The Rules of the Game

February 17-19, 2009

PS 426

How to elect our leaders?How to elect our leaders?

Seems simple enough: select the candidate preferred by Seems simple enough: select the candidate preferred by the most voters.the most voters.

Easy enough with two candidates: one wins, one loses, Easy enough with two candidates: one wins, one loses, and there are only two ways to order preferences.and there are only two ways to order preferences.

Gets messy with three or more candidates:Gets messy with three or more candidates:– Possible to win with less than a majority (indeed, possible to win Possible to win with less than a majority (indeed, possible to win

with 1/3 of the vote +1), or possible that the winner is disliked by with 1/3 of the vote +1), or possible that the winner is disliked by a sizeable majoritiesa sizeable majorities

– How to reflect intensity of preferences?How to reflect intensity of preferences?– ““cycling” phenomenon, when no outcome is universally preferred cycling” phenomenon, when no outcome is universally preferred

to othersto others Outcomes depend on process: therefore, in most cases, Outcomes depend on process: therefore, in most cases,

how how we elect our leaders may determine we elect our leaders may determine whowho is elected. is elected.

How the votes are counted

Basic approaches:– Plurality (most votes wins), – proportional (allocate representation based on % of votes

received), – Majority runoff systems (winner must have majority of the votes).

More complex systems– Cumulative voting – get to show intensity by clumping multiple

votes for one candidate.– Borda counts – like balloting for the AP basketball poll or MVP.– Instant Runoff voting – cast ranked votes for all candidates, if

nobody has a majority, drop the last place candidate and reallocate his/her votes to the remaining candidates.

– Approval Voting – one vote for every acceptable candidate.

Ranking Preferences with 3 or More CandidatesRanking Preferences with 3 or More Candidates

Normally think of choices in binary terms: we either Normally think of choices in binary terms: we either choose A or B, vote yes or no, prefer one candidate choose A or B, vote yes or no, prefer one candidate over the other. What happens when there are 3 or over the other. What happens when there are 3 or more options?more options?– What decision rule to we use?What decision rule to we use?– What if, in opting for our first choice, we wind up What if, in opting for our first choice, we wind up

with the least preferred option?with the least preferred option?

2006 AL-MVP and 1992 pres. election:2006 AL-MVP and 1992 pres. election:– Morneau, 15-1Morneau, 15-1stst, 8-2, 8-2ndnd, 3-3, 3-3rdrd, 2-4, 2-4thth, 320 points (14 , 320 points (14

for 1for 1stst, 9 for 2, 9 for 2ndnd, 8 for 3, 8 for 3rdrd, 7 for 4, 7 for 4thth, etc.), etc.)– Jeter, 12-1Jeter, 12-1stst, 14-2, 14-2ndnd, 1-4, 1-4thth, 1-6, 1-6thth, 302 points, 302 points– Who would win the 1992 presidential election Who would win the 1992 presidential election

with MVP-style, Borda count voting?with MVP-style, Borda count voting?

2000 Presidential election2000 Presidential election

Preference rankings with 3 candidates in 2000 Preference rankings with 3 candidates in 2000 (hypothetical, but likely). Why are Bush and Gore (hypothetical, but likely). Why are Bush and Gore reversed and Nader at 5% rather than 3%?reversed and Nader at 5% rather than 3%?

In straight-up popular vote with everyone voting In straight-up popular vote with everyone voting sincerely, Bush wins, 48-47-5; also Bush won the sincerely, Bush wins, 48-47-5; also Bush won the electoral college 271-266 (1 abstained).electoral college 271-266 (1 abstained).

How would the election have turned out with How would the election have turned out with alternative vote-counting rules?alternative vote-counting rules?

48%48% 47%47% 5%5%

BushBush GoreGore NaderNader

GoreGore NaderNader GoreGore

NaderNader BushBush BushBush

2000 Presidential Election, cont.2000 Presidential Election, cont.

Gores wins under all alternatives:Gores wins under all alternatives:– If Nader is not on the ballot, Gore wins 52-48 If Nader is not on the ballot, Gore wins 52-48

(assuming Nader voters still vote)(assuming Nader voters still vote)..– If there were a runoff election or instant runoff If there were a runoff election or instant runoff

voting, Gore wins 52-48.voting, Gore wins 52-48.– With approval voting, Gore wins with 100 votes, With approval voting, Gore wins with 100 votes,

Nader comes in 2Nader comes in 2ndnd, with 52 votes, Bush finishes , with 52 votes, Bush finishes third, with 48 votes.third, with 48 votes.

– Borda count (3,2,1 scoring), Gore gets 247 (47x3, Borda count (3,2,1 scoring), Gore gets 247 (47x3, 5x2, 48x2), Bush gets 196 (48x3, 47x1, 5x1), and 5x2, 48x2), Bush gets 196 (48x3, 47x1, 5x1), and Nader gets 157 (5x3, 48x1, 47x2). (cumulative Nader gets 157 (5x3, 48x1, 47x2). (cumulative voting can’t be determined).voting can’t be determined).

Example of Majority VoteExample of Majority Vote

Special election in California’s 50Special election in California’s 50thth Congressional Congressional district, to replace Randy “Duke” Cunningham in 2006district, to replace Randy “Duke” Cunningham in 2006

Process:Process:– 11stst round, a “jungle primary” in which all candidates round, a “jungle primary” in which all candidates

from all parties run. If one candidate receives more from all parties run. If one candidate receives more than 50% of vote, she or he wins. If not, the top than 50% of vote, she or he wins. If not, the top candidate from each party face each other in a candidate from each party face each other in a runoff.runoff.

– Generally considered a Republican districtGenerally considered a Republican district– 18 candidates ran: 14 Republicans, 2 Democrats, 1 18 candidates ran: 14 Republicans, 2 Democrats, 1

Libertarian, and 1 IndependentLibertarian, and 1 Independent

ResultsResults

First Round (138,000 votes):First Round (138,000 votes): Francine Busby (Dem)Francine Busby (Dem) 43.7 %43.7 % Brian Bilbray (Rep)Brian Bilbray (Rep) 15.3 %15.3 % Eric Roach (Rep)Eric Roach (Rep) 14.5 %14.5 %

Second Round (134,000 votes):Second Round (134,000 votes): Brian Bilbray (R)Brian Bilbray (R) 49.5 %49.5 % Francine Busby (D)Francine Busby (D) 45.3 %45.3 %

Bottom line – all methods have their Bottom line – all methods have their advantages and disadvantages. Australia advantages and disadvantages. Australia example of instant runoff voting.example of instant runoff voting.

Other factors

Ballot design – infamous “butterfly ballot” in Florida. Who gets to be first? Party column vs. office block. Straight ticket option?

Voting technology: ATM-style machines (paper trail or not), optical scan, punch card, paper ballots, lever. Controversy over Diebold machines and lack of a paper trail. Legislation proposed in Congress to require a paper trail. However, it is easy to hack in and steal votes. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JESZiLpBLE

Human error: Franken/Coleman recount.http://minnesota.publicradio.org/features/

2008/11/19_challenged_ballots/

Butterfly ballot

Example: Florida 13th, 2006

Combination of ballot design and voting technology. 13th Congressional District election in Florida between Democrat Christine Jennings and Republican Vern Buchanan --- in which some 18,000 votes disappeared on Sarasota County's paperless touch-screen machines in a race decided by just 369 votes. Undervote of nearly 14%, compared to 2.4% in same election in counties not using the ATM-style machines. Ballot design? Probably not.

Redistricting

Criteria for redistricting: population equality and race come first and then compactness, contiguity, partisan bias, protect incumbents, geographic boundaries, and respect for existing communities (split municipalities).

redistricting process – state legislatures, the courts, and non-partisan commissions. What data can be used?

Racial Redistricting

the 1965 Voting Rights Act: access to vote. Mississippi redistricting. The right to a “meaningful vote.” Then Mobile v. Bolden (1980) – intent to discriminate, not effect.

The 1982 VRA Amendments reversed the Mobile decision. Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), three-prong test for vote dilution.

The 1992 redistricting process: maximize the number of minority-majority districts.

Racial redistricting, cont.

Shaw v. Reno (1993) and progeny. Race cannot be the predominant factor (Miller v. Johnson, 1996). The question of legal standing and its implications for these cases.

Status of racial redistricting today. Easley v. Cromartie (2001). 2002 round – tension between VRA and Shaw. Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003). LULAC v. Perry (2006).

Ashcroft overturned in 2006 in the VRA extension. Racial representation may also be affected by at-large

versus single-member districts. partisan redistricting. Historical examples. Veith v.

Jubelirer (2004). LULAC again.

• The 1992 North Carolina House The 1992 North Carolina House Plan:Plan:

Texas’s mid-decade redistricting – carving up Democratic districts.

Money in congressional elections

How much money? Campaign finance law

– FECA of 1974, Buckley v. Valeo. – Soft money, PACs, independent expenditures,

candidate expenditures, leadership PACs.– McCain/Feingold. Upheld by the Supreme Court in

McConnell v. FEC (2003). New loophole – 527 groups.

Money and influencing the legislative process. Untangling the causal web.