the role of civil society in national reconciliation and ... · the role of civil society in...

The Role of Civil Society inNational Reconciliation and

Peacebuilding in Liberia

International Peace Academy

by Augustine Toure

APRIL 2002

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The International Peace Academy wishes to acknowledge the support provided by the Government of theNetherlands which made the research and publication of this study possible.

ABOUT IPA’S CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMThis report forms part of IPA’s Civil Society Project which, between 1998 and 1999, involved case studieson the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. IPA held a seminar,in partnership with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in Cape Town in 1996 on “Civil Society andConflict Management in Africa” consisting largely of civil society actors from all parts of Africa. An IPAseminar organized in partnership with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa(CODESRIA) in Senegal in December 1999 on “War, Peace and Reconciliation in Africa” prominently featuredcivil society actors from all of Africa’s sub-regions.

In the current phase of its work, IPA Africa Program’s Peacebuilding in Africa project is centered around theUN community and involves individuals from civil society, policy, academic and media circles in New York.The project explores ways of strengthening the capacity of African actors with a particular focus on civilsociety, to contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding in countries dealing with or emerging fromconflicts. In implementing this project, IPA organizes a series of policy fora and Civil Society Dialogues. In2001, IPA initiated the Ruth Forbes Young fellowship to bring one civil society representative from Africato spend a year in New York. IPA provides research facilities to allow the fellow to conduct and publishpolicy-relevant research, benefit from interaction with the UN and NGO community, as well as from thelibrary facilities in New York. The Civil Society fellow is expected to contribute to IPA’s Civil Society Dialogueseries and its seminars on Security Mechanisms in Africa. He/she would then be expected to share his orher experiences with local communities on returning home.

As part of the project on Developing Regional and Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms in Africa, IPA’sseminar in Botswana in December 2000 focused on Southern African security issues while its seminar inNigeria, held in partnership with ECOWAS in September 2001, examined security issues in West Africa. Bothseminars featured strong civil society representation from all of Africa’s sub-regions. Specific papersfocused on the role of civil society actors in managing conflicts in Africa. Civil society representatives arealso expected to feature prominently in IPA’s third seminar in East Africa which will address security issueson the Horn of Africa and is scheduled for December 2002.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. Augustine Toure was co-founder and Deputy Executive Director of Liberia Democracy Watch, Monrovia,from 1995-2001. He is currently the Ruth Forbes Young Civil Society Fellow for 2001-2002 at theInternational Peace Academy, New York.

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Some General Observations About Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Background to the Liberian Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

US/Liberia Relations and the Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Emergence of Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Civil Society During Liberia’s Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The July 1997 Elections and Charles Taylor’s Victory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Civil Society in the Post-1997 Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Government-Created Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The Role of the International Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The Post War Security Sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Restructuring the National Security Apparatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Reintegrating Ex-combatants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Protecting the Rights of Women and Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Elections and Peacebuilding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Threats to Peacebuilding and National Reconciliation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Strategies for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

“THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN LIBERIA”

Table of contents

Contents

Executive summary

The holding of democratic elections in July 1997marked the end of Liberia’s brutal seven-year civil

war. The end of the war, it was thought, had settledLiberia’s leadership question and it was hoped thatcessation of hostilities would usher in a new era ofdemocratic order, political stability, and economicdevelopment. This post-war peace dividend howeverproved to be a mirage. Liberia continues to suffer frompolitical repression even as the socio-economicsituation worsens, threatening hopes for democratiza-tion in Liberia. Rebels calling themselves LiberiansUnited For Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)continue to control parts of the country. The end of theLiberian civil war has not brought peace to thec o u n t r y. Civil society groups in Liberia havecourageously championed peacebuilding, reconcilia-tion and democratization, but have experienced manydifficulties operating under a repressive environment.This report examines the role of Liberia’s civil societygroups in this struggle. Some of the main observationsin the report include the following:

Civil Society in Liberia (1990-1997)

• Civil society in Liberia has been a critical force inthe movement for democratization and has thepotential to play a crucial role in national reconcil-iation and peacebuilding. During the civil war,civil society groups collaborated on commonissues such as disarmament and elections, threat-ening to withdraw cooperation from and reject anyfaction that came to power through bullets ratherthan ballots. Though sometimes marginalized bywarlords during the peace process, civil society’sultimate endorsement of the transition from war topeace in Liberia was critical to ending the war in1997.

• The earliest responses by civil society to theLiberian civil war can be found in the activities ofthe Inter-faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) anamalgamation of the Liberia Council of Churches(LCC) and the National Muslim Council of Liberia(NMCL). The IFMC held the first consultations

between the parties to the conflict in 1990, and itsproposals were adopted and articulated as theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) peace plan for Liberia.

• The civil war also witnessed the birth of a numberof human rights organizations and women’s groupsnotable among which were the Catholic Justice andPeace Commission (JPC), the Center for Law andHuman Rights Education (CLHRE) and the LiberiaWomen Initiative (LWI). During the civil war, theJPC and CLHRE documented and exposed thehuman rights abuses and widespread atrocitiescommitted by all the warring factions during thecivil war. With the installation of the InterimGovernment of National Unity (IGNU) in November1990, and with the gradual restoration of relativenormalcy to Monrovia under the protection of theE C OWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),these organizations expanded their activities toinclude human rights education and the provisionof legal services to victims of human rights abuses.Through their active involvement in the Liberianpeace process, women’s groups succeeded inplacing women and children’s issues on the agenda.

• In the humanitarian field, groups like SUSUKUU, anoffshoot of the Movement for Justice in Africa(MOJA) and the Special Emergency Life FoodProgram (SELF) provided humanitarian relief andassistance to war-affected populations. SUSUKUU’smain activities were geared toward establishingcooperatives and providing technical supportservices to farmers. SELF organized communitiesinto blocs for the purpose of food distribution andother relief items. Almost every action whichrequired social mobilization was patterned afterthe bloc (mapping) system put in place by SELF.

• The period of the civil war (1990-1996) witnessedthe growth of a robust, though fractious, media inLiberia. There was the Monrovia media establish-ment comprising newspapers like the Plain Talk,the Liberia Age, the Inquirer and the Foto Vision .These newspapers articulated concerns about theunfolding peace process, reflecting anti-warringfaction sentiments. The ‘Greater Liberia’ media


Executive Summary 1


establishment, represented by the private medianetwork of Charles Taylor known as the LiberiaCommunication Network (LCN), functioned chieflyas the propaganda arm of Taylor’s NationalPatriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) faction.

Civil Society in the Post-1997 Period

• The three main tasks faced by civil societyincluded: supporting the process of peacebuilding,national reconciliation and democratization.

• Despite Liberia’s notorious history of governmentrepression, the country’s civil war provided someuseful lessons about the power of advocacy andcollective action. Civil society was prepared, withthe end of the war in 1996, to seize the opportu-nity to expand its democratic space in peacetime.There are now over a dozen human rights organi-zations, pro-democracy and women’s groups, anddevelopment-oriented NGOs in Liberia: Theseorganizations include human rights, media,women’s, religious and student groups whoseactivities are briefly summarized below.

Human Rights AdvocatesHuman rights groups in Liberia have had themost impact in raising public awareness and insustaining the public’s interest and participa-tion in campaigns for the protection of humanrights. Such groups have also expanded theknowledge of citizens of the democraticprocess, thereby contributing to the develop-ment of democracy in Liberia.

Liberia’s Free PressThe Liberian media has contributed signifi-cantly to shaping public opinion and toencouraging public debate. By creating aforum for debate of public issues, the mediacreates space for political action by civils o c i e t y. The independent media oftencontributes to raising public awareness aboutcritical issues and attempting to act as a checkon government abuses.

Women’s OrganizationsThe campaign by women’s groups for reform ofcustomary law on inheritance, spearheaded bythe Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia(AFFEL), has resulted in a proposed bill, whichwas sent to Liberia’s National Legislature and isstill pending passage. The women’s lobby hasalso helped pass a law creating a Ministry ofGender Development. Women’s groups such asthe LWI and the Liberian Women Pe a c eNetwork have also participated in peacemissions, joining their counterparts fromGuinea and Sierra Leone as part of the ManoRiver Women’s Peace Network to promotepeace in the Mano River basin.

Religious CommunityOne of the oldest, most consistently influentialcivil society voices in Liberia is the religiouscommunity – comprising both Christian andIslamic faiths. Liberia’s religious communityhas been at the vanguard in the struggle forpeace and social justice. Liberia’s religiouscommunity attracts a huge following swelledby its work in providing relief services tocommunities throughout the country, as wellas its provision of services in the fields ofhealth care and education.

Student ActivismF i n a l l y, Liberia’s student community hashistorically been one of the most activeadvocates of democratic transformation inLiberia. Students have often demonstratedagainst autocratic rule and suffered thebrutality of the security forces for their efforts.The student community, largely represented bythe University of Liberia has spoken out onalmost every issue of national concern –ranging from the ongoing war in Lofa County(condemned), to the international sanctionsimposed on Liberia (supported). The govern-ment of Charles Taylor has, however, attemptedto divide the student community by infiltratingits ranks with government agents and by tryingto limit its ability to organize effectively.

2 Executive Summary


Civil Society and External Funding

• Internally, civil society’s dependence on foreignaid – largely provided by institutions in the US andthe Netherlands - has threatened its own existenceand survival and, in some cases, limited itscapacity. Funding provided by external donorsallows civil society to impact the political process.When donor support is reduced or withdrawn, civilsociety groups either disappear or their impact onnational politics is greatly diminished. Their abilityto reach out to the population becomes consider-ably limited.

• To reduce civil society’s dependence on externalfunding will require harnessing and encouragingsupport for civil society’s activities through localinitiatives. This can only be possible when thepolitical environment in Liberia is free of repres-sion and when people do not feel threatened by thegovernment when they give support to civil societygroups. One way out of this dependency syndromeis to allow NGOs to use some of the funding theyreceive from donors to build their investmentcapacity.

The Role of the International Community

• The failure to reintegrate Liberia’s 33,000 ex-combatants into civilian life remains a real threatto domestic peace as well as for the stability of theWest African subregion. International support of acomprehensive plan for the full reintegration ofex-combatants into society could significantlyreduce the threat these ex-fighters pose to society.Related to stability in Liberia is the restructuringand retraining of the country’s national army andother security agencies. International pressureshould be brought to bear on the Taylor regime torestructure and re-train its security forces underinternational supervision as provided for by the1996 Abuja Agreement which ended Liberia’s civilwar. Making this demand conditional on inter-

national sanctions being lifted could be aneffective way of forcing compliance on theLiberian government.

• The international community has also sought tosupport peacebuilding in Liberia through theactivities of the UN’s various agencies. However,the flow and level of UN and other external donorassistance to Liberia has been largely affected byLiberia’s involvement in the Sierra Leone civil war.In May 2001 the UN Security Council imposedeconomic, military and travel sanctions on thegovernment of Liberia for its failure to end supportfor RUF rebels fighting in Sierra Leone.

• The current sanctions regime on Liberia and thefurther tightening of these sanctions appear tohave had a large impact in reducing CharlesTaylor’s support for the RUF. The sanctions couldalso force him to open up political space to hisdomestic opponents if they remain targeted andwell-coordinated. In this respect, the cooperationof ECOWAS leaders, some of whom have expressedskepticism about the efficacy of sanctions, must besecured, as their involvement in monitoring thesanctions regime will remain crucial to the successof the embargo.

• According to critics of the sanctions regime, ifreconstruction aid had been provided immediatelyafter the end of the war in 1997, it could havehelped ward off anti-democratic tendencies inpost-war Liberia. The UN therefore has to distin-guish between aid that could possibly bolster theregime of Charles Taylor and aid that can influencea human rights culture, promote democracy, andstrengthen civil society in Liberia. Innovative wayshave to be found to channel assistance to needyLiberians through both local and internationalNGOs. Only through such a process, and thecontinued strengthening of civil society, can theconditions which led to the Liberian conflict bemitigated.

Executive Summary 3


4 Introduction

Introduction

The holding of elections in July 1997 marked the endof Liberia’s brutal seven-year long civil war.1 The

end of the war, it was thought, had settled the leader-ship question – the violent contestation for poweramong the leaders of Liberia’s warring factions. Thehope was that peace would usher in a fresh start and anew democratic order and economic development, theabsence of which were felt to have been among themain causes of the war. This post-war peace dividendhowever proved to be a mirage. President CharlesTaylor’s regime, since its ascendancy to power afterwinning a landslide victory in the July 1997 elections,has been plagued with one crisis after another. Thekilling of Samuel Dokie, a former ally turned politicalopponent of Taylor, along with his wife and othermembers of his family in November 1997, barely threemonths after the election, cast a dark cloud over thenew regime and spread shock and fear among thepopulation.2 This was followed by several other killingsand mysterious disappearances.3

In September 1998, the Taylor regime faced its firstmajor security challenge when state security forcesclashed with supporters of former United LiberationMovement For Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO-J) factionleader, Roosevelt Johnson. The events that followedleft several hundred casualties and fatalities, and asubsequent treason trial convicted and jailed many ofJohnson’s associates,4 many of who mostly belonged tohis ethnic Krahn group. Post-war Liberia has alsosuffered from perennial armed incursions by Liberiandissidents operating from Guinea. Taylor’s involvementin gun-running, diamond-smuggling, and supportingRevolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra

Leone has exposed Liberia to international sanctionsand isolation and adversely affected the flow of badly-needed international assistance for Liberia’s post-warr e c o n s t r u c t i o n .5 S i g n i f i c a n t l y, the Taylor regime’spreoccupation with its own survival – usuallyexplained as state security - has resulted in atrocitiescommitted by state security personnel. These develop-ments threaten the prospects for democracy in Liberia.Consequently, many analysts have argued that the endof the Liberian civil war has not brought peace anddemocracy to the country, and that the root causes ofconflict (economic exploitation, mass poverty,structural violence, violence against women andchildren and political repression),6 which still persist inpost-war Liberia, must be urgently addressed.

As Liberian academic George Kieh observed, “the newdemocratic order must be hoisted on a synergy ofeconomic, political, social, cultural and religiouspillars.”7 In this statement can be found the problemand solution to true national reconciliation andpeacebuilding in Liberia. Previous attempts at nationalreconciliation have not been pursued synergistically.Rather, such efforts have tended to concentrate dispro-portionately on political issues to the detriment ofother equally important issues. Until Liberia’s currentgovernment addresses these fundamental issues in amore holistic way, with the support and full participa-tion of a vibrant civil society, the hopes for a durablepeace and genuine reconciliation in Liberia will remainunfulfilled.

After seven years of a brutal civil war, Liberia urgentlyneeds national reconciliation and peacebuilding. At theheart of the political controversies in Liberia has beenthe quest for democracy and social justice. It wasaround these two issues that an emerging civil society,

1 On the Liberian Civil War, see Festus Aboagye, ECOMOG: A Subregional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management andPeacekeeping in Liberia, (Accra: Sedco Enterprise, 1999); Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone andGuinea-Bissau (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG andRegional Security in West Africa , (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming, 2002); Eric G. Berman and Katie E.Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, (Geneva and Pretoria: UN Institute for Disarmament Research andInstitute for Security Studies, 2000); Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War, (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998);George Kieh, “Combatants, Patrons, Peacemakers and the Liberian Civil Conflict” Studies In Conflict and Terrorism Journal (1992),Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia, (Hampshire, London and New York:Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and Margaret Vogt (ed.), The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt At RegionalPeacekeeping, (Lagos: Gabumo Press, 1992).2 The killing of Dokie was widely believed to be an act of political vengeance. Many blamed his death on the government becausehe was last seen in the custody of state security personnel who claimed he was only held for questioning but later released. Therewas no independent confirmation of this claim.


Introduction 5

dominated by the intelligentsia and the studentcommunity, were able to mobilize the Liberian popula-tion resulting in the first significant change of govern-ment – in the form of a military coup d’etat in 1980.This coup overthrew the ruling True Whig Party whichhad been in power for more than a century. However,when the military began showing signs of prolongingits stay in power and resorted to repressive rule, boththe intelligentsia and the student community, nowjoined by an expanding civil society, including thereligious community, the media, and pressure groups,challenged the junta. After a blatantly rigged electionin 1985, Doe continued his repressive rule. A failedcoup d’etat by Gio general, Thomas Quiwonkpa, inNovember 1985 led to the killing of about 3,000 Giosand Manos in Nimba county by Doe’s soldiers. InDecember 1989, Charles Taylor’s National PatrioticFront of Liberia (NPFL) rebels launched an invasionfrom Côte d’Ivoire which won the support of thedisaffected population in Nimba County, marking thestart of a brutal seven-year civil war.

But Liberia’s struggle for democracy did not end withits civil war. Five years on, with the man who startedthe war still controlling the reins of power, the strugglefor democracy in Liberia can now be said to be moreintense than it has ever been. Civil society has beencentral to this struggle – undertaking advocacycampaigns, mobilizing the population, and morerecently, providing legal aid to victims of human rightsabuses as well as humanitarian relief support. Whilethis report is essentially about peacebuilding andnational reconciliation, these processes cannot beisolated from the challenge of democratization whichhas been at the very core of Liberia’s political struggles.

We argue that the democratization of Liberian politicscan potentially impact and enhance processes ofpeacebuilding and national reconciliation and thatboth activities can be better understood and appreci-ated when they are situated within the context ofdemocratization. If the state is not democratic, itsinstitutions will be hard pressed to contributeeffectively to the democratic transformation of society.This report will focus principally on three issues: first,the restructuring of Liberia’s national securityapparatus; second, the re-integration of ex-combatantsinto society; and third, the protection of women andchildren in Liberia after 1997. These three issues will beexamined in light of the role of Liberian civil societyactivists in pursuing them and thereby contributing tonational reconciliation and peacebuilding. Aside fromthe role of civil society in these issues, this report willassess security sector reform and reintegration of ex-combatants into society as obstacles to peacebuildingand national reconciliation in Liberia.

The report begins with a general discussion of civilsociety in Africa, before tracing the emergence andevolution of civil society in Liberia between 1970,when it first appeared as a structured institutionalagency of social and political change, and 2001. Wethen, in the second section, critically examine the roleof civil society and other institutions associated withcarrying out the tasks outlined above. The report alsodiscusses the constraints on civil society actors inLiberia, the strategies they have employed, and thefactors that are required to make their role moreeffective. We conclude the report by highlighting thethreats to peacebuilding and national reconciliation inLiberia and discuss the future of civil society in Liberia.

3 The murders of ‘El Dorado’, market woman Nowai Flomo, and George Yealla are but a few of several of such cases recorded. 4 The many and varied explanations made by the government on the deployment of troops on Camp Johnson road which resultedin violent clashes with Johnson supporters raised questions as to whether the government action was a pre-emptive strike to removewhat had come to be known as the ‘Johnson Factor’. The subsequent conviction of 13 of the 14 defendants charged with treason –all of whom were ethnic Krahns – also raised questions in some quarters about the government’s motives. They were grantedamnesty and released from prison in March 2002.5 See UN Report of the panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in relationto Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, which discusses Liberia’s role in the war in Sierra Leone.6 Alaric Tokpa, “Political NGOs and Peace building in Liberia”, Liberia Journal of Democracy , vol.1 no.1, 1999, p. 50.7 George Kieh, “Beyond Authoritarianism: the quest to build democracy in Liberia”, Liberia Journal of Democracy, vol. 1 no.1, 1999,p.11.

Some General Observations AboutCivil Society

In its current usage, civil society is generallyunderstood to constitute the realm and range of

voluntary and autonomous associations in the publicsphere between the family and the state, which exist inrelation to, but are independent of the state.8 Anotherimportant definition which points to perhaps its chiefattribute, is civil society’s norm-setting role which isconcerned with the nature and limits of state powerand the rules that govern its functioning. The publicrealm in which these associations exist is populated byorganizations such as ethnic, religious, professional,trade/labor unions, gender, environmental, humanrights and pro-democracy groups, student and youthgroups and media organizations, but exclude politicalparties and the private sector.9

There is general agreement among scholars on thecentrality of civil society in enhancing and consoli-dating democracy.10 Because of its crucial role intransitions from war to peace, civil society has cometo be seen, by many analysts, as the vital link in thetransition to and sustainability of post-ward e m o c r a c y. However, what is contested amongscholars is how effective and durable the actions ofcivil society can be, and which actions are most like l yto contribute to democratic consolidation.

In his classic study on civil society in Kenya, StephenNdegwa raised four important issues pertinent to thisr e p o r t .11 First, Ndegwa challenged the notion that civilsociety is uniformly progressive in opposing thee xcesses of the African state and in advancing the

process of democratization. Second, the Kenyanscholar questioned whether the popular drive towarddemocratization in Africa is founded on inherentlydemocratic values within civil society and genuinegrassroots representation, or rather on civil society’sreactions to external pressures. Third, Ndegwaquestioned the notion of “grassroots empowerment”which he felt was often lacking in the activities ofKenya’s civil society. Finally, the author attributed thisflaw to the singular focus on organizational or institu-tional actions by civil society elements, and wonderedhow citizens could be empowered to act on their own,rather than through apparently benevolent civilsociety organizations.1 2

Ndegwa referred to “two faces of civil society” to showhow NGOs involved in similar work can hold opposingviews and pursue different sets of action in relation tothe same goals. As he noted: “One opposes the stateand seems to further the democratization movementand the other seeks accommodation with the repressivestate.”13 In a similar vein, Kenyan scholar JuliusNyang’oro also recognized this fact when he observedthat civil society is a diverse space, which includes thegood, the bad and the ugly. Nyang’oro further notedthat the struggle for democratic development involvesconflict not only between the state and civil society,but also within civil society itself for its own furtherdemocratization.14 Similarly, Alison Brysk asserted thatcivil society can only impact the democratizationprocess when it is itself democratized. To bedemocratic, she observed, civil society must berepresentative, accountable, pluralistic, and mustrespect human rights. Suggesting that civil society’sdemocratizing role is diminished when it is undemoc-ratic and fails to observe democratic norms, Brysk


6 Some General Observations About Civil Society

8 See, for example, John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (eds.), Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder: LynneRienner, 1994).9 Patrick Molutsi, “Searching for a role: Civil Society in Southern Africa” paper presented, International Peace Academy, AfricanRenaissance Institute, Southern African Regional institute for Policy Studies, and Department of International Relations, Universityof the Witwatersrand Seminar, Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects, Gaborone, Botswana,December, 2000.10 See Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998);and Julius E. Nyang’oro (ed.), Civil Society and Democratic Development in Africa (Harare: Mwengo Press,1999).11 See Stephen Ndegwa, The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa, (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996).12 Ibid. pp. 1 – 8.13 Ibid. p. 4.14 Julius E Nyang’oro, op. cit. p. 5.

noted, that as “normal politics replaces crisis…civicgroups that are unrepresentative or unaccountable willoften lose legitimacy, split up into factions or simplyfail to adapt to changing political circumstances.”15

Ndegwa concludes his study on Kenya with thewarning that, in focusing on the role of civil society indemocratic transitions in Africa, it is imperative thatone looks to organizations that best express thedynamics of social movement i.e. groups that areconscious of the need to establish, practice andpreserve democratic values and institutions. JuliusNyang’oro corroborates this view by arguing, that the“key to identifying NGOs as agents for democratiza-tion…would be to first identify those groups whichhave open and clearly identified agendas pushing forpolitical inclusiveness and a broader social space forviews that enhance political participation”16

These general observations can also be applied to civilsociety in Liberia. An examination of civil societygroups in Liberia will reveal the following: Theopposition of civil society to the Liberian state has notbeen uniformly progressive. Liberian civil society hasrevealed signs of internal struggles and demonstrateda need for further democratization. The task ofadvocacy has almost entirely been left in the hands ofNGOs at the expense of genuine grassroots participa-tion. However, civil society in Liberia has also been acritical force in the movement for democratization andhas the potential to play a crucial role in nationalreconciliation and peacebuilding.

Background to the Liberian CivilWar

The outbreak of the Liberian civil war cannot beexplained by a single dominant factor. The war

grew out of the domestic, socio-economic and political

environment of the 1980s.17 There were two majorevents principally associated with this period: the 1980military coup and the 1985 parliamentary andpresidential elections. There is general agreementamong analysts of Liberia that the 1980 coup, whichwas led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe and endedover a century of Americo-Liberian rule, failed toaddress the fundamental questions of political andsocio-economic exclusion of the majority of thepopulation which had characterized settler rule. Nosooner had the initial euphoria which greeted theputschists of 1980 evaporated than the military regimeprogressively descended into a brutal reign of terror.This repressive rule in turn engendered economicdecline, accompanied by widespread corruption.18

Augustine Konneh noted that “….the coup did notfundamentally alter the political oppression or theperipheral capitalist economy and its exploitativerelations of production and distribution…theunderlying contours of the political economy remainedintact; the only ‘change’ was the loss of Americo-Liberian suzerainity.”19 Amos Sawyer spoke of “theappropriation of the autocracy of the presidency by amilitary dictator organized around a Krahn ethnic core,supported by military power and serviced by a core ofcivilian officials at varying levels of acculturation.”20

As Liberian civil society grew wary of the military’srepressive rule, its opposition to the regime increased.The student community, particularly at the NationalUniversity of Liberia, called incessantly for a return toconstitutional civilian rule and became the voice of adisaffected population. Faced with growing oppositionat home and external pressure, particularly from theUS, the illegitimate military regime organized electionsin October 1985. The elections were massively riggedin favor of the incumbent Samuel Doe who succeededhimself as the newly elected civilian leader. Barely amonth later, a botched attempt by Doe’s former army


Background to the Liberian Civil War 7

15 Alison Brysk, “Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America”, Journal of Democracy, April 2000, pp. 145-147.16 Julius E Nyang’oro, op. cit. p. 5.17 Jeremy Armon and Andy Carl (eds.) Accord, The Liberian Peace Process 1990 –1996, (London: Conciliation Resources, 1990), p. 10 .18 On the Doe era see: D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Ta r r, L i b e r i a : A National Polity in Transition, (Metuchen,NJ and London: ScarecrowPress,1998); J Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Quest for Democracy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Press, 1987); and Amos Sawyer, The Emergenceof Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge (San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992).19 Augustine Konneh, “Unconstitutionalism and State Failure in Liberia”, Liberia Journal of Democracy , vol 1 no.2 2000, p.73.20 Amos Sawyer, op. cit. p.299.

commander, General Thomas Quiwonkpa, to topple theLiberian autocrat, resulted in the brutal murder ofQuiwonkpa. The failed coup attempt was followed by apogrom against Quiwonkpa’s ethnic Mano and Giokinsmen in Nimba County by the Armed Forces ofLiberia (AFL) dominated by Doe’s ethnic Krahn. In theaftermath of the abortive coup and as Doe sought totighten his grip on power, he mercilessly crushed allreal and perceived signs of opposition to his rule andstifled dissent. Thus began a second reign of terror inLiberia, until Charles Taylor launched his armedrebellion against the Doe regime in December 1989which culminated in the civil war.

Looking further back than the volatile political climateof the 1980s and the immediate causes of the war, theLiberian conflict is rooted in a past that reads verymuch like the history of colonial Africa, though thecountry itself was spared the indignities of Europeancolonization. The Liberian conflict is the “brutalculmination of the country’s unresolved past”21 – apast that is steeped in contradictions. As BoimaFahnbulleh, noted: “Liberia has been postponingrather than resolving its contradictions.”2 2 T h e s econtradictions largely revolve around the lofty idealsof freedom and self-determination on which theLiberian state was founded and the politics ofe xclusion anchored on the appropriation of the state’sresources by a ruling elite which marginalized themajority of its population.

US/Liberia Relations and The CivilWar

An assessment of US/Liberia relations is crucial tounderstanding how American policies contributed

to the outbreak of the civil war in Liberia. Thisrelationship dates back to the 1820s, beginning withthe activities of the American Colonization Society

(ACS), and created a historical perception of the US asthe “mother country.” But this has been a hopelesslyunequal relationship between a major power and anear mini-state.23

In the unequal power relations that evolved,Washington as a major power, has had tremendousinfluence over the domestic affairs of its economicallyweaker partner, Liberia. The US has wielded thisinfluence through its provision of various forms ofassistance to Liberia – namely, economic and militaryaid. US/Liberia relations must also be seen in thecontext of the Cold War which largely underpinned theAmerican foreign policy framework at the time.24

Washington supported repressive regimes in Liberiafrom William Tubman (1944-1971) to Samuel Doe aslong as they advanced its Cold War interests. US aidprovided the “oxygen that kept dictatorship alive andwell in Liberia.”25

US assistance to Liberia during the 1980s (estimated atover 500 million US dollars) was more generous thanassistance to previous Liberian governments. Thisassistance continued amid widespread human rightsabuses committed by the Doe regime and even when itbecame clear that the regime had lost all legitimacy.Washington’s legitimization of the massively rigged1985 elections gave the beleaguered Doe the recogni-tion from a major power that the Liberian autocratcraved. Chester Crocker, the US Assistant Secretary ofState for African Affairs, at the time, patronizinglyremarked that the elections “portended well for thedevelopment of democracy in Liberia, because Doe’sclaim that he won only by a narrow 51% electionvictory was virtually unheard of in the rest of Africawhere incumbent rulers normally claimed victories of95 to 100 %.”26

Yet many Liberians believed that Charles Taylor, whohad escaped from a US prison in 1986 – a feat manyfelt he could not have achieved without collaboration


8 US/Liberia Relations and The Civil War

21 Armon and Carl, op. cit. p. 11.22 H Boima Fahnbulleh, “ECOWAS and Liberia Analysis of an Intervention”, Africa World Review, July 2000, p. 13.23 Dunn and Tarr, op. cit. pp. 169 – 170.24 See George Kieh, Ending the Liberian Civil War: Implications for United States Policy Towards West Africa, (Georgia: AtlantaUniversity Press, 1996).25 Ibid. p. 122.26 Ibid. p.120.

with senior American officials - was unleashed onLiberia to wage war on Doe, but later abandoned byWashington when Taylor’s Libyan links becameevident. Consequently, some Liberian scholars haveargued that the United States has both a “moral andethical responsibility” to clean up some of the “mess”it had created in Liberia.

The Emergence of Civil Society

The antecedent to organized civil society in Liberiacan be traced to a lone crusader for press freedom

and other civil liberties – Albert Porte. A school-t e a c h e r, social commentator and pamphleteer, Po r t e ’ swritings criticized the excessive authority of thepresidency as well as government corruption.2 7 D u r i n gthe long years that spanned his career (1920-1986)the writings of Albert Porte came to epitomize theconscience of society. Porte’s crusade against govern-ment abuses raised the awareness and consciousnessof Liberia’s citizenry. It also provided inspiration forcivil society activism and a rallying point forLiberians to demand accountability of their govern-m e n t .

However, it was not until the 1970s, during thepresidency of William Tolbert, that social groupingsand other bodies appeared in Liberia as modern institu-tions of civil society. The flurry of civic activitiesduring this period has been attributed largely to theend of the Tubman presidency in 1971 and thereformist political overtures made by Tubman’ssuccessor – William Tolbert. These openings providedthe political opportunity for Liberia’s intelligentsia tomount a challenge to settler domination. Indeed, it hasbeen said that it was the end of the Tubman presidencythat gave rise to the “outburst of hitherto repressedsocial forces.”28

Among the many organizations that appeared duringthis period, there were two that were to have the mostenduring impact – the Movement for Justice in Africa(MOJA) and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL).MOJA was a social movement organized in 1973 by agroup of students and professors of the University ofLiberia, prominent among whom were Amos Sawyer,Togba-Nah Tipoteh and Boima Fahnbulleh. Themovement was initially a liberation support groupfounded to educate the public and mobilize materialsupport for the liberation wars against Portuguesecolonial forces and apartheid in South Africa. But, asMOJA’s membership expanded, it took on local issueslike civil liberties, equality of opportunity, and urbanand rural poverty. With the help of supporters, it alsocreated a socio-economic advisory service known asSUSUKUU.29 SUSUKUU’s main activities were gearedtoward establishing cooperatives and providingtechnical support services to farmers. Dutch fundingagencies supported its programs.

The Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) wasfounded by Liberians in the US in 1975. This was a“pressure group in search of an opportunity toorganize a political party. "3 0 In 1978, PAL opened itsoffices in Monrovia and quickly found supportamong the unemployed and under-employed ofurban Liberia who were its main support base.To g e t h e r, these two groups supported by otherprofessional organizations, interest groups andstudent bodies mobilized civil society, agitated forpolitical reforms and made demands on the state.Their persistent pressure hastened the demise of theAmerico-Liberian settler oligarchy culminating inthe military coup of 1980. As in many parts of Africaexperiencing opposition to repressive regimes anddemands for greater political reforms, Liberian civilsociety organizations acquired a distinctivelypolitical character from the outset.


The Emergence of Civil Society 9

27 Amos Sawyer, op. cit. p. 289.28 Ibid. p. 295.29 Ibid. pp. 289 – 290.30 Ibid. p. 291.

Civil Society During Liberia’s CivilWar

Adecade of repressive rule under Doe adverselyaffected organized civil society in Liberia, stunted

its growth and created a vacuum. However, thisvacuum was filled during the outbreak of the civil warin December 1989, and the enormity of humansuffering and widespread atrocities which character-ized the conflict was ironically to provide the impetusfor civil society’s rejuvenation.

Liberian civil society’s opposition to the warringfactions during the civil war was not “uniformlyprogressive” neither was civil society homogenous. Asa result of the war, civil society became polarized,mirroring the divisions of the various warring factions.It was common during the period of the civil war tospeak of two separate civil societies, representingdifferent ideological camps. There was the MonroviaGroup consisting of the population residing in thecapital, under the authority of the Interim Governmentof National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer.There was also the Greater Liberia Group comprisingthe population “up-country” (in the rural areas) andunder the control of the various warring factions. Theformer was largely an anti-war faction and supportiveof the role of ECOMOG, while the latter gave support tothe various warring factions under whose control theyfell. Furthermore, an important distinction betweenthese two groups lies in the evolution of civil society inthe two communities. Whereas civil society tended toflourish in Monrovia where civil political authority hadbeen instituted, organized civil society life was virtuallyabsent in “Greater Liberia” – areas controlled by CharlesTaylor’s NPFL. The political environment in Monroviawas more tolerant and open than that in “GreaterL i b e r i a ”. This also explains why, throughout theLiberian civil war, the critical mass of civil societyorganizations was to be found in Monrovia.

The earliest responses by civil society to the Liberiancivil war can be found in the activities of the Inter-

faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) an amalgamation ofthe Liberia Council of Churches (LCC) and the NationalMuslim Council of Liberia (NMCL). The IFMC sought tomediate a peaceful end to the crisis. It held the firstconsultations between the parties to the conflict,representatives of the Doe regime, the NPFL and theArmed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in Freetown in June1990.31 Significantly, it was the IFMC’s proposals thatwere adopted and articulated as the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS) peaceplan for Liberia. Throughout the civil war, the IFMCremained actively involved in the search for peace. Theorganization continued to hold regular consultationswith the warring parties, organized conferences both athome and abroad, helped set the agenda for meetings,and was also represented in many of the peace negoti-ations. The IFMC emerged as the leading critic of theflaws in numerous peace accords. Two of its mostnotable achievements included the stay-home actionsorganized in March 1995 and February 1996 in protestagainst peace agreements that rewarded the armedfactions with positions in government. IFMC alsolaunched a campaign to encourage disarmamentamong Liberia’s estimated 33,000 fighters through theCampaign for Disarmament Committee (CDC), aconsortium of civic organizations. But perhaps themost significant achievement of civil society, as notedby Kofi Woods, was the cooperation between LiberianMuslim and Christian clerics through the IFMC which“forestalled the emergence of religious disharmony asa component of the Liberian civil war.”32

The civil war also witnessed the birth of a number ofhuman rights organizations and women’s groupsnotable among which were the Catholic Justice andPeace Commission (JPC), the Center for Law andHuman Rights Education (CLHRE) and the LiberiaWomen Initiative (LWI). In the humanitarian field,groups like SUSUKUU and the Special Emergency LifeFood Program (SELF) provided humanitarian relief andassistance to war-affected populations.

The human rights community, represented by organi-zations such as the JPC and CLHRE, devoted their


10 Civil Society During Liberia’s Civil War

31 See D. Elwood Dunn, “Liberia’s Internal Responses to ECOMOG’s Interventionist Efforts”, in Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan(eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia, (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1998).32 Kofi Woods, “Civic Initiatives in the Liberian Peace Process” in Armon and Carl op. cit. p. 32.

attention to documenting and exposing the egregioushuman rights abuses and widespread atrocitiescommitted by all the warring factions during the civilwar. With the installation of IGNU in November 1990,and with the gradual restoration of relative normalcyto Monrovia under the protection of ECOMOG, theseorganizations expanded their activities to includehuman rights education and the provision of legalservices to victims of human rights abuses. Thepioneering efforts of both the JPC and CLHRE were tocontribute significantly to the upsurge of human rightsand pro-democracy groups after the end of the civilwar in 1997.

The LWI, a women’s organization, focused on theplight of women and children during the war. Theorganization drew attention to atrocities committedagainst women, such as rape,33 which was prevalentduring the war, and criticized the mass recruitment ofchild soldiers by the warring factions.34 The LWI alsocalled for international action to address these issues.Through their active involvement in the Liberian peaceprocess, women’s groups succeeded in placing womenand children’s issues on the agenda. Thus, it wasappropriate that the head of the transitional govern-ment from August 1996 until July 1997 was to comefrom the LWI – Ruth Perry, a member of the governingboard of LWI – who became Africa’s first female Headof state.

In the development field, the work of two organiza-tions - SELF and SUSUKUU - are worth noting. Theformer was essentially a relief organization set up tocoordinate aid provided by donor agencies. Thetremendous success enjoyed by SELF in organizingcommunities into blocs for the purpose of food distri-bution and other relief items was perhaps one of themost enduring legacies of civil society activity duringthe civil war. Almost every action which requiredsocial mobilization was patterned after the bloc(mapping) system put in place by SELF. Significantly,SELF’s work contributed to a renewed sense ofc o m m u n i t y. SUSUKUU, an older organization thanS E L F, was instrumental in encouraging thousands of

combatants to disarm in 1996 through its ‘school forguns program.’ Combatants were encouraged tosurrender their arms to ECOMOG at the variousdisarmament sites set up throughout the country inreturn for a SUSUKUU assistance package whichsupported the enrollment in schools of disarmedfighters. An estimated 15,000 combatants gave uptheir arms under SUSUKU’s school- for- gunsp r o g r a m .

The period of the civil war also witnessed the growth ofa robust though fractious media in Liberia. There wasthe Monrovia media establishment comprising newspa-pers like the Plain Ta l k, the Liberia Age, the I n q u i r e rand the Foto Vision. These papers attempted to steer anindependent course. They were often supportive ofECOMOG’s role in Liberia but sometimes critical of it.The ‘Greater Liberia’ media establishment, representedby the private media network of Charles Taylor knownas the Liberia Communication Network (LCN),comprised both print and broadcast outlets. They wererabidly anti-ECOMOG, depicted IGNU as a puppet ofECOMOG and ECOWAS as a “club of dictators”, andfunctioned chiefly as the propaganda arm of Ta y l o r ’ sNPFL. Significantly, while the Monrovia-based mediaarticulated concerns about the unfolding peace process,reflecting anti-war faction sentiments and a genuinecraving for a democratic transformation throughdisarmament and elections, the media in ‘GreaterLiberia’ echoed the position and demands made byCharles Taylor during the peace process.

As civil society organizations collaborated on commonissues such as disarmament and elections, it sent aclear message to the warring factions that peacethrough elections and disarmament was an imperativeand not an option. Civil society insisted on bothdisarmament and elections, threatening to withdrawcooperation from and reject any faction that came topower through bullets rather than ballots. Thoughsometimes marginalized by warlords during the peaceprocess, civil society’s ultimate endorsement of thetransition from war to peace in Liberia was critical toending the war in 1997.


Civil Society During Liberia’s Civil War 11

33 See Africa Watch Report, Liberia: The Cycle of Abuse (New York: Africa Watch,1991).34 See Human Rights Watch Report, Child Soldiers in Liberia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).

The July 1997 Elections andCharles Taylor’s Victory

In explaining Charles Taylor’s spectacular electoralvictory in 1997, many analysts have pointed to the

fears of many Liberian voters that, had Charles Ta y l o rlost the July 1997 elections, he would have returned tothe bush and resumed the war he started.3 5 H o w e v e r, anequally important but often overlooked explanation, isthe breakup of the alliance of political partiescomprising seven civilian-based political parties whichhad been formed on the eve of the elections in a bid todeny Taylor an electoral victory. The breakup of theAlliance – as the coalition of parties was known inMarch 1997 - virtually guaranteed Taylor’s victory. Thedisintegration of the Alliance confirmed the worst fearsof Liberians: that the civilian politicians were egoistic,p o w e r - h u n g r y, disorganized, and disunited, and couldnot subsume their personal ambitions to the commongood. The disintegration of the Alliance thus dissuadeda significant portion of the Liberian population whohad held deep-seated suspicions of civilian politiciansfrom casting their votes for members of the Alliance. Aunited front of civilian politicians could have presentedthe Liberian population with an alternative to the muchdiscussed security threat posed by Taylor in the eventthat he had lost the election. The fact that Taylor wonthe majority of votes cast in Monrovia – generallyregarded as the stronghold of the civilian politiciansand as anti-warring factions - is reflective of the extentof the disillusionment felt by the population.

A major weakness responsible for the failure of theAlliance was that its conceptualization and formationtook on an elitist approach, and it was controlled anddominated by elite interests.36 The political process thatemerged was not grounded on the popular participa-tion of the constituencies of the various politicalparties represented in the Alliance. The decision toform an alliance did not benefit from sufficient consul-tations with local communities nor did it originate withthe grassroots sections of the various political parties.

It was largely the construct of a political elite whichfashioned out and guided the process. These factorsaccount for the power struggle that characterized thepolitics of the Alliance that led to its eventual dissolu-tion. Party representatives to Alliance consultativemeetings were handpicked by party bosses and wereneither representative of, nor necessarily the choicesof, the cross-section of the various political parties.Given this arrangement, it is not difficult to imaginehow these representatives easily became entangled inthe personal politics of party bosses pandering to theirown parochial designs. The Alliance disintegratedwhen the Liberian Peoples Party (LPP) and the UnitedPeoples Party (UPP) withdrew after their candidates –Togba Nah Tipoteh and Baccus Mathews of LPP andUPP respectively - could not secure the presidentialslot of the Alliance. The Alliance fell apart even thoughall of its political parties had agreed beforehand toabide by its rules for selecting its presidentialcandidate. Out of the seven political parties whichmade up the Alliance, only two political parties – theLiberia Action Party (LAP) and the Liberia UnificationParty (LUP) - remained in the Alliance. The late entryof Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf into the electoral process inApril 1997 and her decision to contest the electionoutside of the Alliance framework further accentuatedthe deep divisions among the civilian politicians andreduced their chances of electoral victory.

Civil Society In the Post-1997Period

If civil society in Monrovia had operated freely andunfettered by government intervention during the

civil war of 1989 to 1996 largely due to the favorablepolitical climate under IGNU, the actions of the Taylorregime after the end of the civil war threatened theexpansion and consolidation of that democratic space.

Having viewed Monrovia as the stronghold of thecivilian political opposition, once in power, the Taylor


12 The July 1997 Elections and Charles Taylor’s VictoryCivil Society In the Post-1997 Period

35 See, Richard Joseph, “Africa, 1990 – 1997: From Abertura To Closure”, Journal of Democracy April 1998, pp. 10-25; and US StateDepartment, Human Rights Report (Washington: US State Department, 1999).36 Interview with Abraham Mitchell, Deputy Chair for Mobilization, and Deputy Campaign Manager for the Alliance, Monrovia,September 2000.

regime adopted a hostile attitude toward civil societygroups, most of which were based in Monrovia and hadearlier opposed Taylor during the war. The regimemade no distinction between civil society organiza-tions and the political opposition, which it regarded asone and the same. The ensuing adversarial relationshipthat developed between the government and civilsociety was further exacerbated by a governmentperception which views civil society groups – largelyfunded by external donors – as working at the behestof the donor community. Taylor has persistentlyaccused the donor community of undermining hisgovernment by withholding international assistance tohis administration. Hence the regime is overly sensitiveand intolerant of almost any criticism by civil societygroups. Consequently, the Taylor government hassought to repress the activities of civil society throughintimidation, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentionof its members.

In 1997, following the mysterious disappearance ofmarket-woman, Nowai Flomo and the failure of thepolice to solve the case, Etweda Cooper of the LiberiaWomen Initiative was briefly arrested and detained bythe Liberia National Police for suggesting that thevictim might have been murdered. James To r h ,E xecutive Director of the Child Rights Ad v o c a c yGroup, FOCUS, was arrested and charged with seditionfor describing the Taylor regime as a government of“boys scouts.” Out on bail, James Torh subsequentlyfled Liberia for fear that he would not get a fair trial.Samuel Kofi Woods and James Verdier, both formerheads of the Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), andmany other civil society activists have on numerousoccasions been threatened with arrest. Amos Sawyerand Commany Wesseh, leaders of the Center forDemocratic Empowerment (CEDE) were physicallyattacked in their offices by Taylor’s security forces inNovember 2000. Both subsequently fled into exile.

On other occasions, the government has also bannedpeaceful demonstrations to forestall mass action bycivil society groups. Taylor has also sought to penetrateand divide the ranks of civil society by giving supportto organizations favorable to his own position.Organizations such as the Concerned Citizens ofLiberia, Network of Liberian Human Rights Groups, theAssociation of Liberian Journalists and the Movement

of Liberians Against Sanctions have all benefited fromgovernment support. These organizations have allappeared on the scene intermittently, mobilized by thestate in response to specific ‘national calls’ and insupport of the government. The greatest danger posedto civil society by the government’s acts of repressionand intimidation is to free speech and press freedom.Government actions against the independent presshave resulted in the closure of radio stations, newspa-pers and the arrest and detention of journalists –usually on trumped-up charges. In March 2000, thegovernment closed down the Catholic-owned RadioVeritas and Star Radio stations for broadcasting whatit termed, news that was “inimical to national securityinterest”. Though Radio Veritas was later reopened,Star Radio remained closed. In August 2001 theLiberian government refused to renew the short wavepermit of Radio Ve r i t a s, claiming that broadcastlicenses granted by the government were a matter ofprivilege and not a right. Five months later, RadioVeritas’ license was renewed. Newspapers such as theNew Democrat, the H e r i t a g e, and the N a t i o n a lChronicle all closed down as a result of governmentactions.

In August 2000, four foreign journalists working on aTV documentary on Liberia were arrested and chargedwith espionage. The journalists were accused offabricating the script they were to use as narrative fortheir TV documentary and the government claimedthat the script included libelous material aboutCharles Ta y l o r. The Liberian government later releasedthe journalists after considerable pressure and appealsfrom various sections of the international community.In February 2001, four local journalists were arrestedand charged with espionage for reporting that thegovernment had spent large sums of money repairingmilitary helicopters while civil servants went unpaid.These journalists were subsequently released afterspending six weeks in jail. As a condition for theirrelease, the government forced a written apology outof the journalists. Journalists, Al Jerome Cheidi, AlexRedd, Tom Kamara and Momo Kanneh have all fledthe country due to threats made on their lives by statesecurity agents. The extreme form of this clampdownon the media and free speech has sometimes resultedin the arrest and intimidation of persons participatingin radio talk-shows who express views contrary to


Civil Society In the Post-1997 Period 13

those held by the government.3 7 These assaults on freespeech have been systematic and characterized by theuse of intimidation and threats of arrest andd e t e n t i o n .

Liberia’s civil war provided some useful lessons aboutthe power of advocacy and collective action. Civilsociety was prepared, with the end of the war, to seizethe opportunity to expand its democratic space inpeacetime. There are now over a dozen human rightsorganizations, pro-democracy and women’s groups,and development-oriented NGOs in Liberia. With theend of the civil war in 1997, the three main tasks facedby civil society included: the consolidation of anascent democracy, peacebuilding, and nationalreconciliation. Again, drawing from the lessons of thepast, civil society became more critical of governmentactions. It insisted on the practice of good governance,transparency and accountability, and espoused otherbroad democratic principles. It also embraced andpreached the message of peace and reconciliationthrough justice and the rule of law. Civil societyorganizations in Liberia argued that justice foundedupon a system of the rule of law was the only truebasis of peace and national reconciliation.

I n t e r n a l l y, civil society’s dependence on foreign aid –largely provided by institutions in the US and theNetherlands - has threatened its own existence andsurvival and in some cases limited its capacity.Funding provided by external donors allows civilsociety to impact the political process. When donorsupport is reduced or withdrawn, civil society groupseither disappear or their impact on national politics isgreatly diminished. Their ability to reach out to thepopulation becomes considerably limited. However,this is not to suggest that civil society will cease toexist in the absence of external funding for itsprograms, but to underscore that financial support forits activities is crucial to its success. To reduce civilsociety’s dependence on external funding will requireharnessing and encouraging support for civil society’sactivities through local initiatives. But this can only bepossible when the political environment is free ofrepression and when people do not feel threatened by

the government when they give support to civilsociety groups. One way out of their dependencysyndrome is to allow NGOs to use some of the fundingthey receive from donors to build an investmentc a p a c i t y. As the investment capacity of NGOs growsover time, they will become less dependent onexternal funding to support their programs. Civilsociety organizations in Liberia have also come undercriticism for lacking an agenda - a clear plan ofaction. The charge is that civil society groups arereactive and tend to address issues sporadically asthey arise, which does not contribute much to acomprehensive understanding of problems or to asystematic search for solutions.

But more importantly, how has civil society impactedon the democratization project and contributed topeace and national reconciliation in Liberia? We nowturn our attention to examine the activities of fivesectors of civil society in post-1997 Liberia: humanrights groups, the media, women’s groups, religiousorganizations, and student activists.

Human Rights Groups

Human Rights groups such as the JPC and CLHRE area relatively new phenomenon on the Liberian politicallandscape. They first appeared on the scene during thecivil war and since then have grown steadily innumber and prominence. Their advocacy for therespect of human rights, constitutionalism and theprovision of legal aid to victims of human rightsabuses – have put human rights groups on a path ofcollision with the Liberian government. Human rightsgroups, through their various civic educationprograms, are in more direct contact with the popula-tion, and by addressing critical issues of civil andpolitical rights they have attracted a wide and vastconstituency. Human rights groups have made themost impact in raising public awareness and sustainingthe public’s interest and participation in its campaignfor the protection of human rights. Such groups havealso expanded the knowledge of citizens of thedemocratic process, thereby contributing to thedemocratization efforts in Liberia.


14 Civil Society In the Post-1997 Period

37 Miss Precious Andrews, a private Liberian businesswoman was arrested and briefly detained by the police for comments she madeon a radio talk-show. See also JPC situation Reports on Liberia, (Monrovia: JPC, November, 2000) for cases of intimidation.

The Media

The media has been an important ally in the crusadefor a democratic and open society in Liberia. Themedia’s relevance to the democratization of societystems from its ability to influence and shape publicopinion through its creation of a forum for publicdiscourse, thereby contributing to transparency andaccountability in government. Though the media inLiberia has struggled to continue in its bold reportageof the news as it did during the period of the civil war,it has now slipped into a mode of self-censorship as aresult of repressive actions taken by the governmentagainst the press. For fear of arrest and threats to theirlives, journalists refrain from publishing news storiesconsidered sensitive to the government. In an environ-ment dominated by fear and by government censor-ship, the Liberian press has been unable to perform itsduties of educating and informing the publiceffectively. The media in post-1997 Liberia has alsoremained as fractious as it was during the civil war –divided between the independent free press and thepartisan media. The latter is dominated by CharlesTaylor’s privately-owned media network, the LiberiaCommunications Network (LCN), comprising Kiss FMRadio and TV, Radio Liberia, the Patriot Newspaper,and state-owned media institutions such as the LiberiaBroadcasting System (LBS) and the Ministry ofInformation’s New Liberia newspaper. Privately-ownednewspapers such as the Poll Watch and the MonroviaGuardian – papers with known links to the rulingNational Patriotic Party (NPP) - are also included inthis stable. Among the independent press include theInquirer newspaper, Ducor Broadcasting Corporation,the Catholic-owned Radio Ve r i t a s, and the N e w snewspaper. The divisions in the media have oftenundermined collective action taken by the press underits umbrella body – the Press Union of Liberia (PUL).During crisis periods, rival blocs such as the LiberianAssociation of Journalists have emerged in oppositionto the PUL. In March 2000, when the PUL called for apress blackout in protest at the government’s actionordering the closure of Radio Veritas and Star Radio,only the independent press heeded this call. Also, inAugust 2000, the media was divided over the govern-ment’s arrest and detention of four foreign journalistscharged with espionage. While the independent mediadescribed the government’s action as harsh and

unwarranted, the partisan press supported anddefended the government’s action.

The increase in the number of media institutions inLiberia has not necessarily translated into a qualitypress. The Liberian public has often criticized the mediafor the poor quality of its reporting and the generallylow educational standards of journalists. This in turnhas affected the credibility of journalists and hastended to diminish the influence of the Liberian media.Notwithstanding these hindrances and limitations, theLiberian media has contributed significantly to shapingpublic opinion and encouraging public debate. Bycreating a forum for debate of public issues, the mediacreates space for political action by civil society. Civilsociety groups have often used the support of theindependent media to its full advantage in its dissemi-nation of information or during public campaigns.

Women’s groups

Increasingly civil society groups are now including intheir advocacy issues other than civil and politicalliberties, women and children’s issues as well as socio-economic and cultural rights. In this realm, women’sgroups have emerged as an influential and powerfulvoice. Though the activities of these groups largely centeron the protection of the welfare of women and children,women’s groups have also influenced national policyand played a key role in peacebuilding and nationalreconciliation efforts. The campaign by women’s groupsfor reform of customary law on inheritance, spearheadedby the Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFFEL),has resulted in a proposed bill, which was sent toLiberia’s National Legislature and is still pendingpassage. The lobbying by women’s groups has alsoresulted in the passage of a legislative enactmentcreating a Ministry of Gender Development. Wo m e n ’ sgroups such as the LWI and the Liberian Women Pe a c eNetwork have also participated in peace missions, joiningtheir counterparts in Guinea and Sierra Leone as part ofthe Mano River Women’s Peace Network to promotepeace in the West African sub-region.

The Religious Community

One of the oldest, most consistent and influentialvoices among civil society groups in Liberia is the


Civil Society In the Post-1997 Period 15


16 Civil Society In the Post-1997 Period

religious community – comprising both Christian andIslamic faiths. Liberia’s religious community has beenat the vanguard in the struggle for peace and socialjustice. Its role is inspired by values of morality whichare also central to its teachings. In post-1997 Liberia,the religious community continues to speak out as ithas done in the past against abuses of governmentpower. It has done this largely through pastoral lettersissued by the church and sermons preached at places ofworship. The religious community in Liberia attracts ahuge following swelled by its work in providing reliefservices to communities throughout the country, aswell as its provision of services in the fields of health-care and education. Religious groups represent atremendous source of moral authority, not only amongtheir followers but also in the broader Liberian society.

These priests and imams have invoked their moralauthority in articulating their concerns on nationalissues. The collaboration between church and mosqueunder the auspices of the Interfaith Council of Liberia(IFCL), formerly IFMC, represents one of the country’sfinest examples of civil society networking. In post-1997 Liberia, this group has contributed significantlyto staving off the incipient religious intolerancecreeping into Liberian society. IFCL played animportant mediating role in easing tensions in Lofaand Nimba Counties following attacks on Mandingosbetween 1999 and 2000. Symbolically, it is indicativeof the fact that peaceful co-existence and cooperationcan be possible between peoples of different faiths –Christians and Muslims. This collaboration sends out apowerful message of peace and national reconciliationto Liberian society. The IFCL’s strength has been inmobilizing civil society groups in expressing acommon position for mass action on crucial nationalissues. The religious community also continues to playan active role in conflict resolution and mediation andalso works closely with the religious community inSierra Leone in addressing common issues of peace andsecurity in the Mano River basin.

The Student Community

The student community is one of the traditionaladvocates of democratic transformation in Liberia. It isone of the most vocal sectors of civil society in Liberia.

The student community, largely represented by theUniversity of Liberia has spoken out on almost everyissue of national concern – ranging from the ongoingwar in Lofa County (condemned), to the internationalsanctions imposed on Liberia (supported). The agitationby students has, on numerous occasions, incurred thewrath of the government. For example, in November2000, when students of the University of Liberiaquestioned the war in Lofa, they were arrested by thepolice and beaten up. The students were forced toaccompany Taylor on a visit to wounded soldiers at theJohn F. Kennedy Memorial hospital in Monrovia. Also,in March 2001, a peaceful rally by students on thecampus of the University of Liberia, in solidarity withlocal journalists detained on charges of espionage,ended violently when the police and the Anti-TerroristUnit (ATU) moved in to break up the rally. The securityforces beat up students and several of them sustainedinjuries. The student lobby has, however, been effectivein bolstering the debate on democratization and hasalso contributed to accelerating the public’s demandfor democratic change. On 24 August 1984, the publicdemonstration organized by students of the Universityof Liberia against the military rule of Samuel Doe waspart of the chain of events that led to the 1985 generalelections. However, the influence of students inpromoting a civic culture is increasingly beingundermined by the deliberate infiltration of theUniversity of Liberia student population by mostlyformer ex-combatants of the NPFL, who barely meetthe entry requirements of the university. This infiltra-tion is supported by the Taylor regime as a way ofweakening the radical sector of the student community.The removal of Patrick Seyon as President of theUniversity of Liberia in February 1996 was promptedby his campaign to expel students who had gainedadmission into the university illegally. Many of thestudents affected were former ex-combatants. Thesesoldier-students have organized themselves intocampus-based organizations ostensibly with the soleaim of undermining common positions expressed bythe student community on national issues. One suchgroup is the Student Academic Challengers (SAC). SACmostly comprises state security operatives. It routinelyopposes many positions taken on national issues by thestudent government leadership at the University ofLiberia.

Government-Created Institutions

Several institutions created by the Liberian govern-ment have also sought to impact on post-war

peacebuilding in various ways. But these institutionshave failed to make any real impact or contribution tonational reconciliation and peacebuilding.

The Liberia Human Rights Commission

The creation of the Liberia Human Rights Commission(LHRC) represents one of government’s earliest actionsto address the human rights situation in post-1997Liberia. This was in response to numerous calls madeby civil society and backed by the internationalcommunity as one of the measures required to promotea human rights regime and the rule of law in Liberia.

The LHRC was created by an Act of the Liberianlegislature in October 1997. It has as its mandate, interalia, “the power to investigate any complaints thatallege violations of human rights and fundamentalfreedoms as enshrined in the Constitution andStatutory Laws of Liberia and in international humanrights treaties and conventions which Liberia hasratified and other relevant human rights instruments.”38

However, it is worth noting that such a broad mandatedoes not include the investigation of past abuses ofhuman rights violations and administrative injusticecommitted in Liberia prior to 2 August 1997 whenTaylor assumed the presidency.39 Since its creation, thecommission has largely been dormant. Among themany hurdles it must first overcome in order tofunction effectively, is the constitution of a fullcommission. Presently, out of a five-person member-ship required to sit on the commission, only two havebeen confirmed by the legislature (appointments by thepresident to the commission have to be confirmed bythe parliament). Though two other appointees to thecommission have been named and designated by thepresident, confirmation hearings for them are yet to be

held by the legislature. Also, the fifth commissionerhas yet to be named. The situation is further compli-cated by the departure to, and subsequent death, in theUS of the commission’s chairman, retired Justice HallBadio. The failure to set up the commission hasdiscouraged donors from funding the LHRC. Donorshave requested the commission’s full constitution as apre-condition for any assistance. The open alliance ofthe commission’s acting chairman, Chief Jallah Lone,with the ruling National Patriotic Party (NPP) and hisinvolvement in partisan politics which the commis-sion’s rules forbids, undermines his role as a commis-sioner.

The proposed amendment to the Act creating the LHRCwhich grants the commission powers to “compel theappearance of witnesses before the commission, totestify and/or to produce any document, record, orother evidence relevant to a matter being investigatedby the commission”40 has not yet been passed byLiberia’s parliament.

Government assistance to the commission has alsobeen minimal. Besides setting up office space andmaking available some funding for personnel cost, ithas not shown much interest in the commission’swork. Staffers at the commission attributed thegovernment’s lack of support to a general problem ofpoor governance.41 They also argue, somewhat implau-s i b l y, that government funding to the commission willnot compromise the commission’s independence. Thegovernment’s position on funding the commission isthat external assistance to the commission is crucial inorder for its own contribution not to be construed asan attempt to manipulate and thereby compromise theindependence of the commission. This claim has beendismissed by many as an excuse not to fund thecommission and as evidence of the government’s lackof interest in protecting human rights. Staffers at thecommission also believe that the designation of thecommission under the Presidential Project Special


Government-Created Institutions 17

38 See the Act creating the Liberia Human Rights Commission, (Monrovia, Liberian National Legislature, October 1997).39 In the wisdom of the drafters of the Act, it was felt that to do so would be counter-productive and not serve the purpose of nationalreconciliation.40 See the Act to amend the Liberia Human Rights Commission, (Monrovia, Liberian National Legislature, August, 1998).41 Confidential Interviews.


Fund which leaves funding for the commissionentirely to the discretion of the president, is anotherhandicap. A fixed budget line item in the NationalBudget for the commission, they argue, wouldenhance its viability.

Notwithstanding the many constraints it faces,members of the commission have embarked on a publicinformation and sensitization campaign drawingattention to the importance of creating a viablecommission. Commission members have appeared onradio talk shows and other public fora to make a casefor the commission. Since its creation, the commissionhas received a total of thirty-four complaints frommembers of the public. However, since the commissionlacks any real powers, as it is presently constituted, itsrole in hearing complaints have been largely mediatoryand advisory.

The National Reconciliation and ReunificationCommission

The National Reconciliation and ReunificationCommission (NRRC) is another government initiativeaimed at promoting a stable political order. An entityflawed from its conception, the NRRC has neither hadmuch impact nor succeeded thus far in building peaceand reconciling Liberians. The NRRC grew out of aPresidential Proclamation in 1997, later enacted intolaw by the legislature, which declared the month ofAugust to be National Reconciliation Month. Theactual constitution of the commission itself, whichcame into being with the presidential appointment ofcommissioners, was never the subject of legislation.This leaves the commission’s legal status in question.As a result, the commission lacks any clear and writtenterms of reference other than what the commissionerssee fit as advancing the tasks of peacebuilding andnational reconciliation.

The NRRC has embarked on few activities. Since itscreation, the commission has undertaken the followingactivities: In 1999, in collaboration with the Ministryof Internal Affairs, it hosted a meeting in Côte d’Ivoirewith Liberia’s Krahn ethnic group; it organized a

television and radio discussion which featured leadersof civil society organizations and other groups asregular guests; and it arranged a children’s fair whichwas basically aimed at presenting holiday gifts tochildren.

It is clear that the NRRC’s role in peacebuilding andnational reconciliation has not amounted to much.4 2

But there are also factors responsible for the commis-sion’s inactivity. Prominent among them is theinadequate financial and material support from thegovernment. Though a government creation, thecommission has received very little attention from it.The commission has also not been able to attractexternal funding because donors insist on thecommission’s full independence and non-partisanship.They also insist that the commission’s legal status,with respect to its creation, must be resolved.Ad d i t i o n a l l y, the appointment in August 1997 ofVictoria Reffell – a partisan die-hard and loyalist ofthe ruling NPP - to head the commission is perceivedas counter-productive to the process of peace andnational reconciliation.

The Role of the InternationalCommunity

The international community has also sought tosupport peacebuilding in Liberia through the activi-

ties of the various UN agencies. However, the flow andlevel of UN assistance to Liberia has been largelyaffected by Liberia’s involvement in the Sierra Leonecivil war, which has led to the imposition of economic,military and travel sanctions on the regime of CharlesTaylor in May 2001. But the international communityhas also come under criticism from many Liberians forinsisting upon progress toward democracy beforeLiberia can qualify for any external assistance.According to such critics, if reconstruction aid hadbeen provided immediately after the war, it could havehelped ward off anti-democratic tendencies in post-war Liberia. In a similar vein, the first SpecialRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General to Liberia,Felix Downes-Thomas, argued that the lack of

18 The Role of the International Community

42 This was a view expressed by one of the commissioners, Monrovia, August 2000.


financial assistance to complement peacemaking and aculture of human rights is one of the biggest setbacksfor peacebuilding in Liberia. Downes-Thomas notedthat financial assistance to support developmentactivities was crucial to creating a stable politicalenvironment.43 The UN therefore has to distinguishbetween aid that could possibly bolster the regime ofCharles Taylor and aid that would influence a humanrights culture, promote democracy, and strengthen civilsociety in Liberia.

Additionally, the United Nations Peacebuilding Officein Liberia (UNOL) has been criticized by Liberia’s civilsociety groups for not contributing sufficiently topeacebuilding efforts. Civil society groups criticizedFelix Downes-Thomas for being too close to theLiberian government and for sometimes being anapologist for the regime. Eritrean diplomat, HaileMenkerios, replaced Felix Downes-Thomas in February2002. UNOL’s effectiveness in dealing with civil societygroups has in the past been undercut by a rathernarrow mandate of helping to mobilize peacebuildingfunds, but stopping short of actively promoting humanrights issues. The support of the international donorcommunity remains crucial in keeping civil societyengaged in influencing the political process. Civilsociety groups in Liberia would like to see increasedaccess to international organizations and morefreedom in choosing, planning and implementing theirprojects.

The Sanctions Regime

In May 2001, led by Britain and the US, the UNSecurity Council imposed economic, military andtravel sanctions on the government of Liberia for itsfailure to end support for RUF rebels fighting in SierraLeone. The sanctions targeted Liberia’s diamondindustry – placing an embargo on its trade as well asimposing travel restrictions on Liberian governmentofficials, as well as private individuals with links to theRUF’s illicit diamond trade in Sierra Leone. TheSecurity Council tightened an existing arms embargoon Liberia and forbade external military training to thegovernment. Though the Liberian government has

persistently denied the allegations of the UN SecurityCouncil of its support for the RUF and the smugglingof Sierra Leone’s “conflict diamonds,” a report by theUN Panel of Experts44 concluded that the governmentof Liberia is still actively engaged with the RUF. Inview of Liberia’s continued support for the RUF, the UNPanel of Experts recommended a further imposition ofsanctions on Liberia, targeting its timber industry andmaritime shipping registry. The Security Council iscurrently reviewing the report of the panel forappropriate action. However, it must be noted thatwithin UN circles, there are concerns that furthersanctions might worsen Liberia’s already feebleeconomy and lead to a massive loss of jobs particularlyin the timber industry.

Many civil society actors have argued that the numberof Liberians who are said to be benefiting fromemployment opportunity and risk losing their jobs inthe event of further sanctions on the timber industry isgrossly overstated. In an industry where mechanizedand automated equipment is increasingly used, there isless emphasis on manual labor. Liberians employed inthe timber industry have frequently complained thatforeign nationals dominate the workforce. Moreover,the majority of Liberians employed in the timberindustry are unskilled laborers, earning very lowwages. Thus, any loss experienced in the timberindustry in relation to the job market and as a result ofthe proposed sanctions would not have as great animpact on Liberian workers as is often argued.Similarly, Taylor’s regime has been neither accountablenor managed the country’s resources effectively. Theproposal to place Liberia’s maritime funds underinternational control would be a welcome move insome civil society quarters.

Since the imposition of sanctions, the Liberian govern-ment has tried to create a perception that publicopinion is firmly united against the sanctions regime.But it is worth noting that even before the impositionof sanctions, life in post-1997 Liberia had been verybleak for the vast majority of the population, with thegovernment unable to provide basic amenities for itscitizens and to revive the country’s damaged

The Role of the International Community 19

43 Interview with Ambassador Felix Downes-Thomas, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Liberia, Monrovia,September 2000.44 See Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343, S/2001/1114, 5 November 2001.


infrastructure. Some Liberians see the sanctions as away of limiting the government’s ability to plunder thecountry’s resources.

Another important point worth highlighting is thelinking of the sanctions regime to the war in SierraLeone. Presumably, the return of peace to Sierra Leoneand, following apparently successful disarmament, theholding of elections scheduled for May 2002 couldmean the end of sanctions on Liberia since progresstoward peace in Sierra Leone was the primary justifi-cation for the imposition of sanctions on Liberia. Thecurrent sanctions regime on Liberia and the furthertightening of these sanctions appear to have had alarge impact in reducing Taylor’s support for the RUF.The sanctions could also force him to open up politicalspace to his domestic opponents if they remaintargeted and well coordinated. In this respect, thecooperation of ECOWAS leaders, some of whom haveexpressed skepticism about the efficacy of sanctions,must be secured, as their involvement in monitoringthe sanctions regime will remain a crucial part inmaking the embargo effective. 45

The Post War Security Structure

The Economic Community of West African StatesCease-fire Monitoring Group’s (ECOMOG)

peacekeeping activities in Liberia are well documentedand have been the subject of much academic debate.Suffice it to say here that ECOMOG’s large presence inMonrovia and its environs for much of the civil warmade it impossible for any of the warring factions tooverrun the capital and seize power violently. Thisforced a negotiated settlement in Liberia, resulting inthe holding of elections in July 1997 and contributingsignificantly to ending the seven-year war. However,the inability of the international community to supportthe restructuring process of the Liberian army andother state security services, which was to have beensupervised largely by ECOMOG, became one of thesub-regional force’s most serious setbacks. Theinternational community’s preoccupation with the

holding of elections as a means of peacefully resolvingthe Liberian civil war resulted in the neglect of therestructuring of the army – one of the most criticalareas and pre-conditions to peacebuilding and inensuring a stable post-war environment in Liberia. Onbeing elected president in July 1997, Charles Taylorrefused to allow ECOMOG to supervise the restruc-turing of his security services.

The failure of the international community to giveequal importance to the restructuring plan and tosupport the process gave Taylor overwhelming andunrestrained control and influence over the statesecurity services. Taylor succeeded in creating a privatearmy largely consisting of former fighters of theNational Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Heappointed NPFL operatives to head key state securityagencies. The domination of the state securityapparatus by former NPFL fighters and the ruthlessnesswith which these agencies have operated, continue topose a significant threat to peace in Liberia. Taylor hasalso used his control of the security apparatus todestabilize neighboring states like Sierra Leone andGuinea. A restructured army could have altered thecomposition and hierarchical nature of the currentsecurity forces and might have served as a counter-vailing force in limiting Taylor’s influence and control.Taylor currently faces a rebellion by a faction callingitself Liberians United for Democracy andReconciliation (LURD), consisting of former fighters ofULIMO. At the time of writing, LURD rebels werereported to be about 20 miles from Monrovia.

Restructuring the NationalSecurity Apparatus

An ECOWAS peace plan signed in Abuja in 1996provided for the comprehensive restructuring of

Liberia’s security sector.46 The splintering of Liberia’sarmy and other security forces during the civil war intovarious armed factions made the restructuring of thecountry’s security sector critical to ensuring peace and

20 The Post War Security StructureRestructuring the National Security Apparatus

45 Many of these issues were discussed at a lively IPA Civil Society Dialogue titled “Civil Society Perspectives on Charles Taylor’sLiberia” held in New York on 13 November 2001.46 Armon and Carl op. cit. pp. 43 –52.


Restructuring the National Security Apparatus 21

stability after 1997. The restructuring exercise, whichwas expected to have taken place before the 1997elections under ECOMOG’s supervision with interna-tional support, did not occur due mainly to the lack ofresources and time constraints in preparing for theelections. Thus, the task of restructuring Liberia’ssecurity sector was left to the newly elected govern-ment of Charles Taylor.

The role of civil society in security sector reform inLiberia has mostly involved advocacy on the part ofcivil society groups. It has also involved training ofpersonnel in civil military relations and human rights.Civil society has, however, not played a role nor can itbe expected to play much of a role, in the technicalaspects of security sector reform.

Currently, the only attempt at restructuring Liberia’ssecurity apparatus has focused largely on the ArmedForces of Liberia (AFL), Doe’s old army, which was oneof the factions during the civil war. Though there havebeen some attempts at reorganizing other securityservices, whatever “restructuring” has occurred hasdepended solely on the personal discretion and initia-tive of the head of the security forces. As a result, theseefforts have been piecemeal and have not been institu-tionalized.

The AFL Restructuring Commission

The body with the responsibility to restructure thenational army is the AFL Restructuring Commission –a 27-member Presidential Commission, comprisingrepresentatives of the Defense Ministry, active andreserve members of the military, civilians from thepublic and private sectors, as well as other profes-sionals. The commission was constituted in 1998 andbegan work after a special presidential order todemobilize and retire 2,250 personnel of the AFL,backfired due to inadequate planning and a host ofadministrative problems. The presidential order lackedany comprehensive package of assistance for soldiersto be demobilized, procedures for the selection ofdemobilized soldiers were not transparent, and the

financial benefits for the demobilized soldiers weremismanaged by officials of the Defense Ministry. Witha pre-war strength of 6,500 personnel, the number ofthe AFL rose to 14,981 service members during thecivil war.47 However, with the end of the war, thegovernment argued that the current “national securityand economic realities” of Liberia did not warrant themaintenance of such a large army. Thus, the need for asmall, efficient and professional army coupled with thereasons earlier stated, provided the rationale for theAFL’s restructuring.

Any restructuring of the AFL would affect all threebranches of the armed services – Army, Navy and Airforce. The current plan consists of four separate butoverlapping phases: (1) re-documentation; (2)downsizing through demobilization; (3) downsizingthrough retirement and discharge and (4) recruitmentfor formation of the new armed forces. The first phaseof the plan would essentially entail sorting outpersonnel files to determine persons eligible for retire-ment; the second and third phases would categorizepersons eligible for retirement; and the fourth phasewould involve training. Some 8,900 service personnelare to be demobilized at the end of the re-documenta-tion exercise. This should reduce the AFL to its pre-warstrength of about 6,000 personnel.48

The restructuring plan thus far only covers the AFL.The Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU), an elite armed unitcreated by Taylor for his personal protection, is notpart of the restructuring plan, even though thegovernment claims that the ATU is part of the AFL.The ATU has been a source of controversy since it wascreated. Its creation was announced by the govern-ment in June 1999 in the wake of the terrorist attackson US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam. Thegovernment claimed then, that the ATU was created inresponse to the growing threats posed by terrorismand to protect foreign missions in Monrovia againstthese threats. It is evident though, that the real reasonbehind the creation of the ATU was for the president’spersonal protection. Taylor now employs the unit ashis own private army. Some Defense Ministry officials

47 See AFL Restructuring Commission Report (Monrovia, the AFL Restructuring Commission, August 1998).48 Ibid.

interviewed for this report contest the legality of theATU because it was neither under the control of theMinistry of Defense nor was it created by an Act of theLiberian legislature.4 9 As a result, these officials notethat the ATU is an illegal entity and cannot be consid-ered to be part of the AFL. But, concerns have beenraised by the public about the exclusion of the AT Ufrom the restructuring process which would render thee xercise incomplete and less credible. The exclusion ofECOMOG or international participation from theprocess, in keeping with the Abuja peace plan, alsohas serious implications for the credibility of thee xe r c i s e .

Presently, the restructuring exercise is at a standstill,bogged down in its very first phase – re-documenta-tion, apparently due to a lack of funding. But theproblem goes beyond that. More significant is the lackof real commitment on the part of the government tocomplete the exercise. It is politically impossible todischarge all personnel who fought during the warfrom the Krahn-dominated army. To do so would raisesuspicions about the government’s intentions, andgiven the AFL’s own role during the war, the govern-ment is still wary of the army and doubtful of itsloyalty. Thus, the view is commonly put forward that itis in the interest of the political actors to keep the AFLas it is – weak, under-funded and on the periphery ofnational security.50 Evidence of this can be seen in thelimited role the AFL now plays in the security of thestate – a role which has been taken over by the eliteAnti-Terrorist Unit, many of whose members areinvolved in the government’s current war with rebelsin Lofa County.

However, in spite of these political intrigues, the pointmust be made that the restructuring of the nationalsecurity apparatus in a transparent manner would go along way in allaying the fears of political opponentsand exiles and contribute immensely to peacebuildingand national reconciliation efforts.

Indeed, the army itself has expressed its intention to‘civilianize’51 the military, incorporate courses on civil-military relations, conflict prevention and managementand peacebuilding, into its training curriculum. In thisregard, the army has also expressed its willingness tocollaborate with civil society groups which it believescan play a crucial role in this area.

Reintegrating Ex-combatants

Three years after the end of the Liberian civil war,the government still finds itself grappling with the

problem of the reintegration of ex-combatants intosociety. Though reintegration was expected to havetaken place simultaneously with disarmament anddemobilization of combatants, this was only partiallyachieved when donors halted support to the program.The reintegration of ex-combatants was initiallymanaged by the United Nations Observer Mission inLiberia (UNOMIL), under the bridging project whichprovided training in different vocations and equippedex-combatants with technical skills. The program washalted when the US government, the program’s majorfunder, withdrew its support. As a result, less than athird of an estimated population of 33,000 combatantswas reintegrated back into society. The responsibilityfor the reintegration of ex-combatants then fell on thenewly elected government of Charles Taylor.

The government’s response to the problem after morethan a year of delay, was to establish a SpecialPresidential Commission, the National Ex-combatantsCommission. The commission’s mandate was toprovide assistance and opportunities for the reintegra-tion of all ex-combatants. Though established by thegovernment, the commission claims an autonomousstatus. It maintains a secretariat, which functions as itsadministrative arm, and the role of its commissionersis basically supervisory, involving mobilizing resourcesfor its programs.


22 Reintegrating Ex-combatants

49 Confidential Interviews.50 This was a view expressed by a high-ranking Defense Ministry official.51 I use the term here to refer to efforts by authorities to improve civil-military relations as well as attempts to reinforce the subordi-nation of the military to civil political authority as provided for by the Liberian Constitution.

L i ke many other government-established commis-sions, the National Ex-combatants Commissionsuffers from limited government support. Thecommission has also not received external support asdonors insist on demonstrated evidence of thecommission’s autonomy and a stable politicalenvironment. Nevertheless, the handicaps have notprevented the commission from drawing up a plan ofaction. The commission has set out three main tasks:first, to identify all ex-combatants; second, toorganize registration of all ex-combatants; and third,to conduct a needs assessment of combatants, whichwill eventually lead to the design of appropriateprograms for their re-integration.5 2

The majority of ex-combatants are in Monrovia andthe most vulnerable among them, the homeless anddisabled, represent the largest percentage. The reasonfor such a concentration of ex-combatants in thecapital can be traced back to the attraction of ‘big citylife’ and the fear of returning to towns and villageswhere atrocities were committed. The cosmopolitanmix of Monrovia offers a kind of ‘safe haven’ for ex-combatants and insulates them from open attacks thatthey might otherwise experience in localities outsidethe capital. Thus, one of the primary objectives of theregistration exercise is to reduce such concentration byspreading their numbers throughout the country so asto reduce their potential for destabilizing activities inMonrovia. The case of the 4,306 former child soldiersalso presents a special problem.53 Having failed tobenefit from full reintegration, they suffer from socialmaladjustment, often refuse to go to school, and resortto crime.

The full reintegration of ex-combatants is critical tothe peace and stability of the West African sub-regionas well as to domestic peace. Their huge potential formercenary activities in neighboring countries, asevents in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone illustrate,cannot be taken for granted. This makes the task ofaddressing the reintegration of ex-combatants an

urgent one and warrants the support of the process bythe international community.

But, central to the issue of ex-combatants and their fullreintegration, are two critical factors on which asuccessful program hinges: first, winning theconfidence of local communities into which ex-combatants return, and second, reconciliation amongthe ex-combatants themselves. The communities intowhich ex-combatants will be reintegrated must beprepared psychologically and through education fortheir reintegration. Otherwise, there will be nocommunities to be reintegrated into. Also, suspicionsstill held by members of the various, former warringfactions will have to be addressed and reconciliationamong them fostered if reintegration is to succeed.

The important roles that each of the commissionsdiscussed above have to play in peacebuilding andnational reconciliation in Liberia cannot be fulfilledeffectively until the government adopts a more seriousattitude in assisting them to realize their respectivemandates. Essentially, the government can providefinancial support to these commissions in order to makethem more viable, resolve their legal status through thelegislative process, complete the appointment ofcommissioners on some of the commissions, andguarantee the integrity and autonomy of the commis-sions. This will require the reconstitution of some ofthese commissions and the appointment of non-partisan and impartial individuals to sit on them. Also,crucial to the success of these commissions is the levelof cooperation that exists between them and civilsociety groups. Fostering close cooperation between thetwo groups could provide a convergence of perspectivesand allow an opportunity for the full participation ofthe public in their work. This would also build supportand legitimacy for the commissions. However, the starkreality of Liberia is that the almost total neglect of thesevery important commissions by the government make sthe task of national reconciliation and peacebuildingdifficult, if not almost impossible.


52 Interview, National Ex-combatants Commission, Monrovia, November 2000.53 See Human Rights Watch, Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).

Reintegrating Ex-combatants 23

Protecting the Rights of Womenand Children

The situation of women and children in Liberiaremains a problem requiring urgent attention.

Crimes perpetrated both by children and againstchildren are on the rise; so is gender-based violence.There is an increase in the number of street children,the infant mortality rate and maternal morbidity arehigh, and more than half of the population of school-age children are not in school.54 This dismal state ofaffairs can be traced to a variety of factors: failednational leadership; poverty and underdevelopment;social, cultural and traditional practices which keepwomen and children at the bottom of developmentpriorities; and the devastating effects of a seven year-long civil war which weakened or destroyed existinginfrastructure and institutions.

The task of addressing the plight of women andchildren, undoubtedly worsened by the civil war, haveincreasingly been taken up by civil society organiza-tions such as human rights groups, specialized institu-tions, and those devoted to gender and child-rightsissues, which have increased in number since 1997.Organizations such as the Forerunners for the Growthand Survival of Children (FOCUS), a child rightsadvocacy group, the Association of Female Lawyers inLiberia (AFELL); and LWI, both women’s groups, havebeen playing prominent roles in this sphere.

These organizations have been active in their advocacyand in raising the level of public awareness andsensitization on women and children’s issues, but areseverely limited in their capacities and not well-grounded in local communities where a significantpercentage of abuses of women and children takeplace.

A situation report on children in Liberia, commissionedjointly by the government of Liberia and UNICEF,noted:

Child rights monitoring organizations need toenhance their capacity, and cultivate the samelevel of partnership with the government thatthey have succeeded in doing with UN special-ized agencies. Families and social institutions(schools, health facilities, religious institutions)in local communities should also be engagedin a meaningfully structured way; they all arestakeholders in the welfare and developmentof children.55

Ad d i t i o n a l l y, to protect the rights of women andchildren effectively would also require a reform ofdomestic laws which are presently inadequate inguaranteeing protection and addressing the specialneeds of women and children. It is also important toenlist the support and active participation of men –who are the main perpetrators of abuses againstwomen and children – in the campaign to fosterattitudinal changes. Finally, it has been suggestedthat, a “long-term national development frameworkwith clear goals, quantifiable targets and perform-ance indicators as bench marks for effective follow-up, monitoring and evaluation…,”5 6 as well aspolitical will must drive and underpin this nationale n d e a v o r.

Elections and Peacebuilding

The role of elections as a conflict resolutionmechanism is undeniable. It provides an exit

strategy from often violent crisis. However, in order foran election to fulfil its conflict resolution andpeacebuilding role it must address the basic require-ments of a level playing field. And because electionsare in themselves a potential source of conflict, it is allthe more important that they are held under conditionspromotive of peace. A fundamental flaw of the 1997election is that these prior requirements were notfulfilled. An analysis of the conditions on the groundfor the holding of Liberia’s next general electionscheduled for 2003 do not inspire much confidence

54 For detailed statistics see, UNICEF/Government of Liberia Report on The Impact of Underdevelopment, Debt and Armed Conflicton Liberian Children, (Monrovia, September, 1999).55 Ibid. p. 10.56 Ibid. p. 12.


24 Protecting the Rights of Women and ChildrenElections and Peacebuilding

that free and fair elections can be held. Theseconditions can be summarized as thus: The state ofemergency declared by the government in February2002, in response to the ongoing war by the LURDrebels; both the elections Commission and theJudiciary are stacked with Taylor’s party loyalists; themedia has been muzzled; and security forces continueto threaten ordinary citizens.

Threats to Peacebuilding andNational Reconciliation

This report has identified several factors thatthreaten peacebuilding and national reconciliation

in Liberia. Six factors further considered as havingdirect implications for peacebuilding and nationalreconciliation are highlighted here: armed challengesto the regime, ethnicity, religious intolerance, reinte-gration of ex-combatants, security harassment, andeconomic stagnation.

Armed challenges to the regime represent one of themost significant and real threats to peacebuilding inpost-war Liberia. It perpetuates conflict throughwarfare and violence. To this end, armed opposition tothe Taylor regime posed by dissidents operating fromoutside Liberia constitutes a significant proportion ofthis threat. There have been more than six armedincursions into Liberian territory by dissidents sinceApril 1999. Each incursion has left not only death anddestruction in its trail, but also, political recriminationsand ethnic tensions.

By establishing a foothold on Liberian territory -parts of which they now control - the LURD rebelshave transformed what essentially began as hit-and-run cross border attacks into more conventionalwarfare and control of territory. Thus far, the Liberiangovernment has been unable to defeat the rebelsm i l i t a r i l y.5 7 The potential of this conflict plungingLiberia into another round of full-scale civil war anddestabilizing the sub-region is real. Both Liberia andGuinea are supporting dissidents fighting each other’sregime. Liberian government forces are backed bySierra Leonean RUF rebels – now increasingly being

referred to as the Independent Revolutionary UnitedFront- a break-away faction led by the notoriousbattle front commander – Sam Bockarie alias"Mosquito," whose fighting forces did not take part inSierra Leone’s disarmament. In February 2002, theleaders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone met inMorocco in an effort to end the conflict and ECOWA S ,through its new Executive Secretary, MohammedChambas, has been actively involved in thesemediation efforts.

Ethnicity and conflict tend to feed on each other.While ethnicity may sometimes be one of the manycauses of conflicts, civil wars like Liberia’s between1990 and 1996 may also bring to the fore andaccentuate ethnic cleavages. The Liberian civil warsaw the manipulation of ethnicity by warringfactions. During the war, recruitment of fighters bythe various warring factions was largely ethnic based.For example, the NPFL’s fighting force mainlycomprised, Gios and Manos, ULIMO-K’s force wasdominated by Mandingos, the LPC and ULIMO-Jdominated by Krahns, and the LDF recruited mostlyLormas. This increasingly drew the various ethnicgroups into direct confrontation in what essentiallystarted off as a political conflict, as it pitted onegroup against the other. Doe’s Krahn-dominated AFLtargeted Manos and Gios, the NPFL in turn targetedKrahns and Mandingos. Though historically theethnic divide in Liberia was essentially between theAmerico-Liberian settler group and the indigenes, theDoe regime and subsequent civil war expanded thearena and accentuated inter-ethnic animosities. Thewartime legacy still persists, as evidenced by inter-ethnic tension in various parts of the country after1 9 9 7 .

Religious Intolerance: There are three majorreligious groupings in Liberia: traditional,Christianity and Islam. However, these three have notalways co-existed peacefully due to religious over-zealousness and fundamentalism exhibited by someof its adherents. Such antagonisms have tended togrow with the increase in the population of thefaithful in each group. Consequently, religiousintolerance is more pronounced between adherents of

57 See Augustine Toure, “Rebels put Taylor in a Corner”, West Africa, 17-23 December 2001, pp.18-20.


Threats to Peacebuilding And National Reconciliation 25

Christianity and Islam, which have emerged as thetwo dominant groups and jointly account for about85 percent of the population. Religious intolerancebetween these two groups has manifested itself in theform of social exclusion or discrimination basedpurely on religion.

Reintegration of Ex-combatants: The threat posed byex-combatants to domestic peace has already beennoted above. The lack of full reintegration of ex-combatants into communities provides them with astrong incentive to resort to crime and other acts ofviolence for their survival. These ex-fighters alsoprovide a ready pool of manpower that can be manipu-lated to commit acts of violence and vandalism.Former combatants have proved to be a source ofsocial and political unrest.

Security Harassment: In the past, security forces havebeen used by the state as an instrument of repression.And in spite of the war, which was also waged againstthe repressive and brutal rule of the Doe regime, thesemethods continue. Acts of violence, torture, andintimidation perpetrated by state security personnelhave become commonplace in Liberia after 1997.Though, the government has, on many occasions,spoken out against these “acts of indiscipline”, itsinconsistency in dealing with the problem makes itdifficult to differentiate between individual acts ofviolence and state-supported acts of violence.

Economic Stagnation: There is abundant evidence inLiberia’s history to vindicate the relationshipbetween worsening economic conditions andpolitical and social unrest. The April 1979 “rice riots”and the events that followed culminating in Doe’sbloody 1980 coup, are a case in point.5 8 T h etemporary end of the war in 1997 has not broughtabout any significant improvement in the Liberianeconomy and the worsening economic situationcontinues to widen the economic disparity amongthe population. The widespread disenchantmentfollowing from this has also increased the prospectsof further instability.

Strategies For Peacebuilding AndNational Reconciliation

To be successful, strategies for peacebuilding andnational reconciliation must involve as many

sectors of the population as possible. Importantly, suchstrategies must seek to build consensus. Civil societygroups can mediate the process between the govern-ment and its citizens and at the same time act as agentsof change. We now turn our attention to a few strate-gies for peacebuilding including: civic education;dialogue between government and the opposition;broad consultations; reconciliation with Liberians inthe Diaspora; and networking of civil society groups.

Civic Education: A great deal of information andeducation of the public must take place if the citizenryis to understand how peace serves both national andindividual interests. Important also is the cognitiveaspect of education – learning new ideas and conceptswhich in this case must of necessity be associated withdemocratic values and practice. Out of this processemerges the huge potential for political socializationand the development of a new civic culture. As apractical measure, a note of caution must be sounded:this civic education need not be limited to formalinstitutions such as schools and periodic workshopsorganized by civil society organizations. It must begrounded in communities, target the grassroots andother disadvantaged sectors of the population –typically women and children - and take into consid-eration their special needs. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, therural/urban imbalance, wherein civil society organiza-tional activities tend to concentrate more on urbanareas, must be overcome if civic education is to makean impact on the national ethos.

Dialogue with the opposition: Political parties arecrucial to any electoral democracy. They are usuallymass-based and locate their support in the variousconstituencies of the population. The raison d’être o fpolitical parties, which is the acquisition of politicalp o w e r, is often a source of conflict and strains the


26 Strategies For Peacebuilding And National Reconciliation

58 The 1979 rice riots reflected the population’s frustrations over the hike in the price of rice amidst a declining economic situation.This was one of the events that significantly contributed to the 1980 coup.

relationship between the opposition and the governingp a r t y, adversely affecting peacebuilding. Politics oftenbecomes a zero-sum game as a result. Frequentdialogue between the opposition and the governmentmust be facilitated with a view to building consensuson the rules of the political game as well on matters ofnational interest. This kind of dialogue could help buildconfidence between the government and the opposi-tion and reduce needless, violent confrontationsbetween the two.

Broad Consultations: Events since 1997 have clearlydemonstrated that peace cannot be achieved throughgovernment proclamations, grandiose declarations bylegislation or communiqué, and government commis-sions. Lasting peace can only be achieved through thepopular participation of the people. In other words,peace must be made by the people and with the people.As Amos Sawyer noted, the kind of participationneeded to sustain peace must include the “voluntaryinvolvement of individuals in the process of concep-tion, design and implementation, not the mobilizationof crowds, cheering squads or work units forimplementing central directives.”59 Government consul-tation with civil society can assist the process ofpeacebuilding, increase the legitimacy of governmentdecisions, and allow citizens to derive satisfaction thattheir views are taken into account. This could also helpto generate a sense of ‘ownership’ of the governanceprocess. Consultation with civil society can also reducethe risk of confrontation and adversarial politics whichhave come to characterize civil society-governmentrelations in Liberia since 1980.60

Reconciliation with Liberians in the Diaspora: T h e r eis a significant percentage of Liberia’s populationresiding outside the country. It is estimated that morethan a third of Liberia’s population resides outside thec o u n t r y. More importantly, skilled and technicalmanpower represents a sizeable proportion of thispopulation. Thus, it has been suggested thatpeacebuilding and national reconciliation efforts mustalso target Liberians in the Diaspora – particularly,Liberians in the United States. US-based Liberians tend

to be the most influential and active group outsideLiberia. The rationale for including Liberians in theDiaspora such as the Union of Liberian Associations inthe Americas (ULAA) and the Movement forDemocratic Change in Liberia (MDCL), in civil societyactivities, is that they form a critical core of Liberianswhose actions are influential in shaping and affectingnational developments back home.

Networking: Increased networking among civil societyadvocates is one area in which there has been much talkand little concrete action. Yet, there is increasingevidence to support the claim that networking amongcivil society improves its bargaining position andincreases its chances of success in its advocacy work.Networking among civil society can also increase itscapacities by pooling resources and expertise. Thus,networking is vital to the success of civil societyorganizations. But civil society groups in Liberia havenot been able to collaborate effectively due to threeprincipal reasons: they are often in competition forlimited donor resources to perform almost the sametasks; deep-seated political differences among civilsociety actors arouse mutual suspicions; and bigger andmore established groups tend to dominate consortiums.Smaller and weaker groups are often accused by largerones of enjoying equal organizational benefits withoutpossessing the same capacity. The distribution ofresources and division of labor in consortiums haveoften been a source of rancorous disagreements amongmembers. The donor requirement for collaborationamong local groups as a precondition for projectfunding - emphasizing an all-inclusive, commondemocratic front, without taking these nuances intoconsideration - have often resulted in failed projectsand made many civil society groups averse tonetworking. For these reasons, very little networkingtakes place among Liberian civil society groups, andwhatever collaboration exists among them is oftenseverely hindered by these obstacles. Nonetheless,networking among civil society groups in Liberia can beenhanced when it is based more on shared commonvalues and goals than on expediency to satisfy precon-ditions set by external donors.


Strategies For Peacebuilding And National Reconciliation 27

59 Amos Sawyer, op. cit. p. 312.60 Many of these issues were discussed at an IPA Civil Society Dialogue on “Civil Society Perspectives on Charles Taylor’s Liberia”held in New York on 13 November 2001.

Conclusion

As long as the Liberian state remains undemocratic,with governance structures that are subject to and

frequently compromised by political interference, it willbe difficult to achieve the goals of peacebuilding andnational reconciliation. Thus, the democratization of theLiberian state is central to achieving sustainable peace.Investing in civil society groups whose activities havefound resonance with the population is one way to

promote the democratization of Liberian politics and thefull participation of the citizenry in public life. Given therepressive environment in which it operates, Liberian civilsociety must continue to employ a collective advocacyrole to mobilize consensus for a national agenda ofdemocratization, peacebuilding and national reconcilia-tion. Moving away from individualized, fragmented anddisorganized advocacy to collective advocacy is essentialto becoming a strong countervailing force to a repressivestate which has attempted to stifle the emergence of aviable civil society since elections in 1997.


28 Conclusion

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