the sand table volume 1 / issue 2 december 17 · pdf filethe heaviest fighting in 2014 and...

THE SAND TABLE VOLUME 1 / ISSUE 2 DECEMBER 17

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COMMANDER’S NOTES There are several features in this month’s issue of The Sand Table that I’d like to highlight.

The first is our focus on the Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG). At the tactical level, this unit’s

combined arms task organization, particularly if outfitted with the most modernized equipment, is a

potent force on the battlefield. This formation proved its capabilities in the Ukraine, particularly during

the heaviest fighting in 2014 and 2015. Of particular significance is the high ratio of fires to maneuver

assets, in some cases at a 1:1 ratio. Additionally, the Russians demonstrated proficiency at integrating

unmanned systems along with signals intelligence and electronic warfare to enhance their targeting and

sensor-to-shooter capabilities. It is likely that their task organization and tactics will be emulated by

future adversaries. At the high end of conflict, we must be prepared to face this combined arms

capability.

Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS) is another focus area. As this emerging technology continues to

revolutionize the commercial sector and is leveraged by forces around the world to enhance

intelligence, fires, communications, and logistics, in the Corps we are fielding a family of systems aimed

at enhancing capabilities at the small unit level. We put a spotlight on some of these capabilities in this

issue and will continue to focus on this dynamic technology and associated tactics in future issues.

I encourage all readers to view the “Slaughterbots” video that is available on YouTube.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw. This video developed by Silicon Valley

organizations highlights the revolutionary capability inherent in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and SUAS. This

has the potential to revolutionize the battlefield and will be used by our adversaries in an attempt to

gain a tactical advantage. At MCTOG, we are placing more and more emphasis on understanding the

developments in the field of SUAS, CUAS, Tactical Tablets, C2 applications, and the future role of AI as

they pertain to the Ground Combat Element and our tactical battlespace.

As a spotlight on professional reading, we’ve included a selection of some of the best readings on Urban

Operations. Given the likelihood that we will fight in ever more complex urban landscapes, it is

incumbent upon every Marine to study what is arguably the most challenging terrain in which to fight.

Semper fidelis, Col Tim Barrick, CO, MCTOG

Cover Photos

TOS-1: wikimedia.org, Vitaliy Ragulin

Osprey: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Richard A. Tetreau

Mantis i45 Gimbal: AV AeroVironment, www.avinc.com

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) ............................................................................................................... 3

OPORD Phasing Construct ............................................................................................................................ 7

File Naming Conventions .............................................................................................................................. 8

Naming the Regiments: RCT vs RLT .............................................................................................................. 9

Small Unit Remote Scouting System ........................................................................................................... 10

RQ-20A/B Puma .......................................................................................................................................... 11

MCTOG’s SPARTAN Exercises...................................................................................................................... 12

URBAN READINGS ....................................................................................................................................... 12

MCTOG Air Assault Wargame Report

Go to the MCTOG Community of Interest Sharepoint Portal to

read about the results from MCTOG's Future GCE Wargame

Series which is designed to inform future organization, training

and equipping of the GCE. The most recent report is from

September and describes the results of our July Air Assault

Wargame.

https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/msc/magtftc/mctog/gcec

oi/Future_GCE_Wargames/Forms/AllItems.aspx

Note: Use your email certificate on your CAC card for access.

https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/msc/magtftc/mctog/gcecoi/Future_GCE_Wargames/Forms/AllItems.aspx

https://vcepub.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/msc/magtftc/mctog/gcecoi/Future_GCE_Wargames/Forms/AllItems.aspx


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ince 2014, the Russian Battalion Tactical

Group (BTG) has solidified its role in the

Russian Army, particularly with those

units stationed in the western portions of the

country. Initial reporting from early 2016

indicated Russian desires to build toward a goal

of 100+ operational BTGs by 2018. The success

of Russian forces in the Ukraine and the

flexibility provided by the BTG construct make it

increasingly likely that other countries, to

include potential adversaries, will mimic these

efforts. Tacticians, both operations and

intelligence focused, will be well served to

maintain awareness of the BTG construct and

its potential employment in future conflict

scenarios.

The BTG came to the forefront during the

military conflict in Ukraine beginning in 2014.

To date the true nature and full capabilities of

the BTG have not been observed due to Russian

deception efforts, the nature of the conflict in

Ukraine, and the on-going efforts of the Russian

military to codify BTG doctrine. In using

unclassified source material from combat

reporting, various capabilities are employed to

task organize the BTG to include: UAS, artillery,

armor, reconnaissance, and air defense.

Additionally, the Russian military forces are

adept at incorporating Information Operations

(IO) and Electronic Warfare (EW) to generate

desired effects against both adversary forces

and the local populace. Moreover, Russian

military forces are capitalizing on the Ukrainian

conflict to field and test emerging concepts to

include their ability to conduct lethal targeting

facilitated by EW and UAS.

The BTG model is adaptive, capable of

semi-independent combined arms operations,

but also capable of integrating into a larger

force structure. The BTG can be task organized

to support different mission sets in varying

types of environments. There is an armor

variant - capable of heavy combat operations, a

mechanized variant – highly mobile and capable

of medium combat operations, and an airborne

variant – capable of long-range insertion and

light combat operations. The MCTOG BTG

model is also adept at integrating with irregular

forces, private military contractors (PMCs),

special forces, and strategic military assets

(Rockets, SRBMs, and CBRN). In addition to

combined arms, the BTG model organically

possesses electronic warfare (EW), intelligence

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and

information related capabilities (IRCs).

The BTG model is constructed around a

battalion echelon, however the type/variant of

the battalion is dependent upon the required

mission set. With this in mind the BTG

construct operates in one of three types:

Mechanized, Airborne, and Armor. Mechanized

and Airborne BTGs are built around an infantry

battalion whereas, the Armor BTG is built

around a tank battalion. Each BTG, regardless of

the variant, possesses an organic lift capability

(trucks), air defense, reconnaissance, engineer,

S

The Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) The Russian Battalion Tactical Group is a versatile and potent combined arms organization capable of

effects across multiple domains. Future adversaries will see it as a successful task organization to

emulate. By GySgt Olson, MCTOG Intel Instructor Maj P.J. Tremblay, MCTOG Adversary Force OIC, Emerging Concepts Div OIC

Threat Tactics & Capabilities


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and rear-area support element. Additionally,

the BTG construct incorporates the following:

• Mortars, manpads, snipers, anti-tank

weapons, and small unmanned aerial

systems organic to the companies.

Common attachments include tanks, fire

support (such as the TOS-1 or BM-21),

additional air defense artillery, and

electronic warfare elements.

• Russian BTGs are manned by an all-

volunteer force (contracted, not

conscripted) that train as a combined

arms unit.

The Mechanized BTG can field a number of

different vehicle types, but typically only fields

one type at a time rather than an assortment.

This eases the logistic strain by reducing the

number of parts required to maintain the force.

The mechanized BTG can be equipped with the

following mechanized vehicles: BTR-80 (APC),

BMP-3 (IFV), and the new T-15 (IFV). Artillery

support is provided by the 2S1 (122mm self-

propelled howitzer) but can be reinforced with

other assets.

(Figure 1: BTG Mechanized Variant)

The Airborne BTG is very similar to the

mechanized BTG, but it fields the air-droppable

BMD-3 (IFV) as its mechanized vehicle.

Additionally, the Airborne BTG’s artillery comes

in the form of the air-droppable 2S9

combination gun (self-propelled

mortar/howitzer).


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(Figure 2: BTG Airborne Variant)

Due to the vast number of Russian tank variants

and efforts to modernize the tank fleet and

develop new tanks, the Armor BTG has been

observed to operate with a mix of tank

platforms. The Armor BTG model can field a

combination of T-72B3, T-90, and the new T-14

tanks. Additionally, armor assets attached to

support other BTG variants have been observed

with a mixture of the three platforms. The BTG

model is a living construct that can be changed

to meet the evolving demands of the future

operating environment.

In order to develop a challenging and

realistic training adversary, MCTOG selected the

Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) as the most

capable threat. The baseline adversary

(structure, organization, and equipment) were

developed from unclassified sources so

personnel and units can familiarize themselves

with the threat model at their home station

prior to the start of planning during training

exercises. This ensures staffs develop an

adequate understanding of the adversary to

support detailed mission planning in time

compressed environments. During MCTOG’s

SPARTAN exercises, the BTG model is employed

by a free thinking enemy who mimics Russian

doctrine and tactics as they relate to the BTG.

This not only forces Marines to face a peer

threat, but one that also adapts to the changing

conditions of the battlefield. The MCTOG BTG

model is a peer threat with the capability to

fight across the five domains, employ hybrid

forces, and exploit an urban operating

environment.

For design of the BTG contact GySgt Ryan J

Olson at [email protected]. For employment

considerations contact Maj Paul D Tremblay at

[email protected].

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


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(Figure 3: BTG Armor Variant)

Sources:

1. Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook; Asymmetric Warfare Group 2. ATO and JMTG-U Lessons Learned from the Ukrainian 1st Battalion 24th Mechanized Brigade; Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine,

USAREUR Inspector General, USAREUR G2X, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Asymmetric Warfare Group, 66th Theater Intelligence Brigade

3. Threat Tactics Report: Russia; TRADOC G-2 ACE Threats 4. Russia’s Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric-and Putin-Led; Timothy Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office 5. Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Personal Observations; Dr Phillip A. Karber 6. Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare; Maria Snegovaya, Institute for the Study of War 7. The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, a Case Study; Jolanta Darczewska 8. Assessing Russian Hybrid Warfare: A successful tool for limited war; Small Wars Journal, Amos C. Fox, and Andrew J. Rossow 9. Russia’s “Weaponization” of Information; Helle C. Dale 10. Russia and the Menace of Unreality: How Vladimir Putin is revolutionizing information warfare; Kara Gordon/The Atlantic 11. “Maskirovka” is Russian Secret War: Sneaky tactics are an old Russian Tradition 12. MCIA Tactics Update: Russia Volume 1; Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 13. Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military; Timothy L. Thomas 14. Country Handbook; Russia, MCIA 15. FM100-2-1 The Soviet Army Operations & Tactics 16. FM100-2-2 The Soviet Army Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support 17. FM100-2-3 The Soviet Army Troops organization & Equipment 18. FM100-60 19. https://russiandefpolicy.blog/tag/btg/

https://russiandefpolicy.blog/tag/btg/


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either Marine Corps nor Joint doctrine specifies a standardized phasing hierarchy at the tactical level, leading to a lack of logical nesting of tactical plans

at higher and subordinate echelons. This lack of nesting frequently goes unnoticed until transition or execution, resulting in confusion. Background: A phase is a definitive stage or period during an operation in which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.1 Phases are

distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural progression. Each phase should have a set of starting conditions that define the start of the phase and ending conditions that define the end of the phase. The ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement

Solution: The following recommendations help nest the subordinate unit’s phasing with higher headquarters:

Commanders identify key tasks or events in Problem Framing during the Orientation and Initial Intent

Commanders identify the phasing of key events in their COA Development guidance

The planning team identifies the phasing method to the commander during the Rough

Cut COA brief, and describes how it nests with higher headquarters phasing method

Subordinate echelons must ensure their phasing method is nested with higher headquarters prior to COA refinement or risk misalignment of mutually supporting activities in time, space, and purpose.

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OPORD Phasing Construct MCTOG observes multiple regiment and battalion units plan and execute each year, and commonly

observes units not nesting their phasing with that of higher headquarters. This error is usually

identified during a transition drill, challenging the subordinate unit's ability to reorganize its activities to

better align with higher and adjacent units. This causes internal friction that could be mitigated by

adhering to a standard phasing hierarchy no later than the rough cut COA.

PROBLEM: Subordinate units whose

phasing hierarchy is misaligned with

the HHQ phasing model creates internal

friction driving units to reorganize their

activities resulting in wasted time,

resources, tempo and opportunities.

Figure 1: MCTOG’s recommended phasing hierarchy

By LtCol John Price Van Cleve MCTOG Maneuver Div OIC

Best Practice


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roblem Statement: How can battalion and regimental staffs apply file naming conventions to rapidly locate information

in a way that supports commander’s decision-making? Background: The forward in the Marine Corps Techniques Publication MCTP 3-30B, Information Management, states that "technology improvements have led to more effective command and control capabilities; yet, overly complex information processes have left warfighters with new challenges." One such challenge Marines encounter during the processing of information is the challenge of effectively using standard file naming conventions, which leads to version control

issues, lost planning time, and degraded shared situational awareness. A file naming convention is essentially a policy that consists of a set of rules for naming files. While file naming may seem like an insignificant detail, developing intuitive, descriptive file naming rules can help minimize file access and management challenges. Developing a standard file naming convention improves a person's ability to quickly find and understand. FILE NAMING CONVENTIONS File naming policies consist of a set of file naming rules that drive user actions with what a file contains. As stated in MCDP-6 “effective command and control is concerned with getting the right information to the right person at the right time, information management is crucial."

Figure 1: Benefits of File naming Conventions

FILE NAMING CONVENTION EXAMPLE: Formatting recommendation: ORG_FILENAME_YYYYMMDD_VER_CLASS Unit: V16 Title: F739 is abbreviation for Frago # Context: ACM, air contingency MAGTF Date: 24 Feb 2018 Version: DRAFT or FINAL FRAGO: V16_F739_ACM_20180224_DRAFT_U.doc

OVERLAY: V16_F316_CONOP_PART1_20180224_FINAL.ovl

LOI: V16_SD1-18_Brief_20180224_FINAL_S-REL.ppt

P

File Naming Conventions When properly implemented, good information management practices enable Marines to leverage information

systems much like weapons systems are leveraged when properly used in the conduct of warfare. As an

organization designed to fight and win wars, the Marine Corps recognizes the importance of IM to decision-

making.

Improve Information

Sharing

Improves Content

Identification & Retrieval

Improves Content

Organization

Improves Accessibility

EnablesCollaboration

File Naming Conventions

By Major Mike D’Eredita MCTOG Battle Staff Training Lead

Best Practice


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he newly signed MCWP 3-10 MAGTF

Ground Operations publication

(announcement message and link to final

product is pending) eliminates Regimental

Combat Team (RCT) in favor of Regimental

Landing Team (RLT) to better align with how the

GCE labels task organized units at the regiment

and below. The new MCWP 3-10 (page 1-12)

establishes a simplified method and definitions

for naming task organized ground units that

places the emphasis on the Marine Corps’

expeditionary and naval character.

The GCE uses four basic terms to organize itself

- regimental, battalion, and company landing

teams, and task forces. In general, the first

three are built around an infantry core, and are

reinforced and organized as necessary for the

mission. The last serves as a catch-all for any

temporary grouping of units under one

commander, though it is generally intended for

ground combat task organizations built around

a core other than infantry units, such as armor

or combat engineers.

Finally, while there is a Marine Corps order

establishing what a BLT consists of for service

with a Marine Expeditionary Unit, the new

MCWP 3-10 deliberately avoids dictating any

other organizational structure, placing the

needs of the mission and commander at the

center of task organization decisions.

This new, simplified, nomenclature exists to

support how the GCE task organizes,

underscores its expeditionary nature, and

eliminates unneeded changes in unit naming

based solely off mission or conditions.

T

The GCE uses four basic terms to

organize itself:

Regimental Landing Team

Battalion Landing Team

Company Landing Team

Task Force

Naming the Regiments: RCT vs RLT The new MCWP 3-10 MAGTF Ground Operations explains how the GCE labels task organized units at the

regiment and below.

By Mr. Scott Kinner, LtCol (Ret) USMC MCTOG Doctrine Lead

Doctrine Update


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he Marine Corps family of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is comprised of unmanned aircraft (UA) ranging from

Group 1 to Group 3 in accordance with the joint UA categories. SURSS (Small Unit Remote Scouting System) contains a collection of Group 1 SUAS and is composed of the RQ-20A/B Puma, RQ-11B Raven, and RQ-12A Wasp IV. The purpose of these systems is to collaboratively provide day and night, all-environment, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) at the squad, platoon, company, and battalion levels. The current approved acquisition objective (AAO) for SURSS consists of 145 RQ-12A Wasp, 185 RQ-11B Raven, and 95 RQ-20A/B Puma systems (does not include SkyRanger, InstantEye, or PD-100 which are non-program of record) for a total of 425 systems. See Table 1 to the right for the GCE’s allocation across battalions and regiments. Marine Corps Force 2025 projections show an increase to over 850 systems. However, this projection may change

in the near future as the decision may be made for Wasp and Raven systems to decrease for replacement by quadcopters/vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) platforms that are currently non-program of record. Technological upgrades in progress for the RQ-20A/B Puma include high definition electro-optical/infra-red (EO/IR) and signals intelligence (SIGINT)/electronic support (ES) sensors. Table 1. SURSS Approved Acquisition Objectives for GCE Units

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Small Unit Remote Scouting System The upgraded RQ-20A/B Puma sensor capabilities now available to GCE units provide day and night, all-

environment reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition. By Major Chris Perry MCTOG UAS Instructor


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RQ-20A/B Puma The RQ-20A/B Puma is the largest and most capable platform in SURSS. During FY 18, the Mantis i45 Gimbal payload will be fielded, significantly increasing the targeting capabilities of the system. In the future, the Silent Echo 10.6 payload will be fielded (currently still in development). Without further modifications, the Puma can only mount one payload at a time, requiring a choice between the Mantis and Silent Echo payloads depending on operational requirements. The Mantis i45 payload provides ultra-high resolution electro-optical/infra-red (EO/IR) sensors with a high definition option for video downlink, an 860nm laser pointer, and water proof capability. The payload’s zoom is 7x greater than the original EO/IR sensors which will enable increased standoff from targets and the ability to be visually and audibly undetected. Limitations: Current payload limitations result in the conduct of flight operations at lower altitudes so that targets can be accurately identified. In theater, flight at lower altitudes provides opportunity for effective enemy small arms fire that has prevented mission completion. High definition imagery and increased zoom capability provided by the Mantis i45 Gimbal payload will enable the conduct of targeting at higher altitudes, thereby reducing the effectiveness of enemy small arms fire. Once fielded, the Silent Echo 10.6 payload will provide a signals intelligence capability at the battalion and company level. The payload will enable the intercept of handheld radio emissions and the user to receive feedback from the sensor on a graphical user interface.

Mantis i45 Gimbal Payload

Source: AeroVironment, Inc


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SPARTAN FURY 1-18: 31 Jan 9 Feb 2018

SPARTAN FURY 2-18: 18-27 Apr 2018

SPARTAN FURY 3-18: 15-24 Oct 2018

SPARTAN FURY

partan Fury is a MCTOG facilitated,

simulation driven, free-play force-on-

force Command Post Exercise (CPX)

conducted in conjunction with the Tactical

MAGTF Integration Course (TMIC). The Spartan

Fury scenario takes place in the European

Theater of Operations (ETO) and includes

mechanized urban assault and river crossing

operations supported by multi-domain

combined arms against a modern, hybrid, peer

threat in a prepared urban defense with CBRN

capability. The Spartan Fury training

methodology pairs a Regimental Landing Team

(RLT) comprised of three TMIC student

battalions with an adjacent RLT comprised of

Battle Staff Training (BST) units from across the

GCE, with MCTOG faculty serving as the higher

headquarters for the student battalions and the

BST regiment. The current Spartan Fury

Exercise construct can accommodate up to one

BST Infantry Regiment, one BST Artillery

Battalion, one BST Tank Battalion, one BST LAR

Battalion, and three BST infantry battalions.

BST units participate in the exercise from Camp

Wilson while TMIC students participate aboard

the MCTOG compound on the main side of

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center

(MCAGCC). The exercise includes five to six

days of planning and two to three days of

execution. For regiments, a two week Planning

Exercise (PLANEX) is required at least 45 days

in advance of the CPX. Future exercise design

initiatives include expanding this BST

opportunity for recon and up to an artillery

regiment as well as FVEY coalition partners.

S

MCTOG’s SPARTAN Exercises


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SPARTAN DAWN 1-18: 12-21 Feb 2018

SPARTAN DAWN 2-18: 30 Apr – 9 May 2018

SPARTAN DAWN 3-18: 3-12 Oct 2018

SPARTAN DAWN

partan Dawn is a MCTOG facilitated,

simulation driven, free-play force-on-

force Command Post Exercise conducted

in conjunction with the Tactical MAGTF

Integration Course (TMIC). The Spartan Dawn

scenario takes place in the Pacific Theater of

Operations (PTO) and includes combined joint

forcible entry (airborne, air assault, and surface

assault) operations against a modern near peer

threat in a prepared coastal defense including

complex, integrated beach obstacles with CBRN

capability. The Spartan Dawn training

methodology pairs an air assault RLT, comprised

of three BST battalions from across the GCE,

with a surface assault RLT, comprised of three

TMIC student battalions, with MCTOG faculty

serving as the higher headquarters for the

student battalions and the BST regiment. The

current Spartan Fury Exercise construct can

accommodate up to one BST Infantry Regiment,

three BST infantry battalions, and one BST

artillery battalion. The exercise includes five to

six days of planning and two days of execution.

For regiments, a two week Planning Exercise

(PLANEX) is required at least 45 days in

advance of the CPX. Future exercise design

initiatives include adding a surface assault

option for the BST regiment and including BST

opportunities for Army airborne units and FVEY

coalition partners

S The current SPARTAN DAWN Exercise

construct can accommodate up to

one BST Infantry Regiment, three BST

Infantry battalions, and one BST

Artillery Battalion.


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City Fights: selected histories of Urban Combat

from World War II to Vietnam edited by John

Antal and Bradley Gericke

City Fights is a collection of urban operations

case studies written by active duty members,

veterans, and civilian analysts, examining the

nuances and intricacies of urban operations.

The book investigates several different aspects

of urban conflict; from snipers and rockets, to

tunnels and tanks; offering the reader several

lessons for future urban operations.

Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad

to Iraq by Louis A. DiMarco

Concrete Hell provides a study of the realities of

urban warfare, of what it means to seize and

hold a city block by block. The author

investigates modern urban battles describing

the successes and failures of each, forcing the

reader to consider what tactics, equipment, and

skills will be necessary to succeed in future

urban operations.

READINGS ON URBAN OPERATIONS MCTOG recommends these readings to GCE leaders preparing and training units for Urban Operations


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Fighting in the Streets: A Manual of Urban

Guerilla Warfare by Urbano

Fighting in the Streets provides a

comprehensive look at how to wage guerilla

warfare in an urban environment, describing

proven tactics and techniques from worldwide

examples. Readers are provided an in-depth

look at how potential future adversaries, armed

with less sophisticated military resources, can

and will fight in the urban environment.

Hue 1968: A turning point of the American War

in Vietnam by Mark Bowden

Hue 1968 is a multi-perspective, all-

encompassing historical study on the Battle of

Hue. The author narrates each stage of the

battle using multiple viewpoints, providing the

reader with a “front-row” seat to the fighting

which took place. The book goes well beyond

the typical historical narrative, keeping the

reader engaged throughout and providing a

deeper understanding to this historical and

pivotal battle.


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Managing Complexity During Military Urban

Operations by Russell W. Glenn

This study offers a practical way in which

military planners can begin to understand and

identify the important aspects of an urban

environment. Going beyond highlighting the

myriad of challenges faced in an urban

environment, the author introduces the use of

critical points and density. He offers that the

use of these principles will help planners

overcome the complexity of the urban

battlespace and aid in the allocation of a unit’s

scarce resources.

Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban

Operations by Sean J. A. Edwards

Mars Unmasked is a collection of three case

studies, examining urban operations in Panama,

Somalia, and Chechnya. The author places a

spotlight on the political factors that will affect

operations in an urban environment to include

the media, non-combatants, rules of

engagement, and information operations. The

reader is able to gain a stronger appreciation

for the complexity of fighting in an urban

environment by going beyond a street by street

replay of the battles.

.


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Modern Urban Operations: Lessons Learned

from Urban Operations from 1980 to the

Present by the Asymmetric Warfare Group

This study was written to prepare units for

urban operations in Iraq by capturing best

practices and lessons learned from modern

urban battles from 1980 to early 2000.

Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the

Urban Guerilla by David Kilcullen

Out of the Mountains argues that future conflict

will likely occur is sprawling urban areas along

the coast, in slum settlements, and in highly

connected, electronically networked areas. This

book examines what future conflicts and future

cities look like, as well as the challenges and

opportunities that will arise due to the upward

trend of populations, urbanization, coastal

settlement, and global connectedness. The

author provides the reader with an in-depth

look at future urban environments and the

military implications associated with it.

Feedback

We welcome your comments on what

you’ve read in this issue of The Sand

Table. Contact the Senior Editor:

MCTOG XO, LtCol David O’Brien,

[email protected]

the sand table volume 1 / issue 2 december 17 · pdf filethe heaviest fighting in 2014 and...

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