THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CLAIM NO. CV2014-03082

BETWEEN

RASHEED KHAN

Claimant

AND

CONRAD BARROW

(THE COMMISSIONER OF PRISONS)

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Defendants

Before the Honourable Master Marissa Robertson

Appearances:

1. Mr. Davis for the Claimant

2. No appearance for the Defendants

Date of Oral Delivery: January 19, 2018

Oral Decision reduced into writing

DECISION

1. The Claimant’s claim was one for false imprisonment arising out of his incarceration for

the period January 11, 2011 to May 27, 2011. On January 8, 2011, the Claimant was

arrested under a warrant and imprisoned as serving a sentence of imprisonment in

default of a fine but which warrant was issued in the name of his identical twin brother,

one Ricky Khan. Both the Claimant and his brother were arrested and taken into custody

at the same time.

2. Both the Claimant and his brother Ricky Khan have been incarcerated before and

therefore their fingerprints were a matter of police records.

3. The evidence before the Court is that from the inception of his detention, the Claimant

protested his innocence and indicated that his name was Rasheed Khan (also known as

Rocky) and that his brother Ricky was the one for whom the warrant was issued. At the

time the police officers would have had two persons identical in appearance save for

perhaps “hair difference and a little difference in size”. Unfortunately, the police did not

verify the identities of the Claimant and Ricky with the finger prints and the information

that they must had had on record. The consequence was that the Claimant was

incarcerated for a period of sentence some 135 days.

4. Judgment was made against the Defendant for false imprisonment of the Claimant

between January 11, 2011 and May 27, 2011, inclusive, with damages to be assessed.

Order

5. On January 19, 2018, this matter came up for decision on the assessment of damages and

upon hearing the attorney at law for the Claimant and the Defendants not appearing and

being unrepresented, the following Order was made by this Court:

“1. The Defendants do pay to the Claimant general damages in the sum of Two Hundred

and Sixty Thousand Dollars ($260,000.00) inclusive of aggravated and exemplary

damages in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).

2. Interest to accrue at a rate of two point five percent (2.5%) per annum on the general

damages from the date of service of the Claim Form i.e. 21st August. 2014 to 19th January,

2018.

3. The Defendants do pay to the Claimant prescribed costs in the sum of Forty-Nine

Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighteen Dollars ($49,718.00) being in accordance with

Part 67 Appendix A of the Civil Proceedings Rules (as amended).”

Reasons

6. The only evidence before this court was the witness statement of the Claimant. The

Defendant adduced no evidence and the Claimant’s evidence was not cross-examined.

7. It was the Claimant’s case that on January 8, 2011, police officers went to the premises of

the Claimant at No. 48 Malick, Barataria and arrested him and the said Ricky Khan

purporting to act pursuant to the warrant of imprisonment. The Claimant was not shown

any warrant or any other authority for his arrest. The Claimant claimed that he was

neither required nor afforded an opportunity to provide identification.

8. The evidence before the court regarding the events which unfolded were:

(i) The Claimant identified himself as Rasheed Khan to the arresting officers but

both he and Ricky Khan were taken to the Morvant Police Station. At the police

station, he stated his name as Rasheed Khan and was informed that there was

no warrant for his arrest. The Claimant was detained at the police station for

three (3) days after which he was taken to the Port of Spain Magistrate’s Court.

(ii) At the Magistrate’s court, the reception officer indicated to the Claimant that

there was no warrant for the arrest of Rasheed Khan but the escorting officer

informed the reception officer that a warrant was coming for the Claimant and

therefore the Claimant was then placed in a holding cell.

(iii) Ricky Khan was taken before the Magistrate and was not seen thereafter.

(iv) The Claimant was taken before the Magistrate to answer to the charges of

Ricky Khan. Before the Magistrate, the Claimant indicated that he felt

pressured to answer to the name Ricky.

(v) The Claimant further indicated that he was thereafter taken into the Port of

Spain Magistrate’s court holding cell where police officers continued to insist

that his name was Ricky Khan and that the warrant was for his arrest. His

evidence is that he was threatened with the possibility of being charged with

an unsolved murder if he did not sign a document as Ricky Khan. He was also

refused the right to speak to an attorney.

(vi) The Claimant, under duress, signed as Ricky Khan.

(vii) Although the Claimant continued to assert that the police arrested the wrong

brother, he was taken to the Port of Spain prison under the name of Ricky

Khan.

(viii) On January 11, 2011, the Claimant was taken to the State Prison in Port of

Spain and he gave his name as Rasheed Khan to the prison authorities and

continued to insist that he was not Ricky Khan as named in the warrant of

commitment.

(ix) On January 12, 2011, the Claimant was brought before the then

Superintendent who, had previous interactions with both brothers.

(x) Approximately one week later, fingerprints were taken from the Claimant and

he was questioned about his identity.

(xi) The Claimant continued to inform prison officers and the Inspector of Prisons

that he was wrongfully incarcerated but nothing was done to have him

released.

(xii) During the period of incarceration, the Claimant continued to assert his

identity and to protest his innocence of the charge.

(xiii) He remained imprisoned for the duration of the sentence, which was a period

of 135 days, that is, from 11th January 2011 to 27th May 2011.

9. The Claimant, at paragraph 11 of his witness statement, described the condition of the

prison cell as follows:

“I was afterwards put in a cell with 11 other people. Those conditions were ridiculous. I

have been in prison before – in Golden Grove and so on but those were the worse

conditions I ever see. The cell was nasty with a foul smell. There was no proper lighting

and no proper ventilation so the place was stuffy – no air passing through. The wire

covering the open vent for air was so thick with muck that I doubt any air could pass

through. Of course, I had to use a pail for the time there and with the amount of men

there that pail used to fill up and when that happen I had to use a sheet of guardian

paper to mess in. Sometime the pail full and you pee in a cup or something. It was very

bad. That smell I get used to it meaning after a while the bad smell seems to affect you

less but it never stops smelling bad.”

LAW AND ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE

False Imprisonment – The Law on Assessment of Damages

10. The law as it relates to the heads of damage that the Court addresses in an award for the

tort of false imprisonment is well settled. The principal heads of damage are the injury

to liberty and injury to feelings. McGregor on Damages (18th Edition) Paragraph 37-

011 stated that the loss with regards to false imprisonment:

“is not a pecuniary loss but a loss of dignity and the like, and is left much to the

jury's or judge's discretion. The principal heads of damage would appear to be

the injury to liberty, i.e. the loss of time considered primarily from a non-

pecuniary viewpoint, and the injury to feelings, i.e. the indignity, mental

suffering, disgrace and humiliation, with any attendant loss of social status and

injury to reputation. This will all be included in the general damages which are

usually awarded in these cases; generally no breakdown appeared in the cases.”

11. Damages for false imprisonment were summarised in Thadeus Clement v The AG of

Trinidad & Tobago Civ. App. 95 of 2010 at paragraph 12, per Jamadar J, under the

following three heads:

(i) Injury to reputation – to character, standing and fame;

(ii) Injury to feelings – for indignity, disgrace and humiliation caused and suffered;

and

(iii) Deprivation of liberty – by reason of arrest, detention and/or imprisonment.

12. The Court in addressing its mind to the injury to liberty and injury to feelings in a

particular case is highly subjective to the particular circumstances of that case. This point

was made Uric Merrick v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago and Others

Civ App No 146 of 2009 Smith JA stated at paragraph 22 that:

“22. The award of damages under the two heads of compensation for the injury to liberty

and the injury to feelings involves many subjective factors. So much so that one can

safely say that no injury to liberty or feelings will be the same as between different

persons. Hence in assessing general damages for false imprisonment:

“Any one person trying to fix a sum as compensation will probably find in

his mind a wide bracket within which any sum could be regarded by him

as not unreasonable— and different people will come to different

conclusions. So in the end there will probably be a wide gap between the

sum which on an objective view could be regarded as the least and the sum

which could be regarded as the most to which the plaintiff is entitled as

compensation.” (per Lord Reid in Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome and Another

[1972] 1 All ER 801 H.L. at page 836.)

Therefore in the exercise of assessing general damages for the tort of false imprisonment

there will probably be a wide range within which an award could reasonably be made

without interference from a court of appeal.”

Injury to Liberty

13. This head refers to the time which was lost by the Claimant as a result of the tort (135

days) and it is considered from a non-pecuniary perspective.

Injury to Feelings

14. Injury to Feelings include mental suffering, loss of dignity, humiliation, loss to reputation

and loss to social status which arose as a result of the tort.

15. Unfortunately, the conditions of prisons in this jurisdiction can be categorized as being

inhumane conditions and therefore the Claimant’s evidence of the conditions of

imprisonment are accepted. The fact that the Claimant was an inmate on previous

occasions ought not to be seen as a basis for ignoring the indignity suffered on this

occasion. Dignity, as is the case of one’s reputation, has an objective value. Dignity is an

indivisible essence of being a human being. This Court joins the chorus of other Courts

which look forward to the amelioration of prison conditions within this jurisdiction.

The Determination of an Appropriate Award

16. Given the content of the closing submissions of the attorney at law for the Claimant, this

Court will briefly explore the relevant principles in awards where there are claims arising

out of tortious claims and comparable constitutional infringements.

Awards under Common Law and Awards for Constitutional breaches.

17. It is settled law that the award of damages under common law and the award for

constitutional breaches are distinct and ought not to be equated. The former seeks to

compensate while the latter is an award in vindication of rights breached. On this matter

Smith JA in Merrick (supra) stated that “the distinction between constitutional law

damages and common law damages is not ‘merely cosmetic’. However it is noted that this

distinction does not mean that it is pointless to make reference to these cases as guide

for appropriate awards. Smith JA in Merrick also noted:

“That… comparable common law awards of damages may be useful as a guide to an

award of compensation for the violation of a constitutional right, a court ought not to

feel obligated or pigeonholed into following common law awards when assessing

damages in respect of constitutional law claims. Similarly, a Court seeking to use

constitutional awards in a case of common law breaches must note the distinctions in

the nature of the awards and note that in constitutional law matters what is required

to vindicate or uphold a right can go far beyond compensation. Compensation is merely

an element of vindicating or upholding a right. Further, relief in a constitutional law

claim to vindicate or uphold a right is discretionary unlike at common law where

compensatory damages are awarded as of right once loss is proved. See Merrick para.

57.”

Claims Seeking Mixed Reliefs

18. The Court disagreed with the attorney at law for the Claimant’s submission that the cases

for Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment are distinct in nature and ought not

to be considered among judicial trends when arriving at an appropriate award in false

imprisonment cases.

Arriving at an Appropriate Award

19. The determination of an award for false imprisonment differs from that which operates

in England. In England the Courts allow a specific award to be made for the first hour of

imprisonment and a reducing quantum relative to the time spent in custody. Similarly, a

specific sum representing 24 hours in custody and an award on a reducing scale for the

days spent in custody. (See Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the metropolis

and HUS v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1998] QB 498, CA.

20. In this jurisdiction the authorities do not support this methodology. The Court of Appeal

in the Merrick case indicated that the pro rata basis for assessing damages for false

imprisonment has repeatedly been held to be erroneous.

21. In cases such as these where there is an extensive period of detention, the Court would

consider all of the circumstances and determine if tapering the award in relation to the

softening of the initial shock of being incarcerated is appropriate or some other method

is appropirate. In the case of Ronnie Abraham v The Attorney General of Trinidad

and Tobago HCA 801 of 1997 Smith J (as he then was) stated:

“Secondly, the cases cited with the exception of one, to which I will refer later, were cases

of much shorter periods of incarceration, some even less than a day, and are in my view

of little assistance in this case; additionally there is a strong element of shock to the

system during the early part of an arrest which merits a higher award than at later

stages of detention, hence a reducing scale of compensation, see Thompson's case op cit.

When the time of incarceration is as drawn out as here, it is difficult to ascertain the

principles and methods to be applied in deciding on the reduction in the scale and the

time from which each reduction is to take effect; in fact no guidance was presented to

the court to assist in this task.”

22. In the case of in Edwin Huggins v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago HCA

1714 of 1998 Mendonca J (as he then was) formed the view:

“I also do not agree that even if an hourly rate were to be awarded it should necessarily

be applied in a progressively reducing scale. Support for the proposition of a reducing

scale came from Thompson v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, (1997) 3

Weekly Law Reports, 3. The basis for that seems to be that a higher rate was justified to

compensate the arrested person for the initial shock of being arrested. But as Sinanan J,

as he then was, pointed out in Steven Singh v The Attorney General:

“But an equally plausible argument can be advanced the other way. The trauma, the

humiliation and frustration of a plaintiff falsely imprisoned increases with each passing

moment, the more protracted the ordeal, the greater the effect.”

23. De la Bastide CJ in Josephine Millette v Sherman Mc Nicolls C.A. CIV. 14/2000

reasoned that this position and one in which the shock of incarceration ‘tapered off’ were

not necessarily conflicting points of view. In fact, these positions lend credence to the fact

of the subjectivity of each matter. For example, in Millette, while it was accepted that the

initial shock would taper off and that there would be some adjustment to the

circumstances by the confined person, the fact that that person is imprisoned would

become more burdensome the longer it lasted. In that particular case, a special factor

considered was that the Plaintiff was the sole caregiver of an invalid son and she

continuously worried about the level of care that he was receiving and the longer that

she stayed imprisoned, the more aggrieved she would become.

24. De La Bastide CJ In Millette at pages 365-366 emphasised:

“[…] I should begin by saying that counsel for the appellant did not pursue the

mathematical computation of damages which had been proposed on behalf of the

appellant in the court below. The absurdity of such an approach is demonstrated by the

fact that on the basis of awards in comparable cases it was submitted in the court below

that the daily rate for wrongful detention was $20,000. Multiplying that by the number

of days for which the appellant was detained, produces a figure in excess of $2,600,000!

We have already indicated in Bernard v Quashie our disapproval of this mathematical

approach to the assessment of general damages in a case of this sort. We are told that

in England juries have been instructed that they may adopt a specific daily rate in

assessing damages for wrongful detention. Well, we do not have juries in civil cases in

this country, and I say unhesitatingly that that is an approach which this court will not

adopt or approve.”

25. The manner in which the initial arrest was made would pose an ‘initial shock’ for which

a person can be compensated. Thereafter, while it can be expected that there will be some

adjustment by any normal person to the circumstances of his imprisonment, it is also true

that the longer it lasts the more burdensome it becomes (see Millette case page 367 para.

g-h).

26. His Lordship went on to say that the length of detention is a very important factor but it

not the sole factor on which damages are calculated. He emphasised that other factors

such as aggravating factors, which were considered in the comparable cases should be

noted when deciding what is indeed comparable. For example, in Thaddeus Bernard v

Nixie Quashie C.A. CIV. 159/1992 there was physical violence meted out to the Plaintiff

whereas in Josephine Millette there was no such physical violence.

27. In this case the Claimant was taken to the station and kept in a cell for 3 days. When he

was taken to the Magistrate’s court there was no warrant of arrest or no other basis for

him to be before the court hence the enquiry of the officer for his warrant of arrest.

Perhaps he thought that the matter would still be sorted out, but it was not, and he was

sent off to prison. Perhaps it can be argued that the shock of the arrest was intensive

since the Claimant felt that the police would have verified his identity with his finger

prints but this did not happen and after three days in a holding cell he was ‘carted off’‘ the

prison. The conditions of the prison are not of a nature that any person can be expected

to adjust to the circumstances of incarceration thus the Court will not speak of “tapering

off”. However, there is no evidence to suggest that there were particular considerations

which created additional burdens of incarceration as operated in the case of Millette1 for

which there should be an increase to the award.

Judicial Trends – False Imprisonment

28. The Claimant in this case was unjustly imprisoned for a period of 135 days. This case

presents a unique set of circumstances since there are not many instances in this

jurisdiction where there exists that particular length of detention. However, as alluded

to in Bernard v Quashie (supra), per de la Bastide CJ at page 7, the calculation of

damages in this instance cannot be a strict mathematical exercise.

29. The court took the following cases into consideration when assessing the appropriate

award of damages for False Imprisonment.

30. Kedar Maharaj v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, delivered on

February 2, 2010 by Boodoosingh J.

The Claimant was wrongfully detained at a mental hospital for a period of 28 days after

a court order for his release had been made. He was not released until after the Claimant

brought proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus.

The Claimant was awarded a sum of $280,000.00 in general damages and $50,000.00 in

exemplary damages.

1 Supra.

31. Uric Merrick v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago & Anor C.A. CIV.

146/2009, delivered February 5, 2013.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was wrong to use the pro-rata basis for

assessing damages for false imprisonment and increased the award from $36,000.00 for

a period of 36 days to the sum of $200,000.00 with an uplift for aggravated damages.

32. Anthony Scott v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2008-02309,

delivered on May 16, 2012 by Master Alexander.

The Claimant was detained for a period of 37 days as a result of mistaken identity.

General Damages awarded in the sum of $150,000.00 with no uplift for aggravation and

no award for exemplary damages made.

33. Peter Deacon v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2010-04134,

delivered on September 26, 2012 by Master Mohammed.

The Claimant claimed damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. He

was detained for a period of 255 days in deplorable conditions. The court also found that

the nature of the arrest created personal humiliation.

The Claimant was arrested for possession of cocaine. He was subjected to deplorable

conditions for 255 days which the court found would have caused a high degree of

physical and mental anguish. He was charged and prosecuted for a little under 6 years

for a relatively simple offence for which no evidence was found by the police since they

failed to search his home and failed to obtain evidence from the hospital that he had

ingested the cocaine and consequently was in possession of cocaine. The Claimant lost

his income which adversely affected his family financially; his wife was forced to seek

employment since the Claimant was the sole breadwinner. The Claimant was unable to

see his sons (aged 3 and 4 years old at the time) which strained the relationship between

them as father and sons. The lengthy period of imprisonment and prosecution tarnished

his name in his neighbourhood.

The court also took into consideration the nature of his arrest. He was humiliated in front

of his family and his neighbours he was led away from his home in his underpants

without being afforded the opportunity to dress which the court found to be wholly

unnecessary,

General damages was awarded in the sum of $900,000.00 inclusive of an uplift for

aggravation and exemplary damages was awarded in the sum of $10,000.00.

34. Chabinath Persad v Deonarine Jaimungal PC No. 11124; The Attorney General of

Trinidad and Tobago CV2008-04811, delivered on November 15, 2011 by Master

Alexander.

The Claimant was awarded damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution

for a period of detention of 76 days. He was awarded the sum of $110,000.00 inclusive of

an uplift for aggravated damages. Exemplary damages was awarded in the sum of

$20,000.00.

35. Steve Dyer v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago CV2007-02202, delivered

on November 10, 2011 by Ventour J.

The Claimant was arrested pursuant to a warrant of commitment signed with respect to

two matters. The Claimant was serving time on a third matter at the time of signing of the

warrant. The sentences in all three matters were to run concurrently. The Claimant was

made to serve an additional 186 days in prison which was held to be unlawful. He was

awarded the sum of $250,000.00 in general damages for his unlawful arrest and false

imprisonment, inclusive of aggravated damages. No award for exemplary damages was

made.

36. Ted Alexis v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago & Anor H.C. 3795A/2002,

delivered on March 17, 2008 by Kangaloo J.

The plaintiff claimed against first defendant, damages, including aggravated and/or

exemplary damages for malicious prosecution, unlawful arrest and detention and false

imprisonment. The plaintiff alleged that on December 30, 1996, the second defendant

maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause preferred against the plaintiff

the charge of having in his possession a dangerous drug, namely cocaine, for the purpose

of trafficking. The case was dismissed on October 24, 2000. The period of incarceration

of the plaintiff was 2 ½ months before he was able to access bail.

General Damages was awarded in the sum of $100,000.00 inclusive of aggravated

damages and Exemplary damages was awarded in the sum of $25,000.00.

37. Jospehone Millette v Sherman Mc Nicolls C.A. CIV. 14/2000, delivered on November 1,

2000.

The Appellant was imprisoned for a period of 132 days. A sum of $145,000.00 was

awarded. The Court of Appeal did not interfere with the sum awarded by the Master,

although they did find that they found that the award was on the low end of the spectrum

but not low enough for them to interfere with.

Aggravated and Exemplary Damages

38. The Court may also consider aggravating factors in arriving at an award for false

imprisonment. In Takitota v The Attorney General and Others [2009] UKPC 11 at

paragraph 11 Lord Carswell explained:

“In awarding compensatory damages the court may take account of an element of

aggravation. For example, in a case of unlawful detention it may increase the award to

a higher figure than it would have given simply for the deprivation of liberty, to reflect

such matters as indignity and humiliation arising from the circumstances of arrest or

the conditions in which the Claimant was held. The rationale for the inclusion of such an

element is that the Claimant would not receive sufficient compensation for the wrong

sustained if the damages were restricted to a basic award.”

39. Further, in Bernard v Quashie (supra) de la Bastide C.J. stated the following in relation

to aggravated damages:

“The normal practice is that one figure is awarded as general damages. These damages

are intended to be compensatory and include what is referred to as aggravated

damages, that is, damages which are meant to provide compensation for the mental

suffering inflicted on the plaintiff as opposed to the physical injuries he may have

received. Under this head of what I have called ‘mental suffering’ are included such

matters as the affront to them person’s dignity, the humiliation he has suffered, the

damage to his reputation and standing in the eyes of others and matters of that sort. If

the practice has developed of making a separate award of aggravated damages I think

that practice should be discontinued.”

40. This Court took into consideration the following aggravating factors when making the

award in this matter:

(i) The Claimant was threatened that he would be charged with murder, a non-

bailable offence, if he did not answer to Ricky Khan before the Magistrate and

if he did not sign a document as if he were Ricky Khan.

(ii) The Claimant was not afforded an opportunity to speak to or retain counsel.

(iii) The conditions of the prison in which he was held was unsanitary and

inhumane.

41. An award of aggravated damages must be distinguished from exemplary or punitive

damages. Lord Carswell went on to say in Takitota at paragraph 12 of the judgment that

“[T]he awards of exemplary damages are a common law head of damages, the object of

which is to punish the defendant for outrageous behaviour and deter him and others from

repeating it ...”. To be noted also is the comment of Lord Nichols in Kuddus v Chief

Constable of Leicestershire [2001] UKHL 29 at paragraph 63:

“The availability of exemplary damages has played a significant role in buttressing civil

liberties, in claims for false imprisonment and wrongful arrest. From time to time

cases do arise where awards of compensatory damages are perceived as inadequate

to achieve a just result between the parties. The nature of the defendant’s conduct calls

for a further response from the courts. On occasions conscious wrongdoings by a

defendant is so outrageous, his disregard of the plaintiff’s rights so contumelious that

something more is needed to show that the law will not tolerate such behaviour. Without

an award of exemplary damages justice will not have been done.”

42. Taking the above into consideration, the court found that an appropriate award for

General Damages which would satisfy the justice of this case is the sum of $260,000.00

inclusive of an uplift for aggravated damages.

43. The Court further considered the law on Exemplary Damages and found that this was an

appropriate matter for such an award to be made. In Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129,

Lord Devlin stated that exemplary damages may be awarded in circumstances where the

conduct by servants of the government can be viewed as “oppressive, arbitrary, or

unconstitutional”.

44. In light of the circumstances of the Claimant’s detention and incarceration; the fact that

the Claimant was wrongfully detained instead of his twin brother without proper

investigation into the claim that he was not the person named on the warrant; that no

steps were taken to verify that the Claimant was the same person as the person named;

and that on being told of this fact, the Claimant was threatened by officers and forced to

respond to the name Ricky Khan in court; the Court was of the view that there should be

an award in exemplary damages. The sum of $10,000.00 is awarded to represent

exemplary damages.

THE ORDER

45. It was ordered that:

(i) The Defendants do pay to the Claimant general damages in the sum of Two

Hundred and Sixty Thousand Dollars ($260,000.00) inclusive of aggravated

damages and exemplary damages in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars

($10,000.00).

(ii) Interest to accrue at a rate of two point five percent (2.5%) per annum on the

general damages from the date of service of the Claim Form i.e. August 21, 2014

to January 19, 2018.

(iii) The Defendants do pay to the Claimant prescribed costs in the sum of Forty-Nine

Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighteen Dollars ($49,718.00) being in accordance

with Part 67 Appendix A of the Civil Proceedings Rules 1998 (as amended).

Marissa Robertson Master of the High Court Research Assistant: