the rise of europe and atlantic trade did national · to the 2009 fresh alps, 2010 ehs conference...

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THE RISE OF EUROPE AND ATLANTIC TRADE: DID NATIONAL

INSTITUTIONS DO IT?1

Guillaume Daudin2

[email protected]

Draft: please do not quote

Abstract

This paper explores the idea that Atlantic trade had a role on growth in Early Modern

Europe through constitutional, nation-level institutional change à la Acemoglu, Johnson and

Robinson (2005). In a first part, it presents arguments which could explain a positive link

between Atlantic trade in Early Modern Europe and growth. It underlines that there are

difficulties associated with the constitutional argument. In a second part, it studies the

individual experience of 193 cities to show that, once externalities of cities on each other are

taken into account, the positive national effect of Atlantic trade conditional on starting

institutions exists alongside a positive local effect of Atlantic trade, unconditional on starting

institutions. In a third part, it uses a new database of regional urban population to show the

same thing based on the experience of 684 European cities. Atlantic trade had unconditional

local effects. As constitutional institutions are by definition national, it makes it unlikely that

they were the only channels of its influence on European growth.

Keywords: Early Modern Europe, Intercontinental trade, Growth, Economic Geography,

Cities

JEL Codes: F43, N13, N73, O18

1 I thank Leandro Prados de la Escosura, David Ormond, Richard Sullivan, Jacob Weisdorf, participants to the 2009 Fresh Alps, 2010 EHS conference in Durham, 2010 EBHS annual meeting in Braga (Portugal), 2010 ASSA meetings and the economic history seminar in the University Carlos III, 2014 Berlin Economic History seminar for their insightful comments and suggestions. I thank George Welling for sharing Dutch navigation data with me. I thank Leonor Freire Costa for sharing Portuguese navigation data. All errors remain mine. 2 PSL, Université Paris-Dauphine, DIAL UMR-IRD 225 F-75016 Paris, France PSL, IRD, DIAL UMR-IRD 225, F-75016 Paris, France Sciences Po, OFCE, F-75007 Paris, France

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Introduction

The European exploration voyages of the fifteenth and sixteenth century and the

colonialist policies of European states transformed Europe from a peripheral region of the

world economy in 1500 to its mercantile center in 1850. It was a spectacular and impressive

phenomenon. As the Great Divergence in economic development happened at the same time,

it seemed natural to many observers to link the two. The debate on the subject has been raging

at least since the warnings of Adam Smith on the deleterious effect of mercantilist policies on

national prosperity. Marxist historians have long defended the idea that the profits from

empire and intercontinental trade were important for capital accumulation preparing the

Industrial Revolution before the Industrial Revolution (Marx [1867 (1993)], Williams [1944

(1966)], Amin [1974], Frank [1978], Wallerstein [1980] et Crouzet [1972], p. 8). Neoclassical

economic historians mostly agree with Patrick O’Brien that empire and intercontinental trade

was simply too small to significantly affect European economies (O’Brien [1982]; see also

Sheridan [1965], Thomas & Bean [1974], Richardson [1975], Inikori [1981], Darity [1985],

Solow, Barbara L. & Engerman [1987] et Eltis & Engerman [2000]). Patrick O’Brien

famously changed his mind on the subject, and both the Great Divergence debate and new

empirical analysis have given new life the idea that empires and intercontinental trade were

central to Europe’s economic success (O’Brien et de la Escosura 1998; O’Brien 2000;

Pomeranz 2000; Allen 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson, et Robinson 2005; Findlay et O’Rourke

2007; Costa, Palma, et Reis 2015)3.

This paper empirically explores the channels that can explain this relation, and

specifically discusses whether Atlantic trade had a role on growth in Early Modern Europe

only through constitutional, nation-level institutional change à la Acemoglu, Johnson and

Robinson (2005) or also through local effects.

3 For a contrarian view, see (De Pleijt et Van Zanden 2013)

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Both national or local effects would be plausible. Many different channels through which

empire and trade had an effect of European growth have been proffered, that can be regrouped

into two groups.

The first one looks into goods and markets. Atlantic trade deepened the market

integration of Europe with the rest of the world, making new markets and new sources for raw

materials available. As underlined by (O’Rourke, Prados de la Escosura, et Daudin 2010),

comparative advantages could only have limited effects in a world where scarce resources

could be transferred from one sector to another. The structural changes linked to increased

trade could be large if some sectors were more conducive to long-term growth than others.

There are both theoretical arguments (Galor 2005; Galor et Mountford 2003) and empirical

evidence (Williamson 2011) on the importance of international trade in de-industrializing the

« South» Asia and industrializing Europe, but that is mainly a nineteenth century story. This

is also the case for the idea that intercontinental trade allowed Europe to escape the

Malthusian constraint by integrating the large land expenses of the New World into its

economy (Pomeranz 2000). In the eighteenth century, the Indian manufactured sector was

going well and Europe was not dependent on the exterior for its industrial raw materials or its

caloric intake. It is not clear the volume of trade was then large enough to have a sizeable

effect on prices and on the reallocation of productive resources in Europe (O’Rourke et

Williamson 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson, et Robinson 2005, 562) before the industrial

revolution, all the more so as a sizeable part of intercontinental trade was entrepot trade.

Buying sugar in the West Indies for its ultimate sale in Northern Europe was less

transformative than producing goods for foreign markets or consuming foreign goods.

Yet this effect could have been larger if there were many under-utilized factors of

production in the economy and if Smithian mechanisms of deepening market integration

(Jones 1998; Mokyr 1990, 5) were crucial for the development of Europe. One version of this

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idea is the notion of “industrious revolution”. The germ of this idea can be found in Smith’s

“vent for surplus” theory of international trade (Oulton 1993). It suggests that the integration

of households in the domestic market economy through proto-industry and market agriculture

was an important growth mechanism (de Vries 1994; de Vries 2008). It manifested, for

example, through the increase in the number of hours worked (Voth 2001). Slave and Atlantic

trade offered new, exotic, consumption goods which encouraged market participation of

willing consumers. Hersh and Voth have suggested that the availability of tea, sugar and

coffee at affordable prices improved English welfare by around 15% (Voth et Hersh 2009).

The fact that new markets and products encouraged industrial and agricultural production

at least locally, as demonstrated a contrario by the devastating effect of trade disruption

throughout coastal continental Europe during the Napoleonic wars (Crouzet 1964), is beyond

doubt. Whether there was a sizeable national effect, or if, for example, the prosperity of the

coastal economy was the counterpart to a lack of investments in the interior economy, as

famously argued by Smith and Young in the French case (Smith 1776, book IV, chapter VII;

Young 1794, september 21st 1788), is still in doubt.

The second group of channels through which empire and trade had an effect of Europe

focuses on the actors of international trade and their profits. Even if Atlantic trade might not

have been large enough to change the structure of European economies, it was large enough

to improve the economic and political position of specific groups, especially traders. In a

specific European tradition started by Venice, mercantilist policies ranging from direct

subsidies to military action against competitors (Curtin 1984, 116) supported their activities to

the detriment of other European. It led them to a higher rate of profits in intercontinental trade

than in domestic activities. This has been abundantly studied throughout Europe. We will use

the example of France to illustrate it. (Daudin 2004) has shown the existence of high profits in

French slave and Atlantic trade in the eighteenth century has. These high profits were not a

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remuneration for risk or illiquidity: long distance trade was still a good investment even

taking these into account, as long as diversification was possible, which was possible

conditional on wealth.

A number of anti-competition mechanisms were at work to maintain intercontinental

trade profits could be maintained at a high level for traders. First, because traders privately

benefited from mercantilist policies which burden was shared by the society as a whole.

Second, because the extension of the trade of individual countries was often done at the

expense of other countries. Finally, because European-controlled trade represented only a

small part of world trade. For example, intra-Asian trade was still a frontier for European

mercantile expansion in the late eighteenth century. French traders and capitalists during the

eighteenth century first exploited trade with the West Indies, then slave trade, and finally were

starting to expand in Asian trade at the end of the century.

As a result, investing into slave and Atlantic trade was restricted: that prevented profit

rates to decline to market levels. Trade entrepreneurs did not accept everyone’s capital. Most

passive investors were either former trade entrepreneurs, or part of the family and friends of

trade entrepreneurs. There does not seem the have been a demand for external capital. In

Nantes, ‘The study of ship shares leads us to believe that capital circulated in a close circuit’

(Meyer 1969). In Marseilles, the town used mainly its own capital to finance its trade. Most of

what seems to be external capital was actually former trading capital coming back to the

sector (Carrière 1973, 944). In La Rochelle, a relatively small port, only 20% of the capital

invested in international trade came from other places at the end of the 1780s, and much of

that came from Nantes and Bordeaux (Clark 1981, 221�24). In Bordeaux, traders ‘were keen

to deal within a circle of close friends, preferably parents, and were reluctant to deal with

speculators from different towns’ (Butel 1974). The entry ticket for would-be investors seems

to have been to become traders, or get a trader in their close circle. Solier is an example of

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how a Swiss protestant group tried to get into trade in Marseilles (Dermigny 1960, 171�81;

Carrière 1961; Carrière 1973, 939): The early career of Benoît Lacoube is another example of

a successful trading family from the interior trying unsuccessfully to get into Atlantic trade,

this time in Bordeaux (Cornette 1986).

Traders were not able to capture rents from intercontinental trade everywhere. They could

do it in England and in the Netherlands and, as we have seen, in France. They implemented

international policies partly devoted to supporting the activity of domestic traders (Mielants

2007; Arrighi 1994). It was not the case in Spain and Portugal were colonial revenues

reinforced the state and the aristocracy and allowed them to bypass negotiation with other

power groups (O’Rourke, Prados de la Escosura, et Daudin 2010). Furthermore, the Spanish

and Portuguese states were unsuccessful in checking the rising trade activity of their

competitors.

The improvement in the political position of traders had as its most direct consequence

the improvement of their own prospects of wealth accumulation. One traditional view is that

traders’ profits had an important role in early modern accumulation of capital. The strongest

form of this idea suggests this was at the root of the Industrial Revolution (Williams 1944;

Wallerstein 1989). It is now discredited. A weaker form of this idea is that slave trade and

plantation colonies played an important role in accumulation before the Industrial Revolution.

This is still debated. Many economic historians would agree with O’Brien’s view that profits

from the “periphery,” or, approximately, the non-European world, were simply too small to

have played a major role in European growth before the Industrial Revolution (O’Brien 1982;

Eltis et Engerman 2000; Daudin 2006).

Traders might have been central as economic actors, especially as the handmaiden of

deepening market integration and “industrious revolution”, domestic traders played two roles.

First, they offered new consumption goods, which diffusion can be seen in probate

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inventories (Baulant 1989; Roche 1997). Second, they had an active role in the organization

of production and in distribution, as suggested by the literature on proto-industry (Mendels

1972). As we have seen before, getting into Atlantic trade was an important, and difficult,

step in the enrichment of traders. Increased Atlantic trade profits might have encouraged them

to do even more effort to access the sector. As not every trader succeeded, this increased

effort might have lead to more domestic trading activity in the same way than the possibility

of brain drain increases education formation in developing countries and, if the “success rate”

is not too high, actually paradoxically increases the stock of human capital in some countries

(Beine, Docquier, et Rapoport 2001).

The view espoused by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson focuses on traders as political

actor in the political economy of the European state. Obviously, the ultimate aim of traders

was to improve their own position rather than the functioning of the state, as is recognized by

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, especially in the working paper version of their article

(Acemoglu, Johnson, et Robinson 2002, 27). Traders mainly clamored for public protection

and support to their own economic activities (Hirsch 1991; Lindberg 2009; Stasavage 2016).

Still, the improved economic and political position of traders was crucial for European

development because traders were a progressive political force able to coerce national

governments into setting up institutions restricting the power of monarchy and securing

broad-based property rights. Their numerous empirical tests and convincing robustness

checks (Acemoglu, Johnson, et Robinson 2005) certainly give weight to their argument. It

gives an explanation of the emergence of improved institutions in Northwestern Europe

(North et Thomas 1973). More generally, the link between the rise of traders, merchant

capitalism and growth is a recurring theme in the historical literature (e. g. Braudel 1997)

since Voltaire remarked on the role of English traders in their polity in his tenth lettre

philosophique (Voltaire 2010).

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These are arguments about national politics. A large part of politics is local, and it might

be the case that traders also left their mark in sub-national, city level institutions. This has

been argued forcefully by Oscar Gelderbom (Gelderblom 2013). Studying the cases of

Bruges, Antwerp and Amsterdam from 1250 to 1650, he shows that urban competition

(including a large number of competing cities, footloose foreign traders and municipal

autonomy) was central to the rise of inclusive trade institutions in Europe. This is very

plausible in the case of decentralized polities like the Low Countries and Italy. Can it be

generalized?

Most of the economic, quantitative, debate on the role of Atlantic trade on European

growth focuses on the national level, presumably because that is the level at which most of

the quantitative data are available. Most of the historical, qualitative debate focuses on the

local level, where the consequences of Atlantic trade are the most visible. This paper aims at

bridging the gap by examining quantitative evidence at the local level. Countries might not be

the proper unit of analysis to think about growth, especially before the 19th century. This

paper shows that, beside national effects, trade also had local effects. Towns and regions

nearby trading cities benefited from Atlantic trade more than interior cities. Because

constitutional institutions are national, these local effects must have been transmitted through

another channel. Many explanations are obviously available, as we just discussed.

The paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the data. The next

section uses Bairoch’s database of city sizes to show that, once externalities of cities on each

other are taken into account, the positive national effect of Atlantic trade, conditional on good

starting institutions, is completed by an unconditional local positive effect. This analysis uses

a balanced panel of 193 cities. The third section, it uses a new database of regional urban

population to summarize the experience of 684 cities and show the importance of the local

effects of Atlantic trade. to show the same thing. As constitutional institutions are by

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definition national, it makes it unlikely that they were the only channels of its influence on

European growth.

1. Data

The main proxy for development in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson is urbanization as

their main proxy for development, and they emphasize the link formed by institutions. Like

they do, we use (Bairoch, Batou, et Chèvre 1988). This database has been expanded and

corrected by (Maarten Bosker, Buringh, et van Zanden 2013). We have made a number of

corrections, notably for the population of Amsterdam and Antwerp (Van Roey 1975; Lourens

et Lucassen 1997, 55�57).4

Our measure of trade comes mainly from the database provided by Acemoglu, Johnson

and Robinson. This database measures Atlantic trade in terms of annual voyages by 400-ton

equivalent ships. Figure 1 gives their estimates for the five trading countries.5

4 Jan Van Roey, ‘De Bevolking’, in: Walter Couvreur (ed), Antwerpen in de XVIde deuw, (Antwerpen 1975) 95-108; Piet Lourens and Jan Lucassen, Inwonertallen van Nederlandse steden, ca. 1300-1800 (Amsterdam 1997) 55-57. 5

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Figure 1: National Atlantic trade, 1400-1850

We improve the quality of their data at the margin by taking into account Portuguese and

Dutch trade with the Western Hemisphere along with more recent estimates for French trade

(thanks to George Welling and Leonor Freire Costa and Guillaume Daudin for sharing their

data).

Figure 2: Better national Atlantic trade, 1400-1850

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2. Explaining city growth

One first way to look at that is to contrast the growth rates of cities close to Atlantic ports

in country with reasonable starting institutions in the 16th century (see Figure 3). As predicted

by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, towns in countries participating to slave and Atlantic

trade and with good starting institutions grew faster than other European towns (except in the

early 18th century). But it is striking that, inside these countries, towns nearer to Atlantic ports

also grew faster by a similar order of magnitude.

Figure 3: Urban growth in Europe

More formally, Table 1 uses a panel regression to show that this difference is indeed

significant. This econometric exercise expands from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson and

Bosker, Buringh and Luiten van Zanden (Marteen Bosker, Buringh, et Luiten van Zanden

2008).

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Regression (1) tests AJR’s hypothesis on the 193 which population is known from 1300 to

1850. Atlantic ports in good institution countries are larger than other cities. All cities in

countries with both good institutions and Atlantic trade are larger than other cities, confirming

the hypothesis that Atlantic trade and good starting institutions, together, favour development

at the national level, maybe because of their positive effect on national institutions. On the

other hand, cities in countries which participated in Atlantic trade6 are on the whole smaller

than other cities: good institution were indeed crucial to benefit from Atlantic trade.

Regression (2) however shows that this result is weakened by the introduction of the

urban potential variable suggested by Bosker, Buringh and Luiten van Zanden. This variable

takes into account the positive externalities of cities on one another in Europe.

Urban potential of city i = Population of city jDistance between i and jj≠i

∑

Regression (3) goes further to check if Atlantic ports, in good institution settings, have

more of a positive effect around them than other cities. It introduces a “domestic Atlantic

port” specific variable. This variable is constructed like the urban potential variable, except

that only domestic Atlantic ports are taken into account. This variable has a non-significant

negative effect. Its product with starting institutions has a small, barely statistically significant

negative effect.

Atlantic port potential of city i = Population of Atlantic port kDistance between i and kk≠i

∑

Using all the information available on all cities does not change significantly the results.

The hypothesis by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson is indeed vindicated. Countries which

participated in Atlantic trade did not have larger cities. Countries which participated in

Atlantic trade and had good starting institutions did.

6 Only five countries are considered as having participated to Atlantic trade in the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s dataset: France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 1988 borders are used throughout.

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Table 1: Explaining city size, 1300-1850 (BBZ&AJR population data, new trade data)

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Summary statistics

Unbalanced panel

Summary statistics

City and year dummies everywhere

Western Europe x year dummies everywhere Weighted by city populations

(1) AJR main hypothesis for cities

(2) AJR main hypothesis

+ BBZ

(3) AJR + BBZ

+ This paper

(4)

Explained variable: ln(city population)

3.29 2.53 (0.87) (0.74)

Log(European volume of Atlantic trade) x being part of a country participating to

Atlantic trade

-0.12*** -0.11*** -0.17*** 1.97 -0.08*** 2.57 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (2.81) (0.01) (3.30)

Log(European volume of Atlantic trade) x being an Atlantic port

-0.00 0.03 0.02 0.32 0.01 0.26 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (1.34) (0.03) (1.29)


x starting institutions

0.14*** 0.07* 0.08** 0.37 0.08*** 0.30 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (1.75) (0.02) (1.66)


Atlantic trade x starting institutions

0.15*** 0.10*** 0.17*** 1.90 0.07*** 2.55 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (3.10) (0.01) (3.81)

Log(Urban potential) 1.32*** 1.40*** 2.80 1.56*** 3.17 (0.11) (0.12) (0.74) (0.06) (0.77)

Log(European volume of Atlantic trade) xLog(1+ Atlantic port potential)

-0.03** 5.84 -0.02*** 8.76 (0.01) (5.67) (0.01) (6.32)



-0.01*** 6.73 -0.00* 9.31 (0.00) (9.27) (0.00) (10.85)

Constant 3.87*** 1.06*** 0.87*** -0.19 (0.05) (0.24) (0.26) (0.13)

Observations 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 5,639 5,639 R-squared 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95

*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels

The abundance of interactive variables makes these regressions difficult to interpret

without a study of marginal effects. This is provided by Table 2.

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Table 2: Marginal effects in explaining city size (1) (equation (3))

Balanced panel Summary statistics

HRS: ln(city population) City and year dummies everywhere


(3) AJR + BBZ +

This paper

Mean: 3.3 S.d.: 0.8

Log(European volume of Atlantic trade) x being an Atlantic port 0.11*** 0.3

(1.3)

Starting institutions 0.29*** 1.1 (0.8)

Log(European volume of Atlantic trade) x being part of a country participating to Atlantic trade 0.02*** 1.9

(2.7)

Log(Urban potential) 1.40*** 2.9 (0.8)

Log(European volume of Atlantic trade) x Log(1+ Atlantic port potential) -0.04 5.7

(5.6)


The same exercise can be conducted with estimation of country-specific Atlantic trade,

using Atlantic trade data. We use “Atlantic trade potential” where the share of Atlantic trade

of each port in a country is assumed to be proportional to its population.

Atlantic trade potential of city i = Atlantic trade by Atlantic port kDistance between i and kk≠i

∑

Table 3 gives the results of the regressions. They are similar to the results of preceding

regressions and, again, vindicate the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s hypothesis.

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Table 3: Explaining city size (2) (BBZ&AJR population data, new trade data)

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Summary statistics

Unbalanced panel

Summary statistics





+ BBZ

(3) AJR + BBZ

+ This paper

(4)


3.29 2.53 (0.87) (0.74)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) x being part of a country participating to

Atlantic trade

0.09* 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.09*** 0.20

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1.23) (0.03) (1.23)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) x being an Atlantic port

0.02 0.04 0.04 0.19 -0.01 0.17 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.93) (0.03) (0.92)



-0.12*** -0.12*** -0.18*** 1.04 -0.10*** 1.65

(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (1.87) (0.02) (2.38)



0.16*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 1.01 0.10*** 1.71

(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (2.18) (0.02) (3.01)


Log(1+ Atlantic trade potential) -0.07 0.44 -0.20*** 0.76 (0.10) (0.58) (0.05) (0.70)

Log(1+ Atlantic trade potential) x starting institutions

-0.13*** 0.52 -0.04** 0.81 (0.03) (0.90) (0.02) (1.11)

Constant 3.93*** 1.30*** 1.23*** 0.00 (0.04) (0.26) (0.27) (0.13)

Observations 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 5,639 5,639 R-squared 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95


Table 4: Marginal effects in explaining city size (2) (equation 3)

Balanced panel 1300-1850

Summary statistics

HRS: ln(city population) City and year dummies everywhere


(3) AJR + BBZ +

This paper

Mean:3.3 S.d.: 0.8

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) 0.13*** 1.8 (2.6)

Being an Atlantic port 0.17*** 0.17 (0.38)

Starting institutions 0.16*** 1.16 (0.7)

Log(Urban potential) 1.2*** 2.8 (0.7)

Log(1+“Atlantic trade potential”) -0.22 1.7 (2.5)


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However, spatial autocorrelation might be an issue with these results. A city has an

influence on the urban potential of neighboring cities. This increases their size. This, in return,

is linked to a larger size for the initial city. Sorting these relationships out would require

proper spatial econometrics. Furthermore, the link between national Atlantic trade and city

size might be endogenous, as one suspect that larger cities would attract more trade. One

solution is to look at the growth rate of cities rather than at their size. This reduces the number

of observation, but solves both the endogeneity and the spatial correlation issues.

Table 5 conducts the same regressions, but uses city growth rate as the right hand side

variable. The city size has been introduced as an explanatory variable to take into account the

fact that larger cities have a priori less growth potential because of the increased issues of

pollution, supply, etc. This variable has the expected negative sign.

The coefficients of our main variable of interest are strikingly different, especially with

regression 3. In the balanced panel, a city in a country which took part to Atlantic trade,

whether an Atlantic port or not, does not seem to have grown any faster than any other city. It

seems to grow a little slower in equation 1 and 2. The crucial variable becomes the “Atlantic

trade potential”. If one believes regression (3), the positive effect of Atlantic trade on the

growth of city is only local, and is not dependent on the quality of institutions. It might even

be stronger when starting institutions are bad.

Regression (4) uses the full dataset. Its results are less surprising. Cities in countries

involved in Atlantic trade grow slower than other cities, except when they benefit from good

national institutions. ????Cities nearby Atlantic ports grow as well even faster if they benefit

from good institutions.???? Still, this does not prevent the existence of local, non-institutional

based, positive effects of Atlantic trade on city growth.

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Table 5: Explaining city growth (1300-1800)

(BBZ&AJR population data, new trade data)

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Summary statistics

Unbalanced panel

Summary statistics





+ BBZ

(3) AJR + BBZ

+ This paper

(4)

Explained variable: annual urban population growth*100

0.21 0.41 (0.56) (0.69)

Log(city population) -0.49*** -0.49*** -0.49*** 3.21 -0.60*** 2.56 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.83) (0.03) (0.74)


Atlantic trade

0.03 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.20 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (1.06) (0.05) (1.14)


0.06 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.16 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.80) (0.06) (0.82)



-0.16*** -0.16*** -0.20*** 0.84 -0.19*** 1.35 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1.60) (0.03) (1.99)



0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.81 0.17*** 1.42

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1.86) (0.03) (2.58)

Log(Urban potential) 0.00 -0.10 2.63 0.28** 2.87 (0.19) (0.19) (0.60) (0.13) (0.61)

Log(1+ Atlantic trade potential) 0.66*** 0.28 0.44*** 0.45 (0.18) (0.37) (0.12) (0.44)

Log(1+ Atlantic trade potential) x starting institutions

-0.28*** 0.33 -0.25*** 0.51 (0.08) (0.58) (0.05) (0.72)

Constant 1.76*** 1.76*** 2.00*** 1.26*** (0.17) (0.41) (0.41) (0.27)

Observations 924 924 924 924 3,371 3,371 R-squared 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.68


Table 6: Marginal effects in explaining city growth (1300-1800) (equation 3)

Balanced panel

Summary statistics

HRS: annual growth rate *100 City and year dummies everywhere


(3) 0.3 (0.7)

Log(city population) -0.49*** 3.21 (0.83)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) 0.08 1.3

(2.0)

Being an Atlantic port 0.14** 0.1 (0.4)

Starting institutions 0.10 1.2 (0.8)

Log(Urban potential) -0.10 2.6 (0.6)

Log(1+“Atlantic trade potential”) 0.32*** 0.6 (0.7)


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3. Explaining regional urban growth

They are two reasons to go further than Table 5.

The first one is that the panel setting poses a dilemma. Using a balanced panel is more

consistent, but it restricts the sample to 10% of 19th century European cities. Still, something

could be happening with new cities. It might be the case that Atlantic trade is not important

for the growth of established cities but encourages the growth of market towns such that some

become cities. This is all the more plausible as established cities have often more options for

internal growth whereas smaller urban locations might be on the lookout for external sources

of growth.7 If that is true, the balanced panel equation will show no role of Atlantic trade on

city growth, whether the Unbalanced panel will show one. In order to both take into account

new cities and keep a balanced dataset, it would be useful to continue the analysis at the

regional level.

The second one is that Acemoglu, Johnons and Robinson do not conclude their economic

analysis with the analysis of city growth. On the contrary, their final regressions are at the

country level. They use Bairoch’s database and total population figures to compute the

urbanization rate of European countries, and use this as their main proxy of economic growth.

However, if we were to move the analysis to the national level, we would, by definition, be

incapable of measuring any the local effects: they would become invisible and be “absorbed”

in the national effect. Hence again, we would like to find an intermediary scale of spatial

analysis.

There are two difficulties. The first one is that there is no consistent dataset of regional

population from 1300 to 1850: hence, it is not possible to compute regional urbanization rates.

As a proxy, we will use regional urban population. The second difficulty is that regions are

not easily comparable between European nations in terms of size and history. To solve these

7 Richard Sullivan suggested this idea.

19

difficulties, we use a Geographical Information System (GIS) software to divide Europe into

arbitrary regions.

These regions are squares seventy-five kilometer wide. When a square includes two or

more countries, we divide into one region per country. We then compute the urban population

in each region at each point of time. These regions will be our unit of analysis. Figure 4

contrasts this new view with the city-based view.

Figure 4: Two views of European urbanization in 1300

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Table 7 shows the results of the region-based analysis. The balanced panel includes only

113 regions (against 193 cities), but these 113 regions themselves include 684 cities in 1850.

In the balanced regressions, we have increased the sample from 10% of the total population of

19th century cities to nearly one third. Including an Atlantic port does not increase the rate of

urban growth in a region. Atlantic trade in itself decreases urban growth, but with good

institutions it encourages it: again, the Acemoglu, Johnson and Robison hypothesis is

confirmed. Being near domestic Atlantic ports also increases urban growth, unconditional on

starting institutions.

20

Table 7: Explaining regional urban growth (1300-1850)

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Summary statistics

Unbalanced panel

Summary statistics

Region and year dummies everywhere

Western Europe x year dummies everywhere Weighted by region populations



+ BBZ

(3) AJR + BBZ

+ This paper

(4)

Explained variable: annual urban population growth*100

0.40 0.58 (0.71) (0.90)

Log(region population) -0.57*** -0.60*** -0.63*** 3.86 -0.68*** 3.35 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (1.00) (0.05) (1.04)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) x including an Atlantic port

-0.16** -0.16*** -0.24*** 0.86 -0.24*** 0.98 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (1.61) (0.06) (1.76)



0.12 0.11 0.10 0.25 0.12 0.39

(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.98) (0.09) (1.27)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade)) -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.24 -0.05 0.43 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (1.14) (0.07) (1.60)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) x starting institutions

0.16*** 0.15** 0.21*** 0.80 0.22*** 0.96

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (1.83) (0.05) (2.10)

Log(Urban potential) 0.81** 0.76* 2.43 0.87** 2.48 (0.40) (0.42) (0.59) (0.37) (0.58)

Log(1+ Atlantic trade potential) 0.62*** 0.25 0.46** 0.31 (0.20) (0.33) (0.18) (0.33)

Log (1+ Atlantic trade potential) x starting institutions

-0.42*** 0.24 -0.36*** 0.27 (0.09) (0.45) (0.08) (0.48)

Constant 2.27*** 0.74 0.95 0.88 (0.25) (0.80) (0.83) (0.71)

Observations 686 686 686 686 1,334 1,334

R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.65 *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels

Considering the number of interactive variables in this regression, the computation of

marginal effect helps understanding the role of each individual variable. Table 8 suggests that,

on the whole, the effect of starting institutions is not very precisely measured and is smaller

than the effect of the Atlantic trade potential. One standard deviation change in starting

institutions increases the annual growth rate of the regional urban population by 5.5 per cent

of its standard deviation. One standard deviation change in the log of (1+Atlantic trade

potential) increases the annual growth rate of the regional urban population by 17 per cent of

its standard deviation8.

8 Remember these effects exclude the regional dummies. These would certainly increase the effect of both variables.

21

Table 8: Marginal effects in explaining regional urban growth (equation (3))


HRS: annual growth rate *100 Region and year dummies everywhere


(3) 0.4 (0.71)

Log(regional urban population) -0.63*** 3.9 (1.0)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) -0.06** 2.0 (1.8)

Including an Atlantic port 0.11* 0.2 (2.4)

Starting institutions -0.36 1.2 (2.5)

Log(Urban potential) 0.8** 2.4 (0.6)

Log(1+“Atlantic trade potential”) 0.14 1.8 (0.4)


Figure 5 confirms that the local effect of Atlantic trade was larger than its national effect.

It shows four different evolutions of the urban population of Western Europe: the actual one,

the one predicted by equation 4 in Table 7, the one predicted by the same equation assuming

that Atlantic trade had no national effect and the one predicted assuming Atlantic trade had no

local effect. In 1850, the predicted urban population in Western Europe would have been 6%

smaller without the national effect of Atlantic trade and 15% smaller without the local effect

of Atlantic trade.

22

Figure 5: Counter-factual of the evolution of Western European urban population,

1300-1850

It might be the case that the results in Table 7 and Table 8 are dependent on the specific

regional partition we have chosen. To test their robustness, we generate 1,000 different

regional partitions by varying the size of regions (from 2,500 square kilometers to 22,500

square kilometers – the square length is drawn from an uniform distribution between 50 and

150 kilometers) and the starting point of the partition (North-West, North-East, South-East or

South-West corner of Europe).

Following the standard aggregation method in meta-analysis, Table 9 presents the

weighted mean of the regression coefficient, where the weights are the reciprocal of the

standard errors of each coefficient (Deeks, Altman, et Bradburn 2001). Non weighted means

are nearly the same as weighted means. Meta-analysis methods cannot help us to compute the

relevant standard error, as our 1000 samples are not independent from one another: Table 9

reports the weighted mean of the standard errors among the samples.

23

Table 9: Explaining regional urban growth (1300-1800) – 1000 samples

Weighted mean of the regression coefficient (weighted mean of the standard error) Balanced panel Balanced panel Balanced panel Summary

statistics Unbalanced

panel Summary statistics



(1) (2) (3) 0.4 (0.7) (4) 0.6

(1.0)

Log(regional urban population) -0.51*** (0.04)

-0.54*** (0.05)

-0.53*** (0.05)

3.2 (0.7)

-0.68*** (0.03)

4.5 (1.4)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) -0.20*** (0.06)

-0.20*** (0.06)

-0.24*** (0.06)

2.0 (2.7)

-0.30*** (0.05)

1.9 (2.6)


0.20** (0.09)

0.20** (0.09)

0.17* (0.09)

1.0 (2.2)

0.17** (0.08)

0.8 (2.0)



-0.16** (0.07)

-0.16** (0.07)

-0.13* (0.07)

1.4 (3.3)

-0.14** (0.06)

1.1 (3.0)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) x starting institutions

0.25*** (0.05)

0.24*** (0.05)

0.25*** (0.06)

2.4 (3.7)

0.31*** (0.04)

2.2 (3.6)

Log(Urban potential) 0.37 (0.24)

0.19 (0.24)

3.2 (0.7)

0.42** (0.19)

3.7 (0.7)

Log(1+“Atlantic trade potential”) 0.75*** (0.18)

0.7 (0.7)

0.65*** (0.14)

0.7 (0.7)

Log(1+“Atlantic trade potential”) x starting institutions -0.29***

(0.08) 0.9

(1.1) -0.24***

(0.06) 0.8

(1.1)

Mean adjusted R-squared (unweighted) 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.46

Mean number of observations (unweighted) 986 986 986 2498

The columns of equation (1), (2), (3) and (4) provide the weighted mean of the regression coefficient and the weighted mean of the standard error. The weight is the standard error of each individual regression in each sample. The “Summary statistics” columns provide the unweighted mean of the sample means and the unweighed mean of the standard deviations. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, using reported numbers and assuming 800 degrees of freedom.

24

Table 10: Marginal effects in explaining regional urban growth (equation (3)) – 1000

samples




(3) 0.4 (0.7)

Log(regional urban population) -0.51 3.2 (0.7)

Log(country-specific volume of Atlantic trade) -0.21 (0.15)

2.0 (2.7)

Including an Atlantic port 0.02 (0.06)

0.2 (0.4)

Starting institutions -0.14 (0.14)

1.2 (0.7)

Log(Urban potential) 0.19 (0.24)

3.2 (0.7)

Log(1+“Atlantic trade potential”) 0.39*** (0.13)

0.7 (0.7)

The column of (3) provides the weighted mean of the marginal effect and the weighted mean of the its standard error. The weight is the standard error of each individual regression in each sample. The “Summary statistics” columns provide the unweighted mean of the sample means and the unweighed mean of the standard deviations. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, using reported numbers and assuming 800 degrees of freedom.

4. Conclusion

After presenting some possible justifications for the positive effect of Atlantic trade on

early modern European growth, this paper has shown through the study of city size, city

growth and regional urban growth that, even if the mechanism suggested by Acemoglu,

Johnson and Robison is indeed important, it is not the only one. The evolution of national

institutions was not the only channel through which Atlantic trade had a positive effect on

European growth. Local effects also existed. Our preferred specification even suggests that

these effects were much larger than the ones going through national institutions.

25

5. Appendix

Table 11: Explaining city size, 1300-1850 (AJR population data)

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Balanced panel

Summary statistics

Unbalanced panel

Summary statistics


Western Europe dummies everywhere Weighted by city populations



+ BBZ

(3) AJR + BBZ

+ This paper

(4)


3.41 2.55 (0.86) (0.73)


-0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.31 0.01 0.26 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1.29) (0.03) (1.27)



0.22*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.28 0.09*** 0.30 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (1.32) (0.02) (1.63)


Atlantic trade

-0.13*** -0.12*** -0.20*** 1.92 -0.07*** 2.53 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (2.72) (0.02) (3.24)



0.18*** 0.13*** 0.25*** 1.77 0.07*** 2.52 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (2.77) (0.02) (3.75)



-0.05*** 5.53 -0.03*** 8.73 (0.01) (5.45) (0.01) (6.19)



-0.01*** 6.29 -0.00* 9.28 (0.00) (8.47) (0.00) (10.71)

Constant 3.89*** 1.87*** 1.64*** 0.09 (0.05) (0.26) (0.27) (0.12)

Observations 824 824 824 824 5,445 5,445 R-squared 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95

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