the role of the ottomans and dutch in the commercial integration between the levant-mehmet bulut

8/13/2019 The Role of the Ottomans and Dutch in the Commercial Integration Between the Levant-Mehmet Bulut

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The Role of the Ottomans and Dutch in the Commercial Integration between the Levant and

Atlantic in the Seventeenth CenturyAuthor(s): Mehmet BulutReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2002), pp.197-230Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3632841.

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THE ROLE OF THE OTTOMANS AND DUTCH IN THECOMMERCIAL NTEGRATIONBETWEENTHE LEVANT ANDATLANTIC IN THE SEVENTEENTHCENTURY

BYMEHMETBULUT*

AbstractThe present paper focuses on the role of the Ottomans and Dutch in the early commercialintegration between the Levant and Atlantic in the seventeenth century. As an expandingtrading nation in the world economy, the Dutch Republic played an importantrole in thecommercial integrationbetween the provinces of the OttomanEmpire and WesternEurope.The growth of Ottoman-Dutcheconomic relations in the seventeenth century followed thegrowthof economic relationsbetweentheprovincesof theEmpireandWesternEurope.Therefore,the two world economic systems, the Ottomanand WesternEuropean economy increasinglyopened to each other.Le pr6sentarticle examine les r6les respectifs des Ottomans et des N6erlandaisdans le d6butde l'int6grationcommercialeentre le Levant et l'Oc6an Atlantiqueau XVIPImeiecle. Nationcommerciale en expansion dans l'6conomie mondiale, la R6publiquehollandaise a jou6 unr61eimportantdans l'int6grationcommercialedes provincesde l'EmpireOttoman&'EuropeOccidentale dans la meme p6riode.La croissance des relations 6conomiquesentre le mondeottoman et la Hollande au XVIIme siecle a suivi la progressiondes 6changes entre l'Empireet I'Europeoccidentale. En cons6quence, les deux systimes 6conomiquesdu monde se sontde plus en plus ouverts l'un t l'autre.Keywords:WesternEurope,Ottomans, Levant, world economy, commercialintegration.

INTRODUCTIONThe growthof tradebetweenthe OttomanEmpireand WesternEurope s oneindicationof the commercialntegration etweentheLevantandAtlanticduringthe seventeenthcentury.Another is the increasedexportsof preciousmetals(gold and silver) fromEurope hroughouthe Ottomanareas to the East. Com-paredwith levels achieved at the end of twentiethcentury, rade n goods andcapitalflows between the Levant andAtlanticduring he seventeenth entury s* Mehmet Bulut, Bagkent University, Department of Economics, Eskigehir Yolu 20km, Baglica Kampusu, 06530 Ankara, Turkey, [email protected] am indebted to Professor Jan Luiten Van Zanden, University of Utrecht and ProfessorSevket Pamuk, Bogazigi University, for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of thispaper.

? KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden,2002 JESHO45,2Also availableonline- www.brill.nl


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198 MEHMETULUTincomparablen size. However,another act is that the volume of long distancetrade, travel,communication nd flow of the preciousmetals between the tworegionsincreased o a size that was impossibleto comparewith the earliercen-turies. This paper attempts o analyse the role of the Ottomansand Dutch inthis process.The Ottomansrecognised the importanceof the connections between theMediterranean,he Red Sea and the IndianOcean in the control of east-westtrade.They attached pecial importanceo the improvement f their naval forcefor controlling hese areas.Duringthe sixteenthcentury,the OttomanEmpirehad been a significantpowerwhose conquestswere directednot only towardconquering and but also towarddominatingor controlling he tradeentrepotsand commercialnetworksacross the zones of internationalrade.The commer-cial zones in which the Ottomansoperatedextendedfrom the Mediterraneanothe IndianOcean.'Due to its naval and commercialpower, the OttomanEmpirewas able todominate he tradingroutes between Asia and Europeuntil the last decades ofthe sixteenthcentury.2The end of the fifteenthcenturymarked he beginningofa significant urningpointfor the Westerneconomy.3The discoveryof the Capeof Good Hope in 1486 and the shift of Indianand Persiantrade routes to thehigh seas around South Africa was an important point of concern for theOttomanrulers. Of course,after the discoveryof the Caperoutespice tradeinthe Mediterraneanid not cease immediately,as is borne out by evidence.4Dueto theirposition n internationalransit rade,and since they controlled he traderoutesfor a long time, the Ottomans ontinued o gain much revenuefrom tran-sit trade.Spices and other valuableproducts rom Asia and the Levant had forcenturies oundtheirway to Europethrough he Ottoman erritories.

1 Ottoman power at sea and the Empire's strategy in the Mediterranean,Red Sea andIndian Ocean in that periodhave been addressedby historians such as Orhonlu(1967; 1974),Ozbaran(1972; 1990) and Brummett(1993) For later periods, see Anderson 1952.2 By the middle of the sixteenthcenturythe OttomanEmpirehad become the prime statecontrolling all the trade routes from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean since theByzantine Empire lost its possessions in much of the area in the seventh century. TheOttomannavy played a crucial role in controllingthe trade routes (Mantran1995: 111).3 In his famous chapteron colonies, Adam Smith noted that the discovery of Americaand that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are two greatest and

most importantevents recordedin the history of mankind (Smith 1993: 363).4 According to Pearson (1976: 79), still more spices and paper were coming to Europevia the Red Sea and the Mediterraneanhan via the Cape in the first half of the 16th cen-tury. Moreover, the studies of Lane (1966; 1973a; 1973b), Steensgaard(1967; 1973-74) andBraudel (1972; 1984) indicate that the old spice route continued to be important hroughthesixteenth century.


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OTTOMANS NDDUTCH N THECOMMERCIALNTEGRATION 199Hence, until the end of the sixteenthcentury,the OttomanEmpireenjoyed

significantand even increasingprofitsby the spice and silk routesfrom the Eastto the Mediterranean. owever,startingat the beginningof the seventeenth en-tury,this situationbegan to changewhen the NorthernEuropeansappearedasactive nations in the profitableFar East trade as well as the Levant trade(Mantran1987: 1433-39). These developmentsforced the Ottomans to seekstrategies or maintaining heir considerableprofitsfrom the trade routes fromthe East to the West. Therefore,they encouragedthe newly rising westernnations to tradein the Ottomanterritoriesby grantingthem some privileges( capitulations )n the sameperiod.It was quitenatural hat the Ottoman ulerspursuedeconomic and politicalaims by grantingcapitulationso these westernnations.Consequently,he new commercialpowers of Europe-the Dutch,theEnglish,and the French-increased theirtradingactivitiesin the Levantduringthe seventeenthcentury.It seems that while the seventeenth enturywitnessedstrongcommercialandeconomicexpansionof the Northwestern uropeannations,France,Englandandparticularlyhe Dutch,for the OttomanEmpire, his age markeddifficultiesandthereforea transformationeriod.However,according o Wallerstein, he Otto-man state was a 'worldempire'while Braudelregards t as a 'worldeconomy'duringthe sixteenthand the seventeenthcenturies.5Braudel s the first historian o approach he economyof the Mediterranean,the centre of gravity of the world economy in the sixteenthcentury,from aglobal angle (Braudel 1972). He demonstrated hat the history of Europeanexpansion can be viewed as the history of an expanding world economicsystem,which during he seventeenthandeighteenthcenturiescentredon Ams-terdamand London(Braudel1978: 17-27). According o Wallerstein,while theOttomanEmpirewas outside the capitalistworld system, the Dutch Republicbecame the core of the new westerncapitalistworld systemin the seventeenthcentury.He attempted o improveBraudel'sstatic analysis by introducing heconceptof the 'worldeconomicsystem' (Wallerstein1974; 1978-80).In analysingthe role of the Ottomansand Dutchin the commercial ntegra-tion of the Levant andAtlantic,the changeof the centreof the Europeanworldeconomyand of the relationsbetween the new economic centre of Europeand

5 According to Wallerstein's concept of a 'world empire,' the state played a central rolein commercial relations (Wallerstein 1974; 1979). But in Braudel's definition, Ottomantraders controlled the vital local routes linking the different parts of the empire (Braudel1972). Thus, in the 'world economy' merchants rtrqapable of making the state act in con-formitywith theirinterests,in the 'world empire'?hdstate apparatusdominates the scene andmerchantsplay second fiddle (have a secondaryrole) (Inalcik 1994: 479).


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200 MEHMET ULUTthe OttomanEmpireneeds to be stressed.Before the seventeenthcentury,theMediterraneanegion was the centre of the world economy and the OttomanEmpirewas a very importantpower in that area. However, in the followingyears, the centre of the world economyshifted to the Atlantic.THEDUTCHAPPEARANCEN THEOTTOMAN MPIRE

Commercialrelationsbetween the OttomanEmpireand the Dutch Republichave remaineda little knowntopic in the historyof both countries.The Vene-tian, French and English capitulations and Ottoman-Venetian,French andEnglishcommercial elationshave been examinedby severalauthors.But up tonow, archival documentson commercialactivities of Dutch merchants n theEastern Mediterraneanhave remained untouched. Although the 1021/1612Dutch capitulationand early diplomaticrelations have been investigated byAlexanderde Groot and the relationsbetween the two nations n the eighteenthcenturyhave been examinedby G.R. BosschaErdbrink,heirstudies focus onthe diplomaticrelations between the two countries(De Groot 1978; Erdbrink1975). Dutch trade and shippingin the Mediterranean ave been studiedbyIsrael(1986; 1989; 1990b)andEngels (1997). Israelprovideda generalpictureof Dutch trade and shipping n the Levant while Engels concentrated n Dutchmerchantactivitiesin the WesternMediterranean rea such as Leghorn.Althoughformal diplomaticrelations between the OttomanEmpireand theDutchRepublicwere first established n 1612, commercialcontactshad alreadybeen made bothby travellersandby merchants ngagedin Mediterraneanradebefore 1600. The presenceof individual Dutch subjectsin the East Mediter-raneandates back to as early as the 1560s.6The tulip (ldle) was the first itemcomingfromthe OttomanEmpireto the Netherlands.7

In the last decade of the sixteenth century, Dutch maritime trade in theMediterraneantarted o grow rapidly.Dutchshipssailed under oreign (English6 As a traveller,R. Ghislain de Busbecq, a member of the Flemish nobility, was the con-tact person from the Netherlands in Turkey. He was sent on a diplomatic mission byFerdinand(brotherof the late EmperorCharlesV) to Istanbulin 1561. AnotherDutch trav-eller, Georgius Dousa, made the voyage to Istanbul in 1590 (Yalmln1939; Erdbrink1975,1-2). In a letter dated 1562 Busbecq wrote that he had seen gardens with tulips (lale inTurkish)in the OttomanEmpire.Then he sent seeds and bulbs to Vienna but it is not known

whether he did this before the beginningof the 1570s. It is clear that some of the tulips fromthe OttomanEmpirearrived n Centraland WesternEuropevia Vienna, and after Vienna thetulip passed from Flanders to Holland (Segal 1993: 10).7 There is a common view that the Ottomans' first gift to the Dutch was the tulip. Formore informationon the importanceof the tulip in this respect, see Theunissenand Roding1993.


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OTTOMANS NDDUTCH N THECOMMERCIALNTEGRATION 201

or French)flags in the Ottomanportsuntil 1612. The Dutch first traded n theLevant underthe protectionof the French.Traditionally, renchmaritime radehad been concentratedmore in the Mediterraneanhan in the Atlantic.In 1569,the Frenchhad alreadyconcludeda commercial reatywith the OttomanSultan,who had given them permission o allow nations,with no treatyof theirown,to tradeunderthe same conditions,when flying the Frenchflag (Braudel1972:625-28; Kurat 1953: 305-315). Due to these privileges, the Ottomansultangranted he rightto the French o protect he harbi8merchants n the Levant.In1598, France extendedthese privileges to the Dutch, hence Dutch merchantsobtained formal permissionfrom King Henry IV to trade in Ottomanportsunderthe Frenchflag (Heeringa1910: 169).As Braudelstates,the Levant tradecontinued o flourishdespite 'the discov-eries and some fundamental hangesin the worldeconomyof the sixteenthandseventeenthcenturies'(1972; 1978). However,Venetiantradewas declininginthe Levant,while French,Englishand Dutch traderegisteredan increasefromthe last quarterof the sixteenthcenturyonwards.In otherwords, it was not somuchEuropeanLevant trade which was decliningin the early modem period,but traderswere no longerItalians,rather heywere French,EnglishandDutch.Before 1612, because of the non-officialpositionof the Dutchmerchants n theOttomanports,the corsairswere the main obstacles for theirtradingactivitiesin the EastMediterranean. s a matterof fact, piracywas a seriousobstacle nthe Levant for the merchantvessels. Moreover,there was a close connectionbetween tradeand piracy.According o Braudel,when there were no merchantvessels, therewere no pirates(1972: 883). Therefore,t was very importantorthe States General to establish direct diplomaticcontacts with the Ottomanauthorities.At first the Dutch merchantsconcentrated heir tradein the old emporiaofthe Levant:Cyprus,Cairo and the ports of Syria (Steensgaard1967: 13-55).Antwerpmerchantsoined the Galataforeign merchantcommunity n the lastdecades of the sixteenthcenturyafter benefitingfrom the individualgrantofamnesty, a provisionin Islamic Law.9 In the following years, Dutch tradeincreased n Aleppo, as is reportedby the watchfulconsuls of Venice. Protec-tion underthe Frenchor Englishflags was exercisedlocally by the consuls of

8 Harbis, or 'foreigners,'were, accordingto Ottoman Muslim theory, those enemy aliensor non-Muslimsnot protectedby treatywho inhabit the Dariil-harb, that is, any part of theworld which had not yet become Dariil-islam,which was the partof the world thatwas ruledaccordingto Islamic law (Qur'an).9 Dutch merchantshad come to the Ottomanterritoriesbefore the capitulations,and theywere very active in caravantrade (Wood 1935: 29).


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202 MEHMET ULUTthose two nations n the Levantports.Therewas also a possibility or the Dutchto appointconsuls, even though they did not have theirown capitulations DeGroot 1978:90). However,protectionby foreignor even by Dutchconsuls wasnot satisfactoryn the long run. Withthe increase n Dutchtrade,therewas anincreasenharmfulnterferenceytherivals nbusiness,amongwhom heVenetiansand Frenchwere foremost(Wood 1935: 44).

Frequentattacksby North African corsairs on the Dutch merchants'shipscontinued n the firstdecade of the century.10herefore, he States Generalwasforced to establish direct contactswith the Ottomangovernment,as was previ-ously mentioned.Althoughthe Ottomancourt did not respond mmediately othe States General's 1604 overture, a letter from the kapudan-iderya (theTurkishsupremecommanderof the navy) Halil Pasha eventuallyreachedtheRepublic in 1610 and stated the Sultan's intention to grant the Dutch theright to trade undertheir own flags in Ottoman erritories Erdbrink1975: 3:Kiitiikoglu1974: 38-45). After significantefforts exerted by Haga,12 he firstcapitulation,dated evail-i Cemaziyelevvel 021/6 July 1612, was granted o theDutchmerchants Heeringa1910: 255; Uzungar?lll 1959: 235-6). Accordingtothecapitulations,llDutch laveswouldbe freedwithoutanypayment.13Throughoutthe Ottoman erritories,Dutchmerchantswere allowed to tradeundertheirownflag.14 Withcapitulations ranted o the British n 1580, and to the Dutch at thistime, Francelost her monopolyto protectthe harbi merchantsand theircom-mercialprivilegesin the Ottomanrealm.Frenchmerchantsnow had two greatrivals: the Englishand the Dutch.THE IMPORTANCEOF THE DUTCH CAPITULATIONS

Significantdetails are recordedregarding he capitulationsgranted o Dutchmerchants, specially concerning he economicactivity they carriedout in theOttoman erritories.However,the SublimePortegrantednot only economicbutalso certainpoliticalrightsto Dutchmerchants. t is necessaryto analyse this

10 BBA ED 13/1 110, 3.11 From the beginning, the Ottomangrand-admiralHalil Pasha played a decisive role inestablishingfriendlyrelationsbetween the Dutch Republic and the OttomanEmpire(Erdbrink

1974: 160-61; De Groot 1978).12 The firstDutch ambassadorCornelisHaga presentedvery importantgifts, such as strate-gic maps of the world and a compass to the OttomansultanAhmed in Istanbulwhen he wasaccepted to the throne.For the list of these presents, see Heeringa 1910: 266-276.13 See the articles of 17 and 19 in the capitulations.14 BBA ED 13/1, 1-4.


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OTTOMANS ND DUTCH N THECOMMERCIALNTEGRATION 203from the originalregistersof the capitulations f 1612. But firstthe term'capit-ulation' or 'ahidname'15hould be explained.

Accordingto Inalclk (1979: 1179), the following provisionsconcerning hestatus of non-Muslim merchantsin the Ottomanareas were included eitherexplicitlyor implicitlyin all of the commercialprivileges:1. Generalsecurityof personand property,ncluding:- testamentary ights,freedomof worship,burial,and dress;- ship repairs,emergencyrations,and aid againstattackby corsairs;- permission o addresscomplaints o the head of the Muslimcommunity.2. Extraterritoriality,ncluding:- consular jurisdiction;- consular'ssalaryand otherexemptions.3. Abolition of collectiveresponsibility.

A capitulation uaranteehad pre-eminence ver the laws of the empireand,upon drawing up a capitulation, he sultan sent orders to local authorities oabide strictlyby its provisions.It was not a treaty ut a freedom r priv-ilege grantedto the Europeansto trade freely throughout he Ottoman ter-ritories (Inalclk 1979: 1179-80). But in practice the members of foreignnations were permitted esidenceonly in certainports,and within these portsusually only in specified quartersor caravanserais.However, n izmir, Aleppo,Galata and otherOttoman radingcities, they enjoyedconsiderable reedomofmovement.Our main focus is the capitulations ranted o the DutchRepublic.Theyweregranted wice in the first half of the seventeenth entury, irst in 1612 and thenin 1634, andonce in the secondhalf of the century, hat is in 1680. In order ounderstand he new status of the Dutchin the Ottomanarea one has to exam-ine the capitulations f 1612. The sultansolemnlypromised articles6 and55)that capitulatory uaranteeswere above the law. Those Ottomansubjectswhoresisted theirapplicationor violated themwere declaredrebelsagainstthe sul-tan and punishableas such.All capitulatory rivilegesandguaranteeswere granted o the Dutchby these

15 Where can information be found about the capitulations grantedwestern nations andabout the activities of western merchants in the Ottoman areas? The answer is DiiveliEcnebiye Defterleri in the BaybakanhkOsmanli Archives (BBA) in Istanbul. These registersconsist of more than a hundredvolumes of varying length, covering the periodfrom 1567 to1922 and devoted to thirty-twostates in total, from America to Venice. FelemenkAhidnameDefterleri is related to the Dutch Republic in this respect.


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204 MEHMET ULUTinstruments;and all rights included in the French and English capitulationsappliedto the Dutch. For the Republic,the political-military ooperationwiththe Empireis quite explicitly mentioned n the capitulations.Accordingto aspecial provision (article 51), Dutch ships fighting against the ships of non-capitulatorynations were allowed to use Ottomanportsand to replenishtheirsupplies.Article 21 made it clear thatcorsairshipsfromAlgiersremainedenti-tled, as formerly, o providethemselveswith munitionsand materials n Dutchports.If enemy merchants oadedmerchandise n Dutchships, it could not beconfiscatedon the grounds hat it was enemy merchandisearticle 38).The Ottomangovernment's egulationsregardingpreciousmetals,as formu-latedin the capitulations ranted he EnglishandDutch,stipulated hat no dutywas to be levied on the importof gold and silver coins. These coins could notbe converted nto Ottomancoins in the local mints (article 1) and ordersweresent to the provincialauthorities o this effect. Such measuresservedOttomanfinances and the Ottomaneconomy in general,since exactly at this time theempirewas suffering rom a dearthof preciousmetals (Inalcik1951, 651-61).But this policy would finally result in financial and economic upheavalwiththe invasion of the Ottomanmarketby counterfeit oins imported hiefly by theDutch. The Dutch were permittedo bringin and take out goods by sea to theBlack sea ports, including Trabzon and Caffa, and by land to Azov andMoscow, and Dutch ships coming from Dumyat and Alexandriacould carrygoods to Istanbulor otherplaces belongingto the Muslims. These clauses wereevidentlyfavouredby the Ottomans n orderto profitfrom Dutchshippingandcontributeo the feeding of Istanbul rom the two most important reas,Egyptand the northernBlack Sea (article6).In the Dutch capitulations,guaranteesagainst corsair acts show how con-cernedWesternnationshad become about increasedprivateeringn this period.The sultanpromised hatany Dutchsubject,enslavedby the corsairsof Algiers,would be freed and his property eturnedn its entirety(article 17). The con-suls could not arrest the Dutch merchantsnor steal their houses. Merchants'lawsuits involving consuls and dragomans translators) ad to be heard at theSultan'sCourt(article 6).In comparisonwith Venetians and French,the Dutch capitulationsprovidedmore extensiveprivilegesand guarantees.The Dutch were granteda 2-3%rateof customs duty16 (article 46) instead of the 5% paid by the Venetians and

16 In the capitulationof 1612, the phrase adet ve kanun iizere (in accordancewith tra-dition and the currentregulations), appears to determine the customs rate. In the sixteenthcentury,the generalrate was 5%, but the Ottomancustoms tariffrate varied accordingto thestatus of the merchant,and the nature of the commodity. The Dutch merchantswere also


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OTTOMANSND DUTCH IN THE COMMERCIAL NTEGRATION 205

French.17No authority ould levy more customsdutythan 3% (article56).Freedomof tradewithin the Ottomandominionshad been the primaryaimwhich the Dutchhad set for theirembassyto Turkey.This had been well servedby the capitulation,which was mainlya set of regulations or trade n additionto articlesdefiningthe legal status of Dutchsubjectsresiding n Ottoman erri-toryfor the purposeof trade.The documentdid not containany clausesregard-ing reciprocalbenefitsfor Ottoman radeor clausesof a politicalnature article21). The Dutch capitulationsof 1612 acknowledged he requestfor friendshipandfreedomof trade as transmitted y the ambassador.As to trade, n general,the principlesof free shippingand tradewere conceded(article21, 43).In spite of the fact that Ottoman raderegulationsoccasionallyforbadetheexport of some luxury commoditiessuch as leatherand preciousmetals andsome bulky commoditiessuch as grain,as a resultof the capitulationsDutchmerchantswere allowed to exportnon-strategicgoods, such as cotton, cottonyarn, leatherand beeswax (article 3). As for the most significant radeitems,reference s made to silk from Aleppo and otherplaces, and to Dutchexportsof lead,tin, ron,andsteel(articles 3 and46).A purposewas toimportunprocessedwar materialsto the OttomanEmpire.In the capitulations he statement hatthe Dutchimport nto ourwell-guardeddominionsof lead, tin, iron, steel andotherscrapmetal merchandisemay not be hindered article46) was very clear.Dutchsubjectswouldbe freetotransportheirgoodsonshipsof non-capitulatorypowers, or corsairs,without confiscationby Ottomanauthorities.Furthermore,the security of person and propertywas guaranteed, ncluding testamentaryrights, ship repairs, emergencyaid and the abolition of the sultan'srights incase of a shipwreck. n case of complaints,redressmightbe soughtfrom thePorte(article1).The Dutch capitulations,ike others,containedan articlestatingthat rightsmentioned n the first FrenchandEnglish capitulations pplyto the Dutch.Anymajordifferencesof opinionthatmightarise betweensubjectsof the Sultanandthe Republicwere to be referred o the SublimePorte and to the Dutch am-bassadorresidingthere.The first capitulationsgranted he Dutchwere renewedby SultanMurad n

exempt from kassabiye, masdariye, reftiye, yasakpi and bac duties (BBA ED 22, 39). Theywere Ottoman taxes levied on all merchantstrading in the market, except merchants withprivileges such as grantedin the Dutch capitulations.

17 There was a common view thatthe first single 3% customs was grantedto Francewhichrenewed their capitulationsof 1673 (Inalclk 1959: 96). However, the registers of the Dutchcapitulations clearly show that the Dutch were the first who were legally grantedthe maxi-mum 3% rate (see article 46, 56 in the Dutch capitulations).


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1634.'sThe second capitulations ontained he same rights for the Dutch mer-chantsin the Ottoman erritories s the first.THE OTTOMAN AUTHORITIESAND THE DUTCH NATION IN THE LEVANT

One can easily understand hat both the central and local Ottomanauthori-ties paid a greatdeal of attention o providingsecurityon the land and sea forthe westernmerchants,and thus earningincome for their treasurers nd meet-ing the needs of Ottomanpeople. The Ottomanprovisionistmentality19 layedan especiallycrucialrole in this process.In orderto realise this aim, the west-ern merchantswere very important,while securitywas of primaryconcerntothe traders n the Ottoman erritories.Afterestablishingdiplomaticrelations n 1612, the Dutch ambassadorn theSublimePorte,CornelisHaga, made effortsandpaid specialattention o devel-oping economic relationsbetween the two nationsby entering nto close coop-erationwith the Ottomanauthoritieso protect herightsof the Dutchmerchantsin the Levant.20Theoretically,Dutch merchantswere protected rompiracyandenslavementat the handsof the corsairs hanksto the capitulations. n spite ofsignificanteffortsdeployedby the Ottomanbureaucrats nd officials,establish-ing a safe commercialareawas not easy to accomplish.After 1612, it also became possible for the Dutch to appointconsuls.21Ac-cording o theircapitulations,he Dutch ambassador ad the rightto appoint heconsulsand otherpersonnelwheneverDutch commercial ettlementsmighthaverequired his. Thus, in April 1613, Haga was able to acceptthe oath of allegi-ance of a travellingcompanion,CornelisPauw,as the Dutchconsulin Aleppo.The role and the duty of the consulwas also to protectthe rights of the mer-chantsand developtheirtradingcapability n the region.22

18 Although Sultan Ahmed I died in 1617 and two successive sultans ascended theOttomanthrone,only MuradIV renewed the Dutch capitulations n 1634.19For more informationon the Ottomanprovisionistmentality, see Genq 1989.20 For more informationon the importanceof the Haga in the economic relationsbetweenthe two nations and his diplomatic mission and achievement in the relations, see Erdbrink1975; De Groot 1978.21 According to the Ahidname, the Dutch ambassadorin Istanbul could establish a con-sulatewhereverhe wanted. The primarypurposeof the ambassadorwas to promotethe tradeof his nation. Haga established new consulships at Aleppo (1613), Larnaca (1613), and

Algiers (1616). And now under the supervisionof the ambassador n Istanbuland the con-suls in the other trading centres of the Porte, the Dutch commercial network and businessexpanded in the Levant. From 1657 onwards the Dutch consuls began to be directlyappointedby the States General from Holland. For more informationon the function of theconsuls in the Levant, see Steensgaard1967.22 The Dutch representatives n the Empiresharedall the problemsof theirmerchantssuch


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OTTOMANS ND DUTCH N THECOMMERCIALNTEGRATION 207The Dutch ambassadorsat the Porte had both diplomaticand commercialroles.23The ambassadorwas located in the centre of the Empire,the capital,with his appointment f 12,000 pounds per year being paid out of the generaltrade duties levied in the Republic(convooienen licenten).In addition,he hada shareof the incomefrom the Dutchconsulates n Istanbul, zmir,CyprusandChios. The Consulswere allowed to levy consularduties on all goods carriedby Dutch ships passing throughportsunder theirjurisdiction.Consulsin otherpartsof the Mediterraneannly served the privateinterests of the merchants,ship owners,and captains(Heeringa1910: 319-22).Haga as the first Dutch ambassador 1612-1639) contributed reatlyto thedevelopment f the Ottoman-Dutchommercial elations.His successors riedtofollow him in buildingup the relationsbetween the two countries.Levinus Warner,anotherDutch representativewas an important cholar inthe field of Orientalstudies24t LeidenUniversitypriorto his arrival n Istan-bul. After Warner,JustinusColyer became the Dutch resident ambassadornIstanbul. During the mission of Colyer (1668-1682), new regulations weredrawnup concerning he Dutch communityand their business in the Levant.His first aim was to renewthe two earliercapitulations f 1612 and 1634. Hemanagedto do this, resulting n the thirdcapitulationgranted o the Dutch in

1680. Colyerdied in Istanbul n December1682. At the end of the seventeenthcentury,his elder son JacobusColyer(1684-1725) succeededhim as the Dutchambassador t the Porte. In 1699, Colyerplayeda significant ole in establish-ing peace between the OttomanEmpireand the AustrianHapsburgs.25ogether

as tradingactivities, loans, and credit relations.Furthermore,hey were interested n buildingproblems of the merchants'houses. The Dutch merchantAlexandre Colyer gave money tothe consul Hochepied in Izmir in order to have his house rebuilt (ARA, LH 27).23 According to the Resolution of the States-General n April 1675, new regulationswereset up concerningthe residence of Dutch citizens and the manner of conductingbusiness inthe Levant. According to the 1675 regulations,the principaltask of the ambassadorand ofthe consuls in the Ottoman Empire was to insure that the capitulations were properlyobserved and implemented.The Directorate also envisaged assessors, members to be chosenfrom the Dutch nation in every port, who would control the consul's action and financialmanagement(Erdbrink1975: 28).

24 Warner studiedOrientallanguages at Leiden University in the Netherlands.Priorto hisdeparturefor Istanbul in 1644, he had already written four short works. After residing inIstanbul for ten years, he was appointedambassadorof States General in 1654. He carriedout extensive research on the Middle East and Islam and compileda huge collection of workson the region. This collection is located at Leiden University now. Warnerdied in Istanbulin June 1665. For more informationon this collection and on Warner,see Drewes 1970.

25 At the end of the negotiations, during the peace conference that was held in theSlavoniantown of Carlowitz(Karlofqa n Turkish),a peace agreementwas signed. With this,the OttomanEmpire,for the first time in its history, accepted the principleof uti possidetis-


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208 MEHMET ULUTwith his Englishcolleague,Colyerwas involvedin the negotiations,and medi-ated betweenthe two powers.26A consul was also empoweredby the Sultan'sberat27to supervise he affairsof his millet,to register ncominggoods and to collect the appropriate ues forthe ambassador nd the consul. No ship of his nation could leave portwithouthis authorisation, nd he resolved disputesand settled suits between membersof his nationaccording o his home country's aws and traditions.His person,servants,and animals were immune from interference, t his residence,on theroad,or at overnighthalts;his personalgoods were exemptfrom customdues.28However,protectionby the Dutch ambassador r consuls was not sufficient nthe long run.With the increase n Dutchtrade,there was an increase n harm-ful interferenceby businessrivals, among whom were the Venetians,French,andEnglish (Wood 1935:44). They had many disputeswith the other westernmerchantsas well as with the Ottomanparties n the market. n addition,someOttomangovernmentofficials occasionally wanted more customs29 than wasstipulated n the capitulation rticles.30In addition o the Dutchrepresentativesin the OttomanEmpirethere was a strong institutionin Amsterdam or theorganisationand the expansionof the Dutch Levant trade.The Levant Directoraten Amsterdam31rganisedshippingand tradeto theOttomanEmpire.The Directorateacted as the representativebody of Dutchcommercein the Mediterranean.Among its main tasks, therewas the corre-spondencewith the States' ambassador t the Porteandwith Dutchconsuls inthe variousportsof the Levant and North Africa (De Groot 1981: 235). Thus,the Directorateserved as a link between the governmentand merchantsandmaintained he Dutch consulates n the Mediterranean.The Directorateoften asked the Dutch authorities or new regulationsper-

both parties being allowed to keep their conqueredterritories.This meant that they had tocede Transilvaniaand Hungary,with the exception of the Banat of Temesvar.26 ARA LH 127.27 A diploma bearing the Sultan's official seal.28 See Capitulationsof 1612: article 9, 21, and 39.29 The Dutch representativeappliedto the Porte for these problems.In these situationsstip-ulated in the Sultan sent the firmans to the local Ottomanauthoritiesin order to solve theproblem(BBA ED 22, 79). In anotherregisterdated 15 April 1680, the Sultan sent a firmanto the kadi of Istanbul for a problem occurredbetween the Dutch merchantsand Ottoman

custom officials. The sultan sent his order the kadi to preventthe abuses of local officer thatgiimriikemini Hiiseyin asked 5% rate custom duty instead of 3% (BBA ED 22, 1).30 BBA BA 902, 116.31 Directorsof the LevantTrade and Navigationin the Mediterranean ea (Directeurenvanden Levantschenhandel en navigatie in de MiddellandscheZee) was established in Amster-dam in 1625.


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OTTOMANS ND DUTCH N THECOMMERCIALNTEGRATION 209tainingto the Levant.And most of the timetheymanaged o achieve theirgoalsregarding he organisationof the Levant trade. For instance,there were somecustom duties for commoditiescoming from abroad.The customsduty leviedon commoditiescomingfrom the Levant,was generally1%. After a petitionofthe Levantorganisationo the Dutchauthorities n 1663, certainchangesweremade in the customduties for certainLevantproducts.According o this newregulation,special rates were imposed for some of the merchandisecomingfrom the Levant, such as Turkishyarn, cotton, cottonyarn, goat wool, camelhair, naturaldrags,rice, soda, potash,wood, leather,and carpets.32Obviously,textile productswere the main commodities.The importcustom duty became2% for these products in the Dutch Republic. According to the rules, theLevantineDirectorate ouldimposethe new customs evies on the tradinggoodsin the Levant.A shareof these duties levied by this organisationn all Dutchportswas assignedto meet its financialneeds. After 1663 an additional Levan-tine duty was imposedby the Directorate n all Levantinegoods importedntothe Netherlands.This was an additionalduty of 1%levied on all commodities(except on ships properand on cash money) loaded on ships sailing for orreturningrom the OttomanEmpire.33o they managed o raise the customdutyfrom 1 to 2%.

Most problemsencounteredby the Dutchmerchantsn the Ottoman errito-ries came from assessingthe value of the commoditiesand thus the payingoftaxes or customs duties. Accordingto the capitulations, he Dutch merchantshad to pay a maximumof 3% customsduties to the tax farmerof the imperialcustoms,giimriik mini. The customsduties were paidon the value of the com-modities. Occasionally,a controversyoccurredbetween the Dutch merchantsand the Ottomanofficials. The conflict mostly resultedfrom disagreementonthe value of the commodities.3432 ARA LH 5028, 533.33 Ibid.34 Dutch merchantsobjected to high customs duties and as a result the Dutch ambassadorat the Porte appealed to the Ottomanadministration o take action (BBA, ED 21/12). Thesetypes of cases were also prohibitedby the Sultan. Elqi-yimezbur arz-u hal ginderiip yed-lerinde olan niyan-1hiimayundagiimriik giin hazine-i amiremeahlndi, iizre can olan nukudu(Nederlanda tacirleri) ahidname-ihiimayunummucibincevermege razilar iken giimriikeminihilaf-i ahidnameve niyanihiimayun .. gurugalurumdeyu rencide olunmamakbabinda emr-i yerifimverilmek rica etmeginahidname-ihumayunumamiiracatolunduktaNederlanda tiic-

can vilayetlerinden getiirdiikleri ve alub gitiirdiikleri metalardan Halep ve Iskenderiyevesayir yerlerde yiizde iig akqe giimriikvereler ziyade vermeyeler.. . (The Dutch ambas-sador has conveyed a petition to my court and has complainedthat althoughcertain Dutchmerchants are ready to pay the customs duties accordingto the exchange rate of the imper-ial treasury,the local customs authorityclaimed excessive amountscontraryto the capitula-tions... Custom duties have to be charged to the Dutch merchants carrying goods from


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210 MEHMETULUTVarioustaxes had been levied to be paid by traderssuch as masdariye onthe goods importedby the Ottomans),miiruriyye r bac-i umur(transitpermit)and selamet izn-i (permitfor passage of vessel) in the OttomanEmpire;andfinally, the merchantswere given the a tezkere (licence) that permittedthegoods to be transportedo any partof the Empire,withoutbeing subjectto anyothertax. According o the regulations, he Dutchmerchantswere exemptfromthe duties of kassabiye,masdariye,reftiye,yasakglandbac.35The archivaldoc-umentsindicate that local customsofficerscausedthe problemsfor the Dutchtradersby demandingsuch taxes nonetheless.However,the Dutch merchantsalso tried to avoid payingofficial customdutiesin the portsof the Empire.36Goodstransportedr importedby sea were subject o customsduties,where-as wares transported y land were exemptfrom these duties,unless trade wascarriedoutby Muslimand non-Muslim ubjectsof the OttomanEmpire. n gen-eral, exportsto Europewere discouraged o provideabundant oods and food-stuffs for the domestic market.Foreign merchantswere permitted o bring infine woollen cloth, especially London and Flemish (Felemenkcukasi) cloth,metals and bullion,which were in great demand n the Levant. The exportofscarcemerchandisewas prohibitedn times of drought.Lists were issued peri-odicallybytheOttoman overnmentenoting oodsprohibitedrombeingexported.

The amountof customs duties was calculated on the basis of the estimatedvalue of the commodity,ad valorem, by the office of the tax-farmerof theimperialcustoms,the giimriikemini.The OttomanEmpirebegan to establish the new tax farming system in thelast decadeof the sixteenthcentury.Thus, in the following century,most giim-riik emins of the Ottomanportswere individualand private.There were alsomanynon-Muslim ax farmers n the Empireduring he same period,who triedto obtainas much custom dutiesfromthe merchantsn the Ottoman erritoriesas possible.37Throughout he periodunderstudy, therewere numerouscom-Alexandretta, leppo,etc. are,as before,3% butnotmore,and merchantsmustnot be dis-turbed...) (BBA ED 22, 5).35 BBA ED 22, 39.

36 .... cezire-i Sakiz ve izmir giimriigii mukatasi eminlerinin iltizamina tabi iskelelerinegelen sefinelere giimriik kaqirmamakigiin bekqi ve arayict konulagelmiv iken Ingiliz veFelemenk taifesi getiirdiiklerimetalartgece ile giimriiktenkaqirmak qiin... (Not to causeany leakage from Chios and Izmir ports, customs and control officers were assigned by thetax farmers.The English andFlemish communitiesare used to unload at night to escape fromcustoms duties...) (BBA BHM 20, 56).37For instance, there were two non-Muslim tax collectors, Sonos Karag6zogluand Bedikwho were brothersand settled in Aleppo duringthe first half of the seventeenthcentury.By1616, Bedik was in the position to negotiate directlywith the Dutch consul over the amountof tariffs to be paid by the Netherlanders n Aleppo (BBA MD 80, 1339).


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plaintsfrom the merchantshat the custom officers were abusing heirauthority(De Groot1978: 216-17; Lane 1958:401-17; inalcik 1977:27-29). These com-plaintsusuallyfell into two generalcategories.The firstwas related o the giim-riik emins attemptsto alter the procedure or taxation on items stipulatedastaxable,while the second was relatedto the claimthat customsofficerstriedtotax items which had been traditionally xemptfrom taxation.The Dutchmer-chantscomplained hatthe custom officersoften triedto tax the merchantsnotby a percentageof the assessedvalue of the commodities hey had importedorexportedbut ratherby their volume and type.38The consularrepresentatives f the foreign merchantsof each nation werepaying 'avanias' or arbitrary ayments o the local authorities.The Dutch mer-chants were also comfortedwith the avanias, frequentlyrequiredby the localofficials.Occasionally, he foreignmerchantsmanaged o avoidpayingavaniasby offeringgifts to the local authorities.The avaniasconstituted1 to 2%of thevalue of a merchant'smportedandexportedcommodities.Theseaccountswerekept by the ambassador nd consuls,respectively.Since the Dutchmerchantsnthe Levant tried to avoid payingthe avanias, Dutchrepresentatives ppliedtothe Ottomangovernmentor a solutionto theseproblems Heeringa1917:214).The regular evies, called tanza,were paid by the captainsof Dutchships totheirconsulsin Aleppo, Cyprus, zmir,and so on. The complaintsof the Dutchconsuls to the Porte and their reportsto the States General indicate that theDutchshipsavoidedpayingtheselevies andthata numberof shipssailed underforeign flags to escape the payments.39After 1612, the expenditures f the Dutchconsulwere compensated y a taxthat was paid by Dutchmerchants o the consul.40Most of these expenditureswere incurred n Istanbuland Aleppo. However,the majorityof the revenueswere paid by Izmir merchants,41 hich sometimescaused a conflict betweenlocal consuls and merchants Slot 1990: 18).Since consulate ees levied on foreigners or the rightto tradeunderthe pro-tection of the flag of a Europeannationwas an importantource of income,theconsuls competedwith each other in orderto induce othernationsto ask forprotection.The consuls of the Netherlands n the Levantfollowed this policy

38 BBA, MM 6004, 124; BBA A.DVN 30, 76.39 Both the Ottoman and the Dutch archival documents show these kinds of situations(BBA ED/22; BBA MM 2765 and ARA LH 97-101, 123-126).40 BBA BA 902, 116, 2.41 The reportof the Dutch consul in Izmir indicates that their consularrevenues were thefollowing in the 1680s: 7/10 from Izmir, 2/10 from Aleppo, and 1/10 from Istanbul (ARALH 125).


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212 MEHMETULUTand sometimestried to collect more consulatefees fromboth Dutch merchantsand foreigners protected by them. The complaints of the merchantsin theLevant ndicate hatpayingconsulateees (cottimo) ausedsomeproblems etweenthe merchantsand the consuls.42Evidence indicates that after getting their own capitulations,occasionallyDutch ships sailed underFrench,English or Venetianflags in orderto avoidpayingthesefees.43The complaintsof the Dutch merchants how that the Dutchconsul in Izmir,Jacobvan Dam, tried to obtain as manyconsulate ees as pos-sible.44n 1673, Leidenmerchants45skedfor the dismissalof the Dutchrepre-sentativein Izmir,Van Dam. His reactionto the conductof some merchantsand his treatmentof them in generalwere unacceptablen theireyes. In theiropinion Van Dam had harmedthe relationsbetween the Netherlandsand theOttomanEmpire.46ndeed,although hese consulate ees mightbe seen as a rev-enue for the Dutch mission in the Levant,it was harmfulfor the Dutch mer-chants as well as for the Ottoman-Dutch ommercialrelationsbecause thesefees would discourage he merchants rom trading n the Ottoman ands.The othercomplaintsof the traderswere related to the monetaryconditionsof the OttomanEmpirein the seventeenthcentury.Accordingto some Dutchmerchants,the most importantproblemwas createdby the Ottomanmoneymarket.It is a fact thatthe OttomanEmpirewas a greatempireandhad largepublicexpenditures.Thatis why it absorbedmost of the money fromthe mar-

42 Niel Steensgaard(1967: 32) states that the conflict is very well illustratedby a petitionby the Levant merchants n Amsterdam to the States-General n 1615:1-The consul should be a scrupulousman, and must not carry on business on his ownaccount.2-A cottimo on the Venetian model ought to be establishedin the nation.3-The consul should receive a fixed salary.4-Gifts must only be made with the nation's approval,and they should be paid from thecottimo, as is done by the Venetians.5-Otherextraordinary xpenses on the nation's behalf should be paid from the cottimo aswell, including the frequentgifts now being neglected on account of the consul's economicsituation.6-Should the cottimo not suffice in case of a large extraordinary xpense, a tansa (specialduty) as large and as protractedas necessary should be imposed on the members of thenation, only of course with the nation's cosent.7-The consul will be shown due respect.43 ARA LH 97; Leiden Univ. OrientalManuscripts,code 1122, 45.44 ARA LH 98.45 These merchantswere Adrien en Jean le Pla, CharlesWasteau,B. Hoogmade,David enElize de Bane, Pieter le Pla, A de Visscher, Dr. van Peene, Marinus Adr. Veer, and HossonCompte.46 Leiden Gemeentearchief,StadsarchiefII, 1280.


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214 MEHMETULUTVan Dillen and Israelis moreprecisethan that of the above Englishor Frenchhistorians Van Dillen 1979; Israel 1989). According o Van Dillen (1970), theDutchrole in the East and West Mediterranean as less predominanthan inthe East India and the Baltic trades. He arguesthat the Dutch Mediterraneantradedevelopedin severalphases, startingwith a vigorousfirstphase between1590 and 1620. In the second phase spanningfrom 1620 to 1645, the DutchMediterraneanrade was less intense. After 1645 Dutch trade in the regionbegan to expand again, till the last quarterof the century.However, in thefourthphase, after 1672, the Dutch Mediterraneanradeconstantlydeclined.Israel(1989; 1995) dividedthe DutchStraatvaartnto seven phases:the firstfrom 1585-90 to 1609, the second from 1609 to 1621, the thirdfrom 1621 to1647, the fourth rom 1647 to 1672, the fifth from 1672 to 1700, the sixthfrom1700 to 1713, and finally the seventhfrom 1713 to 1740. He states that theDutch succeeded n capturinghardlyMediterraneanrade n the firstphase.Healso concludesthat their commerce n the regionexpanded n the secondphasebut weakened n the thirdphase.Accordingto Israel,the fourthphasewas thezenithfor the Dutchin the Mediterranean, hereas n the fifth and sixthphasesa decline was witnessedin the Dutch Mediterraneanrade,and in the seventhphase (1713-1740) therewas a decline in Dutch tradeand its primacyoverall.All historiansagree that after 1590, Dutch vessels set sail for the first timeto the Mediterranean. hey also agree that in the following years Dutch ship-ping and trade flourishedin both the Eastern and Western Mediterranean.However,both Van Dillen and Israeldisagreewith the explanationof Braudelaboutthe decline of Dutchtradein the regionfrom the middleof the century.Moreover, sraelandBraudeldo not agreeon the significanceand natureof theDutchtradinggoods in the Mediterranean.raudelwas of the opinionthat tradein bulky goods, especially grain,was the key factorin determininghe Dutchdominationn the Mediterraneanrade(Braudel1972:545). By contrast, srael,in his work on Dutch Primacy in the Mediterranean s well as world trade,stressedthe significanceof tradein luxurycommodities 1989: 9).The Dutch role in the Mediterraneanfterthe mid-seventeenth entury s acontroversial ssue among western historians.Braudel believes that from themiddleof the seventeenth entury,Dutchtradesharplydeclined n the West andEast Mediterranean. ccordingto him, Dutchships disappeared ecauseof thedecliningdemandfor the Northerngrainin the South.Thus, the Dutch domi-nation in the Mediterraneanended and the balance of commercial powerchanged,no longerbeing in theirfavour(Braudel1972: 572-3, 635).However,in the light of the reportsand lettersof Dutch representativesnthe Levant, the Braudelian view regarding the East Mediterraneanin the second


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OTTOMANSAND DUTCH IN THE COMMERCIAL NTEGRATION 215half of the centurybecomesquestionable.48raudel s correctregarding he de-cline of the Dutchrole in bulky commodities n the South in this period.Butthe Dutchtrade n luxuriesdid not decline,rathert increased. n fact, it reacheditspeakespecially ntextileproductsn the thirdquarterf the seventeenthentury.49In additionto Israel, Van Dillen also states that the Dutch Mediterraneantrade increased after 1645 (Israel 1989; Van Dillen 1970). Furthermore, l-though they faced strong English and Frenchcompetition,the Dutch in theLevantcontinuedo beimportantntil he asttwo decadesof thecentury.However,it mustbe said that the main rivalsof the Dutchin Ottoman erritorieswere theEnglishtraders n the middleof the century,not the French.50But towardstheend of the century, he FrenchLevant tradeexpandedmore than both Englishand the Dutch.As a matter of fact, in the middle of the century,Dutch EasternMediter-raneantradewas of a differentnature hanat the beginning.While in the firsthalf of the century he Dutchexportsto the Empireconsistedof silver,colonialproducts,and certain uxuryandbulkycommodities; owards he middle of thecentury,by contrast, he compositionof tradehad drasticallychangedand theDutchbegan to importmostly raw materials or textiles and exporttheir ownmanufacturedroducts Posthumus1939: 2. 273). Thiswas a kindof captureofthe Ottomantextile marketfrom the Italians, in competitionwith England.Furthermore,hey also became importersof the raw materialsof the textilesfrom the Empireto the whole of WesternEurope.Woodis of the opinionthat the Dutch becamea strengthn the Levantowingto the differentpolicies pursuedby the Ottomans owardsthe western nations(Wood 1935: 54-55). In fact, except for the Venetians,the Ottomans ollowedthe samepoliciestowards heotherwestern rading ationsntheLevant, specially

48 The reportsand letters of Dutch representatives n the Levant to the Netherlands indi-cate that the Dutch trading activities increased from the middle of the century in the EastMediterraneanARA SG 12593; ARA LH 97, 98, 99, 100, 122, 123, 161). Ottoman archivaldocumentsin Istanbulalso reveal that the Dutch shipping and tradingactivities increased inthe Levant towards the middle of the century(BBA MD 39, 100, 76, 192-193).49 Accordingto the Ottoman archivalrecords,in the second half of the century,the Empiremainly exportedraw materials for textiles such as mohair, cotton,wool, silk, and agriculturalproductssuch as grapes, figs and some otherproductssuch as coffee and oil. While the Dutchmerchantsbroughtin cloth, lakens, sugar, Asian and colonial products,coffee, clove, cinna-

mon, lead, tin, cooper, mercury,etc. the primary trading productswere the textile materials(BBA, ED 22/1: 502, 523, 569, 591, 642, 647, 687, 697, 704, 860, 898, 1035, 1087, 1165,1351, 1529, 1622, 1627, 1823, 1916, 1974, 1990, 2184).50 The Dutch Levant trade volume amounted to 12 million livres annually in the middleof the century,while the Frenchwas about 6-7 million annually(McGowen 1981: 21).


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216 MEHMETULUTas regards o the Englishand Dutch. It is a fact thatthe Venetian-Turkish arof 1645-1669paralysed he sale of Venetianwoollen cloth through he OttomanEmpire,and the Dutch seized this opportunity.The Dutch merchants,who took advantageof the trade routesat this time,reached a very good positionin the Levantin the 1650s. Their trade activitiesflourishedn Izmiras well as in otherportsof the Levant.Theirtradeactivitiesin the Levant increased o such a degreethat in 1649 Englishmerchants om-plainedthat the Dutch merchantswere capturing he Levant trade because oftheir large ships, cheap freight and low charges, and that large quantitiesofTurkishgoods were reaching England via Dutch sources (Wood 1935: 54).On a few occasions and especially when the Anglo-Dutchwar broke out in1652, the Dutch made no secret of their aim to drive the English out of theLevanttradeby makingthe Mediterraneanoo dangerous or them.They couldeasily managethis because they collaboratedwith Ottomanmerchants Wood1935: 55).

By the middleof the century, he essence of the Dutch Levanttrade becamethe exchangeof mohairyarnsfor the Dutch fine woollen clothwhich was madein Leidenand Haarlem.OttomanAnatoliaappearedas the foremostmarket orthis commodityand it was the only sourceof supplyof mohairyarn, the rawmaterial or camlet,which was Leiden's second most significantproductafterlakenduring his period.By the 1670s the DutchRepublicbecamea significantimporterof wool as well. It was dependentuponraw materials romSpainandespecially from OttomanAnatolia. During the third quarterof the century,exports of Leiden lakens to izmir and Aleppo rose to aroundsix thousandpieces yearly (Heeringa1910: 98, 303).Israelbelieves that the most successfulphase of the value of Dutch woollenproductsexportedto the Ottomanswas duringthe thirdquarterof the seven-teenth century(Israel 1989: 224-27). It must be added that the Dutch Leeu-wendaalders upplantedhe Spanishpiece of eight as the preferred oin in theLevantmarkets.TOWARDSTHE COMMERCIALNTEGRATIONBETWEENTHE LEVANTANDATLANTIC

One can presume hat the rise of the Ottoman-Atlanticommercialrelationsinfluenced he Europeanworldeconomyandconsequentlyncreased he volumeof internationalradeand broughtnew tradingpartners o the Levant.Hence,traditional ommercialrelationsbegan to changebetween the OttomanEmpireand the Westerners. The middle of the seventeenth century marked a new stagein the pattern of Ottoman-Europeaneconomic relations: Ottoman raw materials


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OTTOMANS AND DUTCH IN THE COMMERCIAL NTEGRATION 217

beganto be exchanged or manufactured uropean oods, andthe Ottoman er-ritoriesbegan to be openedto the Europeanmarkets.51The Ottomanstaple and open door policy towardsthe new westerntradingnations n the Levantcreatednew commercial entres n the MiddleEast.Whilebeforethe seventeenth entury, he Europeanswere mostly in favour of Aleppo,duringthat time they discovered he new tradingand producingcentres of theEmpire:Ankara,Bursa, Salonica, Cyprusand Izmir. In the beginningof theOttoman-Dutch elations,Antwerpand Aleppo were two importantcommer-cial centres,but laterizmir became the commercialcentre for the world econ-omy in the Levant,while Amsterdambecame the centre of internationalradein Europe.For the Europeans, zmirbecame the international ntrepot or all kinds ofcommodities between the East and the West while the other cities becameimportantproducingand local tradingcentres.All these centresproduced hemain raw materials or the textile industriesof the EmpireandEurope.Follow-ing such tradingcentresas Aleppo, Istanbul,Bursa,Cyprus,and Izmir;someothercities alsobecameproductionentres.From hemiddleof thecentury nwards,all these centresappeared o becomevery important ities in providing he rawmaterials or the Europeanworld economy.

Ottoman oreigntrade did not fall in value after the decline of the WesternMediterraneanconomy.Instead of the Italians,due to the Ottomaneconomicpolicy, the NorthernEuropeansbecame the leadingwestern traders n the latesixteenthand seventeenthcentury.By grantingprivileges (capitulations)o theFrenchandEnglish n the sixteenthcentury,and laterto the Dutch in the seven-teenthcentury,the Levanttradecontinued n the early modernperiod.Never-theless, the Ottoman-Dutchcommercial relations markedthe beginning ofcertainchangesin the productionprocessof the Ottomaneconomy.Although he Ottomaneconomicpolicy was directlyconcernedwith the con-trol of the economy,it seems that the mainobjectiveof this policy was not toprotectOttomanmanufacturesrom foreign competition.On the contrary, heSublime Porte maintained ts traditional iberal policy.52While the Ottomansmade a greatdeal of profit by exportingraw materials o the countries n the

51 We can get an idea about the merchandise,which was tradedbetween the Levant andWestern Europein the second half of the seventeenthcenturyfrom the Appendix. It revealsthe amount of custom duties on certaingoods. It also shows how much duties were paid byDutch merchantsto Ottomanauthoritiesper article.

52 It can be said that the Ottomangovernment'smain concern was taxationand allocation,and open borders for commodities were perceived as a means to increase income in thisrespect.


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218 MEHMETULUTAtlantic,the economyof the Empirebeganto becomea producerof raw mate-rials for WesternEuropeas well as for the Leiden textile industry.Thus, byprovidingraw materials, he Levant marketbegan to play a significantrole inthe developmentof the textile industry n WesternEurope.For the OttomanEmpire his marked he beginningof becomingan exporterof raw textile mate-rials, particularly ilk,53 otton,mohairand wool rather hanbeing an exporterof manufactured roducts.Furthermore,he Ottomanswere not only importantin the seventeenth enturybecausethey supplied he Europeanswith raw mate-rials used in textile productionbut also with grain. Consequently,he Ottomaneconomy increasinglyopeneditself to Europe n agriculture,ndustryand tradein the same period.The regionalandinterregionalrade n grain,silk, cotton,mohairyarn,wool,silver, etc. flourishedand the productionof the raw materials ncreased n theOttomaneconomy.The treasuryof the Empirecollected a greatamountof cus-tom dutiesfromthe westernmerchants'activities n its territories.However,theOttoman extile manufacturersegan to be affectedby these developments,aswas observed n the case of the silk industries n Bursa(Cizakqa1978; 1985).The raw silk pricesin Bursa ncreasedby 293%in the periodbetween 1550 and1650. One can concludethat the increasedexportsof raw materialsfrom theEmpire o Europe, n whichthe Europeanraders, speciallythe EnglishandtheDutch had a significantrole, providean explanation or these price increases.54In fact, the Ottoman ndustrialproductiondid not decline in the seventeenthcenturyeither.55However,the Europeandemand or raw textile materials ed tosome changesin the industrialproductionof the Empire.The Ottomans hem-selves startedto preferEuropeancloth and concentrated n the productionofthe raw materials nsteadof final cloth products.This processbegan to accel-eratetowardsthe middleof the seventeenthcentury.Domestic final cloth pro-ductionentereda new phase of stagnationafter tremendouslyncreasingyarn

53 Silk exports from the Empireto the West included both the Ottomans' own productionand some Iraniansilk. This meant that the OttomanEmpirewas the exporterof Iraniansilkto the West as well as of its own production.However, the exact share of Iraniansilk intotal Ottomanexports of silk is difficult to determine.54 The lack of data on raw materialsused in textile production n the Empirefor the periodbetween 1571 and 1699 leads to some difficulties n making a complete analysis of the topic.

The Dutch were active in trade of cotton, silk and especially mohair yarn. Therefore,iizakqa's study in particularmay give an idea about the results and effects of Europeanimports from the Empire as regards Ottoman industrial production in the early modernperiod.55 For more informationon the industrialproductionof the Empirein the seventeenthcen-tury, see Gerber 1988 and Quataert1994.


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OTTOMANS ND DUTCH N THECOMMERCIALNTEGRATION 219exportsto the Atlantic world. Consequently,mohairyarn (sof) productionandthe numberof producersncreased n Ankara n the seventeenthcentury.Fur-thermore, he populationof Ankara n the seventeenth enturydid not decreaseand may have in fact grown.56Accordingto Cizakga, the prices of locally producedcloth also increasedduring he sameperiod,but at a far slower rate than the raw materials Cizakqa1978). The increasein the Europeandemandfor the raw materials ed to thegrowthof productionn raw materialsn the Ottoman conomy.While thepricesof raw materials ncreased,clothpricesfailed to increaseat the same rate. As aresult of this development,he production f raw materialsbecame moreprofit-able than the production f cloth in the OttomanEmpire.This probablycauseda relative shift in domesticactivityfromthe production f cloth to the produc-tion of rawmaterials.This developmentmarks he mutual nfluenceof the Otto-man economy and the westernEuropeanworld economy in the early modernperiod.OttomanseventeenthcenturyobserverNaima complained hat the Em-pire beganto become the main area for production f raw materialsbut a goodmarket or consumptionof final textile products Naima 1866: vol. IV, 293).Nevertheless,as Pamuk57tates, the Ottomanmanufactureswere not sub-jected to any seriouscompetition romEuropean ndustryuntil later. Until thenineteenthcentury,the volume of trade with Europeremained imited and theimportswere primarily uxury goods and items such as colonial wares whichdid not competewith domesticallyproducedgoods (Pamuk1999b:23). I agreewith this statement.However,due to the Ottoman-Dutchconomicrelations heinfluenceof the WesternEuropeansbeganto appear n the Ottomaneconomy. 58This effectemerged n two ways: first n the purchaseof rawmaterials,andthenin the sale of the finishedproducts.Nevertheless, t must be emphasised hat theEuropeaneffect on the industrialproductionof the Empirein the seventeenthcenturyremained imited.Some historiansview the Ottomaneconomicrelationswith the newly risingwestern nations in the seventeenth century as a revolution in internationaltrade.59 add that the most dynamicwestern nation in this respect was theDutch.Especiallyregarding he circulationof western coins in the Levant,the

56 The following kadi sicilleri (AKS) of Ankara are related to the beginning and the endof the seventeenthcentury. They clearly indicate that the population,volume of mohairpro-duction and the number of producers ncreasedduringthe seventeenthcentury:vols, 3, 4, 5,6, 7, 8, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71.

57 I am gratefulto the authorfor allowing me to read partof his book in manuscript orm.58 Of course, Ottoman-Englishand Frenchrelationsmust also be taken into account.59 For more information see Steensgaard 1972, 1974; McGowan 1981; Mantran 1987;Masters 1988; Goldstone 1990; Goffman 1990; 1995 and Jennings 1993.


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220 MEHMETULUTsignificance in the Ottoman economy of the Dutch lion dollars (leeuwen-daalders) must be emphasised.The characteristic feature of the Levant trade had long been the fact that alarge proportionof the payments for Oriental products had to be made with pre-cious metals. The Dutch merchants were therefore faced with the necessity ofacquiring precious metals for their trade with the Levant.The estimates of the bullion export show that during the second half of theseventeenth century, Dutch trade in coins did not decline in the EasternMediterranean,rather it increased. According to table 1, Dutch bullion exportsincreased in East Asia and the Levant, but in the Baltic, they were at the samelevel at the beginning and at end of the seventeenth century. The growth ofEastern Asian trade was much more significant, however.

Table 1. Holland'sBullionExports1600-1700(Inmillionsof rix-dollars er year)Trade Area Around 1600 Around 1650 Around 1700The Baltic 2 2.5 2The Levant 0.6 0.8 1The Eastern Asia 0.3 0.4 2Total 2.9 3.7 5.0Source:Attman (1983: 103)Note: The only precise figures regarding precious metals requiredfor the Western Euro-pean-Levantinetrade relate to the Dutch merchantswho in 1614 importedinto Aleppo-apartfrom goods-0.6 million rix-dollars in Spanish reals as well. According to Attman(1983: 8): 1 rix-dollar= 25.98 grammesof silver, 1 rix-dollar= 2.5 Dutch guilders (after1606), 1 guilder = 20 Dutch stuivers,and 1 rix-dollar= 50 Dutch stuivers.

In 1614, there was a registration in Aleppo of the Dutch trading growthwhich was estimated at 0.6 million rix-dollars (1.5 million guilders). The otherregister is related to 1683. This estimate amounted to 0.8 million rix-dollars forthe volume of goods in izmir (Attman 1983: 93). It means that the Dutch tradeto the Ottoman Empire amounted to nearly 2 million Dutch guilders.

Furthermore,during the seventeenth century, both France and England trans-ported 1 million rix-dollars yearly and Venice 0.4 million rix-dollars to theLevant. The total supply of precious metals to the ports of the Levant duringthe seventeenth century can be estimated to be around 2 million rix-dollars(table 2). It means that, in the seventeenth century, the Dutch merchants weremore active and effective than other westerners in exporting precious metals tothe Ottoman territories. Pamuk points out that the Ottoman import of the west-


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OTTOMANS NDDUTCH N THECOMMERCIALNTEGRATION 221ern coins reached the peak between 1656 and 1669, which is the period of theDutch zenith in the Levant trade.60

Table 2. EstimatedAnnual Exportsof Precious Metals fromEuropeto the East (in million of rix-dollarsper year)Year 1600 1650 1700Levant 1 2 2The Baltic region 1.7-2 2.3-3 2.3-3The route the Cape 1 1.7 3.3Total 3.7-4 6.6-7 7.6-8.3

Source: Attman(1983: 12)

When a cargo of 200,000 Dutch lion dollars arrived at Aleppo in 1677, thegrand vizier ordered the whole consignment to be seized and although the dol-lars proved to be of full measure, it cost 15,000 dollar to secure their release(Wood 1935: 101). The Dutch leeuwendaalders were not only used by theDutch merchants, but also by other western nations, especially the English whoalso exported Dutch lion dollars to the Empire.61The Dutch lion dollars becamethe main western coins of demand in the Ottoman markets in the seventeenthcentury. Dutch merchants played a major role in the import of these coins tothe Empire.

Cotton, linen, wool, silk and mohair yarn became the main raw material forWestern European textile industries in the seventeenth century. Ankara becamean importantproducingandtradingcentre for mohairyarnin the middle of Anatolia,while Bursa was a significant production and trading centre for silk in the west-ern part of Turkey. The Dutch merchants in the seventeenth century, and latermerchants from other western nations tried to establish their own production

60 Pamuk states that the peak in the traffic was reached between 1656 and 1669. J.B.Tavernierestimates the total volume of Europeancoinage that went throughthe Ottomancus-toms at 180 million pieces, or at more than ten million Spanishpieces of eight. In gold, thiscorresponded o more than six million Venetian ducats. In addition,some unknownquantitywas smuggled into Ottoman territory in part by bribing customs officials. According toanotherestimate, an average of 22 ships arrived at the port of Izmir every year duringthisperiod, all loaded with these debased pieces. Such volumes suggest that the remaining goodcoins in the Ottomanmarketswere being takenback to southernEuropeandreminted as baseluigini and re-imported o the Ottomanmarkets Pamuk 1997: 350).61 This silver coin was minted in Holland particularlyfor the Middle East. It was firstimportedinto Englandfrom Holland and then exportedto the Levant (Abbott 1920: 237-38).


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222 MEHMETBULUT

agents in either Ankara or Bursa, but never succeeded for any length of time.The Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim merchants controlled this trade andtransferredthe raw materials via Izmir to Western Europe.It may be said that the Ottoman exports, though they contained only a smallfraction of the total world trade in the early modern times, made a significantcontribution to the economic evolution of Western Europe. Main items from theLevant such as wheat, cereals, cattle, hides, olive oil, wool, linen, mohair, silkand cotton reached Europe and this led to the institutionalisation of internationalcommodity markets in world trade and production. The Dutch merchants werethe most active community both in the trade of bulky and luxury commoditiesbetween the Empire and Europe. They sent these products not only to Holland,but also to Italy, France, Germany, England, and also to some other places inEurope.Moreover, the Netherlands became the main entrepot for the distribution ofthe Levantine products to the European world during the same period. Dutchships to the Ottoman ports sailed from many different ports of Europe: Ham-burg, Danzig, Amsterdam,Enkhuizen,Rotterdam,Dordrecht,Cadiz, Lisbon, Emden,Barcelona, Zante, Marseilles, Genoa, Naples, Leghorn and Malta. This trans-portation and commercial network between Europe and the Levant made theflow of commodities between the two regions possible.The commercial expansion of Europe and the accumulation of capital led tothe creation of new industries, particularly in the area of textiles, which had tofind export markets to continue their expansion. The fundamental inputs of theFrench, English and Dutch textile industries were silk, cotton, linen, mohairyarn and wool. England mainly imported silk, wool and cotton while Franceand the Dutch Republic mostly imported cotton, silk and mohair. Due to theexchange of goods and differences in currency rate, the Levant trade was veryprofitable for the Western European economies. The European Levant compa-nies accumulated great wealth from this trade. Their consuls and ambassadorswere active in protecting their commercial rights. Many of them were even per-sonally involved in commercial activities.

Consequently, the Ottoman Empire increasingly opened its economy toWestern Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With the wideningof the network between the two regions, the commercial relations of theOttoman-Dutch merchants increased significantly. This development created anew situation between the markets of the two regions, the Levant and North-western Europe. Especially due to the Ottoman-Dutch commercial relations, atrend began to develop towards the integration of the European world economywith the Levant, and a world market for goods was based on international sup-


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OTTOMANS AND DUTCH IN THE COMMERCIAL NTEGRATION 223ply and demand.These relationsplayeda crucialrole during he early stage ofthe integrationbetweenthe Ottomaneconomywith the Europeanworld econ-omy in the seventeenthcentury.However,it did not constitute ull integrationof the economyof the Empireand the Europeancapitalistworld economy.Itwas only the startingpoint for the integrationof the two economies and thistrendcontinueduntil the construction f railways n the late nineteenth entury.CONCLUSION

The Ottoman-Dutchommercial elations n the seventeenth entury epresentthe relations between the European capitalist world economy and a WorldEmpire. As an expanding tradingnation in the world economy, the DutchRepublic played an important ole in the commercial ntegrationbetween theprovincesof the OttomanEmpireandWesternEurope n the sameperiod.Thegrowth of Ottoman-Dutch conomic relationsin the seventeenthcenturyfol-lowed the growth of the economic relations between the provinces of theEmpireand WesternEurope.Therefore, he two world economic systems, theOttomanand WesternEuropeaneconomiesincreasinglyopenedto each other.The point is that the Ottomanshad no politicalconflictwith this newly risingwesterncapitalistnationin the concernedperiod.Moreover, his tradingnationwas an Ottomanally in the West.Fromthe last decadesof the sixteenthcenturythe Dutch merchantshad anincreased nterest n the Mediterranean. ut, the trade n thisregionwas not sosecurefor the Dutch seamen. The hazardous onditions n the regionmotivatedthe Dutch to establish formal economic relations with the Ottomans.In fact,both the Ottomansand the Dutch had economic andpoliticalinterests n coop-eration n the improvement f theirrelationships.Israel'sviews supportour findingsthatpoliticalreasonsplayeda role in therise of the DutchMediterraneanradeduring he earlymodernperiod.Then,inunderstandinghe Dutch role in the Levanttrade,the Ottomanpolicies towardsthe Dutch shouldbe taken nto consideration.ndeed,the Ottomangovernmentswere friendly owards he Dutch.Thus,in 1612, the OttomanEmpireand DutchRepublic formallyestablishedeconomic and politicalrelationships,n that thefirstcapitulationswere granted o the Dutch. With this the Dutch succeeded nobtaining avourableprivilegesfrom the OttomanSultan AhmedI, comprising

seventy-fivearticles of trade which defined Dutchliberties on the subject.These articles allowed the Dutchformal access to the Ottomanmarkets.It is clear thatthe OttomanEmpirefollowed an opendoor policy towardsthe Dutch merchants. Having the privileges granted by the Empire, the Dutch


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224 MEHMET BULUTmerchantscould extend their trade activities easier thanbefore in the portsofthe Ottoman ands. The OttomanEmpire granted hem two more capitulationsin the seventeenthcentury(1634 and 1680). It must be pointed out that therenewedcapitulationsmeant a betterstatus anda moretolerant ituation or theDutch merchantsn the Ottoman erritory.The important hingis that a new sul-tan confirmsthe 'old' privilegesof the Dutch merchants. n the same respectthe capitulations re modifiedto take into consideration he changesin tradingpatterns mohair).Many historiansstress that the increasingDutch role in the Mediterraneanwas dependentuponthe trade n bulkycommodities. srael,by contrast, tronglyarguesthat it was dependenton the tradein luxurycommodities.Braudel andhis followers arguethat the Dutch decline started n the mid-seventeenth en-turydue to the disappearance f Baltic grain transportso the Mediterranean.Ourstudyhas confirmed hat towards he middleof the seventeenth entury,a new featuren the commercial elations etween heOttomans ndDutchemerged.They became significant exporters of manufacturedgoods to the OttomanEmpirefrom Europe duringthe same period.The Dutch began to become themain importerof mohairyarn and the mainexporterof lakensand camlets.Inthis respect,commercialrelationsflourished owardsthe middle of the seven-teenthcenturyand the Dutch Levanttradewitnessed ts zenithin the thirdquar-ter of the century.In the last decades of the centurydue to the flourishingOttoman-Frenchand Englishrelations and the mercantilistpolicies of these two nationsagainstthe Dutch in the EasternMediterranean,he Ottoman-Dutchommercialrela-tions began to decline relative to those of the other western tradingnations.Therefore,once again the politicalconditionsandwars playedtheirrole in theOttoman-Dutchconomicrelations.

One can observethat the Ottoman conomicpolicy playedsome role in thesedevelopments.The Ottomangovernmentwas able to maintain ts controloverthe presenceof westerntradingnationswithin its bordersthroughouthe sev-enteenthcentury.Besides the Dutch and English, the Ottomansopened theirmarkets o the French n the last quarterof the century.They renewedFrenchcapitulations n 1673 and English ones in 1675. After this period the Dutchtradebeganto be adverselyaffectedby the FrenchandEnglishexpansion n theEasternMediterranean. he fact is that the seventeenthcenturywitnessedthecommercialntegration etweenthe Levantand Atlantic.Both the OttomansandDutchplayed an important ole in this development.


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OTTOMANSAND DUTCH IN THE COMMERCIAL NTEGRATION 225APPENDIX

TYPESOFTRADINGGOODSAND TARIFFS PPLIED Y THE DUTCHAMBASSADOROF THE LEVANT N 1675Merchandise rom Christiancountries

Articles Weight Amount (lion dollars)Couchenille from Mexico By weight (occa) 12Sylvester 0.66Indigo dye 3from Guatemala ' 3Pepper 0.75Cloves 6Cinnamon 4Nutmeg ' 3.5Ginger 0.25Vermilion 3Silver 2Whale-teeth 7Elephant-tusks IBread-sugar 0.75Amber

By weight (cantar)Copperwire 40Iron wire t 14Red copper 2Venetian steel 9Danzig steel 8Load 5English 27White load ' 7Brazilian wood 16Japanesewood 7SandalwoodLetterwoodEbonyDutch cloth (laken) from By the piece (stuck)A half piece from 45-50 ellEnglish cloth by the piece 80Venetian clothGenoese velvet ' 200Florentine velvetFlorentine satinLuca's satin


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226 MEHMET ULUTExport of merchandise rom the OttomanEmpire to Christiancountries

Articles Weight Amount (lion dollars)Seeds By weight (occa) 0.66AloeArmature ' 0.25Smoke 1.25Leather 0.66Skin 0.25Wool ' 1.50Gall By weight (cantar) 8Yellow-wax 22Wood 1Cotton 6Cotton thread 18Wool 4.5Alum 2PotashPaint By the piece (stuck) 50Skins 1.25Tapestry 1Source:AGA,Lev. Handel5, 5028: 533Note: 1 occa (okka):1.282495kg1 cantar kantar)= 100 lodra= 17600 dirhem= 56.443kg. For more nformation n Ottomanmetrologyee inalclk1993.REFERENCES ND SOURCESPrimary SourcesTurkeyIstanbul,BaybakanlikAryivi (BBA)Bab-i Asafi Kalemleri (BA), numbers: 30 and 902.Bab-i HarameynMukatasi (BHM), number: 20Ecnebiye Defterleri (ED), numbers:13, 20, 22, 24, 26MaliyedenMiidevverDefterler (MM), numbers:2765, 6004, 6006, 6632MiihimmeDefterleri (MD), numbers:73, 80, 90, 107MiihimmeZeyli Defterleri (MZD), number: 8Ankara,Milli Kiitiiphane,Ankara Kadi Sicilleri (AKS),vols: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 65, 66, 67, 68,69, 70, 71.The NetherlandsThe Hague, AlgemeenRijksarchief(ARA)Staten Generaal (SG), numbers:12593/34, 35, 38, 57, 61, 63, 64, 72, 76Directie van de LevantseHandel (LH), numbers:73, 74, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 121,122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 161, 5028Lias Barbarije, numbers:6889, 6898, 6900, 6901Leiden, Leiden University Library,OrientalManuscripts MSS), numbers:1112, 1122, 1598Gemeentearchief,Stadsarchief,number:1280


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the role of the ottomans and dutch in the commercial integration between the levant-mehmet bulut

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