THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959

The Retreat from Nagpur Sisir Gupta

T H E letter w r i t t e n b y the Presi-dent of I n d i a to the Pr ime

Minister , advis ing caution in the mat ter of co-operative f a rming , among other things, is the latest and most significant piece of evi­dence of the pol i t ical repercussions of the Nagpur resolution on land reform. In fact, the contrast bet­ween the acceptance wi thou t a murmer of the A v a d i resolution by a l l , r ang ing f rom the Federation of Ind ian Chamber of Commerce and Indus t ry to the Ind ian Na t iona l Trade Union Congress on the one hand, and the violent opposition to the Nagpur resolution on the other, cannot escape the a t tent ion Of even the most casual observer.

Not Vague. Generalisations Apa r t f rom the inveterate cynic,

none would say that the Nagpur and A v a d i resolutions are the same, nor could the Nagpur resolution be viewed as the culminat ion of a pro­cess in i t i a ted at Avad i . Of bold and good phrases the Congress has never fought shy. In a way, the pre-Avadi goal of a cooperative com­monweal th could be interpreted in speeches and wr i t i ngs as something even more radical than a socialist pa t tern of society. W h a t made the Nagpur decision so remarkable, i n ­deed revolut ionary, and outstanding as a l a n d m a r k in the Congress par ty 's h is tory was tha t never after K a r a c h i had the Congress commit ­

ted itself to a specific i tem of policy. A ceiling on l and holdings, co-ope-rat ive jo int f a r m i n g and service co-operatives on a countrywide scale —these were not vague generalisa­tions about the future pat tern of the agrar ian sector. Taken together, they were to b r i n g about a to ta l change in India 's ru ra l structure.

Pol i t ica l ly ('under duress') the most significant aspect of the Nag­pur resolution was tha t i t represent­ed the first b ig swing away f rom the trusteeship concept and a defi­nite move towards the concept of class conflict. The Nagpur pat tern w a r not meant to satisfy a l l ; i t was to s t r ike at a class of people. The landed middle class would be de­prived of the excess land holding which differentiated i t f rom the smal l peasant. For the first t ime, the Congress had ventured to say against whom its socialism would be directed.

Both Nagpur and Avad i , however, were treated w i t h the same casual -ness by Congressmen. A n d both had been preluded by a threat of ret irement f rom the Pr ime Minis ter . In the middle of 1954, on the eve of his v i s i t to China, Pandi t Nehru had f irst ta lked of ret irement; by Janu-uary 1955, the Congress accepted his bid for socialism. In the middle of last year, Pandi t Neh ru again complained t ha t he ' f e l t stale and flat ': by January, 1959 the Nagpur

resolution was passed. Whether the Congress at Nagpur was vo t ing 'under duress' or not, it displayed supreme unconcern for h igh policies, the immediate problems of engros­sing interest to it being the choice of a successor to Shri U N Dhebar and the organisational disputes in the various State Congress Commit ­tees. It is significant tha t the reso­lu t ion at Nagpur was moved by the very person who had vigorously opposed the proposal for a ceiling on land holdings at the previous A I C C Session.

Prime Minister and His Party This did not, however, take away

f r o m Nagpur its punch. I t m a y be noted here that in his entire pol i t ical career the Prime Minis ter has a l ­ways at tempted to get the Congress Pa r ty committed to more and more radical policies wi thou t ever d ivu lg­ing" the final and u l t imate shape of the things he has in his mind . In 1948, he had opposed in the Consti­tuent Assembly a private member's motion that India 's development should proceed along socialist lines —just wha t he himself put f o r w a r d for acceptance seven years later. In 1955 he turned down the suggestion of a member of the Praja-Socialist P a r t y tha t the ideal should be so-c ia l ism and not a socialistic pat tern of society; in 1956, the Indus t r i a l Policy Statement of the Govern­ment of I n d i a accepted socialism

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What made the Nagpur decision so remarkable, indeed revolutionary, and outstanding as a land­mark in the Congress party's history was that never after Karachi had the Congress committed itself to a specific item of policy. Politically, it represented the first big swing away from the trusteeship concept and a definite move towards the concept of class conflict. For the first time, the Congress had ventured to say against whom its socialism would be directed.

The resolution adopted at Nagpur furnished a basis for inter-party cooperation. For one thing, (here was now a consensus of opinion on land reform: for another, the task was big enough to be under­take?! jointly. But not even all the parties put together can overcome the apathy or antipathy of rural India to such a radical change. India's political parties, dominated largely by the middle class, may draw up the best plans for India's villages: but they have neither the revolutionary zeal nor the urge for united action which can make them face a disgruntled peasantry.

It is a reflection on the peculiar susceptibilities of our political parties that none of them lays the emphasis on the nationalisation of trading that all of them lay on co-operativisation of land. The sources from which the parties draw their funds have obviously a lot to do with this—as also with the attitude of compara­tive detachment that party leaders reveal in looking at the problems of the peasant. While this helps them draw the finest possible picture of the future, it also makes them incapable of ever implementing their promises. Faced with determined opposition from India's landowning peasants, the course that is preferred might turn out to be retreat.

Anyway, Indian political parties will have to do much spade-work before the Nagpur resolution can be implemented, The President's letter can hardly be an accident, and it would be surprising if it were ignored. In fact, this letter may well be part of the grand strategy of the Congress Party to retreat from Nagpur.

S P E C I A L N U M B E R J U L Y 1959 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y

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THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959

as the goa l . N a g p u r was the c u l m i ­n a t i o n of a succession of shocks experienced by Congressmen who were caught unawares every t ime . I t was no mere slogan or m o u t h f u l phrase, however, b u t one of the P r ime Minis te r ' s concrete ideas t h a t the Congress accepted at Nagpur .

To be able to assess the prospects o f the Nagpur resolut ion being i m ­plemented, i t i s necessary to k n o w how the resolut ion was passed. I t w o u l d have been an en t i re ly different s to ry i f p r io r t o Nagpur , the d r a f t resolut ion had been c i rcula ted and discussed at var ious levels—part i ­cu la r ly a t the levels of the M a n d a l a n d D i s t r i c t Congress Committees, These are the levels at w h i c h the resolut ion w o u l d have had i t s grea t ­est impact . H a d the reactions of members o f M a n d a l and D i s t r i c t Congress Committees been properly analysed and even a rough and rea­dy a t t empt made to f ind out how m a n y Congressmen were ready to implement such a programme, the resolut ion w o u l d not have been moved at a l l . Congressmen at the vi l lage level unders tand the compul­sions of J awaha r l a l N e h r u much less t h a n members occupying the upper rungs of the pa r ty who assem­ble at annua l sessions. The reactions of the r a n k a n d f i le wou ld have made i t easier to judge wha t a pro­blem it w o u l d be to put such a pro­g ramme th rough .

Such a p r e l im ina ry assessment of the s i tua t ion was also impor t an t f r o m the point of view of the Con­gress pa r ty : for, i f a f ter official ly adop t ing a policy, i t found i tself inadequate fo r the task, the only eventual result could be re t reat . To the P r ime Minis ter , who is in a w a y above the pa r ty , w h a t is i m p o r t a n t m a y be the programme a n d the pic­tu re of the society of the future, no ma t t e r w h o implements i t . B u t ce r ta in ly the vast m a j o r i t y of Con­gressmen, w i t h w h o m individuals come f irs t , w o u l d have thought more about i t i f the resolution had not come upon them as an inev i t ab i l i t y . W h a t makes the o rd ina ry Congress­man's opinion i m p o r t a n t is tha t , unl ike the c i v i l servant, he knows l i t t l e discipl ine; and un l ike Casa­blanca, he w i l l no t stay a t his post even w h e n the decks are bu rn ing .

Not by Civil Service Alone

Thi s incapaci ty a n d non-a t tach­ment of the Congressman m a y lead, as indeed i t has a l ready done, to complete dependence on the c i v i l

service for Implementa t ion of the N a g p u r resolut ion. I t i s a m a t t e r of doubt, however, i f a p rogramme of such magni tude can be put t h r o u g h by the c i v i l service alone, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the I n d i a n v i l lage continues to remain 'grossly under-adminis tered ' . I t also appears, i f h i s to r i ca l evidence is any guide, t ha t i t w o u l d be impossible to b r i n g about a g r a r i a n reorganisa t ion w i t h ­out a vast po l i t i ca l organisa t ion to supplement Governmenta l efforts. I t wou ld indeed be a wonder i f the c i v i l service could pe r fo rm such m i ­racles, when i ts record in adminis­t e r i n g such other details of policy as food is so d ismal .

The weakness of the Nagpur re­solu t ion thus appears to be t h a t the enthusiasm fo r i t i s confined to the P r ime Min i s te r and the possibi l i ty o f imp lemen t ing i t , to the I n d i a n C i v i l Service. I f , however, i t i s considered ra the r improbable t h a t a r evo lu t ionary change in India ' s r u ­r a l s t ructure could take place by the dr ive of a wel l -meaning Pr ime Min i s t e r a n d a conformis t c i v i l ser­vice, the question w o u l d arise w h a t a l t e rna t ive m i g h t be thought of and w h a t the substi tute fo r the d i lap i ­dated s t ructure called the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress wou ld be able to ca r ry these reforms th rough . A l ­most at the very outset, one would t h i n k o f i n t e r -pa r ty co-operation.

Inter-Party Co-operation Even as th ings were, by the end

of 1958, the theory of 'compulsions of an underdeveloped economy' was being better appreciated t han when i t was f i r s t put f o r w a r d by Shr i A s o k a Mehta in 1953. The lines d i v i d i n g the po l i t i ca l parties had become more and more b lurred , and the ent i re system of p a r t y poli t ics a n d democracy had come to be challenged. The f a l l of As ian de­mocracies, one by one, was a w a r n ­i n g to po l i t i ca l parties o f w h a t pa r ty r i v a l r y m i g h t lead to . The resolu­t i o n adopted at Nagpur furnished a basis for such co-operation. F o r one t h i n g , there was now a consen­sus of opin ion on l and r e f o r m : fo r another, the t a sk was b i g enough to be under taken j o i n t l y .

Immed ia t e ly af ter Nagpur , the prospects of such co-operation ap­peared b r i g h t . A t N a g p u r itself, Pand i t N e h r u h a d appealed for co­operat ion; Smt I n d i r a Gandh i a t her first press conference repeated th is appeal. The Communis t P a r t y ha i led the Nagpur decision. So d id

the P ra j a Socialists. W i t h the ex­ception of the Jan Sangh, a l l other parties seemed satisfied. A n d , w h a t was more, they offered co-operation. The Communis t P a r t y resolut ion on the subject impl ied t h a t the changes suggested by the P a r t y wou ld not be rea l ly insisted upon. The P S P leader, A c h a r y a K r i p a l a n i , wanted a na t iona l government to be fo rmed . I t i s f r o m this point tha t the t r end got reversed. Pandi t Nehru set his face against inter-party co-operation, perhaps for very good reasons. As for the Communis t Par ty , i t is be­i n g fought more energetically since Nagpur t han ever before. Tibet was the beginning, K e r a l a is the c l imax . A n d f a r f r o m there being any pros­pect of in te r -par ty co-operation, the cold w a r seems to have descended on I n d i a n public l i fe in a b i g way.

Irnelevant to Peasantry An intensif icat ion o f Congress-

Communis t r i v a l r y , however, can only be a symptom of the disease, the root of w h i c h lies in the inade­quacy of Ind i an parties. N o t even a l l the parties put together can overcome the apathy or an t ipa thy of r u r a l I n d i a to so radica l a change. India ' s pol i t ica l parties, dominated la rge ly by the middle class, m a y d r a w up the best of plans fo r India ' s vi l lages; but they have neither the revo lu t ionary zeal nor the urge fo r uni ted action w h i c h can make them face a d isgrunt led peasantry.

I f a l l the pol i t ica l parties are equally i r re levant so f a r as India ' s r u r a l masses are concerned, there is no point in s t r i v i n g for in te r -pa r ty co-operation. Even i f such an at­tempt were made, i t would ha rd ly succeed. For , w h i c h pol i t ica l pa r ty wou ld bu rn i ts boats w i t h the people by co-operating w i t h the r u l i n g Congress par ty , when despite such co-operation, people m a y r ema in dissatisfied? If i t is t rue, as some believe, tha t pa r ty r iva l r ies in I n d i a arise less f r o m ideological t han f r o m non-ideological reasons ( l ike the s truggle of the middle class for sta­tus and its emotional sense of belonging to a g roup) , in te r -par ty co-operation becomes diff icult . I f one adds to these the professional character of the vast m a j o r i t y of Congressmen, for w h o m , as K r i p a ­l a n i says, there is not a b i g enough feast, the scope for in te r -par ty co­operat ion appears to be t h i n indeed.

Harsh and Inequitous Pol i t i ca l parties are w a v e r i n g

about the Nagpur resolut ion be-

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cause the react ion i t s implementa­t i o n could provoke m i g h t be f o r m i d ­able. A p a r t f r o m the peasant's t r a d i t i o n a l a t t achment to his piece of l and , there is the fac t t h a t the Nagpur pa t te rn would d is t r ibute pover ty in India ' s countryside. The difference between the m a n above a n d the one below the ce i l ing is the difference between the m a n who can hope to send his son to college and the one who cannot. To take away f r o m h i m th is pr ivi lege i s indeed to deal h i m a very heavy blow. In fact , the r i c h m a n in the v i l lage m a y be poorer t h a n the m a n who runs a 'pan ' shop in a t o w n in te rms of money income. A n d the difference between the r u r a l and u rban figures of the cost of l i v i n g has been progressively g r o w i n g nar rower .

To the r u r a l section, the most objectionable feature of the Nagpur resolut ion is t h a t it proposes a very rad ica l change for one sector of the I n d i a n economy w i t h o u t propos­i n g any for the rest. I t i s diff icult to ascertain w h o - between the l and­l o r d who m a y be g r a n t i n g his la ­bourer n o t h i n g more t h a n a meal a day and the t r ader w h o manufac­tures penic i l l in in his backyard— commi ts a greater social cr ime. Fo r a Government w h i c h has not suc­ceeded in t a c k l i n g pure ly adminis­

t r a t i ve problems invo lved in p rof i t ­eer ing a n d hoard ing , to p lump for co-operative f a r m i n g m a y we l l appear to be a high-handed act of d i s c r imina t i on against landholders , the vast m a j o r i t y of w h o m are men of sma l l means.

It is a reflection on the peculiar susceptibilities of our pol i t ica l par­ties t ha t none of them lays t h a t emphasis on the na t iona l i sa t ion of t r a d i n g tha t a l l of t hem lay on co-opera t iv isa t ion of land . The sources f r o m w h i c h the parties d r a w thei r funds have obviously a lo t to do w i t h this—as also w i t h the a t t i tude of compara t ive detachment t h a t pa r ty leaders reveal in l o o k i n g at the problems of the peasant. W h i l e this helps t hem d r a w the finest pos­sible picture of the future, i t also makes them incapable of ever i m ­plement ing the i r promises, Faced w i t h determined opposit ion f r o m India ' s l a n d o w n i n g peasants, the ob­vious course tha t is preferred m i g h t t u r n out to be retreat .

Who Will Offer Resistance?

There is a basic difference bet­ween the t rader and the peasant wh ich is often fo rgo t ton . Whi l e one has wea l th w h i c h he uses to corrupt , the other has physical courage. The

I n d i a n peasant has also pr ide : he w o u l d no t purchase a Minis te r ' s PA for lakhs of rupees. He has cut-ture; he reveals some feudal v i r tues o f cha r i t y and the l i ke . The I n d i a n t rader has none, In West Bengal , he has successfully sabotaged the scheme for State t r a d i n g in food-gra ins and managed to r e t u r n to his t rade once again . The opposi­t i on of India ' s peasantry m a y be of a "different type. T h a t is w h y it is very un l ike ly t ha t the S w a t a n t r a P a r t y can be the vehicle fo r the expression of the i r a r t i cu la te gr ie­vances. W h a t appears, l i k e l y is the g r o w t h of more m i l i t a n t State par­ties l i ke the one recently founded under the leadership of P V G Ra ju in A n d h r a or the D M K or the G a n a t a n t r a Par i shad to offer deter­mined resistance to the r u l i n g pa r ty . I n fact, M a n n a t h Padmanabhan may be the type the Congress wou ld come up against .

Ev iden t ly , I n d i a n po l i t i ca l parties w i l l have to do much spade-work before the Nagpur resolut ion can be implemented. The President's le t ter can ha rd ly be an accident, a n d i t w o u l d be surpr i s ing i f i t were ignor­ed. In fact, th is let ter m a y wel l be par t of the g r a n d s t ra tegy of the Congress Pa r ty to re t reat f r o m Nagpur .

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