the role of camouflage in modern battlefield …...camouflage • camouflage and survivability on...
TRANSCRIPT
The Role of Camouflage in
Modern Battlefield Survivability
Prof Ian Horsfall MIMMM MIMechE CEng
15th March 2016
Camouflage
• Camouflage and survivability on the modern battlefield
• The interaction of camouflage, signature reduction
and deception
• Defensive aids
• Disguise and deception examples
Battlefield Scenarios
• High intensity warfare against a technically able adversary
– Avoid being detected
– Reduce all types of signature
• Visual, radar, IR, noise, dust
– Disrupt all stages of an engagement
• Detection, recognition, identification and analysis
• Low intensity, urban or asymmetric warfare– Avoid being hit
• Don’t identify the target
– Do not give away capability or gaps
– Control the EM environment
• Detect, jam, spoof and monitor potential IED firing signals
DON’T BE KILLED
DON’T BE PENETRATED
Traditional camouflage, radar and IR
stealthDON’T BE SEEN
Signature Reduction, Deception
DON’T BE ACQUIRED
Defensive aides, Decoys,
Obscuration
DON’T BE HIT
The Survivability Onion
Don’t be acquired
Johnson Criteria
Detection
8 pixels wide (JC=1)
There’s something there
Recognition
16 pixels wide (JC=4)
There’s a bike there
Identification
32 pixels wide (JC=8)
There’s a child on a bike
Each stage can be prevented or delayed
We may want to be seen, or be unable to prevent being seen
We can prevent later stages by signature reduction, jamming the signal or deceiving the viewer, we only need to make them hesitate
Don’t be detected
Don’t be detected
Standard skirts Extended skirts
Don’t be acquired
Deception
Provide false targets
(and camouflage real ones)
Disguise orientation
Medium Mk A 1918
DESTROYHard Kill DAS
Jamming and
spoofing (ECM)
Soft kill DASDISRUPT
What capability is fitted, what is the
targetDECEIVE
Situational awareness,
IED detection,
EavesdroppingDETECT
Counter Surveillance,
DazzleDETER
The Defensive Aids Onion
Rhino
Defensive aids
Antennas
Antennas visually give away position
They give away capability
Antennas individually are radar targets
Antennas become large contributors to the total structural RCS
Visual signature
Visual signature and capability
Capability and RCS
Hiding antenna and reducing
their RCS
i. Redirect antenna/array. Passive -park the antenna in a non-specular back scattering direction. Active -steer a null in direction
ii. Screen the antenna or array as from other frequencies using FSSs
iii. Impedance load the antenna
iv. Radiate from novel materials
(i.) requires the antenna is effectively not in operation in direction of interest. (ii) is the most popular and widely used, (iii) and (iv) are receiving a lot of attention.
• A Frequency Selective Surfaces (FSS)
can be used to hide an antenna
• FSS is a periodic surface
– a repeating pattern of elements
– passive or active
Sequentially rotated fractal dipole surface
Courtesy: Dr Ivor Morrow ([email protected])
Low RCS Antennas and Arrays
• Current technologies
– narrowband (microstrip) antennas and arrays have active devices integrated, (pin diodes) with switchable load conditions
• Novel material media
– (gaseous plasma, magnetised ferrite) and non-linear semi-conductor transmission lines (based on PSiAn) provide negative index materials
• Advantages:
– Reduce electrical size of the antenna
– Easily reconfigurable
– Much reduced (switchable) RCS
• Disadvantages:
– Loading the antennas reduces radiation
efficiency
– Some residual structural RCSActive plasms antenna
Courtesy: Dr Ivor Morrow ([email protected])
Summary
• Camouflage should consider a spectrum of approaches
• All that is needed is a momentary delay in the response from the
opposition
• Deception can be used to disguise the identity or intentions of the target
• Deception also means disguising capabilities or gaps in capabilities
• Numerous technologies exist which can be used to accomplish these
aims
Acknowledgements Dr Ivor Morrow [email protected] Daniel Clarke [email protected]