemiologyhavebeensuccessfullyusedinsimilarindustrialcircumstanceswherethereare:diversegroupsofworkersholdingmultiplejobs,numerous,complexindustrialprocesses,andexposuresthathavechangedovertheyears(McDonaldetal.2004;Maranoetal.2000;Morganetal.1998;Alexanderetal.1996).Ratherthanratingindividualexposures,thisresearchfocusesonprofilingtheproductionprocessesandtheirexposurepoints,alongwithworkplacefactorsthatputworkersatgreater/lessriskofbeingexposed.ThisapproachisbestabletoaddressthechallengespresentedbythenatureofGE’sproductionsystemandlimitationsintheavailabilityandreliabilityof“hard’exposuredatafromindustrialhygienemonitoring.Aswell,detaileddescriptionsofworkerexposuresinmanyoftheseindustriesarelimitedatbest.Publishedresearchseldomcontainsdatareflectingthetypical,day-to-dayconditionsexperiencedbytheworkers,themselves.
Toaddresstheseissuesaparticipatoryresearchapproachwasemployedusingqualitativeresearchmethodsincluding:focusgroupsessionsandkeyinformantinterviews,andreviewsofindustrialhygienedata,governmentinspectionreports,jointcommitteeminutes,andoccupationalhealthliterature.
Thecoreresearchteamconsistedof10retireesfromtheGEfacility,theunion’sformerNationalHealthandSafetyDirectorandtworetiredresearcherswithoccupationalandpublichealthresearchexperience.Thisgroupformeda permanent focus group known as the Advisory Committee on Exposure Profiling at GE.TheactivityofthisAdvisoryCommitteewascoordinatedbyoneoftheretireesandfacilitatedbythetwohealth
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researchers.EachretireeworkedattheGEplantforatleast35yearsprimarilyinthemanufacturingsectors.Allhadworkedatthefacilitybetween1945to2000withmoststartingtheirworkwithGEintheearly1960s.
TheAdvisoryCommitteeplayedadualroleinthisparticipatoryresearchendeavor.ItactedasapermanentfocusgroupconsistingofinformantswithdetailedknowledgeoftheproductionprocessesatGEoveraperiodof35to40years.Italsoservedasanactiveresearchteamwhogathereddetailedinformationandbroughtinkeyinformantswithmorespecializedinformationtofillininformationgapsorexpandthegroup’sknowledgebase.Inthislatterroleallmemberstookanactivepartinleadingtheinterviewprocesswithkeyinformants.
TheAdvisoryCommitteemettwiceaweekfor4to5hourspersessionwheretheCommitteedocumenteddetailedinformationaboutthevariousproductionsprocessesandworkingconditionsdepartmentbydepartment.Thisintenseactivitywentonforover8monthsandthegroupcontinuestomeetregularly.Inthecourseoftheirwork,thegroupwouldseekoutandreviewvariousdocuments,locateprocessesonthehazardmapsoftheentirecomplex,andobtainindustrialhygienereportswhereavailable.Thecommitteeinterviewedanddocumentedinformationfrommorethan75formerGEemployeeswhosenamesarerecordedintheappendix.
Thetworesearchersalongwiththecoordinatorwereresponsiblefordocumentingtheinformationgatheredatmeetingsproviding3setsofdatanotesthatwerecompiledandcheckedforaccuracyandthenreworkedintotheresourcetemplatethatformsthebodyofthisreport.Discussionswereguidedbyasetofbothopenendedandstructuredquestions(foralistofthesequestionsseetheexpandedmethodologysectioninADDENDUM1attheendofthisreport).
Thefocusgroupprocesscanbedescribedasarelaxed,egalitarianatmospherewithasenseofsharedownershipatmeetingsreflectiveoftheretireessharedworkhistoryatGE.Importantly,theoverlapofcommonworkexperiencesamongretireesfacilitatedaquestioning,challenging,confirming,consensusdialoguethatwasbothproductiveandconfirmingofthereliabilityoftheinformationprovided.Forexample,participantswouldoftentellsimilarstoriesindependentofoneanother,servingtoreinforceconfidenceintheaccuracyofindividualrecollections.Moreover,thedialogueamongtheparticipantsandinformantsinvolvedaconsensusbuildingprocessregardingtheaccuracyoftheinformationbeingdiscussed.Thisapproachwasbothproductiveandpersonallysatisfyingduetoastronglysharedcommitmentthatwedothistaskwell(KiddandParshall2000).Discussionswouldcontinueuntilagreementwasreachedabouttheaccuracyandcompletenessoftheinformation.Whereagreementwaslacking,effortsweremadebythecommitteetotrackdownalternativesourcesofinformationincludingotherretireesandindustrialhygieneliteraturereviews.
Risk-Based Approach:
ThisapproachisinlinewiththatofSoniaLal,industrialhygienistwiththeOccupationalHealthClinicsforOntarioWorkers,whoundertookaverythoroughretrospectiveexposureassessmentoftheproductionprocessesintheArmatureandWire&CabledepartmentsattheGEproductionfacilityinPeterboroughfrom2005to2006(Lal2005/6).SimilartoLal’s(2005/6)work,thiscurrentretrospectiveassessmentreliesuponanumberofqualitativeriskfactorsinassessingexposures,comparativetothatusedbyMaranointheaircraftindustry(Marano2000).Inthisregard,weassessedtheproductionprocessesandworkingconditionswithregardtotheirpotentialtohavesignificantlyexposedworkers.Theriskfactorsframeworkincluded:
• Thephysicalstatesofthechemicals(liquid,mist,gas,vapors,solid,dust),• Routeofentry(inhalation,absorption,ingestion),• Thequantityofthechemicalused,e.g.,volumeofchemicals,solvents,resins,etc.,• Sizeofthematerialsandsurfaceareasbeingworkeduponorfabricated,
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• Proximitytothesourceofexposure,• Direct/indirecthandlingofthechemicals,• Durationofexposure,e.g.,useofovertime,• Stateofventilationsystems,e.g.,effectivenessofgeneral,natural,localexhaustventilation,• Provisionofmake-up(freshaircirculation)air,• Provisionofpersonalprotectiveequipment(PPE),e.g.,respiratoryprotection,protective clothing(gloves,coveralls),eyeprotection,• Safeworkpractices/procedures,• Stateofhousekeepingpractices,• Eatinganddrinkingatworkstations,• Workorganizationfactors,e.g.,piece-ratesystem,physicaleffort,impactonsafeworkpractices,• Workersknowledgeofandtrainingre:chemicalsusedincludingaccessto,andunderstanding of,MSDSprecautions.
Inadditiontorelyingonqualitativefindingsbasedontheabove,effortwasmadetoincludequantitativemeasuresavailableincludingthosefoundintheOntarioMinistryofLabour’sGEhygienereports/investigations,GEPeterboroughjointhealthandsafetycommitteeminutes,andworker/uniondocumentationwiththeemployer.Additionally,theIndustrialHygieneliteraturewasreviewedforexposureassessmentsinvolvingsimilarindustries/processes.
Information Sources and Research Process:
Thisprojectrelieduponthreebasicsourcesofinformationonindustrialprocesses,workingconditions,andthenatureandextentofexposuresforthisretrospectiveexposureassessment:
Focus Group (Advisory Committee) Information Source:
FocusGroupmeetingswereorganizedwithreferencetotheindustrialprocessesandworkingconditionsforeachdepartmentwithattentiontodetailson:chemicals,equipmentandmaterialsbeingfabricated,thevolumeofproduction,theworktasksandhowmaterialswerehandled,descriptionsofworkconditions,exposurecontrols,accesstoinformation,workpractices,housekeeping,sensoryexperiences,andadversehealthsymptoms.Additionalinformationwasgeneratedbymembersofthefocusgroupthroughphonecalls,informaldiscussions,andsharingprimary/historicaldocumentsamongthegroup.
Thedynamicassociatedwithfocusgroupmethodsisonethatlendsitselftobothenrichingandchallengingtheveracityofinformationcollectedandprovidingin-depthunderstandingofthecomplexworkenvironmentattheGEfacility.Throughouttheresearchteamappliedthe“constantcomparative”methodassociatedwithqualitativeresearch,whereinformationcollectedisconstantlycontrastedandcomparedforconsistencyandreliability.
Supportive Documentation:
AdditionaldocumentationofexposureconditionsatGEPeterboroughwasobtainedfrom1)theOntarioMinistryofLabour(MOL)Inspectoratereports/investigations1945-2000;2)JointHealthandSafetyCommittee(JHSC)minutes/reports,3)unionoremployee/employercorrespondence,allofwhichprovidedacrosscheckonthereliabilityandvalidityoffocus-groupgeneratedinformationabouttheindustrialprocessesandexposureconditionsatCGE;4)Otherinformationsources,including:TheprevioushazardmappingofGEcarriedoutbyGaryLaneandOCHOW,historicaldocuments,GEproductmaterials,workermedicalreports
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anddocuments,localnewspaperarticles,GEPeterboroughnewsletters,motorproductionprocessvideos,andbroadrangingliteratureandinternetsearches.
Industrial Hygiene, Occupational Health, and other Literature Reviews:
Additionaldocumentationwassoughtthroughreviewsofthescientificliteraturedocumentingindustrialprocessesandobservedexposuresfrompublishedstudiesofsimilarworkenvironmentsaswellasgeneralinformationidentifyinganddescribingvariousindustrialprocesses.
Inthisway,wewereabletocorroboratethedescriptionofworkprocessesandexposureconditionsthroughtheprocessof“triangulation”(LincolnandGuba1985;NeedlemanandNeedleman1996;Patton1990),amajorvalidationtechniqueusedinqualitativeanalysis.Asenseofinformationalreliabilitywasachievedthroughthisuseofdifferentapproachestoinformationgatheringincluding1)Therichnessanddynamicoffocusgroup-baseddiscussionandconsensus;2)Areviewofofficialgovernment(MOL)reports,JHSCminutes,andemployerdocuments;and3)Areviewofindustrialhygiene,occupationalhealth,andotherliteratures.
LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE
Inconsideringtheretrospectiveexposureprofiles,someperspectiveisinorderwithregardtocurrentinterpretationsattachedtonumericalexposurelevelstovariouschemicalsaswellasresultsofepidemiologicalstudies.Firstly,thereistheassumptionthatnoharmshouldhavecometoworkersifexposurelevelswerebelowtheregulatedoccupationalexposurelimitsorThresholdLimitValuessetbytheAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienist(ACGIH).Secondly,thereistheinterpretationofnegativeepidemiologicalstudiesasindicatingthatthereisnoassociationbetweenthediseaseandthechemicalexposuresstudied.
Inresponsetotheseassumptionsitisimportanttorecognizethatthevalidityoftheseapproachesisbeingchallengedbyalargeandgrowingnumberofresearchersinthefieldofoccupationalandenvironmentalmedicine.Inthecaseofexposurestandards,theseresearcheffortshaveprovidedevidencethatexposurestandardsarenothealth-basedlimits.Researchershaveshownthatthestandardsettingprocessandscienceuponwhichthesearebasedaresignificantlycompromisedbyindustryinfluence.Further,theyshowthatthe“science”uponwhichtheselimitsarebasedis,itself,seriouslyflawed.Atbest,theselimitsarewhatindustryhasdeterminedtobeeconomicallyandtechnicallyfeasibleratherthanprotectiveofworkers’health.
Importantly,themisusesofthescienceofepidemiologyandthemisrepresentationofepidemiologicalstudyresultshavecomeunderincreasingcriticalscrutinythatcannolongerbeignored.Hereagainagrowingbodyofcriticalinvestigationhasuncoveredthequestionablemanipulationofdataandanalysisaswellasseriousflawsinresearchdesignshowntobetheresultofindustryinfluenceontheresearchers.Manyepidemiologicalstudiessufferfrominherentlimitationssuchaspoordesign,misclassificationofexposures,andinsufficientstatisticalpowertodetectanelevatedrisktohealth.Theclassicexampleinvolvesconcludingthatthereisnoassociationbetweendiseaseandexposureswhenthestudydidnothavethestatisticalpower,duetosmallsamplesize,todetectariskthatmaybepresent.Theseunacknowledgedlimitationsofsciencehaveseriousconsequencefortheprotectionofoccupationalandpublichealth.
Forafullertreatmentoftheselimitationsanddetailedcitations,pleaseseeADDENDUM2-LIMITATIONSOFTHESCIENCE.
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BRIEF OUTLINE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
Informationwasgatheredontheproductionprocessesandextentandnatureofexposuresfor22departments/buildings.Numerousdepartmentsorprocesseswentthroughchangesinlocationovertheyearsandsomewerediscontinuedasaresultofoutsourcingproducts,beingmovedtootherareas,orbeingcloseddownduetotoxiccontamination.Intotal,22GEPeterboroughdepartmentsarereviewedinthedetailedexposureprofilesthatrepresentthebodyofthisreportincluding:
• Building#4:Capacitors• Building#5:CoilImpregnation• Building#7:Armature• Building#8:MachineShop• Building#9:FractionalHorsePowerMotors• Building#10:GeneratorAssembly/Babbitt• Building#12:PunchPress• Building#14A:TankShop• Building#14:StructuralSteel• Building#16:SwitchGear• Building#16A:TransportationEquipment• Building#17:Non-MetallicMachineShop(akaCarpentry)• Building#18:InductionMotors• Building#20:DriveSystems• Building#21:Nuclear• Building#22:Wire&Cable(until1980)• Building#24:Wire&Cable(Formexuntil1980)• Building#26:Wire&Cable(until1980)• Building#22:TractionMotors(1994-2004)• Building#23:PlatingDepartment• Building#30:BusDucts• Building#34:SteelCutting
Itisimpossibletosummarizeallthatiscontainedinthedetailedexposureprofiles.However,itisusefultoidentifysomeofthegeneralconditions,andthenatureandextentofexposuressharedbymostemployees.Thefollowingaremajorworking-conditionfeatures,commonlyexperiencedthroughouttheplant,thatraisethelevelofriskforsignificantchemicalexposures.
Thesecommonconditionswerealsoconfirmedbytheindependentmultiplesourceofdocumentationtheresearchersreviewede.g.MOL,JHSCreports,etc.Inadditiontosupportingthereliabilityofthefocusgroup-baseddata,themultiplesourcesofdocumentationexposedapatternofrecalcitranceonthepartofGEtowardsmakingnecessaryimprovementsandrepairstoprotectworkerhealthand,often,outrightrefusaltoadheretothelawwithregardtoprovidingworkersandtheirunionwithinformationtheyrequestedandtowhichtheywereentitled.TherewasalsoevidenceofanunclearrelationshipbetweentheOntarioMinistryofLabourinspectorateandaverypowerfulmultinationalcorporation,onewithwidespreadinfluencebothlocallyandinternationally.Whatelsecouldexplaintheinspectorate’sseemingreluctancetoissueorderspreferringinsteadtogive“advicetomanagement”orissueunenforceable“recommendations”--ratherthanwrite“orders”wherecomplianceismandatory.
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Common Physical and Work Conditions:1. TheGEfacilityhadlittleinthewayofeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Mostventilationwasby
naturalmeansandtherewasnotenoughmake-up(fresh)airprovided.Therewerelocationsinwhichcontaminatedexhaustedairwouldre-enterthebuildingatmospherebecauseofthelocationofexhaustandintakeports.
2. Thelackofadequatereplacementairresultedinnegativeairpressurethroughoutthebuildingleadingtothemigrationofaircontaminantswithinandamongdepartments(Kyselka1979).
3. Asbestosforinsulationsonelectricalwiresandmotorpartswasuseduniversallythroughouttheplant.Thelargesizeofproductsrequiredlargeamountsofasbestosinvariousforms.Muchworkwithasbestoswasdonebyhandandinconfinedspaces.Asbestoswasdrilled,cutwithabandsaw,andmilledbyhand,resultinginthedispersalofasbestosfibres/dust.Overheadpipingthroughouttheplantwascoveredwithfriableasbestosinsulation,contributingtoasbostosaircontamination.ItisdocumentedthatGEemployedover500lbs.ofasbestosperday(Rajhan1971).
4. Inadditiontochemicalexposuresassociatedwithindustrialworkprocesses,workerswereexposedtodiesel,propane,andgasfumesaswellasdustfromtransportationvehicleswithinandoutsidetheplant.Oftenvehicleswereleftidlingforhoursduringloadingandunloading.NumerouscomplaintsaboutthesefumesarecontainedinMOLandJHSCreports.Creasoteimpregnatedwoodblockfloorsthroughoutthebuildingwerealsoacommonsourceofchemicalexposureforworkers.
5. Theabsence,andpoorquality,ofhygieneandhousekeepingpracticeswithintheGEplantaredocumentedincluding:lackofshowersandlockers,theuseofrecycledratherthanpotablewater,non-functioningwaterfountains,inadequatelunchroomfacilities,poorcontainmentandhandlingofdust,dirt,spills,fumes,vapors,andworkersrequiredtoprovidetheirownworkclothes.Retireesreportedthatitwasoncediscoveredthatsoftdrinkandcoffeemachineshadbeenhookeduptoarecycledwatersourceratherthanpotabledrinkingwater.
6. Nearlyeverydepartmentorareahadacuringovenand/orheatedresinorsolventtankresultinginemployeesworkingunderhighheatstressandexposedtoheavysolventandresinvapors.Retireesmadereferencetothe“GEsmell”whichreferredtoadistinctodorcarriedonworkers’bodiesandclothingthatfamily,friendsandhealthprofessionalsdetected.
7. Thelargesizeandsurfaceareasofmaterialsbeingfabricatedrequiredtheuseoflargevolumesofsolvents,paints,andresinsaswellasextensiveweldingwhichtookplaceinopenareas.Thistranslatedintohigherlevelsofvaporsandfumesassociatedwiththeseprocesses.
8. Thelargesizeofproductsfabricatedresultedinemployeesworkingwithchemicalsforprolongedperiodsoftimeincloseproximityandconfinedspaces,forexamplewhiledegreasingandwelding.Somepartswereover40feetindiameter.Atpeak,theseoperationsdemandedhigheruseofovertime.Somepiecestookweeks,sometimesmonths,tocomplete.
Thefollowingconstellationofriskfactorswasidentifiedascontributingtosignificantexposureofworkerstoawidespectrumoftoxicandcarcinogenicchemicals:
• Workingcloselytothesourceofexposure,• Prolongedexposuretothetoxicchemicalsusedorgeneratedduringproduction,• Absenceorinadequacyofexposurecontrolsatthesource,e.g.localexhaustsystem,• Absenceorinadequacyofpersonalprotectiveequipment,• Inadequateprovisionofmake-upairandconsequentnegativeairpressureinthecomplex,• Applicationoflargevolumesofsolvents,resins,PAHs,andpaintsduetolargesizeofproducts,
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• Longdurationofexposurebecauseofsizeandproductionschedulepressure,• Inadequateknowledgeaboutthehealthhazardsandexposurecontrolsforworkerprotection,• Poorenforcementofsafe-workprocedures,• Poorhousekeepingpractices,• Eatinganddrinkingandsmokingatworkstations,• Inadequatehygienefacilities,andgenerallypoorhousekeeping.
Common Chemical Exposures:
Solvents:Nomatterwhatdepartmentoneworkedin,therewasenormoususeofsolventsforcleaninganddegreasingmaterials.Degreaserswereusedinlargevolumesandoftenappliedbybarehandsonlargesurfaceareas.Almosteverydepartmentprovideddegreasersintheformoftrichloroethylene(TCE)inverylargetanksthatmeasuredupwardsof24sq.ft.insurfacearea.Somewerevapordegreasersthatattimesdidnotfunctionproperly.Residuesofdegreasersweredrainedonthefloorproducinglargeamountsofsolventvapor.Routinely,solventvaporswouldmigratetoareaswherearcweldingwasperformedthusproducingHCLgas.Workersroutinelywasheddownlargemetalsurfaceswithragssaturatedwith(TCE)ortolueneinpreparationforfabricationleadingtoinhalationandabsorptionofsolvents.Workersfrequentlyregisteredcomplaintsaboutvaporsand/oradverseeffectssuchaseye,noseandthroatirritationaswellasnarcoticeffects.Othercommonlyusedsolventsincluded:toluene,perchloroethylene,MEK,acetone,trichloroethane,xylene,andnaphthagas.Manysolvents,whenheated,producedthermaldecompositionby-productsthatwereequallytoxic.Some,includingtoluene,werehighlycontaminatedwithbenzene,agroup1carcinogen.
Itisinterestingtonotethatinoneinstance,anMOLinspectorissuedorderstoprotectworkersfromexposuretotoluenedespiteconcentrationsbelowtheTLVandprotestsfrommanagement,becausetheworker’sadversehealthsymptomswereanindicatorthattheworkerwasoverexposedtothesolvent(regardlessoftheTLVreading).Solventswereusedineverydepartmentunderreview(AdvisoryCommitteeMeetingnotes).
Welding Fumes:Everydepartmenthadsomeformofweldingand/orsolderingoperationgoingon.Thesewereusuallylarge-scaleoperationsinvolvingfrom1to8weldersworkingatfabricatingelectricalhousingsandpartsformotorsandgenerators.Mobileweldingoperationswerealsocarriedoutinalmosteveryareaoftheplant.Welding“booths,”containedonlyby(frayedandfriable)asbestoscurtains,hadlittleinthewayofeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Weldingworkareaswerecommonlydescribedas“thickwithweldingsmoke-plumes,”withmanycomplaintsrelatedtoirritatinggasessuchasphosgeneandozone.MOLreportslistmanycomplaintsaboutTCEvaporsmigratingfromdegreasingoperationstoaluminumweldingareas(duetonegativeairpressure)producingphosgenegas.ThesewerereportedinfocusgroupsthenconfirmedinMOLreportsandJHSCminutes,aswellasinternalmemorandumfromGEPeterboroughmanagement.ManagementalsoindicatedthatworkerssufferedsymptomsofCOPDasaresultofweldingexposures.Workersthemselvesdescribedbeing“surroundedbycloudsofbluesmokesothickyoucouldn’tseethepersonworkingnexttoyou”(AdvisoryCommitteemeetingnotes).
Weldingoperationsincludedallformsofweldingincludingoxy-acetylenetorchcuttingandwelding,electricarcweldingsuchasMIG,TIG,CO2,andplasmawelding.Dependingonthetypeofweldingandmaterialsused,bothweldersandby-standerswereexposedto:1)Weldingfumescontainingaluminum,beryllium,cadmiumoxides,chromium,copper,fluorides,ironoxide,lead,manganese,molybdenum,nickel,vanadium,orzincoxides;2)Weldinggasesincludingcarbonmonoxide,hydrogenfluoride,nitrogenoxide,oxygendeficiency,andozone;3)Organicvaporssuchasaldehydes(e.g.formaldehyde),isocyanate,phosgene,phosphineandfrommetalscoatedwithisocyanatepaints,epoxyresins,polyesterresins,solvents,orrustinhibitors.
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Asaresultofthelargevolumeofweldinggoingonineveryareaoftheplantandpoorexposurecontrolsandhousekeeping,exposuretoweldingfumeswassignificantthroughouttheplantforbothweldersandby-standers.Significantexposuretoozoneaswellasphosgenegaswasreportedinsomeareasoftheplant.Focusgroupsidentifiedeatingatworkstations,poorhousekeeping,andlittleeffectiveexhaustventilation.Smokeeaterswerereportedto“notbeveryeffective,”thuswithlimitedutilityforcontrollingexposures.Welding,insomeform,wasperformedineverydepartmentunderreview.
Epoxy, Polyester and Asphalt Resins:Epoxyandpolyesterresinswereusedinmorethan70%ofplantoperations.Theresindippingandcuringoperationsinvolveddipping,oftenverylarge,motorcomponents(includinghugecoils,armaturesandstators)inopenvatsofresinorinVacuumPressureImpregnation(VPI)tanks.InthecaseofVPItanks,significantexposuretoepoxyandpolyesterresinvaporsoccurredwhen:tankswereopenfordipping,liftcableswereattachedbyhitchers,andcraneoperatorssittingabovethetanksmanipulatedlargeitemstoandfromcuringovens.Workerswhosqueegeedexcessresinwerealsoexposed.Finally,excesscured/hardenedresinsweregroundoffmotorpartsandtheovensurfacesduringgrindingandcleaningoperations.Retireesdescribed“thickbluesmoke”intheatmosphereduringsuchoperations,and“plumesofsmoke”surroundingthecraneoperator’scage.Workersdescribedthegrindingoperationsasparticularly“dirty”operationswhereworkerswerecoveredindust--andthicklayersofgrindingdustcoveredallsurfaces.Underheat,epoxiesandresinsbreakdownintoconstituentssuchasbisphenol-A(BP-A/endocrinedisrupter)andepichlorohydrin(IARC2A–probablycarcinogenictohumans)andvariousaldehydes.Focusgroupdiscussionsidentified:workersusingcompressedairtoblowoffdust;eatinganddrinkingatworkstations;andpoorhousekeeping.Alsoidentifiedwastheabsenceofeffectivelocalexhaustventilationandlackofrespiratoryprotectionforexposurestoepoxy/resins,whichwascorroboratedbyinspectors’reportsandJHSCminutes.Retireesdescribedan“overheatedVPItankexplodingandcatchingfireaftercityfirefighterssprayedwateronitresultinginhighlytoxic,fumes--theresultofthermaldecomposition--quicklyspreadingthroughtheplantandovercomingworkers(AdvisoryCommitteemeetingsnotes).
Asbestos Exposures:Foryears,asbestoswastheprimarymaterialusedto(electrically)insulatenearlyeverycomponentinthemultitudeofelectricalproductsproducedatGE.AlongwithPVC,lead,andrubbercoverings,asbestos--invariousforms--wasmadeintoelectricalinsulationinstators,armatures,rotors,andvariouswiresandcoils.Asbestoswascarded,braided,cut,sawed,shaved,andembeddedinplasticresinandrubberwirecoatings.TheWireandCabledepartmentwasamajoruserofasbestosfibre.Itspresencewasapparentasairbornedust(“snowstorms”asworkersdescribedthem),onfloorsandmachines,andinstoragebins.Somedepartmentsshavedandorsandedasbestos-impregnatedinsulationfromwiresinpreparationforbrazingandsoldering.Asbestoswasusedasprotectivecurtainsaroundweldingoperationsandovens,andasheatinsulationblanketstoprotectweldersand/orpartsduringwelding.Workersusedasbestosglovesformovinghotmaterialsandparts.Allofthesewerereportedtobeintattered,friableconditionandasignificantsourceofadditionalexposuretoasbestos.TheArmatureDepartmentandCarpenterShopperformedmajorcuttingofasbestosboardswithbandsaws.Thesewerepre-drilledandshapedwithgrindersandsanders,producinglargeamountsofasbestosdust.Asbestoswasubiquitousandfrequentlyblown(offsurfacesandclothing)withcompressedair.WorkersclassifiedaslabourerswereassignedtocleanoutasbestoswastebinsontheroofoftheWireandCabledepartmentwithoutrespiratoryorotherprotection.Thecompanywascavalieraboutthishazardsinceitadvertisedthesaleofwasteasbestosfor13centsapoundas“homeinsulation”(AdvisoryCommitteeMeetingnotesandLocalnewspaperclipping).Exposuresweresignificantforthosedirectlyhandlingasbestosaswellasby-standers.Asmentionedpreviously,negativepressureintheplantcontributedtothemigrationofasbestostootherpartsoftheplant.Giventhelargevolumeusedinproductionandthemannerinwhichitwasused,workerswouldbesignificantlyexposedthroughinhalation.
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Polychlorinated Biphenols (PCBs):TheuseofPCBsattheGEplanthasleftalonglastinglegacyaswitnessedbywidespreadcontaminationthroughouttheplantandthesurroundingcommunityofPeterboroughwellafteritsdiscontinuedusein1977.Thishighlytoxic,carcinogenicchemicalwasusedasadielectricfluidintheproductionofcapacitorsinbuilding#4andintransformersandcircuitbreakersinbuilding#16and#10.IntheprocessoffillinganddrainingPCBoilfromtheseverylargetanks,therewasagreatdealofspillageandsplashesonfloorsandonworkers.Thistoxicfluidwasusedinverylargevolumesnotonlyintheproductionofnewelectricaldevicesbutalsointheprocessofdismantlingold,ordamaged,tanksandindrainingthemandwipingdownthetanksbyhandwithsolventssuchastolueneorTCE.PCBwasusedunderthetradenamesofPyranol,Askarel,andInerteen.Workersfromseveralareas(Bldgs#4,#16and#10)reportedheavyexposurestoPCBsduringtheproductionoftransformers,breakersandcapacitors.TheOntarioDepartmentofHealthreportedlevelsrangingfrom70mg/10m³to130mg/10m³(JohnstonJuly20,1945).Theseexposuresincludedothersworkinginthevicinity.Workersintheseshopsindicatedexposuretodecompositionby-products,includingsubstancesknowntobeevenmoretoxicthanPCBitself.Thesehavebeenidentifiedaschlorinateddibenzodioxins(CDD)andchlorinateddibenzofurans(CDF).ResearchindicatesthatPCBisnotonlycarcinogenicbutalsoactsasatumorpromoter,incombinationwithothercarcinogens(IDSP,December1987).
DocumentationofcontaminationlevelsandexposureswasthesubjectofongoingdiscussionatJHSCmeetingsoverthehighlevelsfound,atorabovetheTLV,atthetime(JHSCMinutesOctober,1981).Alsodocumentedwasanincidentofcontractors“failingtofollowprescribedsafetyprocedures”whilehandlingPCBwasteoils(JHSCminutesSeptember26,1985).Aninternalcompanymemorandumidentifiedseveralareasas“highlycontaminated.”Levelsashighas90,600ug/100cm²werereportedinlabtestreports(BakerJanuary,18,1989;BakerDecember1,1986).
Atpresent,thewidespreadcontaminationofPCBwasteoilsisunderthesurveillanceoftheOntarioMinistryoftheEnvironment,sincePCBresiduespersistandhavebeenidentifiedinmanyareasoftheplant--aswellasadjoininglandwherePCBwasteoilswerespreadoverparkinglotsandroadwaysasa“dustsuppressant.”TheMinistryofEnvironment(MOE)hasrecentlyidentifiedthatplantroofdebrisiscontaminated,andsinceroofdrainsrunthroughtheinteriorofthebuilding,chronicallyleakingintoworkareas,workerscontinuetobeexposedtowastePCBs(StephensonMOEmemo,April21,2016).
Metal Working Fluid (MWF) and Machining:AnothermajorpartoftheGEPeterboroughoperationwaslargescalemachiningthatwentoninTractionMotors(Bldg.22),InductionMotors(Bldg.18),SwitchGear(Bldg.16),TransportationEquipment(Bldg.16A),TankShop(Bldg.14A),StructuralSteel(Bldg.14),GeneratorAssembly(Bldg.10),BabbittShop(Bldg.10B),PunchPress(Bldg.12),MachineShop(Bldg.8),FractionalMotors(Bldg.9),BusDuct(Bldg.30)andSteelCutting(Bldg.34).Allofthesemachiningoperationsusedverylargeboring,milling,drilling,andlathingmachines.Somewereaslargeas40feetindiameter.ThesemachiningoperationsusedlargequantitiesofMWFsconsistingofcoolingfluidsandlubricatingoilssprayedonthemachine’scutters.ThereareseveraltypesofMWFsincludingstraightoils,semisyntheticoils,andwater-solublefluids.Manywater-solublefluidsaretreatedwithbiocidesthatcontainarsenic.MWFsareheatedbyfrictiongeneratedincutting,thusproducingmistsandvaporscontainingthermaldecompositionby-productsaswellasunusedcomponentsofthefluids.AdvisoryCommitteemembersdescribemachiningoperationsas“overwhelmedwithbluishsmokeandmists,inadditiontofoulsmellingvapors.”Operatorclothingwouldbesaturatedwithfluids.InadditiontoMWFs’chemicalcomponentsandthermalby-products,theywouldcontaincomponentsofvariousmetalsbeingmachined.Compressedairwasusedtocleansurfaceareas--furtherspreadingMWFresidue.Workersateatworkstations,thuswereexposedtoMWFsthroughinhalation,ingestion,andabsorption.
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Beryllium and Uranium Exposures:ThenucleardepartmentlocatedinBuilding21wasthesourceofexposuretoberylliumanduraniumoxide.Themajorsourceofberylliumexposurewastheberylliumroomwhereberylliumpowderwouldbevacuumvapor-fusedtozirconiumsheetsthencutintospacersandpadsforthebundletubes.Intheearlydaysofitsuse,levelsashighas41ug/m³,aredocumentedwhenworkers“handsawed”berylliumblocksintopowderforprocessing(eventhoughaletterfromtheDepartmentofHealthwarnedCGEtopurchaseitsberylliuminpowderedform).Despiteeffortstokeeplevelsaslowasreasonablyachievable,berylliumdiseaseisontherise,evenasstandard-settingbodies,suchastheACGIH,proposelowerTLVs(e.g.,0.05ug/m³).Recentevidenceindicatesthatthisnewstandardis“unachievable,”forcingproducerstoseekasaferalternative(Harmsenetal.2010).
Theidentificationofuraniumriskshasfocusedonmeasuringworkerexposures(withpersonaldosimeters)toalphaparticleemissions,yetindirectevidenceintheformofsuppressedmonocyteproductionisreportedtobeanindicationofworkerexposure.AscientificstudythatincludedGEPeterboroughworkersidentifiedthatfuelbundleworkersreceivesignificantexposurestoalpharadiationfromuraniumoxide(Chase1992).Thesamestudyfoundthat44%ofGEnuclearworkershadreducedmonocytecountsthatwere“abnormally”low--15-20timeslowerthanexpectedinasampleofhealthymenandwomen.AccordingtoDr.Chase“…therefore,therearevalidandpersuasivereasonstosuspectthatworkersarebeingaffectedbytheirexposuretouranium.”
Whatthisdescriptionof“commonexposures”indicatesisthatGEPeterboroughworkerswereroutinelyexposedtoacomplexmixoftoxicchemicalsoccurringthroughouttheplantwith“businessasusual.”
HOW THE MAIN BODY OF THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED, AND HOW TO USE IT
Thebodyofthisreportcontainstwenty-twoindividualbuilding/departmentprofilesidentifyingindetailtheworkprocessescarriedoutandchemicalsassociatedwiththesedifferentprocesses.Theinformationispresentedincolumnformwith“ProductionProcess”listedontheleftcolumnand“ChemicalRiskExposure”listedontheright.
Fromthe“ProductionProcess”descriptionsweformulateanexposureprobabilitythroughidentificationofaconstellationofriskfactorsforeachprocess.Indescribinghowworkwascarriedoutweareabletoinferriskfactorssuchas:wastheworkerdirectlyinvolved,didtheworkerdirectlyhandlethematerials,whatwasthephysicalstateofthematerial(s),whatvolumewasused,whatwastheproductionrate,howmuchtimewasspentonthetasks,wereexposurecontrolsavailableandadequate,andwhatisthetoxicityratingofthematerial?FromAdvisoryCommitteenotes,backedbyMOLandJHSCreports,wewereabletodocumentadversesymptomsandcomplaints.
The“ChemicalExposureRisks”setoutintherighthandcolumnariseoutofhowproductionwascarriedoutforeachoftheworkprocessesdescribedinthelefthandcolumn.Therighthandcolumnreflectsaqualitativeassessmentofwhattheexposureswerelike,giventhewayproductionwascarriedoutbyworkersandtheexistenceoftheriskfactorsidentifiedabove.Theseareaccompaniedbyanexplanationfortheassessmentintermsofthenatureoftheproductionprocess.Wherereliableharddataisavailablethisispresented,butalwaysinconjunctionwiththeexperiencesarisingfromtheproductionprocessitself.
Toinformthereader,eachbuildingprofileisprecededbya“facesheet”identifying(inoutlineform)thedifferentprocessesthatwentonineachbuilding,andlistingof(identifiable)chemicalsassociatedwiththevariousworkprocesses.Readerswillnotetherepetitionofmanyindividualchemicals/chemicalgroupsasonereadsthroughtheseprofiles.
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DISCUSSION
GEPeterboroughemployeeswereexposedtoamultiplicityofcarcinogensandothertoxicchemicals.Thechemicalsusedattheplanthavewell-knownadversehealtheffectsandareassociatedwithoccupationalillnesses.Moreover,workerswereexposedtomultiplecarcinogenssimultaneouslywhichfurtherincreasestheriskofdevelopingcancer.
However,fromwhatisidentified,withrespecttosignificantworkerexposurestotoxicchemicalsincludingalargenumberofcarcinogens,itishardnottoconcludethatsuchexposureshaveharmedthehealthofGEemployeesworkingatvariousprocessesthroughouttheplant.Whathasbeendemonstratedintheseexposureprofilesisthatnotonlywerecarcinogenicchemicalspresent,buttheywereusedinlargequantities,incloseproximitytotheworkers,andfrequentlyandforlongdurations—conditionsdictatedbythelargesizeandintricaciesoftheproductsandpartsbeingfabricated.
WhatSoniaLal,ofOHCOW,foundinherretrospectiveexposureprofilesoftheArmatureDepartmentandtheWireandCableDepartmentappliesequallytoallotherdepartmentsandbuildingsthroughouttheGEfacility.Herobservationsareworthrepeatingwithrespecttocurrentfindingsinthisretrospectiveprofilethatincludedanadditional21buildings.
Ms.Lal(inexecutivesummary,OHCOWfile#G884)observed,“Theconstantdipping,baking,curingoftheseproductsandtheexposureforms,i.e.solids,liquids,gasesandtheirdecompositionproductshavebeendemonstratedheretobeofparamountimportancewhentryingtoassessandestablishexposures.Oneprocesscannotbelookedatasstandalone,astheprocessesalloccurredinabuilding,namelyBuilding7-5-8-10,forarmatureemployees.MostbuildingsatGEweresimilarinthattheyallreliedonnaturalventilation.Hencetheabovestatementappliestoallbuildings,asalltheprocesseswithinthebuildingswereclosetooneanother,contaminantswereheavyandaccumulated,(astherewasnoforcedmake-upair)andthusbystanderexposuretodifferentcontaminantsfromseveralprocesseswereincurredbyemployees"(Lal2005/6p.i-a).
ThecurrentfindingsofthismuchextendedexposureprofilecorroboratewhatSoniaLalfoundinhercomprehensive,detailedretrospectiveprofileoftheArmatureandWire&Cabledepartmentsandaredetailedinthebodyofthisreport.
Whilethisprojectdoesnotassignprecisequantitativemeasurestotheextentofexposuresitispossibletoinfertheextentofexposuresfromthenatureoftheproductionprocess,thesizeandintricacyoftheproductionprocess,thetasksperformedbytheworkers,thequantitiesandtypesofchemicalsusedorproduced,theproximitytothematerials,theextentofexposurecontrols,thecharacteristicsoftheventilationssystems,safeworkpracticesandworkorganizationcharacteristics.Hereareafewexamples:extensiveweldingandgrindingoperationsfabricatinghugebreakertanksinconfinedspacesgeneratinglargecloudsofweldingfumesconsistingofacomplexmixtureofgasesandheavymetalfumesintheTankShop;lapping(sanding)largeleadBabbittbearingsbarehandedimmersedintolueneuptotheforearmsinBldg.8andBabbittShop;craneoperatorshoveringoverplumesofvaporsfromdegreasertanksandepoxyresinVPItanksinseveraldepartments;drainingandpouringPCBsinthebuildingofcapacitorsaswellasweldingcapsonintheCapacitordepartment;womendoinghandworkcontinuouslyexposedtosolvents,leadandcadmiumduringsolderingoperations;workersinhalingandbeingsoakedwithMWFsduringmachiningoflargemetalplates,25’to40’indiameter;handwipingoflargecoilsandmetalsurfaceswithragssoakedintoluene;strippingofasbestoscoatedwires;handsqueegeeingepoxyresinfromcoilsafterresinimpregnation;bandsawingasbestosboardsgeneratinglargeamountsofasbestosladendust,tomentionbutafew.Whatisdescribedherewascarriedoutwithouteffectivelocalexhaustventilationoradequateprotectiveequipmentunderintenseproductionschedules.
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ThesefindingsarecorroboratedthroughreviewofMinistryofLabourreports,JHSCminutes,employer-recordsavailable,andindustrialhygienestudiesonsimilarproductionprocesses.TheresearchteamhasnohesitationinconcludingthatmostGEworkersweresignificantlyexposedtocarcinogenicandothertoxicchemicals,andthatitishighlylikelythattheseexposureshaveharmed,andcontinuetoharm,theirhealth.GEemployeeslabouredunderverypoorworkingconditionsmarkedbyinadequatetonon-existentexposurecontrolsandlaxenforcement.Additionally,theseworkerswerechronicallyexposedtosubstancesthatarepotentcarcinogens,orstronglysuspectedcarcinogens--aswellasbeingcapableofdisruptingtheendocrinesystem.Thisconditionisaggravatedbythefactthatworkerswereexposedtocomplexmixturesofhazardouschemicalsthathaveadditiveand/orsynergisticeffects.Whatwedon’tknow,andisnotwelldocumentedinthescientificliterature,isthesynergisticeffectsofsuchamultiplicityofexposures.
Inconclusion,itmustbereiteratedthatmanufacturinginthe20thcenturywascharacterizedbyanhistoricintersectionoftheindustrialandchemical“revolutions.“TheGEplantinPeterboroughisaclassicexample,indesignandfunction,ofthatdynamicsocialexperiment.Assuch,workersatGEwerebothparticipantsin,andwitnessesto,thehorrificworkingconditionsassociatedwiththishistoricalpairing–anditssignificanttollonworkersandtheirfamilies.
LIST OF GE WORKER/FAMILY PARTICIPANTS
Retiree Advisory Group:JohnBall,LyndaBrown,JimDufresne,RogerFowler,MarilynHarding,SueJames,CarlJensen,DonMcConnell,GordTerry,BillWoodbeck,JimGill
Invited Retiree Contributors:SharonArmstrong,BillDrain,SteveCasey,MelCrowe,GaryDalton,SteveDeal,PaulEvans,BobGaspari,PaulGraham(Ptbo.Firefighter)JimHeron,JoeKeating,RonLang,GordWatson
Telephone/In Person Retiree Contributors:CherylArmitage,FrankBlakely,EarleneByrne,BarryBunn,FrankChambo,DebbieChute,PaulCorp,DaveDettman,JohnFlannagan,TheresaFlaherty,TeenaFlood,PeterFlood,JoeFraser,JanGoodbody,JimGooley,PeterGooley,RobHayes,NealJames,JoeKeating,DougKirkcaldy,RogerLathangue,JackLewington,WallyMoore,RogerMorton,PeterNewmaster,RickPage,WayneParker,KeithReil,DebReyner,SteveShiels,JimStabler,PercyTraynor,DougWellman,RogerWild,TomWorr,LeeVitarelli,“anonymousx2”
Widow/family member contributors: Diane Carl, Sandra Condon, Steve and Cindy Crossley, Debbie Chute, HigginsFamily,AileenHughes,PatHuzinga,SandyLebeau,JoanMcKinlay,MarcelleO’Connell,ArlenePetrany,Sara Sharpe, Lenore Shiels
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Whileitishardtosingleoutanyoneindividualwhensomuchdependsonthecollectiveactionofworkers,onecannotoverlookthedebtofgratitudetoaverytough,dedicated,WorkerHealth&SafetyRepresentativeatGEPeterboroughwhopassionatelyfoughtformorethan40yearstobetterworkingconditionsattheplant.HemeticulouslysavedeverypieceofcommunicationthatpassedthroughhishandsduringhisyearsatGE.Hewascourageoustoafaultandbothlovedandhated.Ifthereisahero,amongsomanywhoparticipatedinthisproject,itisJohnBall.WeacknowledgealsotheimportantworkofSueJames,ascoordinatoroftheprojectwhokeptusontrack,andwhoseinsights,broadknowledgeoftheplant,andconstant“digging”forinformationwascritical.EssentialandinvaluablewasboththeindividualandgroupcontributionsoftheAdvisoryCommittee“mainstays”including:JohnBall,LindaBrown,JimDufresne,RogerFowler,SueJames,MarilynHarding,CarlJensen,DonMcConnell,GordonTerry,BillWoodbeck,andJimGill.Asretirees,our
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advisorycommitteememberswerebothwillingandabletocommittotheverysignificanttimeandhardworkrequiredtocompletethisproject.
UNIFOR,astheunionrepresentingworkersatGEPeterborough(specificallyJoelCarr,NancyClark,andNationalHealthandSafetyDirector,SariSairanen,andstaffatthenationaloffice)providedmeetingspaceandsupportaswellasundertakingthecreationofadatabaseforthestorageandretrievalofgovernmentinspectionreports,minutesofJHSC,internalcompanycommunicationsandMSDS.UNIFORhasworkedtocoordinateoccupationaldiseaseclaimswiththeOfficeoftheWorkerAdvisorandisassemblingsupportivedocumentation,generatedbythisretrospectivestudy,togobeforetheWSIB.SpecialthankstoLocal599-Oanditsexecutivesforprovidingmeetingspaceforthecommittee'swork.WethankLauraHargroveforherworkinthefinalpreparationofthereport.
ThedetailedchemicalhazardmappingoftheGEplantdonebybothGaryLaneandOHCOWwascriticaltothisprojectprovidingareferencepoint,andsupportivedocumentationforfocusgroupdiscussions.TheworkofSoniaLalandOHCOWidentifyingriskexposuresatGEprovidedastartingpointforthisproject,servingasaguideandinspiration.HerexcellentretrospectiveprofilesonArmatureandWireandCabledepartmentsweresubstantiallyreliedupon,andincorporatedintothisreport.
WethankDr.NoelKerinofOHCOWforhiscommitmenttoGEfamilies,especiallyhissupportformanyclaimantsthroughtheclinicsof2004.
Andfinally,weacknowledgethelongfightforjusticeledbytheOccupationalandEnvironmentalHealthCoalitionofPeterborough(OEHCP)forpromotingtheirvisionof“AhealthyviablecommunityinPeterboroughandforgenerationstocome,”throughtheirongoingcommitmentto,andpracticalsupportfor,GEfamiliescopingwithoccupationallyrelatedillnessanddeath.
Thisbroadcommunityeffort“tosettherecordstraight”reflectsaconcertedcollectiveeffortonthepartofmanycitizensandactiviststogettothebottomofthisoccupationaldiseasecatastrophe.
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BUILDING: #4 DEPARTMENT: CAPACITOR
General DescriptionBuilding CapacitorsBuilding Cans for CapacitorsCapacitor Reclaim AreaLaboratory 2nd FloorWelding Operation
Known Chemicals used or produced:
Metals: Cadmium, Silver, Stainless SteelGlyptolHexavant ChromiumMercuryPolychloronated Biphenols (PCBs, Pyranol)TCE, (Roylene)Toluene
Tricholorobenzene
Dioctylpthalate
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Building: #4 Department: CapacitorProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
General Description: ThisdepartmenthadtwolargetankscontainingPolychloronatedBiphenols(PCBs),andalargedegreasingtankfilledwithTCE.Itemployed40peopleworking2shifts.ThedepartmentwasgenerallydevotedtothebuildingandfillingofcapacitorsofvarioussizeswithPCBdielectricfluids.Theserangedinsizesfromafewinchesto2-3feetacross.Thisworkinvolvedconstructionofcanisters,formationofthecoilsandfillingandsealingthecanisterwithleadsolder.Theprocessesalsoentaileddeconstructionoffaultyoroldcapacitorsanddumpingoldfluid.NotethatPCBusewasdiscontinuedin1977.Itwasreplacedwithamixtureoftrichlorobenzeneanddioctylphthalate.
Building Capacitors1. Theprocessbeginswiththeconstruction
ofthecomponents.Thisinvolveswindingaluminumfoiland“treated”papertogethertoformthebodyofthecapacitor.Thealuminum foil formed an anode and cathode withelectrolytepaperlayeredbetweenthetwo;
2. Thiswoundbodythenplacedinatrayonaconveyor;
3. Next,thewindingsareplacedina“canister;”4. Leads for the anode and cathode foils are
attachedwithspotwelding,and/orcrimped;5. Thecanistersarethentakentoa“treatment”
areawheretheyaredippedintankscontainingPolychloronatedBiphenols(PCBupuntil1977)andarefilledbyvacuumimpregnation;(smallcapacitorsarehanddipped);
6. Priortodipping,thePCBfluidispouredintotanksofabout50gallonswithsemilidopeningsandexhaustventilation.Thisfluidiscirculated for about 5 hours then pumped into astoragetank,thenusedtofillimpregnationtankswherecapacitorsarefilledundervacuumpressurefor5hours;
7. CapacitorcapsaresolderedclosedafterairpocketshavebeenfilledwithPCBs.Thisweldingoccurredwhilecapacitorwasstill
General Exposures: Workers in this department werehighlyexposedtodegreaserTCE,PCBs,toluene,andvariousweldingfumesthatlikelycontainedhexavalentchromiumandcadmiumfromextensivestainlesssteelweldingandsilverbrazing.Theseexposurestooktheformofdusts,fumesandvapoursaswellasliquidform.(After1977,PCBwasreplacedbyamixoftrichlorobenzene/dioctyl-phthalate[TCB]asthedielectricfluidincapacitorproduction.HenceexposuretoTCBcommencedaround1977).Thiswashighproductionworkinvolvingdirectcontactwithcontaminantsandveryintensivejobtasks.Therewaslittleornoeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Housekeepingwaspoorandnorespiratoryorskinprotectionwasprovided.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionwerehighlylikelygiventheseriskfactors.Andgiventhatworkersateandsmokedattheirworkstations,andtherewerenowashingfacilities,ingestionofthesetoxinswashighlylikely.
PCB Exposures: WorkerswereindirectcontactwithPCBsandworkedincloseproximitytothismaterial.Workerswerenotprovidedwithappropriateskinprotection.DocumentationofrelativelyhighexposurestoPCBisprovidedthroughaseriesofMOLreportsofsignificantcontaminationinthecapacitordepartmentinbldg.#4.MOLreportsavailablebeginningin1945andupuntil1984documentlevelsofPCBaircontaminationwellabovethecurrentTLVof0.05mg/m³.Thereadingswereasfollows:1. 7/20/45:130mg/10m³(open);
70mg/10m3(closed)“Wellabovetheallowableconcentration”of10mg/10m³;
2. 2/20/48:140-360mg/10m³;3. 5/14/8:7-220mg/10m³(5samples);4. 6/03/54:NewmorevolatileformofPCB
introduced-“Recentchangesinpyranol…hasresulted in increased vapours …over those
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underthePCBliquid.Duringtheprocessagreatdealofcombustionby-productsfromheatingthemetalweregenerated,aswellasthePCBs;
8. Capacitorsarethentakentoatestarea;9. PCBtankswerelocatedinBldg.#4North.
Therewassignedprohibitingentryandentrylimitedtospecializedpersonnelinrecognitionofhighhazard;
10. Afterthesealingoperation,capacitorswereremovedtothetrichloroethylenedegreasingtanks;
11. ThenpaintedwithGlyptolepoxybasedpaint.
Welding and Soldering:Weldingwascarriedoutbyonepersonfortheseoperations.Aperturesoncapacitorsweresolderedclosedwithleadand/orsilversolder.Thisprocesswasfairlyintensive.
LargecapacitorswererolledintoanovenandavacuummanifoldwasconnectedtoaSchradervalveandleftforhours.Afterremovalfromtheovencooloilwasplacedinandthevalveclosedwithleadsolder.
Building of “cans” for capacitors1. 6x12sheetsoflowgradestainlesswereused
toform“cans;”2. Theseweredippedintrichloroethylene
degreaserinanopen6x6x10’tank;3. Capacitorcanswerethenhungtodrainbefore
beingwelded;4. Cansfusion-weldedwithstickwelding
(Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandatmospherewasthickwithfumes).
Capacitor Reclaim Area 1. Damagedunits,orthosenotmeeting
specificationsreturnedtothisareaandthefluidisemptiedintoatank6’x2’x8’highatfloorlevel.(Duringtheoperationsplashesoffluidarescatteredandvapoursaredispersed.LocalexhaustventilationineffectiveasperMOLinspector’suseofsmokedetectortube);
2. Apneumaticpressisusedtobreakthecapacitorcanistersapart.(Localexhaustwas
previouslyused.”5. 6/24/56: Discussion of increased volume of
PCBusedandtheneedforbetterventilationandpersonalhygiene;
6. 4/06/59:inspectorrecommendsimprovingventilationbecausevacuumtanksarerichinpyranol;
7. 5/08/59:“Theseresultsarehigherthanthoseobtainedin1948.Wefeelthesefiguresarerepresentative…andthatavapourproblemexists”;
8. 8/22/60:“Installedventilation…ImprovementshownbutconcentrationsstillabovetheMAC.”Hygienefacilitiesunsatisfactory.
9. 01/11/61:FollowupairconcentrationsmeasuredshowPCBlevels5to11timestheTLV.Inspectorrecommendsmedicalmonitoringtoseeiffurtherimprovementsshouldbemade;
10. 08/27/79:OperatorssamplingTCBfluidfordielectricpropertieswithoutPPE-nogloves,organicvapourrespirator.ContainersfilledwithTCBleftuncoveredandmaycontributetoTCBvapours.SplashesandspillsintheTCBreclaimareadispersingintoair.Localexhaustventilationnoteffectivetocapturevapourandparticulate.Localexhaustforpneumaticbreakuppress“completelyineffectiveandshouldbemodified.”TCEconcentrationlevelsatthedegreaserwere100ppmto150ppm.TCBspillageseenandpapertowelssoakedwithsolventleftinanopenbarrel.“Thiscouldcontributetoorganicvapoursbeingdischargedconstantlyintotheworkroom.”Ordersissueforventilation,isolationandPPE.
11. 4/11/84:TestforseepageofPCBthroughconcretefloorsinbldg.#4N.NoairconcentrationsabovetheoldTLV.Butrecommendencapsulatingthefloors;
12. 8/24/84:Swipesamplesshowveryhighsurfacecontaminations,storedtransformersmustberemovedandworkersadvisedofhazardsandhygienepractices.
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ineffectiveasperMOLinspector);3. Chemicalsexposedtoinreclaimprocess
included: Trichloroethylene, Polychloronated Biphenols (Pyronal), Toluene, and trichlorobenzene/dioctylphthalate.
Laboratory 2nd floor:
Mercury(frominstrumentspillsand/orbreakage)routinelysweptupbystaffwithoutprotectionorventilation.Staffwouldcollectspilledmercuryanddipintotrichloroethylenetankstocleanforreuse.Thiswasalldonemanually.
TCE/Cadmium Exposures (MOL reports):1. 8/14/79:highlevelsofTCEvapourin
fillingandreclaimarea.Ventilationfoundineffective.Housekeepingandhygienepracticespoor,e.g.openbucketsofTCE,spillscleanedupbyhandwithpapertowelsandleftonfloor.InspectorrecommendedPPE,adequateventilation,andimprovedhousekeepingandhygiene;
2. 01/27/1982:CadmiuminurinelevelshighandexposuretocadmiumconfirmedbytheMOL.Recommendsnofoodordrinkshouldbeconsumedinthesilversolderingarea.
Mercury Exposure:InhalationandskinabsorptionofmercuryinliquidandvapourstatewithoutprotectiveequipmentaswellasinhalationandabsorptionofTECduringthemercurycleaningprocess.Ingestionalsoanotherlikelyrouteofentrygiveneatingandsmokingattheworkstation.
JHSC report: 10/11/79Re: unexpected test finding: “Ministry of Health conductedtestsinareausingpersonaldosimeters.Chemicalscheckedweretrichlorethylene,trichlorethylane,andtrichlorolenzene.Strangelyenough,D1(2-ethyhexyl)phthalateismajorcomponentofthismixtureandthiswasnotmentionedduringchecks.”
Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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BUILDING: #5 DEPARTMENT: COIL IMPREGNATION
General DescriptionAsphalt Impregnation ProcessMICA Coil ProcessingMICA/asphalt Tape ProductionMaintenance and Cleaning of Impregnation AreaCompounding Tank Removal (1977)
Known chemicals used or produced:
AsphaltAsbestosBenzeneCoal tarCoal tar pitch Mica dustToluene
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General description: thecoil-impregnatingdepartmentwasattachedtoBuilding7,intheArmaturedepartment,andwaspartofthatproductionsystem,employing10-20people.Thisdepartmenthoused2compounding“tanks”thatwerepartiallyaboveandbelowthefloor.Coilswerevacuumpressureimpregnatedwithasphaltandthenbakedtohardeninanoven.Building5alsocarriedonaMicacoilprocessingoperationandamica/asphalttapeproductionoperationduringthe1960s.
Asphalt impregnation process:
Bothcompoundtankswerepressure-impregnatingtanks.Whenthedoorswereopenedheavyasphaltfumeswouldflowout.Atrayofcoilswouldbeplaceinthetanksanditwouldpressurizefrom4to24hours.Withtwotanks,onewouldalwaysberunningwhiletheotherwasbeingunloadedorloaded.Workersdidnotwearrespiratorprotectionandtherewasnolocalexhaustventilationtoprotectfromfumes.Nogloveswereworn.ThecurrentTLVforasphaltfumesis0.5mg/m³asbenzene-solubleaerosol.Informantsnotedthatfumesfromasphaltwereveryheavywhenthedoorswereopened.Intheasphaltimpregnationprocesstherewasconstantcleaningofpartsandhandswith1500toluene.
MICA Coil Processing:
Coilscomingoutofthecompoundingtankprocessweretapedandbaked.Subsequently,2operatorswouldstripoffsacrificialtapeandtarwithknivesandthengobacktothecoiltapingprocess.Informantsdescribed the tasks as dusty and dirty since the tape wasbrittle.Someworkersworeglovesandfaceshields.
Employeesfrequentlycomplainedthatitwasveryhardtobreathbecauseoftheheavyairbornedust.
Mica/Asphalt Tape Production Process:
Mica/AsphaltTapeconsistedofalayerofMicaflakessandwichedbetweentwostripsoftapecoatedwithblackstickyvarnish(asphalt).
General Exposure risks: highriskofsignificantexposuresofasphalt,toluene,benzene,micadustthroughinhalationgiventhevolumeofusageandabsenceofexposurecontrols.
Risksofinhalation,absorption,andingestionwerepresent.Givenworkers’adversehealthsymptomsanddetectionofstrongodoursfromthechemicalsandheatingofthem,itishighlylikelythatreportsofexposureareconfirmedandthatexposurecontrolswereinadequatetoprotectworkers.
Workersinthisoperationwereheavilyexposedtoasphaltfumesandthermaldecompositionby-products.Coaltarpitchfumesfromtheopenpressuretanksandoven-bakingprocesseswerehighlylikelyinhaled.Alsoworkershandledtheseimpregnatedcoilsbarehandedwhichputthematriskofabsorbingthesechemicalsthroughtheskin.Thiswasevenmorelikelygiventhatworkersusedtoluenetowashthetarofftheirbodies.Toluenewoulddefattheprotectiveoilsfromtheskinthusaidingabsorption.
Workerswerealsolikelyabsorbingacertainamountofbenzene,aknowncontaminantintoluene.
Themica/asphaltcoilprocessingalsoexposedworkerstoasphaltfumes,micadustandsolventvapours.
Thesewereverylikelyinhaled/absorbedinsignificantamountsgiventhehighlevelofproductionaswellasthelikelihoodofabsorptionthroughdefattedskin.Theotherfactorcontributingtotheentryofthischemicalintothebodywasthatworkerswereeatinganddrinkingattheirworkstations.
Themicatapeproductionprocessandtasksalsoputworkersatriskofexposuretoinhalingbothasphaltfumesandmicadustsinadditiontoinhalingandabsorbingthesolventtolueneusedtocleanequipmentandexposedbodyparts,especiallyhands.
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1. WorkerswouldfeedMicaintoahopper2’square that travelled on a conveyor into a shakerthat“shook”themicaontothestickytape;
2. Asthemachineran,micablackvarnishwasappliedontothetape;
3. Attheendoftheconveyor,aheatingelementcausedtheflakestosticktothetapeandformedaspooloftape;
4. Thiswasthencutinvarioussizesbyaslitter.Thiswasastickyanddustyoperationandtherewasmicaallovertheworkarea.Compressedairwasusedtocleanmicadustoffequipmentandclothing.
Alarge8’x4’steeltankinthearea,whichcontained1500toluene,wasusedtocleanequipmentontheslittingmachine.Thistankwasopenmosttimes.
Employeesroutinelyusedthetoluenetoalsocleantheirhands.Workerswereveryconcernedabouttheirhealthbecausetheyfounditdifficulttobreatheandsufferedfromfrequentcoughing.
Therewasadangeroffireshouldtheconveyorstopandthepaperbegintoburnbecauseoftheheatingelementoperatingatbetween300and400°C.
Maintenance and Cleaning of impregnation:
Maintenanceworkerswereperiodicallysentintoclean up hardened resins and asphalt caked onto to rail tracks, ovens, and other equipment and surfaces.Thisusuallyinvolvedtheuseofgrindersand jackhammers to remove the hardened asphalt andresins.Thiswasaverydustyoperationsandworkerscomplainedabouttheresiduedustandfumes.Workersdidnotwearrespiratoryprotectionandtherewasnolocalexhaust.Thiswasalong-termproceduretocleantheareaofhardenedresidue.
Compounding Tank Removal 1977:
Compounding Tank 1977 incident: Thecompoundingtankwasusedforasphaltcoatingofparts/coilsbyimmersingpartsinasphaltmixture.Thistankstood20’highandwasencasedinlooseasbestos2’thickinafriablestate.Asbestosinsulationwasheldinplace
Thisoperationputworkersathighriskofexposuretodustsandfumesfromasphaltandresinswithoutanyprotectiveequipmentorotherexposurecontrols.
Thiseventexposedtheseworkerstoenormousconcentrationsofasbestosandledtodevelopmentofasbestosrelatedpulmonarydisease.
InthiscaseoneoftheworkerswasdiagnosedwithpleurafibrosisandtheboardsubsequentlyacceptedhisWSIBclaim.
Workerswouldhavebeenexposedtoasbestoslevelsthatwerelikely1000timeshigherthanthecurrentTLVof0.1f/cc.
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bya2x4framethatsurroundedthetankandwascoveredwithacanvastarptoholdthelooseasbestosinplace.Whenthetankwasnolongerneededanorderforitsremovalwasmadeleadingtoamajorasbestosexposure.
Removal Process: Workersweredirectedtoremoveanddismantlethetank.Workerscutthecanvasopentogetattheasbestosandbegantoremovetheasbestosmanuallywithshovelsandbuckets.Theasbestoswastakentoalocaldump.Somewasgiventoemployeestoinsulatetheirhomes.
WhenanuppermanagerdiscoveredthisdangerousremovalofasbestostheworkwasshutdownandtheMOLwascalledintoinvestigate.Theworkwashaltedanddidnotresumeuntilprotectprocedureswereputinplacebutbythenamajorexposureeventhadoccurred.
Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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BUILDING: #7 DEPARTMENT: ARMATURE
Processes Armature Upstairs:Sheer StationWinding LathesCoil Forming OperationPunch Press 752 Forming MachineAbove Ground Dip TankCut Off Machine and StripperFlux potsSunken Dip TankBaking OvenTaping MachinesStator Coil Set Up and WrapperBake OvenPole Face Bar Press
Processes Armature Downstairs: (1960s)SubstationCopper StorageCopper LatheCoil Winding LatheTin Pot OperationsSpreaderCoil Taping AreaAsphalt VPI TanksTest AreaAssembly WindersOverhead Crane OperationAssembly WindersBending ProcessWelding AreaAssembly Winders MD-CDAssembly Winders (turbine rotors)
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Assembly winders (induction bar rotors)OvensPortable OvensArmature Dip TankStorage TanksMica Tape ProductionHydro Poles Operation
Processes lower level 1960-1980:Copper Storage AreaAssembly WindersBanding LatheVPI TanksVPI Epoxy resin 6860 DippingSmall VPI TanksIsonol 51 TankXylene TankSin-BinCold FormingCoil ManufacturingFridge Epoxy Storage Facility
Processes Armature lower level 1980-2005:Coil FabricationBake OvensCrane CycleExcitor ProcessIsonel TankWinding LatheShear Station
Known Chemicals used or produced: Asbestos,fiberglass,eponglass,resi-glasscord,“castor”brandasbestosglovesAsphalt1592,asphaltvarnish,“blackvarnish”BCME, CPA BenzeneBisphenol-AChromatap, Chromic acidCopper,copperdust,brazedcopper,gywireDicumylperoxideEpichlorohydrinMethylEthylKeytone(MEK),MEKperoxide,FillersFormaldehydeGlyptolpaint,5105paint,5142epoxy,epoxy74023HydrogencyanideIsonel 51, 9700 Isonel Lead,tin,beeswaxLiquidasphaltbondingagentsspecifications1027and1028MEKMethanolMineral spirits MuriaticacidMWFsNomexOzonePhenolsRosin Royalene, TCEShellac, varnishSilica, silica dust, liquid silica Silver solder, sylphs solderStyrene/styreneoxides,tributylstyrenethinnerTapes:FG/epoxy,FG/mica,Terylene,Kapton,mylar,hydro,permfil,shrink,fiberglassTCE,TCE-1300glue,TCE1500thinnerToluene,xyleneToluene,xylene,methyl,VinyltolueneTrichloroethyleneVinyl tolueneVPIResinmixes:A311,M6860,485(50-50thinner-resin), 9522, 9637, 5918, Isonel 51WeldingfumesMica, mica mat
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Background: Thiswasalargedepartmentemploying200workersover3shifts.Thisdepartmentproducedcoilsformotorsandgenerators,stators,DCmotors,andlargesizearmaturesformotors.Productionprocesstookplaceinbuilding#7measuring350’x100’x70’ht.TherewasamezzaninecoveringhalfthebuildingthatranN/S,opentothelowerfloor.Large-scalearmaturesweretransportedviadedicatedrailwaytobuildings#8and#10wheresameprocessesandchemicalswereused.Henceexposuresinbuildings#8and#10weresimilartothoseinbuilding#7.Inaddition,VPIprocessesofcoatingelectricalcoilswithpolyesterresinsandepoxywerecarriedoutinbuildings#8and#10.Windingassemblywasalsodoneinthesebuildings.Partsweretransportedfromdepartmentto department via dedicated transfer cars on rail tracks.Dependingonvolumeofparts,twoormorecarswereused.Building#10builtlargewater-wheelgeneratorsandbuilding#8processed30-40tonnesofequipment.ProcessestookplacebothinArmatureUpstairs(mezzanine)andDownstairs:
Armature (Upstairs)
(Productioncarriedoutmainlybywomenmaking5coilspershift)1. ShearStation:(replacedbywindinglathes
in1980s).Thiswasalargemachinetocutinsulationforcoils.Anoperatorcutfibreglassandasbestossheetstosizegeneratinglargeamountsofdustresultinginfreefloatingasbestosandfibreglassfibressuspendedintheworkplaceatmosphere.Suspendedfibresweredispersedfurtherduetolarge-standingfansusedtocoolthearea.Alsousedtocutasbestoswedgesandfillersinwindingprocess;
2. WindingLathes(replacedshearstation).Thisoperationconsistedof20’latheswherecopperwirewasrunthroughthemachineand‘taped’withclothinsulationafterthewirewasfirst‘lubricated’withsilicapowder
Summary of toxic chemical exposures: Alargevarietyofchemicalswereusedinthearmaturedepartmentaswellasinbuildings#8and#10.Thesewereusedinlargequantitieswithlittleornolocalexhaustventilation,PPE,inconsistenthousekeeping,andlackofappropriatehygienefacilities(noshowers,nonear-bypotablewaterorwashfacilities).Chemicalcontaminantsaffectedallemployeeswhetherdirectlyhandlingtheseorfromby-standerexposures.Becausetheyweremists,vapours,fumesorliquids,mainroutesofentrywereinhalationandskinabsorption.However,becauseworkeratelunchandsmokedattheirworkstations,chemicalwerelikelyingestedaswell.Chemicalsworkersexposedtoincluded:copper,Isonel 51 (solvent borne polyester resin), formaldehyde, BCME, mineral spirits, shellac, methanol,trichloroethylene,hydrogencyanide,chromicacid,styrene/styreneoxides,dicumylperoxide,asbestos,mica,vinyltoluene,rosincoresolder,royalene,solventmixtures,liquidasphaltbondingagentsspecifications1027and1028,benzene,toluene,xylene,methylethylkeytone(MEK),MEKperoxide,chromatap,Bisphenol-A,epoxyresins*,fillers,phenols,epichlorohydrin,weldingfumes,ozone,fibreglass.VPIResinmixturesworkerswereexposedtoincluded:A311, M6860, 485 (50-50 thinner-resin), 9522, 9637, 5918,andIsonel51bakedat160c.Inhalationofasbestosfibreandfibreglass.Levelspriortotheenactmentoftheoccupationalhealthandsafetyactin1979weremeasuredforasbestosat10fibres/cc.PriortotheAct,littlewasdonetoabateasbestosexposureorprovidepersonalprotectiveequipment.Butevenasasbestoslevelsdeclinedintheplantafter1979,theystillwouldbeatlevelsfarexceedingcurrentexposurelimitsof0.1f/cc.Clothinsulationwaslikelyasbestosandthereisapossibilityofsilicaexposureaswell.
Building: #7 Department: ArmatureSources: Sonya Lal, 2006 (OHCOW retrospective) and Advisory CommitteeProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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inlargetubs.Silicawasreleasedintotheworkplaceifthesetubsweredamagedorcracked;
3. Coilformingoperation:Thisinvolvedtheshapingofdieselcoilbyalargehydraulicpressusinglongstripsofcopper.Fibreglassinsulatedwirestripswereformedusingvarioussizewoodenformsormolds.Theinsulationusedwas‘Nomex’,afibreglass,orMicaMat.Thecoilproductwasthendippedinmethanoltosecureafirmmoistwrap.Isopropylalcoholwassometimesuseddependingonspecifications.Thecoilwasnextdippedinagreenbondingsolutionandsentto‘drypress’tobecompressedandbakedinanoven.Duringthebakingcyclethecoilwaswrappedina‘Nomex’wrap.1300Glue(yellowglue)wasbrushedontocoilslotsandcoilwasinsulatedagain;
4. PunchPress:Oneemployeeassignedtothepunchpressusedtoflattencopperleadsandpieceswerepunchedout.Operationdidnotrequireheatingofmetal,butweretreatedwithcuttingoils.Presswasveryloudandnoearprotectionprovided;
5. 752Formingmachine:Flatcopperwirewasshapedintoaloopandpunch-pressedintoaform.Insulationwasaddedtowireconsistingofeithersilica,mica,fibreglass,scotchtape,or2-gauzefibreglasstapewithmicasandwichedbetweenlayers.Wirewasthen dipped in isopropyl alcohol and fed into atapingmachinewherefibreglasswrapwasappliedwithglyptolglue.Liquidsilicawasusedasabondingmaterial.Minimaldustproduced.Otherissues:Nolocalexhaustventilationtocapturefibresreleasedduringtaping.Machineswereusedcontinuouslyon8-hourshifts.Tapewascutinrollswithroughedgesandloosefibres,whichwerenotcontainedduetolackofexposurecontrols;
6. AbovegroundDipTankforglassmeasured3’x4’.TankwasfilledwithIsonel51,(anorangedye)withtolueneadded.Nolocal
RiskofinhalationtofibreglassandMicadustfromfrayedinsulationsheetsandduringtheformingoperation.Alsoinhalationandabsorptionofalcoholvapours,bondingsolutionaswellasthermaldecompositionby-productsduringthebakingandcuringprocess.Additionalinhalationofdustas1300gluefumes.
Punchpressoperationproducedbothcopperdust(possiblycoatedwithmetaltreatmentssuchasdegreasers)andinsulationdusts(fibreglass,mica,asbestos).Riskofinhalationofcopperandinsulationdustlikely.
Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofalcoholandingredientsinglyptolglue.Inhalationofinsulationfibresfromedgesoftapethatwouldbreakoff.Fibreswerenotcontainedwithoutlocalexhaustventilation.
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ventilation.ThetankwasusedtodyethetapeinGEcoloursplusaddedtexture.Therewasastrongodourofalcohol.Thelidforthetankwasrarelyusedtocontainvapours.Awirebasketloweredpartsintothetank,andthenemployeesremovedthedippedwettapewithbarehands.Nogloveswereworn.Workershandsandarmswerefrequentlyinthediptank.Someworkersreporteddis-colorationofhairandfingernails;
7. Cutoffmachineandstripper:This10”machinewasusedtostraighten,strip,andcutfibreglass-coveredwire.Copperdustwasgeneratedduringthecuttingprocess.Theendsofwireweresentthroughbrushesthatstrippedofffibreglassinsulationandthewirethencuttolength.Muchofthewirewasinsulatedwithasbestos,alsoreleasedintheprocess.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Machineusedbyoneemployeefor8-hourshift.Thebrushesstrippedoffagreatdealofinsulation,generatingalargeamountofasbestos/fibreglassfibreincludingKaptonGlass;
8. Lead,flux,andtinpots:Leadpot(sizeofacrockpot)washeatedtomeltbarsofleadat621F.Theleadsofcopperwire,aswellasGywire,weredippedintheleadpot.Thewirewasplacedonaracktocool.Whiletherewassomeventilationabovethepot,therewassplashing,bubblingandvapourspresentintheair.Noprotectiveequipmentwasprovided.FluxPotcontainingabrown,stickysubstanceingallonpailsusedtocleancopperleadsforsoldering.Thefluxcontainedmuriaticacid.Whenfluxedwirehitthemoltenlead,theleadwouldsplashupproducingfumeswithastrongodour.Astandingfanwasusedtodispersefumes,butwasnotalwaysavailablesinceitwassharedwithothers;
9. Diptank(4’x4’)sunkeninfloorcontainingepoxyvarnishthinnedwithtolueneandxylene.MEKperoxidewasaddedasan
InhalationoffumesandvapoursfromdiptankscontainingIsonel51.ExposuretoformaldehydeandtheformationofBCME,BPA.AlsoexposuretoYellowdyeandbothinhalationandskinabsorptionofdyeandalcoholduetoextensivedirectskincontactwiththesechemicals.
Riskofinhalationtocopperdustsgeneratedduringcuttingprocessaswellasriskofinhalationofinsulationdustscontainingfibreglassduringstrippingprocess.Riskofinhalationofinsulationdustveryhigh,giventhestrippingprocessandlackoflocalventilation.
RiskofInhalationofleadmoltenleadfumeshighlylikely.SupportedbywhatweknowabouttheindustrialprocessaswellasMOLandmedicalmonitoringreportsexceedingacceptablelead/urine/bloodlevels.Aswell,ventilationwasinadequateandprocessproducedsplashesandbubbling,increasingthepotentialforexposure.Alsoriskofinhalationandskinabsorptionofacid-basedflux.
MOL:03/26/68: re:lead/tinpotspoorhousekeeping,potsnotcleaned,notprovidedwithclearcompositionoftinningprocess.Local“exhaustinadequateandrequirecompleteoverhaul.”
MOL:03/26/68: followingpreviousreportonleadpots.Ventilationinadequateinarmature.Ordersissued:medicalsurveillance,leadsignage,noeating,drinkingsmoking,housekeeping,hygienepractices,PPE
MOL:08/04/71: Followupofresinexplosiontopreventfurthercontamination;Cleanupofphenolic
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accelerator.Partsweredippedanddrip-driedoverthetank,thenbakedinanoven.Thisareawasfullofheavyfumesfromthetankanddrippingpartsaswellasovenbakinganddryingparts.Tankwasusedtoapplyvarnishtoarmaturesorrotor-typecoilsinmanysizesupto7to8feet.Duetodripping,varnishaccumulatedonfloors.Therewasaheavychemicalodourfromtankanddryingcoils.Employeesinadjacentareasalsoexposedtostrongfumes.Fansused,dispersingthefumes to other areas of the department aswellasotherdepartments.Employeeworkstationswerenearthedippingtanks.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationforthedippingoperation;
10. BakingOvenusedfordippingwasnotproperlyventilated.Itwas8’-10’insize.Employeescouldseeandsmellsmoke.Ovenheated by electric heaters that forced air downthecoils.Fumeswereveryheavy,consistingof:varnishes,lead,flux,andthermaldecompositionby-productsfromthebakingprocess.Employeesexperiencedheavysolventodoursoftenreportingsymptomsofeyes,nose,andthroatirritations;
11. TapingMachines(seeMOLreport)5machinesusedwith5or6employeesassigned.Reportsdescribeheavyfibresinairlikea“snowstorm.”ProcessinvolvedtheuseofMica-Mat,Fibreglass,andKaptontape.Allproductionitemsweretapedhere.Processgeneratedheavyfibres.Employeescouldnotwearglovesduetofinenatureofthework,hencehaddirectskincontactwithtreatedtapes.Alcoholin5-gallonpailsusedtomoistentapes.Thealcoholsconsistedofisopropyl,MEK,Xylene,toluene,causingskintogowhite,aswellascauseburnsandskinrashes.Machineswerecleanedwithsolventsonceperweekwithalcohol.EmployeeswouldgetcoveredinglueanduseMEKtocleanitoffwithvigorousscrubbing.When
resinvapourizedandcondenseonstructures.Instituteadequatemeasurestoavoidskinandinhalation.MOL:06/7/73:dermatitisasaresultofepoxyimpregnatedtapesthataresoakedintolueneandusedinthewindingoperation.Glovesdifficulttoperformtaskswith.Improvedhygieneandlatexglovesprovided.MOL:06/26/73: Testresultsnotreportedbutepoxytapeissoakedintoluene.Threetypesoftapesused:FG/epoxy,FG/mica/epoxy,terylene.Companyfailedtotakeproperprotectivemeasurebecauseitwastoldbythemanufacturerthatepoxywas“mild”.
MOL:06/19/74: Highexposuretoresinwhilecoatingstatorwithresinusingahose.Workerwassoakedinepoxyresin.Highsolventandepoxyexposure.‘”…companyhasrecognizedthehazardinvolvedinthismethod…andtakenstepstodiscontinuetheoperation.Noordersissued.MOL: 11/24/76: Investigateasbestosexposuresinarmaturedept.—workersusingbandsawstocutasbestoswithoutlocalexhaust;ventilationshouldnotallowfibrestore-enterworkarea.Airsamplingsuggested.Orderissuedforadequateventilation.Riskofinhalationandskinabsorptionofepoxyresin,MEKperoxidewasverylikelygiventheamountsandsurface areas of covered material and temperatures ofoven.Thermaldecompositionby-products.Reports of heavy fumes and odours from the dip tankandovenbakingoperation.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.
Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofresinfumes,lead,fluxesandthermaldecompositionby-productsishighlylikelygiventheriskfactorsandobservationsofheavyfumesdocumentedinthisarea.
Riskofinhalationofinsulationfibreshighlylikelyduringthisoperationgivenobservationaboutvisiblefibredustcontainingmica,fibreglass,andKaptontapedusts.ThisisconfirmedbyMOLreports.
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workingondieselcomponents,workersdippedtheirhandsinalcoholcontinuouslytopositioninsulation,whichledtomanycasesofdermatitis.Workersreportedskinpeelingoffinsheetswhenshoweringathomeduetosolventexposure;
12. Statorcoilsetupandwrapper:TCE-1300glueusedinthisprocesshadaveryheavyodour.ItwasappliedbybrushandMEKwasusedtoremoveandcleanup;
13. Oven(5’x6’)usedtoheatcoilspriortomovingtodiepress.The761,Gysand581epoxieswerebakedinoventomakeslotssolid.Workersoftenheattheirfoodintheovensandateatworkstationsbecauseofdistancetocafeteriaandlimitedseating;
14. Polefacebarpress.Solidpieceofcopperinsulatedwithlayersoftape,e.g.hydrotape,shrinkMylar,terrylene,tedlartape,permfiltape,alldonebyhand.Varnishalsousedforadhesive(anepoxyresin)brushedonasaverystickypaste.Aheatedpressheatedboththecopperwireandepoxyresinstocuretapeontothewire.Therewasnolocalexhaust.MEKwasusedtocleanpressesandremoveepoxybrownvarnishes.RagsdippedinMEKusedtowipedownpresseswhilestillhot,thusemittingheavyfumes.“FreeCoat”spraywasappliedtothepresstoactasanon-stick,whichcontainedMEK.Employeesateandsmokedattheirworkstations.Fibresweresignificantatthemezzaninelevel.Theairbornefibresandfumesweredispersedtootherareasofthebuildingaswell.
Armature Downstairs (1960s)1. Asubstationconsistingof2-3transformers
werelocatedinthisarea,usedbymaintenanceandfencedofffromtherestofarmaturedepartment.Itincludedadegreasingtankmeasuring16’x4’x6’deep.Thetankwashalfin,andhalfabove,ground.Itcontained#10000Royalene(TCE).Thiswasavapourdegreaseroperationheatedto200F.
Inhalationandabsorptionoftreatmentsfortapesaswellasseveralsolventshandledbarehanded.TheseincludedIsopropylalcohol,MEK,xylene,toluene.UseofMEKtocleanglueoffhands.Exposuresconfirmedbytheincidenceofdermatitisandothersymptoms.
RiskofinhalationandskinabsorptionofingredientsinbothTCE1300glueandMEK.
Riskofexposuretoepoxiesthroughinhalationandabsorptionhighlylikely.Ingestionalsopossiblegiveneatingatworkstations.
Riskofinhalationoftapefibresaswellastheirchemicaltreatments.Alsoreportsofheavydustaccumulationatmezzaninelevelwouldsupportthisassessment.Alsoriskofinhalationofepoxyresinsandthermaldecompositionproducts.InhalationandskinabsorptionofMEKhighlylikelygivenuseforcleaninghandsandarms.
JHSC: 1/15/80re:smokeGrievancefiledonmatterofenclosureofuppergalleryandmethodofpaymentwhenfumesforceworkerstoevacuatearea.Althoughseveralcorrectionsmade,problemstillthere.Situationunderinvestigationforlongtime(firstbroughttoattention10/79).
Riskofinhalationandskinabsorptionoftrichloroethyleneexposureswashighgiven:proximitytothechemical,itsforminhighvapourstatefrombeingheated,directhandling,lackoflocalexhaustventilation,andworkerobservationandexperienceofhealthsymptomsofexposure.
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Partswereloweredinabasketcontainingcopper and steel components by an overhead hoist.Thedegreasingprocesswasmonitoredfor10-15minutes.Vapourwasverystrongwithworkersstatingthatit“clearedtheirsinuses”.Therewasnoeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.Awatertankofthesamesizewasheatedwithanexhaustoverthetop.Brazedcopperpartsfromotheroperationsweredippedintothistankforrinsing;
2. Therewasacopperstorageareawhereworkerswearingcottonglovespickedupcopperwireonreelstobemadeintocoils.Somewirewasinsulatedwithasbestosfromthecardingoperations;
3. Copperlathemachineformedcopperwireintoaflatplate2”x1/2”thick;
4. Coilwindinglathesoperatedona2-3-shiftbasis.Thiswasadryoperation.Copperwirewasfedintoalathe,whichtensionedthewireandcreatedcoils.Micaorfibreglassandasbestostapewereappliedautomaticallycreatingairbornefibrevisibleintheatmosphere.Ifthewirecamefromwireandcable,itwaslikelyasbestos.TherewasnolocalexhaustorPPEprovided.Motorizedsweeperscleanedthemainaisle.Workerssweptotherareas.Dustaccumulationonallsurfacesandairbornefibreswerevisibleinsunlight.Nochangeroomswereprovidedandworkclotheswerebroughthome.Workerscomplainedaboutitchinganddermatitis.EmployerprovidedSBS30andPLY-geltorelieveitchingaswellastimeforthesetobeapplied;
5. TinPotoperations/stripperflux.Tin/leadmixture(beeswaxaddedasreleaseagent)heatedto449F.Wirewasmechanicallystrippedofinsulation.Fluxmadeofrosinandalcoholappliedtocleancopperinpreparationoftinning.Significantamountsofvapourandfumesdetectedbythoseworkingon
Potentialexposuretoasbestosdependentonconditionofasbestosladeninsulationandwhetherthiswasstripped.
Riskofinhalationofcopperdustaswellasdustsconsistingofmica,asbestosandfibreglass.Inthelattercase,thewindingmachineapplyingtheinsulationtapesdidgeneratefibresbyabradingtheinsulationasitwasbeingapplied.Workersreportsofhighfibreintheworkplaceatmospherethatwasclearlyvisible.Riskofasbestosmorelikelyifwirecamefromwireandcabledepartment.
Notethattherewasnolocalexhaustventilation,norPPE.Dustaccumulation,clearsignthattheatmospherewasladenwithfibres--aswellasworkers’symptomsofdermatitisanditching.Latterisconfirmedbytheemployer’sattempttoaddresstheadversehealtheffect.
Highriskofinhalationandskinabsorptionoftinandleadfumesfromheatedmoltenpotsaswellasthealcoholbasedresin,giventhatthepotswereopenandworkershandledmaterialsdirectlywithouteffectivelocalexhaustventilationandrespiratoryprotection.“Sap-like”odoursarealsoasignthatworkerswereexposedtothesefumes.
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lathesadjacenttothepotoperation(whichproducedsap-likefumes).Odourswereheavyfromtin/flux.Ventilationsysteminadequate,despiteroofexhaustsystem.Moltentinwasmadeof60/40solderlead/tin.Workersmanuallyfedpotswithbarsofleadandtin.Asbestosgloveswereworn(brandname“Castor”);
6. Spreader:(usedwithhighvoltagecoils)Machine spread the coils into the shape requiredforinsertioninstator/rotor.Thespreadingoperationgeneratedanddispersedasbestosfibres;
7. Coiltapingarea:(30workerspershifton3shifts)Coilswereplacedinclampsandleadtapedwithmicatape,thenvoltageappliedtodetermineamountoftaperequired.Eachroundoftapingrequiredtheapplicationofblackvarnish(45gallondrums).Requiredtheapplicationof9layersoftapeandvarnish.Fibreglasscordusetotightencoilsbackintoposition.Coilswerethenair-dried.Glovesnotwornbecausedetailedmovementsrequired.Consequentlyworkersdippedtheir hands in 1500 (TCE) thinner to facilitate tighteningofcord.Handsoftenbrokeoutinblistersanddryskin.Theworkareawascharacterizedbytheaccumulationofblackvarnish, mica dust, and talc and considered tobe‘oneofthedirtiestjobs’intheplant.Workersatelunchatworkstationswithwindowsopenedorfansprovidedinsummer.Areafilledwithheavyfumesandvapoursduetolargenumberofworkersandlargeproductionruns;
8. TwoasphaltVPIcompoundtanksmeasuring25’deepx10’diameterand12’deepx8’diameter.Thiswasavacuumpressureimpregnationprocesstocoatcoils,etal.Oneoperator/shiftandtwotofillandempty.Tankfirstfilledwithasphalt,thencoilstobecoatedplaced on trays and heated in tank for three 24-hourperiodstoallowasphalttohardenthemicaandfittosize.Onetankrunning
Riskofinhalationofasbestosfibrehighlylikelygiventhegenerationofasbestosdustduringthespreaderoperation.
Inhalationofmicadustandinhalationandabsorptionoffumesfrom‘blackvarnish’aswellasdirecthandlingofthismaterial.
AlsoinhalationandabsorptionofTCEwhiledirecthandlingandcleanskinwiththischemical.Thisisconfirmedbyadversehealtheffectsonskin.
Thereportedaccumulationofblackvarnish,micadustandtalcindicatesthatworkershighlyexposedgivenreportsofheavyfumes,volumeofproductionandnumberofworkersemployedintheoperation.
Riskofinhalationofasphaltfumes(likelycontainingTCE)washighlylikely.Skinabsorptionrisk,givendirecthandlingofthecoatedparts.Alsorisksofinhalationofbothglyptolpaintfumesanddustfrominsulationtapescontaininggraphiteandasbestos(whichwasinafriablestate).Confirmationofexposurefromworkers’adversehealthsymptoms.*NOTE: See also Building #5 report regarding compounding “tanks”.
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continuously.Bakedcoilsandcardboardseparatorsremovedbyhand.Paperdustmaskswereworn.Asbestostapeusetotapetheleadscameina1”widereelwithloosefibressecuredwithgraphitetape.Theremainingwirewaspaintedwithredglyptolpaint.Exposuretoresinsbecameworseovertimewithworkersexperiencingburningsorethroats.Fumesheaviestwhenlidswereopened;
9. Testarea:Processinvolvedhighpotentialtestingof30to40thousandvolts.Forlargecoils,testtook60tests.Ozonewasemittedinprocess,burningworkers’nosesandsinuses.Ozoneodoursweredetectedattheupperlevelaswell;
10. Assemblywinders:(alsoconductedinbuildings8and10)Processinvolved20to30workershandlingasphaltcoatedwiretobesetupinthestators.Coilsfirstplacedintoslotsinstatorthenheldinplacewithasbestoswedges.Varnishplacedineachslot(1592asphaltvarnish),whichheldtheasbestosintact.Additionalwedgesofleatheredcardboardandwoodusedtosecurecoilsinplace.Varnishedfibreglasscordfurthersecuredeverythinginplace.Coilswereconnected individually, and then soldered inplacewithrosincoresolderbyacetylene/oxygentorch.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Coilleadswereinsulatedwithafibreglasstapealsocoatedwith1592asphaltvarnish.Thisprocesswasrepeated10-15timesperpairofcoilleads.Workerswerecoveredinblackasphaltvarnish;someworesafetyglasses;
Note:Generalenvironmentcanbecharacterizedassimilartoaroadtarringoperationwithaheavysmelloftarandbluehaze.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandlittle,ifany,PPE.Workpracticesincludedusingcompressedairtocleandustoffsurfacesandsolventstocleantheirbodies.Smokingandeatingatworkstationswerepermittedthroughoutthedepartment.Theotherimportant
Riskofinhalationofozonegasgeneratedbyapplicationofhighvoltageswasverylikelygivenworkers’experienceofodours(evenintheupperlevel)andadversehealthsymptoms.Ozoneisconsideredalungcarcinogen.
HighriskofinhalationofasphaltfumesaswellasTCEusedtothinasphalt.
Highriskofskinabsorptionofasphaltgiventheamountofdirecthandlingofcoatedmaterials.
Highriskofinhalationofasbestosandfibreglassdust.
Highriskofinhalationofsolderfumesandthermaldecompositionby-products.
Theseexposureswouldbeintensegiventhevolumeofproductionandtherepetitivenessoftheprocessandthefactthattherewasnolocalexhaustventilationandlittleppe.
Environmentalconditionsaresupportiveindicationsthathighexposureswereverylikelywithweakexposurecontrolstoprotectworkersfromthesetoxicchemicals.Theseconditionswereaggravatedbythepieceworksystemthatwasinplaceuntil1988.
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aspectofworkatGEwastheinstitutionofthepieceratesystem,whichtendedtoexacerbatetoxicexposure;11. Overheadcraneoperation:Armaturesand
otherparts,weretransportedfromoneendofthebuildingtoanotherbymobileand overhead cranes driven by operators in wiremeshcabsmeasuring5’x5’.Hitchersworkedwithcraneoperators,guidingthemfromthegroundandattachinganddetachingpartstobemoved,dipped,etc.OverheadcraneswerenotenclosedandtheoperatorwassubjecttolargeamountsoffumesandvapoursfromthedegreasingtankscontainingheatedTCEaswellastheresinsfumesfromtheVPItanksandbakingovens.Thisincludedasphalt,epoxyresinsanddegreasers.Observersindicatethatthecranecabwasengulfedincloudsofsmokeandfumes.Theoperatorwouldtakepartsinandoutofthedippingandbakingcycle3to4timesormoredaily,rangingindurationfrom5minutestohoursdependingontheprocess.Theoperatorhitcherswerealsoatsignificantexposureriskindirectingthecraneoperatorandleaningovertanksandovensto hook and unhook parts and monitor the process.Bothoperatorshadnoprotectiveequipmentandtherewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Accordingtoobservationsofother employees, the crane cab and operator wouldbeengulfedinbluesmoke.Alsoobservedwerelargeamountofresindustoncranecabsurfaces;
12. AssemblyWinders(MultiCircuitFieldArmaturesMCF)tasksincludedsecuringcopperwiretothearmature1’to5’inlength.Thisinvolvedinserting3”to4”sheetsofvarnishedasbestos(wedges)intheslotsofthestatoraswellassheetsofMicaandvarnish.Eponglasswedgeswerealsoused;
13. BandingProcessrequiredtheuseofabandingmachinelocatednearthemagneticframedepartment.Herethemachinewouldapply
Craneoperatorsweresubjecttoratherhighrisksofinhalingresinfumes,degreasersandvariousdustscontainingasbestos,fibreglass,andmica.Fumeswouldalsoincludethermaldecompositionby-productsresultingfromheatingandbakingresinsandcuringagents.Hitcherstooweresubjecttohighrisksofinhalingfumes,oftenbendingovertankstohookandunhookproductsbeingtransported.
Riskofinhalationofmicaandasbestosdustfromabraidedwedgesbeinginsertedintoslots.Thiswouldalsoincludeabsorptionofresinsfromdirectlyhandlingthesecoatedproducts.
Riskofexposuretofibreglassbreakoffandtaperesins.Inhalationoffibresandresinfumesand/orbyproducts.
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avarnishedfibreglasstapecalledResi-Glasscord;
14. Weldingarea:TIGweldingandbrazingwasmainlyusedtoattachleadstotheinsulatedbarsofthecommutatorsriser.Thisusuallyinvolvedcopper-to-copperweldingwithnofiller.Italsoinvolvedweldingresinsonthewires.Thisoperationgeneratedcopperandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromburningresins.Theseoperationstook3-4dayswith2-4welders.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandnoproperrespiratoryequipment.Silphoswasalsousedtosolderleads.Fumesweredenseandrosetothemezzaninelevel.Thiswasalengthyprocessandproducedaheavyaccumulationoffumesandduststhroughoutthebuilding;
15. AssemblywindersMD-CD:SameasMCF.Leadscutbylathe,dippedintinpotheatedat500-600c.Hoistedbycranetothetinpotfor10to15minutes.WipeddownwithTCEcoatedragsmanuallyandthentakenforcutting,smoothingandsanding.Partwasthenplacedinawalk-inoven,dippedin9700Isonel,dipped,bakedandcooled2to3times.Fumeswereheavyandwouldirritateeyes,noseandthroat.Uncuredresinwouldreactinthe2nddipandproduceachemicalreactionthatwasstronger.Thetrappeduncuredresinswouldbereleasedwhencooledandorgrinded;
16. Assembly Winders (turbine rotors): Insulation-blocksofmicaandfibreglassand/or asbestos inserted into the slots and repeatedseveraltimebetweenhighpotentialtesting.Thelargesteelringwasheatedtoshrinkintotherotorwithwoodenblockscontinuallysandedtocreateaproperfit.Finallyapieceofinsulationwasaddedwithasteelwedge;
17. Assemblywinders(InductionBarRotors):Thisprocessinvolvedbarecopperwireandmica-mattapelinedwithMylarorNomex.LineristhendippedinIsonelvarnish.Additional
Riskofinhalationofweldingfumesincludingthermaldecompositionby-productsfromweldingresins.
Riskofinhalationoffumesfromsolderingsilphos,asilver-basedsolder.
Thesefumeswereheavyandpermeatedotherpartsofthebuildingsuchastheupperlevel.
Highriskofinhalationandabsorptionoftinandleadfumes.Fumeswerequitedenseandworkersdirectlyhandledthecoatedpartwithbarehands.
Also,inhalationofmetalandresindustsfromsandingandgrindingexcessresinsinadditiontoinhalationofuncuredresinstrappedinmaterialsreleasedwhencooled.
Riskofinhalationofmica,fibreglassandasbestoswheninsertingtheseblocksintoslots.
RiskofinhalationofdustsandresinfumesfromMylar,Nomexandisonelvarnishhigh.Riskofinhalationofasbestosdustfrompaper.RiskofinhalationofTIGweldingandSylphssolder.Inhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsfrombakingresinsseveraltimespercycle.
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insulationprovidedbyasbestospapervarnished(with#1592)betweenbars36’wide.ConnectionsTIGweldedwithSylphs.Allcoilstiedwithresi-glasscord.Producttested,banded,andcure-baked.Theprocessofdipping,bakingetc.repeated2-3times.
Note: the above process involved close and intricate workwithdirectcontactwithmaterialsandchemicalprocessesincludingasbestosandchemicalreactionsassociatedwithresincoating,curing,andweldingetc.;18. Ovens:typicalovenwas15’deep10’high
and10’door,heatedto160c.Workerswalkedinandoutwithpartsandwouldbeexposedtohightemperaturesandintensefumes.Doorswouldbeopenedquiteoftenbecauseofthepiecerateoperation.Odourswerelikeburntdieselfumesorvarnish.Ventilationwasinadequate;
19. Portableovens;(inbuildings8and10also)Ovenswere20’x20’x15’equippedwithCalrodheaters.Productswerecoveredinanasbestoscloththatwasgreasytothetouch.Workershandledthisclothintensely,manipulatingitrepeatedly,e.g.,byremovingitanddroppingitfromheights.Workerscameoutcoveredinfibres,whichwerevisibleintheair;
20. Armature dip in Isonel 9700: Armatures dippedintank7’x7’containing9700Signalandtoluenethinner.TheArmaturewasmanuallyhosedwithvarnish.Armaturerotatedasitwascoveredbyvarnishasectionatatime.WorkerrepeatedlyaddedtoluenethinnertotheIsonel5gallonpail.Therewasapproximately150-180gallonofIsonelandabout20gallonsoftolueneinthemix.This process produced heavy fumes that smelledlikediesel.Workersexperiencedburningeyesandupperrespiratoryirritation.Varnish applied manually, then brush used to removeexcess.Thistook8hourstocomplete.Armaturemovedtobakingovenwhereitdrip-driedwhilerotatingasitbakedtocure.
JHSC: 2/12/80 Re: #3 oven ventilation system: Padlock to ensure vent remains open not properly installed.Switchcanbeknockedoffwithpadlockinplace.Becomeobviousthatcarefulmonitoringof requested repairs necessary to ensure proper compliance.
Riskofinhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsinandoutsideoftheovens.Thesewouldbequiteintenseintheovenswhereworkerswereintheovenitself.Ventilationwasnotadequatetocontrolexposures.MOL: 10/04/82: Investigationofheavyfumesandordersfromcuringoven.Reportsuggestsodorsmaybeduetocresolformaldehyde,hexaldehyde,acetaldehyde,propeanaldehyde,andphenol.MOL: 10/25/82: followuponcuringoven.Workerscomplainingofirritation,odors,andnausea.Leakdetected.Employerconcludesnohazardaftertesting.However,inspectornotes—fumescontainalargevarietyofthermaldecompositionproductsthatatlowconcentrationscanbeirritants;exhaustsystemislikelycompromisedbyroofexhaustandoverloadingofoven.Noordersissued,justadvice:don’toverloadovenandencloseupperend.
Highriskofinhalationofresinfumesaswellasasbestosdustfromhandlingtheovenblanket,whichwasfrayingandhandledcontinuously.
HighriskofinhalationofIsonelfumesandtoluene,handleddirectlyandincloseproximitytothedippingoperation.Largevolumeofchemicalscontributedtoaheavyexposureoveralongperiodoftime.Resinandtoluenewereusedinlargequantitiesandhandledmanually.
Riskofinhalationofasbestosfibrefromcuttingasbestosblanketstosizeandmanipulatingovercoatedandheatedparts.Processtookagreatdealoftimeandwasrepeatedseveraltimespercycleresultinginalongdurationofexposure.
Nolocalexhaustandhighfumeconcentrationconfirmedby1982MOLinvestigation.
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Afterthis,anasbestosblanketcoveredthearmature.Thiswascuttosizeandputinplace by an overhead crane and manipulated bythecraneoperatorandworker.Thiswasahighfibreoperationandtheworkerdirectlyhandled and manipulated the asbestos blanket.Processalsomonitoredbyoperatorwhowasrequiredtogointotheoventoread/recordtemperatures.Exposurestohighheat(160c)aswellasasbestosfibres.Processrepeated2-3times.See1982MOLreportregardingtrappedfumes.Nolocalexhaustventilation;
21. StorageTanks:Tin,varnish,Isonel.Three-storeystoragetankforasphalt;
22. Micatapeproductiontookplaceinaroom30’x60’x30’whereflakedmicaparticleswereappliedtoatapecoatedinwarmedvarnish.Micawasthrownintoahopperandtraveledup and over into a shaker that deposited micaparticlesontothevarnishedstickytapethatcapturedtheflakes.Asmachineran,micablackvarnishwasappliedontothetape(asphalttarvarnish).Thiswasheatedtokeepitsoftandsticky.Largeamountsofvarnishonflooranddustfrommica.Taperollscutwithaslittermachine.An8x4’toluenetankusedtocleantheslitterbladesandworker’shands.Compressedairusedtoblowdustfrommachinesandclothes;
23. HydroPolesoperation:Tosecurecopperwiretopoles,insulatedwireswereattachedtosteelframesthenvarnishedandbaked.Workerscleanedpoleswithragsdippedintolueneandnoglovesforabout30minutesforasmallitem.Toluenevapourwasoverwhelming.Polethenpaintedwithblackvarnish/shellacalcoholbased.Micawasapplied,heatedandpaintedwithshellacandbaked3timesfor8hours.Workersgroundoffexcesscuredresingeneratinglotsofdust.Nolocalexhaustventilationduringthisbecauseovensshutoff;
Riskexposuresduringfillingandcleaning.Exposuretobothresinandsolventswhentankdooropened.Aftertankisdrainedforcleaningoftenhadtogrindoutdriedspotsofvarnishthusexposedtogrindingdustaswellasanyfumescreatedbyfrictionheat)
Riskofinhalationofmicadustandfumesfromblackvarnishandtoluenewashighgiventheopenprocessingofflakesandvarnishcoatedtapes.
Riskofskinabsorptionofvarnishaswellastoluenehighgivenextentthatvarnishgotonworkers’skinanduseoftoluenetocleanitoff.
Thevolumeofwastevarnishaccumulationwouldconfirmthehighriskofexposurefromseveralroutesofentry.
Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofvarnishfumesandtolueneasaresultofdirecthandling;workerreportsofheavyconcentrationoffumes.
Riskofinhalationofmicadustsaswellascuredresindustfromgrindingexcessresinfromcoatedparts.
Lackoflocalexhaustventilationelevatedriskofsignificantexposures.
HighriskofinhalationofTCEfumes,copperdust,andsolderresiduesgiventhevolumeofmaterials,directhandling,andlackofexposurecontrolsforlongperiodsoftime.
Exposuresconfirmedbyreportedacuteadversehealtheffectsbyworkers.
JHSC: 5/20/80 re: armature stacks
Recentlyinstalledexhauststackscreatingheavysmokeandacridfumesinwholeeastofplantarea
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includinginsidebldgs.nowthatwarmweatherishere.
JHSC: 3/23/82 re: fumes - Polyurethane tent used tocoverareawheretoluenethinnersusedtocleancoils.Workrefusalbecauseoffumes.Tenttobeused temporarily but the special job is done and tent stillinuse.Tentisnotvented,alsoafirehazardwithtoluenefumes.
Highriskofinhalationofbrazingfumesaswellasresinfumes,intenseenoughtoaffectthecraneoperator.Thesewerelargeleadsandbrazingandresultingfumesweresubstantial.
HighriskofinhalationofresinfumesandIsonelfumesfromthebandinganddippingprocess.
HighriskofbothinhalationanddermalexposuresassociatedwithVPItanks.Workersthroughouttheplantcomplainedoffumesfromthesetanks.
VPIdippingandcuringoperationinvolvedextensiveinhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromdippingandovencuringwhichwouldgoonextensivelyinrepeatedcycles.
Inhalationofresinandcopperdustsfromgrindingexcessresinsafterbaking.
Riskofbothinhalationanddermalexposuretoresinfumesanddecompositionby-products.
MOL:06/24/83: Lab test by MOL re: Workers concern abouthazardsfromthermaldecompositionbyproductsfromburningureaformaldehydefoams.Testindicatedthefollowingby-products:p-dioxane,
Armature Department: 1960-1980s:24. CopperStorageArea:Taskscarriedout
includedaTCEdegreasingareaandgrindingexcessivecopper.Nolocalexhaustventilation.Generatedagreatdealofcopperdustandresiduesofsolderfor3-8hours/shift.TheTCEoperationinvolvedbathingpartsinTCEforanhour,andthenbathinginwater.Thisproducedaviolentchemicalreactionofsmoke,producingrashesandirritationsofeyes,noseandthroat;
25. Assemblywinders:WorkersinthisareapreparedandattachedlargecopperleadsforlargeDCandACstators.Thebrazingproducedthickbluesmoke,affectingcraneoperatoraswell.Workersreportedburningresinsoftheleads.Inlate1980ssmokehogswereinstalled,butnotviewedaseffective;
26. BandingLathe:Resi-glassappliedtoarmaturesproducingfumesfromheatinginsulatedparts,resinsandotherthinners.Armatures then dipped in Isonel for 10-15 minutesandliftedanddrainedovertankfor½hour,producingheavyfumesandvapours;
27. VPITanks:Twotanksinstalledin1967-68plusothersaddedlatter.LargeVPIaddedin1990(10’partlyunderground).Smalltanks100’’x116”x152”deep.Materialsheatedinclude:catalyzedepoxy74023,Tributylstyrenethinner,andresinM6860.Reportsofrashesfromthinnersandresins.Tanksremovedin1994-95;
28. VPIEpoxyresin68608-hr.dippingcycleswenton24/7.Whenlidraisedheavyfumesemittedwithadverseeffectsfeltwithin10-15minuteofliftingorplacingarmatureinoroutoftank.Tankoperatorsusedsqueegeestoremoveexcessresinwheninovenanddrippingovertank.Otheractivitiesincludedgrindingexcesscuredepoxyresin.Leadswerealsogroundandbrazed.Theseactivitiesgeneratedheavyfumesfromresins,andcopperandresindusts;
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vinyl chloride, 2-chlorethanol, cyclopentanone, and isocyanatesfound.
MOL:06/02/87: Investigationofexcessiveemissionsfromcuringoven.GEepoxyresinGE74023coveredbaffle.Excessiveamountofepoxyonbafflesuspectedassourceoffumesaffectingworkersandresidents.MSDSnoestablishedTLV,butindicatesthattoxicgasesmaybegenerated.Stopworkorderissueduntiladequateprecautionsdevelopedandinstituted.Highriskofinhalationofresinfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsduringthedippingandbakingoperationintheIsonelcoatingprocess.Inhalationofresinandcopperdustsfromgrindingoperationsonleads.DirectdermalexposuretoXylenein“washing”ofhandsaswellasinhalationofxylenevapourswithoutlocalexhaustventilation.
Riskofinhalationofvarioussandingdustshighlylikely.
Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumesfromcoatingsandpaint.
Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumes.
RiskofinhalationofNomexinsulation,solderfumes.
29. SmallVPItanksinvolveddippingsmallpartsinVPItankresinfor1½hours,generatingresinfumeswhichwouldbedrawnbackintotheroomwhendoorsopened.Ovenbakedat160°Cfor8hours;
30. Isonel51tankusedtocoatcoilwithinsulatingvarnish.Partsweredippedintotankuntilbubblesstopped.Varnishthinnedwithxyleneandtoluene.Thenliftedandlefttodrainfor½hourwhichwouldreleasevapours.Partsthenplacedinanovenat160°Cfor4-8hours.Aftercooling,thedippingprocesswasrepeated.Sincethepartswerestillwarmfromthefirstdip,theseconddipwouldproducemorevapourandheat.Leadsweregroundtoremoveexcessresincreatinglotsofdustinadditiontofumes.SeeJHSCMinutesre:aninspectioninthisregard;
31. Xylenetank:Duringthe70stank(32’x12’x8’)usedtocleanresinoffbarehands.Sometimessoakedhandsfor5-10minutes.Producedheavyvapours.Noexhaustventilation;
32. Sin-Bin:Asandingareathatproducedandaccumulatedgreatdealofdust.Noexhaustventilation;
33. Coilforming:Coilcut,madehollowandthenepoxied,paintedandheated.Productionofvapoursfromepoxyandpaint;
34. Coilmanufacturing(BruceGenerating)Hydrocoilbarforming.Coilwasformed,thenepoxiedandheated.Verysticky;
35. Fridge:(Epoxystoragefacility)30x40x20’.Epoxyodourdetected,staffcouldstayinthereforalongperiod;
Armature 1980s to 2005:1. Coilfabrication:Producedcoilforarmature.
Involvedwindingenamelwire,tying(armature)legswithstring.Thenstrippedandtinnedupstairs.Nomexplacedinslots,leadssoldered,thenbrazedwithrosincoredsolder.Emittedfumesduringthesolderingoperation.
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Riskofinhalationandabsorptionofcopperdusts,silphossolder,MEK,acetoneandtoluene.Riskofinhalationofasbestosandotherinsulatingmaterialsincludingmica.JHSC: 5/20/80 Re: toluene incidentEmployeeworkingfor2hrs.onarmaturebarsusing1500thinnersinlargeamountsresultedinlossofconsciousnessandtakentoPeterboroughHealthCentre(toluenerecentlysubstitutedforacetoneandworkershadnotbeeneducatedonuseofchemicalandheathrisks).
Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumes,toluene,Isonel,thermaldecompositionby-products.
Riskofinhalationofepoxyfumesandthermaldecompositionby-productsgeneratedbyheatingandcuring.JHSC: 10/27/81: Pole windingAnumberofnewemployeeshavesincemovedfromthisworkareabecauseofepoxyrash.In1/12/82reportitstates“rashesincreasing.”
Producttiedwithresi-glass,banded,andshippedtooven;
2. Ovenswereat160°Cmeasuring6’x8’.Partscarted in and out, pot tested and then process repeated2-3times;
3. Crane cycle involved 3 cycles at 6 hours per cycle;
Brazing Operations:Extensivebrazingwascarriedoutinthisdepartment.Armaturedownstairstorchbrazedcoppersegmentswithsilversolderthenpowersanded.Whitepastefluxfumesfromsolderandflux.SilphosbrazingrodsusedcontainingcadmiumOxyacetyleneandnaturalgas.VPI,degreaserTCE,andcuringoven.4. ExcitorProcessforinsertingcoilsinstators:
1.Bandinglathe(see#26above);2.Punchpresstoflattencopper,blankoutcorners,pressflat,andpushtogether,thenbrazecorners,cleanwithwater;thiscouldtaketwoweekswithcopperdustallover;copperstripsusedsilphossolder,airgrindinggeneratingcopperandsilphosdust.WashedwithMEK,acetonewipedbyhandwithrags(workersreportbeingovercomebysolventfumes);insulationcouldinvolveasbestos,quinogo,quintax,Nomex;cuttosizewithshears,slitter,userectifiertobondeverythingat135°Cinpress,coolto40°Candcleancoil.InsulationofpolewithMicaM5680epoxyonwindinglathe.RotorPole5105redepoxytopolewithinsulationusingMicaeponglass,paintwith5105paintthenredepoxybetweeneachlayer;bakeat160°Cfor8hours;(warmingup5105paintproducesfumes);apply5142epoxytwice.CleanupwithToluene1500.Workersateatworkstation;
5. IsonelTank:Partsweredippedfor10minutesinIsonelthenexcessbrushedmanually.LowvoltagecoilspreppedanddippedintoVPItanktwice.Resinandfluxthensolderedandtapedwithfibreglasstape.Partsdippedagainandplacedinoven.Afterbakingandcooling,excesscuredresinair-chiselledoff,leadsburnedbybrazing,generatingfumesanddust;
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JHSC: 12/8/81: rotor pole area
“Areaverysmokyanddusty.Requestcheckforventilation.”
See above
Riskofinhalationofairbornefibresgeneratedfromcuttingoperation.
6. Windinglathe:RotorPole#5105redepoxypiecedpolesinsulatedwithcoil;wetwindingprocess;reelwireupandinsulatewithMica.Eponglasspaintwith5105tobondfirstlayer,paintallotherlayerswithredepoxy,thenbakeinovenat160°Cfor8hours;5105warmedto60°Cthenbacktovarnish.HeavyfumesgeneratedbyIsonelat160°C;
7. Shearstation:noexhaustventilation.Materialsshearedtosizetofillslots.Thereweretwomachinesrunningproducinglotsofairbornefibres.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Airfromopenwindowwoulddispersefibresfurther.
Note: Thehydropolesreferredtointhistextisapartofthearmatureandnottobeconfusedwithwoodenhydropolesfoundontheroadside.
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BUILDING: #8 DEPARTMENT: MACHINE SHOP
General Description South West Area South East Area North West Area North East Area Gallery North and SouthWork Processes/MachinesBalancing Machine/Welding and Brazing Phosgene Gas Tread Cutting in 8ADegreasers MWF (Metal Working Fluids)Babbitt Fitting (Midway in South End of Building)Machining Process (Concentrated in South End of the Building)Green Layout PaintGrinding and De-burring OperationsCuring and Annealing Ovens
Known chemicals used or produced:EpoxyResinsFormationofnewchemicalsthroughdecompositionormixing(phosgene,BPA,formaldehyde)MetalDusts(Brass,Bronze,StainlessSteel,Steel,Nickel,Chromium,Cadmium,Zinc)MWFs(SteelKut,TrimSol,Cimcool,DascoTap,Benzeneincludingadditives:ArsenicChlorine, Sulphur, Mineral Oils)Solvents (Toluene, Xylene, Acetone, MEK)WeldingFlux(Tin,Lead)Brazing
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Workerswereexposedtoavarietyoftoxicchemicalthatcouldbeinhaled,absorbedthroughskin,and/oringested.TheseincludedvariousdegreaserssuchasTCE,MWFsuchas‘SteelKut’,dustssuchasasbestos,micaandmetalssuchascopper,tin,cadmium,andchromate.
JHSC: 8/23/83: re: thinners:“Largegluingoperation,operatorsusingthinnerstogetglueofftheirhands.Recommendusinggreenglovestopreventcontactwithglue.”
ThelackofadequatelocalexhaustventilationandPPEcertainlyaggravatedexposurerisks.
InhalationandabsorptionofMWFaswellasheavilyuseddegreaserswereinthehigh-riskcategorybecauseofshearvolume.
WorkersareexposedtothroughinhalationvariousvapoursfromdegreasingfluidssuchasTCE,MEK,acetone,xyleneaswellasphosgenegaswhenthesesolventscomeincontactwithweldingoperations.
Workersinmostmachiningoperationsinhaleandabsorbthroughtheskin,largeamountsofMWF.Onesuchcuttingoilcalled‘SteelKut’isparticularlyusedinlargequantitiesandisresponsibleforvariousadverserespiratoryanddermalreactionsindicatingthatworkersareexposedsignificantly.
ExposuresthroughinhalationandskinabsorptionwereevidencedbyobservationsfromtheMOLindicatingthatworkersweresoakedwiththisoilandthatrespiratorswouldclogduringmachining.Thisproductcontainsmineraloil,sulphurandchlorine.Thelattertwodecomposeintosulphurdioxideandphosgene.(MOL:Sept10,1982–fouroperatorsidentifiedwithdermatitisinpast5years).
MOL: June 25,1990 –reportofsolderingnearfurnacehood.Solventsinlargecoveredbeakersbesidelappingmachine.
General Description: Thisdepartmentwasprimarilyengagedintheproductionofpartsforverylargemotors.Thiswasahighvolumedepartment.Therewereapproximately250employeesinthemachineshop.Workerscarriedoutmajormachiningprocessesincludingcutting,boring,milling,grinding,polishingandsanding.Thesevariousprocessesproducedsubstantialamountsoffumes,dusts,vapours,mistsandgases.
Partsproductioninvolvedtheuseofalargenumberofmetalmachines(approximately35inthesouthendandapproximately20inthenorthend).WiththislargenumberofmachiningoperationsgoingontherewereextremelylargeamountsofMWFswhichincluded:‘SteelKut’,‘Trimsol’,‘Cimcool’,DascoTap,andseveralotherwatersolublefluidscontainingarsenicasabiocide.Mostoperationsalsoappliedsolventdegreaserstocleanandpreparemetalsformachining,weldingandfinishing.Therewere3degreasingtankscontainingvariousdegreasingagentsincludingRoyalene(TCE),Toluene,xylene,acetone,andMEK.Tankswererefilledandcleanedmanuallyduringslackperiods.Largesurfaceareaswerehandwipedbyemployeeswithragsheavilysoakedintoluene,TCEorMEK.
South West Area of the Building:
Therewere6largeverticalboringmachines,4millingmachines,severalradialdrills.Thisareaalsoincluded:2slotL&S,planer,degreaserpowerwash,balancemachineandweldingbooth.
South East Area of the Building:
Therewere2horizontalboringmachines,oneofwhichwasa25’machineinadditiontothelarge“RedGilbert,”theKozmamachine,fourgrindingoperationsandsmallandlargelathesbesidetheforeman’soffice.Thisareaalsoincluded:apaintbooth,cleanandgrindoperation,NCverticalboringmill,radialdrill,andthreehorizontalboringmills.
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WorkersareexposedtothroughinhalationvariousvapoursfromdegreasingfluidssuchasTCE,MEK,acetone,xyleneaswellasphosgenegaswhenthesesolventscomeincontactwithweldingoperations.
MOL: Dec 6,1982 - Micadustbuild-uponflooroflathe machine noted in Internal Responsibility System CyclicalReview.
MOL: Dec 6, 1982 – exhaustventilationatpaintsprayboothinadequateairvelocity(signsofoverspraynotedonsurroundingarea).
Significantriskofinhalationofweldingfumescontainingresidualdegreasersandheavymetals.
Gallery South/West:
Spindledrills,2layouttables,drill,2millingmachines,2MonarchNCmachinesandhorizontalboringmill.
Gallery South/East:
3enginelathes,NClatheandshaftgrinder.
North West Area of the Building:
JustbelowtheMainAisletherewasasmallmachiningarea,3horizontalboringmills,aspiderandshaftassemblyareaandaverylargeopendegreasingtanknexttotheweldingoperationacrossthemainAisle.AlargedegreasingtankwaslocatedintheNWcorner.Thisareaalsoincludedshaftshrinkingoperationwithdryice,horizontallathe,largeNClathe,LargeWotanLathe.
North East:
Largelathe.
Gallery North:
Assemblyandshipping.
North East Area of the Building:
Therewere5lathesand4NCboringmills,de-burringboothandapaintbooth.Northofthemainaisle,ashaft-balancingmachinewaslocatedaswellasaweldingarea,asmallassemblyarea,amachiningarea,atin-platingarea,apaintshop,andashippingarea.TheareaalsocontainedalargeovenusedtocureepoxiedpartsandarmaturesfromtheArmatureDept.acrosstheoutsidedriveway.
Balancing Machine/Welding and Brazing:
Thisprocessinvolvedbalancingofspinningmotorpartssuchasshafts.Thisrequiredagreatdealofbrazingbythewelderswhoattachedcounterweightstotheshafttoreducewobbleandfriction.Thebrazingoperationproducelargeamountsofweldingfumeaswellasresiduesofdegreasersandothermetalpre-treatments.
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JHSC: 11/4/80 re: TCE exposure:
“(Companydoctor)feels(worker’s)medicalproblemsprobablyrelatedtocloseproximityofhisworkstationtoBldg.#8degreaser(asarea)stillconsidereda‘troublespot’andnumberofotherpeoplehavecomplainedofdiscomfortaswell.”(Workercurrentlyonlayoff).
SeeinhalationandabsorptionofMWFandthermaldecompositionby-products.
Theriskofinhalationoffinedustcontainingvariousmetalalloysincludingbronze,brass,stainlesssteel,mildsteel,combinedwithcuttingoilfumes/vapours.
MOL inspector observations, Sept. 29, 1982: The chlorineandsulphurisbondedtothealiphaticchainintheoilandwilldecomposeathightemperatureandproducesulphurdioxideandphosgenegas.
JHSC: 8/24/82 re: cutting oils: Fourworkersexperiencingskinproblems,somemoreseverethanothers.
Phosgene Gas:
Sincethebrazing/weldingoperationwasveryclosetothelargeopendegreasingtankcontainingTCE,fumesfromthetankwouldcomeincontactwiththeweldingoperationproducingahighlytoxicgas--phosgene.Thisgasisreferredtoaspoisongas.
Tread Cutting in 8A:
AmajorboltthreadingoperationwasconductedinBldg.#8Areferredtoasthe‘holeinthewall’.Duringthisprocess‘Steel-Kut’cuttingoilconsistingofmineraloilsmixedwithsulphurandchlorine,wassprayedliberallyduringthethreadcuttingoperationonthelathe.‘DascoTap’wasusedduringthisthreadcuttingoperation.Theboltstobecutwereaslargeas3-4”diameterand12”long.
Degreasers:
This department manufactured various components ofmotorandgeneratorproduction.Duringtheprocessofmachining,cutting,milling,grinding,buffingandweldingtherewasasubstantialuseofdegreasers,e.g.2tanksofRoyalene(TCE)andotherdegreaserssuchasacetone,MEK,toluene,andxylene.
MWF (Metal Working Fluids):
ThevariousmachiningoperationemployedtheconstantandheavyuseofMWF.Thedepartmentused“SteelKut”MWF,whichwasthesubjectofahealthimpactstudyduringthe1990sbecauseof reported health complaints and adverse effectsexperiencedbytheoperatorsandotherpersonnel.OthermachiningoperationswouldapplylargeamountsofMWFthatwouldbesprayedoncontinuouslyduringthemachining.AirinthebuildingwouldbefilledwithMWFmistandbluishsmokefromheatingoffluidsduringmachining.Workers’clothingwouldbesaturatedwithfluid.Dermatitis,skinburnsandirritation,irritatedeyes,noseandthroatwerecommoncomplaints.
Aftermachining,operatorsusedcompressedairtoclearcuttingsandcoolantandoils.Thiswasfollowed
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Babbittfittersexperiencedmajorexposuresboththroughskinabsorptionandinhalation.Ingestionwasalsoafactorbecauseworkersateandsmokedattheirworkstations.
Workingwithbarehandsinaslurrycontainingleadalloyandtoluenewouldinvolvedmajorabsorptionofbothleadalloyandtoluene,particularlysincethetoluenewoulddefattheskinandmakeabsorptionmorelikely.Aswell,sincethetoluenevolatilizes,vapourconsistingofbenzene-contaminatedtoluenewouldbeinhaledreadily.(MOL:May23,1986–airtestingidentifiedsignificantleadexposurewhichcompanyattributedtouseofcompressedair.Practiceterminated.Urinelevelsbelowalertlevel).
Thetinningoperationwouldgenerateheavymetalandcyanideacidvapourswouldbeinhaledandabsorbedthroughskincontactduringmixinganddippingandretrievingtinnedparts.
Significantriskofcopperdustinhalationdustaswellasabsorptionthroughtheskin.Sinceworkersate
byamanualwashdownwithragssoakedintoluene,and/orTCE.
MWFs:Inbuilding8I,Bay15measuringabout30x60x60feettwoHerbertTurretlatheswereoperated.Theseweremostlyusedforcuttingthreadonbrass,bronze,stainlessandmildsteel.ThisoperationusedSteelKutoilforover20yearsattheplantbeginninginthe1960s.Thisoilisamineraloilcontainingsulphurandchlorine.Themachinesused4gperweekandaredrippedfromapipeontotheworkpiece.Mostoftheoilisdissipatedbybeingthrownoutbycentrifugalforceintheformofdropletsormistsaswellasthermaldecompositiononthehotmetalchips.Occasionallyoperatorsuserespiratorbutwhenitissoakedwithoilitisimpossibletobreathethrough.Attimesthehotchipswillcausetheoiltoflareupandproduceirritatingsmoke.Operator’sshirtsandtrousersareroutinelysoakedwithoilaswellasonoperators’faces.
Babbitt Fitting (Midway in South End of Building):
Babbittfittingwascarriedoutinbothbuildings#8and#10.Thisoperationinvolvedfitterssandingandsmoothingimperfectionsinthebabbittbearingswithbarehandsinatroughoftoluene.Thisprocesswouldtakeseveralhoursdependingonthesizeofthebearing(Seebuilding#10profile).
Tin Plating (South of Paint Booth in North East Section of Building):
Thisdepartmentcarriedouttin-platingintheNEsectionofthebuilding.Theplatingprocessinvolvedcyanideacidandtin/leadsalts.Thisprocessproducedsignificantamountsofvapoursasaresultoftheelectroplatingprocess.Thesevapourcontainedcyanidesaltsandtin/leadconstituents.
Machining of Commutators (Concentrated in South End of the Building):
SomeofthemachininginvolvedtheapplicationofMWFwhileotherswouldbeconducted‘dry.’Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.MachiningofCommutatorsinvolvedthegenerationofcopper,asbestosandmicadusts.Retireesdescribedthearea
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attheirworkstationsitishighlylikelythatworkersingestedthesedusts.Workers’skinandhairwerereportedtoturngreenfromtheoxidationprocess.
Vapoursfromapplyinglayoutpaintarereadilyinhaledandwouldbehighlyconcentratedonlargesurfaceareas.Sincethisprocesswasbyhand,absorptionthroughtheskinwouldalsooccur.JHSC: 8/30/83: re: paint fumes: Test-meninhighpotentialtestingthreatenworkstoppageifpainterscontinuetopaintlargejobsoutsidebooth.“(Unionrep)disregardednotescirculatingpumpforwaterexhaustisnotworkingproperly.”
JHSC: 12/17/84: re: paint fumes: “jobsstillbeingpaintedoutsidethebooth.Thisproblemexistedbeforethenewmodernboothinstalled.However,allthat has been accomplished is more material is in the boothandwhenfull,workispaintedoutside…lotsofexcuses…butverylittleiseverresolved.”
Theriskofinhalationoffinedustcontaininggrit/resin, metal dust contains various metal alloys such as nickel,chromium,cadmium,zinc.Thermaldecompositionby-productswouldbereadilyavailabletobeinhaledinthisbakingandannealingprocess.Thiswouldincludevapourizedoilsduringannealingaswellasdecomposedcuringresinsintheformoffumesandvapours.JHSC: 2/21/83: re: V-100 epoxy grout:“Largequantitiesusedforbaseofamachine.Producthashighlytoxicfumes.Workerscomplainingaboutfumes.Actionoffered:Tonotifyworkersinareanexttimeproductisused.”JHSC: 12/16/77 re: diesel exhaust fume incident: Whilecraneoperatorloadingatransporttruck,thedriverstartedthedieselengineand“revved”it.Heavysmokeandfumesblanketedcraneoperator.Shortlyafterwardhecomplainedofheadachesandseverenausea.Nextdayfeltpoorlybutreportedforworkandineveningsufferedaheartattackandrushedtohospital(doctorcouldn’tconfirmthe
ascoveredwithwasteparticles/dustsixinchesdeep.Workers’clothingandskinwouldbeencasedinmetaldusts.Thisdustconsistedoffinecopperandsilicaparticulate.
Green Layout Paint:
GreenLayoutPaintcontainingleadandsolventswasusedtooutlinecutsandboringstobemadeonsteelplates.Thispaintwasappliedwithnaphthagas,whichishighlyvolatile.
Grinding and De-burring Operations:
Allmachinedandweldedpartsneededtobede-burredofsharpedgesandroughness.Thesegrinding,de-burring,andbuffingoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmetaldustthatcontainedresiduesofMWF,degreasersandothercontaminants.TheuseofChromac,acuttingandgrindingoilwasnoted.
Curing and Annealing Ovens:
Machiningoperationsrequiredmetalstobeannealed(heated)priortomachining.Aswell,largeepoxycoatedmotorpartssuchasarmaturesweretransportedfromthearmaturedepartmenttobebakedandcured.Thisgeneratedagreatdealofresindecompositionby-productsincludingBPA,formaldehyde,andotheradditivesintheresinmixes.
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causebecausehedidn’tknowabouthisexposuretoexhaustandrequiredbloodtestsweren’tdone”).
JHSC: 4/27/82 re: pigeon droppings:Workersin#8havingproblemwithpigeondroppingsinwaterfountainandontheirlunchtables.”JHSC: 12/13/82: re: drinking fountains: watertestsshowpipesleadingtodrinkingfountainsin#8and#10“rustingaway.”JHSC: 12/13/82: re: Imron Paint: (This is a special for acustomer).Warninglabelisverystrictonventilationandairsupplyrespirators(unionrepworriedaboutIsocyanatesinpaint).Questionishowpaintgotontothefloorwithoutsafetyunitknowingofhazard?JHSC: 5/27/83: re: solder fumes: “Solder fumes from capacitorstravelalongwalltofemalebenchworkerinbalconycausinghertofeelill.”
JHSC: 1/22/85: re: hygiene station in rotor area: “Workerhasdevelopedarashandneedsthehygienestation.Theareahygienestationisnotmaintained.”
JHSC: 1/22/85 re: eye wash station: “(In paint booth)aneyewashstationisneededinthisworkstation.”
JHSC: 12/10/85 re: lead assessment for rotor and bearing booth areas: “Assessment(legaldocument)recommendationsincludedthatworkersbeprovidedwithpropershoweringfacility.(Thiswas)rejectedbycompany.”
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BUILDING: #9 DEPARTMENT: FRACTIONAL MOTORS
General Description
General Working Conditions
Work Regime
Production Machinery/Processes:
1. Punch Press Operation
2. Die Cast Operation
3. Grinding & Cleaning Operation
4. Machining Operation
5. Winding Operation
6. Degreasing
7. Asbestos Glove Repair
8. Brazing
Known chemicals used or produced:
Aluminum AlloyAsbestosfiberanddustCopper and other metal dustsEpoxy(Formex)MEKReleaseAgentsTCE (Royalene)ThermalDecomposition(annealingandcuringprocesses)Silversolder(30%cadmium)Silphos (cadmium)
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LowceilinginFractionalMotorscontributedtotheconcentrationofmist,vapours,andfumes,gasesandsmokeinthegeneralatmosphereofthisoperation.Thistoxicatmospherewasmoreavailableattheworkers’breathingzone.
Additionally,workerswereexposedtothegreatnumber of contaminants from the Armature operation.NotonlydidworkershavetowalkthroughArmaturetogettotheirjob,buttheywerealsoexposedtotoxicsthatmigratedfromtheArmaturedepartment.
TheworkregimeinFractionalwasintensewitheverythingconditionedbythepieceratesystem.Thismeantthatworkersworkedmoreintenselyforlongperiodsthusconditioningtheamountoftoxinsthatwouldbeinhaledandmetabolizedbythebody.Thiswasmostexhibitedonthespeedoftheproductionassemblylines;punchingoperations,anddiecasts.Itmeantworkerswouldshortcutsafeworkprocedurestomaintainpayrates.
JHSC: 2/23/j83: re: Cosmo furnace: “ExcessfumesreportedintheCosmoarea.Areaispoorlyexhausted.When Feseco is sprayed on products the area is full of mist.”MOLhaswrittendirectiveonproblem.
JHSC: 8/23/83: re: Kozmo furnace: “Problem has risenagainregardingpoorventilationaround2furnacesinFractional.Althoughmanagementhadindicated to Floor Safety members that both units wouldnotbeused,thisinfactwasnotso.Bothunitswereinoperationtheweekofthismeetingandfumeswereveryheavy.”
Averycomplexmixtureofchemicalswasgeneratedfromalltheseoperationscombined.Mostoperationswerenotequippedwithlocalexhaustventilationandlittleinthewayofprotectiveequipment.Thismixturewouldincludeexposuretoacombinationofsolvents,resins,MWF,thermaldecompositionproducts,variousdustsfromgrindingoperations.Theseweremostlyinhaledbutalsoabsorbedbybare
General Description: FractionalMotorsproducedelectricmotorsthatwerefractionsofafullhorsepowermotor.TheproductionprocesseswerehousedinalowceilingbuildingattachedtotheArmaturedepartmentinBuilding#7.Infact,workershadtowalkthroughtheArmaturedepartmenttoenterFractionalMotors.Theceilingwasapproximately16’highandafloorspaceofabout500’x250’.Thisistheonlydepartmentintheplantwithamovingassemblyline(i.e.,smallsizeofproductparts).
Work Regime: Thiswasahighproduction,labourintensive,operationemployingapproximately80to100staffon2-3shiftswithagreatdealofovertimeona24/7basis.Productionwasonthepieceratesysteminvolvingbuildingthevariouscomponentsofinductionmotorsofdifferentsizes.Allmotorpartsweremadefromscratch—handwoundfieldcoils;machinedrotors,armatures,andstators;diecasts;punchplating;grindingandcleaning;degreasing;resincoating;baking;welding,solderingandbrazing.Twocuringovens(CosmoandKozma)werelocatedinthelowceilingbuilding.
Motorpartswereassembledfromstarttofinishbyemployeesworkingonamovingassemblyline.“Thepaceofworkwaspunishing,butthisiswhereyoumadegoodmoney”(Worker).
Production machinery/process included: Twopunchpresses,threediecastoperations,openresindippingtank,VPItank,twoovens,openpotdegreasingcontainingMEKandRoyalene(TCE)tank,boringmachines,keyingmachines,rotorlathe,and2parallelassemblylines.
General Working Conditions:Duetolowceilingsandinadequategeneralandlocalexhaustventilation,thebuildingairqualitywaspoorandcontaminatedwithamixtureofverytoxicchemicalsfumes,vapoursandmistsgeneratedfrompunching,machining,casting,resindippingandbakingoperations,aswellasgrit,metalandresindustsfromcleanandgrindoperations.Sinceproductionwasintense--intermsofpaceofworkandvolumeofmaterialsused--the
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handhandlingandingestedbecauseofsmokingandeatingattheworkstation.
Thismetalpunchingoperationgeneratedlargeamountsofoilmistsandvapours.Giventhevolumeandspeedofproductionthisgeneratedahighconcentrationofoilmistsandvapourthatwouldbeinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin.
Sincetheseweredeburredbygrindingandsandingthisoperationwouldproducelargeamountsofmetalduststhatwouldbeinhaledbythosedirectlycarryingouttheprocessaswellasby-standersgiventheproximityofotherworkers.
Moltenaluminumvapoursandfumeswerereadilyinhaledatthisoperation.Thiswasaverysmokyenvironment.Reportsofsinusproblemswouldconfirmtheroutineexposuretothesefumesandvapours.
Inhalationofmetaldustscontainingresiduesofreleaseagents.Nolocalexhaustwasprovidedandnorespiratoryprotectionworn.
Exposure to MWF: ThemachiningoperationsproducelargeamountsofvariousMWFsthatwereinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin.Thesealsocontainedbiocidescontainingarsenicinadditiontothechemicalconstituentsoftheoilsandcoolantsandmetals.MOLinvestigationofworkrefusalin1976indicatedthatasignificantamountofoversprayfromoilmistfromgrindingmachiningwashavingadverseeffectsonworkersusingChromac2213.Inspectornoted this should be corrected because of risk of dermatitis(OHB#6L-111-7A-74;January8,1976).In1983aninvestigationintoaworkerillnessfromMWFexposuretoCimcoolusedinthesamegrindingprocessnotedinthe1976refusalinvestigation.Inspectornoted‘trampoil’intheMWFandsmallamountsof‘thiol’.Metalchipswereblownoffwithcompressedair,whichwouldaerosolizethecuttingoilsandcoolantcalledCimcool5Star40.Contaminants included small amounts of oil mist, ethanolamine,formaldehydethatwere0.69mg/m³(TLV=5mg/m³),0.07ppm(TLV=1ppm)and<2.0ppm(TLV=3ppm)respectively.Thesearenotinsignificant
atmospherewashighlycontaminated.Inaddition,theseoperationswerelabourintensive,e.g.workershandledallaspectsofproductiondirectlybyhandincloseproximitywitheachother.Localexhaustventilationandpersonalprotectiveequipmentwasnotprovided.Workersateandsmokedattheirworkstations.Housekeepingwaspoor.
Specific Processes:
Punch Press Operation: Oil-lubricated and annealed steelsheetswerepunchedatarapidpaceatabout100/minute.Thisoperationproducedlargeamountsofoilmistsandvapour.
Thesepunchingwerethenstackedonspindlesandpressedtogetherona‘capton’machine.These“pilings”werethengroundanddeburredandbuffedwithhandgrindersandbuffers,producinglargeamountsofdusts.Asimilarprocesswascarriedoutfortherotorsaswell;
Die Cast Operation:Thiswasasemi-automatic,aluminum,die-castingoperationwithmoltenaluminumalloy(2400°F)producingendshieldsandendcaps.Therewerethreediecastoperations,simultaneouslyproducingapproximately1000perhour.Threediecastoperatorsworkedonpiece-ratefor3shifts.Theseoperationscreatedveryheavyfumes and vapours from molten aluminum alloys andmold/diereleaseagents.Operatorsandthoseworkingnearbydevelopedmajorsinusproblems;
Grinding and Cleaning: Castingswerethenmachined,groundanddeburredbeforegoingintoasoapwashandthenintoheatedopendegreasingtanks;
Machining Operations: Inmachiningprocesses,largeamountsofMWFwereusedduringtheboring,milling,drilling,andkeyingoperationsaswellasinturningshaftsonlathes.Thesevariousmetalmachiningoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmetal dusts and mists and vapour from the heated MWF,whichalsocontainedbiocidescontainingarsenic.Diecastsweremachinedaftercomingoutofmolds.MachiningwithMWFgeneratedlargeamountsofcoolantandcuttingoilswouldproduce
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amounts for Formaldehyde and Ethanolamine sincetheselevelsrepresent70%and60%oftheirrespectiveTLVs.Nolocalexhaustprovided.Coolantchangedonly3timesayear.(SeeMOL/OHB# 1183HMOW; 08/23/1983.)
InadditiontohandlingtheFormexwirecoilsthatcontainresinsthatwouldbeabsorbedthroughtheskin,thedegreasingprocessandresincoatingexposedworkersthroughinhalationofheavyconcentrationsofdegreasersolventsaswellasresinvapoursandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromovenbaking.
ThelargedegreasingtankscontributedheavilytotheinhalationofsolventvapourscontainingTCEandMEK.
Workerswerealsoexposedtosignificantamountsofasbestosdustfromovencurtainsaswellasasbestosinsulationusedinthemotors.Thesewerecutandpressedintomotorsandsuchactionwouldreleasefibresintotheatmosphere.
JHSC: 12/14/78: asbestos exposure: “Onroutinecheck(JB)foundasbestosmittsbeingrepairedinlargequantities(hundredspernight).Obviousthatthewomanwhorepairsmittsissubjecttomuchfibrewhenhandlingandcutting.”
JHSC: 1/25/79: asbestos exposures: “(Company doctor and Company H&S rep) are supposed to surveyuseofasbestosinplant.Sofarwestillhavea good deal of it in use and control is, at best, very lax.”
JHSC: 2/23/78: fibrosis diagnosis: “Worker(woman)diagnosedwithfibrosisofbothlungs.Herdoctorsaysitcouldbecausedbyworkenvironment.”
JHSC: 4/6/78: fibrosis diagnosis: (Company doctor) visittoinvestigateareawhere(womandiagnosedwithfibrosis)worked.SafetyCommitteenotinformedeventhoughwemadetheinitialrequestfortheconsultation.Hemadeacursoryinspectionofendshield area then called in several (union) members formeeting.NorepfromSafetyCommitteeorshop
significantamountsofoverspray.Excellomachinesneartheshaftgrindingareahadnolocalexhaustventilation.Approximately800endplatesweremachinedperday;
Winding Operation: Coilswerehand-woundbyabatteryoftworowsofwomenwindingformexcoatedcopperwireintocoilsthatwerethencutandshapedandpressedintostators/rotors.AftercuttingtheywerefirstdippedindegreaserMEKandthendipped into the resin tanks (about 100 coils per dip), takenoutandallowedtodripdry.Thecoilswerethenplacedintobakingovensforcuring.Frayingasbestoscurtainswerehungatbothendsofthebelt-drivenoven.Aftercuring,thecoilswerecleaned,ground,andpressedintothestators/rotorsalongwithinsulationcontainingasbestos/fibreglass.Thepressingandtappingofinsulationreleasedasbestosandfibreglassfibresintotheatmosphere.Thisreleasewassubstantialgivethevolumeofcoilsandinsulationbeingpressed;
Degreasing: Therewere2largedegreasingtankscontainingTCEandMEK.Motorcomponentsweredegreasedinvapourdegreasers.Degreaserfumeswereveryheavyandmigratedtootherareasoftheoperation.
Theseaboveoperationsproducedlargeamountsofsmoke,mists,vapours,anddustsfrommachining,grinding,degreasing,epoxydippingandbakingincuringovens.Workersdescribetheworkatmosphereas‘athickhazeofbluishsmoke24/7’;
Brazing Operations: ExtensivebrazingwascarriedoutinthisdepartmentutilizingsilversolderandsilphosbrazingrodsaswellasleadsolderwithwhitepastefluxdegreaserTCE,andcuringoven;
Spot Welding: Themotorshellswerespotwelded,producingagreatamountofweldfumes.Notethatthisdepartmentwaspushingout1000motorsaday.
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stewardwaspresent.Todatenoreportonfindingsoropiniononmatter.
JHSC: 5/4/78: fibrosis diagnosis: “Test results onfeltusedinworkunderTLVinbothsamples,suggestingthatfeltis‘probablysafe’.Wefeelfurtherinvestigationisindicated.”
JHSC: 2/17/81: failed clean up: “Hydraulic oil clean-uporiginallydroppedfromminuteswithunderstandingeverythingwastoberepaired.Sinceproblemstillexists(from’79)checkingwhythiswasnotcompleted?OurconcernisthatismaycontainPCSs.”
JHSC: 6/30/83: re: Cimcool: “Work refusal due to cimcool.”
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BUILDING: #10 DEPARTMENT: FOUNDRY
General descriptionBabbitt production in the Babbitt ShopRotor AreaLapping ProcessGarlock GasketsMachining and BoringMWFGrinding and Deburring Welding OperationPaintingLayoff ProcessTemporary Oven 1980sGrinding and chiseling Testing ProcessMOCA in Mining Hoist
Known Chemicals used or produced:ArsenicDegreasers(Toluene,Benzene,MEK,TCE)EMFsEpoxyResins(Glyptol,MOCA)FluxLead Paint, Lead AlloyMetals (Cadmium, Tin, Copper, Nickel, Chromium, Beryllium, Silver, Lead)MWFs (Steel Kut, Cimcool, Dasko Tap)Naptha GasOzonePolyurethane Foams and AdhesivesReleaseAgents
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General Exposures: Inhalationandabsorption(throughtheskin)oftolueneanditsconstituents(e.g.benzene)wasendemictomachiningprocesses.Absorptionwasfurtherenhancedbytoluene’sdestructionoftheskin’sprotectiveoil,thusincreasingriskexposure.Bothtypesofexposureinvolvedlongandclosecontactwiththesetoxicchemicals,resultinginheavyexposuretothesesubstances.InhalationandskinabsorptionofMWFmistsandspraysarecontinuousthroughoutthemachiningprocess.Machiningwouldinvolveexposuresthatcouldlastforhours,daily.Alsosincetheoperator’sclothingwassaturated,theexposurewouldoccurbeyondtheendoftheprocess.MWFhavebeenratedbyseveralinternationalagenciesascarcinogenic.Inhalationofvariousmetaldustandparticlesishighlylikelygiventheextentofmachining,particularlywhenmachiningisconductedwithoutfluidsandwettingagents.Addedtoinhalationandabsorptionexposureswastheriskofingestionoftoxicchemicalsasaresultofworkerssmokingandeatingattheirworkstations.Lead alloy fume exposure: TheBabbittfoundryoperationinvolvedmajorinhalationofleadalloyandreleaseagentthermaldecompositionproducts.Theseweresignificantbecauseofthelargevolumeofleadalloyusedinamoltenformwhereleadfumeswouldbeproducedduringthemeltingandpouringoperationwithoperatorsdirectlyinvolved.TherewasalsosignificantstandbyexposuretoworkersinadjacentdepartmentsnotisolatedfromtheBabbittformingoperation.
Exposuretoleadwasconfirmedbythefactthatworkerswouldexceedtheregulatedbodyburdenforleadunderthedesignatedsubstancesregulationoflead.E.g.SeeMOLreportonDougTwist.Companymonitoringshowedairconcentrationlevelsofleadat0.02TWAEduringtinningandbabbittingandurinesamplesrangingbetween0.24and0.34umol/lovera2-yearperiod.TheOELsatthetimewas0.15mg/m3and0.72umol/l.Arethesereadingsreliableandvalid?Weretheconditions
General description:Building10wasapproximately800’longandemployedover60workersoneachshift.Ithousedamajormachining,boring,milling,turning,andweldingoperationaswellasassemblyandresincuringoperations.Thebuildingisequippedwith25’and40’largeboringmachinesaswellassmallerboringandmillingmachines.Italsoincludedlargedrillsandlathes.Thebuildinghadlargebakingovensandresindippingtanksusedtoresin-coatandcure-bakelargearmaturesthatweredeliveredfromthearmaturedepartment.Thiswasahighproductiondepartmentinvolvingthemanufactureofverylargemotors(someaslargeas400metrictonswhenfinallyshippedoutoftheplant).General Working Conditions: Theworkenvironmentwasheavilycontaminatedwithalargevarietyoffumes,smoke,vapoursanddusts.Inmostcasesitwasnotonlytheoperatorwhowasexposedbuttherewasagreatdealofby-standerexposure.Thiswasparticularlytrueinwelding,Babbittmolding,andresincuringoperations.Ventilationwaspoorandlocalexhaustventilationmanytimeswasnotworking,ifitwasprovided.
Manytasksrequiredbare-handhandlingoftoxicsthatenhancedriskofexposure.JHSCreportsindicatethathousekeepingwaspoorandworkpracticesinvolvedsmokingandeatingatworkstations.Babbitt production in the Babbitt Shop: Building10Bwasusedforthemanufactureof‘Babbitt’bearingscomposedofaleadalloycalledarsine—88%to100%lead.Priortopouringleadintothetinnedbearing,onehalfofthesteelbearingisheatedinanovento220c.Thehotbearingisremovedandloweredbycraneintoamoltenmetalbath(60%tin/40%lead)for10minutes.Thisisrepeated1ortwotimes.Themeltingpotwasabout4’-5’indiameterandapproximately4’deepandraisedupseveralfeetofftheground.2’x6”Leadalloyingotswerefedbyhandintothemoltenleadpot.Themoltenalloywasgravityfedthroughachutethatdirectedthemoltenleadintolargecastmoldstreatedwithareleaseagent-‘CML’or‘CKL’.Thisprocessgeneratedagreatdealofsmokecontainingleadalloyfumesand
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sampledrepresentativeofnormalconditions?Didanaccreditedlabanalyzetheresults?WhiletheairsamplesdonotindicatetheTLVstandardwasexceeded,theresultsoftheurinesamplesdoindicateleaduptakeandpotentialforharm.
Rotor Area Exposures: TheMOLoriginallyissuedanordertoplacetheRotorareasolderingunderthedesignatedleadregulationrequiringmorestringenthygienecontrols.ThisorderwassuccessfullyappealedonthegroundsthatairconcentrationandurineconcentrationswerebelowtheOELs.Wehavenowayofdeterminingthevalidityandreliabilityoftheemployer’sairandbiologicalmonitoring.However,itwastheprofessionalopinionofthehealthandsafetyinspectorthatmorestringentexposurecontrolswerenecessarysincetherewasnolocalexhaustventilationanditwasnotedthatcompressedairforcleaningwascondonedbyemployer.
Babbitt Fitting exposures: The emersion of bare skin inthebearingtroughde-fattedtheskinincreasingtheriskofabsorptionforbothleadandbenzenecontainingtoluene.Workersreportedgetting‘high’whileperformingthistask.Itwasn’tuntilthelate1980sthattheOntarioleadregulationwasappliedtothisworktask,requiringmedicalsurveillance.Thisprocesswascarriedoutinthenorthendofbuilding#10.Itwasalsocarriedoutina‘bearingbooth’inbuilding#8.
Thecompanyattributedtherelativelyhighleadairconcentrationsofbetween0.17and0.16mg/m³intheBabbittshoptothepracticeofblowingoffleaddustwithcompressedair.ThispracticewasfinallyreplacedbyusingaShopVacwithaHEPAfilter.DuringthisperiodtheMinistryofLabourissuedorderstoplacetheseleadoperationsundertheleadregulationthatrequiredmorestringentprotections.Theemployersuccessfullyappealedthisorder.SeeOHB86E049MOAR,March18,1986.
Garlock Gaskets:ThecuttingandshapingofgasketsfromrollsofGarlockmaterialexposedworkerstoasbestosfibres.Asbestoswasreleasedasthematerial
releasingagents.Ahugeplumeofsmokewouldriseviolentlywhenthemoltenleadcontactedthereleaseagentwhichwassodensethatsmokeandfumeswouldmigratetobuilding#12,adverselyaffectingworkersinthepunchpressoperation.TheseBabbittbearingscouldweighupto2tonswithaverylargesurfacearea.
Afterdipping,thesurfaceofthepouredmetalistorchedtopreventhardening.Thenleadsolderandpastewereusedtofillinremainingcavities.Thesecoatingandpouringoperationstookanestimated3.5to6hours.
Thebabbittswerethenmachinedanddrysanded.Theworkerswouldsandscrapeandfilethebearinginpreparationtobefittedontoashaftandruntoallowthebearingtowearin.Until1986,dustsfromsandingbabbitswereblownoffsurfacesandclothingwithcompressedair,dispersingleaddustintothegeneralatmosphere.Jointcommitteeminutesfromthe1980sindicatethattheventilationsystemintheBabbittshopwasnotworking.
Rotor Area: Thiswasaleadsolderingoperationthatinvolved4workersinhandsoldering0.5”copperbarconnectorsontorotors.Thefitterheatedthecopperbarsto235°Ccausingtheappliedleadsoldertomeltandrunontoconnections.Workersspentabout10hoursadaydoingthis.
Lapping Process: (Babbitt Fitting Process Carried out in the ‘bearing booth’ in Building #8 and in #10): AftertheBabbittswerereleasedfromthemoldtheyweremachinedtosizeandtestrunonashaftfollowedbyalappingprocess.Thelappingprocesstookabout½day.Thiswascarriedoutbya‘fitter’whosandedtheinsideofthebearingwithhisbarehandsimmersedintoluene--using400gritsandpaperand‘scotchpad’.Asluryofleadalloyandtoluenewouldresult.
Garlock Gaskets:Fittersalsoperformedthetaskofcuttinggasketsfrom3’x4’sheetsofGarlockgasketmaterial.Garlockwasanasbestosfibreimpregnatedrubbermaterial.Thiswasdoneeithermanuallywithasharporpunchedoutonthepunchpress.This
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wascutandmanipulated.Thecloseupworkwouldalsoplaceworkersatsignificantriskofinhalingthesefibres.Theremightbefurtherasbestosdispersionasworkerscleanedtheirworkareawithcompressedair.
MWF Exposures and Machining and Boring: Exposuretometalworkingfluids,bothcoolantsandcuttingoilswassignificant.TheseexposuresinvolvedlargeamountsofmistsandfumesfromMWFsbrokendownbyhightemperaturesgeneratedduringhighvolumemachiningonlargesurfaceareas.Exposureswerethroughinhalationandabsorptionthroughtheskin.DermalexposureswereconfirmedbyreportsofskinirritationanddermatitisaswellasmajorinvestigationintotheseproblemswithMWFs.
JHSC: 9/21/78: re: drilling in 10C: Complaints of headache,nauseafromoperators.SampletakenofvapourproducedidentifiedDascoTap#2.Testtubesatfaceareaofmethylchloroformregisteredexcessof650ppm(whereasshorttermexposurelevelis450ppmfor15minutes).Unionrepcalledforoperationtoceaseuntilcorrectionsmade.Facemasksobtained to remove contaminant but union asked for ventilationtobeinstalledsinceotherpersonsinareaarebeingaffectedaswell.”
JHSC: 11/16/78: drilling update: “We have asked for acompletiondatefromengineering(re:ventilation).Todatewehavehadnoluckonthis.Itmaybenecessarytotakefurtheraction.”
couldbean8-hour/dayoperationdependingonthedemandfromotherdepartments.Theprocessofcuttingand/orstampingoutgasketsfromtheGarlockproducedasbestosdusttogetherwithothercompositionmaterial.
Machining and Boring:TheseoperationsinvolvedagreatdealofMWFincludingcuttingoils,fluidsandcoolants.Theworkincludedmilling,machining,boring,metalcutting,metalturningonlathesforshafts,andshaping.TheseprocessesinvolvedmajoruseofMWFs,alsoreferredtoascuttingandcoolingoils.Somearesyntheticwhileothersarenaturalproducts.Manyhavetoxicadditivestopreventspoilage,suchasarseniccompounds.
MWF: Metalworkingfluidsweresprayedoncontinuouslyduringmachiningwithcoolingfluidssprayedfromalargetankofrecycledcoolantandoperatorsapplyingcuttingoilsmanually.Thesewouldgeneratelargeamountsofmists,vapourandsmokeproducebyheatgenerateduringcutting.Theatmospherewouldbewetwithmistandvapourandworkerswouldbesoakedwiththesefluids.OneoftheseMWFcalled“Steel-Kut”wasparticularlyreactiveandworkerswouldoftendevelopdermatitisaswellasrespiratoryirritationandsensitization.Steel-Kutwastheobjectofamajorstudyinthe1990sinbuilding#8and#10.TheMSDSforthiscuttingoilindicatedthatitcontainedmineraloil,sulfurandchlorine.SeelistofvariousMWFusedintheseprocesses.CimcoolandDascoTapwerealsousedinmachiningoperations.
Themachiningprocesswouldalsoproducelargeamountsofmetaldusts.Someareaswouldaccumulateseveralinchesofdust/particles.Somemachiningwouldbeconducteddryandthiswouldincreasetheamountofairbornemetaldust.Operatorswouldcleanoffoilsandparticleswithacompressedairgun,thusdispersingthesecontaminantsfurther.Withthenegativeairpressurethesecomplexcontaminantswerespreadtootherareas,producingcrosscontamination.
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Exposures During Grinding Operations:Thegrindingandcleaningoperationsgeneratedgreatquantitiesofinhalablemetalandresindusts.Therewasnoeffectivelocalexhaustventilation.
Exposure to Various Welding Fumes: Weldingwascarriedoutextensivelythroughoutthedepartmentcreatingagreatdealofby-standerexposure.Themainrouteofexposurewasinhalationofweldingfumesincludinggasessuchasozone,residuesfromdegreasersandvariousmetalandfluxfumes.Asignificantamountofweldinginvolvedoilysurfaces,generatinglargeamountsofsmokeinthegeneralatmosphere.Metalssuchascadmium,chromium,silver,copperandberylliumwerepresentinthesefumes.
Welderswerealsoexposedtoasbestosfibresfromusingasbestosblanketstoprotectpartsandthemselvesduringweldingoperation.Workerslaidontheseblanketsthatwereinfriableconditionfromheavyusage.
Solvent Exposures: WeldingoperationsinvolvedriskofinhalationofvariousdegreasersincludingTCE,toluene,xyleneandMEK.Workersreportedbeingovercomebytolueneandexhibitingneurologicalsymptoms.Investigationconfirmedthatworkerswerehandwipingtheinsulationoffstatorcoilswithragssoakedintoluene.Theonlyventilationwasby“naturalmeans”withnolocalexhaustventilation.SeeMOLReport:OHB05890GMOW;08/12/1980re:Bldg.#10Bays21to29.
Paint Exposures: Highriskofinhalationofglyptolpaintingredientsincludingsolventsandepoxyresinsandpigments.Thiswasparticularlyevidentwhenpaintwassprayedinopenareas.SeeJHSCreport
Grinding and Deburring: (Aftermachining,milling,drilling,turning,cuttingandwelding)Materialswerethengroundanddeburredwithairdrivenwirebrushes,andbuffed.Thesetasksproducealargeamountofgrit/resindust,andmetaldustcontaminatedwithresiduesofMWFanddegreasers.
Welding Operations: This department contained a fairlylargeweldingoperationlocatedsouthofthemainaisle.Thisinvolvednumeroustypesofweldinganduseofvarioustypesoffluxesandweldingrods for mild steel, stainless steel, cast iron, and aluminum.WeldersoperatedMIG,TIG,submergedwelding,brazing,oxy/acetylene.Thisgeneratedlargeamountsofweldingfumescontainingmetalssuch as cadmium, nickel, chromium, beryllium, silver, copper,tomentionafewoftheroutineby-productsofweldinginadditiontoresiduesofdegreasersandMWF.Weldingwasalsoconductedwithportableunitscarriedtovariouslocations.
Sincetherewasagreatdealofoilonmetalsurfaces,weldingoperationswouldproduceagreatamountofsmokethatwascarriedthroughoutthedepartment.Thearcairweldingwhichinvolvedacarbonrodcoatedwithcopperwouldbeusedtocutplates3”thickandproducegreatamountofweldingsmoke.Alsowelderswouldperformweldsonsurfacesthatwerecoatedwithepoxiesand/orpolyurethanefoamsandadhesives.Theassemblyandshippingareaswouldalsoinvolveagreatdealofweldingtofitmotorparts,aswellassecuringtheseverylargemotorstoflatbedrailcars.Securinga400-tonmotorwascomplexandinvolvedalargeamountofweldingtotherailcar,whichcouldtakeoveraweektocomplete.
Degreasers: Motorpartswereregularlydippedorhandwipedwithdegreasersasapre-treatmentpriortoweldingorpaintingand/ortocleanoffMWFfromthemachiningprocesses.ThedegreaserofchoicewasusuallyTCE,orMEK,toluene,andacetone.
Painting: MotorsandpartswereregularlypaintedwithwhatwascalledGlyptol.Therewerefrequentcomplaints about the vapours and odors from this
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regardingaworkrefusalthatoccurredbecauseofspraypaintinginBayN-26.
Exposure to lead and naphtha gas: Riskofinhalationsignificanttoveryvolatilenaphthagasandfumesfromvolatizedlead.
Exposure to Asbestos and Resin vapours: Significantworkerandbystanderriskofinhalationofasbestosdustfromcurtains,whichwereinfriableconditionasaresultofwearandtearfromworkactivity.Thiscombinedwithriskofinhalationofpolyesterepoxyresinsandthermaldecompositionby-productsduringovenbakingmadeworsebylackofappropriateventilationanddispersalofcontaminantsthroughairmovementandworkactivities.Workersexperiencedfrequent headaches and eye, nose and throat irritationfrominhalationandabsorptionoftheresinfumesandgases.
application,particularlywhenitwassprayedonintheopen.GlyptolwasaGEproductcomposedofagroupofAlkydpolymers.Amongitsconstituentswerepigmentscontainingmagnesiumsilicate(asbestos),titaniumdioxide,calciumcarbonateaswellasvolatilessuchasalkydresins,butylcellosolire,paropasal“P”,andammonia.
Layoff Process:Thisprocessinvolvedpaintingsteelplateswithleadpaintmixedwithnaphthagas.Thiswasmanuallypaintedontheplatessothatdirectcontactwouldbemadewithpaint.Thisprocesswasalsocarriedoutinbuilding#34.Thisprocessproducednaphthalenevapoursaswellasleadfumes.
Temporary Oven 1980s: Inthe1980sa‘temporarytent’curingovenwasconstructedinBay24NofBldg.#10toaccommodatecoatingverylargearmatures.ItwasconstructedagainstthewestwallofBldg.#10.Thisovenwas25’highand40’x40’square.Itwaslinedwithaverythick asbestos curtain, which surroundedall4sidesoftheoventokeeptheheatin.Atinroofwasalsoconstructedtokeepheatinwhichwasequippedwithaverticalexhaustduct.Activityintheoveninvolvedrotatinglargearmatures(ferris-wheelstyle)inaresin-filledepoxy(vinyltoluene)trough,12’x15’insize.AsthearmatureswerebeingcoatedwiththeresintheKelroheaterswouldbakethecoatedarmaturetohardentheepoxyresins.Duringthisprocessworkerswouldalsosqueegeetheresintoensureuniformcoverage.WorkerswerenotedinJHSCminutestohavemadecomplaintsabouthowtheywererequiredtohandletheresinsduringthisprocess,anddemandedthehygienistcometoviewtheworkwithrespecttoitshealthimpact.
Armatureswerebakedforapproximately72hours.
Thisresindipping/bakingprocessproducedlargeamountsofthickbluishsmokethroughoutthedepartment.Theresinswereusedingreatvolumesgiventhesizeofthearmaturesbeingcoated.HealthandsafetyJHSCcommentthatventilationinthisovendidnotworkconsistently.
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Exposure to Resin Dusts: Inhalationofsignificantquantitiesofcuredhardenedresindustsduringgrindingandcleaningoperationstoremove(bakedon)excessresinsaswellascleaningtheoventrough.Generateddustswouldalsobedepositedonandabsorbedthroughtheskin.
Exposure to Electromagnetic fieldsduringelectricaltestingatveryhighvoltages.WorkerswerechronicallyexposedtoEMFsatveryhighamperages.EMFsareclassifiedasahumancarcinogen.
MOCA Exposures: ThisprocessgeneratedlargeamountsofMOCAdustinhaledbyworkershandlingthesubstancebygrinding,cutting,filingandhammeringtomakeitfit,aswellasthoseincloseproximity.MOCA,4,4’-methylenebis(2chloroanilineisclassifiedbyIARCasaGroup1carcinogen-carcinogenictohumans,IARCMonographVol.100F,2012).
JHSC: 11/3/77: re: Tar epoxy exposures: “CrownDiamondtarepoxyissprayedinunventilatedarea.Thisjobquestionedasfarbackas2yearsbutnoactiontakentocorrectit.”
JHSC: 8/14/79: re: Asbestos dust: “Largearmaturewasbeingprocessed(epoxybake)andlargesheetsofasbestosclothandblanketsofKaowooldrapedoverit.WhencyclefinishedtheasbestosandKaowoolwasdraggedoffarmaturecreatingcloudsofdustandfibreinlargeareaof#10bldg.Uponcheckingoutsituationitwasbadlycontaminatedsoinstructionsgiventousezerodischargevacuumcleanerstocleanupparticles.”
JHSC: 12/8/81 re: spray paint:Painterspainting25footkeybarsoutsidepaintbooth.Alsogoinginsidestatorstospraypaint.Chemicalsinpaintare
Grinding and chiseling: Aftertheepoxyhardenedworkerswouldgrindand/orchiseloffexcessresinandhardenedresininthetroughproducinggreatamountsofgritandresindustssincethese(40-ton)armatureswereverylarge.
Pershift,40to50motorsweredippedandbakedinthismanner.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Fumeswereheavyandprevalent.Therewerefrequentworkstoppagesthroughoutthe1980sasaresultofworkersconcernsabouttheseexposures.
Testing Process:Largemotorsthatwouldrunatbetween20,000and30,000horsepowerwereregularlytestedandrunatextremepower.Gasesgeneratedduringtheprocessincludedozoneandnitrogendioxide.ThisoperationalsoproducedstrongmagneticfieldsintheELFfrequencyrange.
MOCA in Mining Hoist:Mininghoistswerebuiltin10S.ThisinvolvedfittingMOCApucksintheslotsofverylargehoistdrums.Thesewerefittedinslotsaroundtheentirecircumferenceofthehoistdrumwherethe2”-3”diametercablewould“ride”onthem.The6”MOCApuckswerehandmachined,filed,sandedandthencutwithachainsawandhammeredintotheslotsbutt-joined.Thisinvolvedhand-fittinglargenumberspucksaroundthedrum,producingsignificantMOCAdustthatwouldcoverthesolesofworkers’shoes.
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ammoniamagnesiumsilica(aformofasbestos).Managementtogetmoreinformationonpaint.
JHSC: 8/24/82: re: hydrogen leak: “Hydrogenleakledtoevacuationof#8,#10,#10C,#12.Workerscomplainedthatevacuationroutetookthemrightpasthydrogentankertruck.”
JHSC: 10/19/82: re: asbestos refusal: “Workers in10Cwereaskedtoheatanasbestosboard.Laboratoryworkerhadnoworkorderforjobandnoauthoritytogivemenworkwithoutfirstcontactingforeman.”
JHSC: 12/13/82: re: drinking fountains: “Water tests showedpipestowaterfountainrustingaway.”
JHSC: 9/26/85: re: removing PCBs: On Saturday, transformerswerebeingdrainedofpyranolwhichcontainsPCBs.Theprescribedprocedureswerenotfollowedandasaresultofthepoorhandlingtherewasaworkrefusalbyemployeesinthesurroundingarea.”
JHSC: 12/86: re: showers for lead workers:
(AsperrecommendationinLeadAssessmentdonein#10)“…companyisnotpreparedtosupplyshowersforleadworkersinBabbittshop,LeadRotor,andBearingFitareas.”TobeappealedtoMOLbyunion.
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BUILDING: #12 DEPARTMENT: PUNCH PRESS
Punch Press OperationGeneral DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsPunching/MachiningWeldingGrinding/DeburringAnnealing and Enameling OvensEnamelingAnnealingCopper Coil AnnealingCommutator MachiningCoil StrippingCutting with Carborundum SawDegreasing TanksRebuilding Old Motors
Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCausticSoda:sodiumnitrite/nitrateGasses:C0₂,helium,ozone,phosgene,Decompositionby-products:formaldyhyde,benzene,PAHsDegreasers:TCE,TolueneDetergentsFibers/Dust:Asbestos,Fibreglass,Insulationproducts,MicaMetals: steel, copper, stainless steelMWFs: Steel Kut, Dasco TapResins/Resinfumes:Glyptol,others?
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Thiswasahighvolumeshopthatinadditiontowhatthepunchpressandmachiningoperationsgenerated,thisdepartmentwassubjectedtocontaminantsfromtheweldingandgrindingoperationsinbuilding14AandleadandmoldreleasefumesfromtheBabbittshop.
Thesecontaminantswerehighlylikelytobeinhaled.Thecomplaintsfromworkersconcerningthesefumesaswellassymptomsattesttotheseoverexposures.
JHSC: 2/23/78: re: degreasers: Whendegreaserscheduledforcleanout,air-lineputdowntoexhaustfumesanddryoutresidue.Thisprocesstendsto1.Blowstrongvapoursinawideareacreatingrealhazardtootherpersonneland2.Createsadangerousenvironmentforworkerdoingthecleaning.
Ingestionalsolikelygiventhatworkersateanddrankattheworkstationanddidnothavewashingfacilities.
Inhalation,absorptionandingestionsofseveralMWF,solventandoilmistsproducedbypunchingandmachininghighlylikelyinlargesurfaceareaandhighvolumeproductionprocess.
Punch Press Operation:
General Description: The Punch Press shop ran northsouthbetweenbuildings#14and#10.Itemployed100-150workerson3shifts.Itwasabout1000’x200’x60’high.Itwasawide-openoperationinthenorthsectionandpartiallyenclosedinthesouth.Itwasamajorpunchingandmachiningoperationthat provided punched out parts and punched sheets ofsteelaswellasmachinedpartsthroughouttheGEoperation.Ithadverylargepunchpressandalargeshearingmachine,smalllathes,2largeboringmills,abatteryofsmallpunchpressesoperatedbywomenintheSEaisleandalaseroperatedpress.Verylargedegreaserswerelocatedinthearea.The‘RimPlate’areacontainedaverylargepunchpressthatpunchedlargeplatesforwatergenerators.Finally,thisdepartmentwasheavilyengagedinthe‘re-manufacturing’ofdieselmotorsthatweretorndown,cleaned,rebuiltasnecessary,andpainted.
General Working Conditions:Inadditiontocontaminantsgeneratedinbldg.12operations,contaminantsfromtheTankShopinbldg.14wouldmigratetobuilding12punchpressoperators.Thisincludedlargeamountsofweldingfumes,degreaservapours,andgrindingdusts.Aswell,fumesandgaseswouldmigratefromtheBabbittShopinbldg.10Bconsistingofleadalloyfumesandreleaseagents.Thisinfiltrationwasduetothenegativepressureandlackoflocalexhaustventilationsinthesetwoareas.
Punching/machining operation and use of solvents and MWF: Thiswasamajormetalmachiningandpunchingoperation,punchingoutlargeandsmallpartsthroughout,aswellasshearinglargeheavygaugesheetsofsteelwithalargeshearingmachine.Metalsbroughtinwerecoatedwithvarsolpriortoshearingandpunching.Theshearingandpunchingoperationwouldgeneratelargeamountsofmistandvapourfromthevarsolcoatingbeingstampedandheated,fromimpact.Thestampingprocesscouldproduce 100s of parts per minute, so that the rapid punchingprocesswouldproducelargeamountsofmistandvapour.
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Attimes,weldingactivitywouldgeneratesmallfiresandexplosionsasaresultofTCEresiduetrappedinsmallcavitieswithinthemotorcastings.Workersreportedseverenosebleedsandsinusinjury.Weldersalsousedasbestoswovenblanketsduringweldingoperationstoprotectcertainpartsfromtheweldingsplatter.
Grindinganddeburringoperationsproducedlargeamountsofdustcontainingsolventsresidues,heavymetalsandepoxyresindusts.InhalationhighlylikelygiventhelackofadequatelocalexhaustventilationandPPE.
JHSC: 11/15/82: re: radiation: “Queryradiationcheckssincex-rayroombesidethisworkareahasbeenincreased.Workersupsetthisproblemhaspersistedforoverayear.”
Annealingandenamelingovensgeneratedamixtureofthermaldecompositionbyproductsthatwerereadilyinhaled.Thesewouldincludeoilandsolventresiduesthatwereheatedtohightemperatures.Thiswouldalsoincludeepoxyresinfumesandbreakdownbyproductsfromthecuringprocess.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionofavarietyofthermaldecompositionbyproductsfrompolyesterandepoxyresins.
Inhalationofasbestosfibresfromfrayingasbestoscurtains,degreaserandMWFresiduesanddecompositionby-products.
TheRimPlateoperationwouldinvolvepunchingasteelplatethatcouldbe8’x5’x1/4thick.Theplatewasmoppedwith‘SteelKut’machineoilinpreparationforpunching.Duringtheimpactagreatdealofmistandvapourwasproduced.
Welding:Asubstantialamountofweldingwascarriedonfabricatingpartswhichwerethengroundanddeburred.
Grinding/Deburring: Afterpunchingandmachining,partshadtobedeburredbygrinding,sandingandbuffing.Thiswasusuallydonewithcompressedairdrivengrindersandmetalrotatingbrushes,aswellasbeltsandersusing400gritsandpaper.Thedeburringoperationproducedagreatamountofairbornedustcontaininggrit/resin,metalparticulatewithresiduesofMWF.
Annealing and Enameling Ovens: Thereweretwoovenslocatedonthewestwallnorthofthemainaisle.Thesewereenclosedexceptforanentryandexitportswithasbestoscurtains.
Enameling: Afterbeingdeburred,punchingswereplacedonaconveyorbeltthattravelledthroughtheoven.Thesewereheatedtoburnoffoilsandthensprayedwithbrownepoxyandbakedforabout15minutesthentakenoffthelineandstacked.ThisprocessgeneratedagreatamountofbluishsmokethatpermeatedtheatmospherewithacomplexmixtureofepoxythermaldecompositionbyproductssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzene,etc.Whilethereweremanytypesofepoxiesused,thiswasmostlikelyIsonal.
Annealing Process: Duringtheannealingprocesspunchingswerebakedathightemperaturestotemperthesteelparts.Thisalsogeneratedagreatdealofsmokecontainingthermaldecompositionby-productsfromtheburningoffofvariousoils,degreasersandMWF.Thisprocesswouldalsogenerateasbestosfibresfromthecurtainsbeingbrushingagainstthepunchingsastheyenteredandexited.Thesecurtainswerereplacedoftenasaresultofthewearandtear.
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ExposuretoTCEvapours,nitrite/nitratesalts,andpossiblyNO₂.WhilethiswasnotmeasuredthelikelihoodofNO₂beingformedandinhaledisentirelypossible.
Machiningcommutatorsgeneratedcopper,micaandasbestosdustwhicharehighlylikelyinhaledandingested
Inhalationofinsulationdustscontainingresins,asbestos,fibreglassfibreshighlylikely.
Asabove.
Inhalationofgritandresindustsgeneratedbysaw.
See MOL report dated August 26, 1964addressingemployersconcernsaboutthehandlingofwastesodiumnitrite/nitrate.Firebrokeoutwhenmaterialsspilledonwoodenpallet.Asbestospapersubsequentlyusedtopreventfirewhenstoredonwoodenpallets.
Thelikelihoodofinhalationofcausticsodasaltvapourandasbestosaswellasdegreaservapours.Inspectornotesthepossibilityforcausticsaltstobecarriedinthevapourandsteam.
Copper Coil Annealing Process: Flat copper coils are hoisted by an overhead crane and dipped into a vat of TCE, then dipped into a tank of molten sodium nitrite/sodium nitrate, and then soaked in a cold waterrinse.Periodically,thecaustictankhastobe replenished and the old material taken out and dispensed.There is a possibility that this solution can react with an acid and produce nitrogen dioxide gas. This might be possible if there is insufficient time for the TCE to be completely dripped off before entering the caustic bath. Because of the piece rate systemoperatorswerenotallowingsufficienttimetoelapsebetweenthetwodips.
Commutator machining:LargecommutatorsweremachinedonlathesinthisareaaswellasinBuilding#8.Thisproducedlargeamountsofmica,asbestosandcopperdustsfromthemachiningprocess.
Duringthisprocess,asbestosboards2”x16”x1/4weremachinedforcommutators.
Coil Stripping: Thisinvolvedstrippingcopperandinsulationofcoilrings,whichwerethenground,sandedandchiseledandthendippedincausticsoda.ThesewerethensenttoBldg.16Atobere-woundandre-insulatedinandasphaltdip.
Cutting with carborundum saw: Constantcuttingwithacarborundumsawwasanightanddayoperationthatgeneratedlargeamountofmetalandgrinderdusts.Workersdescribeareaas‘coatedindust’.
Degreasing Tanks: Thisdepartmenthad3degreasingtanks.TCE,causticsoda,possiblyxylene.Thesewereusedextensivelyduringthere-manufacturingprocess.Routinely,partsweredippedfromTCEtocausticsodawithoutallowingtheresiduestodripdrysufficiently.Thiswouldcausesomeseverereactionsandnoxiousfumesthatworkerscomplainedabout.MOLreportsnotedthispracticeand‘recommended’thatatleast15minuteselapsebetweendips.Despitethisrecommendationthedepartmentcontinuedthepractice.(SeeMOLreports)
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Exposuretoheavymistofdetergent,solvents,andunknownresiduesfrommotors.
Steps4and5generatedheavyfumesfromthedippinginTCEandcausticsoda.
Steamcleaninggeneratedheavymistofdetergentandsolventresidues.
Frequentexposurestolooseasbestosfiberfallingonworkersandfloatingintheair.
Craneoperatorsexposedtomistsandfumesfromdegreasingoperationscarriedoutbelowthem.Describedas“cloudsofdustandfumes.”
A“toxicsoup”ofchemicalsandfumesgeneratedinaprocessthatwentonfor12hourspershift,aroundtheclockformanyyears.(Producing3-4remanufacturedunitsperday).
This“toxicsoup”included:weldingfumesandgasses,MWFs,degreaserfumes(TCE),heavymetals,toluene,insulationdusts/vapours,resinfumes,whichworkerswouldbeexposedtofor12-hourshifts.
Welders’ Health Issues:Workers made frequent complaints of irritated nose, eyesandthroat.Workerscomplainedandfiledworkers’compensationclaimsfornosebleeds.Theseweldingoperationscangeneratesignificantquantitiesofozonegasthatisaknownrespiratoryirritantaswellasaprobablehumancarcinogen.Aswell,in
Re-manufacturing used Motors:
There-manufacturingofuseddieselmotorswasdoneinsouthendofbldg12and16A.ThesewerereconditionedlocomotiveenginesforCN.Theoperationcontinued24/7formanyyears.Areameasuresabout30x20x60high.
Manual Disassembly Process: 1. Entiremotorsweresteamcleanedwithhigh-
pressurenozzles;2. Bolts manually removed from frames to
releaserotors,stators,castingparts;3. Thedisassembledpartsweresteamcleaned;4. Newlycleanedpartsfirstdippedina(10’x12’)
vatofheatedTCE;5. Partswerethendippedina(5’x6’)vatof
causticsoda;6. Partsthensteamcleanedunderhigh
pressure;7. Theseheavypartsweremaneuveredby
overheadcranes,whichwouldattimeshitasbestosinsulatedpipesthusdislodginglargeamountsoffriableasbestos.Thesewouldfallonweldingoperationsandcauseflash-fireswhenignited;
8. Craneoperatorsworkedinopencabswithnobuildingexhaustsystem;
9. Weldingoperationsgoingonsimultaneouswiththemanualdisassemblyoperationaddingweldingfumestotheotherchemicalfumesandmistsgeneratedinthedisassemblyprocess.Approximately3weldersintheareacarryingoutMIGandCO₂weldingintheareaofaTCEdegreasingtankandoperation;
10. Locatedbetweenthedisassemblybuilding(12)andremanufacturingbuilding(16A)wasamajorweldingoperation.ThegassesusedwereCO₂,helium,andfumesfrommoltenmetal,whichwouldbecarriedintobuildings12and16Aasallofthesebuildingswerenotphysicallyisolated,ratherdividedbylowpartitionsthatdidnotpreventfumesfromreachingotherpartsofthecomplex;
11. Armaturesofheavycoppercoilsweremade
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contactwithTCE,phosgenegascanalsobeproduced.Thisgasishighlytoxicandamajorrespiratoryirritant.MeasurementviaDraegerTubesofTCEintheareawherethenosebleedoccurredwas25ppm.Report # IE-67; June 5, 1970. These tubes have an error rate +/- 25-35%.
WeldersmadefrequentcomplaintsaboutozonegasandweldingfumesfromarcMIGandstickwelding.ThereportnotesthatoneworkerwaswellonhiswaytodevelopingCOPDandshouldfindotherworkthanwelding--particularlyMIGandTIGweldingwhichgeneratesignificantamountsofozonegaswhichisamajorirritant.
Crane operator health issues:Department of Health report dated April 1, 1970 concerningacraneoperatorwhofiledaworkrelatedillnessclaimasaresultofexposuretotheannealingchemicalwhilehewasdippingthecoilsinthesesolutions.Nosebleeds,swellingoftheankles,rashesandafever.
Whiletheinvestigatorsconcludedthatthiscouldn’thavebeenwork-related,thereisapossibilitythatnitrogendioxidecouldhavebeenformedasaresultofacidbeingformedfromtheTCEdegreasingoperationbeingneartheweldingoperations.ItispossiblethatNO₂wasformedbyreactionofthesaltbathandtheacidmists.
Department of Health report dated April 6, 1970 indicated that a field visit on March 23, 1970 found a number of problems with the operation:
Poorhousekeeping;“visualinspection.…Indicatedthattheexhaustsystemwascompletelyineffective”;andtherewerenoeyewashfountainsnearcausticsodatanks.Craneoperatorexperiencedadversehealtheffectswhiledippingcoilsincausticsodaaswellassteamgeneratedbyquenchtanks.
in the shop, then cleaned and annealed beforeusing.CleaningwasdoneinavapourdegreaserofTCEtank7x5x9’deepfittedwithexhaustslots.Degreasingtakesabout20minuteswithcraneoperatorhandlingthebasket.Thencraneoperatorplacesthebasketnexttoasaltbathofsodiumnitrite/nitrateina8’x4’tankofmoltensalts(DrawTemp-275°F).Bathismaintainedat800°F.Theparts soak for 6 hours in the salt bath then are soakedinarinsingtankat200°F.Considerablesteamisgeneratedduringtherinsephase.Thecraneoperatorisabovethesetankswhilevapourandsteamisgeneratedupward.
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BUILDING: #14 DEPARTMENT: POWDER PAINT/STRUCTURAL STEEL
General Description Powder PaintSteps in Powder Paint ProcessGeneral Description Structural SteelTank ShopSpecific Operations: WeldingAirBlastTanks Stainless Steel Tanks 102”andFGKBreakers EvidureTorchandAluminumWelding BertramVerticalBoringMill RadialDrilling HorizontalBoringMill Grind and Clean GritBlasting Paint Booth Welding WeldingFumesandDust Electro-MagneticFields Asbestos Solvent Vapour and Fumes Machining MetalWorking Metal Grit and Dusts
Known Chemicals used or produced:AntiSplatterPaintCausticAcidChromates, CadmiumEpoxyResinPaintandDustGritsHCLMetal Fumes (Cadmium, Zinc, Chromium, NickelMetalParticulatesMetalWorkingFluids(coolantsandoils)Silica DustStainless Steel
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Workersexposedtoepoxyresinpaintdustingreatquantitieswithnothingmorethanpapermasksandpaintoveralls.Theyworkedinanelectricallychargedenvironmentandwereexposedtoextremeheatandelectricalshocks.Chemicalsusedintheproductionprocessincluded:epoxyresin,causticsodaandacid.
Workerscomplainedofexcessivedustexposures;MOLtestsidentifieddustlevelsclosetoTLVasventilationinadequate.MOL, 14A, March 17, 1981.
JHSC: 9/27/79: re: heavy dust: “We have recurrence ofthisproblem.(unionrep)reportsthecollectorbagshavenotbeencleanedinalmosttwoyears.Theyprobablyneedreplacing.Thereisheavydustaccumulationinthearea.”JHSC: 10/11/79: re: collector bags: Thebagshavenotbeencleanedorreplacedinalongtime.Alsowetriedtogetinfoonepoxypaintdustfromengineeringlabbutnewpolicyguidehasshort-circuitedthatsourceofinformation.”JHSC: 12/20/79: re: epoxy paint dust: “Stillwaitingforresearchonpossiblehazardsofepoxypaintdust.”JHSC: 2/12/80: re: epoxy paint dust: “Problem here issevereandhealthofworkersseemstobereflectingthoseproblemsmoreandmoreastimeprogresses.”Notesoneworkeronleavewithsevererash,anotherexperiencingbadcoughandtraceofbloodinsputum,anotherworkerremovedfromjobwithsevererash.DustescapingispollutingnotonlytheimmediateworkplacebutalsostructuralsteelandpartsofGPC.Theonlyprocessinvolvingachemicalexposureonfirstfloorwastheuseofcausticacidtocleanthehooksfollowingtheiruse.Workersworeglovesandglassesbutdescribedtheacidas“stinging”whensplashedonthem.Anyexposuresduringthe3-washstagecouldoccurwhenproductsmovedoutofthewashtunnel,whichwasself-contained.
Largeamountofepoxypaintoversprayduetoelectrostaticcharge.Workerssubjecttoelectricalshocksduetoelectrostaticenvironment.
Background for Powder Paint Operation:
Powderpaintoperationinvolvedthesprayingofelectrostaticionizedpowderedepoxypaintonmetal(steel and some aluminum) products that involved twofloorsinbuilding14.Thisprocesswasusedspecificallytocoathousingsofelectricalpanelsforswitchgearbetween1977-1985.Theentireprocesswascontrolledviaconveyorbeltsystem.Therewereverylowceilingsonsecondfloorwithtemperaturesoftenashighasthatofthebakeovensused(105°F).Steps in the Process:1. Partspreppedandhungonhooksattachedto
aconveyorbeltonfirstfloortakingproductsuptothe2ndfloor;
2. Hangingpartstravelthrougha3-washopentunnel:hotwash,hotcausticsodabath,hotrinse;
3. Partstraveltosemi-enclosedautomaticpowdersprayareaforpainting;
4. Edgesandanyareasmissedinsprayareapaintedmanuallybyworkersusinghand-heldwands;
5. Newlypaintedpartsentera50’bakeovenfor2½hours;
6. Afterbaking,partstravelbackdownto1stfloortobeunloadedandshippedtovariousdepartments;
7. Hooksusedtocarrypartstakenoffconveyorandsoakedinan(uncovered)“acid”bathtoremoveanysprayedpowderpaint.Tankwaslocatedatgroundlevelandoriginallyhadnobarrierstopreventfalls(barriersaddedafterworkerfellin);
8. Responsibilityforcleaningacidtankwaslefttothepainters.
Observation: Theprocessgeneratedagreatdealoffloatingpaintdustthatcoveredworkers.Operatorsreportedelectricshocksfromspraywandstouchingchargedmetal.Aluminumproductswerebakedfor24hourspriortopainting,whichmeantcomingtoworkatallhourstomeettheproductionschedule.Runwiththreeshiftsof5workerspershift.Thegeneral
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Employeesworepaperfacemasksandwhiteoveralls–norespirators.
Onlyexposureduringbakingprocesswouldoccurasproductsmovedoutsidetheovens.
Workersexposedtofumesfromnewlypaintedpartsandproducts.Workersexposedtoacidresidueanddirtparticleswhenscrapingandwipingtank.
Afteraseriousincidentwhenaworkerfellintotankwithsevereburnsonhislegs(anddiedtwoyearslater),abarrierwasinstalled.
Workersexposedtohighlevelofpaintdust,possibilityofelectricalshocks,highlevelsofheat(105°F),paintandcleaningfumesandadditionalchemicalsandfumesrelatedtoweldingtakingplacenear-by.By-standerexposuretoweldingfumeswassignificant.
Inspectornotedsignificantescapeofdustfrompaintenclosureandindicatedthatthepaintoperationwasnotsufficientlyenclosedandventilated.(MOL Report # 41181CEAA; Building 14, April 14, 1981). Inspector: “It appears because of inadequate enclosures and airvelocityintotheenclosure,significantamountofdustmayescapefromthebooths.”Concernofunioncommitteememberswhennewfiltersinstalleddustescapedandsettledonmachines100’away.Aworkrefusalinitiatedandthensettledwhentoldnewfilterswouldbeinstalledonnextshift.Inspectororderedthatworkersbeprovidedwithapprovedrespirators.
areawasnearstructuralsteelwhereagreatdealofweldingandmachiningtookplace.
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Exposures in Structural Steel involved the following:
MachininginvolvestheriskofinhalationandabsorptionofvariousMWFsincludinglargeamountsofcoolantslikelycontainingarsenicasabiocideaswellasvariouscuttingoilsthatcouldincludesulfur,mineraloilandchlorine.TheseMWFwouldbreakdownasaresultoftheheatproducedduringthemachiningprocessexposingworkerstoothertoxiccompounds.Aswell,metalswouldbreakdownintovariousmetalcompoundsthatwouldfurthercontaminatethefluids.Metalscouldinclude:chromium,nickel,zinc,mildsteel,cadmiumandcopper.Theseinhalationandabsorptionexposureswouldaffectotherworkersinthearea.
Weldingoperationswouldexposeworkersthroughinhalationtovariousweldingfumesandgasesthatwouldbeproducedthroughtheweldingprocess;e.g.,heavymetalssuchasmildsteel,chromium,nickel,cadmium,zinc,copper,aluminium--aswellasvariousgasesproducedduringtheweldingprocess,e.g.,ozone,phosgenefromresidualsofdegreasers--orvapoursfromotherareascontainingsubstancessuchastrichloroethylene.
JHSC: 3/23/78: re: fumes and dust: Fumes and dust stillaprobleminthisarea.ThedustisrisingintoPowderPaint,causingproblemsthere.Wehaveencounteredproblemsgettingtesttubesforcheckingfumesandgassesbuthopetofindsomeshortly.”
JHSC: 12/2/80: re: Oil coating fumes: “There are peoplewithdermatitisontheirforearms.CheckforphosgenegasandcarbonmonoxidegasatBldg.#14,spotweldingwhereoilcoatingisheated.”
MOL order regarding poor housekeeping and over exposures.Thebreakdownofsomefluxesthatwereusedintheweldingprocesswouldlikelybeinhaledalso.MOLorderthatallweldingareasinbldg.14shallbecleanedup,indicatingthathousekeepingwasvery poor (MOL, Building 14,Nov. 27, 1989).
Structural Steel Department:
GeneralDescription:Inadditiontothepowderpaintoperation,building14containedthemajoroperationsoftheStructuralSteeldepartmentinvolving:largescalemachining;cutting,rolling,welding,grinding,fabricationandde-burring;coatingandpaintingoflargesteel(102”+dia.x1”-2”thick)sheets.Inadditiontosupplyingmetalsheetstootherdepartments,thisdepartmentfabricatedlargehousingsfortheswitchgeardepartmentinwhatwascalledtheTankShop,northofthemainaisle.AShaftovenusedtoheatshaftsinpreparationforassemblywasalsolocatedNorthofthemainaisle.Southofthemainaislemajormachining,welding,fabricating,cleanandgrindoperationstookplace.
Theseoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofenvironmentalcontaminantsincluding:weldingfumes,metalandgritdusts,degreaserfumesandvapours,mistsandfumesfrommetalworkingfluids,aswellaslargeamountsof“whitedust”containingfibreglassandresin(frommachining,drilling,boringandgrindinglargeepoxiedfibreglassinterruptertubes).
Workersalsousedgreenlayoutpaintthatcontainedwhitelead,kerosene,trichloroethane,blackoilandnaphthagas.
AccordingtoreportsofGEretirees,respiratoryprotectionandlocalexhaustventilationwasnotprovided.Tank Shop (North End Bldg. 14)
MuchoftheproductionintheTankShoplocatedinthenorthendofBuilding#14wasfortheSwitchGeardepartment(building#16).Theshopwasequippedwith:
• Threelargeboringmillsandalargeradialdrill;• Apaintbooth;• Threelargeweldingtables;• Analuminumweldingoperation;• Threegritblastingoperations.Thismulti-processoperationemployedapproximately65workersonthreeshifts.Theoperationsconsisted
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Inaddition,workerswereatriskofexposuretovariousdustsproducedduringthegrindingandcleaningoperations.Inthiscaseworkerswereatriskofinhalingfinedustparticulatecontainingresingrits,various metal dusts such as mild steel, aluminum, chromium,cadmium,nickel,epoxyresins,andpaintcoatings.
primarilyoffabricatingverylargecircuitbreakersranginginsizefrom28”to102”andtheevenlargerFGKbreakers.
Thisoperationinvolvedcutting,rolling,welding,grinding,gritblasting,buffingandmachining,boring,andfinallypaintinglargeplatesofsteelandstainlesssteel.
Theoperationusedlargeamountsofmetalworkingfluids(MWFs)lacedwithbiocidescontainingarseniccompoundstokillbacteriaandfungusthatgrowsinthefluids.ThisgeneratedlargeamountsofMWFmistsandvapours.
Workersdescribea“bluishsmoke”thatpermeatedtheatmosphereintheentireshop(“After15minutesonthejob,theworkareawasfilledwithbluesmokethatlastedtherestoftheshift”–GEretiree).
Weldingoperationsintheareageneratedlargeamountsofweldingfumesaswellasthermaldecompositionby-productsfromdegreasers,appliedbyhand(withaclothorbrush)inpreparationfortheweldingoperation.Theseincluded:trichloroethylene,xyleneandacetone.
Weldingoperationsinvolvedseveraltypesofweldingincluding:submergedarcweldingemployingblackgranulatedflux;andstainlesssteelweldingoflargetankswhichgeneratedheavymetalfumescontainingcadmium,hexavalentchromium,andnickelalloys.
Muchoftheweldingtookplaceinsidethelargetanksbeingconstructed,inconfinedspace.Workersreportedbeingovercomebythefumesfromthedegreasersandweldingfumes.Workers(especiallycleaners)alsodescribedbecoming“high”fromthefumes.Insidewelderswerenotprovidedwithair-suppliedhoodswhenperforminginsidewelds.And,thesupplyairwasofquestionablequalitygiventhattheaircamefromacompressorpumpingairfromtheshop.Thesteelsupplylineswereequippedwithoilsedimentbowlstopreventlinesfromrusting.
Afterwelding,workerswouldperform“grindandclean”operationsontheweldsaswellasfurthermachiningusingtheboringmills.Thisprocess
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Inhalationofweldingfumescontainingmildsteelandfumesfromblackgranulatedfluxuse.
Inhalationofstainlesssteelweldingby-productssuchascadmiumandhexavalentchromium
Sameasabovewithrespecttoinhalationofweldingfumesandresiduesofdegreasers.
generatedagreatdealofblackdustthatworkerswererequiredtoremoveanddiscard.Workerswoulddrysweepandshovellargeamountsofdustanddiscardintoatotebox.Thisprocessgeneratedairbornedustthroughoutthisarea.Dustwasblownoffworksurfaces(andclothes)usingcompressedair--apracticethatwaswidespread,furthercontributingtotheairbornecontamination.Workerswerenotprovidedwithadequaterespiratoryprotectionandtherewasnolocalexhaustventilation.
Cleanandgrindoperatorsweresuppliedwithair-suppliedhoodsinsidethetankwhilecleaningwelds.
Thegrindingoperationinvolvedusinganairpoweredwirerotatingbrushaswellasabay-flexstonegrindingwheelforbuffingandsmoothingwelds.Thistaskalsoremovedanti-splatterpaintfurthercontributingtothemixofdustsgeneratedintheprocess.Grindandcleanoperationstook8to9hourstocompleteonthelargebreakers.
Aftergrindandclean,breakerswereagainwipeddownwithdegreasersinpreparationforpaintingandtheapplicationofundercoating.Thesepaintscontainedisocyanatesand/orepoxy.DegreaserswereeitherTCEorToluene.
Specific Operations:
Welding air-blast tank:Mildsteelweldingofinsideseamsusingstickelectrodesbyaninsidewelderwhileoutsideseamswerearcweldedwithairedcarbonrodsbyoutsidewelder.Endflangeswereweldedwithsubmergedweldingusingblackgranulatedflux.
Stainless Steel Tanks:Allflanges(solidstainless)andseamswereweldedwithstainlesssteelstickelectrodesandoutsideseamsarcairedwithcarbon rod electrodes to prepare the seam for full penetrationtotheinsideweld.Insideseamswerestainlessstickwelded.Buttheshellwasmadeofmildsteelandstickweldedaccordingly.
102” and FGK Breakers: Outsideseamsweresubmergedarcweldedusingblackgranulatedflux.Insideseamsandpartswerestickrodwelded.All
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Sameasabove.
Exposuretoionizingradiation(fromx-rays)aknowncarcinogen.
Sameasabove.
InhalationandexposuretoMWFcontainingcoolantsandcuttingoils.Ingredientslikelyincludebiocidescontainingarsenic.
Inhalationoffineresindusts(epoxyorpolyestervinyltolueneaswellasfibreglassdust.
JHSC: 4/5/79: re: smoke hazard spot welding: “Complaints from operators indicate minor to severe discomfort.Onemanoutofworkwithsuspectedlaryngealcancerhasotheroperatorsconcerned.”JHSC: 3/25/80: fume hazard spot welding: “StrangelyenoughnotabletogetMSDSonoilusedaspreservativeonsteel.LawsayswecandemandMSDS.Sincesupplierclaimstheydon’tknowoilused,wesimplycan’tacceptthat,sinceweknowcompanieshavedisposedofchemicalssuchasPCBs.Wecan’triskthatthisanti-rustpreparationcouldcontainverydangerousproducts.”
threesizesofbreakerswerepreppedwithdegreasersandanti-splatterpaintbyhand.TheFGKswerestickweldedinsideandoutside.
Evidure torch (TIG) and aluminum welding (MIG): Asbestosblanketswereusedtocoversomejobstoprolongcoolingandpreventdamagetothematerialsduringweldingoperations.Asbestoscurtainswerehungaroundtheperimeteroftheseweldingoperations.
Afterwelding,alltanksweregritblasted,x-rayed,cleanedandgrinded,horizontallymachined,subjectedtohydrostatictesting,thenpainted/coatedandshippedtoSwitchGearforassembly.
Machining process: BertramVerticalBoringMillusedformachiningweldprepsandtrepanningplatesforbreakerstoaccommodategaskets.Whitecoolant(MWF)appliedwithasquirtbottleorblackoilasacuttingfluidwerebothusedresultinginMWFmistsandvapoursduringthemachiningprocessduetohighheatwhichcausedthefluidstovapourizeandmist.
Machine’stables,slotsandwayswerecleanedwithkerosene,naphtha,soakedragsbybarehandandcompressedairwasusedtoblowoffdust.
Radial Drilling Process—Angleiron3/8to5/8thickweredrilled,tapped,andspot-faced.Platesteel11/4thickforbreakerdomes28”to54”weredrilled.Greenlayoutpaintusedwithnaphthagasasdegreaser;whiteleadpastemixedwithblackoilusedfortappingandwhiteMWF(lacedwithbiocidewafers)usedfordrilling.Thisprocessgeneratedvapour and mist from all three chemicals because of heatgeneratedduringdrilling.
Horizontal Boring Mill: Machinedfibreglassinterruptertubeswerebored,tapped,drilledandspot-faced,generatinglargeamountsoffibreglassandresindusts.Workerswereprovidedwithpaperpants and shirts, but not adequate respiratory protection.AirBlasttankpartswerealsomachinedusingblackmachiningoilfromasquirtbottlewhichcreatedgreatamountsoffumes--especiallywhen
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Inhalationoffinemetaldustsandresingritsfromgrindingwheels.
Anti rust residues: Inspector notes that in Bay 68 –spotweldingarea--weldedpartshaveresiduesofrustpreventativesandthatitsevapourationduringweldingiscausingeyeandupperrespiratoryirritationatlevelsbelowtheTLVof5mg/m³.“Nomechanicalexhaust.Thefirmstateditwasnotrequired.Theyhavesuppliedabenchfantoblowthesmokeaway…Operatorstatedhisthroatissore.”(MOL:Building14,March17,1981).
Itwasnotedthat:“Orderissuedtowearrespiratoruntiltheinspector’svisit.”
JHSC: 2/12/80: re: fume hazard: “Steel supplier does notknowwhatthetemporaryoilcoatingconsistsofso(JL)willtrytogetsampleofoilforanalysis.Goodluck(JL).
Sameasabove.
machiningontheinsideofthetank.Blackoilmixedwithkerosenewasusedtopolishsurfacesusingdifferentgradesofemerypaper.Whitecoolantwithbiocidewasalsoused.
Thecleanupofthe(horizontalboringmill)machinewasdonewithkeroseneandacompressedairguncausingdustandvapourstobecomeairborneandmigratetootherareas.Operatorsusedoilsquirtcansforvelocitywhenmachiningvariouspartsforallmetalbreakers.
Thisgeneratedlargeamountsoffibreglassdustcontainingvariousresins(curedanduncured).
Grind and Clean Operation: Workersusedbay-flexbuffers,stonegrinders,beltsandersandvibratorsthatwereair-poweredtoremoveandsmoothweld“grapes”,weldsplatter,andanti-splatterpaint.The102”andFGKtankswererotatedwhilebeinggroundand cleaned simultaneously by both inside and outsideworkers.Theseoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmetaldustsandweldingby-products.
102”tankswererotatedonlargerollerswhileFGKswererotatedbycraneforcleanandgrind.Insidegrindersweresuppliedwithairsupplyhoodsandwererequiredtosweepdustanddebrisoutofthemanholeopeningontotheshopfloor.
Grit Blasting Operations: Gritblastingtookplaceinenclosedboothsthatairpropelledalloypellets.Whilethesewereenclosed,theworkerhadtoperiodicallycleanthedustholdingchambers.Whentheleverswereopenedlargeamountsofdustswouldbereleasedintotheenvironment.Workersdescribedthisasacontinuouslydustyjobwithnorespiratoryprotectionorlocalexhaustventilation.
Somegritblastoperationsweredonebyworkersusingahand-heldblastingnozzleandwearingprotectiveclothingincludinganair-suppliedhoodwithquestionableairquality.Gritswouldhavetoberetrievedforre-usewhichinvolvedshovelingoutthealloypellets,generatinglargeamountsofdustduringrecapture.
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Inhalationandabsorptionofpaintparticulatesandvapourscontainingisocyanates,epoxy,andvarioussolventsandthinners.
Sameasabovewithregardtoinhalationofweldingfumes.Thesewerehighvolumeoperationsthatgeneratedlargeamountsoffumesandgaseswithoutadequateexhaustventilationorprotectiveequipment.Thereforeriskofinhalationveryhigh.
Sameasaboveaswellaslargeamountsofweldingdustssettledonfloorsandsurfaces.
Thisoperationutilizeda‘wheelabrator’ontwoshiftsusingsmallalloypelletspropelledbyasteelimpeller.
Therewasabuildupofblackdustthatwasreleasedfromtherapperwithleversintoasteeltotebox.Workersdescribedthisoperationasadry,dustyanddirtyjobwithlotsofexposuretothedust.
Smallgritblasterwasusedon3shiftsusinglargepellets.Theseoperatorsworeairsuppliedhoods.
Paint Booth Operation:Boothwasequippedwithawatercapturesystem.Allsteelproductsweredegreasedwithvariousthinnersthenprimedwith‘redprimer’.Thesewereappliedbyhandandbrushedorsprayed.
Structural Steel - Building #14 South
General Description: ThatportionofBldg.14southofthemainaislecontainedverylargeboringandmillingmachines,lathes,metalcuttingandweldingoperations.Thiswasaveryintensiveoperationinvolvinglargevolumesofproduct.
Welding Operations:
Thewestsideandsouthendofthebuildinghousedmajorweldingoperations.Thiswasanareaapproximately600feetlongfromtheaisletotheendofbldg.#14.Duringthe1980sthisdepartmentalsooperatedaverylarge‘burner’usedtocutlargeplatesofstructuralsteelintovariouspatterns.ThisburneralsoinBldg.34.Weldingoperationswereintensive,running3,sometimes4,12-hourshifts.Weldingtookplaceon4’x4’x6”thickweldingtableswhosesurfacewasgratedsoweldingwastecouldfallthrough.ThesetablesweresupportedbyHframesabout18”offthefloor.
Therewasalsoalargertableavailableatthesouthendofbuilding#14.It’simportanttonotethatweldersregularlygroundthesurfaceofthesetablestoremoveweldspatterand'grapes'sothatnewmaterialslaidtrue.
Retireesreportedmorethanonehundredofthesetablesusedbyweldersinthisarea,withfrom30to
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ElectricweldinginvolvesveryhighamperagesandproduceveryhighEMFintheELFfrequencyranges.IARChasclassifiedEMFsasaprobablehumancarcinogen.
Inhalationofasbestosfibresverylikelygiventhefriableconditionsofasbestoscurtainsandmannerinwhichasbestosblanketswereusedbytheworkers.
Inhalationofsolventfumeswasroutineandchronic.Thesevapoursandfumesfromsolventswereubiquitous.
SameasabovewithrespecttoinhalationandabsorptionofMWFduringmachiningoperations.
50+weldersweldingatonetime.Suchheavyweldingintheareaproducedverylargeamountsofweldingfumes:“theweldingfumesweresodensethatsometimesyoucouldn’tseeyourworkmateatthenexttable”Retiree.
Welding fumes and dusts: Verylargeamountsofweldingdebrisanddustwouldbuildupundereachtable.Thisdustwouldbecomeairborneduringcleaninganddrysweeping,aswellasfromtrafficmovementfromvehiclesandemployees.
Electro-magnetic fields (EMFs): Agreatdealoftheweldingwaselectricarcwelding.Theweldingmachines could operate at 600 amperes and producedverystrongmagneticfields.Weldersworkedincloseproximitytotheseweldingunitswhileothersnearbyworkedinby-standerpositionstothesefields.
Asbestos:Asbestoscurtainswerehungaroundtheentireweldingareaofabout550feet.Theseasbestoscurtainswereinfriableconditionduetotheamountofwearandtearandabrasionfromproductmovement.Asbestosblanketswerealsousedtocoverproductthatwastobewelded--eithertoprotecttheproductorkeepitwarmduringtheweldingprocess.Forexample,largeshaftswereheatedtobetween300and500degreeFinanelectricovenandthencoveredwithathickblanketofasbestostokeepthetemperatureconsistentduringwelding.Welderwouldlayontopofanasbestosblanketthatwasinfriablecondition.Whentheyweredone,thefrontoftheirclothingwouldhaveacoatingofasbestosfibres.
Solvent vapour and fumes: Inpreparationforweldingormachiningtheselargesteelplatesweretypicallycoatedwithresiduesofcuttingoils/degreasers/rustinhibitors.
Machining Operations:Machiningoperationswerelocatedalongthelengthoftheeasternpartofthebuilding.Itcontainedseverallargeverticalandhorizontalboringmachines,millingmachines,radialdrills,grindersandlathes.Thisdepartmentalsoused
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Sameasabovere:inhalationofMWF
JHSC: 6/1/78: re: scorched fumes: “Safety Committeewascalledre:averybadworkingcondition,highambienttemperaturesduetoatmosphericconditionsandlargerthanusualshaftinoven,whichinfactwastoolargefortheunitandasaresultwascausingaterrificheatlossintotheworkarea.Alsotheasbestosclothstillbeingusedtocovertheovenduringheatingwasemittingascorchingstenchthatrangedoverhalfthebuilding.”
JHSC: 2/26/80: re: air pollution problem: Sincefire,doorsbetween#14and#16havebeenkeptclosedbecauseofTCEproblems;anewsituationhasarisenin#14assmokeandfumesfromweldingnowbeingtrappedinNorthpartofbldg.Ceilingventswillnotsolveproblem.
JHSC: 11/28/83: re: pigeon droppings: “Complaint receivedonpigeondroppingsoninspectiontable,lunchtable,andstoredsteelarea.”
a40’boringmachine.Machiningoperationsinvolvedlargevolumesandsizesofproduct.
Metal Working Fluids (MWF):AllmachiningoperationsinvolvedtheuseoflargequantitiesofMWFtoprotecttheequipment.MWFweredrawnfrom tanks and sprayed on metals surfaces and cuttingblades.Theseoperationsgeneratedlargeamountsofmists,vapoursandfumes.Workersdescribed“largecloudsofbluesmokerisingandhangingintheatmosphere.”Theuseof“Steel-Kut”machiningoilwasassociatedwithmanyemployeecomplaintsof:dermatitis,breathingproblems,skinrashes/burns.Itwasthoughttocontainmineraloil,sulphur,andchlorine.(TypesofMWF:mineraloil,watersoluble,semi-synthetic,synthetic,additivessuchassulfurandbiocidescontainingarsenic).
WD-40wasappliedwithasquirtbottletothehighspeedtoolbitswhenturningonthe25’verticalboringmill,
Solvents used to clean: Tableswerecleanedwithvarioussolvents,whichincludedragssoakedin:MIK,1500thinner,toluene,roylene,naphtha,andalcohol.
Metal Grit Dusts:Workersdescribeexcessivedustbuilduponfloorsandsurfacesasaresultofmachining/grinding.
Compressed Air:participantsnotedthatcompressedairwasuseduniversallytocleandustsoffsurfacesandclothing.Thispracticecontinuedtobeusedduringthelate2000s.
Balconies on 2nd and 3rd floors: Workers performingworkonthebalconieslocatedabovetheseoperationsonthegroundfloorweresubjectedtoallthefumes,dusts,vaporsgeneratedonthegroundfloor.Theoperationsonthebalconiesonthe2ndand3rdfloorswereengagedinwindingofsmallcoils,assemblyofswitchesandmagneticswitches.
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BUILDING: #16 DEPARTMENT: SWITCH GEAR
General Description General Working Conditions Production processes/MachinesAssembling Breakers Disassembling/Refurbishing old or damaged BreakersMetal Clad assemblySulphur Pot AreaOther componentsMagna Blast BreakersMachining OperationExposure controls
Known Chemicals used or produced:
Aluminum,iron,copper,brass,magnesium,stainlesssteel,particlesanddustAsbestosandFiberglassdustandfibersBrominatedfireretardantsEpoxyresinsanddust(Glyptol)MWFs(Cimcool.TimSol,SteelKut,Roco,DascoTap,ChromaTap,Kerosene)OzonePCBsSolvents (TCE, Royalene, Acetone, MEK, Toluene, Naptha GasSulphur, lead, tar,
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General Risk Exposures:Therewasaveryhighriskofinhalingandabsorbingvarioussolventsusedinthedegreasingandcleaningtasks.Notonlywerefumesintensefromthedegreasingtanksinthisareaandelsewherebutalsoworkerswereapplyingdegreasersbybarehandwithragsoverlargesurfaceareas.Someofthesecontaincontainedthecontaminantbenzene.
MWFandcoolantmistweregeneratedduringmachiningoperationswithoperatorsclothingsoakedwiththesefluids.Allthreeroutesofentrywereinvolved:inhalation,absorptionandingestionsinceworkersroutinelyateanddrankattheirworkstations.
Skinabsorptionandinhalationofsolventshighlylikely.
Becausethesemigratingfumescameincontactwithweldingoperations,therewasahighriskofinhalingphosgenegas.
Theuseofglyptolpaintalsogeneratedvapoursfromthevolatilescontainedinthepaints.Thesewerereadilyinhaledandworkersfrequentlycomplainedaboutthefumesparticularlywherethepaintwasbeingsprayed.
SincethisoperationalsoinvolvedfillingbreakersandtransformerswithlargeamountsofthePCBoiltherewasahighriskofinhalingandabsorbingthistoxinduringfillingandemptyingprocedures.PCBspillswouldinvolvecleanupaswellasresiduesleftbehind.
Fittersarealsoexposedtoinhalabledustsfromgrindinganddeburringoperations.Workerswouldinhalemetalandgritandresindustsduringtheseoperations.Thesewereperformedwithoutrespiratoryprotectionorlocalexhaustventilations.
Machiningoperationswouldinvolvethehighriskofinhalationandabsorptionofcoolantscontainingarsenicandcuttingoils.Soakedclothingaswellassymptomsofadverseskinreactionsandfoulodoursevidencedthis.
General Description: SwitchGearDepartmentwaslocatedinBuilding16northofthemainaislebetweenBuildings18and14.Therewerenowallsbetweenthesethreebuilding.Itwasentirelyopen.Atitspeak,employeesnumberedbetween100and150employeeswith3to4shifts.Thiswasanintenseproduction,highvolumeoperationconditionedbythepiece-ratesystem.
Theproductionprocessesconsistedoftheassemblyandfittingofverylargecircuitbreakers,limitamps,metalclads,rectifiers,exciters,GPCrelaysaswellasdrivesystems.
Theassemblyoperation,carriedoutbyassemblersandfitters,involvedmachiningandmillinginternalelectricalandmechanicalpartsbothmetalandfibreglass,aswellasdrilling.Assemblyalsoinvolvedvarioustypesofweldingoperationsincludingaluminum and stainless steel, arc MIG and TIG welding.Grindingandcleaningofweldswerealsocarriedoutinvolvinggrindingandbuffingmachines.Thesenumerousmachiningoperationsrequiredtheuseofvariousmetalworkingfluidscontainingarsenicbiocideagents.
Weldingoperationinvolvedmetalpreparationwithsolvents,includingtrichloroethylene,acetone,naphthagas,MEK,toluene,amongothers.ThecentralareaofthebuildingwasequippedwithatankofRoyalene(TCE)degreaserthatmeasured8’x12’x6’andwasheated.
Breakerswerefirstpreppedwithprimersandglyptolpaints,thenfilledwithPCBdielectricoil,andtested,drained,adjusted,refilled,re-testeduntilthebreakerwasfullyfunctional.TheeastsideoftheshopcontainedthreetanksofPCBoils.
Thehighvoltagepotentialtest(usedforqualitycontrol)involvedtheapplicationofveryhighamperagebetween0and3,000amp.
General Working Conditions:Thiswasaverysmokyanddustyenvironmentwithverystrongodoursofsolvent,metalworkingfluidmistsandvapours,andheavyweldingfumesfromvariouswelding
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Therewasalsoahighriskofingestingthesecontaminantsbecauseworkersregularlyateandsmokedattheirworkstations.
Theriskoftheseexposureswashighgiventhevolumeofworkandproductuse,theclosecontactwiththecontaminants,thedirecthandlingandintricaciesoftheworktasksandfinallythelackofadequateexposurecontrols.
Riskofexposuretoveryhighmagneticfieldwasveryhighgiventheproximityandstrengthofthesemagneticfieldsbasedontheveryhighamperage.
Inhalationandabsorptionofcuttingoils,inhalationofsolventvapours,inhalationandabsorptionofPCBoilswasprevalent.
ExposuretoPCBswhiledrainingoldbreakertanks.WashdownofPCBresidueswithsolvents—TCE,toluene,MEK.EvaporationofPCBsenhancedduringhandwipedown.
JHSC: 11/16/78: re: Ozone from welding: “Ventilationisinusebutsituationstillverybad.Thereisaconglomerateoffumespresentinthebuildinganditisobviousthatabroadercontrolisonlyanswer.”JHSC:1/25/79: re: Ozone build-up: “No improvement inthisarea.Infact,problemseemstobemoreintense.Notonlythatmeninareafeelingchronicproblems from it but it seems to be much more
operations.Thelargenumbersofoperationsgoingonatthesametimecontributedgreatlytoveryhighconcentrationsofcontaminantmixtures.Theseoperationsalsoproducedgreatamountsofwelding,grinding,andmillingdusts.ThemachiningandmillingwithMWFproducedlargeamountsofvisiblebluesmoke.Workerssaidthattherewasalwaysabluehazeintheair.Housekeepingwaspooranddustandspillsaccumulatedintheworkenvironment.
Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationonlynaturalventilation,andnoadequatemake-upair,sothatatmosphereintheGEbuildingwasundernegativepressureresultingincontaminantsfromotherareasbedrawnintobuilding16(atthecentreoftheplantwhereceilingheightwasthehighest)whichexacerbatedthetoxicatmosphere.(SeeH&Smanagementmemoregardingthesenegativeairpressureconditions,aswellasMOLinspectionreports).
Eatingandsmokingattheworkstationwasroutineandpermittedbythemanagement.Thiswasaresultofaworkregimedefinedbythepiece-ratesystemwithitsindividualisticcultureandlackofsufficienteatingfacilities.
Detailed production processes:
Assembling Breakers: Breaker assembly involved several“fitters”whowouldcarryoutanumberoftaskstobuildacompletebreaker.Thebreakersvariedinsizefrom28”,36”,48”,54”,102”aswellasthelargerFGKbreaker.Completingthesewouldinvolveseveraldaystoaweek.Thesetaskswerecarriedoutwiththefitterinsidethebreakershell.Fitterswould:1. Degreasethebreakershellbyhandwithrags
soakedinTCE;2. Fit and install various parts that had to be
machinedorgroundtofit,includingthebushings,weldedstuds,andotherpartsspotweldedonthewalls—someofwhichweremadeofasbestosandweremachinedtofit;
3. Preparebreakersforpainting,whichinvolvedbuffingandhandwipingwithTCE;
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concentrated(asreportedbypeoplecomingintothearea).AskedHealthDept.tomakechecksonceagain.”
JHSC:2/15/79: re: Noxious fumes:“Areadingof6-16ppmofTCEinweldingarea.AlthoughwellbelowTLV,whenpresentinweldingitbecomesadifferentproblem.TeststhenmadeforHCLandTVAof5ppmwasexceededtoalargedegree.Readingwentoffscalecompletely.”
JHSC: 9/27/79: re: Noxious Fumes: “About three timesaweekthis(HCL)pollutantbecomesveryapparent.OnSept27,areadingof4.5-5ppmwasrecorded.ThisoriginatedfromTCEinacoldprocesstank.(DM)awelderinareaisonsickbenefitsafterathroatoperation.Hehascomplainedofrespiratoryproblemsforsomeperiod.Othersaresufferingdiscomfortaswell.Taskoperatorwillbetoldtokeeplidclosedtocontrolfumes.”
JHSC: 12/20/79: re: Asbestos dust: “Diesel poles usingasbestossheetsarebeinggroundandcut,ventilationistotallyinadequate.Newmaterialbeingslated from armature is also asbestos under another name.Althoughsaferinitsoriginalform,hazarddoesn’timprovewhencutorground.”
Inhalationofmetal,paintandresiduedustsfromgrindingandcleaningoperationsduringrefurbishing.Alsoexposuretovolatilesfrompaintfumes.
4. Paintingthebreakerswithepoxyglyptolpaintinside(gray)andoutside(green);
5. FillingthecompletedbreakerwithPCBoildispensedfromthePCBstoragetanks;
6. TestingthefilledBreakersatthe‘highpotential”testingareawhereaveryhighvoltagewasapplied--atupto3000amperes.Highmagneticfieldsareproducedduringtestingatextremevoltagesinthehighbayareaofthebuilding.(Notedduringdiscussionsthatthereseemedtobeahighdeathrateamongtesters);
7. Dependingontestresults,Breakerscouldbedrainedofoil,adjusted,refilledandretestedseveraltimesover.
Thisassemblyoperationproducedanumberofatmosphericcontaminants:weldingfumes,cuttingoil mists, solvent vapours, paint fumes, metal and gritdusts.By-standeremployeeswouldbeaffectedaswellasthefitterswhodirectlyhandledthesecontaminants.Aswell,PCBspillageduringdispensinganddrainingwouldalsocontributetothemixtureofcontaminants.PCBleakagealsooccurredduringthetestingphase.AirblastbreakerswerefilledwithSF-6gasasaninsulatorinthistypeofbreaker.
Disassembling and refurbishing old or damaged Breakers: ThisinvolveddrainingusedPCBoilsfromthetanks,whichexposedworkerstospillageaswellashandlingleakytanks.Oncedrained,electricalandmechanicalcomponentsweredisassembledandsurfaceswerehandwipedwithTCEsoakedragsproducinglargeamountsofsolventvapours.Tanksweregroundandbuffed,preppedwithTCE,andpaintedwithglyptolpriortorefitting.Tankswouldalsohavetobehydrostaticallytestedforleakage.
Metal Clad assembly: Thisinvolvedfittersassemblingwhatwereactuallymetalshedsusedtoholdelectricalequipment.Thesewerepreparedinbuilding14andthenequippedwithhingesandothercomponentsthathadtobeassembled.Fitterswouldperformdrilling,grindingandmachiningtofitpartstogether.
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Inhalationofsulphur,leadandtarfumeswashighgiventhestateofthechemicals,theconfinedareatoworkinandthedirecthandlingofmaterials.
MOL Report May 28, 1982. Order 0123, Bay 327, Bldg. 16re:pouringleadsulphurwithoutexhaust;also Order 0126 re: silver solder booth, inadequate ventilation.
Inhalationoffibreglassandresindustsaswellasparticulatefrommaterialscontainingbrominatedfireretardantswasverylikelyduringthisoperation.
Inhalationofasbestosfibreslikelyduringthisoperationsinceworkershadtofitandworkasbestosbafflesinplace.
Exposuretoasbestosdustlikelyinhaledgivendirectcontact.
InhalationandexposuretoMWFverylikelygiventheamountoffluidsusedduringthesemachiningoperations.
Workersreportthatthereweredensecloudsofbluishsmokeovertheseoperationsaswellasmistssurroundingthegeneralatmosphere.
JHSC: 2/12/80: re: Noxious fumes: “Itwasnotedbyall present that heavy fumes reached the aluminum weldingareaabout3minutesafterVPItankatsouthendwasopened,eventhoughtankwascoldandhadnoloadinitforsometime.Wearehopingthatmake-upairventswillreducethenegativepressureandperhapsbettercontrolofairmovementinbldg.”
JHSC: 3/25/80: re: Noxious fumes: “Despitetwomake-upairsystemsinplacetoreducenegativepressurefactor,problemfumesstilloccurring.(e.g.,complaintsofozoneat3ppmvs.TLVof1ppminnorthendweldingarea).”
JHSC: 4/8/80: re: Noxious fumes: “Checks as requirednotbeingdoneonregularbasis.(Unionrep)asksthatmorepeopleonfloorbetrainedtotake
Sulphur Pot Area: This area included the use of hot openpotsofsulphur,leadandtarwithnoexhaustventilation.Amixtureoflead,sulphurandtarwereappliedtosealjointstopreventleakage.Thesemixtureswerecontainedinaheatedliquidstateandappliedtothemetalcladjoints.Moltenleadwashand ladled onto the part, then sulphur, and then itwascoveredwithtar.Workersindicatethatverystrongpungentodoursemanatedfromthevariouspotsduringapplication.Localexhaustwasintroducedmuchlaterinthedepartment’shistory.
Other components: Connectingmetalcladstobreakersalsoinvolvedfibreglasstubingusedasinsulatorsthatweresecuredoverbusbarsthentapedwithblackurethanetape,bolted,sealedwithductsealputty,coveredwithfibreglasstapeandpaintedwithafireretardantpaint.Thesefiberglassinsulatorswerefirsttapedwithbrowninsulation,thentapedwithblackurethaneandfinallysealedwithductsealcontainingasbestosandhasaputty-likeconsistency.Thiswasagaintapedoverandpaintedwithabrownfireretardantpaintthatcameingallontubes.MSDSlikelyabrominatedfireretardant.Theoutsideofthemetalcladwasinsulatedwithfibreglass.
Otherproductssuchasrectifiers,exciterswereassembledutilizingaluminumarcweldingproducinghighlevelsofozonegasaswellasothermetalandchemicalby-productsassociatedwithaluminumweldingoperations.Preparationforaluminumweldingincludedtheuseofnaphthagas.
Magna Blast Breakers: These mechanical breakers arespring-loaded,motor-drivenbreakersreferredtoaselectricalimpactdrivers.Thebearingarespringloadedand8”x11”bafflesmadeofmachinedasbestos,thengluedandboltedonbyfitters.Thisdisturbedtheasbestosfibres,whichweredispersedinthegeneralatmosphere.
Machining Operation: Themachiningoperationwasquiteextensive,employingapproximately40to50workersandutilizing35largeboring,milling,drilling,andlathingmachines,inadditiontomanysmallerpiecesofmachiningequipment.
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(air)samples.(Name)loggedreadingsof3ppm,butneglectedtowarnworkersofdangerouslevels.”
JHSC: 11/28/83: re: Xylol complaint: “ Xylol fumes made(worker)dizzyandgavehimaheadachewhilewashinghistoolsinatankofxylol.Jobisdonefor15to20minutes,1-2timesperweek.”
JHSC: 10/21/86: re: Asbestos: “Workers not been includedonassessmentforasbestosinthisarea.They should be instructed on proper procedures forhandlingasbestosandincludedinthecontrolprogram.”
MOL:06/27/76:OzoneTLVexceededduringaluminumwelding.
MOL:2/13/78: Ozoneexposureduringweldingoperationinbldgs.16and30.Workercomplaintsirritatedupperrespiratorytractandeyes.MOL:03/1/79: HydrogenChlorideGashigherthantheTLVduringMIG/argongasweldingincombinationwithTCEdegreaservapoursfromtank.EmployerrefusedtoreplicateconditionsforMOLtests.
MOL:03/17/79: HCLconcentrationMOLtestunrepresentative.
MOL:03/17/81:ToolRoom-tungstencarbidedustescapingduringcarballoytoolgrinding.Dustaccumulationhigh.
MOL:04/2/81: carballoygrindingdustrevisited.Highweldingfumes.
MOL:05/20/82;05/28/82;06/2/82: Lead/sulphur/chlorinepouringoperation.Inspectorindicatedthatworkershowsallsymptomsofoverexposure.Issuesstopworkorder.MOL:05/8/86: Order for lead assessment under designatedsubstanceregulationforlead.
Verylargemotorsbuiltinbldgs.8and10weremachinedwithaMazakmillingmachineinbldg.16.ImportanttonoteisthattheMazakmachine,locatedinBuilding16,wasoperatedbyBuilding8/10employees.
Machiningalsoincludedlargeamountsoftappingoflargemachinedboltsaswellasamajorcleaningandgrindingoperationutilizinglargegritblaster,grinding,deburringandpolishingmachines.Thisoperationmilled, bored, drilled and turned steel, cast iron, copper,aluminum,brass,magnesium,stainlesssteel,andfibreglassstructures.
Inthelattercase,workerswouldmill,boreanddrilllargefibreglasstubes3’x4’x12”dia.1/4”thick.Thisoperationgeneratedlargeamountsofresin/fibreglassdustthatworkerscomplainedaboutbecauseitcauseddermatitisandskinirritations.
Whenmachiningandrefurbishingused102”breakers,workerswouldencounterasbestosinsulationoriginallyusedintheolderbreakers.Themachiningprocesswouldgeneratesignificantamountsofasbestosdustduringtherefurbishingoperation.Allmachiningoperations,includingtapping,usedlargeamountsofMWFthatwerebothautomaticallyormanuallyappliedbytheoperators.MWFincluded:TrimSol,Cimcool,BlackOil(containingsulphur compounds), Steel Kut, Roca, kerosene, and bothDascoandchromaTapfortapping.Thiswasaveryhighvolumeareathatgeneratedlargeamountsofsolventvapours,MWFmistsandsmokeaswellasdustconsistingofmetal,fibreglass,andgritandresindustsfromalloperations.MWFwererecycled,andmanytimesthefluidswouldbecomebiologicallycontaminated.
AluminumWeldinginBay319usedveryhighamperagesexposingworkerstoveryhighEMFs.Also,phosgenegasfrommigrationofTCE.
MOCA: ExposedtoMOCAproducedandfitted.
Exposure controls: Upuntilthe1980’stherewaslittleornolocalexhaustventilationandnoadequaterespiratoryprotectionprovidedtothesemachine
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MOL:11/27/89: MWF/coolant mist clouds heavily emittedduringmachining;orderedtocleanupthepaintshop,whichshowedpoorhousekeeping.
workers.Itwascommonpracticeforworkerstoeat,smokeanddrinkattheirwork-stations.
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BUILDING #16A TRANSPORTATION/DIESEL EQUIPMENT
General DescriptionGeneral Work ConditionsProduction Areas
Diesel Production:
Diesel ControlCircuit BoardsResistersMachining AreaWelding AreasWinding AreaAssembling AreaEpoxy Dipping and BakingPainting OperationDiesel Offices
Diesel Rebuilding:
Rebuilding CoilsRe-machiningAssembling Rotors and StatorsTestingPainting
Known Chemicals used or produced: Aluminum,iron,copper,brass,magnesium,stainlesssteel,particlesanddustAsbestosandFiberglassdustandfibersBrominatedfireretardantsEpoxyresinsanddust(Glyptol)MWFs(Cimcook.TimSol,SteelKut,Roco,DascoTap,ChromaTap,Kerosene)ThermaldecompositionOzonePCBsSolvents: TCE, Royalene, Acetone, MEK, Toluene, Naphtha GasSulphurLeadtar
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Negative Air Pressure Impact on Exposures: Due tonegativepressureinthebuildingcomplex,contaminantsfromotherareasandoperationsweredrawnintothisarea.ThiswasnotedbytheGESafetyUnitmanagementinmemosdated:
October2,1979fromA.K.Faggetter,Hygienist;andOctober29,1979fromP.J.Kyselka,ManagerPlantFacilitiesSection.
ThiswasparticularlytrueforthemigrationofTCEvapourmakingcontactwiththealuminumweldingoperationinbldg.16A.
Inhalationofphosgenegasaswellasheavyozoneexposures.Workerreportedsymptomsofnosebleedsandirritatedeyes,noseandthroatindicatingoverexposuretobothcontaminants
General Description: Thisdepartmentbuiltlargemotorsandgeneratorsfortransportationvehicles,miningequipmentsuchashoistelevators,crushingequipmentetc.Thisincludedvariouscontroldevicesandcircuitrytocontrolthefunctioningofthismachinery.Thedepartmentwaslocatedbetweentheinductionmotorsandstructuralsteeldepartmentandsouthoftheswitchgearareas(bldg16).
Open to adjacent departments: Thesebuildingwerenotseparatedbywallsandessentiallysharedthesameairspace.Workin16Ainvolvedseveraloperationsthatincluded:assemblyofmotors,buildingcircuitboardsandwiringconfigurationsforcontrols,producingthevariouspartsformotors.Theseprocessesincludedmachining,drilling,grinding,cleaning,andvarioustypesofwelding.Thisoperationinvolvedtheuseofboringandmillingmachines,lathes,radialdrills,spindledrills,gritblastingunits,burringboothsandwindingmachines.Theseprocessesusedvariouschemicalsincluding:solventsanddegreasersincludingTCE,toluene,MEK,acetone,andnaphthagas;avarietyofMWF,epoxyresinsandcatalysts,asbestos,fibreglass,moca,andpaints.
Thelargemotorsdepartmentemployedapproximately200to250workerson3shifts,mostlyondayshift.Thiswasahighvolumeproductionoperationthatran24/7.Allchemicalswereusedroutinelyanddirectly,andinlargequantities.
General Work Conditions:
Negative Air Pressure:Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandlittle if any make up air.Asaresult,theentireareawasunder negative pressure and majorbuild-upofheat.Accordingtoaworker:”Itwasaterriblyhotbuilding.”Consequently,crosscontaminationoccurredregularlywithcontaminants from other areas drawn into the area. The use of largeoscillatingfanstodealwithhightemperatures,furtherdisturbedanddistributedcontaminants.Theatmospherewasverysmoky,withaconstantbluishhazeovervariousworkareas.Thiswasparticularlytrueinareaswithweldingfumes,MWFmists,and
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InhalationofMOCAvapoursanddustsduringmixingandmoldingoperationswashighsincethiswaswithoutanycontrolsorrespiratoryprotection.TheMOCAwasmanuallymixedandpouredintomolds.Vapourduringthemixingandcuringprocesswouldexposeworkerstotheriskofinhalation.Furtherinhalationandskinabsorptionwouldoccurduringtheprocessoffiling,sandingandcuttingthecuredresin.
Workerswereexposeddailytolargeamountsofasbestosfibersanddustwithnopersonalprotection.
JHSC: 2/21/83: re: fumes in varnish area: “Complaints of fume problem since air replacement bags(forventilationsystem)outofcommission.”
JHSC: 8/28/85: re: varnish spray: “Crane operators concernedaboutvarnishspraywhilestatorssuspendedfromcrane.”
Chemical names and/or MSDS needed of machine fluids,cuttingoils,varnishes,degreasers,aswellascompositionofweldingfumes.
grindingoperations.Housekeepingwasverypooranddustbuild-upwasveryhigh.Personnelintheofficelocatedintheeasternareaoftheplantwouldneed to clean their desks and other surfaces of settledsootanddustseachmorningandafterlunch.
Workersalsosmokedandatelunchatworkstationsandwashingfacilitieswerenoteasilyaccessible.
Production Areas:
Diesel Control: This area made control mechanisms andswitchboards,circuitcards,rectifiers,reversersandresistersfordieselelectricmotors.Thisworkinvolvedanextensiveuseofepoxy resins and catalyst identified as MOCA in hand buckets that weremixedandappliedbyhandintomolds,whichwerethenplacedinVPItankstoensureuniformcoverageforapproximately2hours.TheseMOCAmoldswerethenbakedinovens.
Circuitboardswerealsoformedusingasbestos fiber and concrete,aswellasepoxyresins.Thesewerealsoplacedinovensforcuringandhardening.
MOCA,asyntheticchemicalusedtomakeurethaneandacatalystforepoxyresin,wasalsomixedinmoldstoformpartsforhighforce/frictionoperations.Workerswouldsaw,grind,file,andshapethisproductinitssolidstatethuscausinglargeamountsofdust.MOCA (methylenebis[2-chloroanaline] ) is recognized as a group 1 carcinogen.
Resistersweremadebyassembling8tiersofasbestosboardstackedinalayeredgrid,framedbyheavygaugesteeldividers,containedina2’x2’frame.Coppercoilswereplacedbetweentheasbestosboards(boardsservedasinsulators).Workerswereindirectcontactwithasbestosandotherbi-productswhengrindingandfittingtheseboards.Thecompletedresisterswerethensoakedinlinseedoilandbaked.
Machining Area: Themachiningareautilized2largehorizontalboringmachines,1largeverticalboringmachine,largeradialdrills,millingmachinesandlathes.Large2”thickcastironframesaswellasplatesteelweremachined,milled,boredanddrilled
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Weldersexposeddermallytolargeamountsofmachinefluids.Whileprotectedfromweldingfumesbypersonalexhaustventilation,capturedfumeswereventedintotheworkspace,puttingotherworkersatrisk.Duetocontinualfrictionandfrayingofasbestoscurtainsandblankets,workerswereexposedtosignificantamountsofasbestosdustandfiber.Insunlight,theairappearedtobefilledwithsnowflake-likeparticles.
Ozonegasisclassifiedascarcinogenicandalsocausesanarcoticeffectanddamagetothemucusmembraneofeyes,earsandthroat.Manycomplaintsofeyeandthroatirritations.EMFsclassifiedascarcinogenicandalsoanendocrinedisrupterandcanaffectcentralnervoussystem.
Negativepressurein16Aaredrawingfumesinfromlongdistancesinotherdepartments.IncontactwithweldingoperationsTCEproducesphosgenegasthatworkersareexposedto.SeeMgt.memosdate:October29,1979fromP.J.Kyselkaregardingdegreaserfumesandnegativepressure;October2,1979forA.K.FaggetterregardingheavyconcentrationofTCEescapingandtheformationofHCLgas.
JHSC: 1/22/81: re: aluminum welding:“airtestingshows2ppmand3ppmofTCEatdoorwayofdegreaser.”
Workerswereathighriskofinhalingepoxyfumesduringdippingandbakingoperations.Workers
onlargeboringandmillingmachines,lathesanddrills.ThemachiningoperationutilizedlargeamountofMWFthatwassprayedonbothmanuallyandautomatically.
MachininggeneratedlargeamountsofMWFmistsandbluishsmokeaswellaslargeamountsofmetalparticulateintheformofdusts.Machiningalsoinvolvedtapping,deburring,grinding,buffingofmachinedproductsproducingmoregritandmetalduststhatwerecontaminatedwithepoxyresinsanddegreasingandMWFresidues.
Welding Area:Theweldingareawaslocatenexttothemachiningareaandwassurroundedbyasbestoscurtains,whichwereinfriablecondition.Metalstobeweldedweredegreasedbyover-headcranesdippingthemetalsina12’x12’degreasingtankcontainingRoyalene(TCE).ThetankwasnotcoveredandthedegreaserproducedlargeamountsofTCEvapour.InadditiontoTCEvapours,theairwasfilledwithvariousweldingfumesanddusts.Negativepressurepromoteslongdistancemigrationofvapoursandothercontaminantstootherdepartments.
Aluminum Welding Area 16A, Bay 319: The aluminumweldingareaemployed8to10weldersinvolvedinelectricarcMIG/TIGweldingonvariousaluminumalloysheetspretreatedwithxylenedegreaser.Thiswasahighproductionareaproducinglargeamountsofaluminumfumesaswellasothermetalalloys,ozonegas,andphosgeneasaresultoftheultravioletlightcomingincontactwithsolventvapours from nearby TCE tanks and/or similar degreaserresiduesonthemetalbeingwelded.Somealuminumalloysweldedalsocontainedberyllium.
NOTE: SeereportbyA.K.Faggetter,hygienistforGEdatedOct.2,1979documentingaheavyconcentrationofTCEescapingfromTCEtankandfindingitswayto16AaluminumweldinginBay319andproducinghydrogen-chloridegaswhenarcweldingcameincontactwithTCE.AlsominutesofmeetingOct.29,1979indicatingthatnegativeairpressureinbuildings16Aand18wasdrawinginTCEvapoursfromTCEtanks.
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describetheintensefumesandodorsduringtheseoperations.
Exposurestoresindustalsooccurredduringgrindingandcleaningoperations.
Inhalationofpaintandtoluenevapourswashighlylikely.Exposuretosignificantamountsoftolueneandepoxyresinduetothesizeofengineandmotorparts.
Inhalationofasbestosdustfromthecuttingofasbestossheetshighlylikely.
JHSC: 8/27/79 re: epoxy fumes: “Westillhavenowordre:thischemical.Todatewehavenoideawhatsubstancetotestfor…peopleworkinginareaarebecomingsickfromthefumes.”
JHSC: 9/27/79: re: epoxy fumes: “(Managementrep)wassupposedtogetinformationontheepoxyproductbeingusedbuthegothisbuildingsmixedup.Noreportasaresult.”
Inhalationofvapourfromsolventsandpaintslikely.
By-standerexposuretodieselfumeslikely.Severalworkersinanadjacentofficetakentohospitalwithdizzinesswerefoundtohavehighlevelsofcarbonmonoxideintheirblood.Workersthroughoutareaexposedtolargeamountsofdieselfumesfromidlingvehicles.JHSC: 2/17/81: re: mica dust:(needtoaddress)longstandingreportsofmicadust.JHSC: 3/28/83: Noise test: “Request for noise test in DieselGrindingarea.”
Winding area: Involved the manual and mechanical processofwindingofcopperwirecoatedwithepoxyandinsulatedwithasbestoscalled‘deltabeston’copperwire.Approximately50woundcoilswerepressed into appropriate shapes and dipped in 2 VPItankscontainingepoxy.Thedippedcoilswerehandsqueegeedandbakedintheoven.Followingthis,coilsweregroundandcleanedofanyexcesshardenedepoxyresin.Coilswerethenassembledintomotorsbyapproximately10assemblers.
Assembling area:Assemblersfirstinsertedasbestoswedgesintothecoilsandthenintothemotorframes.Asbestoswedgeshadtobefittedandpoundedintothecoilsandframes.Theselargepieceswerethenmovedbyhoistorcranetothe10’x10’heateddegreasertankanddippedwherevapourscondensedon frames and drip dried almost immediately due to hightemperatures.
Epoxy dipping and baking operation: Assembled Motorsweredippedbyahoistperson(forlessthan2tons)orcraneoperation(ifover2tons).
InthesamemannermotorsweredippedinVPItanksfor2hours,thenbroughttothebakingovensforcuring.Subsequently,workerswouldhandgrindexcesshardenedepoxyresin.Thebakeovenswereregularlymaintainedbygrindingandsweepinghardenedepoxyspillsfromovensurfaces.
Painting Operation: Thiswasanopen4’x4’areawhereoneperson,pershiftspray-paintedeachmotorwithepoxybasedblackenamelpaintoveragratecontainingflowingwater.Thepainterpretreatedthemotorsforpaintingbyhandwipingthemdownwithtoluene.
Diesel offices: Staffedby(mainlyfemale)employeeswhoconductedclericalandotherduties.Theairintheseofficeswasverydustyduetomigrationofdustsandfumesandgasesfromvariousoperationsmachining,grinding,welding,degreasingandpaintingconductedinthisdepartment.
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HeavyuseofMWFwouldhighlylikelyinvolvetheinhalationandabsorptionoffluidmistsandsmoke.Inhalationofweldingfumesandasbestosfibrelikely.Exposuretomagneticfieldslikelygivenstrengthoffieldsandproximitytothem.Alsoinhalationofozonegaslikely.JHSC: 8/24/82: re: toxic fumes: “Workers in test areaofdieselreportirritationfromVPItanks.(unionsafetyrepreportsfumesas‘extremelyharsh’.”MOL Reports:04/06/59:Grindingareanotlocallyexhausted.Highconcentrationofgritresinsdustsandmetaldusts.06/4/70: Workersufferingnosebleedsandupperrespiratoryirritationduringweldingaluminum—TCE,ozone,HCLgasexposurespossible.01/25/79:Aluminumweldingassemblyinvolving6welders.Workercomplaintseyeirritation.OzoneandHCLgasgeneratefromTCEvapourandarcweldingandozonegasproducingHCLgas.Ozonelevelsat0.1ppm;companyrecordsonHCL0to0.4in1978.06/26/81:Kozmafurnacenotadequatelyexhausted.Poorhousekeepingnoted.BansawcuttingMicageneratinglotsofmicadustinBays405,414.05/8/86: Order issued for lead, silica, mercury benzene,andisocyanateassessmentunderrespectivedesignatedsubstanceregulations.JHSC: 4/18/83: re: insulation fire: 200hpdestructiontesthadgrayfoaminsulationstuffedinducts.Whenarmatureburntout,insulationcaughtfire.Fumesfromfirewerehigh.
Rebuilding Diesel Motors:Background: Afterdisassemblyofuseddieselmotorsinbuilding12thepartsweremovedtobuilding16Aforrebuildingand/orreassembly.Theworkprocessesincluded:1. RebuildingtheCoils:Solidasbestossheets
werecutbysheersintostrips3’x1/2’usedtoprotectelectriccoilsfromexcessiveheat.Thestripsweredrivenbetweenenginecomponentsmanuallygeneratingsubstantialamountsofasbestosdust.
2. Re-machiningofoldcastingsbyweldingonadditionsteeltoattainpropersize.Thesepartswerethenre-boredusinglargeboringmachines,whichproducedlargeamountsofweldingfumes.Thesemachiningprocessesinvolvedtheextensiveuseofmachinefluidsandcuttingoils(Onlyidentifiedwascimcool).Weldingfumeswerecapturedbypersonalexhaustventilationwornbyweldersbutfumeswerethenblownoutintogeneralworkarea.
3. Statorsandframesassembledmanuallywithfinalclosuresweldedshutbywelderlyingonasbestosblankets.
4. TestingProcesses:Testingwentonthroughoutthere-manufacturingprocesstoensureproduct met performance standards for qualitycontrol.Motorswererunwithhighvoltagescalledheatruns.ThisproducedhighEMFsandOzonegas.
5. Paint Area: Finished motor sent to paint shop whereitwaswipeddownmanuallywithtolueneinpreparationforpainting.Afterthisdegreasing,engineswerespraypaintedwithglyptol,awaterproofpaintmanufacturedbyGE(PortUnionplant).
6. Afterfinalperformancetest,engineswerepreparedforshipping,thenloadedontotrucksortrainsparkedwithmotorsrunning.
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BUILDING: #17 (#21, #18N) DEPARTMENT: CARPENTRY
General DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsProduction Process:
Building Structures and Fiberglass Molds Cutting and DrillingFiberglass Operation
Known Chemicals used or produced:AcetoneBeeswaxBenzeneBPACabasylEpoxiesFibreglassFormaldehydeMEKPeroxideStyreneTCEThinners(e.g.,1500andPartal)TolueneVinyl ester resinsXylene
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FromthedescriptionsofthevariousworktasksperformedintheCarpentryShop,workerswerelikelyexposedtoanumberoftoxicchemicalsusedinproductionthroughinhalation,absorptionandingestion.1. Therewasagreatdealofinhalable/respirable
dustsgeneratedwithoutadequatelocalexhaustventilation.Thesedustscontainedvariouswoodparticlesthatwouldcontainformaldehydefromgluedwoodlaminates,epoxyandpolyesterresindustsfromsandingandgrindingfibreglassmolds.Alsoincluded,weremineraldustsfromcuttingasbestosandfibreglasssheetsandcloth.AsbestosandcompositeslikeTextalitewerefrequentlycutwithsawsandthendrilled,planedandshapedgeneratinglotsofdusts;
2. Therewasagreatdealofsolventandresinvapoursgeneratedfromlayingupepoxyandpolyesterresins,andcuringtheseinovens.Theuseofepoxyandisocyanatepaintsthatweresprayedorrolledonaddedtothevapourmix.Largesurfaceareasrequiredgreatamountofpaint/solvent,thusproducinglargeamountsofvapour/mists;
3. Thecuringovengeneratedagreatdealoffumesandvapourasaresultofheatingvariouscoatings.Thisprocessproducedanumberofthermaldecompositionby-productswhenepoxiesandpolyesterresinswereheatedincludingBPA,Formaldehyde,andbenzene;
4. AlsocontributingtotheseroutesofexposurewasalackoflocalexhaustventilationandPPE;
5. Housekeepingwaspooranddustsandothervolatileswerenotlookedafter;
6. WorkersusedagreatdealofsolventsforcleaninguppaintsandresinswhichweremostlyappliedbyhandwithragssoakedwithTCE,MEK,toluene,xylene,andacetone.ManyofthesearePAHs,containingbenzene.Workersalsohandledmold-releaseagents.
General Description of Carpenter Shop: The shopwasoriginallylocatedonthegroundfloorofBldg.21,andthenmovedtoBldg.18.ThenitwassubsequentlymovedtoaseparatebuildinglocatedatthenorthendoftheGEsiteanddesignatedasBldg.#17.Thebuildingwascladwithwhatwascalled‘ASBESTOSLUMBER’anicknameforasbestossheetsforexternalsiding.
Theshopwasanopenconceptbuildingapproximately200’X300’with20’ceilingheight.Thebuildingcontainedapproximately40–50non-metallic/woodworkingmachines,lathes,drillpresses,bandsaws,tablesaws,planers,joiners,sanders,andgrinders,etc.
Carpentryemployedapproximately80–90workerson3shifts.Themajorityofworkerswereondayshift,aswasmostoftheplant.
Theshopalsohada10’x10’ovenwithdoubledoorentryof5’x6’inheighttoaccommodateproductsthatneededtobeheatedorcured.Thecarpentryshopalsohadaspecializedareaforlayingupfibreglassmoldsorhousings.Somewerehuge,producedforthelargemotorsarea.Theareaalsohadasmalldegreasertank.
General Working Conditions: The shop had poor ventilation,withlittleornolocalexhaustventilationandwasalsoaffectedbypoorreplacementair,whichcreatednegativepressure.Workerswerenotprovidedwithadequateppeincludingrubberglovesforhandlingacetoneorrespiratorsforsprayingvariousresinsonfibreglass.Itwasn’tuntilthe1980swiththeenforcementofthenewOHSAthatprotectiveequipmentbegantobeprovided.Priorto1980sprotectiveequipmentwasnotmadeavailable.
Theatmosphereintheshopwasgenerallyverysmokyanddustyandheavilycontaminatedwithsolvents(acetone,MEK,xyleneandresinfumessuchasstyreneandformaldehyde).Housekeepingintheshopwaspoorwithlargeamountsofdustsfromsawing,sandingandgrindingoperationsonequipmentandfloors.
Building: 17 (21, 18 N) Department: Carpentry ShopProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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Thesewouldbeinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin;
7. Thechemical,styrene,wasusedextensivelyasacomponentofresinsandgel-coatsasathinner.Thiswasinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskin;
8. Mixingresinsbyhandalsoproducedagreatdealofchemicalvapourfromoffgassingresinsandcatalysts;
9. Workersateandsmokedattheirwork-stations,increasingtheriskofingestingchemicalstheywereusingorwereintheirworkarea.
Dustsweregeneratedinlargeamountswithoutrespiratoryprotectionandlocalexhaustventilation,wereinhaledroutinely.Operatorsworkeddirectlyandclosely,carryingoutdetailedtasksusingsubstancesinlargequantities.
JHSC: 9/9/80: re: Dust sampling: “Non-metallic machineshopreportidentified20%ofdustsamplechecksindicatedhigherthanTLVondustandfibres.”
MOL: 04/26/79: Investigationofasbestosexposureconcludesconfirmedriskofexposureforcarpentersandveryhighriskofexposureformaintenancepersonnel.Recommendationsre:controllingasbestosexposure:wetasbestoswhenremoving,enclose area, use respirators, clean up area, launder clothesinplant.Noordersissued.
MOL: 06/7/79:Asbestosconcentrationstested.FoundinexcessoftheTLV.
MOL: 11/16/82: Investigationofworkercomplaintofillness,e.g.tiredness,headache,feelingsickduringsilversoldering.Inspectorindicatedthatexposurelikelytocadmiumoxide,butnoairsamplingwerecarriedout.Suggestionsmadeforlocalexhaustventilation.Noordersissued.
Thesechemicalswereroutinelyanddirectlyusedandappliedbyhand.Theywereinhaledandabsorbedthroughtheskinroutinely,andinlargequantities.
Typesofrawmaterialsworkedonincluded:AsbestosLumberandboards,fibreglass,variouswoodssuchasmaple,cherry,oak,etc.andcompositessuchasTextolite.Workerswouldalsocutvariousmetalssuchassteelandaluminum.Thisshopusedlargeamountsofplywoodsheetsforconstructionofpartsandstructures.Plywoodlaminatesusedcontainmanytypesofgluetreatedwithformaldehydecompounds.
Chemicals used: AcetoneandMEK(forcleaningequipment) and Styrene, Thinners such as 1500 thinner,Partal,andbeeswax,whichwereusedasmoldreleaseagents.Cabasyl,aspraywasalsoused.Variousresinswereusedinlargequantitiesinliquidorpowderform.Thesewerebothepoxiesandvinylesterresins.Workersusedagreatdealoffibreglassclothofdifferentgradesinmoldingprocess.Thesechemicalswerehandledin5-gallonpails.
Production processes:Workerswereengagedinbuildingvariouswoodenstructures,buildingmoldsforfibreglasspartsandmolds,andlayingupfibreglassandresinsinthemolds.Mixingofresins,fillers,andadditivesforlayupswasdone;aswascuttingofcompositeasbestoslumber,other composite materials and pressure treated materials.Thesematerialsweredrycutwithoutdustsuppressionmeasurestaken.Thesawsutilizedstonecuttingblades,whichwerechangedtodiamondsawbladesafter1980.Asbestosboardwasgreyincolourandwouldproducelargeamountsofwhitedustwhencut.Asbestosdustandcuttingswouldfallunderthelargesawtable,andsometimesintothesewagesystemthroughdraingratesinthefloor.AftercuttingCarpenterswouldmovetodrillingandbevelingtheedges,dependingonwheretheproductwasgoing.Alloftheseproductsweresuppliedtootherareasoftheplantforuseinmotorsandgenerators.Thisheldtrueforallrawmaterialsbroughtintothecarpentershop.Withcuttingasbestos,woodandtextolite--andhavingafibreglassmoldingoperation--thedustfactorwashuge,especiallywiththepoorventilationsystem.Workersspokeofsmells,coughs,andeyeirritationsexperienced.Asbestosandfibreglassdustwerepartoftheoveralldebris.Partswerelayedoff(scribedontothematerial)andcutbyhandusing
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Inadditiontovariouswooddustsinhaled,workersroutinelyinhaleasbestosfibrefromcuttingandsawingasbestosboardandsheetsfornon-metalfabrication.Thesewerehandleddirectlyandroutinelywithdetailedtasksbyhand.
Workersdirectlyhandledlargeamountsoffibreglassandpolyesterandepoxyresinsandhardenersdirectlyandroutinely.Theyinhaledandabsorbedvariousfumesfromresinssuchasstyrene,MEKperoxide,BPA,formaldehydeinlargevolumesgivenproductsizeandthedetailedworkperformed.
Theyalsoinhaledfibreglassresindustsduringsandingandgrindingtasksoncuredfibreglassandresins.
handsawsorsabresaws,andalsodrilledonsmalldrillpresses.Someproductshadrubbersealspop-rivetedon.
Fibreglass operation: Spraynozzlescontainingrazorbladesinthetipwereusedtocutfibreglassstrandthatwouldfeedintothenozzle.Aspartofthisprocesstherewouldbetwo45-gallondrums--onecontainingaresin,theotherahardener.Theresinandthehardenerwouldbepumpedtogetherfromthedrumsintothesprayhosealongwiththefiberstrand.Whensprayedontothemoldtherazorsinthenozzleofthesprayerwouldcutthestrandtocreatethefibreglassproduct.Couldbesprayedwithseveralcoatstoreachdesiredthickness.Twoorthreepeoplewouldbewaitingtorolltheproductdownwithrollerstomakesurefibreglassadheredtoallareasofthemold.Thissameprocessisusedextensivelyintheboatbuildingindustryusingsimilarchoppedfibre/resinsprays.Atmospherewasheavilycontaminatedwithstyrene.LocalexhaustventilationandPPEinadequatefortheseoperations.
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BUILDING: #18 DEPARTMENT: INDUCTION MOTORS
General DescriptionDie Cast Rotor Production: 140, 180 210 motorsSpin Cast Production for 520 and 580 motorsMachining and metal cuttingCoil and winding processCoating parts with epoxy shellacAdditional Factors associated with exposure risksAssembly of medium size motors
Chemicals used or produced:aluminium,leadandsteelparticles/dustarsenicasbestos“blackpaste”brominatedfireretardantsdasco-tapdecompositionbyproducts(BPA,PAHs,formaldehyde,benzene)duct sealdusts(mica,coppersolder,metals,fibreglass,asbestos,epoxies)EpoxiesFormaldehydeglyptol/shellacMEKMWFsTCEtoluenevarsol
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Summary of Chemical Exposures: Oil mists and vapoursfromvarioustypesofchemicalsincludingmanydifferentMWF;dustsandresiduesfromtreatedpapersandtapesthatcontainedbrominatedfireretardants;fumesfromheavymetalssuchasheatedaluminumandlead;heavyconcentrationofheavymetaldustsfromgrinding,sandingandbuffingmetalcastings;dustandfumesfromepoxycoatingsthatwereheatedandbaked;dustsfromfibreglassandasbestosusedasreinforcementandinsulation;MWFandmetalparticulatefrommachiningoperations;variousepoxypaintsandcoatings;degreasersandsolventssuchasTCE,MEK,andvarsol.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionofoilmistsandvarsol.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilationandnoadequaterespiratorequipmentandworkershandledthesedirectly.Thiswouldalsoinvolveingestionbecauseworkersateandsmokedattheirworkstations.
Inhalationoffumesfromresiduesonmetalsurfacesduringtheannealingprocessinvolvingheatingbetween300and400degreesF.Thermaldecompositionby-productssuchasPAHs.Workerswouldincurexposuresbecausethesewerehandleddirectlyingreatvolumes,e.g.10sheetspersecond.Workersindicateheavyfumes/odoursduringannealing.Nolocalexhaustventilation.
General Description:InductionMotors(referredtoassmallmotors)werebuiltinbuilding#18.Thefollowingisadescriptionofthebuildingofonecomponentofinductionmotors—theproductionof‘diecast’and‘spincast’rotors.Thisinvolvedtheproductionofpunchsheetsusingalargepunchpressaswellasthemachiningofspaceblocks.Intheearlydaysthiswasdoneinbuilding18,butlaterpunchingandspaceblockmachiningwascarriedoutinbuilding#12 and plates delivered to this department in building18.Withdiecastrotorsfor#140,180and210motors,steelsheetswerepunchedtocreatepredetermined holes and then annealed in an annealingoven.Whenpartiallyassembledacastingwasmadebypouringmoltenaluminumintotheform.Thiswasfurthergroundandmachinedandfittedwithashaftandinstalledinthestator.Therotorsforthe580motorswereproducedusingspincastprocessincludingtheuseofasbestosandKozmafurnaceintheproduction.
Die-cast Rotor Production of 140, 180, 210 Motors:
Punch Press operation:3’widesteelsheetscoatedwithoilweresprayedwithvarsolandsentthroughahighpoweredpunchpresstocutoutpredeterminedholesinthesheets.Duringthepunchingprocesstheimpactofthepresswouldcausetheresiduesontheplatestovaporize.Steelsheetswerefedmanuallybytheoperator,atarateof10sheetspersecond.Thiscreateddensemistoilresiduesthatwouldcoattheoperatorandhisclothes.
Annealing the plates:Thepunchedplatesweremanuallyplacedonaconveyor,whichcarriedtheplatesintoanannealingovenrunatatemperatureof300to400degreesFahrenheit.Theovenopeningateachendwasapproximately3’x4’.Annealingwouldtake5minutes.Annealedplatesthentakenoffconveyoratexitendbyoperatorwearingasbestosglovestohandlethehotplates.Participantsindicatethatfumeswerestrongatbothendsoftheovenandpermeatedthearea.Anasbestosblankethungovereachendbutdidnotprovideaseal.Theasbestosblanketwaswornandfrayedfromcontactwithplatesandbeltwhenpassingthrough.
Building: #18 Department: Induction MotorsProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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Inhalationandskinabsorptionofchemicaltreated(flameretardants—brominatedretardants)paperappliedbyoperatoraroundthecasting.Alsoexposuretofibreglassparticlesfromfibreglasspaper.
Inhalationofaluminumandleadfumesfromheatedvatandpouringoperationhandleddirectlybytheworkersathighvolumewithnolocalexhaustventilation.Productionvolumewashighandwouldinfluencetheconcentrationsofalloyfumesworkerswouldbeexposedto.
Furtherinhalationofaluminumandleadfumesduringmaintenanceoperation.Thiswouldinvolvehigherconcentrationbecausetheworkersweredealingwithremovalofslagforanintenseperiod.
Inhalationofvapoursfrom‘blackpaste’DuctSealaswellasskinabsorptionwhenincontactwithskin.
Inhalationandabsorptionoflargeamountsofair-borneparticulatecontainingheavymetals,epoxypaints,fibreglass,treatedpaperwithfireretardantsasaresultofgrinding,sandingandbuffing.
Exposuressameasabovefordiecast.
Die Cast operation:Punchsheetswereplacedonastationaryarbourwheretheywerestackedandseparatedwithspacersbetweeneachsheet.Oncestackedthesheetswerecoveredwithfibreglasspaper,whichformedabarrierforthepouringofaluminum/lead alloy into the cast to form the structureoftherotor.Priortothepouringoperation,a“blackpaste”wasappliedtothebottomofthecast.
Aluminum/lead pouring operation: An open furnace containingatroughofmoltenAl/Pbsuppliedtheoperatorwithmoltenmix(60:40).Theoperatorsmanuallyscoopedthemixoutwithladlesandthenpoured its contents into the die formed by the stackedsheetsandfibreglasspaperwrap.Operatorsproduced 40 to 50 die-casts per day for the 140, 180 and210motors.OperatorsreportedheavyfumesduringthisprocessofpouringmoltenAl/Pb.
Aluminum oven maintenance:Regularmaintenancewasmanuallyundertaken2-3timesperweektoremoveslagfromthemoltentroughwithrakes.Operatorswereprovidedwithheatshields,butnorespiratoryprotection.Operatorsreportheavyfumesduringmaintenance.Nolocalexhaustventilationprovidedforovens.
Shaft placement into rotors:Shaftswerepressedintotherotorswithapressingmachine.Operatorsappliedanasbestosbased‘blackpaste’calledDuctSealontotherotors.Therotorswerethenplacedinatoteboxtoanotherstationwhereitwasturnedandbalancedinpreparationforinstallationintothestator.
Grinding, sanding and buffing of die cast for fitting: Operatorswouldmanuallygrindandsandtosmoothcastingsurfaceswhichproducedlotsoffinedust.
Machining: Rotorswouldalsobemachinedtopropersizeforinstallationofcoilsandplacementinstator.Machineoilscouldbeusedinthisoperation.
Spin Cast Production for 520 AND 580 Motors:1. Plateswerepunchedinsamemanneras‘die
cast’processandplacedonarbour;2. Spaceblockswereinsertedbetweenplates
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Inhalationofasbestosfibresfromtearingandstuffingasbestosinrotorspaces.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionofepoxypaintsandasbestosfibresfromasbestostapes.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionoffumesandvapoursofepoxycoatingsandthermaldecompositionby-productssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzene.
Inhalationoffumesandvapoursfromaluminumandleadaswellasresiduesofcoatings.
Inhalationofheavymetaldusts,epoxypaintdusts,fibreglasstapesfrompowergrindingoveran8to10hourdaywithoutlocalexhaustand/oradequaterespiratoryprotection.
InhalationandskinabsorptiontomistsandaerosolsofvariousmetalworkingfluidssuchasDasco-Tapandotherstreatedwithbiocidesandotheringredients.
Descriptionsbyworkersof“cloudsofmist”andaerosolshangingintheatmosphereaswellasreports
andanasbestosinsulationcalled‘fibrefax’waspressedwithbarehandintothespacescreatedbyspaceblocks.Thisrequiredthattheworkerstearoffchunksfromalargesheetofasbestos.Thetearingandstuffingofasbestoschunkscreatedasubstantialamountofdust.Workersdidnotuserespiratorsnorwasthereanylocalexhaustventilation;
3. Next,asbestostapewasusedtowrapandsealtherotorcast,whichwassubsequentlypaintedwith‘glyptol’epoxypaintinpreparationforovencuring;
4. Therotorcastwasthenplacedinacastingovenwheretherotorwasbakedovernight;
5. Afterbaking,themoltenAl/PbmixwaspouredintothecastandspuninaKozmaaluminum-castingfurnace.HerethemixwaspouredinmechanicallyandthroughcentrifugalforcepenetratedallcavitiesinthecastingthusproducingasignificantamountofAl/Pbfumesinthevicinityofworkers;
6. Thecompletedrotorwasthencleanedwithspinningwirebrushpoweredbycompressedairtocleanofftheglyptolpaintandasbestostape.Anairchiselwasusedtoremoveexcessaluminumcasting.Theprocesswouldtake1to1½days.Thiscleaningprocessgeneratedagreatdealofdustcontainingepoxy,Al/Pb,andasbestosfibres.Localexhaustwasnotfunctioningatmosttimes.
Machining and Metal Cutting:
Shaftsweremachinedandpreparedonmetallathes,cuttingmachines,andkeyingmachines.ThesemachinesusedlargequantitiesofMWFincludingtradenameDasco-tap,acuttingfluidcontainingmethylchloroform.Therewereinstanceswhereworkerswereovercomebythefumesfromthissubstance.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.
Redcuttingoilsusedcreatedcloudsofmistandaerosol that surrounded the operators and those standingbyinthevicinity.SomeoftheMWFscontainedtoxicbiocides(e.g.,arsenic)tocontrol
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ofirritatedeyes,nosesandthroats,anddermatitiswouldsupportrelativelyhighexposures.
Inhalationofweldingfumesaswellasresiduesofdegreasersandthermaldecompositionby-products.Thiswouldinvolve:PAHs,heavymetals,etal.By-standerexposurestoMWFandmetalparticulates.Handlingcoatedwiresinthewindingprocess.
Inhalationandabsorptionofingredientsintreatedtapes—e.g.fibreglass,flame-retardants,etal.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionofheatedepoxyshellac.Likelihoodofhighexposureduetosprayingoperationandheatingofshellac.
JHSC: 8/24/82: re: thinner fumes: Largepainttankinnorthendof#18hasveryhigh(level)ofthinnerfumebysmellofit.Workershavecomplainedtheyget“highfromfumeswhenmixingthepaintwiththelargepaddles.”
Inadequateventilationbothlocalexhaustandgeneralinadditiontotheworkorganizationbasedonthepiece-ratesystemaswellaspoorhousekeeping,hygienepracticessuchaseatingandsmokingattheworkstationandcircumventingexposurecontrolmeasureswhereavailable,supportsthevalidityoftheconclusionthattheriskofexposurewashighintheseoperations.
JHSC: 8/20/84: drinking fountain: “There has been alongdelayinrespecttocorrectingthedistasteful
bacterialandfungalgrowth,whichwouldbeincludedinthemistandaerosolgeneratedbymachining.
Weldingtookplaceonaregularbasisinthemachiningprocessproducinglargeamountsofweldingfumes.
DegreasingwasalsoapartofthisprocessandutilizedseveraltypesofdegreasersincludingTCE,MEK,etal.
Coils and Winding Process Production:
Windingprocessperformedbywomenworkingnearthemachiningareafortheproductionofcoilstobeinsertedinthestatorslots.SeveraltapeswereusedinthisprocesscontainingfibreglassandMylarasseparatorsandstifffibreglasswedgeswerealsoinsertedintothecoils.
Coating Parts with Epoxy Shellac:
Partswereslowlyrotatedabovea20gallontrough3’deepwithacontrolledsprayofshellaccoatingthepartsfortenminutes.Thisprocessproducesagreatdealoffumesandoverspray.Note:Ventilationwasaseriousprobleminthisandotherbuildingsbecauseofthebuildingconfiguration,theuseofcompressedairforcleaningandremovingdustfromworksurfaces,partsandworkers’clothingaswellascoolingtheirbodies.Thewholeventilationsystemwasundernegativepressurethatcreatedatendencyfortoxicfumesanddusttobetransportedtootherareas.Also,ceiling-highwallsdidnotseparatebuildings--atmost,therewerelowpartitionsseparatingworkarea.
Additional Factors Associated with Exposure Risks:
WorkOrganization:workorganizationwascharacterizedbythe‘pieceratesystem’.Thisresultedinintenseworkactivity,circumventionofexposurecontrolmeasuresbymanagementandworkerstomeetproductionquotas.
PracticesandHygiene:AsinmanyotherpartsoftheentireGEoperationworkersatetheirlunchesandsometimessmokedattheirworkstations.Thiswasconditionedbythepieceratesystemandthe
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wateratfountaininBay523.ThisCommitteehasreceivednumerouscomplaints.”
Exposures risk during assembly:
Thisoperationinvolvedexposuretoseveraltoxicchemicals in the form of dusts, liquids and fumes vapoursormists.
Thelikelihoodofinhalationandabsorptionofthesechemicalswasrelativelyhighgiventheirphysicalstate,theproximitytothework,theintensityofthework,thelackoflocalexhaustventilationorppe.Theseworkersinhaledvariousfibres(asbestos/fibreglass)fromcuttingandshapingwedgesandseparators,pressingmaterialsinslotsandgeneralhandling.Alsoinhaledmetalfumesfrombrazingleads,resinapplicationsandbaking,andapplicationofsolvents(TCE,MEK,Toluene).
MOL Reports:
MOL:09/17/75:Investigationregardingzincchromatepaints.Exposureidentifiedaslowbecauseitdriedquicklyandhard.Ordersissuedforbetterhousekeepingandnoeating,drinkingorsmoking.Recommends:adequateexhaustventilationandgoodhygienepractices.
MOL:06/30/81: HozmaandKozmafurnacesgeneratinglargeamountofsmokeandfumesescapingfromunderthecanopy.Ordersissuedforlocalexhaustventilation.GEmanagementrequest‘minimumexhaustrequired’.
MOL:09/30/81: AluminumfumesfromKozmafurnace.Priorordersissuedtoaddressescapingfumesintoplant.Suggestiontoredesignthefumehoodtopropersize.
MOL:03/31/82: Paintandsolventvapouraffectingworkerwhoisstirringpaintintoadiptank.Order
unavailabilityofsafeeatingfacilities.Therewasalsoaproblemwiththeavailabilityofpotabledrinkingwater.
Theuseofcompressedairtocleanworksurfaces,parts,clothing,andtocoolworkers’bodieswasprevalentinthisbuildingandthroughouttheentireGEfacility.
Assembling Medium Size Motors: This process involvedapproximately100to150employeesontwoshifts.
The processes involved:
Parts received from Punch Press
CoilWinding
Coilinsertionintostators:
Cuttingasbestos(orfibreglass,mica)wedgesandseparators
Insertionofasbestos/fibreglasswedgeswithasbestos‘felt’backing:
Insertionofseparatorscomposedoftreatedpaper,fibreglass,asbestos:
Assemblingpunchsheetsandpilingsheets:
ConnectingleadsbybrazingwithatorchappliedtoSilPhos solder:
Lacingwithcottonorfibreglasscordtoholdcoilsinplace
Testingconnections:
Dippingassembledmotorinadiptank(largeandsmalltubs)filledwithepoxyresin:
Then baked in oven:
Grindingexcesscuredresin:
Chemicals/Material by-products produced by processes:
Productionofdusts(asbestos,fibreglass,mica,epoxyresins,(copper/solderdust)fromcutting,inserting
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issueto“reconnectthelocalexhaustinstitutedtogreatlyreduceexposures.”
wedges,separators,grindingresins,andbrazingleads.
Productionoffumesandvapoursfrombrazingcopperandsolder,andtheapplicationandbakingofepoxyresins.
TherewasnolocalexhaustventilationnorwasPPEprovided.
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BUILDING: #20 DEPARTMENT: DRIVE SYSTEMS
General Description
Printed Circuit Board Production
Work processes:
Etching: Rotating Track Flow-Solder Solder Benches
Semi-Conductor Production
Work processes:
Degreasing and etching Metal fusion and cleaning Assembly
Known Chemicals used or produced:
Acids: ferric chloride, HSC, sulfuric acidDegreasers:Acetone,TCE,MEKHeavyMetals:lead,cadmium,chromium,mercury,copper,gold,tungstenThermal by-products: Polymers: PVC, VCM Phthalates: DEAP, BBP, DBP, DIBP Brominatedfireretardants
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Major exposures: GiventhequantityofproductionandlackofPPEandothereffectiveexposurecontrolsoperatorswerelikelyexposedsignificantlytoanumberofverytoxicchemicals,chronically.Theseexposuresincludedacidmists,solventssuchasacetone,TCE,MEK,andheavymetalsincluding:lead,cadmium,chromium,mercury,copper,andgold.Otherexposureswerepolymers,suchasPVC,VCM,phthalates,andbrominatefireretardants.
Riskofexposuretoacidmistsgeneratedbyacidsinteractingwithsubstratesandcopper.Copperfumesfromremoval/breakdownofcopper.Thepotentialofinhalationsignificant.
Workers handled components barehanded thus wereexposedtoresiduesofmetalsandpolymercontaminantsfromtheacidbath.Riskofslightinhalationandabsorptionthroughskin.Alsolikelihoodofingestionfromworkerseatinganddrinkingattheirworkstations.
Workersarelikelyexposedtoleadsolderfumescontaininglead,cadmiumandflux.Inadditiontheseworkersareexposedtothesolventvapoursindicatedaboveaswellasresins.Thislikelythroughbothskinabsorptionandinhalation.Overexposureindicatedbycomplaintsofphysicalsymptomsaswellasthevolumeofproductioncarriedoutby4to6womensolderingtheprintedcircuitboards.
General Description:DriveSystemswaslocatedinbuilding#20andconsistedoftwoelectronicsproductiondepartments:ElectricCircuitBoardproductionandSemi-conductorproduction.Theserelatedproductionfacilitiesusedsignificantamountsofdegreasers,acids,andheavymetalsincluding:leadmercury,cadmium,andchromium6.Exceptforspecializedareasinsemi-conductors,thesedepartmentslackedadequatelocalexhaustventilation.Workerswerealsoexposedtochemicalsthatwerecontainedinthepartstheyhandledincluding:PVC,VCM,fireretardantssuchasPBBP,PBDP and phthalates (DEHP, BBP, DBP, DIBP) these latterwereimbeddedinthelaminatedinsulatedsubstratesoftheboards.
Printed Circuit Board Production:
Thisproductionprocessemployedapproximately25to30workerswhoweremainlyfemale.
Workerswereprovidedwithpre-printedcircuitboardsthatwerelaminatedfibreglassepoxyinsulatedsubstratewithathinlayerofcopperfoillaminatedononeortwosides.
Etching: Laminatedboardwasetchedinanacidmixofferricchloridebathcreatingtracksinaccordwiththepre-printedcircuit.Amaletechniciandidtheetchinginanetchingroom,whichwasequippedwithgeneralventilationandafumehoodoverasink.
Rotating Track: Afteretching,theetchedboardsweresenttotherotatingtrackwhere4-6operatorsinserted the various electronic components (diodes, capacitors,resistors)inthecircuitboards.
Flow-Solder: Aftertherotatingtrackprocess,theboardsweresenttotheflowsolderroomwhereamaletechnicianwouldoperatetheflowsoldermachinewhichwasinadequatelyventilatedandsubjectofhealthcomplaintsandMOLinvestigationsandissuanceoforders.
Solder Benches: A number of female operators (5or6)equippedwithsolderingironsengagedintouchupsolderingofthesolderedboardsto
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TheFlowSolderoperationaswellasthebenchsolderingwasamajorsourceofheavymetal(silver,lead,cadmium),solventfumesandvapours,withahighriskofexposure.
ThiswasrecognizedintheOctober 7, 1981 MOL inspection report. Inspector noted that the local exhaustventilationwasineffectiveandcouldbeinterferedwithbyrandomaircurrents.Theinspectornoted that the complaints of eye, nose and throat irritationwereindicativeof“overexposure”andorderedtheemployertoconductaleadexposureassessmenttodeterminelevelofskinabsorptionaswellasexposuretoisopropylalcoholfromsolvent.Workersreportedfrequentheadachesduringtheflowsolderoperation.Twoworkerswerereportedtohavehadepilepticseizuresaswell.Workerscomplainedaboutstrongsolventandresinodoursasreported in MOL: December 30, 1981investigatingworkercomplaintsanddetectingisopropanolandtolueneintheworkatmospherethroughairmonitoring.
JHSC:6/30/81:Workersinvicinityofdeep-wavesolderingmachinecomplainofdizzinessfromfumes.Hoodreadingapprox..50-75F.A.M.(usingKesterflux#1571andKesterfluxthinner#104.
Althoughthereseemedtobeeffectiveengineeringcontrolsmeanttoprovideanextramodicumofprotectionto“products”beingmade,therewereconditionsthatwouldallowexposureoftheoperatorto the acid mist, solvents, and possible heavy metal residues.Etchingwascarriedoutintheopenbutwithafumehoodoverthesinkwheretheetchingwasperformed.
Sinceworkerscoulddetectprominentacidodors,itislikelythatworkerswerebeingexposed.Thiscouldoccurwherematerialswerehandlewithoutprotection.Inareaswherematerialswerecleanedwithacidsorsolventsintheopen,thelikelihoodofexposurewouldoccurduringtheshakingprocesswithsolvents.
Therewereanumberofcancersinbldg.#20includingseveralwomenemployedineachofthe
ensureproperconnections.ThisareawasfilledwithheavyleadsolderandotherbreakdownproductsfromapplyingheattothePVCboards.Thesecouldhave lead, cadmium, chromium, VCM, brominated fireretardantsandphthalates.TheareahadnoventilationandnoPPEwasprovided.Therewereonlyportablefanstoblowfumesawayfromoperators.Aftertouchup,solderingboardsweredegreasedwithisopropanol alcohol and toluene and then dipped in poly-butyl-methacrylateresin.
Note: Frequentcomplaintsofrespiratoryirritationanddifficultybreathing.MOLinvestigation
Semi-conductor Production:
Thisdepartmentemployedapproximately15to25,mainlywomen,workersintheproductionofvarious semi-conductors such as diodes and Silicon ControlledRectifiers(SCR).Thisproductionusedtungsten,gold,amixtureofacidsandsolventsincluding:acetone,TCE,MEKandceramiccoverings.Theoperationinvolved1)etchingthesurfacesofgold,tungstenandsilicondiscsinpreparationforconstructionoftheelectroniccomponents;2)thefusionofgoldleafonthetungstendiscand3)thelayeringoftheseandplacementintoaceramiccovering.
Degrease and Etch:Operatorwouldfirstdegreaseandetchthegoldflakeandtungstendiscwithacetone/TCE and then bathe these in acid usually ferricchloride,HCL,sulfuricacidoramixtureofthiswithothercompatibleacids.Thiswascarriedoutoverasinkequippedwithafumehood.
Fusing of Discs: Afteretching,theoperatorplacedatungstendiscontoahotplate.Thiswasfollowedbyplacingagoldleafonthetungsteninordertofusethetwometals.Oncefusedthesewereremovedquicklytoabeakerinordertocool.
Disc cleaning: Afterfusion,thediscsweretransferredtoabeakerwithacetoneandtolueneforcleaninginanultrasonicshakermachinewhichmeasuredabout4’x3’.Thiswascarriedoutintheopen.
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twooperations,whichshouldbeinvestigated.Theseincludedseveralcasesoflung,breast,andbraincancers,aswellaslymphoma.
Sincethisworkwascarriedoutintheopenareawithoutlocalexhaustventilation,itishighlylikelythatworkerswereexposedtosolventvapours.
Likelyexposuresviainhalationandabsorptiontosolventvapoursandresiduesfrommanualassembly.
Alternative layering of discs:Thesediscswerethentransferredtoanassemblyareawherethegoldfusedtungstendiscswerealternativelylayeredwiththesilicondiscandthenplacedinaceramiccontainer.
Diode assembly:Someofthelargerdiodeswereassembledonanaluminumheatsink.
Theonlyprotectiveequipmentprovidedwasforthoseworkingwithacidsinthecleanroomincludingapairofyellowrubbergloves,apolyestersmock,andafumehoodoverthesinkswhereacidsweremixed.Therewerenoticeableodoursfromtheacidfumesaswellasfromsolventssuchasacetone.Workersreported acid burns and eyes, nose, and throat irritationfromacidmistsandsolventvapours.
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BUILDING: #21 DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR
General DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsExposure ControlsNuclear Bundle
Work Processes:
Sand BlastingBeryllium DepositionOther Procedures
Chemicals used or produced:
BerylliumDegreasersDetergents(causticsoda)GraphiteSilicaUraniumOxidesZirconium (Nickel Zinc, Tin)
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Beryllium Exposure: Accordingtoapaperdeliveredatthe11thInternationalConferenceonCANDUFuel,currentfuelbundleproductionusingBerylliumwouldnotbeabletomeetthenewTLVof0.05ug/m³proposedbytheACGIH.ThepaperalsoindicatesthatcurrenthealthresearchonBeexposuresshowsthat Chronic Be Disease (CBD) is on the rise despite exposuresbeingbelowthecurrent2ug/m³TLVandprovincialOELforBe.ThishasadirectbearingontheGEnuclearfacilityinPeterborough.(seeJ.G.Harmsen*,etal,‘BerylliumBrazingConsiderationsinCANDUFuelBundleManufacture’11thInternationalConferenceonCANDUFuel,NiagaraFalls,Ontario,October17-20,2010).IARCclassifiedBerylliumasaGroup1carcinogen.
JHSC: 8/23/83 re: degreaser urine test results: “UrinetestsonfullandparttimedegreaseroperatorsshowedthatallhadtracesofTCEintheirurine.Dr(C)explainedifTCEisshowingupinurinethenoperatorisbeingoverexposed.(Foreman?)toldgrouphewassatisfiedthatoperatorswereworkingsafelyandproblemisnotcausedbymethodofoperating.”
JHSC: 8/18/84: re: graphite oven: “When ovens are beingcleanedworkersarebeingexposedtoheavyconcentrationoffumes.”
JHSC: 11/18/86: Be air sampling: “Sample results indicatehigherthannormallevelsofBefor1stand2ndquartersof’86.Thelatestquartershowslevelsnowbacktonormal.Employeesworerespiratorsforatime.SinceearlyOctober,nolongerneeded.Employeeswouldlikethisreportedontheirchartsandalsorecordedwiththeirfamilyphysicians.”
Exposure Risk to Be:ThroughouttheBecoatingprocess,therearemanyopportunitiesforBedusttobecomeairborneandinhaledbyworkers.MeasuringouttheBepowder,placingitinthecrucibles,placingthecruciblesintheBefurnace,openingthefurnacedoorstoremoveoradjustthestripsshouldtheycomelooseduringtheprocess,punchingtheseparatorsandbearingpads,and
General Description: This department is dedicated totheproductionofnuclearfuelbundlestructuresandloadingofthesebundletubeswithuraniumpelletsforCANDUnuclearreactors.Thenucleardivisionislocatedinitsownseparatebuilding#21onMonaghanRoadatthewestentrancetotheGEcomplex.
From the mid 1960s to the present, the department hasemployed120to150workerson4shifts,24/7,producing18to20fuelbundlespershiftoraround3bundlesperhour.Theworkistediousandstressfulbecause of the precision required and fear of radiationandberyllium.
General Working Conditions: ThisisviewedasthecleanestworkenvironmentintheGEcomplex.Butatthesametimethetoxicityofthematerials,namelyuraniumoxideandberyllium,presentahighhazard.Inadditiontohandlinguraniumoxidesandthepotentialforexposuretoberyllium,thereareotherpotentialexposurese.g.,tosilica,graphite,degreasers,anddetergentsofconcern.
Exposure Controls:Localexhaustventilationhasbeenprovidedandairseemsclean.Radiationandberylliumexposuresweremonitoredandfederalandprovincialregulationswereapplied.Workershavebeenprovidedwithlabcoatsandcottongloves,butnorespiratoryequipmentexceptduringmaintenanceandcleaningoperations.Inthelattercircumstance,airsuppliedrespiratorsareprovided.Ashowerisprovidedoutsidetheberylliumroom.
Nuclear Bundle: The nuclear bundle produced iscomprisedofbetween26and36nuclearfueltubesmadeofanalloyoftin-zirconium.Fueltubesare held in parallel to one another by a pair of end plateframes.Intheassemblyofthebundles,smallzirconiumspacersarebrazedtothesurfaceofthezirconiumtubes.Thespacersareappliedtothetubesbyabrazingprocess.Thesespacersandpadsarecoatedwithberyllium.
Building: #21 Department: NuclearProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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tackingandbrazingthesetothetubes.AlloftheseprocedurescangenerateBedusts.AndthepotentialfortheseeventualitiestoberealizedisreflectedinthemonitoringresultsundertakenbytheMOL.
ThroughouttheyearsoftheGEBerylliumcoatingoperationtherehavebeenseveralinstanceswhereberyllium-monitoringlevelsexceededtheold2.0ug/m³.Notealso,thatmostofthesereportedlevelsexceedthenew,currentlyproposed,TLVof0.05ug/m³.SeeMOLinspectionreportsaswellasworkrefusalinvestigations.ReportbyH.M.Nelson,IndustrialHygieneBranchindicatespersonalsampleresultsof41.5ug/m³ofBeinthebreathingzoneduringhandsawingofBebartoobtainberylliumdustforcoating.ThishandsawingwascontrarytowhattheregulatoryagencyrecommendedforthesafehandlingofBe.Accordingly,theinspectornotes:“Thesawingofbarstockisaverycrudeoperation.ItwouldbebettertoeitherpurchasecorrectsizebarstockorobtainpowderedBeryllium”.(MOL reports: Building 21, March 23,1965)Besamplingresultsobtainedthenextyearwerestillnotsatisfactory.TestconductedbyGESafetyUnitshowedlevelsof1.97ug/m³and1.95ug/m³veryclosetotheTLVof2.0ug/m³.In1964,priortoGEopeningthenuclearunit, the Department of Health recommended threeprecautionsbetakentominimizeexposureto“beryllium…consideredtobeaboutthemosttoxicmaterialhandledindustrially”including:1)purchaseBeinapowderedformtoreducedirectcontact;2)placeBerylliumroomundernegativepressuretopreventBecontaminationofotherareas;3)separatedlockerandcleaningareas.(MOL: Building 21, April 11,1964).TheserecommendationswereignoredresultinginexcessiveBeaircontaminationof41.5ug/m³in1965,demonstratingGE’scallousdisregardforthehealthofworkersanditspoorsafetyculture.
Note also that these reports indicate that in some instancesthesemeasurementsweretakenwhenthecoatingprocesswasnotinoperation.BevapourscanescapewhenBecoatingovenisopenedorbeingcleaned.SmallamountsofBeinhaledorabsorbedthroughtheskincancauseseriousdisease,including
PROCESS Sand Blasting: Zirconium metal sheets used to make spacersaredegreased,thensandblastedinthesandblastingroomandwashedindetergent.
Beryllium (Be) Deposition: Nextberylliumisappliedtothesheets’surfacebyvacuumvapourplatingdepositionundernegativepressureconditionsintheberylliumfurnacelocatedinthe‘berylliumroom’.Theberylliumispurchasedin2lbtubsinpowderform.Thepowderishandweighedintoacruciblein5to10gbatchesinafumehood.ThecruciblesareusedinavacuumplatingsystemtodepositathinlayerofBeonzirconiumalloystrips.Theoperatorwearsasmock,shoecoversandahalffacerespiratorwithahighefficiencydustfilter(NIOSHTC-21c-135).Amaximumof4batchesareprocessedperday.Duringmaintenanceafull-faceairsuppliedrespiratorisworn.Coatingoperatorscanspendfrom1to4hoursperday.Longerhoursarerequiredduringequipmentmaintenance.
Beplatedstripsarethenprocessedontwosmallautomaticpunchpresses.Thespacersarestampedononemachineandbearingpadsarestampedontheother.Bothprocessesareenclosedandlocallyexhausted.Punchingsarecollectedinaplasticbag.Thereareupto4operatorsinthisroomatatime.Punchingsaretakenbycarttothecoiningroomtobecontouredtotubeshapebytwooperators.TheseoperationsgenerateBe/Zrdusts.
Spacersandpadsaretackandbrazedtothetubeson4tackandbrazeunits.ThisisdoneusingsmallRFinductionfurnacesinenclosedandlocallyexhaustedunits.
Other Procedures: Ultrasoundtestingtoensuretheintegrityofthetubes;Sandblastinginpreparationforcoating;Roughcuttingthelengthofthebundles;Applyingliquidgraphitetotheinsideofthetubes;Bakingthegraphitecoatedbundlesinoven;
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cancer.Exposureusuallypeakedduringmaintenanceoperationsinberylliumcoatingoperations.AirborneBeflakesnotedbyworkersduringbrazingoperationledtoaworkrefusalin1983.TestsconductedbytheSafetyUnitindicatedthatlevelofBewashighbutbelowTLV(MOL: Building 21, February 15, 1983).
Duringpunchingofthespacerfromtheberylliumcoatedsheets,berylliumdust/vapourisgenerated,potentiallyexposingworkerstoaverypotentcarcinogenandsensitizingagent.Whilethemainrouteofentrywouldlikelybeinhalation,skinabsorptionshouldnotberuledoutgiventhewearingofcottonsmocksandgloves.
Uranium Oxide Exposure:
Monocyte Suppression:AlpharadiationexposurefromUraniumoxideislikelytooccurthroughinhalationgiventhedirectclosehandlingofuraniumpelletsduringtheloadingprocess.Thisislikelyevidencedbythelowmonocytecountsforworkerswhoworkedinthenucleardepartment.ThiswasindicatedinthereportpreparedbyDr.R.ChaseattheL.A.M.POccupationalHealthProgramfortheUnitedElectricalWorkers,entitledTheCGENuclearProject:ReportontheInvestigationintoPossibleMonocyteSuppressioninUranium-ExposedWorkers.Itisproposedthatreducedmonocyteproductionisameasureableeffectofradiationexposuresasheavymetaluraniumsettlesintheboneandemitsalphaparticles.
Thatstudyfoundthat44%ofGEnuclearworkershadreducedmonocytecountsthatwereabnormallylow—15-20timeslowerthanexpectedinasampleofhealthymenandwomen.Whencomparedwiththoraxburdencountstheprevalenceoflowcountswasacrossallexposurecategories.ThissuggeststhatmonocyteproductionissensitivetolevelsofradioisotopeabsorptionlowerthanthoseexperiencedbyCGEworkers.Thisevidenceconfirmedthehypothesisthatabsorbedradioactiveparticleshasadetectableeffectonthewhitebloodcells(monocytes).AccordingtoDr.Chase…”Therefore,there are valid and persuasive reasons to suspect
Cuttingthebundleoftubestolength;
Fillingtubeswithuraniumpellets(whilenotenrichedpelletsstillemitalphaparticles);
Executefinalcut,thenweldendcapstothebundledtubes.
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thatworkersarebeingaffectedbytheirexposuretouranium.”
Uranium over exposures:InspectionreportsfromtheDepartmentofHealthindicateinstanceswherebiometricmonitoringresultsforuraniuminurinefarexceededtheallowableconcentrationof16.0ug/L.Inonecase,workerlevelswere1.5,1.5,10.6and195.0ug/Lfor4employees(MOL: Building 21, June 16, 1965).
Beryllium dust over exposures: MOL reports in 1979,reportedhighberylliumdustreadingsintheberylliumroomrequiringremediationanduseofrespiratorsuntildustreadingswerewithinTLVlimits(MOL: March 1, March 9, and June 1, 1979).
Otherconsiderations:Inperformingtheabovetasks,workerspositionthebundlesatgroinlevel.
Someoftheotherprocedurespotentiallyexposeworkerstootherhazardousdustfrommetalcuttingzirconiumtubingandsilicafromsandblasting.
Participantsdescribedanincidentwhereanexplosionoccurredduringbrazing,resultinginheavyberylliumcontamination.
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BUILDING: #22 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE
General DescriptionBanbury Mixer OperationTuber Operation3 inch Lead PressCotton BraidersLacquer ProcessesOpen Saturation TankTar PotsCarding MachinesAsbestos, Water and Enamel Carding MachineGlass MachinesWinding Area
Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCoalTarvolatilesCreasol,BenzolDromus OilDusts/fibres:Asbestos,Mica,Cotton,Jute,EpoxyResins:VinylChloride,“lacquer,”“varnish”Metals:lead,mercury,copper,antimony,MWFsOkumRubberingredients:clay,silica,lampblack,fattyacids,redlead,Vulkene,ThermalDecompositionBy-products:lead,phthalates,benzene,formaldehyde,BPA,butylperbenzoate,dibutylphlthalate,dimethylanline,methylmethacrylate,trichlorahexane,cyclohexanone,styrene,Thinners: TCE, Toluene, Acetone, Xylene, varsolVinyl ester resins
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Exposure sources: dermal/lungexposurestovariousingredients.Fumesfromhotmix.Reportsofhealthissues:heartattacks,cancers,COPD.Fumestraveledsouththroughoutbuildingthenre-circulated.Noexhaustsystemsofumestrappedwithinbldg.area(allwindowsrequiredtobeclosedduetofumecomplaintstootherareas/buildings,e.g.,cafeteria).
1,3butadieneusedinrubberproductionprocess.
Significantexposurestofumesfrombothheatedingredientsandthermaldecompositionby-products.
Forrubber,ingredientsincluded:clay,silica,lampblack,fattyacids,andredlead.Forby-products,query1,3butadiene?
JHSC: 8/24/78: re: Banbury mixer: “The present ventilationisnexttouseless.Astrongsuggestionhasbeenmadetooperatorstowearfiltermasks.Thismeansahotanduncomfortableworkenvironmentandwehopetoexpediteinstallationofventilationtoremovethepollutionatsource.”JHSC: 8/10/78: Banbury mixer: “Dust samples (MercaptoImidazoline?)weretakenandregisteredveryhigh.”JHSC: 8/24/78: re: Banbury mixer: “Hazardisreduced(rechemicalMercaptoImidazoline)byhavingmaterialinsolidformratherthanpowderbuttherearestilldangersinvolvedifprecautionsnotfollowed.Operatorshavebeenaskedtoavoidbarehandcontactatalltimesyettheydon’tseemtorecognizetheimportanceofthisprecaution.”JHSC: 9/21/78: Banbury mixer:“MercaptoImidazalinestillbeingused.Itisimperativewegetaresolveimmediately.”MOL:06/2/77: Workersignoringsafetyprecautions.
General Description: The Wire and Cable department (1945-80)builtconductorscapableofcarryingheaviercurrentsatincreasedvoltages.Itwasalargedepartmentemployingbetween200-300peopleworking4shifts.Formex,amagnetwire,wasalsobuilttosupportinsulatedwireforthewindingsofmotorsandnumerousoutsideclients.Itisimportanttonotethatbetween1957-1960manyGEemployeestransferredbetweentheWireandCableandArmatureDepartmentsasanalternativetolayoffs.(Source: Lal, 2005 OCHOW report)
Production Processes:
Banbury Mixer Operation: This machine produces semi-liquidrubberforexternalcoatings.Ingredientsinclude:clay,silica,lampblack,fattyacids,andredlead(OCHOWhasdetailedlist).Itoperatesat400degreesCfor20-30minutesperbatch.Ingredientsmanuallyaddedtohopperbyworkersfromplatform(70to80lb.bagsofthedifferentingredientsareopenedwithaknifethenpouredin).Ithasanexhaustcanopybutisoftennotused.
Tuber Operations: Thereweretwotypesoftuberproduction:RubbertubersandPVCtubers.40employees(plus12onstrandingmachines)workedbetweenthetwooperationsloadingsemi-softrubberorPVCpelletsintohoppers.1.RubberTubers:Finishedproductactedasextruderstoinsulatecableswhichconsistedofthreecoatedwirescoveredwitharubbertube.Insulationbetweenwiresincluded:fiberglassto50s,asbestosto60sandjutefillerswithoakumin70s.Exhaustfansinareaoftenturnedoffbyworkersbecauseitinterferedwithpiecework2.PVCTubers:Therewere7PBCextrudingmachines.PVCpelletswerepouredintohopperofmachine,strandedthenvinylchlorideinsulation(Vulkene)usedasinsulationincables.
3-Inch Lead Press:(locatedalongsidetubingarea):Copperwireisrunthroughtroughsofmoltenlead(upto20’inlength)heatedto1300degreescentigrade.Oneworkeroperatedpressthatpulledwirethroughdiesinlead-filledtroughwhileasecond
Building #22 Department: Wire and CableSources: Sonya Lal, 2006 (OHCOW retrospective) and Advisory CommitteeProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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ForPVC,breakdownproductsincluded:lead,phthalates,vinylchloride,benzene,formaldehyde.
Sameasabove.
Bothworkersexposedtoleadfumes,withdermalandinhalationroutesofexposure.
Additionalexposures:Thestrippedoffpiecesofoilcoatedleadwerereturnedtopotwhereoilwouldreact,creatingheavyfumes.
Workersatetheirlunchesinareawithlead-coveredhands.Itwasdifficultforworkerstowashtheirhandsduringthedayforanumberofreasons:1.Theywerepaidbypiecework,thustakingtimeoffthefloorcouldsignificantlycuttheirpay.2.Washroomsandcafeteriawerebothlocatedasignificantdistanceaway(only20minuteswereallottedforlunch).3.Foranumberofyearswateravailabletoworkerswasrecycled(graywaterfromtheplantandlaterfromwellontheplantproperty.Signagethroughoutstatedwaterwasnotpotable).
Dusty,noisyworkarea.Asbestoswasrawmaterial,noprotectiveequipmenttopreventinhalationofdust.Workershandledasbestosdaily.Compressedairsystemusedtoblowdustoffequipment,causingasbestostobeairborneandtotravelthroughoutbuildingandotherdepartmentsbecauseofnegativeairpressure.
Bakeovenemittedheavyfumesoflacquerplusfumes from varsol and toluene (added to thin the lacquer).
workerwoundthewire(1/2”coatingofleadonwire)ontoreels.Winderworeasbestosgloves,breakingoffexcesslead.Dromusoiloftenappliedtoavoidstickinginwindingprocess.LeadPotsmanuallyfed80lb.ingotswithbarehands.Exhaustfansusuallykeptoffduetocoolingeffect,whichsloweddowntheprocess(thuswascostlytopieceworkers).Beforewindingontoreel,wirewentthroughwaterbaththatproducedsteamandmist.
Cotton Braiders:(10workerspershift,3shifts):Theseincluded80cottonand18asbestosbraidingmachines,thepurposeofwhichwastospindlebraidsofcottonorasbestosoverwire.Workerfirstdippedasbestosfibersintoisopropylalcoholtoeasethroughmachine(eachworkerhadown5-gallonpailofisopropylalcoholatworkspace).Aftercottonorasbestoswasbraided,hotwaxwasappliedtopreventfrayingofbraid.
Lacquer processes: Newlybraided(cotton,asbestos)wireswereheatedinoventhenrunthroughrubberdiesandcoatedwithlacquer,thenbaked.Exhaustsystem used consistently as aided in process (unlike otherareaswhereitwasconsideredanimpediment).
Open Saturation Tank:Thiscontainedcreosolmixtosoakcottonusedforbraidingwhichwasthenallowedtodrip-dry(theareawasheavywithfumes).
Tar Pots (molten tar):Therewerefourpots,withoneworkerperpot.Cottonwire(Braidex)wasdippedinhottar(byhandormachine?)thenrunthroughdie,sprayedwithwaxandrolledontoreel.
Carding Machines (#31, #32): Employed rolls of asbestosonreel-to-reelmachines(25ftlong,5ftapart).Aten-inchrollofasbestoscovered600ft.ofwire.Speedvariedbetween30and40feetperminute,dependingonwire.Carding#31:wassetuplikebunkbedswith2linesmovingatthesametime.ProcessinvolvedWiretakenoffreelandrunthroughballofasbestos(6ftlongx8ft.wide).Combsrunacrossballofasbestosspreadingthefibersovermovingwire.(ExcessFibersfromtoplineexhaustedintobinsonroofwhileexcessfibersfromlowerlinedroppedintobinsunderneath).Fibercoatedwire
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Areaheavywithfumesfromthecreosolmixcomingfromopentank.Inhalation(andpossiblydermalexposuretochemicals)exposurerisktofumeswhichcouldincludecreosol,varsol,treatedwax,andcoaltarvolatiles.
Airwasfilledwithfibers,exposuresfurtherexacerbatedby:largeoverheadcranesandmachinesshakingdustloose,openwindowsandlargeamountofpedestrianandtrucktraffic.
Maintenanceworkersemptied(throughdoorsonsideofbins)thelooseasbestosfiberintobagsbyhandwithnoprotection.(Sometimestheyhad“snowball”fights;thecompanysoldbagsoflooseasbestostoworkersorthebroadercommunityas“insulation”).
Lunganddermalexposuretoasbestosandcottonfibers.Samemaintenanceprocedureasabove.4-6workers,usuallyonweekends,wouldcleantheasbestosbinswithnoprotectiveequipment.Entirecleaningof8’x8’bintookentireshift.Asbestosfiberhandledbyhandandstuffedintobagsorboxes.Observationbyasupervisorwasthattheseworkers“lookedlikesnowmen.”Noshowerorchangeroomavailable, asbestos likely taken home in cars, on clothesandcarriedthroughouttheplant.
Asbestosexposure;machineventedtoroof.Additionalexposuretofumesfromheatedvarnish(likelyaresin-basedproductanditsby-products).
Fumesfromthermaldecompositionby-products.Workers used compressed air to disperse dust, also dryswept,shoveledfiberwasteintobarrels,thendumpedinlandfillsites.
Workers exposed to various types of fibers -- but fibers also further dispersed by them.
MOL reports:MOL: 12/27/45:Introductionofsyntheticresinwithformaldehyde as a major component for electrical insulation.Alsonotedplanstoexpandporcelain
wasthenrunthroughwaxpotandonto2ndreel.(Theparaffinwaxprocesswasexhaustedtoroof).Carding#32:consistedof2“dryrun”machines(nowaxingprocess)consistingofonelinewhichcarded10to12inchballsofasbestosinonelineoperationwithexcessfibersventedtoroofbins.Thesebinventsoftengotpluggedduetotheamountoffiberscausingmorefiberstobedispersedattheprocesslevel.(The10”rollofasbestoscovered6000ftofwire).
Asbestos, water and enamel carding machine: This machinecoatedwirewithasbestos,thenacoatingofvarnish.Combsspreadasbestosonwirethenwiressentthroughheatedpotofvarnish,thenbakedat80°Fanddrawnthroughwaterpottocool.Thewirewasthendrawnontoareel.
Glass Machines: Varnishtreatedfiberglassrollswrappedaroundcopper,runthroughheatedpotofvarnish,thenbaked.
Winding Area:Threeshifts:26-dayworkers;15inafternoon;15atnight.Finishedandtestedcopperwireputonrollstomeetproductorders.Doorsleftofteninsummer(acrossfromasbestosfilledcardingarea).
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manufacturing.Needtochangeventilationtohandlesilicadustexposure.
MOL:5/11/53:Identifieduseofbenzol,butylperbenzoate,dibutylphthalate,dimethylaniline,methylmethacrylate,styrene,trichlorohexane,cyclohexanone,andphosphate.Inspectornotesthesearehazardous.
MOL:3/24/68:Housekeepingverypoor.Thicklayersofdustnoted.Workerseatinganddrinkingandsmokingatworkstation;overfilleddrossbucket.8meltingunitswithnoexhaust.
MOL:01/5-6/71:”asbestoshandlingconsideredtobeworstintheentireplant.Itwasrealizedthatthecompanynotfullyawareofhazardassociatedwithasbestosdust”“Workersin22SWcornerareunnecessarilyexposedtoasbestosfibresproducedinthisarea.”Suggestedarea…”shouldbesegregatedfromtherestofthebuilding.”
MOL:03/27/71:PyraxsamplesareabovetheTLV.Inspectorrecommendsworkerswearrespirators.
MOL:07/7/71:FollowupvisitonasbestosinSWcorner.Levelsatoneofthecardingmachineswastheworstrecordedatthelaboratory.Whilehousekeepingimprovedtherewerestilllargeamountsoffibreonthemachinesandfloors.
MOL:07/19/72:FiveofsixAsbestosfibrecountsareabovetheTLV.
MOL:09/20/72: Mica dust from machines is very high.TheonlymachinewithexhaustIsabovetheTLV.Soonecan“expecthigherlevelatmachinesnotexhausted.Orderissuedforproperenclosureandadequateexhaust.
MOL:02/6/73:leadconcentrationsatleadpotsandextrudersabovetheTLVof0.15mg/m³.Housekeepinginleadhandlingareapoor.Workersnotwearingrespirators.Exposuresneedtobeassessed.
MOL:06/7/73:Inspectionre:mercury,leadandepoxyuse.Mercuryspillsareapparent;leadlevelsabove
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TLV/inadequateexhaustventilation;workershandlingepoxyresinswithoutglovesorrespirators.Evidenceofepoxyrelateddermatitisnoted.
MOL:08/13/73:airsamplingandvisualinspection“demonstratethatasignificantexposuretomercurystillexists.”Asbestoscleanupnotcompleteandareanotfullyenclosed.
MOL:08/8/75:Unioncomplaintconcerningexposuretovinylchlorideandthedeathof6workerswhoworkedwiththePVCproductionandextruding.Samplestaken,butnoexposureriskfound.Unionquestionedsampling,e.g.accuracyofdraegertubes,nottestforthermaldecompositionby-products.
MOL:09/17/75:Asbestosandmercury—exhaustsystemforasbestosnotworking.AsbestosfibrecountsclosetotheTLV.Allmercuryareasare“….heavilycontaminatedwithmercury.”
MOL:10/16/75: Asbestos levels in drive systems exceedtheTLV.MOL:05/4/77: Asbestosclaiminvestigated.Asbestosexposureminimizedbythewcbbecausetheclaimantwasanofficeworkeratthetimehebecameill.However,hisemploymentrecordsshowhehadsignificantexposuresattheplantindepartmentsheavilycontaminatedwithasbestos.
MOL:06/2/77:Investigationofexposurestodusts,solventvaporsandgases.Inspectornotesheavyodorsaroundblisterpackmachine;needtoadviseworkersofhazardofantimonyandleadintheBanburyarea;preventivemaintenanceonmachinesusingtoxicsubstances;practicegoodhygiene.
MOL:05/11/79: Workers’ complaint of eye and throat irritation.ThenewCEECOmachineworksatfasterspeedandincreaseinexposuretooilmistduringmachineoperationandpossibleexposureconfirmed.
MOL:09/6/79:airsamplingforoilmistsabortedbecauseofmachinebreakdown.InspectorconcludesalltestsunderTLV.
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MOL:06/22/80:Asbestosassessment;possibleexposureconfirmed.Seecommentsmaderegardingnumerousasbestosexposuresobserved.
MOL:03/25/80:Asbestospaperusedasinsulationbeingremovedwithwirebrushexposesworkerstoasbestosfibre.
MOL:08/12/80:LeadexposureconfirmedinthePVCcompoundingarea.Althoughurinelead-levelsdidnotexceedtheTLV,inspectornotesneedforbetterhousekeepingforcleaningupthecompoundingareawithavacuumcleanerratherthansweeping.
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BUILDING: #22, 24, 26 DEPARTMENT: TRACTION MOTORS
General DescriptionMetal MachiningResin CoatingBaking Resin Coated PartsBrazing and WeldingCleaning and DegreasingCleaning and GrindingSand BlastingPower WashingPowder PaintingInduction Brazing
Known Chemicals used or produced:ArsenicDecompositionby-products:BPAs,benzene,formaldehydeResins:vinyltoluene,glyptolDetergentsWelding/Brazingfumes:fluxcore,hardwire,lead,silver,steel,silflexDegreasers:MEK,TCESilica, sandDust/particles:asbestos,resins,metals,epoxypaint,silica,sand,
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Summary:InhalationandabsorptionofMWF(biocides)mists,metaldusts,degreasers,epoxyresinsandthermaldecompositionby-productssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzene,complexmixturesinweldingfumes,brazingfumessuchaslead,silver,silicadust,detergents,epoxypowderpaints.
InhalationandskinabsorptionofMWFmistsandaerosols(somewithbiocide).
Inhalationofmetaldustsoffineairbornemetalparticulate.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionofdegreaserfumes.
Riskfactorsinclude:poorlocalexhaust,heavyproductionschedule,poorPPE,poorPM.
Symptoms:workercomplaintsandtreatmentforirritatedeye,noseandthroat,dermatitis.
Atmospherevisiblysaturatedwithmistandaerosol.
InhalationofuncuredepoxyresinfumesduringdippingprocesseventhoughlocalexhaustprovidedatthelidlipoftheVPItanks.Fumesfromwetpartsbeingtransportedtotheovensforcuringandbaking.Odourswereverystrongfromthisoperationandcouldbedetectedinotherareasofthebuildingaswellasbuilding22.Thestrongodoursweredetectedasfarasbuildings14and16,indicatingthatfumes
General Description:Tractionmotorsisessentiallyanassemblyoperationoftractionmotorsusedtorunlocomotivesandheavyequipmentinminingoperations.
Theoperationran24/7with3shifts,employingmanyemployees.Theoperationproduced2motorsperhour—approximately80perweek.
Thiswasaveryintenseoperationthatranfrom1995to2013(18years).
Theoperationoccupiedthethreebuildings#s22,24,26thathousedthewireandcableoperationuntil1980,anddrivesystemsuntil1994.
The operation involved:largescalemachining,epoxyresincoatingandovencuring,brazingandwelding,cleaning,degreasingandgrindingofparts,sandblasting,powerwashingandepoxypainting.
Metal Machining:Metalmachininginvolvedlargescaledrilling,boring,machining,cuttingutilizinglargeamountsofcuttingoils,coolingfluidscollectivelyknownasMetalWorkingFluids(MWF).Thesevaryincomposition,e.g.somecontaintoxicbiocidestopreventbacterialgrowth.ThemachiningprocessgenerateslargeamountsofmetalparticulateaswellasaerosolsandmistsofMWF.Heatedfluidswillalsoproducethermaldecompositionby-productsintheformofsmoke.Focusgroupparticipantsconfirmthattheseweretheconditionsduringthemachineoperations.
Resin Coating:VinylTolueneResincoatingofpartsinVacuumPressureInfusionTanks.Thesetankswereequippedwithautomatedlidsthatslowlyopenedwhenprocesswascompleteandwasprovidedwithalipexhaustsystemtocapturevapoursandfumesfromtheresintanks.Whileanimprovementovertheoldermodels,workersindistantdepartmentswouldcomplainaboutthefumesfromFractionalMotorsreachingasfarasbuildings16and14.WorkersinFractionalfrequentlycomplainedandexperiencedsymptoms—headache,eye,noseandthroatirritationsignexposuretakingplace.
Building #22 ( CIR. 1994-2004 ) Department: Traction Motor ProductionProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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wereverydenseduringthedippingandcuringoperations.Exposureriskwashigh.
Inhalationofresinsandthermaldecompositionby-productsfromthebakingprocess,e.g.BPA,formaldehyde,benzene,etall.BoththeMOLandMOEinvestigatedthisoperationfrequentlybecauseofcomplaints.Workerssymptoms:irritatedeye,nosethroat,dermatitis.
Inhalationofweldingfumesfrombrazing.Inconsistentlocalexhaustventilation.Poorgeneralventilation.Buildingwasundernegativepressureandlowceilingswhich,incombinationwithnegativeair pressure, tended to disperse contaminants to otherareas.
Inhalationandskinabsorptionofdegreaserfumesandvapoursaswellasthermaldecompositionby-products.Frequentcomplaintsbyworkersofthisdegreasingoperation.
Inhalationoflargeamountsofbrazingandweldingprocessfumes.Likelihoodofexposurehighgiventheamountofbrazingandweldingandthelackofadequatelocalexhaustventilationandgeneralventilation.Whilesomeventilationhoodswereprovidedtheywerenotadequatetodrawthefumesawayfromthewelders.Consequently,theMOLwascalledinmanytimestoinvestigatethe“BrazingTower”operations.
Inhalationofveryfinepowderedresindustfromgrinding,sandingandbuffingofbores,surfaces,andtapholes.Powderedresinswouldalsobeingestedandabsorbedthroughtheskin.Therewasnoadequateexhaustventilation.Workerswereprovidedwithpaperdustmasks.Overtheyearsworkersatetheirlunchattheworkstations.
Baking resin-coated parts:Resin-coatedpartswerebakedinovensfor7.5hourstwice.Thesewerelargeovensthatwerenottotallyenclosed.Duringthebakingprocessworkerswouldsqueegeeresinaroundthepartstoensureresinpenetratedthoroughlyandevenly.
Brazing and Welding:Bothbrazingandweldingwereextensive.Welderswouldbraze20”longbarsofcopperusingsilversolder—“Silflex”.Thisproducedlargeamountsofsolderfumesthroughoutthearea.Inductionbrazingwouldproducelargeamountsoffumesandsmoke.
Cleaning and Degreasing:CableswerecleanedanddegreasedwithMEKandTCE.Residueswouldproducevariousdecompositionby-productsduringthebrazingprocess.Therewasthepossibilityoftheformationofphosgenegas.Greatamountsofvapour,fumes,andstrongsolventodoursreportedbyworkersduringcleaningprocess.
Welding:Therewasextensiveweldingofvarioustypesintractionproduction.ThisinvolvedMIG,TIG,Flux-Core,Hardwire,torchcuttingofheavysteel.Theweldingareainbuilding22involvedweldingbracestostatorsandbalancingweightstorotorsbeforemachining.Cuttingtorchesusedtoremovebridgesfromstatorsbeforemachining.Extensive“torchbrazing”wascarriedoutatthe“BrazingTower.”Theseareashadheavyweldingfumesandinadequateexhaustventilationandfrequentcomplaints.Safetyinspectorsconductednumerousinvestigationsofworkercomplaints.
Cleaning and Grinding of Parts:Borecleaningoperationsweresubjectofconcernandcomplaintsfromworkersaboutexposurestofinecuredresindustproducedbythegrindingandbuffingoperationtoreducehighspotscausedbyexcesscuredresininthebores.Workerswouldalsosandandbuff“spigots”and“tapholes.”Thisprocessproducedgreatamountsof“brownpowder”dustfromcuredresins.Workerswereonlyprovidedpaperdustmasks.
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Inhalationoffinesilicadustandothercontaminantsinthecontaminatedsilica.Likelihoodofinhalationandexposureishighgiventhevolumeofsilicaused,lackofexposurecontrolandtheuseofcompressedairtoblowofdustonparts,machinesandclothing,andthelackofadequatePPE.
Inhalation,absorptionandingestionofaerosolscontainingdetergentsandotherdegreasingagentshigh.
Inhalation,absorptionandingestionofpowderedepoxypaintparticulateaswellasthermaldecompositionby-productsfromthebakingprocess.ThislatterissuemightinvolveBPA,formaldehydeandbenzene,etal.
Inhalationofsolderfumesandotherdegreasingresiduesonparts.Workersreportfrequentsymptoms and complaints of irritated eye, nose and throatandheadache.
Workersalsoreportedbadtasteinmouthwhencleaning‘smokeeater’filters.
Sand Blasting:SandblastingwithSilicaofpartsinenclosedcabinetwastopreppartsforfitting.Partswereplacedinautomatedblastingcabinet.Whenblastwascompletetheworkerswouldopenthedoortoremovethepart.Theworkerswouldusecompressedairtoblowoffdustfromthepartandsurroundingsurfacesandclothing.Workersdescribethisasaverymessyprocesswithgritanddustallover.Thiswasdifficulttomaintainandtheywouldhavetocontinuallyaddsilicatokeeptheoperationworkingassandwouldbecomecontaminatedwithothersubstancesontheparts.
Power Washing:Powerwashingofpartswithamixofdetergentwasdoneaftermachiningandfitting.Thisproducedagreatdealofaerosolofdetergentanddegreasers.Thisworkwasdoneinpreparationforpowderpaintingwithepoxy.
Powder Painting:Partswerepaintedwithepoxypowderedpaint.Powderedepoxypaintwassprayedonheatedparts(rotors)andthenbakedinanoven.Thisproducedgreatamountofpaintparticulateaswellasfumesfromthebakingprocess—thermaldecompositionby-productsfromepoxypaints.Workersdidnothaveadequaterespiratoryprotectionorlocalexhaustventilation.
Induction Brazing:Inductionbrazinginthe“windingarea”involvedelectricalfusingofsolderwithaninductioncurrent.Thisoperationproducedagreatamountofsmokefromthemeltedsolder.While“smokeeaters”wereprovidedtheywerefraughtwithfrequentproblemswithcloggedfilters.Cleaningthesmokeeaterfiltersexposedworkerstolargeamountsofresiduesfromthesmokeproducedbythebrazingprocess.
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BUILDING: #23 DEPARTMENT: ELECTROPLATING
General Description
General Work Tasks:
1. Preparation of Tanks
2. Dipping and Racking
3. Periodic Monitoring
Specific Process:
1. Metal Pre-Treatment
2. Electroplating
3. De-plating or Stripping Process
4. Plating, Cleaning and Maintenance
State of Industrial Hygiene Controls
Known Chemicals used or produced:
BerylliumDegreasersDetergents(causticsoda)GraphiteSilicaUraniumOxidesZirconium (Nickel Zinc, Tin)
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General Description of Exposure Risks in the Plating Operation:
Pre-Plating Stages:
Exposurerisksintheplatingdepartmentwerehigh,bothdailyandroutinelygiventhefollowingriskfactors:Workersdirectlyhandledtoxicsolutioningredientsinlargecontainerspouringandmixingintheplatingtanks(variousformsofcyanideacids,mixedwithvariousmetalsalts,formedtheplatingsolutions).Theriskofinhalingdusts,whilepouringandmakingskincontactwithpowdersandliquidsduringmixingandfromspillswashigh.
Eatingandsmokingattheworkstationputworkersatriskofingestingvarioustoxins.
Workers also handled solvents, acids and alkaline solutionsforpre-treatmentsofmetals.Thereisriskofinhalationandskinabsorptionaswellasingestionduetothepracticeofeatingandsmokingattheworkstation.Nothavingaccesstowashingfacilitiesincreasestheriskofingestionofthesetoxins(SeeMOLinspectionreports,1986).
Workerswerealsoexposedthroughinhalationandabsorption,whenleaningoverplatingtankswhileretrievingbasketsandrackswithpartsbeingplated.
Finally,itisimportanttoconsiderthelargevolumeshandledbytheseworkersandthefrequencyofthesemixingtasksaswellastheprovisionofinadequateprotectiveequipment(Audit,1984,wearingofcottonnotrubbergloves,notwearingeyeprotection).
Exposures During Plating
Thefollowingroutineexposuresarehighlylikelygiventheriskfactorsconcerninginadequatelocalexhaustventilationreported,thebuild-upofvarioussaltscakedonsurfacesandexhaustsystems,routinedirectcontactwiththeplatingtanksandsolutionandidentifiedpoorhousekeepingpractices:1. Metalsaltmistsgeneratedabovethe
electroplatingbathscontainingchromium,nickel,zinc,silver,brasscompounds;
General Description: GE operated several electroplatingoperations(1950-95)overtheyears.Initially,platingtookplaceattheNEcornerofbuilding16(25years)thenin1974movedto#23,anewlyconstructedbuildingwhichwasseparatefromthemainGEbuildings.Electroplatingwascloseddownin1995.
Thebuilding(#23)wasapproximately25,000sq.ft.withabasementwastetreatmentfacilityof6000sq.ft.Thedepartmentemployed10-12employeesononeshift,5daysperweek.
Therewerebetween5and6largeplatinglinesdependingonclientdemand.Theseplatinglinesutilizedapproximately85dippingtankswithplatingsolutionsofcyanideacidandvariousmetalsalts--includingtwolargevapourdegreasingtankscontainingtrichloroethyleneforvariousmetals,andtrichloroethaneforaluminum.Additionally,theprocessincludedseveralacidandcausticsodabathsforcleaningandetching,aswellasrinsingtanks.
Eachplatinglineusedtanksof100to300galloncapacity.Thesmallautomaticplatinglinehadeleven30-gallontanksandone200-gallontank.Theautomaticlinesdidnotrequireoperatorstoapproachthecyanidetanks.
Duringitsearlyoperation,theplatingdepartmentprovidedin-houseplatingservicestoGE’svariousdepartments.Inthelatterperiod,productionincreasedastheplatingdepartmentservedavarietyofcustomersrequiringspecializedplatingfortheirproducts.
Thevariouslinesincluded:brassplating,zincplating,chromeplating,nickelplating,andsilverplating.Platingsolutionscontainvariousmetalsaltsandacids,alkalinematerials,andotheradditivestoimpartstabilityorfunctionalpropertiestothesolutions.
General Work Tasks:
1.Preparationoftanks:
Building #23/16N Department: ElectroplatingProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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2. Acid/alkalinemistsgeneratedinthepre-treatmentphasewereverymuchpresentintheatmosphereasviewedaslikelycauseofsevere corrosion of structural beams in the buildingitself.Thesewerealsoindicatedbyworkers’symptomsofeye,noseandthroatirritation;
3. Cyanide mists, both cyanide salt mists and hydrogencyanidemists,werelikelyaircontaminants,giventhatbothwerenaturallygeneratedbytheelectrolysisprocess;
4. OrganicSolventvapoursandmistswerehighlylikelygiventhatbothsolventswerecontainedinverylarge(8’x6’x4’)vapourdegreasingtanks.Bothtrichloroethyleneandtrichloroethanewerepresentintheatmosphere.
Inassessingexposureonemustconsidernotonlyairconcentrations,butalsothefactthatthesesolventswillbedepositedontheskinandclothing,thusabsorbedthroughtheskin.Andsinceworkersweresmokingandeatingattheworkstation,theyalsoingestedthesecontaminants.Onemustlookatthetotalburdenandthechronicityoftheseexposures.
Giventheconditionsofworkplace,theroutinenessofexposures,thedirecthandlingandvolumehandleddaily,thentoxicexposuresmustbeconsideredhighfromanindustrialhygieneperspective.
Theothercontributingfactorre:exposureriskshastodowiththeseriousissuesofpoorhousekeepingandmaintenance,theimproperstorageofacidsandcyanide,leakingtanksanddrumsofcyanideandacids,andimproperlabeling.The1984auditnotes:“Allowingchemicalsaltstobuild-upontanks,sideshields,andinexhaustductsopenings.ThisaccumulationofmaterialsaddstotheinternalenvironmentandincreasesemployeeexposuretohazardoussubstancesSeeP.4,consultants“Audit”,1984.(See:Briggs,1984below).
Maintenanceandcleaningtasksincreasedtheriskofexposure.Removingcakedonmetalandacidsaltsinvolvesscrapingandgrindingwhichincreases
directhandlingandpreparationofdegreaserandacidsolutionsforpre-plating;preparationofplatingsolutionstobedispensedfromlargedrumsintothetanks;
2.Dippingandracking:Thisinvolvedmanualloadingandunloadingofracksorbaskets;movingthe(racked)partsfromtanktotank--usuallywiththehelpofanoverheadhoist;
3.Periodicmonitoringofoperation:Employeeswererequiredtoentertheplatingtankareatocheckonoperatingconditionsoftheplatingbathsandmaintainlevelofsolutionsasrequired.
Note:Cyanideswerepurchasedin10to100kgcontainers,(e.g.silvercyanidein10kg,zincandsodiumin100kg).Thesechemicalswerehandledmanuallybyworkerswhilepouringintotankstomake,ormaintain,platingsolutions.
Dustandsplashesduringmanualhandlingofpowderfrequentlyoccurresultingincontaminationonskinandclothing.
Note: several MOL reports and environmental assessmentsavailableidentifythisrisk.Workersatelunchandsmokedatwork-stations.Noeasilyaccessiblewashingfacilitieswereavailableandnolockerstochangeclothing.
Specific Processes:
1. Metal Pre-treatment:Priortoplating,basemetalswerethoroughlycleanedtoensureadherence.Thisinvolveduseofsolvents,acids,andalkalinesolutions.Degreasingsolventswereusedtoremovegrease,oils,etc.Theplatingshophadtwolargevapourdegreasingtanks8’x4’x6’,onefortrichloroethyleneandonefortrichloroethane.AccordingtoGEretirees,benzenewasusedtodegreaseintheplatinglaboratoryarea.Acidsolutionsusedtoremovemetaloxideswerereferredtoaspickling.Alkalinesolutionswereusedtoremoveoilsandsolidsoilsthroughdetergentaction.Theseweresometimesagitatedbytheinfusionofgasbubbles.Thesepre-treatmentsolutionswereusuallylocatedatthebeginningoftheplatinglines.Water
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dispersionofcontaminantsandriskofinhalation,absorption,andingestion.
Potentialexposuretocadmium,tungstenandcobaltnotedbyinspector(MOL:8/5/81).Recommendationsmadeforgoodhousekeepingandlocalexhaustventilationand/orappropriaterespiratoryprotection.
MOL:5/28/82:Toxicinhalation/absorptionhazardsnotedandordersissued.Order#119notedbuildupofcyanidewasteoverdykeundermerry-go-round.
GiventhelackoflocalexhaustventilationnotedintheMOLreportcitedbelow,itishighlylikelythattheworkersinhaledcadmiumfumesfromthesilverbrazingoperation.
Furtherevidenceofexposureistherespiratorysymptoms reported to the Ministry of Labour in 1981 and the subsequent issuance of orders to protect the workerfromexposuretoatoxicsubstancei.e.silversolderfumesandcadmium(SeeMOL:4/15/81).
Giventhedeficientstateofengineeringcontrolsandthefrequencyanddurationofexposureintendingtoplatingtanks,e.g.,samplingsolutions,dippingandremovingplatedmaterialsfromplatingtanks,therewassignificantriskofinhalationandabsorptionofcontaminants.
rinse-tankswereusuallylocatedbetweenthevariouspre-treatmenttanks.
Vapours and mists from the various treatment tankswerereadilyapparent,includingatoxicmixofsolvent vapours and both acid and alkaline mists and vapours.Workersreportedheavyodoursofsolvents.Accordingtoworkers,eye,noseandthroatirritationswereprevalentinthedepartment.
Note:Anengineeringreportindicatedthatstructuralbeamsinthebuildingweresignificantlycorrodedfromexposuretothevariousacidandalkalinevapoursgeneratedbyboththepre-treatmentandplatingprocesses(reasonforclosureofplating).
2. Electroplating Process:Duringtheelectroplatingprocess,anelectriccurrentpassesthroughtheplatingsolutionresultinginthedepositionoftheplatedmetalonthecathode.
Theelectroplatingprocessresultsinthereleaseofhydrogenandoxygengasbubbles,which,astheyrise,entrainplatingsolutiondroplets.Theseare carried into the atmosphere and form a mist containing:cyanide;metalsaltssuchaschromium,nickel,zinc,arsenicandcadmium;andacids,includinghydrochloricacid,nitricacid,sulfuricacid,andchromicacidmists.
Thegenerationandemissionofthesecontaminantsintheatmospheredependonthecurrentefficiencyassociatedwiththedifferentplatingsolution,e.g.chromiumplatingislowefficiencyof12to15%resultinginseveremisting,whilenickelplatingishighefficiencyresultinginmuchlessmisting.Solventemissionsarealsopartoftheenvironmentalmix,particularlytrichloroethylenebelowtheTLV(SeeMOLreport).
Asbestos:InsulationonCrownplatesfrayedinsomeareas.Likelyexposuretoasbestos.3. De-plating or Stripping Process: This involves strippingthebasemetalofpreviouscoatingsbydippingthemetalsinsolutionsofcyanideacid.This
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isahazardousprocesssinceitcanreadilygeneratehydrogen-cyanidegas(HCN).
4. Plating Cleaning and Maintenance: Maintenancetasksincludedcleaningoutslurryfromclarifiers,removingvariouscakedonplatingsaltsfromtanksandexhaustsystems.Thesetaskswereasignificantsourceofexposure.SinceanAuditcalledforincreasedcleaningandmaintenance,theriskofexposureincreasedsubstantially.
5. Silver Brazing:ThesilverbrazingareawaslocatedintheSWcornerofBldg.#23andmeasuredabout20’x12’x20’andsharedthegeneralventilationsystemofelectroplatingdepartment.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.Apedestalfanwasusedtoblowthefumesawayfromtheworker.
Oneemployeeworked40hrs/wk.Theworkconsistedofjoiningvariousmetalparts(stainlesssteel,copper,brass,bronze,elkonite,etc.)withanaturalgastorchattemperaturesbetween1300to1800°F.Mostcommonlyusedsolderswere:easyflow45(silver,copper,zinc,nickelandcadmium[24%])andEasyFlow3(silver,copper,zinc,nickelandcadmium[17%]).Upto50’of1/16thusedpershift.Fluxesincluded:HandyFluxA1andJohnsonMattheyFluxandMattiflux3A.Theformercontainsfluoridesandzincchloridewhilethelattercontainsfluorides.
State of Industrial Hygiene Controls:
1. Engineering Controls: Localexhaustventilationwasprovided,butanenvironmentalassessmentindicatedseriousdeficienciesinexhaustventilationincludinginadequatecapturevelocitiesandinsufficientmake-upair,starvingexhaustfromextractingcontaminants.
Note:Seeseveralplatingdepartmentreportsidentifyingdeficienciesinthelocalexhaustsystems.
Examplesinclude:NitrousOxidefumesfromnitricacidbecausenitricacidtankexhaustnotfunctioningproperly;platingchemicalsleachingoutofexhaustducts;exhaustductspluggedwithchemicalsalts;exhaustductspartiallyblockedbychemicalsalts
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resultinginplatingfumesandmiststocontaminatethearea(HarveyBriggs,AssociatedEnvironmentalConsultants, “Environmental, Health and Safety Audit,PeterboroughPlatingShop,CanadianGeneralElectricCompany,Peterborough,Canada,1984).
2. PPE/Housekeeping: Reports indicate that housekeepingandcleaningwerenotroutinelyperformed.Evidenceofimproperstorageofhazardousmaterials;staffwearingcotton,insteadofrubber,gloves;notwearingsafetyglasses;employeessmokingandeatinginplatingshop;workersleaningoverplatingtankstoremoveplatingbasketsorrackswhilemistarebeingemittedallindicatepoorhousekeepingandsafetypractices.Briggsstates:“HousekeepingandpreventivemaintenanceatplatingfacilityisafulltimejobandwillrequiremorethanaFridayafternoonwashdown”(P.9,Briggs,1984).
(HarveyBriggs,AssociatedEnvironmentalConsultants, “Environmental, Health and Safety Audit,PeterboroughPlatingShop,CanadianGeneralElectricCompany,Peterborough,Canada,1984).
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BUILDING: #24 DEPARTMENT: FORMEX
Formex Operation
Process:
Steps: 1-6
Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosAcetoneEnamels:Alkenex,Formex,Formes,FormexA1,HLM,ML,MLRFumes:enamel,degreasers,copper/enamelDegreasers/Thinners:Toluene,MEK,Varsol,AcetoneMetals: copperThermalDecompositionBy-Products:BPA,formaldehyde,benzene
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Inhalationofpotentfumeslinkedtoanumberofbrandepoxy“varnishes”includinguncuredepoxyfumesanddecompositionby-productssuchasBPA,formaldehyde,benzeneetal.
Inhalationofcopperfumeslinkedtoheatinganddrawingthroughdies.
JHSC: 8/14/79: re: asbestos: “Asbestos is used tostuffopeningsonannealingoveninformex.Alternativematerialsavailable!”
Inhalationofbothcopperandvarnishfumesduringdippingandheatingoperations.
Inhalationanddermal(face,eyes,arms,hands)exposurestovarnish,varsol,acetone,andmuriaticacid,andperhapsotherchemicalsduringmaintenanceactivities.
Formex Operation:Referstoapplyingenamelcoatingoncopperwire.EndproductisFormexwirewithvarnish(enamel)onit.NoMSDSavailableon“varnish”epoxieswhichincluded:StraightFormexenamel,Alkenex,FormexA1,MLR,Formes,ML,andHLMwhichwerecontainedin45galloncontainersandthinnedwithTolueneorMEK.“Alkenex”describedas“theworst”wassuppliedbyDavenport(likelytheGEplantinTorontoonDavenportAve).Operationinvolves26machinesand16reels.
Process:1. Copperwiredrawnthroughgasconverter,
whichcreatesatmosphereofcarbonmonoxidecirculationuntilproperthickness(diameter)isachieved.
2. Next,wiregoesthroughannealingoventosoftenwirepriortocoatingstage.Gascomingoffannealingisexhaustedoutside(systemchangedfromwaterexhausttocatalyticconverterduetoneighbor’scomplaintsofbrownfilmontheirwindows).
3. Wirethengoesthroughverticaldippingprocess.Pumpplacedin45gallondrumcontainingheated(30°F)varnishwhichtravelsupanddownaseriesofloopswhilecoatingcopperwire--excessvarnishdripsintolargetroughs.
4. Wiresthentravelalongverticalovensat3differenttemperatures(150,175,and200degrees).Three-inchgapbetweenverticalovensallowsfumestodisperse.
5. Workersregularlymaintainedsheaves(partofmachine)fromacatwalkabovethevarnishcoatingoperation,byscrapingexcessvarnishoffthevertical“sheaves”10-12timespershiftapplyingvarsolandacetonebybrushtocleanthem.Theywould“troubleshoot”bycleaningsheaves1-3timesperhourwithoutpersonalprotection.
6. Involveddippingsheavesinmuriaticacidbathin6’x5’opentroughs,thendrip-dryingthesheavesfor5-6hours.Thislaterprocesscreated heavy vapours and led to frequent complaintsofsevereeyeirritation.
Building # 24 Department: Wire and Cable (Formex) Production Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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BUILDING: #26 DEPARTMENT: WIRE AND CABLE
Shaved Mill OperationButt WeldingTin Pot OperationTar Pot OperationMercury Test Area5-Inch Lead PressHassel Machine PVC Mixing Operation
Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCoal TarDegreasers:TCEDromus OilDusts:copper,asbestos,silica,flameretardants,Fumes:brominated/chlorinatedflameretardants,welding,degreaserGranulated resinMetals: Copper, Tin, Lead, Mercury, other heavy metalsMuriaticAcidPigmentsThermalDecompositionBy-Products:phthalates
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Riskofdailyexposureofworkerstoexhaustfromlifttrucks.Finecopperdustvisible(fromshavingprocess)thatwassweptorblownwithcompressedair.Workersnoteddustupto2”thick.ShavedmillandcraneoperatorsbothexposedtocopperdustandTCEsolution.Bodiesandclothescoveredincopperdustthatturnedgreen.Complaintsofburningskinandeyes.Workersoftenateinworkarea.
Dailyexposuretoweldingfumes,andcopperfumes.Butt-weldinggeneratedsignificantsmokeandfumes.Vapourresidueofdegreasersonwirebeingfused.
Significantchemicalexposuresfromfumesfromacidbathandtinningpots.Exhaustsystemshutdownmostofthetimefor“moreefficient”cooling.
Exposuretocoaltarvolatiles(moltentarpots).Exhaustsystemusuallyshutoff(interferedwithmaintainingtemperatureofcoalpots).Workersidentifiedthat“norespiratoryequipmentwasprovided.”Numerousemployeescomplainedof,andwerediagnosedwith,lungcomplicationsinthisworkarea(likelyrelatedtomuriaticacidexposuresandcoaltarfumes).Lackofventilationresultedinheavyaccumulationofodorsthroughoutthearea.
Biologicalmonitoringcarriedoutonworkersinmercurytestarea.Thosewithhighlevelsofmercurytransferredtootherdepartments.
MOL:06/7/73:“largemercuryglobulesnoticedundermachines.”Mercuryvapourmeasuredat0.04to0.05mg/m³atbreathingzone;0.01to0.02mg/m³atfloorlevel.TLV=0.05mg/m³.Urineanalysislittleornoabsorption.Ordersissuedfor:noeating,housekeeping,personalhygieneandurinetestevery3months.
MOL:09/17/75:Highmercuryconcentrations—0.06,0.08,0.05,0.08,0.04mg/m³exceededTLV.Employerfailedtocomplywithpreviousorderregardingmercuryexposure.Recommendtore-issueorder3-monthcompliancedeadline.Nochargesfiledfornon-compliance.
Shaved Mill Operations: Wire reels delivered to shavedmills(#131and#132)bycraneandlifttrucks.ThenDegreasing/cleaningofwirepriortoandduringshavingdoneinsolutionofTCEand“soap.”Pailsofsolutionispouredintolargetroughsandhandledwithcottongloves.
Butt Welding:Weldersspot-weldendofonereelofcopperwiretoanothercreatingan“endless”reel.Processinvolvedfusingofwireendswithelectricalinjection.Weldersfusedbetween60and3000lbs.ofcopperdaily.
Tin Pot Operations:Tinningofwireemployedthreepotsoftin,with6copperwirereelsoneachsideofpot.Wirewasrunthroughmuriaticacidandadieandthenrunthroughawaterbathtocool(donebymachine).Processranat300’perminute.Note:whenfumesexhaustedthroughroof,treesinsurroundingareaweredamagedasreportedbysupervisorinOCHOWreport.
Tar Pot Operations:(oneemployeepershiftdedicatedtothisjob)Coaltarpitchappliedtominingcables(cablesusedinminingoperations).BXarmourwrappedaroundcabletheninterlocked.Juteburlaptreatedwithcoaltarpitchappliedandwrappedaroundthewires.Cableswere4”-5”indiameter.10,000feetoftarredcableproducedperyear.
Mercury Test Area:4-5operatorspershifttestedFormexwireforcontinuity.Wirewasrunthroughopenmercuryfilledtrough(10”x12”x1½).Workersusedbarehandstodrawhotwirethroughtrough(wirewasslippery).Notedneurologicalsymptomsandthickeningofnailsinworkerssignsofmercurypoisoning.
5 Inch Lead Press:Copperwireisrunthroughtroughsofmoltenlead(upto20’inlength)heatedto1300degreesCentigrade.Oneworker-operatedpressthatpulledwirethroughdiesinleadfilledtroughwhileasecondworkerwindsthewire(1/2coatingofleadonwire)ontoreels.Winderworeasbestosgloves,breakingoffexcesslead.Dromusoilappliedtoavoidstickinginwindingprocess.Leadpotsmanuallyfed
Building # 26 Department: Wire and CableProduction Process Chemical Exposure Risk
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MOL:06/7/73:Inspectionre:mercury,leadandepoxyuse.Mercuryspillsareapparent;leadlevelsaboveTLV/inadequateexhaustventilation;workershandlingepoxyresinswithoutglovesorrespirators.Evidenceofepoxyrelateddermatitisnoted.
MOL:08/13/73:Airsamplingandvisualinspection“demonstratethatasignificantexposuretomercurystillexists.”Asbestoscleanupnotcompleteandareanotfullyenclosed.
(Re:5inchleadpress)Bothworkersexposedtoleadfumes.Dermalandinhalationroutesofexposure.ExposureNotes:Thestrippedoffpiecesofoilcoatedleadreturnedtopotwhereoilwouldreact,creatingheavyfumes.Workersatetheirlunchinareawithlead-coveredhands.
Exposuretochemicalfumesanddustincluding:PVCfumes,VCfumes,phthalatefumes,silica,lead,flame-retardants,asbestos(upto20ormoreingredientsdependingonproductspecifications).Dicerproducedalotofdust,asdidloadingthehopper.Workersexposedtoheavyfumesduringmixingprocess.Accumulateddustdry-sweptand/orblownbycompressedair.Exhaustsystemusuallyturnedoff.Nogloves,safetyglassesusedbyworkerswhooftenateattheirworkstations.Exposurerisksoccurredduringingredienthandlingbyopeningbags,handlingmaterial,pouringmaterialintohoppers,andduringmixingandheatingphase,duringtheextrusionphase,andduringthepurgingandmaintenanceprocedures.
JHSC: 12/1/78: re: PVC mixer malfunction: Mixerunitoverheatedcausingrapiddecompositionofmaterialsinprocess.ReactiongaveoffHCLacidfumes,whichengulfed(worker)andpartiallyincapacitatedhim.Hemanagedtoevacuateareaandsentoutfortreatment.Lettersenttomanufacturerre:installingofbackupsystemtosenseexcessivetemperaturebuild-upwithautomaticcutoffs.
MOL:01/21/47:“GirlFettlingArea”-locatedatwestendofbldg.#26notedhighsilicadustcountsapproachingTLV.Also,8of9airsamplesabovethemercuryTLV.
80lb.ingotswithbarehands.Exhaustusuallykeptoffduetocoolingwhichsloweddowntheprocess(whichwascostlytopieceworkers).Beforewindingontoreel,wirewentthroughwaterbaththatproducedsteamandmist.
Hansel Machine (1975) PVC Mixing Operation: Ninedifferentcoloursandmixesused.Hopper(4’-5’)manuallyfilledwithgranulatedresin.MachineextrudedstripsofPVCthatweredicedtoformpellets.Dicerproducedalotofdustwithheavyfumescreatedduringthemixingprocess.ThiswasaheavyPVCproductionarea.Inadditiontovinyl chloride monomer this process used several tonsofleadpermonthaswellasphthalates,pigments,asbestos,silica,brominated/chlorinatedflame-retardants,andvariousotherheavymetalsdependingonthespecifiedrecipes
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MOL:01/27/47:Overdueexamsregardingemployeeexaminationforleadpoisoning.Levelsatleadpots:1.0and0.3mg/10m³notedtobelowerthanTLV.
MOL:05/05/47:“ideally,testingshouldbeenclosedboothasspraypainting.”Needtokeepclosecheckonamountofmercuryused.Highloss(ofmercury)indicatesfurthercheckingnecessary.
MOL:10/31/47: Update on company’s clean up of mercury:“someprogresshasbeenmade”.RequestfortoxicityinformationonPCBsbutnoinformation“found”.
MOL:02/24/49:Pyranolsampling:“amountfoundishigherinspotsthatwelike.”09/12/55:reviewofvarnishcoatingprocessduringtheFormexprocess.Smokingintheworkplaceacceptable10and20feetfromthevarnisharea.Nameofvarnishesdifficulttoreaderodedprint—‘formex,invarek’.
MOL:06/04/63:Mercuryexposuresincondensercheckingareaandformextestingarea.Globulesofmercuryonswitchboxesandfloor.Evidenceofcontinuedmercuryproblem.
MOL:12/16/68:Fluoridefumesfromweldingfluxinbrazingareausingsilversolder.Recommendationtotesttheairforfluoridefumes.
MOL:05/31/68:LeadinthePVCpelletizingarea.Testforleadfumes,butnotresultsshowninbuilding26.
MOL:10/16/69:AnalysisofepoxypaintbyMOLidentifieditcontaineduncuredepoxyresin,pigmentandsolvent.Catalystconsistedofepoxyresinmodifiedwithamineandsolvent.Epoxypaintcontents:toluene,xylene,ethylcellosolve,andunidentifiedkeytone.Catalystcontents:normalbutylalcohol,tolueneandxylene.
MOL:08/12/80:Tinningsectionidentifiedasaconfirmedareaforleadexposure.
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BUILDING: #30 DEPARTMENT: BUS DUCT
General DescriptionGeneral Working ConditionsCutting and Rolling Aluminum SheetsBus Duct AssemblyMOCA Production
Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosChromate paintFibreglassWeldingfumesMIG,TIGMWFOzoneFire retardants EtchingchemicalsVinylwash,YellowzincchromatesGreenzincchromatesDasco tapEpoxies:greenandorangeepoxyenamels,MOCAFumes:enamelpaint,degreasers,aluminum/stainlesssteel/copperweldingMetalDusts:aluminum,stainlesssteel,copper,tungstenSolvents: TCE, 1,1,1-Trichloroethane, tolueneThermaldecompositionby-products:aluminumalloy,tungsten,magnesium,hexavalentchromiumBlackfibreglasstapeirathenetape
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Workersinthisdepartmentwereregularlyexposeddirectlyorasby-standerstotheweldingprocesses.Thisledtoinhalationofaluminumandstainlesssteelweldingfumesaswellasfumesfromcopperbrazingoperationsandvapoursfromsolvents.
Welding Fumes and Gases: The aluminum arc weldingoperationinvolvedTIGandMIGweldingthatproducedheavyconcentrationsofaluminumalloyaswellastungstenandmagnesiumby-productsfromtheintenseheat.Aluminumalsoproducedheavyconcentrationsofozonegas.TheseemissionswerenotwellcontrolledsincetherewasalackoflocalexhaustventilationandnoadequatePPE.Ozonegasisclassifiedasagroup1carcinogenbyIARC.Theoperationof20”fanstoaddresstheozonegasonlydispersed fumes and other contaminants to other areasofthebuildingtobeinhaledbyotherworkers.Exposuretoozonegaswasafrequentcomplaintfromby-standerworkersandwelders.Consequently,weldingfumesandozonewereblownaroundthebuildingandsuckedintothepaintshop.
JHSC: 3/19/81: re: ozone:“Extremelyhighozonereading.[Ittook]onepullwhenusually5pullsondrageur[testtube]andozonereadingwentoffthescale.”
JHSC: 3/23/82: re: ozone fumes:“Airfilteringsystemwasinstalledbutnotenoughmasksforallworkers.Airflowinbldg.causesheavyconcentrationofozoneateastendofbldg.wherepaintboothlocated.Oneworkerconstantlywearsanairsupplymaskwhenweldingisbeingdone,eventhoughhehimselfdoesn’tworkonwelding,saying‘hefeelsbettersincehestartedwearingit’.”
Solvent Exposures:Workerswerealsoexposedtovarioussolventsthatwereusedtodegreaseinpreparationforweldingorpainting.Thesesolventssuchas1,1,1-Trichloroethane,toluenewereappliedbyhandwithsoakedrags.Thesewereinhaledinclosequartersaswellasbeingabsorbedthroughtheskinsincetheywereappliedwithbarehands.
General Description: The Bus Duct department wasessentiallydevotedtotheconstructionof‘busducts’whichwereelectricalconduitshousingcopperbusbarconductorsforhighvoltagetransmissionconstructedwithelectricalgradealuminumalloyandcopperbars.Itemployed15to20workerspershift.
Thisinvolvedprimarilyaluminumweldingandcopperbrazingaswellassomestainlesssteelwelding.Italsorequiredmetalgrinding,sanding,andplaning--aswellasdegreasinginpreparationforpainting.Upperlevelsofthebuildingcontained:machining,painting,degreasing,MOCAproduction,aluminumcutting,sawing,drillingandrolling.
General Working Conditions:Therewaslittlelocalexhaustventilationparticularlyinthealuminumweldingoperation.Atmospherewasdusty,smokyandcontainedsolventodoursandvapour.Housekeepingwasdescribedaspoor.MWFusewashighduringaluminummachiningandplaning.MOCAproductionprocesswaspoorlyventilated.VentilationwasblowndownwardandwasalsoaffectedbythenegativepressureintheGEcomplex.Fumes(MOCA,MWF,welding)fromtheoperationonthe3rdfloorweresuckeddowntheelevatorshafttothegroundfloor.
Cutting and rolling aluminum sheets: Aluminum plateswerecuttosizeusingbandsawsandhandheldcircularsaws.AluminumwastreatedwithMWF.Thecutsheetswerethenrolledwithlargerollingmachinesshapingthemintobusducts.Thesheetswerenextdeburred,bevelledandsanded.Aftercuttingandshaping,aluminumwasdegreasedbyhandandpreparedforwelding.
Bus Duct Assembly:weldingindividualductstogether,usingTIGandMIGelectricarcweldingassembledthebusducts.5to6weldersoneachshiftcarriedthisout.Thisworkproducedlargeamountsofaluminumweldingfumesaswellashighconcentrationsofozonegasandresiduesfromdegreasers.Welderswereprovidedwith20”oscillatingfanstoblowtheozoneawayfromthewelders.Thiswasproblematicbecauseitcauseddust
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Paint Exposures:Theseworkersalsopaintedbusductswithchromateyellowandgreenpaintsalongwithpre-treatmentswithsolvents.Chromatepaintscontainhexavalentchromium,whichishighlytoxicandclassifiedbyIARCasagroup1carcinogen.
Exposuretoasbestosdustwasalsoapartofregularweldingactivitysinceasbestosblanketswereusedtoprotectplatedpartsfromweldingsplatter.Welderexposedtoasbestosfibrefromlyingontheblanketsduringweldingprocess.
Metal Dusts:Exposuretoaluminumandothermetaldustswasalsoprevalentbecauseofthemajorsawingandgrindingofaluminumsheetsforcreatingbusductstructures.Theprocessofcutting,machiningandgrindingproducedinhalablemetalduststhroughoutthedepartment.
MOCA Exposure:TheMOCAmixingandcuringprocessexposedworkerstoahighlytoxicpolymerthatisclassifiedbyIARCasagroup1carcinogen.Thiswasmixedwithoutanyexposurecontrols.Mixersaswellasby-standerswereexposedtothishighlytoxicmaterial.Becausetheywerehandlingthissointimately,mixerswouldbeatgreaterriskofexposures.Managementpersonnelwereeitherunawareofitstoxicityorweregivingfalseinformationtoemployees.OneworkerdescribedhowaforemantookahandfulofMOCApowderandstuckitinhisfaceandsaying,“youcouldputthisonyourbreakfastcerealinthemorning,anditwouldn’tdoyouanyharm.”
JHSC: 10/11/79: re: MOCA hazards: “In an instructionsheetfromOGWhite,IndustrialHygienistofGESchenectady,(MOCA)workersareinstructedtoshowerbeforechangingtostreetclothes.Also,companytosupplyfreshlylaunderedclothingforworkerseachshift.ItisobviousthatourfearsregardingMOCAdangerswerewellfounded.”
MOL: 12/13/78:WorkercomplaintsregardingthegenerationofozonegasduringtheMIG/TIGweldingofaluminum.Ozonelevelsdetectedat0.3ppmexceededtheTLVforozonegas.MOL:05/28/82:Noexhaustventilationduringpouringofmoltenmetaloperationon3rdfloor.
andozonetomigratetootherworkers.Respiratorswereoptionalandwererarelywornbywelders.
Asbestosblanketswereusedduringweldingtoprotectplatedpartsfromweldingsplatter.Welderslayontheseblanketsduringweldingandwouldbecoveredwithasbestosfibresuponcompletion.
Solventdegreasersweretrichloroethane,1,1,1-trichloroethane, and toluene applied by hand cloth.
AfterweldingbusductswerecleanedinaVinylwashcontainingacid.Thesewerethenpaintedwithzincchromateyelloworgreenenamelpaintasafinishcoating.Paintspraygeneratedheavypaintodoursandvapours.Averticalexhaustfanwasprovided.
The paint booth used 5-gallon pails of acetone, lacquer thinner, naphtha gas, MEK and isocyanate paints.
Itwasnotedinplantdocumentsthatthewestendloadingbayofbldg.#30containedunlabeled45gdrumsofPCBsstoredforshippingtoMontreal.
Work conditions:Ventilationwaspoor.Duringwinter,theairwasheavilycontaminatedbecausenaturalventilationfromwindowsanddoorswassealedshut.Therewasnolocalexhaustventilation.
MOCA Production:MOCAwasmixedandproducedonthethirdfloorofbldg.#30.ThisinvolvedmixingtheMOCAepoxycatalystbyhandinsmallbatchestoproduce6”x4”rectangularpucks.TheMOCAcatalystcameindrumsinpowderedgranuleform,whichproduceddustinthemixingprocess.ThesepuckswereusedandfashionedbyhandtofitontomininghoistdrumsinBldg.#10south.MOCAisclassifiedbyIARCasagroup1carcinogen.
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BUILDING: #34 DEPARTMENT: STEEL CUTTING
General DescriptionSteel CuttingSteel WeldingLayoff Painting
Known Chemicals used or produced:AsbestosCuttingOilsGlyptolwhiteleadpaintFumes:metallicsilicatefluride(fromflux),leadoxide(leadprimerpaint)ozone,carbondioxide/monoxide(welding)varsol,cuttingoils(MWFs)Degreasers:TCE,TolueneDust:Metals:carbon,magnesium,sulphur,phosphorus,iron,silica,lead;Other:epoxyRust InhibitorsThermalDecompositionBy-Products:phosgene,silicatefluride,zincoxideVarsol
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Workersinthisdepartmentwerechronicallyexposedtovariousweldingfumes,primarilythroughinhalation.
Sinceworkersateattheirworkstations,dustscontainingvariousmetalcompoundswerealsoingested.Evidenceofaccumulateddustonsurfacesintheworkareaandonadjacentworksurfacesinofficeswouldindicatewidespreadcontaminationandexposuretoweldingdustsandfumes.
Upper respiratory tract symptoms reported by workersindicatemajorinhalationofweldingfumesanddusts.Thisisalsosupportedbythefactthatworkersdidnotwearrespiratoryprotectionandthathousekeepingwaspoor.
Localexhaustwithsmokeeatersprovidedlimitedprotectionandsimplydispersedweldingfumesintothegeneralatmosphereoftheworkplace.
Mildsteelalloysincludecarbon,magnesium,suphur,phosphorus,iron,andsilicawhicharecontainedinbothweldingfumesanddustsinadditiontoby-productsrelatedtodegreasers(TCE)andMWFs(e.g.,varsol,cuttingoil)used.Additionalmaterialsthatcreate by-product fumes/vapours/dusts are linked to epoxyproductssuchastheleadoxideprimerpaintusedinlayoffpainting.Thereisstrongevidenceofsignificantexposurestotheseproductsbecauseofthelargesizeofmaterialsused,thuslargeamountsofchemicalproductsused/producedinworkprocessesasthefollowingMOLreportssubstantiate.Participantsrecalledaclusterofheartattacksamongpersonnel.
MOL:09/03/82:investigationofworkercomplaintregardingupperrespiratorytractirritationfromweldingfumes.Inspectorconfirmedoverexposuretoweldingfumesbutnospecificcomponentidentified.COtestperformedbutnoweldingfumestested.Recommendedconsistentuseofportablelocalexhaust.
General description:Thisdepartment,employing50-100peopleworking2or3shifts,wasdedicatedtocuttingmild-steelplateswithoxy-acetylenetorches,whichwerethenfitbygrindingandassembledusingelectricwelding.Platescouldvaryindimensionbutwereanywherefrom¾”to4”thickandaslargeas10’x20’.Aswell,thesesheetswerepressedintoshape.Thedepartmenthadverylargeshears,a100-tonpressandalargerollingmillusedtorollsteel.Thisoperationwasmovedintobldg.34in1984frombldg.14.
Steel Cutting:Thesteelwascutwithlargeshearsandaseriesofverylargeoxy–acetylenecuttingtorches(referredtoasburners)thatweremechanicallymaneuveredinapre-determinedpattern.Cuttingoil,varsol, and rust inhibitors could be used in the shear cuttingprocessresultinginchemicalexposuresintheformofvapours,fumes,anddust.
Thebuildingmeasuredabout400x100x30feetandwasventilatedbydoorsandwindowsandapoweredrooffan.Approximately30productionworkerswereemployedfor40hoursperweek.
Steel Welding:Theweldingareameasuredabout30x40x25feet.Itisnotseparatedfrombuilding34bywallsandsharesthegeneralventilationwiththisbuilding.Smokeeaterswereprovidedforweldersbutdonotprovidecompleteweldingfumeextraction.
Stickweldingusingflux-coatedmildsteelrodandshieldedarcweldingusinguncoatedsteelwireand75-25argon-carbondioxideareweldingmethodsused.Inthelattermethod,aflowof30to45cubicfeetperhourofshieldinggasisused.
Eightworkersworkedinthisareaandweldingcomprisedatleasthalfoftheirday.Norespiratoryprotectionwasworn.
Withuptothreeweldingoperationsgoingoninadditiontothelargeoxy-acetylenecutting,veryheavyweldingfumesweregeneratedthroughoutthedepartment.Thesefumeswouldmigratetootherareasoftheplant.Degreasingwasalsoextensiveforthepreparationofsheetsforassemblywelding.
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MOL: 11/18/82:Investigationofworkercomplaintregardingweldingfumes.AirconcentrationforweldingfumesexceededtheTLVof5mg/m³.Concentrationsrangedfrom1.2to6.5mg/m³.
MOL: 12/6/82:Investigationofexcessivesmokeandfumesfromlargeburnerscuttingsteel.Nolocalexhaustventilation.Infact,thesmokewasnotexhaustedatall.Noordersissued.Employerindicateditwouldprovidesmokeeatersinfuture.
Workerhealthsymptomsindicativeofproblemsofover-exposuretoweldingdustsandfumeswereidentifiedinJointHealthandSafetyMinutesInadditiontherewasevidenceofsignificantdermalexposuretoleadpaintandfumes,aslargeamountsofleadprimerwasusedonsteelpiecesthatcouldbeupwardsof25-40ft.insize.
JHSC: 12/8/81: Re: dust control in burner area: “Writealettertomanagerandaskhimtoexperimentwithnextprecipitatorthatcomesinandseeifwecancomeupwithsomesortofexhaustforburnersarea.”
JHSC: 12/8/81: Re: dermatitis: “Report that employeeworkingatlayofftablehasseriousdermatitisfromworkingwithwhiteleadpaint.NotesGlyptolpaintcontains2%lead.”
Significant stand by exposures through inhalation.
Therewasinadequatelocalexhaustventilationwithsmokeeatersprovidinglimitedexhaustventilation;necessaryrespiratoryequipmentwasnotprovided.
Workers reported irritated eyes, nose and throat aswellasheadaches.Agreatmanyvisitstothecompanyhospitalbytheworkerswereforsevereheadaches.
Therewasnoventilationinthisbuilding.Itwasalwayssmoky,dependingonthenumberofwelders.FumeswouldtraveltotheGPCarea.Thiswasa200’longbuildingwithweldingandcuttingsootonallsurfaces.Theofficedesksintheareawouldbecoveredinsootthroughouttheday.
Layoff Painting:Leadpaintwasusedtomarksteelpieceswherecuttingwastobedone.Paintingwasdonebyhandonlayofftables.Leadpaintwasthinnedwithnaphtha.
Thereweregreatquantitiesofleadpaint,burnerscreatingfumes,andmajorweldingwithMIGand‘stick’weldinginbldg.34.
Asbestosblanketsusedwherepartsneededprotectionfromweldingoperations.
Balcony 2nd floor: This area carried out assembly andwiring,packingandshippingaswellithadasmallpaintbooth.Fumesanddustsfromtheoperationsbelowwouldmigrateuptothisareathuscreatingseriousbystanderexposurestothesecontaminants.ThistogetherwithpaintfumesfromthepaintboothandtheproductionofFlamonalandotherwirescontributedsignificantlytothesebystanderexposures.
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ADDENDUM 1
EXPANDED DISCUSSION OF THE QUALITATIVE METHODS USED IN THE GE RETROSPECTIVE EXPOSURE PROFILE STUDY
ThepurposeofthisstudywastodevelopretrospectiveexposureprofilesofproductionprocessesattheGEplantinPeterborough,Ontario.ThiswaspromptedbywhatwasperceivedasanextraordinarilyhighrateofcanceramongGEemployeesandtheconcernsoftheformerGEworkersthattheinformationgatheredtodateaboutexposureswasnotcomprehensiveanddidnotreflectthetrueextentofexposuresandactualworkconditionsattheplantduringtheirtenureattheplant.WiththeexceptionofaverycomprehensiveretrospectiveexposureprofilestudyoftwodepartmentsbyOccupationalHealthClinicsforOntarioWorkers(OHCOW)industrialhygienist,SonyaLal,therewaslittleinformationaboutexposureconditions.Uptothatpointwhatwasrelieduponwerecompanyworkrecords,somecompanyhygienedataandanarrowlybasedexposurematrixdevelopedbythecompanyindustrialhygienestaff.Ineffect,therewaslittleornoinformationgatheredinacomprehensivemannertogetanaccuratepictureofthedaytodayoperationsofthevariousproductionprocessesandtheextentofexposures.
Itwastheviewoftheresearchersthatacomprehensiveretrospectiveexposureprofileoftheplant’smajorproductionactivitycouldbecarriedoututilizingamixedqualitativeresearchmethodology.Theresearcherschosequalitativeresearchdesignandmethodologiesbecausethisapproachwouldbestprovideadeepandrichunderstandingofthedaytodayoperationsbyreconstructingthemajorproductionprocessesasexperiencedbytheemployeesthemselves(Brown2003).
Inessence,byreconstructingtheproductionprocesses/productbeingproduced,materials/chemicalsused,detailedtaskscarriedout,andavailableexposurecontrolsa“measure”oftheextentofexposurecouldbedevelopedviainferencesbasedonidentifiedriskfactorsforexposure(Brown2003;Brophyetal.2012).Increasingly,researchersinpublicandoccupationalhealthareturningtoqualitativemethodseitherontheirown,orinconjunctionwithquantitativemethods,todeterminetheimpactofenvironmentalandworkplacecontaminationonhumanhealth(Brown2003;Brownetal.2006).
Thisoptionismostappropriatebecauseitisabletoaccountforthecomplexcontextinwhichexposurestakeplaceintheworkenvironmentsuchasworkorganization,workregimes,andpowerrelationsatthepointofproduction,exposurestocomplexchemicalmixturesandrecognitionofallroutesofentry,andthefunctioningandavailabilityofexposurecontrols(Keithetal.2015;DeMatteoetal.2012;Simcoxetal.2012;Boiceetal.1999;Stewardetal.1991).Incontrast,muchoftheexposurecontextisleftoutofquantitativedatarelatedtotheextentandprobabilityofexposures.
Thepublishedworksofmanyenvironmentalandoccupationalhealthresearchersusingqualitativemethodsofferacompellingargumentforthevalidityofqualitativeapproachesinhealthresearch.Qualitativeresearchiscontext-dependentandup-closewiththepeopleandthephenomenabeingstudied;itusesexpositorytechniquesandworkstocreateaninteractivedialoguebetween,andamong,theparticipants,whichactsasacheckagainstbiasanderror.Inthissense,theon-goingsocialdialoguewithparticipantsprovidesaself-correctingprocessleadingtoverifiedknowledge(Brown,2003).Additionalrelevantreferencesconsultedonqualitativemethodsinclude:MacEachenetal.2016;Maranoetal.2000;McDonaldetal.2004;Morganetal.1998;NeedlemanandNeedleman1996;andPatton1990.
Verification Methods Used in Qualitative Research:
ThisretrospectiveexposureprofilestudywasdesignedandconductedinaccordwithvalidatedqualitativeresearchmethodstoensurethegenerationofreliableandcredibleinformationabouttheGEproduction
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process--andtheinteractionofworkerswiththoseprocesses.Thiswasundertakeninanefforttoconstructexposureprofilesformajorproductionprocessesineachdepartment.
Thestrength,or“rigor”ofscientificresearchisachievedbymeetingtheconditionsofbothreliabilityandvalidity.Thisistrueinbothquantitativeandqualitativeresearch,buttherouteeachtakesisdifferent(Kvale1989).Inquantitativeresearchthisisprimarilyachievedposthocthroughstatisticalanalysisofstudyresults(i.e.,calculating“p-values”).Incontrast,qualitativeresearchreliesonthecontinualuseofverificationstrategiesfrombeginningtoendbecauseofthedynamic,interactivenatureofthistypeofresearch.Inpracticethisrequiresresearcherstocontinuallymovebetweenresearch“designandimplementationtoensurecongruence[i.e.,a“goodfit”]amongquestionformation,recruitment,datacollectionstrategies,andanalysis”(Morseetal.2002p.10).Notsurprisingly“investigatorresponsiveness”isviewedasessential,ifnotthemostimportantstrategytoensurereliabilityandvaliditybecauseitisthemechanismbywhichresearchersidentifyandcorrecterrorsbeforetheyarebuiltintoadevelopingmodel.Othersignificantverificationstrategiesormechanismsusedinqualitativeresearchinclude:methodologicalcohesion,anactiveanalyticalstance,adequatesampling,andsaturation(Cresswell1997;Morseetal.2002).
Participant Recruitment Process and the Formation of a Permanent Focus Group: The GE Retiree Advisory Committee:
Anexampleoftheinvestigators’effortstoachievecongruenceamongthevariouscomponentsofmethodologymentionedaboveisreflectedintheshiftfromtheoriginalresearchdesignofconducting15ormore“oneoff”focusgroupstoapermanent,on-goingworkingfocusgroupandpurposefulrecruitmentofotherGEworkerswithspecialknowledgeandexperience.Basedonpre-testingofthefocusgroupapproach,theinvestigatorsrecognizedtheneedtomakeadjustmentstoensurethatgroupcompositionandstructurewereappropriateinthecontextofacomplexindustrialoperationaswellasthenatureofourinformationsources,andtheoreticalframework.Throughouttheresearchersweremindfuloftheneedtofollowaresponsive/”iterative”process(LincolnandGuba1985).
InMarch2016,aninitialattempttodeveloparetrospectiveexposureprofilestudyoftheGEplantwasundertakenbyagroupofGEretireesandresearchersusingfocusgroupmethodsorganizedaroundindividualdepartmentsorareas.Inanefforttorecruitinformants,theresearchersandresearchcoordinatormadenumerouspresentationstoretireesgroupsandprovidedsignuppostersthatweredisplayedatcommunityandretireemeetingstorecruitGEworkersaccordingtothedepartmentorareawheretheyhadworked.Twotrialor“pre-test”focusgroupsessionswereheldtotestthequestionnaireanddatacollectionsheet.Itwasimmediatelyevidentthatthis“one-off”methodoffocusgroupinterviewswouldnotleadtoanaccurateanddetaileddocumentationofworkexposuresintheGEplantduetothecomplexityandnumberofproductsdevelopedandworkprocessesemployedovertime.
SeveralmeetingsensuedamongtheGEretiree/researchteamtodiscussproblemsencounteredandwhethertherewereotherwaystoconductamorein-depthanddetailedexposureprofilestudy.Afterconsiderablediscussion,aconsensuswasreachedthata“permanentfocusgroup”beformedmadeupofretireesandresearcherswhowouldcommittothetimerequiredtoretrospectivelydocumenttheworkprocesses,chemicalsandphysicalexposures,departmentbydepartment,withtheintentionofinvitingotherGEretirees,withsignificantandadditionalinformation,tothesegroupmeetings.
Itwasalsodecidedthatalternatesourcesofinformationwouldberequiredinadditiontowhatwastobeprovidedbythefocusgroupandkeyinformants.ThesesourcesincludedMinistryofLabour(MOL)healthandsafetyinspectionreports,jointhealthandsafetycommitteeminutes,internalhealthandsafetyreports,materialsafetydatasheets(MSDSs),technicalproductionmanuals.Manyofthesewereprovidedbythe
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formerLocal524unionhealthandsafetycommitteerepresentative,JohnBall,andsupplementedbyadditionalMOLreportsviaaFreedomofInformationrequest.Subsequently,theuniondeconstructedthesereportsandplacedtheoriginaldocumentsandsummaryinformationonadatabasefortheseandotherdocuments.Thisalsoincludedjointhealthandsafetycommitteereports,MSDSsandinternalmemorandaandreport.TheprocesswasaidedbyasetofhazardmapsthatweredevelopedbyOHCOWafewyearspriorandthosedevelopedbydeceasedretiree,GaryLaneandhiscolleagues,JimDufresneandRogerFowler.Thesevariousdocumentswouldplayacrucialroleintheprocessoftriangulationofthedifferentsourcesofinformationinconfirmingtheaccuracyandreliabilityofinformantinformation.
SecuringameetingspacewheretheAdvisoryCommitteewasfreetosetitsownhoursanddisplaythelargeGEdepartmentalreferencemaps(andothermaterialsassociatedwiththeproject)wasamajorbreakthrough.Oncealocalmeetingsitewasestablished,thecommitmentwasmadetomeettwiceaweekonMondaysandThursdaysfrom1-4pm(andasitturnedoutoftenaslateas6pm)forthepurposeofcarefullydocumenting,buildingbybuilding,theworkprocessesandexposureriskfactorsatPeterboroughGE.
Initially,theretireecomponentconsistedof3womenand5men,whohadeachworkedatGEbetween35and45years.Asagroup,theywerehighlyknowledgeableaboutmany,andforsome,nearlyalldepartments(severalasmobilewelders,oneasajobdispatcherwhomovedthroughouttheplant,anotheraspartofarovinglabourgang,andmosthavingworkedatmultiplejobcategoriesthroughouttheGEfacilityovertheirworklives).InadditiontotheseeightGEretirees,tworetiredhealthresearchersactedasfacilitatorsandquicklybecameimmersedinthe“GEenvironment”themselves.Oneoftheretireemembersservedasstudycoordinator,takingresponsibilityforcommunicationsandminutes.
Theframeworkforthegroup’sfunctioningwasthatitbeopentootherretireesorcommunitymemberswhomightexpressinterestandthatasweprogressedinourworkwewouldseekoutretireeswithexpertiseinparticulardepartmentsand/orworkprocessestoensureascompleteandaccurateinformationaspossiblewouldbedocumented.Atoneoftheearlymeetings,anumber(4)ofGEretireeswhohadworkedinthemaintenancedepartmentwereinvitedspecificallybecauseoftheirplant-wideexperienceandknowledgeofnumerousworkprocessesaswellasvariousmaintenanceprocessesthatwererelevanttoexposures.DuringtheprocessadditionalretireesjoinedtheAdvisoryCommittee.
Forthefirstmonthorso,meetingsbecame“educationalsessions”forthetworesearcherstoestablisha“commonknowledge”aboutGE,asretireespatientlydescribedthebasicsofmotorandelectricalcomponentsproduction;introducedresearcherstothephysicalandculturalenvironmentoftheGEplantthroughpictures,stories,andGEdocuments;sharedgenericvideosofspecificworkprocesses;andsensitizedresearcherstothetremendousvariationandnumberofmotor/electrical-relatedproductsthatwereproducedatGEovertheperiodoftimetheyworkedthere.
Atthesametime,retireesreceivedanorientationintothebasicprinciplesofindustrialhygiene,toensureacommonmeaningtothestructuredandopen-endedquestionsthatguidedthediscussionsoffocusgroupmeetings.Thisincludedconceptsof(chemical)routesofentryintothebody,thebasicbodysystemsandpointsofvulnerabilitytotoxicchemicalsandphysicalagents,andthehierarchyofexposurecontrols.
Overtime,our“mainstay”AdvisoryCommitteegrewto13peopleasseveralotherretireesjoined.Duringthecourseof8monthsspentdocumentingworkexposuresattheGEplant,themeetingswereattendedbynolessthan8andasmanyas15participantsforspecialsessions.Mostmeetingsincluded8-10Advisorycommitteemembers.InadditiontoinvitingotherGEworkerstomeetings,informationwasobtainedfromretireesonaperson-to-personbasisandbyphone.Meetingswerefocused,lively,andparticipatoryandwhilethereweresomewithgreaterscientificknowledgeorexperiencerelatedtothetopicathand,discussionswereinclusivebasedonthehighlevelofsharedworkexperienceamongretirees.
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PerhapsthemostimportantcharacteristicofallwhocomprisedtheresearchteamwasasharedcommitmenttotakewhatevertimewasrequiredtoproduceahighqualityandaccuraterepresentationofGEworkprocessesandtheexposureriskstheseposedtoemployees.WiththissenseofdedicationtoaccuratelydepictingtheproductionprocessatGE,theAdvisoryCommitteebecameahighlyfunctioningresearchteam.Teammemberssoonbecameproficientinthemethodsofqualitativeresearch--intheirmodeofquestioning,attentiontodetail,doggednessingettingthecompletepicture,sensitivitytonegativeorcontradictoryinformation,andimportanceofpursuinginformationthroughavarietyofavenues.Inall,morethan75GEworkersand/orfamilymemberscontributedtothisproject.TheirnamesarelistedinAppendix1.Weapproximatethattogether,thosewhoparticipatedrepresentbetween2000and2500workyearsatPeterboroughGE.Thiswastrulyparticipatoryresearchinaction.
Theoretical Framework and Concepts:
Thisresearchdesignwasguidedbyatheoreticalframeworkthatwasbasedonconceptsderivedfromthedisciplineofindustrialhygienewithparticularemphasisonriskfactorsaffectingexposures.Ourapproachwasarisk-basedapproach.Thatis,alleffortsweredirectedtodetermining:theprobabilityorriskofexposuregiventhemannerinwhichproductionwascarriedoutattheplant;stepsortasksinvolvedintheproductionprocess;thematerialsused,howtheywereused;thequantityused,itsphysicalstate(s);thesizeoftheproductsbeingproduced;theexistenceandfunctioningofexposurecontrols;odours/smoke,symptoms;workpractices;housekeeping;provisionofprotectiveequipment;healthandsafetytraining;knowledgeofthehazards;workorganization;thegeneralatmosphereandworkregimes.Allofthesefactorscontributetotheriskandprobabilityofexposure.
Inconjunctionwiththelimitedhygienedataavailable,theseriskfactorsprovidedindirectmeasuresinoureffortstoreconstructtheexposurehistoriesoftheindustrialprocesses.By“indirect”ismeantthatinferencesabouttheextentofexposurecouldbemadefromdetaileddescriptiveinformationabouttheinteractionbetweentheworkerandtheworkprocessandtheidentificationofriskfactors.Theresearchersalsotookmeasurestoaccountforthelonglatencyperiodforcancerrangingfromseveralyearstoseveraldecadesbetweenfirstexposureanddiagnosis.Thisinvolvedprofilingexposuresdatingbackthirtyormoreyearsbyexploringprocessesastheyexistedmanyyearsagoandtracingtheirevolutionovertime.Inthislatterregard,theinvestigatorswerefortunatebecausetheGEworkexperienceoftheparticipantsrangedbetween35and45years.
Conduct of Advisory Group Discussions:
Focusgroupdiscussionswereguidedbyaseriesofbothstructuredandopen-endedquestionsonadepartment-by-departmentbasis–whichinturnwerealsoguidedby,andconsistentwith,thetheoreticalframeworkthatinformedthestudydesign.Astimewentondiscussionbecamelessformalizedaseveryoneknewwhatinformationwasrequiredandamorenaturalisticdialoguetookplace,unlesswehadavisitingparticipantandthenwerevertedtothemorestructuredapproach.Thisprocessofgroupdiscussionwentontwiceaweekfornearly8months,usuallywiththeadditionofotherinvitedretireesbecauseoftheirin-depthexperiencewithcertainprocesseswithinadepartment.Thegeneralsetofquestionsaskedofretireeinformants included:
HowmanyyearsdidyouworkatGE?
Howmanyyearsdidyouworkinthisdepartment?
Whatwasproducedinyourdepartment?
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Describethemajorproductionactivitiesinthisdepartment?
Giveusabreakdownoftheprocessesrequiredtocompleteeachoftheseproducts?
Whatmaterialsandchemicalwereusedinproduction?
Whatformdidthesetake,e.g.liquid,mist,vapor,gas,dustorsolid?
Howmuchofthechemicalwasused,e.g.pint,quart,gallon(s),tanks?
Howwasthechemicalapplied,directlyhandled,byhand,closeby,confinedspace,isolation?
Howlongdidyouusethischemical?
Describehowtheproductwasapplied?
Werethereanyodors,fumesorsmoke?
Didworkershowanyadversesymptoms?
Wasthegovernmentinspectorcalledin,workrefusal,complaints?
Wasprotectiveequipmentprovided,whattype,wasitused?
Wastherelocalexhaustventilationprovided?
Ifso,wasitworkingtoremovecontaminants?
Whatwasthestateofhousekeeping?
Whatwasthegeneralimpressionoftheworkenvironment?
Whatweresomeoftheobstaclestogettingsafetyproblemsaddressed?
Didworkerseat,drinkorsmokeattheirworkstation?
INFORMATION GATHERING, DATA ANALYSIS, VERIFICATION METHODS
Advisorygroupdiscussionsweredocumentedthroughwrittennotestakenbytworesearchersandthe(GEworker)projectcoordinator.Thiswasapracticaldecisionduetoeconomicandtimeconstraintsbutwasfoundtobeadvantageous.Thenotesgeneratedwereregularlycomparedforaccuracyandclarificationaftercommitteemeetings;oftenthiswouldbedonethroughphoneconferencing.Discussionsontheinformationgatheredwouldfocusonaccuracyandwhatwerefelttobegapsorinconsistenciesintheaccounts.Theseissueswouldbenotedandbroughtupatthebeginningofthenextmeetingforclarification,ortheprojectcoordinatorwouldemailmembersrequestingfurtherinformationorareviewofrelevantindustrialhygieneliteraturepriortothenextmeeting.Uponreflectionbothresearchfacilitatorsfoundthenotetakingtobevaluablesinceitrequiredactiveandfocusedlisteningatalltimes,andreinforcedthroughrepetitionandsensoryinputcomplicatedanddetailedinformationaboutGEproductionprocessestowhichthefacilitatorshadonlyrecentlybeenintroduced.Inthecourseofdocumentingthemeetingsthereemergedagrowing“parallel”listofexposurerisksthatcametobeviewedas“common”toallGEworkers.
Thedynamicoffocusgroupdiscussionswaslivelyandargumentativeattimes,withmembersoftenraisingquestionaboutfactualaccuracy.Discussionswereopen,frankbutrespectful.Thetenorofdiscussionproducedacrosscheckingoffactsandeventualagreementandconsensus.Thiswasamajorstrengthof
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thefocusgroupdynamicinthatitwasacheckagainsterrorandpersonalbias—animportantpartoftheverificationprocessthatwentonthroughout.AsharedcommitmenttoproduceanaccuratereportontheworkconditionsintheGEplantunderlieandtemperedthedesiretoachieveconsensus.
Attribution:
Thedescriptionsoftheproductionprocessesandworkconditionsarenotattributedtoanyoneindividual.Theinformationgleanedfromthefocusgroupprocessisattributedtothefocusgroupasawholeincludingthosewhoparticipatedfromtimetotime.ThenamesofallparticipantsarelistedinAppendix1.
Dynamic Interaction and Verification:
Thenatureofthedynamicinteractionamongparticipantscontaineditsownverificationprocesswhichactedasacheckforaccuracyandbias.Therewereoccasionsinwhichparticipantsdisagreedwithanother’saccountwhichwouldbringforwardalengthydiscussionuntiltheissuewasresolvedleadingtoconsensus.Also,theresearchersfoundthatdifferentparticipantsoftendescribedsimilaraccountsofexposureconditionsoreventsindependentofoneanother,servingtoreinforceconfidenceintheaccuracyofparticipants’recollectionsanddescriptionsofproductionprocesses.
Hazard Mapping Process:
Theresearchmethodsincorporatedhazardmappingtechniques(Keith2001;Keith2004)intheutilizationofseverallarge3’x4’blockdiagrammapswithafloorplanofthelocationsofalldepartments.Thesemapsdepictedthelayoutoftheplant,identifyingvariousproductionprocessesandthelocationanduseofvariouschemicalsandotherhazardousmaterials.Theywerepostedonthewallsaroundtheroomwithtwoothersplacedontheconferencetablewhereweworked.Threetypesofmapswereusedtoaiddiscussion.Theseincluded:AmaplocatingmajorcarcinogensusedatGE,whichwasdevelopedbyOHCOWviaparticipatorymappingsessionsaround2004.TwoothermapsproducedundertheleadershipofGEemployee,GaryLanewithRogerFowlerandJimDufresnein2015-16identifyingthedepartmentalorarealocationofchemicalsused,includingsolventandresintanksandcertainproductionworkstations.Theselatter(GaryLane)mapsrepresentedtwodifferentperiodsoftimeandprovidedthelocationofmajorchemicalsusedindifferentproductionprocessesforthesedifferenttimeperiods.Thesemapswerevitaltodiscussionanddocumentationthroughouttheconductofthestudy.
Withthesemapsasbackdropweaskedfocusgroupparticipantstodescribetheworkflow,jobtasks,chemicalsusedandhowtheyusedthem,thequantitiesused,thesourcesofventilation,etc.(Seeresearchquestionsabove).Importantly,theresearchersfoundthatthegraphicrepresentationhelpedparticipantsrecalldetailsandmoreclearlydescribeconditions.
Other Sources of Verification:
Anotherelementoftheresearchprocessthatassistedindataverificationwastheadditionofavailabledocumentationofconditionsintheplantfromexternalandinternalsources.Includedamongthese,wasacollectionofofficialGEreports,minutesandinternalmemosthatweredeconstructedforidentificationpurposesandtheninputtedintoUnifor’sRAWCdatabase.Documentsincluded:over700MinistryofLabour/DepartmentofHealthinspectionreports,JointHealthandSafetyCommitteeMinutes,internalcompanycorrespondences,MSDSs,allofwhichhavebeenenteredintostorageandretrievaldatabasebyUNIFOR,theunionrepresentingGEworkers.Thesedocumentswereusedtoprovideadditionalinformationabouttheproductionprocessandtoconfirmorchallengeconditionsdescribedbymeetingparticipants.
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AdvisoryCommitteemembersalsoconsultedtheindustrialhygieneliteratureforadditionalinformationonspecificindustrialprocesses.Forexample,wereviewed,indepth,thescientificindustrialhygieneliteratureonelectroplatingprocesses,plasticsproductionandweldingoperations.ThiscouldformthebasisfordiscussionofsimilarprocessesintheGEplanttonotesimilaritiesanddifferences.Despiteclaimsbythecompanythatchemicalswerecontainedwithin“departments”,memosfromthecompanysafetymanagersrevealedandconfirmedthattheventilationsystemwasundernegativepressure,causingsubstantialcrosscontaminationbetweendepartmentsandprocesses.MOLinspectionreportsconfirmedconsistentlypoorhousekeeping,andpoortonon-existentlocalexhaustventilation.Thesearenotedinthemainbodyofthereportandthefullinspectionreports,memos,orMSDScanbeeasilyretrievedfromtheUniforRAWCdatabase.
Issues Related to Adequate Sampling and Saturation:
Despitelimitedresources,otherthanAdvisoryCommitteemembersthemselves,arobustandmethodologicallystrongresourceforassessingworkplaceexposureswasproduced.Thebreadthanddepthoftheworkliesinthefactthattherewerenottworesearchersonthecommitteebutthirteen.Ineffect,theAdvisoryCommittee“livedandbreathed”thisprojectformonths,withindividualmembersspendingmanyadditionalhoursonthephone,visitingpeople,searchingtheInternet,visitinglocallibraries,trackingdownknownsourcesofinformationthatothersheldormighthaveaccessto,alltoensurethattheinformationgeneratedwasasaccurateandcompleteaspossible--giventhecomplicatedandcontinuallychangingworkplacethatwasGE.
Duringthemonthsspentwritingupthereport,theauthorswouldoftensendoutarequesttothecoordinatorforconfirmationoradditionalinformationandshewouldimmediatelyemailourrequesttoothercommitteemembers.Wewereneverdisappointedandusuallyreceivedmoreinformationordocumentationthanweaskedfor.Forthemostpartthosewhoparticipatedwerefront-lineworkers;afewmanagers/leadersparticipated(thoughmorewereasked)andhadfirstworkedmanyyearsatGEoutsideoftheirmanagementroles.Therewereareasanddepartmentswithfeweremployeeswhereitwasdifficulttolocatepastworkers;theyhaddied,moved,wereill,ornotableorwanttocometoameeting--thoughsomeconsentedtophoneinterviews.Amongcommitteemembersandinvitedparticipantswereanumberofworkerswithin-depthknowledgeoftheGEplantthroughtheirworkexperienceswhowereintegraltoworkdevelopingriskprofiles.
TheresearchfacilitatorswerecontinuallyamazedatthehighlevelofdiscussionandsophisticatedknowledgeexhibitedbyGEworkers.TheyallviewedtheiryearsatGEashavingbeenatremendouseducationandknewtheyhadbeeninvolvedinworkthatreflectedthe“cuttingedge”ofthemodernelectricalage.Asworkers,theyproudlydescribedbeing“troubleshooters”thatworkedoutproblemsinproductionorevendevelopednewtechniquesthatthenservedasatemplateforworkprocessesatotherGEplants.
Theparticipantswerescientificallyastuteandtookpersonalinterestintheworktheyandtheirco-workersdidandcoulddiscusstheworkprocessesofmostotherdepartmentsfromaplaceofknowledgeandinterest.Thework“ticket”systematGEallowed,andevenencouraged,traininginotherdepartments,asapersonalinsurancepolicyagainstunemploymentorastheopportunitytotrysomethingnew,orseekhigherpay.Themajoritytookadvantagebyobtainingtheseadditional“tickets”andtheirworkrecordsreflectedpositionsthroughouttheplant.
Thereisamistakentendencytoview“bluecollar”workersaslessinformedandlessthoughtfulthantheprofessionalizedsectorofsociety.Whilethiscouldbenofurtherfromthetruthgiventhedynamicencounterexperiencedinthisstudy,thisprejudiceremainsamajorimpedimentforhavingtheirworkplacehealthconcernsaddressedbygovernmentandcompanyofficials.Giventhehumanandtemporallimitationsassociatedwiththisproject,otherthanhavingaccesstoGE’sowndetailedinformationonthePeterborough
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plant,theadvisorycommitteebelievestheyhavedoneallthatwaspossibletomeettherequirementsof“samplingadequacy”anddata“saturation.”
SampleAdequacy:Intotal,over75participantscontributedinformationaboutplantoperationsgenerally,anddetailsaboutindividualdepartmentsorworkprocesses.TheyrepresentedeverypartoftheGEfacilityandrepresentedworkexperiencesspanning35to45yearsandwerethusabletogiveadynamicpictureoftheplantovertheyears.Thisisamorethanadequatesampletoprovideacomprehensiveandaccurateaccountoftheproductionoperations.
Saturation:Theinvestigativegroupprocesseswhichtookplaceoverapproximately3yearsandintenselyfor8monthsprovidedexceptionallyrich,comprehensiveanddetailedinformationaboutthemajorproductionprocessesatGE.Researcherswillalwaysdesiremoreinformationandneverfeelsatisfiedthattheyhave“everything.”However,itiswithouthesitationthattheauthorsassertthattheinformationgleanedfromallsources—focusgroups,oneononeinterviews,reviewsofrecords,reports,etc.providedthisinvestigationwithsufficientinformationtoprovideareliableandvalidatedpictureoftheexposureconditionsattheGEfacilitybetween1945and2000.
Issues Related to Methodological Coherence:
Methodologicalcoherencereferstothefitofthevariouscomponentsofqualitativeresearch(sampling,interviewquestions,analyticalprocedures,specificaudienceorpurpose)withthedata.Morseetal.(2002p.12)notethat“tomeetanalyticalgoals,thefitofthesedifferentcomponentsmustbecoherent,witheachverifyingthepreviouscomponentandthemethodologicalassumptionsasawhole.”ThroughoutthisworktheinvestigatorsremainedsensitivetothefitbetweenthevariousaspectsofdatacollectionandthepurposeofthisworkwhichwastoprovideanalternativesourceofinformationontheriskofexposuretochemicalandphysicalagentsforworkersattheGEfacility(1945-2000).Inaddition,considerationwasgiventohowthisinformationcouldbestbepresentedtoprovideadetailedbutaccessibleexposureassessmentthatwouldprovideamorerealisticpictureofworkplaceconditions.Thefinalreportanditsstructurecanbeviewedasan“organic”resultofthemethodsofinquiryemployedandindustrialhygienescienceviewedthroughabroad,historical,socialsciencelens.Bycontextualizingworkandworkprocesses,webelievearicherandmorerobustpictureemergesoftheactualworkexperienceofthoseemployedatPeterboroughGEduringtheyears1945-2000.
(March29,2017)RobertDeMatteoandDaleDeMatteo
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ADDENDUM 2
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SCIENCE
Inconsideringtheretrospectiveexposureprofilessomeperspectiveisinorderwithregardtocurrentinterpretationsattachedtonumericalexposurelevelstovariouschemicalsaswellastheresultsofepidemiologicalstudies.Firstly,thereistheassumptionthatnoharmshouldhavecometoworkersifexposurelevelswerebelowtheregulatedoccupationalexposurelimitsorThresholdLimitValuessetbytheAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienist(ACGIH).Secondly,therecanbetheinterpretationofnegativeepidemiologicalstudiesasindicatingthatthereisnoassociationbetweenthediseaseandthechemicalexposuresstudied.
Inresponsetotheseassumptionsitisimportanttorecognizethatthevalidityoftheseapproachesisbeingchallengedbyalargeandgrowingnumberofresearchersinthefieldofoccupationalandenvironmentalmedicine.InwhatfollowstheauthorspresentasummaryofthosecriticalfindingsthatraiseseriousquestionsaboutthereliabilityofoccupationalexposurelimitsandTLVsforassessingexposuresaswellasthemisusesandmisinterpretationofepidemiologicalfindings.Whileepidemiologicalstudyisapowerfultoolinstudyingtherelationshipbetweendiseaseanditscauses,itsmethodsmustbecarefullyscrutinizedtoavoidmisinterpretationoftheresults.
ARE THE OELS/TLVS PROTECTIVE?
General Background on ACGIH TLVs:
TheAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienists(ACGIH)wasestablishedin1938atameetinginWashington,D.C.ThisorganizationisknownworldwidefortheannualpublicationofitslistofThresholdLimitValuesforChemicalSubstances(TLV-CS),developedbytheTLV-CSCommittee.ManygovernmentshaveadoptedtheseTLVguidelinesaslegalexposurelimits.
Briefly,TLVs“refertoairborneconcentrationsofchemicalsubstancesandrepresentconditionsunderwhichitisbelievedthatnearlyallworkersmayberepeatedlyexposed,dayafterday,overaworkinglifetime,withoutadverseeffects.TLVsaredevelopedtoprotect“workerswhoarenormal,healthyadults”(ACGIH2016).AccordingtotheACGIH,TLVsare“developedasguidelinestoassistinthecontrolofhealthhazards”(ACGIH2016).TheyareclaimedtobetheresultofreviewsofscientificliteraturebytheTLV-CSCommittee.Whiletheyarenotlegallimits,manyhavebeenadoptedassuchbygovernmentsaroundtheworld,includingOntario.
Early Criticism of the ACGIH/TLVs:
Inastudypublishedin1988,BarryCastlemanandGraceZiemdescribedthecorporateinfluenceonthedevelopmentofTLVs.Theyexploredtheincentivesforthechemicalindustry’spromotionofhigherTLVsallowingthemtoreduceregulatoryandliabilitycosts.TheirresearchshowedthattheTLVsfornumeroussubstancesdependedlargely,andinsomeinstancesentirely,onunpublishedcorporatecommunicationsandreportswhichcontainedscientificallyunreliableorunsoundinformation.TheirstudiesalsodocumenttheindustryconnectionsofTLVcommitteemembers(CastlemanandZiem1988;ZiemandCastleman1989;CastlemanandZiem1994).
RoachandRappaporthavealsocriticizedthevalidityoftheassertionthatTLVsarehealth-basedlimits.Inreviewingtheannual(1976and1986)DocumentationoftheTLVs,producedbytheTLV-CSCommittee,only
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aminorityofstudiesshowednoadverseeffectsbelowtheTLV.Theauthorsobservedthat,tosomeextent,manyTLVsrepresentwhatindustryperceivestobetechnicallyfeasibleratherthanhealthrelated(RoachandRappaport1990).
Ina1993follow-uparticle,RappaportarguedthattheOccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministration(OSHA)shouldadoptaspeedierpermissibleexposurelimit(PEL)approvalprocess,sothatunreliable/invalidACGIHTLVsneednotberelieduponasdefaultlimits.TheauthornotedthattheACGIHTLVsareslowlybeinglowered,butmoreforcarcinogensthanchemicalsthatcauseotherserioushealtheffects(Rappaport1993).
Additional Studies:
AdditionalstudieshavebeenpublishedthatbuildonthethemesputforwardbyCastleman,Ziem,Rappaport,andRoach.Whatfollowsisasmallsampleofthefindingoftheseworks:AquantitativeinternationalcomparativestudyofexposurelimitsbyLindaSchenketal,identifiedthetendencyforlimitstodecreaseovertime,butnotedthewidevariabilitybetweenlimitsforthesamechemicalindifferentcountries(Schenketal.2008).AnotherarticledescribedtheNetherland’sreassessmentofexposurelimitsinthemid-2000s.WhileoriginallyhavingadoptedtheACGIHTLVs,thegovernment’sreassessmentdeterminedthatoverhalfthevalueswereeithertoohigh--ornotscientificallysupportedasahealth-basedlimit(Stoutenetal.2008).
Rappaportalsoidentifiedthatmanyoccupationalexposurestudieshaveverysmallsizesordonotincludeexposuremeasurementsatall.Heidentifiedthatexposuremeasurementsweremostoftenincludedinstudiesthatdatedfromthe1920stothe1960s(Rappaport2009).Anotherarticle,co-authoredbythesameauthor(RappaportandKupper2008),discussestheoriginsof,anddebatessurrounding,occupationalexposureassessments,includingtheACGIHTLVsandtheUSfederalgovernment’sOSHAstandards.TheauthorsnotedthatfollowingthecriticalarticlesofCastlemanandZiem,andRoachandRappaport,theACGIHchangeditsapproachtoTLVs,applying“morestringenthealthcriteriaasevidencedbytheincreasedrateofreductionofTLVs,especiallyforcarcinogens"(RappaportandKupper2008).Forexample,theTLVforBenzenedecreased2.5foldfrom1957to1974,andthen20foldfrom1974-1997.TheauthorsremaincriticaloftheOSHAstandardsettingprocessonthegroundsthatitisinterpretedasanaverageandnotalimit,andthatfeasibilityissometimesjudgedbythestandardsofheavilypollutingindustries,eventhoughthemajorityofindustrycouldfeasiblyachieveamuchlowerPEL(RappaportandKupper2008).
AshortarticlebyCastleman(2006)reviewedtheadoptionoftheTLVfortrichloroethylene(TCE).IllustratingalegacyofcorporateinfluenceonTLVdevelopment,henotedthattheminutesofa1981meetingregardingtheTLVforTCEwererecordedonDOWstationary--andthatDOWwasamajormanufacturerofTCE(Castleman2006).Importantly,withrespecttoreformoftheACGIH,Castlemanfurtherarguesthat:“evenwiththebestmotivations,itissimplybeyondtheresourcesofavolunteercommittee,withlittlefinancialsupport…torepairtheaccumulateddamageofsomanyyearsofflawedTLVsonthelist”(Castleman2006p.308).
TheotheraspectoftheimpactofcorporateinfluenceiswhatrenownedendocrinologistsFrederickvomSaalcalledthe“fundingeffect.”Inanextensivereviewof115invivoandinvitrostudiesoftheeffectsofBisphenolA,94studiesfoundsignificanteffects.Thirty-onefoundsignificanteffectsatdosesbelowthe“safe”threshold.Whilenoindustry-fundedstudieshavereportedsignificanteffects,over90%ofgovernmentfundedstudiesdidreportsignificanteffects.AccordingtovomSaalandHughes,someindustry-fundedstudiesusedexperimentalratsthatwerenotappropriateforstudyingestrogenicresponseandothersignoredtheresultsofpositivecontrols(vomSaalandHughes2005).Nonetheless,chemicalmanufacturerscontinuetodiscountthesepublishedfindingofpositivestudiesbecausenoindustrystudieshavereportedsignificanteffects.Similarly,theworkofGennaroandTomaticexplores“businessbias”inepidemiologicalstudiesanditsinfluenceonstudyoutcomes(GennaroandTomatic2005).
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LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY TOXICOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT ON STANDARD SETTING
Regulatorytoxicologysufferssimilartendenciestounderstateadverseeffectsasaresultofquestionableparadigmsusedfortestingforadverseeffects--andisalsovulnerabletocorporateinfluence.Thisisplayedoutinthecurrentriftinthescientificcommunitybetweenregulatorytoxicologistswhorelyoncomputersimulationscalled“physiologicallybasedpharmacokinetics”(PBPK)modelingandhealtheffectsresearchers,includingendocrinologists,developmentalbiologistsandepidemiologists,whodrawtheirconclusionsfromdirectobservationsofhowchemicalsactuallyaffectlivingthings.Whilethedebatemayseemesoteric,theoutcomewillhaveasignificantimpactonenvironmentalandoccupationalhealth.Itisshapinghowgovernmentregulatesenvironmentalandoccupationalhealthandhowworkersareprotected(ornot)fromtoxicexposures--aswellashowweassessdiseasecausationfromtheseexposures(BrownandGrossman2015;Huff2007;RappaportandKupper2008).
TheoriginsofthePBPKtestingparadigm(thatusescomputersimulationstotrackhowchemicalsmovethroughthebody)beganinthemid-1980amongscientistsattheWright-PattersonToxicHazardsResearchUnit(aDepartmentofDefensefacility)attheWright-PattersonU.S.AirforceBaseinDayton,Ohio.Knownasinsilico,thesecomputermodelsarepresentedasanalternativetotestingchemicalinvivo(inliveanimals)orinvitro(inatesttube).Theyallowscientiststoestimatewhatconcentrationsofachemical(oritsbreakdownproducts)endupinparticularorgansortissue,andhowlongtheytaketoexitthebody.Thisinformationcanbecorrelatedwithexperimentaldata,butsometimesisnot.Thesimulationmodeltestingisfasterandcheaperforbothindustryandregulators,butithasseriousdrawbacks.Amajorproblemisthat,byitself,PBPKtestingdoesnotprovideapictureofthehealthimpact.Incontrast,biologicalstudiesandexperimentsaredesignedtodiscoverhowchemicalsinteractandaffectbiologicalprocesses.SupportersofPBPKacknowledgethatthemethodisalwayslimitedbythequalityofthedatathatgoesintothemodel.Theproblemisthatmodellingisvulnerabletothemanipulationofdatainputaswellasthefinalriskassessment,asbotharesubjecttoinfluencebecauseoffinancialorothertiestoxicologistsmayhavewithindustry(BrownandGrossman2015).
TheliteratureisrepletewithinstanceswherePBPKstudieswereusedtomakechemicalsappearsafer.Forexample,industryfunded/associatedresearchinstitutessuchasCIIT/Hamner,utilizingPBPKmodellingmethods,havedownplayedtheriskanddelayedregulationorimplementationofmorerigorousexposurelimitsforanumberofwidelyusedandcommerciallylucrativechemicals.Theseincludeformaldehyde,trichloroethylene,BPA,methylenechloride,styrene,acrylonitrile,andthepesticidechlorpyrifos(BrownandGrossman2015).
Studiessomewhatcriticalofcurrentpracticesinoccupationalmedicineandpublichealthwerepublishedina2008issueofNewSolutions:AJournalofEnvironmentalandOccupationalHealthPolicy.IncludedwasanarticlebyBohme-RankinandEgilmanidentifyingthat“corporatescience”isbecomingmorewidespread,characterizedby“manipulationofevidence,dataandanalysis[and],ultimatelydesignedtomaintainfavourableconditionsforindustry”(Bohme-RankinandEgilman2008).Inasimilarexpose/advocacypieceentitled“IndustryInfluenceonOccupationalandEnvironmentalPublicHealth,”JamesHuffprovidesnumerousexamplesoftheimpactofindustryinfluenceonoccupationalandenvironmentalandpublichealthresearchbynotonlyfundingresearch,butincreatingitsowninfrastructureforhealthresearch(Huff2007).Similarobservationshavebeenmadeinmedicinewithrespecttothepharmaceuticalandmedicaltechnologyindustries(Angell2009;Lexchinetal.2003).
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LIMITATIONS OF REGULATORY EPIDEMIOLOGY
Inconsideringthesedifferentapproachestoacomprehensiveunderstandingofthehealthimpactofexposuresincomplexindustrialprocesses,awordabouttheinherentlimitationsofepidemiologyandtoxicologyisinorder.Forexample,epidemiologicalstudiesoftensufferfrompoorresearchdesign,misclassificationofexposuresandinsufficientstatisticalpowertodetectarisktohealth.Togetherthesefactorsarelargelyresponsibleforunderstatingtheextentofriskandprematureconclusionsforlackofassociation.Forexample,numerousstudiesreviewedbyGoldbergandLebrechtfoundnon-significantexcessriskbecausetherewasinsufficientstatisticalpowertodetectariskofaparticularmagnitude.Intheirreviewof115occupationalbreastcancerstudies,theseauthorsfoundthatthemediannumberofbreastcancercaseswas19withanaverageofonly64cases.Onlyfivestudieshadmorethan100cases.Theynotethateventhough75%ofstudieshadstatisticalpowerabove80%thesmallnumberofcasesseriouslylimitedtheabilitytodetectrisksinsubgroupsandtestforexposuretrends(GoldbergandLebrecht1996).Thechallengeforresearchersliesinovercomingtheinherentlimitationsofthedominantscientificparadigmforestablishingcausation.
The Case of the Peterborough GE Health Study:
ThesesamescientificproblemsareassociatedwiththePeterboroughGEHealthStudybyHoseinandGhiculete,whichinits“PhaseII”casecontrolexploration,concludedthattherewasnoassociationbetweenthelungcancersidentifiedamongGEworkersandthetoxicchemicalexposuresattheplant,whenintruththestudylackedthestatisticalpowertodetectsuchanincreasedrisk.Inthisstudytheauthorsadmitonpage47:
“Fromthetablebelowweseethatforanexposurevariablewithaprevalenceofabout45%,inthisstudywouldhavemorethan80%powerofdetectingarelativeriskof2orgreater.
However,foranexposurevariablewithprevalenceintherangeof5to10percentwewouldhave80%powerofdetectingrelativeriskintherangeof2.5to3.0”.(HoseinandGhiculete2003)
Thusoneoftheseriousproblemswiththeabovestudyisitssmallsamplessize.Althoughtheauthorsstatethelackofstatisticalpoweraccuratelyintheabovequote,theydonotidentifythisseriouslimitationintheirconclusions.Ineffect,atruerelativeriskoflessthan2couldnotbedetectedasstatisticallysignificant.Todetectarisklowerthantwofoldthestudywouldrequireaconsiderablelargersamplesize.
Theauthorsconclusiononpage78statingthat“…therewasnoassociationbetweenlungcancerdeathsandanyofthecarcinogens…”ismisleading(HoseinandGhiculete2003).Itwouldbemorecorrecttostatethattherewasnostatisticallysignificantassociationobservedbetweenlungcancerandanyofthecarcinogens.Anditshouldfurtherbeexplainedthatthisresultcouldarisebecause,infact,therewasnoassociationorbecausetherewasanassociationthatcouldnotbedetectedduetothesmallsamplesize.Thisiswhat,inepidemiologyisreferredtoasanegativeerror—astudythat(bydesign)cannotfindanelevatedriskthatis,infact,present.
Also,theGEhealthstudylikelysuffersfromseriousmisclassificationofexposures,whichisamajorsourceofsystematicerrorthatcanbiasthestudytowardsthenullhypothesis.Thisassessmentisbasedontheresultingretrospectiveexposureprofilesofworkprocessesandexposureconditionsconstructedinourstudy.Thismethodologicalproblemhasbeenexploredintheepidemiologicalliteratureindicatingthatsucherrorscanseriouslyunderstatethetruerelativerisk(Dosemicietal.1990;dosSantos1999).
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Making Cancer Clusters Disappear:
MakingcancerclustersdisappearisnotuniquetothePeterboroughGEcancercluster.Asimilarsituationarosein1979whentheU.S.OccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministrationdiscoveredaclusterof23primarybraincancerscalledglioblastomasamongworkerswhoworkedatvinylchlorideplantownedbyUnionCarbide/DowChemicalinTexasCity,Texas.Themainsuspectwasvinylchloride(VC).AccordingtoOSHA,afterinvestigatingtheclusterfor3years,thiswasthelargestclusterofbraincancerseverreported.Duringthistime,industrystudieswerefindinghigherthanexpectedoccurrencesofbraincancersatvinylchlorideplants,andin1979theInternationalAgencyofResearchonCancerhadtakentheunequivocalpositionthatvinylchloridecausesbraincancer(Heath2016).
Yettoday,accordingtotheCenterforPublicIntegrity,“thescientificliteraturelargelyexoneratesvinylchloride.”AfterasecondIARCreviewin1987whichsupportedthebrain/VCconnection(IARC1987),theChemicalManufacturersAssociation(CMA)commissionedSirRichardDolltoreviewpublishedVCepidemiologicalstudies(Doll1988).WhileDollfoundanelevatedrateofbraincancers,hereportedthatthesewerenotstatisticallysignificant,butdidnotreporttheconfidenceintervals(Doll1988).AlsoDolldidnotacknowledgehisfundingsource,whichwastheChemicalManufacturersAssociation(Sassetal.2005).Itisimportanttonotethatpriortothis,evidenceofabraincancerassociationwithvinylchlorideexposurecontinuedtomountafter1988.Forexample,a1991studybyindustryresearcherOttoWongreportedsignificantexcessdeathsfrombraincancerandconcludedthat“thisupdateconfirmstheexcessincancerofthebrainand[centralnervoussystem]”(Wongetal.1991).Wong’sstudywasamongfoursuchstudiestofindexcessofbraincancersamongvinylchlorideworkers(Doll1988;TabershawandGaffey1974;Mundtetal.2000;Wongetal.1991).
However,twoyearslaterWongpublishedaretractionsaying,“weconcludethatourfindingofanexcessofbraincanceramongU.S.vinylchlorideworkersreportedearlierwasnotlikelyrelatedtothechemical”(WongandWhorton1993).ItwasnotedthatWongwasunderheavypressurefromtheChemicalManufacturersAssociationtorecantsincehehadnotreceivedpermissiontopublishthestudyfromtheCMA(Sassetal.2005).
Tocastfurtherdoubtonthebraincancerconnection,a2000industryreviewofbraincancerdeathsatvinylchlorideplantsfoundthattherelationshipbetweenbraincancerandvinylchloride“remainsunclear”(Mundtetal.2000).Basedonthatindustrystudyandothers,IARCreverseditspositiononvinylchlorideandbraincancerin2008.Itwasapparentthatmisclassificationofexposureplayedasignificantroleinsuppressingthetrueelevatedwork-relatedmortalityratebymanipulatingtheexposurecriteriathusexcludingmostofthebraincancerdeaths(Sassetal.2005;dosSantos1999).
AccordingtoDavidHeathoftheCenterforPublicIntegrity,“aCenterforPublicIntegrityreviewofthousandsofonce-confidentialdocumentsshowsthattheindustrystudycitedbyIARCwasflawed,ifnotrigged"(Heath2016).Accordingtotheirreview,thestudyrelieduponbyIARCdidnotreportallbraincancerdeaths.Infact,theyonlyincludedoneofthe23braincancersintheoriginalTexasCitycluster,thuseliminatingthecluster.
Theseflawedindustry-sponsoredstudies,aswellastheuseofindustrysupportedPBPKmodellingfortheU.S.EPAriskassessmentprocess,playedalargeroleinloweringthecancerriskfromvinylchlorideexposures.TheindustrysupportedPBPKmodelestimatedthattheVCriskwas150-foldlessthanoriginallysetbytheEPA.Inthefinalanalysis,industrypressureandtheintrusionofindustryfundedresearchaswellasindustry’sparticipationinbothriskassessmentandpeerreviewprocesseswaslargelyresponsiblefortheloweringoftheVCcancerriskassessmentandeliminationoftheEPAregulatoryprotectiveadjustmentfactor(Sassetal.2005).
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EgilmanandHowedemonstrate,throughacriticalreviewofanumberofcrucialindustryfundedstudies,thevulnerabilityofepidemiologicalstudytopurposefulmanipulationthroughsystematicmisclassificationofexposures,questionablestatisticalanalysis,andthemisinterpretationofepidemiologicalresults.Theyalsonotehowtheovervaluationandrelianceonepidemiologyindeterminingcausationhasbeenattheexpenseofothertypesofscientificinformationsuchascasereports,analogyandpathology.TheypointoutthatbothBradfordHillguidelinesandKoch’spostulatesdonotmake“….epidemiologyarequisitecomponentintheprocessofdeterminingthatthereisarisk”andneitherespousesthesuperiorityofepidemiology(EgilmanandHowe2007).
Accordingtothesesameauthors,“Epidemiologicalstudiesoftensufferfromdesignlimitationsthatdonotaccountfortheinconstantnatureofworkplaceconditionsandexposurelevels,theoftendelayedexpressionofdisease,whichcanremainlatentfor50yearsorlonger,andthefactthatstudiesoftenomitminoritiesandwomen”(EgilmanandHowe2007).Theauthorswarnthatindustryinsistencethatepidemiologicalevidencebeparamountindetermininghealthrisk,andthusregulatoryinitiativesaswellastortandworkers’compensationlitigation,wouldrepresentamajorsetbackforpublicandoccupationalhealth.
Itisessentialforthoseinvolvedintheapplicationofsciencetobesensitivetotheethicalandmethodologicalproblemswithscienceaswellasitslimitations.Science,atitsbest,isonlyasgoodasthecurrentknowledgeavailableandthequalityandindependenceofresearchthatinformsthatknowledge.
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