The Role of the Sophists in Histories of ConsciousnessAuthor(s): Susan C. JarrattSource: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1990), pp. 85-95Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237621Accessed: 11/11/2010 03:32

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The Rôle of the Sophists in Historiés of Consciousness

Susan C. Jarratt

I. Introduction

Intellectual historians often characterize the fifth Century b.c. as a

turning point in the development of human consciousness.1 The

Century is seen as a period of rational révolution , marking a transfor- mation from one form of thought to another, with various pairs of terms denoting the two pôles: archaic to rational,2 oral to literate,3 mythic to logicai.4 Despite their différences, ail thèse "enlighten- ment" narratives share the assumption that certain mental opéra- tions are not possible on the far side of that Great Divide.5 Specifi- cally missing before this révolution, say thèse accounts, is thè criticai

reflexivity necessary for conceiving and using a fully developed logic. This historical formulation is under attack, at least implicitly, from several directions in thè contemporary criticai arena. Decon-

struction, for example, with its challenge to the binary basis of Western philosophy , questions the dualities on which thèse historiés rest. Feminists hâve raised questions about thè validity of a univer- salized "rationality" immune from the effects of gender, and a lively debate is underway among literacy scholars over the possible biases built into the orality/literacy scheme against what are termed "oral" cultures. These critiques raise questions for the historian of classical

rhetoric, who seeks to corne to terms with what Lloyd calls the Grand Dichotomy.6 Because of their ambiguous status, the first

Sophists offer a criticai point of entry into thèse apparently seamless narratives of cognitive development. This essay will engage in a

historiographical exploration of some historiés that rely on the en-

lightenment motif, using the discourse and politicai practice of the first Sophists as a measure of their explanatory power, and asking particularly what can intellectual history in a broad sensé learn from a history of rhetoric.

Though the Sophists are often placed on a mythosl logos contin-

uum, historians are undecided about where they should fall within it. For E. R. Dodds, the Sophists stage a completely "rational"

rejection of thè "conglomerate of religious views" which had rig-

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1990. Published by The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London.

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86 SUSAN C. JARRATT

idly controlied behavior under a patriarchal shame culture. Doing what he styles anthropological history, Dodds positions the Soph- ists astutely within the évolution of ethical Systems. But Dodds's

reading leaves out any emotional component to the sophistic pro- cess of restructuring social control because he ignores their dis- course practice.7 From another perspective, thè Sophists occupy a sort of boundary status between thèse two worlds. Solmsen8 and

Lloyd,9 for example, acknowledge the Sophists' innovations in ar-

gument as contributions to the rational enlightenment, but only as a stage along the way to Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's Organon. These historiés, masterful treatments of their particular thèmes to the extent they touch on the Sophists, suffer from the shorteoming Kerferd has noted in Hegelian historiés such as Zeller's; i.e., the füll scope of sophistic thought is unrecognized when their move- ment appears only as a subjective antithesis to Platonic idealism.10 Another historian focusing on forms of language, Jacqueline De

Romilly attributes to Sophist Gorgias a rational irrationality: he theorized émotions and systematized style as a way of learning and

Controlling the magical power of language.11 De Romilly narrâtes the eventual suppression of Gorgias's magical rhetoric by the di-

vinely inspired magie of Socrates12 and thè logicai techne of Aris- totle.13 But her account leaves out the historical or politicai reasons

why such a shift would occur, as John O. Ward has observed.14 She attributes the reemergence of a magical rhetoric in the French

Symbolist poets in the nineteenth Century to an accidentai pendu- lum swing of préférence.

The dualistic trope informing thèse historiés finds its most ex- treme expression in the work of the orality/literacy scholars Ong and Havelock. In Havelock's literacy studies, the Sophists are bur- ied under the sweep of "philosophy" in its progress toward the

fully "rational" mind.15 Though ail the historians I hâve mentioned

emphasize the complexity of the transition from the mythic to the

logicai, Havelock sometimes draws thè line between two states of consciousness quite sharply. He writes, "With the slow transition from verse to prose and from concrete towards abstract, the man

[sic] of intelligence came to represent thè master of a new form of communication . . . nowanti-poetic."16 Under thisview, the Soph- ists fall short of the füll realization of a rational, literate conscious- ness because of the traces of oral, poetic language left in their

persuasive discourse. It's worth noting that Havelock wrote a pro- vocative study of the Sophists' social theory and politicai dis-

THE ROLE OF THE SOPHISTS 87

course17 before the literacy work but never integrateci thè two

approaches. The complexity of the Sophists' legacy, in light of the array of

représentations offered by the studies cited above, suggests the need for historical treatments that bridge catégories such as intel- lectual history as history of ideas and social history as an empiri- cally based reconstruction of the past. My aim hère will be to examine Jean-Pierre Vernant's The Origins of Greek Thought,

18 a

history I feel provides a fruitful cross-fertilization of historiographi- cal strains by "inquiring into the relationship between social pro- cesses and the interprétation of texts."19 Vernant's account of the

politicai origins of a fifth-century mode of discourse and conscious- ness will lead me to suggest a médiation of the mythosl logos duality through the term nomos. Finally, 1*11 briefly consider the work of

Gorgias in light of thèse rereadings.

II. Development of Démocratie Discourse from Mycenae Forward

We know from Homer that poetic recitation was not the only form of public discourse before the democracy. Debate character- ized decision-making in the highest class for centuries before the formalization of rhetoric. In the hereditary kingships of a warrior

culture, the right to speak with authority feil most often to the head of the highest-born family. But a warrior-king would cali on a Council of fellow-leaders to help him with important décisions be- cause he needed their military and material support.20 Book II of the Iliad offers the most vivid account of conflicts within one aristo- cratie Council between warriors-kings with competing claims for

priori ty. The handing round by heralds of the scepter designating the right to speak concretizes the process of exchanging opinion.21 In the Achilles shield passage from Iliad XVIII, we see repre- sented the adjudication of a legal dispute, including the participa- tion of elders, litigants, and crowd. With this literary background in place, I'd like to look closely at Vernant's view that politicai organization from the Mycenaean period (1600-1150 b.c.) forward created certain forms of language use quite différent from the

poetic recitation described by orality/literacy scholars.22 Under the palace rule of the Mycenaean period, villagers, each

holding a section of land in a feudal arrangement, met in a com- mon space perhaps for the purpose of deciding questions of agricul-

88 SUSAN C. JARRATT

turai practice or thè nature of requests to be delivered to thè king and his Council.23 Though opportunities for speaking in thèse meet-

ings were surely not equally distributed, thè discourse context sug- gests a substantially différent rôle for thè listener/participant than that of thè audience for a recitation of epic verse, who, according to thè orality/literacy scholars, would have been lulled into a hyp- notic state by thè regulär meter of thè verse and its predictable content. Ultimately, argues Vernant, thè politicai space of these

village meetings became defined as a place for negotiating between thè warrior and craft or land-working classes. This meeting space was clearly not thè interior of thè Mycenaean palace, from which law would be passed down arbitrarily, but rather a "middle space," in which "those who contended with words, who opposed speech with speech, became [even] in this hierarchical society a class of

equals."24 Out of thè graduai process of democratization on several fronts - from kingship to thè coalition-building of thè tyrants to thè shared responsibility of oligarchy, from thè independence of thè horse warrior to thè collectve effort of thè hoplite phalanxes -

relations of equality deriving from récognition of similarity created more contexts during thè Archaic period (800-480 b.c.) for rhetori- cal discourse prior to thè actual reforms leading to democracy in thè sixth Century.

These social and politicai changes suggest a much différent form of consciousness than thè "mythic." If thè voice of thè minstrel were like a voice inside one's own head, thè voices of fellow deme, councilor, or king might, in contrast, have generated responses or

questions in thè mind of thè listener in a dialogic fashion. The

development of a choral leader and a communal response began to

produce such exchanges in poetry itself . This concept of changing communal identification - from individuai to group - exactly re- verses thè direction of change from a communal consciousness into individualism posited by thè enlightenment narrative. It fore-

grounds thè perception of shared interests necessary for rhetoric to work. More generally it demonstrates that a change in conscious- ness can be traced to other sources than thè development of liter-

acy, and with différent results.

III. Nomos

Though Vernant maintains thè concept of rationality in his his-

tory, it is not built on a dichotomous mode of consciousness, but

THE ROLE OF THE SOPHISTS 89

rather émerges out of a complex web of social and politicai as well as cognitive conditions. One way of recasting historical discourse is

by changing thè key terms through which a narrative circulâtes. I'd like to engage now in a bit of philological exploration as a way of

pushing a bit harder to dislodge thè twin columns of myth and

logic. Shaping rules for local democracies engaged thè Greeks in an epistemological struggle. Under thè old System of aristocratie

kingship, law could ultimately be attributed to a source of author-

ity outside of human expérience, the will of the gods. Statutes themselves, or thesmoi, were assumed to be imposed externally. But the growing importance of group délibération in making politi- cai décisions adjusted thinking about the origin and nature of "law." While law was codified as early as thè late seventh Century by Dracon, the change in concept is recorded etymologically in the

abrupt replacement at the time of Cleisthenes of thesmos by nomos, denoting law "as the expression of what the people as a whole regard as a valid and binding norm."25 Some reflection on the changing meanings of nomos through the Archaic period may help to mark out a space for thè politicai within the linguistic territory of thè "mythic" and thè "logicai."

The oldest form of nomos meant "pasture," but even within the Homeric epic it was used metaphorically for "a range of words" and in Pindar to mean "habitation."26 An apparently later form

(the accent moves to the first syllable, but both derive from the same verb, nemo) complètes thè metaphorical transfer from an

agricultural to a human domain, signifying "habituai practice, us-

age, or custom." But common to both forms is the importance of human agency: in the first case, in the marking out and distributing of land; and in the second, in explicitly human ratification of norms as binding. Originally something "apportioned, distributed or dispensed," nomos came to mean something "believed in, practised or held to be right."27 The earliest assemblies, whose business concerned the distribution of land, grew into the Councils of military advisers and finally the représentative assemblies legis- lated by Solon's and Cleisthenes' reforms, whose functions in- cluded making décisions about a füll range of social and politicai issues. Rhetoric can be closely linked with nomos as a process of

articulating codes, explicitly understood to be controlied by groups of people and opposed both to the monarchical tradition of law by edict and to the non-human force of "unwritten," divine law.

These définitions help to locate a moment when changing struc-

90 SUSAN C. JARRATT

tures of power and social order coincided with changes in language use. Nomos marks, on thè one hand, a différence from social order and law under a mythic tradition,28 and, on thè other, looking toward the fourth Century, an epistemological alternative to phi- losophy as the ground of logic and timeless truth. It stands for the

process of reformulating human "truths" in historically and geo- graphically spécifie contexts. A substitution of nomos for logos appears in Vernant's description of Solon's law as nomos - a kind of politicai rationalism, "reigning in the place of the king at the center of thè city."29 In contrast to a later metaphysical logos , Untersteiner defines nomos as the human capacity to "fix the main

headings of reality" by means of a "humanizing essence."30 In

epistemological terms nomos signifies the imposition of humanly determined patterns of explanation for naturai phenomena in con- trast to those assumed to exist "naturally" or without the conscious intervention of human intellect. Through this exploration of the term nomos, I wish to offer an alternative to the mythosllogos polari ty - an analytical frame for reconceiving a change in thought, language, and behavior. It allows the historian to reposition sophis- tic rhetoric within those changes, as a rhetoric ordered by a flexible

logic31 and utilized to construet knowledge across a range of fields and to codify norms of behavior in communally sanetioned forms.

Protagoras, with his human-as-measure doctrine, is the Sophist whose fragments and attributions are most easily assimilable to this use of nomos,11 but it will be more of a challenge to test out the

concept as a historical analytic in a reading of Gorgias, the Sophist most associated with the irrational.

IV. Gorgias

Though Gorgias was a diplomat and teacher of rhetoric, his

corpus suggests little interest in politicai délibération or law-

making. Indeed, his most famous text is a méditation not on nomos but logos. He identified possibly dangerous effeets of a language that couldn't be trusted to represent the phénoménal world, and on account of thèse spéculations and his highly self-conscious style, invites a charge of "irrationality." Opinion created by language can be "a most untrustworthy thing," says Gorgias in the Enco- nium to Helen (Sprague 60) ;33 speech, like a drug, can "bewitch the soul with a kind of e vil persuasion."34 But like some drugs, logos can also bring good effeets, saving life and causing delight.

THE ROLE OF THE SOPHISTS 91

Indeed, the awesome logos is "a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works."35

Gorgias's project was in part to understand how that complex process worked. Despite the radical propositions of On Nature, often taken to lead to nihilism, Gorgias doesn't deny any possibil- ity for communication. The point is that Being itself cannot be

communicated, but rather logos is what we communicate "to our

neighbors."36 On Segal's reading of the Helen, the internai process of verbal reception leads ultimately to persuasion of both individu- als and groups, the "psyché [being] the common denominator in both the collective and individuai situations."37 Gorgias, in other

words, recognizes and inquires into the psychological conditions of assent for the audience participating in a rhetorical exchange.38

In choosing Helen to exonerate from blame, he suggests that the

private, internai process of granting assent to the déceptions of

language can hâve a public impact. Further, that process is not

guided by the "rational" intellect. In his story of Helen's abduc-

tion, language is parallel with forces of violence, fate, and love, ail of which exceed the bounds of rational Containment. But it is anachronistic to speak of a psyché divided into rational and "irra- tional" realms where Gorgias is concerned; this division is the later work of Piato.39 Thus, for Gorgias logos signifies a holistic process of language production and reception. This logos shares with the so-called mythic consciousness an interest in the sensual pleasure afforded by rhythm and other sounds. But De Romilly's observa- tion that Gorgias's "magie" dérives from the rational control of a techne places thè producer of the discourse in a self-conscious relation to those effects,40 unlike the situation described by Have- lock for bards in the oral tradition who, he claims, had little con- scious control over the content of their recitations.

What is the rôle of the audience? Gorgias calls that emotional

expérience in thè space between reality and language "déception" (apate). While a Platonic desire for commensurability between word and thing will Interpret this term pejoratively, Gorgias emp- ties it of its moral charge, like Nietzsche in his redéfinition of "lies."41 The Sophist finds that in the création of tragedy, "the de- ceiver is more honest than the non-deceiver, and the deceived is wiser than the non-deceived."42 Rosenmeyer argues that for Gor-

gias logos is the only kind of speech possible, necessarily an apate.43 Déception is a function of any discourse event - rhetoric as well as

tragedy, philosophy as well as poetry. No significant distinctions

92 SUSAN C. JARRATT

concerning authenticity or truth-intention can divide thèse forais that we see today as separate genres, given the epistemological position of language for Gorgias. When Gorgias calls the deeeiver "wise," he draws attention to the audience's self-consciousness about their reception of a discursive performance; their mental par- ticipation and, eventually, their assent is required for any discourse to hâve the force of knowledge.

While we can see that the logos Gorgias explores is a quite différ- ent phenomenon from the rational structure of reasoning built by Piato and Aristotle, the Gorgian apate escapes an accusation of amoral manipulation because, in the Helen , it brings the conditions under which persuasion is effected in front of the audience as a

subject for considération. Thus the listeners are taught by the exam-

ple of Helen, who "against her will, might hâve come under the influence of speech, just as if ravished by the force of the mighty."44 The audience is made to contemplate the way logos works, "con-

straining the soûl . . . both to believe the things said and to approve the things done." Though the Greek is indeed enchanting in its

"poetic" effects, Gorgias's topic in the Helen would hardly be a

prudent one for an immoral word-magician, intent on fooling peo- ple with his mesmerizing oratory. Though Gorgias was certainly alerting Citizens to thè power of language and ways it could be used on the unsuspecting, the well-structured argument of his own dis- course tempers the beguiling effects of his style.45 In this perfor- mance piece, linguistic spéculation émerges within a narrative ré- évaluation of a mythic event. Gorgias balances the disturbing récog- nition of linguistic indeterminacy with the familiarity of myth, both

occurring within a clearly structured argument. The choice of Helen to go with Paris represents an instance of the

intersection of individuai interest with the interest of the commu-

nity. In fact, both of Gorgias's extant Speeches deal with transgres- sions of such codes: Paris violâtes the very important guest/host relationship by stealing Helen, and, in thè De f enee of Palamedes, Odysseus blatantly breaks the law by forging and lying about Palamedes' supposed treachery. These are issues of nomos. Other références to nomos in Gorgias's fragments suggest his interest in the social construction of proper behavior.46 Disturbed by anomia, Gorgias does warn against the dangers of asocial, individuai lawless- ness.47 These détails sketch a quite différent picture than that image often evoked by Piato of the Sophist as opportunistic manipulator of an easily duped public. Having exposed the complicated workings

THE ROLE OF THE SOPHISTS 93

of a holistic logos, Gorgias stimulâtes reflection on the conditions under which people both as individuals and in social groups create and act under their nomoi.

V. Conclusion: Locating the Sophists between Mythos and Logos

With the Sophists, nomos, understood especially as conscious

arrangement of discourse to create politically and socially signifi- cant knowledge, enters as a middle term between mythos and

logos. Ostwald points out the distance between nomos and a

philosophical logos: it is a belief, opinion, point of view, or intel- lectual attitude distinguished from transcendent "truth."48 As such, it stands for order, valid and binding on those who fall under its jurisdiction and thus becomes a social construct with ethical dimensions.49 1 believe that this term might be useful in a

progressive challenge to certain problematic extensions of the Grand Dichotomy view of the development of human thinking. For example, the application of this reassessment of the orality/ literacy thesis to current composition studies would cast serious doubt on the assumption that social groups who rely heavily on oral language forms are trapped in some sort of limited conscious- ness.50 Analysis of such language use, starting from thè premise that they embody the nomoi of the group that générâtes them, would seek to discover thè politicai force of arrangement, espe- cially given the usually lower status of so-called "oral" language users in a highly literate dominant culture. Furt her, such an appli- cation would contribute to a feminist analysis of "logicai" forms of discourse which explores their appeal to audiences on the whole register of responses and seeks to locate any System of

reasoning in thè context of thè power relationships embedded in discursive différences.

While not intending to diminish at ail the great achievements of historians like Dodds, Solmsen, De Romilly, and Havelock, I

hope that this pursuit of the Sophists into the interstices left open between mythos and logos might gesture in a direction indicated by Charles Kahn at a conférence celebrating the legacy of the Sophists a decade ago: Kahn advises that "politicai and technological ac- counts of thè rise of human culture belong together."51

Department of English Miami University Oxford, Ohio

94 SUSAN C. JARRATT

Notes

1. I wish to thank Walter Donlan and Peter W. Rose for helpful comments on this essay. I also benefited from the comments of participants at the 1989 meeting of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric in Göttingen, Germany, where the paper was first read.

2. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Boston: Beacon, 1957). 3. Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Piato (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press,

1963) and The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Conséquences (Prince- ton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1982); Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy. The Technolo- gizing ofthe Word (New York: Methuen, 1982).

4. Bruno Snell, The Discovery of Mind. The Greek Origins of European Thought, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953).

5. For a critique of binary historiés of the development of writing technology, see Beth Danieli, "Against the Great Leap Theory of Literacy," PRE/TEXT, 7 (1986): 181-93.

6. G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 1-6.

7. Dodds, p. 185. 8. Friedrich Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment

(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975). 9. Lloyd, pp. 169-71.

10. G. S. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 4-14.

11. Jacqueline De Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974).

12. Ibid., p. 36. 13. Ibid., p. 55. 14. John O. Ward, "Magic and Rhetoric From Antiquity to the Renaissance:

Some Ruminations." Rhetorica 6 (1988Ì: 88. 15. Havelock, Preface, p. 280. 16. Ibid.. D. 287. 17. Eric A. Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (New Haven: Yale

Univ. Press, 1957). 18. Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.

Press, 1982). 19. Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.

Press, 1983), p. 41. 20. M. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus, rev. ed. (New York: Viking Press,

1977), pp. 79-83; Walter Donlan, "The Dark Age Chiefdoms and the Emergence of Public Argument," paper (Speech Communication Association Convention. New Orleans, 5 November 1988).

21. This setting occurs, for example, at I. 245-46; II. 185-86, 278-82; and, XVIII.

22. Vernant, p. 39. 23. Ibid., pp. 32-34. 24. Ibid., p. 46. 25. Martin Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Demoer acy

(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), p. 55. 26. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Compilers. A Greek-English Lexi-

con, 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 1180. 27. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971),

P.55. 28. Kerferd, pp. 129-30; Dodds, pp. 183-34. 29. Vernant, p. 86. 30. Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, trans. Kathleen Freeman (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1954), p. 59. 31. Before the constraints of an inflexible logic of non-contradiction emerged in

THE ROLE OF THE SOPHISTS 95

the fourth Century b.c., the Sophists explored antithetical propositions and taught the means of arguing for timely and efficacious positions in a démocratie setting.

32. I discuss nomos in the work of Protagoras in chapter two of Rereading the Sophists, fortheoming from Southern Illinois University Press.

33. George A. Kennedy's translation in Rosamund Kent Sprague, ed., The Older Sophists (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 60.

34. Ibid., p. 53. 35. Ibid., p. 52. 36. Ibid., p. 46. 37. Charles P. Segai, "Gorgias and thè Psychology of thè Logos," Harvard

Studies in Classical Philology, 66 (1962): 108. 38. John Poulakos, "Gorgias' Encomium to Helen and the Défense of Rhetoric,"

Rhetorica, 1 (1983): 13. 39. Segai, pp. 106-08. 40. De Romilly, p. 16. 41. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in Philoso-

phy and Truth. Sélections from Nietzsche' s Notebooks ofthe early 1870's, trans, and éd. Daniel Breazeale (New York: Humanities Press, 1979).

42. Sprague, p. 23. 43. Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, "Gorgias, Aeschylus, and Apate" American Jour-

nal of Philology ·, 76 (1955): 225-60. 44. Sprague, p. 52. 45. C. Jan Swearingen, "Literate Rhetors and their Illiterate Audiences: The

Orality of Early Literacy," PRE/TEXT, 7 (1986): 149. 46. Ostwald, p. 26. 47. Ibid., p. 85. 48. Ibid., p. 37-38. 49. Ibid., p. 20. 50. Danieli, pp. 181-93. 51. Charles H. Kahn, "The Origins of Social Contract Theory in the Fifth Cen-

tury B.C.," in The Sophists and their Legacy: Proceedings of the Fourth Interna- tional Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy, éd. G. S. Kerferd (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), p. 92.