the resurgence of hindu nationalism · janata party (bjp). thus, resulting from the retreat of the...
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Pázmány Péter Catholic University
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Institute of International Studies and Political Science
The Resurgence of Hindu Nationalism
Dr. Vera Gáthy Anna Juhos
Associate Professor International Relations MA
Piliscsaba, 2013.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2
2 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 4
3 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review .................................................................. 4
4 Background – An Analysis of the Deeper Determinants .................................................... 7
4.1 ‘Jobless Growth’ .......................................................................................................... 7
4.2 From a Regulatory to a Networking State ................................................................... 9
5 Proximate Causes .............................................................................................................. 11
5.1 Sewa - Service ........................................................................................................... 11
5.2 Unity, Status and Power ............................................................................................. 16
5.2.1 The Concept of the Middle Classes .................................................................... 17
5.2.2 Upper-Middle Class Claims ............................................................................... 18
5.2.3 The Upper-Middle Classes as the BJP’s Support Base ...................................... 19
6 Whither Democracy and Secularism? ............................................................................... 22
6.1 Secularism .................................................................................................................. 23
6.2 Democracy and Good Governance ............................................................................ 26
7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 27
8 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 29
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1 Introduction
“The BJP’s powerful role in mainstream Indian politics and the might of the Hindutva
movement are parts of the new political reality in India. Even though the BJP is no longer
dominant, in the way it was over the last few years, it remains a politically powerful force,
and is working hard to return to office” (Sen 2005: 50–51).
In spite of India’s growing middle class and significant economic development over the last
decade, its democracy has been challenged by the growing number of right-wing
organisations and their supporters in India. At the centre of this research is the question why
modernization and economic growth have not led to increased secularization of society, as it
happened in the West? Additionally, what are the factors which pose a threat to democracy
and secularism? I argue that the way modernization and economic growth have come about in
India have not led to increased democratization and secularization but lent support to the right
wing and caused the resurgence of Hindu nationalism. This resurgence and the consequent
stagnating, or one can argue reversed, secularization process resulted from the combined
effect of the following deeper (indirect) determinants, additionally, proximate (direct) causes.
The first important deeper determinant for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism is the
retreat of the state together with an expanding private and unorganized sector. Additionally,
the one-sided focus on institutional/procedural democracy and the relative neglect of
substantive/representative democracy have also contributed to this. These I differentiate as
top-down versus bottom-up approaches to Indian democracy. Thus, the ruling Indian National
Congress-led (INC) coalition, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) has primarily focused
on procedural and institutional democracy while the right wing has significantly strengthened
its grassroots organisations and also consolidated support for its political wing, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). Thus, resulting from the retreat of the state as a deeper determinant, one of
the proximate causes for stalled secularization and an important means facilitating the
resurgence of Hindu nationalism from below is the spread of grassroots, service-providing
right wing organisations.
The second deeper determinant is ‘jobless growth’, thus the nature of the Indian
economic model itself. Even though this has resulted in overall high levels of economic
growth and modernization, uneven development and growing inequalities characterized the
process. This resulted in more competition about less which consequently triggered more
tension in India’s fractious society. However, the right wing has successfully built its rhetoric
around the need for sustained high levels of economic growth and a new image of India as a
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proud, united, rising power for which Gujarat’s developmental success served as a good
example and role model. This resonates well with demands of the growing middle classes,
who should be the reformer of society but eventually find their needs and vision similar to
those advocated by the Hindu right. Therefore, I regard the successful application of this
‘unity for growth’ rhetoric and the support of the middle classes another proximate cause for
the relatively stagnating societal secularization and a significant means contributing to the
resurgence of Hindu nationalism from above.
Resulting from their overarching character these processes can pose a significant
challenge to democracy and secularism in India in the long run and through the neglect of
substantive democracy eventually erode procedural democracy. Although, the BJP’s rhetoric
has been moderated because of coalition politics and in order to gain widespread support, it
has also transformed the concepts of democracy and secularism. Moreover, spreading
grassroots Hindutva movements, although to various extent, still adhere to an anti-minority
sentiment and a Hindu majoritarian image of India. It is also the aim of this essay to highlight
the need to counter these extremist ideologies through constitutional means.
Regarding the structure of this essay, the main sections will correspond to the main
hypotheses outlined above. After outlining the methodology and providing the wider
conceptual framework, I will elaborate on the problems resulting from the retreat of the state
and ‘jobless growth’ in India. In the following section, I will highlight how the growing
middle classes’ demands and the right-wing tenets seem to resonate, thus resulting in a
strengthened relationship between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the consumerist
middle classes. In the last analytical section I will analyse some speeches by Narendra Modi,
Gujarati Chief Minister and the BJP’s Prime Ministerial candidate, in relation to the
transformation of Hindu nationalism itself together with the reinterpretation of the concepts of
democracy and secularism. Finally, the concluding part summarises the research findings.
It is important to highlight that the aim of this research is not to provide projections for
the general elections in 2014 or the future of India’s democracy because those are determined
by several factors and can be subject to significant changes. The aim of this research is to
provide a longitudinal analysis and consider the underlying causes of the resurgence of Hindu
nationalism and why modernization and growth could not result in increased secularization. It
will contribute to the existing literature by combining political, economic and cultural
explanations to further understanding about Indian democracy, modernity and secularism.
Moreover, in spite of being a case study of India this research can have significant policy
implications for other countries facing the challenge of inequitable and non-inclusive
modernisation and democratization processes.
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2 Methodology
Outlining the most important concepts is crucial before addressing the question why
modernization and economic growth have not resulted in increased secularization. Therefore,
in the next section, I will briefly reflect on the general concepts of democracy, secularism,
secularization and Hindutva, while other complex concepts such as the middle classes or the
BJP’s understanding of the above notions will be analysed in the corresponding analytical
sections.
In order to give a thorough analysis both primary and secondary sources will be used.
For the first part of this essay, statistics and surveys by the World Bank, the World Health
Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, the Indian Ministry of Human Resource
Development and the Planning Commission of India will be used. In order to get more robust
data these primary sources of analyses will be supplemented by monographs and case studies
as well. For the section analysing the right-wing organisations’ service-providing activities,
the Sangh Parivar’s and the particular organisation’s website and database detailing the
number of projects and activities will be used as a primary source. For the analysis on voter
turnout the National Election Study series, statistics and surveys by the Centre for the Study
of Developing Societies (CSDS), an independent social science research institute will be used.
These provide a thorough analysis of the 1998, 2004 and 2009 general elections. In the last
analytical section, given its qualitative character, Narendra Modi’s selected English speeches
will be analysed. Here I will focus on the Foucauldian ‘truth effect’, thus the power to
generate truth by emphasising a particular conceptual and ideological understanding. In the
corresponding section I will highlight problems with selection and justify my cases as well.
Regarding the time period, I will consider proceedings after 1991, the starting point of
India’s economic liberalisation, and use data to outline trends, potential changes in relation to
the contemporary problems and challenges in relation to democracy, secularism and
Hindutva.
3 Conceptual Framework and Literature Review
At the centre of this analysis is the paradox of economic growth, modernization and the
simultaneous resurgence of Hindu nationalism. Since I argue that modernization and growth
have not been accompanied by significant, increased secularization, clarifying these concepts
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should be the first task. Therefore, a distinction between secularism and secularization is
necessary using Achin Vanaik’s (1997) interpretation.
In his book, ‘The Furies of Indian Communalism’ Vanaik refers to secularism as
encompassing practices and policies used by the state in order to separate itself from the
religious domain. In the second part of this research, I will reflect on the unique approach to
secularism in India, which has been understood as ‘sarva dharma sambhava’, the equality of
all religions (Kolodner 1995). This has been propounded by Article 14, 15, 16 and 25 of the
Indian constitution as well (Jaffrelot 2007: 329). On the other hand, secularization has been
described by Vanaik as a process signalling the declining religious influence and religious
identity in modern life (Vanaik 1997: 103–105). However, I will argue that this has been
refuted by the middle classes and through the resurgence of Hindu nationalism, since
traditional values have been simultaneously strengthened with modernisation and lent support
to Hindutva.
However, the concept of Hindutva requires clarification as well. The word ‘Hindutva’
was coined in 1923 by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, a Brahmin from Maharashtra, one of
India’s north-western coastal states. While Hindu nationalism was born in reaction to the pan-
Islamic Khilafat movement (Jaffrelot 2007: 14), and has been transformed since then, the four
constituting elements described in Savarkar’s pamphlet ‘Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?’
remained constant, although with shifting emphasis on one or the other over time. These
elements of ‘Hinduness’ were territory (Aryavarta), race (Hindus, as descendants of Vedic
fathers), language (Sanskrit and Hindi) and religion (Jaffrelot 2007: 15). However, given that
Savarkar was an atheist, religion had only a secondary role among the constituting elements
of Hindu identity. This, nevertheless, played and plays a significant role in describing
Muslims or Christians as ‘others’ and ‘foreigners’ in India, launching (forced) reconversions
and violent persecutions.
The relation between modernization and secularism in India should also be outlined.
For this I will compare arguments by Ashis Nany, T. N. Madan and Thomas Blom Hansen.
While Nandy and Madan argue that religiosity is inherently characteristic of India, they
provide different arguments. According to Nandy, modernity and religiosity are two
alternatives. Thus, “many Indians see the society (…) as leaving no scope for a compromise
between the old and the new (…) These Indians have now come to sense that it is modernity
which rules the world and that religion-as-faith is being pushed to the corner” (Nandy 1990:
79). Consequently, this triggers anger and translates into “an aggressive politicization of
religious identity” according to Nandy (Bose 2009: 12). On the other hand, T.N. Madan
questions the universal applicability of the Western concept of secularism, which will result in
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an outcome that Nandy asserted. These explanations, however, obscure the complexity of
reasons for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism. My argument is rather in line with Thomas
Blom Hansen’s claims. Even if the time periods under investigation differ, since Hansen’s
analysis is from the late 1990s, I argue that his argument adequately describes the current
situation by claiming that Hindu nationalism “acknowledges the powerful attractions of
Western consumerism and modern technology but emphasize that the prerequisite for
developing a sovereign national modernity is the cultural unity and purity of the Hindu
nation” (Hansen 1999: 13). Thus, the adaptation of Hindutva to modernization has brought
about a unique situation where Western consumerism and modern technology are embraced
alongside traditional, patriarchal norms and customs, which eventually hinder secularization.
Sunil Khilnani’s (2003) description captures this oddity best by highlighting that “for many in
India, modernity has been adopted through the conservative filters of religious piety,
moralism, and domestic virtue. This has spawned a novel Hinduism, where holographic gods
dangle on well-used key chains and cassettes of devotional ragas are played in traffic jams”
(Khilnani 2003: 186–187).
Furthermore, the main question of this analysis undoubtedly relates to those aspects of
modernization theory which reflect on the sustainability of democracy. Therefore, the first
task is to reflect on the argument by Lipset that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the
chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959: 75). According to him, aspects of
economic development, thus industrialization, education, urbanization and wealth are
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for democracy. Moreover, the relationship between
democracy and these factors is correlational, not causal in his understanding. However, these
factors’ effectiveness leads to continuous economic development, which consequently
strengthens the government’s legitimacy. Moreover, as a result of changing social conditions,
which can be attributed to education and openness, citizens become more receptive to
democratic norms and values. In this process, Lipset also emphasised the important role of the
middle classes, who contribute not only to democratic transition but also to democratic
stability (Lipset 1960).
Even though economic development was considered by Lipset as one of the factors
forming the set of conditions for democracy, it has gained significant attention in the analysis
of modernization and democratization. For example Rostow (1960) outlined a linear
relationship between economic development and modernization, while Moore’s (1966)
research on transitions concentrated on the social basis and the level of industrialization.
However, the claim “no bourgeoisie, no democracy" (Moore 1966) highlights the importance
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of the middle class both in Lipset’s and Moore’s analysis. In line with this statement the
middle classes’ role in secularization and democratization will be highlighted.
Furthermore, with regard to the relation between democratization and development it
is necessary to reflect on the ‘exogenous version of democratization’ theory by Przeworski et
al. (2000). According to this theory, development makes democracies to endure if they have a
sufficiently high per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) level. However, India still belongs
to low GDP per capita countries. Moreover, in spite of the growing level of all factors of
socio-economic development outlined by Lipset, thus urbanization, wealth, education and
industrialization, even those Indian states which have a relatively high per capita GDP have
uneven human development indicators along gender, caste, class and religious lines. India’s
uneven development therefore significantly questions the assumption that development makes
democracies endure in general, but seems valid with the condition by Przeworski et al. (2000
and 1997) that it is only adequate in describing countries above a particular level of per capita
GDP.
For the central question of this research, why modernization has not increased
secularization, Anuja Bose (2009) argued that capitalist and technological modernization was
not accompanied by a democratic revolution which could have brought about “meaningful
freedoms and social equality” (Bose 2009: 27). In light of Bose’s claim a thorough analysis of
the deeper and proximate determinants of this process is required by first outlining how
capitalist and technological modernization itself hindered equality.
4 Background – An Analysis of the Deeper Determinants
4.1 ‘Jobless Growth’
Some claim that India’s low (3.8 per cent in 2011) unemployment rate indicates the success of
its growth and development. However, this indicator is not truly reflective as only educated,
well-off people can afford waiting for a ’proper’, formal sector job, while the poor usually
take on several part-time jobs in the informal sector (Times of India 2012; Mohanty 2011:
117). Although it was expected that India’s economic growth will be accompanied by a
significant level of job-creation, the country’s employment elasticity1 approaches zero. Thus,
the negligible level of new employment opportunities resulted in a situation with more
competition about less. I argue that consequently this brings about more tension in India’s
1 Employment elasticity measures how employment varies with economic growth (Planning
Commission 2013).
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fractious society and lends support to the expansion of fundamental ideologies and
organisations. Therefore, ‘jobless growth’ should be regarded as one of the deeper
determinants for eroding democratic and secular values. Moreover, through growing
inequalities it is one of the proximate causes for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism.
In contrast to the Chinese or Bangladeshi labour-intensive model, India’s capital-
intensive economic growth has not led to significant formal sector job-generation. Although
multinationals have been increasingly inclined to outsourcing in India, labour opportunities
with minimal wage in the Information Technology and Communication (ITC) sectors are only
provided to some 3 million people from the educated upper-middle classes. Moreover,
employment elasticity decreased from 0.44 between 1994 and 2005 to 0.01 between 2005 and
2010 (Planning Commission 2013: 124). According to estimates by the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) “only if the overall elasticity can be raised to 0.41, would the economy be
able to achieve the required growth in employment with a GDP growth of 9.6 per cent” (2009:
3). Thus, in spite of India’s growing population of working age which could boost its
economy, the current capital-intensive model cannot absorb the roughly 13 million people
entering the Indian labour market every year (Ministry of Human Resource Development
2013). This slowing rate of employment growth is also a result of strict labour legislations on
firing employees, the large proportion of job seekers who are non- or semi-skilled, and
eventually the non-transferable skills from education.
Here, a brief reflection on the difference between the formal and informal sector is
necessary. Overall, the labour force is growing faster than the formal employment sector,
which was 0.1 per cent annually between 1994 and 2005 (Mohanty 2011: 118). Besides the
negligible growth of the formal sector, its share of the total employment has declined from 9
per cent in 1983 to 7 per cent in 2004–5. Therefore, with 93 per cent working in the informal/
traditional sector with generally no health and safety protection or benefits, the surplus of
mostly unskilled workers can be absorbed by the informal sector only, further increasing the
amount of shared work and thus reducing incomes (Sinha 2007). As a result, the gap between
incomes in the formal and informal sector has been widened. Compared to the increase of 2.5
per cent in agricultural wages in the 1990s, IT managers salaries since 2000 have risen by 23
per cent annually (Rajan and Subramanian 2006; Chand 2007; Times of India 2012; Mohanty
2011: 117–9). Even though the need for reforms was also expressed by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh with the aim of achieving a 4 per cent growth rate in this sector annually,
initiatives proved to be relatively weak and signify rather short-term solutions. This is the
case with the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA)
(Mohanty 2011: 120). While providing 100 day work a year with relatively higher incomes
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compared to other informal sector payments, it is rather a temporary solution and would not
solve the job-seeking problems of the rapidly growing unskilled labour force.
Therefore, India’s capital-intensive and consequently ‘jobless’ growth should be
regarded as an important factor, which resulted in economic growth but uneven development
and growing inequalities. Capitalist and technological modernization thus significantly
contributed to India’s economic growth, but the very nature of this development triggered
more grievances and dissatisfaction. Eventually, ‘jobless growth’ has increasingly resulted in
dissatisfaction with failed initiatives from the central government’s side to provide
employment and a fair share from India’s significant economic growth to every segment of
the society. The situation of more competition about less has consequently resulted in more
societal tension as well, which provided a significant ground for the right wing to strengthen
its support base through an ideology-induced strategy to form claims to the gains of
development.
4.2 From a Regulatory to a Networking State
Besides ‘jobless growth’, I claim that the retreat of the state from providing public goods and
services together with the expansion of private, unregulated and some ideology-induced
organisations should be regarded as another deeper determinant for the lack of secularization
and a proximate cause for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism. Moreover, I argue that as a
result of this process the power of the leading Congress-led coalition has been relatively
fading together with its Gandhi-Nehru legacy and values. As a consequence, this ‘soft state’
lacks the capacity to adequately enact law, curb corruption, establish social discipline and act
against vested interest (Karnik 2011; Myrdal 1975). I argue that right-wing organisations
could significantly use this situation, fill this vacuum left by the state, and portray their
widespread service-providing activities as a clear and better alternative to unregulated,
superficial, or corrupted state programmes. Thus, they could attract a significant number of
people.
Through this process, we can clearly see a shift from a regulatory to a networking state
where the state becomes one of the many service providers which are linked to each other
through horizontal linkages and flexible relations (Chandhoke 2958). It is important to
emphasise that the character of this relationship is horizontal and not vertical, thus the state
does not have a central co-ordinating role over other service providers, which hinders its
potential to effectively sanction or monitor.
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In order to highlight the neglect of public services resulting from the retreat of the
state, the example of health care will be used (Keifer and Khemani 2003). First, it should be
highlighted that public spending on health care increased only marginally from nearly 1 per
cent between 1997 and 2006 to 1.2 per cent by 2010 (Rao and Choudhury 2012: 3).
Moreover, according to the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) World Health Statistics, the
“level of per capita public expenditure on health was around a third of Sri Lanka’s, less than
30 per cent of China’s, and 14 per cent of Thailand’s” (cited in Rao and Choudhury 2012: 10).
With regard to the composition of this spending, it is also important to mention that the bulk
of the expenditure is not spent on drugs or material supplies but goes for wages and salaries.
We also have to highlight that according to the National Health Accounts data, almost 30 per
cent of the public expenditure on health was used for improving curative, tertiary health care
while neglecting preventive, primary and secondary health care facilities and problems mostly
affecting the poorer segments of society. While there are significant differences between the
Indian states, such as Bihar spending less than half on health care than Kerala or Tamil Nadu,
the quality of public health service facilities has deteriorated significantly. This means “high
absenteeism, low quality in clinical care, low satisfaction levels with care and rampant
corruption plague [in] public health services in India” (Hammer et al. 2007: 4049). According
to Hammer et al. “the continued deterioration of India’s public sector can be attributed to the
failure of accountability mechanisms in current governance structures” (2006: 13).
Consequently, poor quality, lack of professional health personnel and technological
facilities compel people to go to private health care providers and therefore undertake a
significant financial burden and significant out-of-pocket (OOP) spending on health care (Rao
and Choudhury 2012). However, this is only affordable for the well-off segments of society,
while the poor will be compelled to look for alternative service providers. This is a problem
what Levebvre labelled ‘commodified services’, which are no longer a quality or right, but a
commodity (Lefebvre 1991; Goonewardena et al. 2008). At the same time, a question arises
what happens if these mushrooming service providers include an increasing number of right-
wing organisations, which provide services and companionship, but also require acceptance of
particular fundamentalist ideologies, clearly in contrast to the government’s policy and
commitment to secularism and democracy. The following section aims to address this
question.
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5 Proximate Causes
5.1 Sewa - Service
An overarching institutional network characterises the activity of Hindu nationalist
organizations constituting the Sangh Parivar (the ‘Family of Associations’). I argue that this
widespread and strengthened bottom-up approach should be regarded as one of the proximate
causes for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism, and eventually the flawed relation between
modernization and secularization in India. Therefore, a thorough analysis of this institutional-
ideological expansion is necessary.
One significant characteristic of this Hindu right-wing institutional network is that it
aims at reaching out to different groups along occupational or gender lines, additionally issue
areas. Thus, it addresses peasants, women or even the diaspora. The Bharatiya Kisan Sangh
(Indian Farmers Organisation), the Durga Vahini, the women’s wing of the Vishva Hindu
Parishad, the Mahila Aghadi, the Women’s Front of the Shiv Sena, or the Hindu
Swayamsevak Sangh (Hindu Volunteer Organization) could be mentioned in this regard as
prominent examples. Besides their attempt to mobilise different social groups, Hindu
nationalist organisations try to encompass every aspect of life by providing different kinds of
services, such as education and health care, establishing self-help centres or initiating social
projects. Moreover, all of these organisations are centred on notions of patriotism, national
unity and integrity. According to the Vishva Hindu Parishad (the World Hindu Council) these
notions, described as main aims, “are sought to be achieved through sewa [service] projects in
the field of education, child welfare, [i.e.] balsanskar, schools, orphanages, women
empowerment, livelihood projects, health care, emergency medical aid, socio-cultural
activities, relief in times of natural calamities, dharma prachar [the propagation of dharma]
and samajicsamarasta [social harmony]” (Vishva Hindu Parishad (online)).
However, I argue that the ever-growing popular support for these service-providing
grassroots Hindutva movements poses one of the greatest threats to democracy. This is in line
with Jayal’s assertion which described inequalities, economic disparities and Hindutva as the
greatest challenges to democracy (Jayal 2001: 44). This challenge is largely attributed to the
belief that organisations, such as the Vishva Hindu Parishad, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh or their affiliated youth and women’s organisations provide a better alternative to
insufficient, inadequate and quite often unimplemented government programmes. Acceptance
of these services, however, also requires active participation in the organisations’ work
through protection and propagation of patriarchal Hindu values, tradition and culture from
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below. This, on the other hand can result in a more fragmented society and a newly asserted
hierarchical differentiation based mostly on gender and religion, and a clear demarcation
between Hindus and minorities (Muslims, Christians), strengthening communal tensions over
time.
It should be highlighted that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS – National
Volunteer Organization), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party), the latter
considered as the political arm of the Sangh Parivar, have been advocates of a Hindu India
(Hindu Rashtra/ Hindu Nation) since the early 1920s and 1950s respectively. The emergence
of identity-, and issue-based new social movements in the 1970s, agitational politics and the
‘organic crisis’ of the Congress (Bose 1997; Kolodner 1995) together with V. P. Singh’s
approval of reservations2 catalysed an ‘elite revolt’ and increasing support for the clear image
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Corbridge and Harriss 2003; Kohli 2001: 203). Thus, a
perceived threat against upper-caste interests eventually propelled support for this
majoritarian, chauvinistic, cultural nationalism (Hansen 1999). While the party had only two
seats in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Parliament of India) in 1984, it won 119 by
1991. Even if it was still a minority in a House of 543, its ideology gained prominence over
time and led to its electoral victory in 1998 (Sen 2005: 50). While the Bharatiya Janata Party-
led National Democratic Alliance coalition lost in the general parliamentary elections in May
2004 and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance is in power since then, the BJP is in
power in Goa, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal
Pradesh at present. An asserted emphasis on the bottom-up approach by the right wing seems
therefore justified to help the BJP get back into power and strengthen its support base all over
the country.
The resurgence of Hindu nationalism is thus a more crucial issue from this bottom-up
perspective, with a focus on particular volunteer organisations and movements, rather than
party politics, which eventually becomes compromised through coalitional politics. I argue
that this is a clear weakness of the Indian Congress Party, because its top-down approach
through strengthening procedural democracy and constitutional rights has shifted its focus
2 In 1990 Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced acceptance some of the Mandal
Commission’s suggestions. According to this, 27 per cent of central government positions
will be allocated to the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in addition to those 22 per cent set
aside for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). It is important to highlight that
the BJP supported a merit-based system and wanted to connect quotas to economic situation
because many of its upper-caste supporters were poor (Kohli 2001: 203; 205).
13
away from the importance of building up its support base from below to the extent the Hindu
right wing did. Statistics of the Rashtriya Sewa Bharati (Indian Service), an umbrella
organisation including RSS-affiliated service-providing groups, show that between 2009 and
2012 the number of places with service activities increased by 20,000, with an emphasis
shifting in favour of more educational and self-reliance enhancing projects (Sewa Sadhna
2009; 2012). The Sewa Bharati’s activity is dominant in slums as well where it provides free
schools and low-cost medicines (Jaffrelot 2007: 19).
It is also important to note that the work of the Vishva Hindu Parishad (World Hindu
Council), which ranges from opposing cow slaughtering to the debate on Ayodhya3 has
significantly expanded over the same period and increased its outreach from 25,922 places to
43,805 places with slightly more than 45,000 activities, predominantly focusing on education.
Related to this, the work of the Vidya Bharati (Indian Knowledge), the network of schools
with an emphasis on the importance of education and spiritual development in contrast to
Western education should be mentioned. Additionally, the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram (Centre
for Tribal Welfare), which had almost 12,000 projects in 2012 mostly in tribal areas to
counter the work of missionaries4 through establishing free hospitals, schools and hostels, has
also increased its activity by at least 1,000 new projects (Jaffrelot 2007: 19; 234). It is also
interesting to highlight that with the single exception of Chhattisgarh, where sewa (service)-
providing activity has significantly decreased from 2788 projects to 41 over the last five
years, the highest number of these projects is concentrated in Southern Tamil Nadu (4737
projects as of 2012) and Northern Assam (5913 projects in 2012). This could probably be
attributed to these right-wing organisations’ aim to acquire more support from non-BJP ruled
states, such as Tamil Nadu and attract more tribals from Assam.
3 Ayodhya, a city in Uttar Pradesh, is the alleged “birthplace of god-king Lord Rama, [which
was] supposedly destroyed in the 16th century on the orders of Babur” (Jaffrelot 2007: 20),
and where a Muslim masjid/ mosque was built. This issue was taken up by the Vishva Hindu
Parishad, which wanted this site to be returned back to Hindus. This led to a widespread
movement in the mid-1980s, and eventually the destruction of the Babri masjid on the 6th of
December 1992.
4 Or as one of the commentators on the Sangh Parivar’s website asserted: the ”Vanvasi
Kalyan Ashram is working for the welfare of Adivasis and to save them from getting caught
in the clutches of missionaries”. The RSS, Sangh Parivar (online),
http://www.sanghparivar.org/join-rss?page=5, accessed 19 October 2013
14
In order to further illustrate how right-wing organisations seized the opportunity
provided through the retreat of the state, I will use education and the Vidya Bharati as an
example. A comparison between government-run schools and those related to the Vidya
Bharati highlights that “except Lakshdeep and Mizoram in the whole of the country, there are
more than fifty state and Regional Committees affiliated to Vidya Bharati. Under these
committees about 24,300 institutions are functioning where 30,02,820 lakh [1 lakh=100,000]
students under the able guidance of 1,30,278 teachers attain sanskars [in this context referring
to good influences, impressions] and education” (Vidya Bharati – Sangh Parivar website). If
we consider only the primary and upper-primary schools for the sake of this example, the
latest statistics by the Ministry of Human Resource Development reveal that the number of
these schools managed by the government is roughly 660,000 in India. If we compare this to
1,200,000, which is roughly the total number of primary and upper-primary schools in India,
it becomes clear that 45 per cent of all primary and upper-primary schools are run by local
and/or private bodies (Ministry of Human Resource Development 2010–2011). Moreover, a
study by Kremer et al. (2005) highlighted that “twenty-five per cent of teachers were absent
from school, and only about half were teaching, during unannounced visits to a nationally
representative sample of government primary schools in India”. This clearly shows why the
rapid growth and spread of these Sangh Parivar-affiliated institutions pose a crucial challenge
to democracy in India and are seen by many as a better, functioning alternative. Moreover,
taking into account a kind of ‘cultural crusade’ by Murli Manohar Joshi, India’s Minister of
Human Resource Development between 1998 and 2004, to ‘reform’ the curriculum, the
problem of Hindutva indoctrination through these institutions should be also raised.
One could argue that the spread of private institutions providing education or health
care is a solution for this challenge. Others could also highlight the fact that government
spending was not higher on these social services during the BJP-led NDA government either.
The public spending on education as the per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
India was 4.3 per cent in 2000, and even decreased to 3.3 in 2004, while in 2010 it was still as
low as 3.3 per cent (World Bank 2013). So it is not the case that the BJP-led government was
more successful in investing into socially desirable sectors. However, it is more successful in
building up its support base through service providing from below. Thus, the spread of private
institutions and services is a solution only for the well-off classes, who can afford to pay for
these “expensive commodities”, leaving no other option for the poor but to seek services from
these RSS-affiliated organisations (Sardeshpande and Shukla 2008: 4). This, however, also
means indoctrination and acceptance of fundamentalist tenets in exchange for goods, services
required for personal or group advancement and progress. Therefore, while there were only
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600,000 Swayamsevaks (volunteers) at the time of India’s independence, today there are more
than 50 lakh (that is 5,000,000 million) with a growing support-base from below (Jaffrelot
2007: 16).
On the one hand, it could be argued that the right wing could successfully address
critiques related to its exclusionary, upper-middle class character and reach out to the poor
segments of society as well. However, besides or rather as part of its service-providing
activity the right wing’s bottom-up approach often takes a violent form through persecutions
and forced reconversions. This is labelled as violent ‘Saffronization’ in the name of
establishing a Hindu India. Part of this ‘one people, one country’ sentiment are the
reconversion initiatives, euphemised as ‘ghar vapasi’ or ‘home coming’ by right-wing
organisations. This is done through their service networks, such as schools set up in remote,
tribal areas by the Sangh Parivar. Considering that mostly the poor are attracted by the more
egalitarian values of Christianity or Islam, the ‘ghar vapasi’ movement is predominantly
active in poor and tribal areas. However, it is interesting to note that the ceremony of
‘shuddhi’, a ritual of reconversion was originally introduced by Dayananda, founder of the
Arya Samaj, and it meant a purification procedure for upper caste Hindus (Jaffrelot 2007: 9).
Consequently, the first reconversions by the Arya Samaj were a reaction to forced
conversions during the Khilafat movement in the 1920s (Jaffrelot 2007: 233).
Overall, reconversions are not only part of the anti-Muslim sentiment advocated by
these fundamentalist ideologies in India, but also include stirring up violence against
Christians and Christian missionaries. A clear example of this was the Kandhamal violence in
2008 in Orissa between the Christian Panas (Dalits) by Kandhas (Adivasis). Another case of
anti-Christian violence was when on the 22nd of January, 1999 Christian missionary Dr.
Graham Staines together with his two sons, Philip and Timothy were burnt dead by the
Bajrang Dal, the militant youth wing of the Vishva Hindu Parishad. Forced reconversions and
violent persecution of minorities are thus a significant part of the fundamentalist Hindutva
ideology. This was well articulated by Balraj Madhok, who was president of the Bharatiya
Jana Sangh, the precursor of the BJP, between 1966–1967 by claiming that “the duty of the
Hindu society is to make concerted efforts to Indianise those sections of the Indian society
which have been cut off from the national mainstream” (Jaffrelot 2007: 167).
Besides instances of anti-Christian persecution and violence, strengthened anti-
Muslim sentiment should be noted as well. Articles and videos about physical and moral
training camps for women of the Durga Vahini, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti or male members
of the Bajrang Dal are good examples of this (Bhattacharya 2003; Gupta 2013; The Economic
Times 20/01/2013; The Siasat Daily 29/06/2013). In reaction to these news Union Home
16
Minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde accused the BJP and the RSS of conducting ‘terror training’ to
spread ‘saffron terror’ in India (The Economic Times 20/01/2013). While claims to an
overarching, concerted, India-wide ‘saffron terror’ should be regarded an exaggeration,
sporadic, but horrifying instances of torture, violence and persecution of minorities are not
rare, but quite often hidden from the media. Anti-minority sentiment and action ranges from
school attacks and book burning, as happened in Rajkot, Gujarat, in 1998, where copies of the
New Testament were burnt, the gang-rape of nuns in Jhabua, Madhya Pradesh the same year,
to the execution of Graham Staines and his sons (1999), the Gujarat massacre (2002) or the
Kandhamal violence in 2008 (Sarkar 1999: 1691). These examples highlight that the above
mentioned training camps’ provocative slogans and indoctrination against minorities have
resulted in events which significantly question the country’s claims to democracy. As
inequalities rise and the economic growth stagnates or slows down, blind followers of the
Hindu Rashtra concept explicitly reject the Gandhian notion of ‘ahimsa’ (non-violence) and
eventually increase tensions between Hindus and those they labelled ‘others’ and ‘foreigners’
in India.
After outlining how the retreat of the state provided an opportunity for fundamentalist
service-providing organisations, I will reflect on these organisations’ unity-providing aspects.
5.2 Unity, Status and Power
Described by Max Weber as the ‘carrier’ of reform movements the middle classes and their
role in modernization and secularization are at the centre of this section. While they benefit
the most from India’s economic growth through new jobs in the Information Technology and
Communication (ITC) services, as proponents of traditional, Hindu patriarchal values they
eventually hinder secularization. Therefore, I argue that their efforts to raise status and get
hold on the limited gains of India’s economic growth have resulted in a mutually constitutive
relation with Hindu right-wing organisations and movements. This made the middle classes,
which should be the proponent of democratic values and consequently secularization, an
obstacle of these processes. This is in line with Zoya Hasan’s claim that “opposition to the
secular state and the necessity of Hindu unity to rewrite the agenda of the state…became
central to middle class perceptions” (Hasan: 1998: 211). As part of this, I argue that in
contrast to Europe’s fading religiosity there is cultural (religious) revivalism together with
India’s growing economic and political power, but also growing inequalities. This is also
reflected in the way the new Indian middle classes lay emphasis on selective modernisation,
consumerism and technological innovations while sticking to India’s cultural heritage and
17
spiritual superiority, referring back to the 19th century debate about the materialist West, the
spiritual East and their relation to modernity. Thus, Vanaik’s understanding of secularization
as the declining religious influence and religious identity in modern life seems to be refuted
by the group which should be the most active proponent of it.
Moreover, this middle-class vision combining material and spiritual power coincides
with the image India as a rising power wants to create and maintain in the international arena.
Internationally, this image tries to combine characteristics such as secular, consumerist,
cosmopolitan and high-tech with Indian civilizational greatness, thus spiritual superiority.
This is clearly reflected for example in the counter-hegemonic democracy promotion rhetoric.
Thus, India and the global South describe Western democracy promotion as an interventionist
project and contrast it to the help they can provide, resulting among others from their
familiarity and experience with these processes.
Overall, in order to build up an image which combines material and spiritual power,
the combination of the traditional values represented by Hindutva and the growing,
consumerist, modern middle classes provide the best means. This emphasis on ancient culture
and spirituality should not only be seen as a characteristic of India’s soft power strategy, but
as a potential force which, through the expanding movements of the Sangh Parivar is able to
turn the interpretation of democratic political rights into a much harsher religious and caste
chauvinism in the long run. Therefore, this strive for unity, status and power, the middle class
claims together with the need for an image of a united, proud, strong India in the international
arena, should be regarded as another proximate cause for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism
and eventually fading secularization. This confirms Thomas Blom Hansen’s (1999) argument
that there is a simultaneous acknowledgement of Western consumerism, modern technology,
together with an emphasis on cultural unity and purity. First, however, a definition of the
middle classes is necessary.
5.2.1 The Concept of the Middle Classes
According to Leela Fernandes (2006), “the rise of the new Indian middle class represents the
political construction of a social group that operates as a proponent of economic
liberalisation” (2006: XVIII). The ‘newness’ of this middle class “does not refer to upwardly
mobile segments of the population entering the middle class (…) [but] to a process of
production of a distinctive social and political identity that represents and lays claim to the
benefits of liberalisation” (2006: XVIII). Some other researchers have also laid emphasis on
the middle class as being predominantly consumerist (Appadurai and Breckenridge;
18
Rajagopal 2001; Thapan 2004; Margit van Wessel 2004) and its importance has been justified
by the McKinsey Global Institute (2008) by claiming that India will have the fifth largest
consumer market by 2025. However, it should also be highlighted that at present the
proportion of the middle class is still below 30 per cent of India’s population and ranges
between 50–300 million people according to estimates by the McKinsey Global Institute and
the World Bank among others. Moreover, I claim that while the middle class has been largely
associated with consumerism, referring to the benefits of liberalisation, other constituting
factors of this class, thus political, cultural and social elements, cannot be neglected either.
Additionally, rather than the homogenized image of the middle class used by the media, the
term ‘middle classes’ should be used, given the diverse claims and background of this social
class. Referring exclusively to the urban middle classes would be also misleading, given the
fact that the middle classes are not only beneficiaries of liberalization, but land reforms, the
Green Revolution of the 1960s, reservations and multiparty politics as well. A research by
Ruparelia et al. (2011) provides an appropriate and nuanced concept claiming that the middle
class not only includes “small industrialists, businessmen, traders, employees in the corporate
sector, middle ranks of the professions and the civil service, [but] large numbers of rich
peasants or farmers” as well (2011: 123). Furthermore, since their analysis has not
differentiated between the elite and the new middle classes, throughout this analysis I will
refer to the upper-middle classes.
5.2.2 Upper-Middle Class Claims
In order to substantiate my hypothesis that the right wing’s successful rhetoric, which
resonates well with demands of the middle classes, is another proximate cause for the
resurgence of Hindu nationalism and the relatively stagnating secularization, two examples
will be used. First, through particular issues taken up by the middle classes, such as
beautification projects, it will be showed that in spite of their claims to represent the whole
nation the middle classes create new exclusionary categories domestically and maintain their
self-seclusion. Second, analysis of the 1998, 2004 and 2009 general elections will show that
the upper and middle classes should be regarded as right-wing support base.
In relation to their claims, the middle classes have often been criticized because of
their self-seclusion from the nation and their unwillingness to take responsibility for the
development of the nation (Varma 1998). Fernandes also asserts that the state and the middle-
class practices create exclusionary models of community and civic life, reshape meanings of
citizenship and democracy (Fernandes 2006: 172). I argue that in spite of their claims to
19
represent the Indian nation their vision is based not only on a ‘purified Hindu citizenship’, but
on a “reconstitution of inequalities of gender, caste and religion“ as well (Fernandes 2006:
141; 170). Domestically, this is visible through establishing new boundaries of the public,
such as gated communities, “VIP parking, tiled jogging tracks, pavilions”, or attempts to
“rescue Indian democracy from the corruption, patronage, and ‘special interests’ of rising
politically assertive subaltern groups that diverged from middle class models of citizenship
and civic and political life” (Fernandes 2006: 146, 156, 179). Mumbai’s Chowpatty
beautification project should be considered as an example together with remarks by the
Cultural Minister, Pramod Navalkar regarding the restricted access to the beach (Fernandes
2006: 148). He justified exclusion of poor people, relocation of fishermen, bulldozing of
slums in the name of creating a modern India which lives up to the expectation of the middle
classes, but also highlighted the need to maintain particular values by claiming that decent
men and women are not interested in walking on the beach after midnight. Thus, “politics of
spatial purity”, anti-hawker legislations, new spaces constructed and separated within the
public, such as restricted access to shopping malls, houses or parks clearly show the desire for
recognition of their modernization and development together with the effort to maintain
India’s moral superiority (Fernandes 2004: 2421). Overall, this modern, but traditional middle
class representation of India is definitely in line with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s agenda.
Eventually, it seems that the middle classes have addressed Varma’s (1998) critique
about losing traditional and social responsibilities by highlighting India’s spirituality and
growth in contrast to the fading morality and grievances of the West. As a result, a complex
material-spiritual Indian concept of the middle classes has been created. Eventually this
highlighted that focusing on consumerism is inappropriate and we have to recognise the
importance of traditional family values in constructing notions of the middle classes as well
(Donner 2005). The middle classes’ orientation towards the right wing is not only supported
by their propagated projects and issues based on exclusion and purification, but it is also
supported by the election data, which will be analysed in the next section.
5.2.3 The Upper-Middle Classes as the BJP’s Support Base
Zoya Hasan (1998) argued that opposing the secular state and expressing the need for a Hindu
unity became crucial to middle-class perceptions. This support for unity, but also growth and
a newly asserted Indian status in the world resonates well with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s
statements that the 21st century should belong to India, as Narendra Modi repeatedly
emphasised. While the above-mentioned issues could have been taken up by other parties as
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well, my claims to the synergy between the upper-middle classes and the Hindu right wing
will be substantiated by the analysis of their party preferences.
Regarding the support base of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), statistics and surveys
of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), an independent social science
research institute, will be used. These provide a thorough analysis of the 1998, 2004 and 2009
general elections, based on which the BJP’s support base can be clearly outlined. From these
it can be asserted that the BJP’s support base remained the upper-middle classes. This poses a
significant challenge to the realisation of those claims which call on these educated, open
groups to become the ‘reformer’ of society and facilitate greater secularization. The reason for
this is not only the middle classes’ own fragmentation and manifold demands, but also their
political orientation towards the right wing. This, however, does not mean that members of
the upper-middle classes are extremist Hindutva supporters, since the BJP followed a
moderate path because of coalition politics. However, these statistics confirm that the upper-
middle classes still favour the BJP over the Congress, which eventually supports the
resurgence of Hindu nationalism from above.
On the one hand, analysis of the 1998 elections shows that the BJP and its allies
supplement each other well, with the BJP attracting voters mostly from the upper castes,
while the latter got votes from the middle and lower castes. It highlighted that “the BJP and its
allies secure[d] the support of 60 per cent of upper-caste Hindus and 52 per cent of the
dominant Hindu peasant castes (which are not classified as Other Backward Classes) such as
Jats, Marathas, Patidars, Reddys and Kammas” (The Hindu 06/19/1999). Compared to the
BJP-led alliance, the Congress improves ”its vote share as one moves down the social
hierarchy (…) [but] it has the support of only 21 per cent of upper-caste Hindus”. However, it
has “the biggest share of the votes of Adivasis, Dalits, Muslims and Christians”. The main
conclusion of this analysis is that ”the Congress (I) has not been able to consolidate the
support of the lower sections (except in the case of Muslims and Christians) the way the BJP
and its allies have consolidated the support of the upper castes”. Moreover, in relation to
class-based support this analysis also reveals that the BJP vote rises with the level of
education, caste and class. Additionally, the BJP did slightly better among the younger people
as well. It is important to mention here the deliberate use and the significant power of media in
the BJP campaign. This might be a reason why the right wing could reach out better to the
younger generation. The use of state-induced popular media, thus screening of the Ramayana
in the state-owned television network, Doordarshan, should be regarded as a significant
means to trigger communal tension over the months preceding the demolition of the Babri
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masjid on the 6th of December, 1992 (Corbridge and Harriss 2003; Bose 2009: 24; Tambiah
1996: 260).
In 2004, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance’s ‘Shining India’ and ‘Feel Good’
campaigns, in the light of positive outcomes and gains only for the upper-middle classes,
could not attract more votes from the minorities (Venkatesan 2004). This, however, again
confirms the continuous support for the BJP from the upper-middle classes. With regard to
the 2009 general election, however, results showed that the BJP’s share from the votes of
those younger than 25 years was only slightly better compared to the Congress. Furthermore,
the Congress has also gained votes from the urban middle classes. Even though it was
highlighted that the BJP “has faced a sharper than average erosion in this group”, “it
continues to be the first preference of upper caste Indians, the only social group where the BJP
is ahead of the Congress (…) [and] the BJP trailed the Congress among ‘middle class’ urban
voters” (The Hindu 26/05/2009). Eventually, these analyses have confirmed the claim that the
BJP continues with an upper caste, middle class support base, thus as a “Brahman-Baniya
party” (Jaffrelot 2010: 219).
Moreover, analysis of the 2009 general elections shows only a slight variation
regarding the participation rate of all significant groups. It is important to highlight this high
voter turnout because Alam’s analysis (1999) comparing results from the late 1970s and
1990s signalled an ‘electoral fatigue’ among the upper castes and classes, and an ‘electoral
participatory upsurge’ of the lower classes and castes. Alam’s statistics from 1999 showed
that “compared to 1971 those who vote have, within the same overall percentage, got altered.
There are more illiterates, rural-based people, Scheduled Castes and OBCs who comprise
voters today than earlier. In 1971 there were more upper-caste, urban, and college-educated
voters than in 1996” (Alam 1999: 2653). However, findings of the 2009 election analysis
highlight that “turnout among college educated (60 per cent) is the same as those educated up
to primary level (60 per cent), and (…) higher than those who are not literate (55 per cent)”.
Moreover, “despite sharp divisions between different caste communities in terms of which
party they support, there are only minor differences between them in terms of whether they
vote or not. Muslims (59 per cent), ST (60 per cent) and SC (59 per cent) are a shade more
involved in the electoral process than upper castes (56 per cent) and OBCs (58 per cent). With
regard to men and women, there are just four percentage points separating them in 2009 with
60 per cent versus 56 per cent respectively. Similarly, there is not much variation in
propensity to vote by age. The turnout rate among people under 25 (55 per cent) is a fraction
lower than among older people (58 per cent)” (The Hindu 26/05/2009). However, I argue that
in spite of similar voter turnout rates among upper-middle and lower classes, it is important to
22
highlight that because of their representative role, linkages to networking and lobby groups,
the upper-middle classes exert a greater influence in shaping the political agenda. Fernandes
also argues that “the middle classes continue to shape democratic trajectories as well as
broader processes of globalization in ways that are often disproportionate with their numerical
strength” (2006: 205).
Moreover, the upper-middle classes’ support for Hindutva also poses a challenge to
democracy. With their growing number they would be expected to foster secularization and
strengthen democracy in India. However, they are leaning towards the right because –
resulting from the nature of economic growth – they want to secure their hold on the limited
gains of economic liberalization among others. This necessarily involves practices that
strengthen and set up new divisions and exclusionary categories to keep the number of real
beneficiaries limited. Furthermore, the importance of middle class’ demands and needs for the
state results in “many issues quietly driven away from contestation” (Palshikar 2004b: 1477–
1479). Thus, “so long as the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the middle classes holds
firm, Indian democracy faces the possibility of being swept by appropriational claims”
(Palshikar 2004a: 158). This seems to be the clear refusal of claims by Lipset and Moore,
which highlighted the central role of the educated and open upper and middle classes in
fostering democratic norms and values, eventually leading to democratic stability (Lipset
1960; Moore 1966). In light of the above claims about challenges to democracy and
secularism, the right wing’s understanding of these notions has to be examined.
6 Whither Democracy and Secularism?
The previous sections considered the right wing’s bottom-up approach, how fundamentalist
organisations utilize the retreat of the state, outline a new schema for India as a rising power
and acquire an ever-growing support from above through the upper-middle classes by using a
rhetoric which lays emphasis on unity, status, power and growth. On the other hand, it often
goes unnoticed that while slightly changing its tenets over time Hindu nationalism still builds
on anti-minority sentiment, which eventually results in transforming the concepts of
democracy and secularism. In this section, I will elaborate on the question how Narendra
Modi’s rhetoric resonates well with India’s need for growth and provide a qualitative analysis
of some selected speeches from his website (http://www.narendramodi.in/) in relation to
secularism, democracy and governance. While a selection bias should be noted here since
only the English language speeches provide basis for this analysis, I argue that this selection
23
is nonetheless justified. The reason is that compared to Hindi speeches English ones aim at
addressing a wider audience in India and the West, with special attention to the Indian
diaspora. Thus, they have a potentially greater impact and also importance both in India and
abroad. As for the time period, I analysed speeches only from 2013 because they are more
important in the light of the coming general elections next year. I argue that speeches of the
Bharatiya Janata Party’s Prime Ministerial candidate are crucial to understand how the
political wing of Hindu nationalism tries to build up a new image for India, understands
concepts of democracy and secularism, and how its rhetoric has changed with regard to the
statements of the most important thinkers of Hindutva. In this part I will analyse the texts
based on the Foucauldian discourse analysis (2002) to highlight how discourse determines
people’s perceived reality and generates truth (the ‘truth effect’). Based on this I will outline
the right wing’s arguments, deliberate omissions or reference to particular well-known events
as part of its understanding of democracy, governance and secularism.
6.1 Secularism
“Growth is our only mantra. Growth is our only dream. We don’t talk and do anything but
development” (Modi’s message to the people on Gujarat’s 52th foundation day, May 2012).
Besides socialism and federalism, the notion of ‘sarva dharma sambhava’, i.e. the equality of
all religions (Kolodner 1995) has been regarded by Corbridge and Harriss (2003) as one of the
‘mythodologies of modern India’. Among others the Kandhamal violence (2008), the Gujarat
massacre (2002), violent conversions and the persecution of minorities highlight how
contemporary Indian democracy lacks a clear commitment to secularism. I argue that
Narendra Modi’s rhetoric, which builds exclusively on the peaceful success story of Gujarat,
should be deemed insufficient in relation to secularism considering the unquestioned notion of
Hindu Rashtra. First, however, his understanding of secularism should be examined.
“My definition of secularism is very simple, India first…! Whatever we think or
whatever we do, India must have the top most priority, there should not be anything less than
welfare of India. And if this is maintained, the whole secularism will automatically start
flowing through our veins. We will not let India be harmed. Neither India’s reputation and
glory nor its dreams or future of India’s youths…! India first, with this attitude if 125 crore
[1crore=10,000,000] citizens follow this mantra, within no time we can create an impact in
the world” (March 10, 2013). Moreover, recalling Swami Vivekananda’s remarks about the
priority of Mother India before everything else Modi asserts that a ‘United India, Superior
24
India’ mantra should be followed for the sake of development and regarded as a solution to all
problems (February 6, 2013; March 10, 2013).
Overall, Narendra Modi’s rhetoric about a proud, united and strong nation with high
levels of growth is a clear reflection of all Indians’ endeavour, and provides a strong call for
support. This simple, moderate ‘unity for growth’ slogan is acceptable for everyone and unites
the people of India for the sake of development. It is not limited to the upper-middle classes
only, given their relatively small proportion in the population at present, but it wants to reach
out to the ’common man’ of India, those potentially not attracted by the right wing’s service-
providing organisations. Using Gujarat as a role model, and describing it as “the land of
Mahatma Gandhi” (March 8, 2013) and “the Growth Engine of India” (March 20, 2013)
unquestionably suggests a moderate tone and recalls Gandhi’s universalist understanding of
the Indian nation (Jaffrelot 2007: 4). Furthermore, Modi also addresses different audiences,
for example he emphasised human development with a special focus on the poor, the Dalits,
the Scheduled Tribes, or invoked references to Gandhi, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel or Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, who all called for the unity of India and restored the country’s confidence
and stature in the international arena (March 10, 2013; August 15, 2013).
It is also important to note that in line with the political parties’ moderate position and
the need to expand the BJP’s vote bank, he explicitly addressed the question of communal
violence and asserted that growth and development have bound the society together and as a
result “communal flare ups have effectively become a thing of the past” (June 5, 2013).
Interestingly, a parallel can be drawn between this rhetoric and the campaign before the 1998
Lok Sabha elections, where the BJP claimed that they “subscribe to Samajik Samarasata
(social harmony) and Samajik Nyaya (social justice) and strive to avoid social strife” (cited in
Jaffrelot 2007: 264).
Thus, Modi’s rhetoric builds exclusively on the success of Gujarat and traces it back to
its people’s “unity, brotherhood [and] peace” (May 1, 2013). Here, the notion of pseudo-
secularism should be examined as well. Accusing the Congress of ‘vote secularism’ (Vazirani
1991), and ‘pseudo-secularism’ (Jaffrelot 2007: 292; 313), thus the pandering of minorities in
order to get their votes, was always characteristic of the BJP’s strategy. However, the BJP’s
current, seemingly universalist campaign follows the same vote bank strategy. In this
propaganda, which I label ‘unity for growth’, the BJP’s effort to reach out to all segments of
society is clear. Thus, even though the BJP accused Congress of its vote bank politics it
follows a similar path in addressing different social and even religious groups. This is
however, not the first instance since this strategy was also characteristic of the BJP under
Kalyan Singh’s ‘social engineering’ project to attract OBCs in Uttar Pradesh, through
25
Balasaheb Deoras’ more inclusive and open politics to put aside caste barriers and forge a
unity of Hindus, including Dalits (Vora and Palshikar 1990: 216), or Bangaru Laxman, the
BJP’s Dalit leaders’ attempt in 2000 to gain support from the underprivileged sections and
even Muslims (Vora 2004: 292).
On the other hand, even though this rhetoric is universalist and has a strong mobilising
effect even for Muslims, it has significantly obscured several facts. First, the continuous
problem of India’s ‘jobless growth’. Second, that this call for unity means strengthened anti-
minority, mostly anti-Muslim and anti-Christian sentiment of fundamentalist groups at the
grassroots level. And third, that Gujarat’s success should not entirely be attributed to the
BJP’s governance over the last couple of years only, but to a long-term process and the
combined result of favourable geographical, institutional and historical factors. Moreover,
Modi’s request for iron from every village to construct the statue of Sardar Patel as the ‘Statue
of Unity’ unwittingly recalls former BJP president, L.K. Advani’s ‘chariot-journey’ or Rath
Yathra in 1990 in relation to the Ram Janmabhoomi movement and the eventual demolition of
the Babri masjid (August 17, 2013; Jaffrelot 2007: 21).
Furthermore, it is worth comparing Modi’s statements to L.K. Advani’s and
Vajpayee’s understandings of secularism. According to Advani, “the BJP is unequivocally
committed to secularism. As conceived by our Constitution makers, secularism meant
sarvapantha sama bhava, that is, equal respect for all religions. Secularism as embedded into
the Indian Constitution has three important ingredients, namely (i) rejection of theocracy; (ii)
equality of all citizens, irrespective of their faith; and (iii) full freedom of faith and worship.
We also believe that India is secular because it is predominantly Hindu. Theocracy is alien to
our history and tradition” (cited in Jaffrelot 2007: 291). However, claiming a secular character
based on the rejection of theocracy is problematic. Especially, when at the same time it is
proclaimed that Hindu customs should be respected in the public sphere. As Vajpayee in ‘The
Bane of Pseudo-Secularism’ asserts, “Bharat or the Indian nation is basically a cultural unit
(…) A change in religion does not mean a change in nationality or culture. Culture is related
to the soil and nationality to loyalty (…) Secularism just means an impartial attitude of the
State towards all modes of worship” (Jaffrelot 2007: 315–317; Vajpayee 1969: 55–58).
However, “practices like lighting a lamp at the inauguration of State functions or breaking a
coconut at the time of launching a new ship are not connected with the rituals of any religion
but are part of Indian culture and tradition” (Jaffrelot 2007: 336). Equating Hindu customs
with Indian culture and understanding India as a cultural unit thus undeniably prioritises
Hinduism. Referring back to Vanaik’s interpretation of secularism or even the Indian concept
of ‘sarva dharma sambhava’, this harsh statement has not only questioned separation between
26
the religious domain and the state, but the equality of all religions as well. Compared to this,
Modi’s relatively moderate rhetoric and conceptualising of secularism is compelling, but it
should be kept in mind that growth will provide gains only to the upper-middle classes and
remain uneven if it will continue without job-creation.
Although the changing, at times more moderate rhetoric and character of Hindu
nationalism should not be disregarded, various understandings of secularism by different
Hindutva groups and the intensity by which they propagate some fundamentalist tenets is
important to highlight. In this regard there can be significant fractions within Hindu
nationalism. For instance, the BJP’s deliberately moderate position and Modi’s ‘development
first’ approach with his explicit emphasis on a ‘first toilets, then temples’ stance (August 17,
2013) has triggered the Vishva Hindu Parishad’s stark opposition. Eventually, this clearly
signals that the real challenge to democracy and secularism lies with the bottom-up approach
and the grassroots organisations of Hindutva, whose activities are often difficult to regulate
from above.
6.2 Democracy and Good Governance
While liberal democracy has been described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2005) as
“the natural order of political organisation in today’s world”, it has taken a peculiar and
dynamic form shaped by Indian culture and history, with several unique characteristics and
deficiencies. As such, I argue that Indian democracy became procedural but not
redistributional or more representative in spite of the growing number of identity-based
parties. In fact, it remained the ‘creamy layers’, the well-off members of different castes or
classes, who get hold on power, but lack a comprehensive economic or political programme
(Palshikar 2004a). Moreover, as the previous section highlighted Hindu communal tendencies
spreading through social, political movements and grassroots initiatives at the same time can
eventually uphold and strengthen manifold divisions. Furthermore, the Rousseauian concept
of majority rule has been captured by extremist Hindutva ideologists, subsequently posing a
threat to basic democratic values of freedom, liberties and political equality in India (Karstedt
2006). A combined effect of the need for continuous economic growth together with
Inglehart’s concept (1997) that social insecurity created the desire for strong authority figures
lend support to the right wing.
With regard to democracy, Narendra Modi has outlined the strategy consisting of
‘Five Nectars’ (Panchamrut), thus energy, water, knowledge, human resource and security
(June 17, 2013). Modi also emphasised the need to move from ‘government to governance’
27
(June 27, 2013). His critique of democracy understood as a ‘contract for five years’ by the
United Progressive Alliance’s legislative, top-down government has been clearly contrasted to
the right wing’s bottom-up approach and their (alleged) focus on trust and reliance on the
people. Describing the two characteristics of good governance and effective democracy as the
principle of trusteeship and public involvement, he necessarily invokes Gandhi’s reference to
Ram Rajya (June 27, 2013). In line with this, Modi even asserts that “such governance has no
inequality, ups and lows, difference among rich and poor. Now tell me, should it be
implemented or not…? If this happens, is it communal to call it Ram Rajya..?” (June 27,
2013). This, however, recalls Vajpayee’s previously mentioned remarks about India as a
cultural unit and describing Hindu customs and concepts as being constitutive parts of India.
In Modi’s words, Rajya, thus good governance will lead to prosperity. One just needs to do
his/her duty, and that will eventually lead to peace and prosperity (June 27, 2013). However,
this reconfiguration of Gandhi’s notion is quite apart from what he originally understood as
the Kingdom of God, characterised by truth and righteousness.
It is interesting to note that Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s
propaganda resemble that of the Dalit and OBC parties, where the ideological hegemony of
neo-liberalism distracted them from tackling inequality. It seems now that in the name of
growth, the BJP uses a similar rhetoric in order to unite its supporters, while the question of
equitable redistribution raises significant questions considering Hindu nationalists’ anti-
minority stance and that there is “more competition about less” (Palshikar 2004b: 1477–
1479). This can lead to a situation where identity politics, this time based on religion, can
eventually displace redistributive politics (Palshikar 2004a).
7 Conclusion
This research has attempted answering two broad, but interdependent questions. First, it
outlined why economic growth and modernization have not resulted in increased
secularization and democratization. Second, it highlighted the challenges the Hindu right wing
and the resurgence of Hindu nationalism pose to democracy in India.
I argued that the deeper determinants of stalled or even eroding democratization and
secularization are the retreat of the state on the one hand and the very nature of Indian
economy, thus ‘jobless growth’ on the other. As for the proximate causes, the section on
sewa/service showed how fundamentalist service-providing organisations filled the vacuum
left after the retreat of the state, increased the number of their projects and expanded their
28
activities all over India. Thus, through services, right-wing organisations could successfully
address those, who gained the least from modernization and India’s economic growth.
Eventually, the service-providing work of these grassroots organizations resulted in support
for Hindutva from below, serving as a proximate cause for the resurgence of Hindu
nationalism and stalled secularization.
On the other hand, the importance of the elite and the middle classes was highlighted
as well. They gained the most from India’s economic liberalization and they were expected to
be the reformer of society and facilitator of secularization and democratization. However,
they eventually found their demands and needs resonating well with the Bharatiya Janata
Party’s ‘unity for growth’ rhetoric and traditional values. Through supporting Hindu
nationalism ‘from above’, they have eventually become an obstacle to secularization and
democratization.
After outlining the deeper and proximate causes for the resurgence of Hindu
nationalism, thus the right wing’s unity- and service-providing activities, an analysis of the
BJP’s and Modi’s rhetoric on governance, democracy and secularism followed. This section
highlighted, how these concepts have been transformed and used for the sake of uniting
Indians for growth and strengthening the BJP’s support base.
Overall, this research highlighted how deficiencies of democracy together with an
economic growth, which builds exclusively on an enclave sector, created a vacuum and
provided an opportunity for right-wing organisations. In order to tackle this erosion of
democratic values, equality and human rights necessitates a more concerted effort from the
government’s and the civil society’s side. Therefore, recognition of the problem that Hindutva
provides not only the image of a strong, united nation but requires acceptance of anti-minority
tenets is crucial and was among the main aims of this essay to highlight its challenge to
democratization and secularization.
29
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39
Plagiarism Clause
I, the undersigned, Anna Juhos, candidate for the M.A. degree in International Studies declare
herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only
such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no
unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis
infringes on any person’s or institution’s copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has
been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic
degree.
Piliscsaba, 15 November 2013
Anna Juhos
Nyilatkozat szakdolgozat szerzőség szabályainak betartásáról
Alulírott Juhos Anna (Neptun kód: FQJBFU) jelen nyilatkozat aláírásával kijelentem, hogy a
“The Resurgence of Hindu Nationalism” című szakdolgozatomat magam készítettem, azt sem
más műhelymunka kurzusra, sem szakdolgozatként, sem ezen, sem más egyetemen és szakon,
sem én, sem más be nem adta értékelésre.
Mindezek alapján jelen dolgozat önálló munkám, annak elkészítésekor betartottam a szerzői
jogról szóló 1999. LXXVI törvény szabályait, valamint az egyetem által előírt, a dolgozat
készítésére vonatkozó szabályokat, különösen a hivatkozások és idézések tekintetében.
Fentieken kívül kijelentem, hogy az önállóságra vonatkozóan, a dolgozat készítése közben
konzulensemet nem tévesztettem meg.
Piliscsaba, 2013. november 15.
Juhos Anna