the scope of hermeneutics in natural science

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Home> Philosophy> 1997 After Postmodernism Conference> Heelan (background)

After Post-Modernism: The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science

Patrick A. Heelan*

Philosophy Department

Georgetown University

Washington, D.20057

[email protected]

Section: Science, Logic, Mathematics, Well Formulated Theories, Empirical Research

Copyright: based on forthcoming article in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (Cambridge)

ABSTRACT

Hermeneutics or interpretation is concerned with the generation, transmission,

and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld and was the original method of

the human sciences stemming from F. chleiermacher and !. "ilthey.

Hermeneutic philosophy refers mostly to #. Heidegger$s. %his paper addresses

natural science from the perspecti&e of Heidegger$s analysis of meaning and

interpretation. 'ts purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those

aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are a(sent from the traditionalanalysis of theory and e)planation, to re*orient the current discussion a(out

scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and

to esta(lish some relationship (etween the current philosophy of natural science

and hermeneutical philosophy. %he paper has particular rele&ance to the history

and social studies of science and technology.

+Patric A. Heelan is the !illiam A. -aston Professor of Philosophy at

-eorgetown ni&ersity. He was formerly a research physicist in high energy

physics and seismology.

Introduction

%he title of Heisen(erg$s momentous paper of 19/0 that presented uantum

mechanics to the world was $A(out the uantum theoretical re*interpretation of

inematical and mechanical relationships$ 2Heisen(erg 19/03. %he title reflected

Heisen(erg$s &iew that uantum mechanics was not a new solution within the old

mechanics, (ut a new mechanics that was sensiti&e to the intrinsic dependence of

uantum o(4ects on measurement interactions and where measuring instruments,

unlie the uantum o(4ects they measure, followed $classical physics$ rather than

the new uantum physics. %his, he said, was a re-interpretationinspired (y the

way 5instein in 1960 sol&ed the orent8 and Fit8gerald pro(lem of apparent

length contraction and apparent time dilation (y the apparently simple e)pedient

of re*interpreting the character of space and time, taing the apparentlengths

and inter&als to (e the reallengths and inter&als.213 ' am not going to defend

Heisen(erg$s or 5instein$s notion of interpretation, (ut to e)plore at a

philosophical le&el the sense in which interpretation is at wor in all of physics

and other e)perimental science, and to contri(ute to opening up a new

philosophical**and metaphysical** perspecti&e on physics that was possi(ly

foreshadowed (y 5instein and Heisen(erg in their attempt to mae sense of their

disco&eries.2/3

Interpretation--alternati&ely, hermeneutics--(elongs to the method and thining

of those other sciences, the human sciences, among which are to (e counted

history, classics, philology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, sociology,

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(i(lical theology, 4urisprudence, and philosophy. #ost of these sciences ha&e

di&ersified o&er time, (ut ' mean them insofar as they ha&e retained their original

focus on cultural meaning and its transmission, rather than on physics$

e)planation, prediction, and control. 'n 5urope the human sciences ha&e always

(een as re&ered as the natural sciences and were included in any listing of the

sciences in -erman, they were 'Geisteswissenschaften,$ in French, 'les sciences

humaines.$ %his descri(es a tradition of scholarship oriented towards the $space$

of shared and transmitted meanings within the conte)t of the social historicallifeworld, its characteristic method (eing that of the 2so*called3 hermeneutical

circle 2or spiral3 with multiple foci, 1. on the disco&ery, articulation, and

fulfillment of meaning in the lifeworld, /. on the historical transmission of

meaning, and :. on the transformation of meaning under the historical conditions

of its transmission.2:3 ' aim to loo at the natural sciences from the philosophical

way of thining originally de&eloped to support the human sciences.

%he hermeneuticorientation is contrasted with the explanatorytradition which in

the 5nglish*speaing world is simply called $science.$ 5)planatory method aims at

the construction of a mathematical model comprising measura(le 2theoretical3

&aria(les, to (e accepted or re4ected (y reason of its a(ility under la(oratory

circumstances to predict and control the causal outcomes of assigned initial

conditions. uch is in general the methodological profile of the natural sciences.

;ot that the human sciences ha&e to (e e)clusi&ely interpretati&e, nor the natural

sciences e)clusi&ely e)planatory. 'n fact, during the past fifty years, the human

sciences ha&e taen a strong turn towards the e)planatory orientation under the

name of $empirical$ or $cliometric$ social sciences, though with disappointing

accomplishment on the whole in relation to predicti&e power. As for the natural

sciences, the search for an inherent cultural meaning has come predominantly

2(ut not e)clusi&ely3 from outside the sciences, in particular from religiousinterests looing for traces of di&ine action in the world, large and small.

'n recent years, howe&er, scholars ha&e (egun to use (oth hermeneutic and

empirical social science methods to study the actual and historical profiles of

acti&ity of communities of scientific researchers.


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laid out (y the (est scholarship in the empirical social and historical sciences.273

%he story they tell a(out the natural sciences can hardly (e reconciled with the

no(le ideals of nowledge and reality stemming from the philosophical tradition

4ust mentioned. !hence comes an em(arrassing dilemma either natural science

is not worth the name of 'knowledge' and deserves no more than to be called

'useful opinion,' or the philosophical analysis of knowledge and reality needs to be

revisited and reviewed.

' suppose that most philosophers of science thin they will e&entually find a way

out of this dilemma that preser&es for the natural and other theoreticDempirical

sciences a pri&ileged epistemological and ontological status. #uch of the

enormous cultural prestige of natural science in modern societies has come from

its Faustian powers, (ut e&en more deri&es from the no(le** perhaps, mythic**

(elief that science helps us to see ;ature, perhaps as -od sees it, in a way

unmi)ed with human error, construction, or superstition. 'f the dilemma can (e

resol&ed, it surely will (e done with the (rilliance of the talent a&aila(le.

#y goal, howe&er, in this paper is to re&isit and re&iew the natural sciences from

the perspecti&e of hermeneutic philosophy in order to get a clearer or at least adifferent assessment of the status of theoretical e)planatory nowledge and its

relation to the lifeworld, and possi(ly also to get some sense of how the current

logical empiricist and the hermeneutic traditions relate to one another with

respect to the short term e)planatory goals of science and the long term goals of

nowledge.

Eust as the philosophy of science has its own fundamental literary corpus, so

interpretati&e or hermeneutical philosophy has its own (asic corpus. %his

comprises wors (y F. chleiermacher, 5. Husserl, #. Heidegger, !. "ilthey, #.

#erleau*Ponty, H.*-. -adamer, P. @icoeur, and only in part, their structuralist,post*structuralist, and critical theoretic successors who remain strongly tied to

the empiricDtheoretical tradition.23 %he principal author used in this essay is

Heidegger. ' include a woring (i(liography here (ecause Heidegger is not often

found cited in the philosophy of science.293 %hough these writers may (e

relati&ely unfamiliar to philosophers of physics, their approach and concerns ha&e

long (een the (usiness of the human sciences. %hey ha&e, howe&er, recently

(ecome rele&ant to the philosophy of science (ecause of the dilemma mentioned

a(o&e.

cientific nowledge, lie all e)pert nowledge, is a domain of common meaning

that finds fulfillment in the e)perience of local communities of researchers sharing

a common scientific culture. =nowledge such as this is transmitted synchronically

from local community to local community and also diachronically in the historical

chain of transmission and reception. !hat is transmitted is not** to use E.

"ewey$s term** a museum piece, (ut the product of human understanding in

action, re*creating and re*constructing meanings from the sources of meaning

that are transmitted. %his process is called $interpretation,$ and out of it, a certain

di&ersity of understanding is ine&ita(le among different local e)pert communities

and, of course, among different generations of researchers.

%urning in particular to historical transmission, what is handed on (y pastresearchers to their successors is not always what is recei&ed (y these

successors, for changes occur (oth in the transmission of common meanings and

in the cultural matri) in which the recei&ed meanings find fulfillment. !e


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scientists are today -alileans in a way in which -alileo himself was not a -alilean.

' am not referring to episodic 2say, =uhnian3 paradigm shifts, (ut to the general

conditions under which any tradition of nowledge is historically transmitted.2163

;ot only do such changes occur, (ut they must occur in any chain of nowledge

transmission, let alone in any progressi&e research program. %he interpretati&e

character of science shows itself then historically in two ways 213 in the way the

meaning-fieldof the lifeworld is continually (eing refined, replaced, or

transformed (y scientific theori8ing **an enterprise that is easily misconstrued ifthe role of interpretation is misunderstood and 2/3 in the way meaning-

fulfillmentin the lifeworld changes as the lifeworld is transformed (y a succession

of new technological pra)es 2among them, a&aila(le instrumentation3 em(odying

new or re&ised scientific theories.


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II. Interpretation and meaning

Human understanding functions (y interpretationand its product is meaning.

#eaning is nothing physical it is not a te)t, a (eha&ior, a neural networ, a

computation, not e&en a sign or a medium, nor any relationship among things,

though all of these may (e generated (y and producti&e of meaning. ;or is it a

pri&ate $domain$ accessi(le only (y some ind of introspection. @ather meaning is

a pu(lic $domain$ where people share the products of human understanding first

(y common ha(its of action 2in which di&erse networs are recogni8ed3 and then

through the use of language and language*lie media. #eaning is the $domain$ in

which people understand one another, argue with one another, gi&e reasons,

esta(lish goals, set up norms, define inds, etc.** more or less effecti&ely

according to the purpose, intelligence, language sills, and education of the

parties in&ol&ed. #eaning is historical (ecause language is constituti&e of history

it is also deeply affected (y human temporality213 and historical forgetfulness

(ecause the communityDlifeworld milieu in which it is transmitted has gains and

losses o&er time it is local and social, (ecause it is the product of acti&e local

interests and social communities and constituti&e of their interests it is then

neither once*and*for*all fi)ed, nor e&er perfect and unchanging. Finally, thoughsu(4ect to change under transmission, it is not on this account de&oid of truth,

rather is meaning the instrument through which truthfulness maes its

appearance in the lifeworld.

III. Scientific traditions or the historical transmission of scientific meanings

#eaning, howe&er, is articulated and transmitted only through the medium of

language, actions, and other pu(lic e)pressi&e signs. %hese ser&e as the $conduit$

for meaning, (ut do not constitute meaning, for meaning is not a transporta(le

su(stance lie (rics or water. #eanimg has to (e re*created from its transmitted

sources (y readers of the recei&ing community and there is no guarantee that the

meaning deri&ed from these sources (y readers from one community will (e the

same as the meaning deri&ed from the same resources (y readers from a

different community separated from the first (y history and cultural en&ironment.

As historians of science well now, this is as true for natural science as it is for

literature and politics.

#eanings are adopted from traditions of interpretation, or constructed or

re*constructed in eeping with the responsi(ilities, constraints, and presumptions

of rational hermeneutical method 2see (elow3.2103


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to (e used for scientific research communities** (ut no one use or $ownership$

need go unchallenged either (y logic or (y e)perience nor should any one use

(ecome the sole property of 4ust one interested group.2193

Howe&er, it is not the case that anything goes. @ational hermeneutic inuiry

acnowledges the e)istence of traditions of interpretationthat gi&e today$s

readers and inuirers a culturally pri&ileged &ersion of past sources, shaped

always to the goals of the linguistic and cultural en&ironment of the communitywith special $ownership$ rights in the su(4ect matter.2/63 !ithin the sciences such

traditions of interpretation appro)imate to what =uhn called $paradigms.$

'n addition to meanings construed on the (asis of a common tradition of

interpretation 2with its presumption of historical continuity3, legitimacy can (e

gained (y other meanings independently of any presumption that there e)ists a

historical continuity of meaning with the source through a common tradition of

life, action, and interpretation. uch discontinuities of meaningwithin the

sciences are at the heart of what =uhn called $re&olutions$ in which old

$paradigms$ are replaced (y new ones.2/13 'n the wor of hermeneutics,

howe&er, a radically new meaning need not e)pel the old, (ecause each, thoughdifferent, may (e a &alid historical and cultural perspecti&e. 'ndeed, despite some

sense of discomfort, we often find in the sciences the old flourishing side (y side

with the radically new, uantum mechanics with ;ewtonian mechanics, statistical

thermodynamics with phenomenological thermodynamics** though with respect

to their formal models they are mutually incompati(le** and so on. 5ach acting

within its own hori8on of research purposes is in dialogue with rele&ant data

through its own empirical processes of testing and measurement.

%he appropriate philosophical approach to the method or process of interpretation

is the $hermeneutical circle 2or spiral3.$ ?riefly, following Heidegger 2Heidegger199B, 106*1013, any inuiry is initiated (y the (readown of a tas and (egins (y

calling on the deep structure of pre*theoretical pre*categorial understanding2//3

of ?eing which is found in the lifeworld 2orhabe3. Heidegger$s name for the

human inuirer is $Da-sein$ Da-seinis $e)istence,$ the em(odied understanding of

?eing, a $there*ness$ 2Da3 in the domain of ?eing 2!ein3.2/:3 'nuiry is awaened

when Da-seinposes a directed uestion 2orsicht3 which, lie all directed

uestions, already implicitly contains an outline of a search and disco&ery

strategy aiming at unco&ering a solution. %he uestion so construed in this case is

not yet in an articulated form only later will it achie&e an adeuate e)pression in

2what philosophers of science call3 an $e)planation.$ %here follows an acti&edialogue (etween orsichtand orhabe, accompanied (y actions seeing practical

fulfillment in the awareness that the sought*for understanding 2die!ache selbst3

has presented itself and made itself manifest to the inuirer 2orgriff3. 'f on first

trial the sought*for understanding is a(sent, something ne&ertheless has (een

learnt, and the search resumes, dipping again into the a&aila(le resources of

orhabe, orsichtand orgriff. %his hermeneutical circle of inuiry is repeated

until a solution presents itself within a new cultural pra)is in the lifeworld.


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possi(ly elsewhere at an earlier time. %his is the method of the hermeneutical

circle "or spiral#. 'nterpretati&e wor of this ind is clearly historical, cultural, and

anthropological, multidisciplinary in character and in need of a philosophical

foundation which hermeneutical philosophy tries to pro&ide. 'n this wor lies the

significance and power of hermeneutic method and hermeneutic philosophy for

the history and philosophy of science. And not 4ust for these, (ut also for

understanding how uantitati&e empirical methods gi&e meaning to empirical

contents, how theory*laden data depend on the pu(lic self*presentation of themeasured entity as a pu(lic cultural entity and, in particular, how measurement

euipment plays a dou(le role creating and refining (oth theoretical and cultural

meanings. %hese are topics that will (e addressed (elow.

IV. The furniture of the lifeworld

%he lifeworld has a furniture that comprises those physical and em(odied cultural

o(4ects, (oth $natural,$ lie trees, and $cultural,$ lie institutions or technologies,

which ha&e names or descriptions in the language among them are perceptual

o(4ects. All of these are 2to use Heidegger$s term3 onticbeings.

V. Hermeneutics of theory-ladenness: theoretical understanding as explanation

ince in the age*old tradition going (ac to Aristotle the characteristic goal of all

scientific or scholarly inuiry is theoretical understanding, it is important to

understand what theory does in modern science. A theory e)plains why some

e&ent occurs 2or does not occur3 (y pro&iding a model of the causes or conditions

that control its occurrence 2or non*occurrence3 its goal is e)perimental prediction

and control. Alternati&ely, a theory may e)plain a lawful regularity among

empirical e&ents (y pro&iding a model of the causes or conditions that, if fulfilled,

necessitate the lawful regularity among these e&ents.

%o pro(e what is implied (y this meaning of theory, ' follow Heidegger 2199B,

:07*:B3. He (egins with a (roen hammer and a construction pro4ect. A

hammer is a tool used in a construction pro4ect a worer generally does not as

what a hammer is until (y (ad luc he has to find a replacement for it or a

su(stitute.


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and anti-realismis often confused a(out what is percei&ed to (e at stae in

theoretical scientific research.

VI. Measurement and data

%hese conclusions ha&e important conseuences for understanding measurement,

since they illuminate the (inary &alence of empirical $facts,$ something not gi&en

(y the usual empiricist accounts.2/93 %he process of measurement in science

fulfills two different (ut coordinated functions. 't presents the ob$ect-as-measurable, this is the pra)is*laden cultural function. And it taes the data

from the presented o(4ect, this is the theory*laden data-takingfunction.2:63

%hese are the (inary &alences of scientific data. %he data*taing is usually called

$o(ser&ation$ (ut there is no o(ser&ation without the prior preparation and

presentation of the o(4ect*as*measura(le.2:13 A well*defined measuring process

does (oth 4o(s, presenting the o(4ect and recording the data. %hese in&ol&e two

different epistemological perspecti&es, a pra)is*laden cultural one 2which (elongs

to the strategy of e)perimental culture in la(oratory en&ironments3 and a

theory*laden 2or e)planatory3 one. %hese two perspecti&es can and should (e

logically, semantically, and pragmatically distinguished 2see Heidegger, 199B,:0*:093. et us consider what these two perspecti&es re&eal a(out the

measuring process, scientific entities, and data.

Consider the theory*laden perspecti&e.2:/3 ince it is the function of theory to

o&ersee the e)perimental design what will do the 4o( of presenting the o(4ect*

as*measura(leG %he ontic referent of theory as such is the measuring process

&iewed from the construction or engineering or technical point of &iew. %hin of

the theory of the hammer in relation to the cultural pra)is of hammering !ithin

the life of science, theory refers directly to the internal structure of the

2particularly measurement*presenting3 processes (y means of which $theoretical

entities$ enter the pu(lic cultural domain of science where they then pro&ide data

to o(ser&ers. %his leads to a first conclusion& what is formally theory-laden is

experimental design.

'n the pra)is*laden cultural perspecti&e, the presentation of the o(4ect*

as*measura(le is a pu(lic cultural e&ent pra)is*laden in the scientific culture of

the la(oratory, deri&ing meaning not from the o(ser&ation e&ent itself (ut from a

research program. %he o(4ect*as*measura(le is recogni8a(le as such (ecause it

comes $dressed$ in sensi(le $clothes$ pro&ided (y the e)perimental strategies

used. !hether such $clothes$ render the scientific entities percepti(le will (e

discussed (elow. %his leads to a second conclusion& observation events shouldnot be called semantically 'theory-laden'-- this appellation should be reserved for

experimental design2::3-- but rather semantically praxis-laden like all dedicated

or designated cultural ob$ects of the lifeworld presented as fulfilling experience.

%he meaning of data is also (i&alent and, lie the meaning of a hammer, su(4ect

to am(iguity. "ata (elong hypotheticallyto the theoretical perspecti&e of

measurement (ut affirmativelyto the cultural perspecti&e of the lifeworld forum

of scientific research strategy the research $narrati&es$ that @ouse2:3 speas

a(out would (elong here. %his is the special en&ironment of the e)pert researcher

and, though pu(lic, is usually closed to the understanding and e)perience of theordinary citi8en. o*called $theoretical entities,$ such as, for e)ample, electrons

and electron-data, are theory*laden (ut, for the reasons gi&en a(o&e, they cannot

(e said to e)ist as such unless locata(le in a pu(lic forum, the primary pu(lic

forum (eing that of an e)perimental scientific research program where as pu(lic


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cultural entities they are e)plicitly pra)is*laden with respect to some standard

configuration2s3 of la(oratory euipment. %hough the theory of electrons may

change, it is ne&er the case that what we call $an electron$ fails to ha&e an in

principle relationship to contingent local practical cultural milieus.

VII. Theoretical entities as cultural entities

'n addition to the pu(lic forum of scientific research, there are other pu(lic fora

within which indi&idual $theoretical entities$ and the data a(out them can (ecomecultural entities.2:03 %hese are, for e)ample, pu(lic fora featuring technology,

finance, political power, religion, art, media, and so on. All of these** lie the

scientific research forum itself** are local fora in which a scientific entity, usually

in some technological conte)t, can play the role of a dedicated cultural resource

2for the life of finance, politics, religion, art, media, etc3 and (y this means

(ecome part of the local furniture of the lifeworld. For e)ample, choosing

tele&ision as one such local technological forum, then, electrons** or, at least,

electron*(eams** can (e designated e&en to children and others unlettered in

physics as cultural entities in that forum (ecause of their role in $painting$ the %

picture. 'n all such local fora, the scientific entity and its data are meaningfully(i&alent and emulate the relationship (etween theory and pra)is in the study of a

hammer. @emo&ed from all such local fora the putati&e $data$ are not data at

all2:B3 since they do not mae manifest in the lifeworld the presence of anything

(ut $themsel&es$** (ut of $themsel&es,$ ha&ing no determinate lifeworld meaning,

they are 4ust noise.

!hen new theory*(ased technologies are added to the lifeworld, theoretical

scientific terms can (e introduced into e&eryday descripti&e language with new

non*theoretical cultural meanings. For instance, temperatureas a cultural entity

is endowed with non*theoretical, practical lifeworld meanings which can (e used

to create, designate, employ, and control new classes of euipment, for e)ample,

thermostats, in the lifeworld. !ith the help of these new resources, the old

cultural en&ironment can (e changed, perhaps, in re&olutionary ways. Pu(lic

space, for e)ample, was re&olutioni8ed in renaissance 'taly in the uattrocento

prior to the Copernican re&olution and the de&elopment of modern science when

it came to (e su(4ected to uni&ersal measurement, and to analysis according to

the principles of the newly disco&ered mathematical perspecti&e. 't was

transformed (y this process, from a manifold with di&erse local geometries into

one with a single measurement*(ased 5uclidean geometry. For those who looed

for a unified cosmology, the way was prepared for -alileo and the Copernican

re&olution.2:73

%he second e)ample is from medicine and illustrates how the (i&alence of

scientific descriptions can create new moral perple)ities in the lifeworld.

"udon2:3 ass, is the term $foetus,$ merely a scientific redescription of the

lifeworld entity, a (a(yG


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increasingly in the current practice in the !estG


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#oreo&er, in the search to e)plain the explicandum, the theori8ing process soon

disco&ers the e)tent to which the cultural function of the explicandumcan (e

transferred to different artifacts from the indi&idual e)emplars originally studied.

An old (oot can on occasion do the wor of a hammer %his leads to the following

2surprisingG3 conclusion what makes this or any individual hammer to be a

hammer--or what makes this or any individual thing in human experience to be

what it is perceived to be-- is not a defining permanent essence but a set of

contextual properties any one of which can be found in, or retro-fitted for, avariety of different physical hosts.

%he truth a(out things in the lifeworld then is not a classical conformity (etween

a mental representation and the o(4ect represented (ut a property of comple)

meanings with local and historical uses.263 %he meanings we entertain a(out

things are disclosed (y pra)es that are implicitly theory*laden. %hese meanings

are not permanent (ut historical, local, and changing. %hey are local, (ecause

e)pert communities of use are e)clusi&e. %hey are changing (ecause, it happens

that, when the particular theory*ladenness of the pra)es (ecomes e)plicit, new,

(etter or, at least, different, pra)es can often (e engineered with a conseuent

transformation of cultural meaning. 't can happen, say, that some old (oots

function as hammers, or that hammers e&entually disappear entirely in a world of

plastics and high tech. uch a spiral of meaning change turns endlessly within the

historicality of ?eing 2see Heidegger, 199B, 93 as such tri&ial e)amples show.

uch a process of theory*dri&en cultural change (rings new historical perspecti&es

into play and through forgetfulness ine&ita(ly puts old ones out of play. %he (ig

mistae of modernity was to commit itself to a classical static conformity notion

of truth that could only (e retained (y supposing that scientific theory could (e

separated logically or ontologically from temporality and culture. %his is what

hermeneutic reflection shows to (e contrary to e)perience.213

IX. Scientific technologies

Heidegger feared that, to the e)tent that scientific inuiry is successful in the

construction of e)planatory theories, it would turn the focus of philosophical

inuiry away from $meditati&e thining$ a(out the lifeworld as the cultural arena

for human life fulfillment, that is, away from meaning and meaning change, and

toward 2what Aristotle called3 $calculati&e thining$ ordained toward management

and control in the latter, things are treated as means to ends within Gestell, the

assumed $o(4ecti&e$ frame of $o(4ecti&e reality$ 2Heidegger, 19B, pp. :*:0 19BB,

p. B3.

;o minimi8ing is intended, howe&er, of the great (enefits that can and do flow

from the $calculati&e thining$ of scientific inuiry. ;e&ertheless, Heidegger

foresaw that such (enefits could ha&e a human cost, for they affect the way

cultural life teaches people to (e human and communicates to them the sense of

the wholeness, integrity, and goodness of the world, the self, and human

communities. %his is "udon$s point 2in the e)ample cited a(o&e3 in uestioning

the implication of using the scientific term $foetus$ e)clusi&ely in place of the older

maternally related &oca(ulary. Changing the traditional &ehicles for the

transmission of these core meanings ine&ita(ly changes how people regard

themsel&es, their personal destinies, their neigh(ors, and the world around, withconseuent riss of cultural insta(ility in all these areas.2/3

X. 'Theoretical entities' as perceptual entities


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't was argued a(o&e that $theoretical scientific entities$ are pu(lic cultural entities.

Among the latter are perceptual entities. 's it possi(le that some $theoretical

entities$ are also perceptual entitiesG

#uch depends on what perceptual o(4ects are taen to (e. 'n the empiricist

tradition perceptual o(4ects are e)plained as organi8ations of sensations, and

from this position it can (e argued that sensations recei&ed from a measuring

instrument can only (e ingredients of the scientist$s perception of the statechange of the instrument, and not of the $theoretical entity$ that caused that

change. 'n a more de&eloped &ersion of empiricism, an argument is sometimes

made for the partial o(ser&a(ility of the $theoretical entity$.2:3 %his whole line of

thining deri&es from a theory or model of perception** one incidentally that has

little supporting e&idence** and when applied to the perceptual o(4ect itself as a

cultural phenomenon, it maes no sense at all. %he perceptual o(4ect is the

explicandumand should not (e confused with the empiricist explicans.23

;e&ertheless, the empiricist theory of perception e)ercises an influence far

(eyond its weight in discussions a(out the ontological status of $theoretical

entities.$

!hat then are perceptual o(4ects as phenomena in the lifeworldG A (rief setch of

an answer would go something lie this they are su(stanti&e indi&idually

locali8ed cultural o(4ects in the lifeworld, presented to local human percei&ers in

sensory e)perience, and understood (y the character, multiplicity, and

systematicity of their sensory presentations or profiles.203 -i&en that 2on the

(asis of the argment already made3 a scientific $theoretical entity,$ say, an

electron, is a su(stanti&e cultural entity in the lifeworld, we as can it ha&e the

appearance of a perceptual o(4ectG %he answer ' ga&e in an earlier wor is Ies

and this answer still holds.2B3 et me re&isit the uestion (riefly.

'n section '', ' referred to the historical influence in the uattrocentoof two

technologies, distance measurement and mathematical perspecti&e, on pu(lic

space transforming it from a di&ersity of local and mostly non*5uclidean pu(lic

spaces to one uni&ersal 5uclidean pu(lic space. uch technologies as those

mentioned a(o&e ' called $reada(le technologies,$ (ecause they made it possi(le

to mae and mar en&ironmental cues that ena(led the learning of 5uclidean

&ision. 'n general, reada(le technologies are technologies capa(le of transforming

perception.273 ome la(oratory measurement de&ices when standardi8ed ha&e

the capacity of presenting a cultural entity, such as, for e)ample, an electron or a

molecule, as locali8ed in the lifeworld and as $clothed$ with systematic sensoryprofiles that can (e taen in conte)t as an electron$s recogni8a(le signature. uch

technologies are readable technologiesand confer percepta(ility on the scientific

entity in uestion.

XI. Contextual Logic and Bivalent and Multivalent meanings

%ools, such as, for e)ample, hammers, and practically e&erything else in the

lifeworld including $theoretical entities$ ha&e multi&alent meanings. ?y $multi&ant

meanings,$ ' mean, a minimum of two synchronic meanings in different,

coordinated (ut not isomorphic, perspecti&es that are descripti&e of a pu(lic

cultural entity. uch perspecti&al multi&alence raises the further uestion Arethere articulate logically reasona(le conditions 2within the pur&iew of

hermeneutical philosophy3 that would gi&e coherence to such perspecti&esG

%he answer ' ga&e in an earlier wor is still fundamentally the one ' would gi&e


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today though with some correcti&e glosses.23 %he core of the solution is that

the two complementary perspecti&al languages** theory*laden and pra)is*laden**

must (e partially ordered (y statement inclusion within a complemented

non*distri(uti&e lattice 2or context logic3.293

XII.The scope of hermeneutical philosophy for the philosophy of science

%he hermeneutic turn in the philosophy of science is necessary to study aspects

of science for which the traditional philosophy of science is not well euipped.%hese are the dynamic, narrati&e, historical, and lifeworld aspects of science. 'n

this light the traditional philosophy of science appears to (e a &ersion aimed at

fulfilling the cultural goal of supporting theoretical research with a strong interest

in management and control, and as a philosophy it is cropped of much of its

(acground in human life and history that is rele&ant for (roader and longer term

issues.2063

From what has (een said, the following are among the pro4ects and themes that

hermeneutic philosophy of natural science can fruitfully address and in some

cases has already (egun to address.

1. !cientific discovery, or how traditions begin, needs to (e studied in indi&idual

e)emplary cases, such as -alileo$s telescopic o(ser&ations of enus or

Heisen(erg$s uantum mechanical e)planation of the hydrogen atom. %he

appropriate philosophical approach and method is that of the $hermeneutical

circle$ as setched a(o&e

/. (eaning persistence or changeneeds to (e studied in the process of

transmission of a scientific tradition under ordinary and e)traordinary conditions

of di&erse and changing cultural and theoretical interests.2013

:. %he role of metaphor20/3 needs to (e studied metaphor is as fundamental for

the hermeneutical perspecti&e as literality is for traditional philosophies of

science. ince theory is mathematical and the lifeworld is empirical, it maes no

sense to predicate a(stract and mathematical theoretical properties literally of the

lifeworld at (est, the two come together in some unam(iguous way in a &ariety

of authoritati&e conte)ts each comprised of e)perts, guided (y 2what Aristotle

called3 $phronesis,$ and conscious that they are seeing a consensus a(out a set

of rele&ant solu(le issues. Among these authoritati&e conte)ts the scientific

discipline has a certain pri&ilege of $ownership$ it might (e called the $producer

ownership,$ others in contrast (eing $user ownership,$ though the notions of$intellectual ownership$ and $use$ as they relate to science is a matter that is not

to (e resol&ed here.


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ten*dimensional spaces, and -od$s #ind$s 5ye on ;ature ha&e all helped to shape

scientific theories. ;or is it possi(le to come to understand, say, modern physics

or (iology, without passing through stages of metaphor in the learning process.

As in the search for theory, so in its application, theoretical instruments apply to

real situations in socially negotiated ways, using metaphors.

0. )ow scientific traditions end needs to (e studied from the hermeneutic

perspecti&e. =uhn and others argue that the a(andonment of a tradition is notsimply a function of ha&ing failed the challenge of anomalies, (ut of a decision of

those who principally $own$ the tradition to mae the tradition &ulnera(le to

challenges. @esistance to such a mo&e is strong, (ecause what eeps a tradition

ali&e is usually some transcendental good it offers or some hope (eyond the

particular useful solutions it has generated. %hat good could (e mythic or

aesthetic. A mythic good is religious in nature, connected with the notion of

theory as a sharing in di&ine or transcendental nowledge203 this is the

spiritual good that -alileo, ;ewton, and 5instein sought in their science.

Alternati&ely, it could (e an aesthetic good lie the styles of art, music, and

cuisine that is connected with the fulfillment of human em(odied acti&ity in the

world this is a good associated more with la(oratory &irtuosity than with

disem(odied spirituality2003 one thins of some great e)perimenters, a Pasteur

or a Fermi, in this connection.

B. )ow myth as a grand narrative, understood as normative, metaphorical, and

metaphysical,20B3 operates in the transmission of scientific traditions needs to (e

studied in particular cases. For e)ample, the historical -alileo and today$s

physicists share something associated with the term $-alilean,$ (ut today$s

physicists are $-alilean$ more in a mythic than a historical sense.

7. !hile we do not as of a philosophy that it contri(ute to the successful practiceof science, science ne&ertheless continually throws up philosophical uestions

that di&ide the scientific community and constrain or limit its energies in a world

of finite resources. A sur&ey of recent literature2073 suggests that many currently

frustrating and contentious topics should (e looed at through the optic of

hermeneutical philosophy. ome of these are epistemological or metaphysical

framewor topics, such as, for e)ample, realism, relativism, constructivism, truth,

ob$ectivity, causality,purpose, and history, and some are issues that call for

liaison with the lifeworld, such as, for e)ample, space, locali*ation, time,measurement, data, explanation, macroscopicand microscopic, elementary

particles, multivalence of scientific claims, indeterminacy, and the paradoxes ofuantum physics.203

. ince theory*(ased technologies can change the lifeworld and the range of

possi(le meanings a&aila(le to human life and action, hermeneutical philosophy

should as in what way does a changing lifeworld change the playing field for

science, old or new+

9. cience also throws up epistemological uestions regarding interdisciplinary

studies of science communities of historians, philosophers, sociologists, cultural

anthropologists, etc. are deeply trou(led (y their ina(ility to communicate well

among themsel&es.2093 A common platform in a hermeneutic philosophy ofscience might ease this situation (y disclosing the different agendas and different

fundamental resources 2in te)ts, technologies, cultural ha(its, etc.3 that define

these disciplines in relation to the differing perspecti&es they engage in a


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postmodern lifeworld.

16. An important focus of interest for hermeneutical philosophy is the empirical

social, cogniti&e, psychological, neuro(iological, and medical sciences, where a

profusion of theoretical models &ie with each other and conflict with the way

people understand themsel&es in their own cultural practices.2B63

11.


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Feleppa, @. 21913 KHermeneutic interpretation and scientific truth,K hil. !oc. !ci., 11, 0:*B:.

Feyera(end, P. 21973 9arewell to 4eason2ondon erso3.

Fiumara, -. C. 219903 %he (etaphoric rocess& /onnections between 5anguage and 5ife2ondon and ;ew Ior @outledge3.

F4elland, @. 219913 K%he %heory*ladenness of


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JJJJJJJJ 21993 K-alileo, uther, and the Hermeneutics of ;atural cience,K in %. tapleton 2ed3, %he 0uestion of

)ermeneutics& 9estschrift for


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;elin, ". 2199B3 K!hat are the science wars all a(outGK /hronicle of )igher 2ducation, Euly /B, p. A0/, and ept. B, pp.

?B*7.

;icles, %. 219903 KPhilosophy of cience and History of cience,K siris, 10, /onstructing 3nowledge in the )istory of

!cience, 1:9*1B:.


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0.ee, for e)ample, the wor of ?. ?arnes, ". ?loor, H. Collins, #. Eaco(, ?.

atour, A. Picering, and . hapin, as well as the monumental wor of Crom(ie

21993.

B.Among the scholars in this field to whom ' implicitly refer in this paper are ;.

Cartwright, '. Hacing, #. Hesse, =. Popper, H. Putnam, !. Luine, !. ellars,

&an Fraassen, and E. Miman.

7.ee, for e)ample, how Cartwright 219:3 and 5arman 2199/3 address some of

these uestions.

.For an o&er&iew of the tradition see, for e)ample, ?leicher 2196, 19/3,

Heelan 219:aD193, =ocelmans 2199:3. %he -erman tradition is co&ered

#ueller*ollmer 21993 which contains (rief (i(liographies. ome of the (asic

wors of the authors mentioned are listed among the references.

9.Among the many e)cellent commentaries on Heidegger and the hermeneutic

tradition are ?ernasconi 2199:3, ?ucley 2199/3, "reyfus 219913, -rondin 2199,

19903, -uignon 219:3, -urwitsch 219BB3, =isiel 2199:3, =ocelmans 2190,199:3, #ueller*ollmer 21993,


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/.%he socio*cultural meaning then is not something that can (e dropped, lie

slag from ore when a metal is refined, (ut essential to the intelligi(ility of the

meaning. For an understanding of cultural meaning, see -eert8 2197:, 19:3.

/9.5mpiricist accounts of measurement are legion many of them ha&e purposes

that are not strictly philosophical (ut methodological. Philosophers of science

ha&e also written on measurement (ut mostly from the &iewpoint that empirical

measures are grounded in ideal, o(4ecti&e, in the short term uniue, and realistic&alues. For a hermeneutic &iew on measurementand data, see Heelan 2199a3.

For its (acground in Heidegger, see 2199B3, :07*:B.

:6.'n physics, these are sometimes called $preparation$ or $measurement of the

first ind$ and $o(ser&ation$ or $measurement of the second ind$ respecti&ely. ee

Heelan 219:aD193, chap. 11. and Heelan 219:(, 199a, 199/3.

:1.%his is a point also made (y Hacing 219:3 (ut from a different perspecti&e.

:/.!hat follows comes from a further e)ploration and correction of Hanson$s

Ktheory*ladenness,K and is also in part a critiue of F4elland 219913.

::.How this analysis applies to a $closed$ system, that is, one that is not

interacting with its en&ironment, needs further study. %he study of $closed$ and

$open$ systems within this conte)t in&ol&es also a study of the spaceDtime notions

of $(ody,$ e.g., a (ody$s $spatial (oundaries,$ its $si8e,$ $mass,$ $uantity,$ etc. and

how the notions of $macroscopic$ and $microscopic$ apply. ome of these ha&e

(een partially addressed in recent literature, e.g., see ;eedham 2199B3 and the

references he gi&es, (ut these studies are against a philosophical (acground that

is o(4ect* and concept*oriented. ;one of these analyses addresses satisfactorily

how the meaning of these terms relate to a (ody$s lifeworld engagement, say, in

measurement.

:.@ouse 2199B3, p. /7 and in chap. 9.

:0.For the notion of culture, cf. -eert8 2197:, 19:3.

:B.


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re&iew of the former in %he ew 4epublic, eptem(er 9 /:, 199B, $... progress

for QAmericansR means almost e)clusi&ely technological impro&ement ... ?ut all

the new tools a people master cannot assure their generous use. %echnology

tra&els a different road from political sta(ility, moral well*(eing or aesthetic

achie&ement...$ 2p. :3. ee also, "udon 2199:3, for a feminist perspecti&e. Also

Heelan 219:aD3, chap. 10.

:.uch as, for e)ample, made (y Fraassen 21963.

.%his confusion can arise from the common (ut mistaen conception that the

&alue of a theoretical &aria(le is to (e identified with the ideal or limiting &alue

o(tained (y e&er more precise measurements. uch a conception does not wor,

as =ant indicated, for any singular theoretical &alue must (e postulated a priori.

;either can it (e uniuely deri&ed inducti&ely from an empirical series. #oreo&er,

as the argument a(o&e shows, empirical data (elong to the domain of the

culturally manifested o(4ect 2the explicandum3 while the theoretical &alues (elong

to the mathematical model of the measurement process 2the explicans3.

0.For a more technical account, influenced (y -i(son 219793 and Husserl219D197:, 19763, of what constitutes a phenomenological perceptual entity,

see Heelan 219:aD19, 190, 19B, 197(3.

B.Heelan 219:aD19, 19B, 1997(3.

7.For the transformation of pu(lic space in renaissance 'taly, see Heelan

219:aD193, chap. B for other rele&ant comments, see chapter 11. Putting the

emphasis on the transformation of perception effected (y instruments, this

philosophy is $hori8onal realism$ putting the emphasis on the hermeneutical

character of the processes of disco&ery and recognition in physics, this philosophy

is $hermeneutical realism.$ ' ha&e used (oth designations. For the hermeneutic

aspect of e)perimentation, see Heelan 21970(, 19:aD19, 19:(, 199a,

199/3.

.ee Heelan 219:aD193, chaps. 16 and 1:, which is (ased on Heelan

219763. %he glosses would correct the interpretation of the language lattice in the

light of the more de&eloped doctrine of this paper. %he author intends to re&isit

this topic in another wor.

9.%he author has used conte)t logic to articulate the sense of complementarity

in the uantum theory. "ata in the empirical social sciences are also su(4ect tocomplementarity conditions, which suggests that theories of the uantum type

and conte)t logic might (e useful in the social science domain. ee Heelan 21990,

1997a3.

06.%his is the su(stance of Feyera(end$s critiue of the culture of science in

Feyera(end 21973.

01.%he recent history of science contains a wealth of material a&aila(le for this

study. Among recent pu(lications should (e noted the magisterial wor of

Crom(ie 21993.


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0:.ome (rief reflections on the limits of precision the chaos situation in physics

is an anti*Cartesian phenomenon that arises when the unlimited precision of a

theory in mapping inputs and outputs (reas down 2fails in relation to the cultural

scientific goal of control3, as when small changes in practice produce large and

uncontrolla(le outcomes. Perhaps, a lie anti*Cartesian phenomenon occurs in

dielectical discourse when unlimited clarity is pursued to a point where the o&erall

cultural point of the discourse 2(etter understandingG control o&er the discourseG3

is no longer attaina(le.

the scope of hermeneutics in natural science

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